@webpieces/http-routing 0.4.761 → 0.4.763

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/http-routing",
-  "version": "0.4.761",
+  "version": "0.4.763",
   "description": "Decorator-based routing with auto-wiring for WebPieces",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@inversifyjs/binding-decorators": "1.1.5",
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.761",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.761",
-    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.761",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.763",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.763",
+    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.763",
     "inversify": "7.10.4",
     "jsonwebtoken": "9.0.2",
     "minimatch": "10.0.1"

package/src/AuthHooks.d.ts

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export declare abstract class JwtHook {
     abstract parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;
     /**
      * DEFAULT authorization: enforce the endpoint's roles (any-of). Override to enforce app-defined
-     * requirements. Throw ForbiddenError to deny; return to allow. ASYNC so an app-defined
+     * requirements. Throw ApiForbiddenError to deny; return to allow. ASYNC so an app-defined
      * requirement can be answered from a datastore; see the class doc.
      */
     authorizeJwt(caller: AuthenticatedCaller, requirement: JwtRequirement): Promise<void>;
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ export declare const OIDC_HOOK: unique symbol;
 export declare abstract class WebhookAuthCallback {
     /**
      * Verify ONE inbound request. Return the {@link AuthenticatedCaller} the vendor's signature
-     * proved; throw {@link UnauthorizedError} to deny.
+     * proved; throw {@link ApiUnauthorizedError} to deny.
      *
      * IT RETURNS A CALLER, not `void`, for the same reason {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} does: once
      * the signature checks out, the payload's vendor account is a PROVEN fact, and a hook that could
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ export declare abstract class ApiKeyHook {
     /**
      * AUTHENTICATE one inbound request. Return who the caller is plus the {@link AuthenticatedCaller.entries}
      * the framework seeds into `RequestContext` via `putTrusted`, or throw
-     * {@link UnauthorizedError} to deny.
+     * {@link ApiUnauthorizedError} to deny.
      *
      * NOTE the seeded entries are TRUSTED context keys, so return only what THIS hook proved from the
      * credential it just verified. Anything the caller merely asserted on the wire is not admitted by

package/src/AuthHooks.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
 class JwtHook {
     /**
      * DEFAULT authorization: enforce the endpoint's roles (any-of). Override to enforce app-defined
-     * requirements. Throw ForbiddenError to deny; return to allow. ASYNC so an app-defined
+     * requirements. Throw ApiForbiddenError to deny; return to allow. ASYNC so an app-defined
      * requirement can be answered from a datastore; see the class doc.
      */
     async authorizeJwt(caller, requirement) {
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ class JwtHook {
         // `allRolesAllowed: true`, never "the field was missing" — that state no longer compiles.
         const roles = (0, core_util_1.rolesRequired)(requirement);
         if (roles.length > 0 && !roles.some((role) => caller.roles.includes(role))) {
-            throw new core_util_1.ForbiddenError(`Endpoint requires one of roles: ${roles.join(', ')}`);
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiForbiddenError(`Endpoint requires one of roles: ${roles.join(', ')}`);
         }
     }
 }

package/src/AuthHooks.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Its DI token is the {@link JWT_HOOK} Symbol injected via\n * `@inject(JWT_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses autobind; rebindable in tests). Bind one\n * to turn on `@WpAuthJwt({...})` endpoints. When NO JwtHook is bound, the framework\n * {@link AuthFilter} treats every jwt endpoint as \"not enabled\" and fails fast (401) — there is no\n * default JWT verification because it needs an app secret + payload shape the framework can't guess.\n *\n *  - `parseJwt`     — AUTHENTICATION: decode/verify a user JWT into {@link AuthenticatedCaller}, or throw. The\n *                     app owns the strategy (HS256 secret, RS256 + JWKS, a provider SDK, ...).\n *  - `authorizeJwt` — AUTHORIZATION: check the authenticated user against the endpoint's\n *                     {@link JwtRequirement}. The DEFAULT enforces the roles any-of; override for\n *                     app-defined requirements carried by the SAME decorator, e.g.\n *                     `@WpAuthJwt({allRolesAllowed: true, inOrg: true})` →\n *                     `if (requirement['inOrg'] && !values.claims['orgId']) ...`.\n *\n * BOTH ARE ASYNC, and both for the same reason: the strategy is the app's, and an app's strategy\n * reaches the network. `parseJwt` may fetch a JWKS or call a provider SDK; `authorizeJwt`'s own\n * motivating example — `@WpAuthJwt({allRolesAllowed: true, inOrg: true})` — is a membership question a\n * real app answers from a datastore. A sync signature makes both of those unwritable, and it made\n * `JwtHook` the last sync hook: {@link OidcHook.verifyOidc}, {@link WebhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook} and\n * {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} all return promises. An implementation that needs no I/O simply has\n * no `await` in its body — {@link DefaultJwtHook} is exactly that and pays nothing for it.\n */\nexport abstract class JwtHook {\n    /**\n     * Parse a user JWT (kind:'jwt') — AUTHENTICATION only. Return who the user is, or throw.\n     * ASYNC so an app can reach a JWKS endpoint or a provider SDK; see the class doc.\n     *\n     * IT TAKES THE TOKEN, NOT THE REQUEST — the one deliberate asymmetry among the four hooks, and\n     * NOT an oversight to be \"fixed\". {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} and\n     * {@link WebhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook} take the whole {@link HttpRequest} because their\n     * credential regime is the APP's: which headers carry an api key, and how a vendor signs, are\n     * things the framework cannot know. A user JWT is different — the framework owns the\n     * `Authorization: Bearer` scheme and has already extracted the token from it. Widening this to\n     * the request would only invite a JwtHook to authenticate off some OTHER header, which is a\n     * second, ungoverned credential path on the mode that guards browser traffic.\n     */\n    abstract parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n\n    /**\n     * DEFAULT authorization: enforce the endpoint's roles (any-of). Override to enforce app-defined\n     * requirements. Throw ForbiddenError to deny; return to allow. ASYNC so an app-defined\n     * requirement can be answered from a datastore; see the class doc.\n     */\n    async authorizeJwt(caller: AuthenticatedCaller, requirement: JwtRequirement): Promise<void> {\n        // rolesRequired is the ONE reader of the JwtRoles union: [] means the endpoint typed\n        // `allRolesAllowed: true`, never \"the field was missing\" — that state no longer compiles.\n        const roles = rolesRequired(requirement);\n        if (roles.length > 0 && !roles.some((role: string) => caller.roles.includes(role))) {\n            throw new ForbiddenError(`Endpoint requires one of roles: ${roles.join(', ')}`);\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link JwtHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The JwtHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const JWT_HOOK = Symbol.for('JwtHook');\n\n/**\n * OidcHook - the OPTIONAL override for Google OIDC service-to-service verification. Its DI token is the\n * {@link OIDC_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(OIDC_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses\n * autobind; rebindable in tests). Bind one ONLY to customize the caller policy — e.g. an app that reads an\n * `ALLOWED_OIDC_CALLERS` env var at its composition root and enforces that allow-list. When NO\n * OidcHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} runs the built-in {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n * directly, so a server that wires nothing still verifies Google OIDC against its `@WpAuthOidc(...callers)`\n * (else trusts the edge — any Google-signed caller). `verifyOidc` verifies the token against `callers`;\n * throw on failure.\n */\nexport abstract class OidcHook {\n    abstract verifyOidc(token: string, callers: string[]): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link OidcHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The OidcHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const OIDC_HOOK = Symbol.for('OidcHook');\n\n/**\n * WebhookAuthCallback - the OPTIONAL mechanism behind `@WpAuthWebhook(name)`: prove that an inbound request was\n * really authored by the outside vendor the contract names. Its DI token is the {@link WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK}\n * Symbol injected via `@inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses autobind;\n * rebindable in tests). The third hook, symmetric with {@link JwtHook} / {@link OidcHook}:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * // AppModule.ts, beside the CompanyJwtHook binding\n * options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(CompanyWebhookAuthCallback);\n * ```\n *\n * When NO WebhookAuthCallback is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `@WpAuthWebhook` endpoint,\n * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be\n * one: silently allowing an unverified webhook is the single default that must not exist, and the\n * framework ships no vendor crypto by design (see {@link WpAuthWebhook} for why reimplementing five\n * vendors' schemes is a losing trade).\n *\n * ONE hook serves EVERY vendor: `name` selects which, so an app with a Sentry hook and a Twilio hook\n * switches on it rather than binding a token per vendor. What arrives is enough of the raw request to\n * call the vendor's OWN validator — `request.raw.rawBody` for a body-signing vendor (Sentry, GitHub,\n * Stripe, Slack), `request.raw.absoluteUrl` for one that signs the url instead (Twilio).\n */\nexport abstract class WebhookAuthCallback {\n    /**\n     * Verify ONE inbound request. Return the {@link AuthenticatedCaller} the vendor's signature\n     * proved; throw {@link UnauthorizedError} to deny.\n     *\n     * IT RETURNS A CALLER, not `void`, for the same reason {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} does: once\n     * the signature checks out, the payload's vendor account is a PROVEN fact, and a hook that could\n     * only return `void` had no way to say so. The framework seeds `entries` with\n     * `RequestContext.putTrusted` exactly as it does for a jwt or api-key caller, so a controller\n     * reads which vendor account this webhook is for off the context instead of re-deriving it.\n     *\n     * Return only what THIS hook proved from the signature it just verified. `webhook` remains\n     * caller-NOT-verified (see `AuthFilter.verifiesCaller`): a vendor is not a peer service, so\n     * nothing the vendor merely ASSERTED on the wire is admitted.\n     *\n     * @param name    the string on the contract's `@WpAuthWebhook(name)` — which vendor this route is.\n     * @param request the transport-neutral request, narrowed to {@link RawHttpRequest}: `request.raw`\n     *                holds the verbatim bytes + absolute url and is PRESENT, never optional.\n     *                `@WpAuthWebhook` requires `@Endpoint(..., { rawBody: true })` at wiring time, and\n     *                AuthFilter 401s rather than calling this hook with nothing to check — so an\n     *                implementation never writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    abstract verifyWebhook(name: string, request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link WebhookAuthCallback} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The WebhookAuthCallback class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK = Symbol.for('WebhookAuthCallback');\n\n/**\n * ApiKeyHook - the OPTIONAL mechanism behind `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)`: authenticate a\n * CUSTOMER-held api key\n * against the app's own datastore and return the context to seed. Its DI token is the\n * {@link API_KEY_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(API_KEY_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container\n * uses autobind; rebindable in tests). The fourth hook, symmetric with {@link JwtHook} /\n * {@link OidcHook} / {@link WebhookAuthCallback}:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * // AppModule.ts, beside the CompanyJwtHook binding\n * options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(OneTabletApiKeyHook);\n * ```\n *\n * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `@WpAuthApiKey` endpoint,\n * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be\n * one: the key regime lives in the app's datastore, under the app's hashing scheme, behind the app's\n * choice of header names.\n *\n * THE ONE THING THIS HAS THAT `JwtHook.parseJwt` DOES NOT: it receives the whole {@link HttpRequest},\n * not one pre-extracted token. A real key regime validates the key TOGETHER WITH a second header — the\n * organization the caller is acting for — and a hook handed one header's value physically cannot do\n * that cross-check. The framework therefore EXTRACTS no api-key header: which headers carry the\n * credential is the app's business, and `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues` read as many as the regime\n * needs. The contract's `credentials` list DECLARES those header names for readers and spec\n * generators — it is documentation of the regime, never an instruction to this hook, so the hook\n * stays the single place the pair is actually validated. (Being ASYNC is no longer a difference — every hook here is, and for the same reason: an\n * app's strategy reaches the network.)\n *\n * ONE hook serves EVERY regime: `regime` selects which, so a server with a partner-api regime and an\n * internal-tooling regime switches on it rather than binding a token per regime.\n */\nexport abstract class ApiKeyHook {\n    /**\n     * AUTHENTICATE one inbound request. Return who the caller is plus the {@link AuthenticatedCaller.entries}\n     * the framework seeds into `RequestContext` via `putTrusted`, or throw\n     * {@link UnauthorizedError} to deny.\n     *\n     * NOTE the seeded entries are TRUSTED context keys, so return only what THIS hook proved from the\n     * credential it just verified. Anything the caller merely asserted on the wire is not admitted by\n     * `@WpAuthApiKey` — the mode is deliberately caller-NOT-verified (see `AuthFilter.verifiesCaller`),\n     * because a customer is not an internal service.\n     *\n     * @param regime  the first argument of the contract's `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)` — which key\n     *                regime this route belongs to.\n     * @param request the inbound request; read as many headers as the regime needs with\n     *                `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues`, either by raw name or by {@link ContextKey}.\n     */\n    abstract verifyApiKey(regime: string, request: HttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link ApiKeyHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The ApiKeyHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const API_KEY_HOOK = Symbol.for('ApiKeyHook');\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"AuthHooks.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/AuthHooks.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,oDAAwF;AAIxF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,MAAsB,OAAO;IAgBzB;;;;OAIG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,MAA2B,EAAE,WAA2B;QACvE,qFAAqF;QACrF,0FAA0F;QAC1F,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAA,yBAAa,EAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;QACzC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAY,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACjF,MAAM,IAAI,6BAAiB,CAAC,mCAAmC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;QACvF,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ;AA7BD,0BA6BC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9C;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAsB,QAAQ;CAE7B;AAFD,4BAEC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAEhD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,MAAsB,mBAAmB;CAuBxC;AAvBD,kDAuBC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,qBAAqB,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AAEvE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8BG;AACH,MAAsB,UAAU;CAiB/B;AAjBD,gCAiBC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,mNAAmN;AACtM,QAAA,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { JwtRequirement, rolesRequired, ApiForbiddenError } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller } from './AuthConfig';\n\n/**\n * JwtHook - the OPTIONAL user-JWT mechanism. Its DI token is the {@link JWT_HOOK} Symbol injected via\n * `@inject(JWT_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses autobind; rebindable in tests). Bind one\n * to turn on `@WpAuthJwt({...})` endpoints. When NO JwtHook is bound, the framework\n * {@link AuthFilter} treats every jwt endpoint as \"not enabled\" and fails fast (401) — there is no\n * default JWT verification because it needs an app secret + payload shape the framework can't guess.\n *\n *  - `parseJwt`     — AUTHENTICATION: decode/verify a user JWT into {@link AuthenticatedCaller}, or throw. The\n *                     app owns the strategy (HS256 secret, RS256 + JWKS, a provider SDK, ...).\n *  - `authorizeJwt` — AUTHORIZATION: check the authenticated user against the endpoint's\n *                     {@link JwtRequirement}. The DEFAULT enforces the roles any-of; override for\n *                     app-defined requirements carried by the SAME decorator, e.g.\n *                     `@WpAuthJwt({allRolesAllowed: true, inOrg: true})` →\n *                     `if (requirement['inOrg'] && !values.claims['orgId']) ...`.\n *\n * BOTH ARE ASYNC, and both for the same reason: the strategy is the app's, and an app's strategy\n * reaches the network. `parseJwt` may fetch a JWKS or call a provider SDK; `authorizeJwt`'s own\n * motivating example — `@WpAuthJwt({allRolesAllowed: true, inOrg: true})` — is a membership question a\n * real app answers from a datastore. A sync signature makes both of those unwritable, and it made\n * `JwtHook` the last sync hook: {@link OidcHook.verifyOidc}, {@link WebhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook} and\n * {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} all return promises. An implementation that needs no I/O simply has\n * no `await` in its body — {@link DefaultJwtHook} is exactly that and pays nothing for it.\n */\nexport abstract class JwtHook {\n    /**\n     * Parse a user JWT (kind:'jwt') — AUTHENTICATION only. Return who the user is, or throw.\n     * ASYNC so an app can reach a JWKS endpoint or a provider SDK; see the class doc.\n     *\n     * IT TAKES THE TOKEN, NOT THE REQUEST — the one deliberate asymmetry among the four hooks, and\n     * NOT an oversight to be \"fixed\". {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} and\n     * {@link WebhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook} take the whole {@link HttpRequest} because their\n     * credential regime is the APP's: which headers carry an api key, and how a vendor signs, are\n     * things the framework cannot know. A user JWT is different — the framework owns the\n     * `Authorization: Bearer` scheme and has already extracted the token from it. Widening this to\n     * the request would only invite a JwtHook to authenticate off some OTHER header, which is a\n     * second, ungoverned credential path on the mode that guards browser traffic.\n     */\n    abstract parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n\n    /**\n     * DEFAULT authorization: enforce the endpoint's roles (any-of). Override to enforce app-defined\n     * requirements. Throw ApiForbiddenError to deny; return to allow. ASYNC so an app-defined\n     * requirement can be answered from a datastore; see the class doc.\n     */\n    async authorizeJwt(caller: AuthenticatedCaller, requirement: JwtRequirement): Promise<void> {\n        // rolesRequired is the ONE reader of the JwtRoles union: [] means the endpoint typed\n        // `allRolesAllowed: true`, never \"the field was missing\" — that state no longer compiles.\n        const roles = rolesRequired(requirement);\n        if (roles.length > 0 && !roles.some((role: string) => caller.roles.includes(role))) {\n            throw new ApiForbiddenError(`Endpoint requires one of roles: ${roles.join(', ')}`);\n        }\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link JwtHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The JwtHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const JWT_HOOK = Symbol.for('JwtHook');\n\n/**\n * OidcHook - the OPTIONAL override for Google OIDC service-to-service verification. Its DI token is the\n * {@link OIDC_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(OIDC_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses\n * autobind; rebindable in tests). Bind one ONLY to customize the caller policy — e.g. an app that reads an\n * `ALLOWED_OIDC_CALLERS` env var at its composition root and enforces that allow-list. When NO\n * OidcHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} runs the built-in {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n * directly, so a server that wires nothing still verifies Google OIDC against its `@WpAuthOidc(...callers)`\n * (else trusts the edge — any Google-signed caller). `verifyOidc` verifies the token against `callers`;\n * throw on failure.\n */\nexport abstract class OidcHook {\n    abstract verifyOidc(token: string, callers: string[]): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link OidcHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The OidcHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const OIDC_HOOK = Symbol.for('OidcHook');\n\n/**\n * WebhookAuthCallback - the OPTIONAL mechanism behind `@WpAuthWebhook(name)`: prove that an inbound request was\n * really authored by the outside vendor the contract names. Its DI token is the {@link WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK}\n * Symbol injected via `@inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)` (a Symbol, because the app container uses autobind;\n * rebindable in tests). The third hook, symmetric with {@link JwtHook} / {@link OidcHook}:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * // AppModule.ts, beside the CompanyJwtHook binding\n * options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(CompanyWebhookAuthCallback);\n * ```\n *\n * When NO WebhookAuthCallback is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `@WpAuthWebhook` endpoint,\n * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be\n * one: silently allowing an unverified webhook is the single default that must not exist, and the\n * framework ships no vendor crypto by design (see {@link WpAuthWebhook} for why reimplementing five\n * vendors' schemes is a losing trade).\n *\n * ONE hook serves EVERY vendor: `name` selects which, so an app with a Sentry hook and a Twilio hook\n * switches on it rather than binding a token per vendor. What arrives is enough of the raw request to\n * call the vendor's OWN validator — `request.raw.rawBody` for a body-signing vendor (Sentry, GitHub,\n * Stripe, Slack), `request.raw.absoluteUrl` for one that signs the url instead (Twilio).\n */\nexport abstract class WebhookAuthCallback {\n    /**\n     * Verify ONE inbound request. Return the {@link AuthenticatedCaller} the vendor's signature\n     * proved; throw {@link ApiUnauthorizedError} to deny.\n     *\n     * IT RETURNS A CALLER, not `void`, for the same reason {@link ApiKeyHook.verifyApiKey} does: once\n     * the signature checks out, the payload's vendor account is a PROVEN fact, and a hook that could\n     * only return `void` had no way to say so. The framework seeds `entries` with\n     * `RequestContext.putTrusted` exactly as it does for a jwt or api-key caller, so a controller\n     * reads which vendor account this webhook is for off the context instead of re-deriving it.\n     *\n     * Return only what THIS hook proved from the signature it just verified. `webhook` remains\n     * caller-NOT-verified (see `AuthFilter.verifiesCaller`): a vendor is not a peer service, so\n     * nothing the vendor merely ASSERTED on the wire is admitted.\n     *\n     * @param name    the string on the contract's `@WpAuthWebhook(name)` — which vendor this route is.\n     * @param request the transport-neutral request, narrowed to {@link RawHttpRequest}: `request.raw`\n     *                holds the verbatim bytes + absolute url and is PRESENT, never optional.\n     *                `@WpAuthWebhook` requires `@Endpoint(..., { rawBody: true })` at wiring time, and\n     *                AuthFilter 401s rather than calling this hook with nothing to check — so an\n     *                implementation never writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    abstract verifyWebhook(name: string, request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link WebhookAuthCallback} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The WebhookAuthCallback class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK = Symbol.for('WebhookAuthCallback');\n\n/**\n * ApiKeyHook - the OPTIONAL mechanism behind `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)`: authenticate a\n * CUSTOMER-held api key\n * against the app's own datastore and return the context to seed. Its DI token is the\n * {@link API_KEY_HOOK} Symbol injected via `@inject(API_KEY_HOOK)` (a Symbol, because the app container\n * uses autobind; rebindable in tests). The fourth hook, symmetric with {@link JwtHook} /\n * {@link OidcHook} / {@link WebhookAuthCallback}:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * // AppModule.ts, beside the CompanyJwtHook binding\n * options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(OneTabletApiKeyHook);\n * ```\n *\n * When NO ApiKeyHook is bound, the framework {@link AuthFilter} 401s every `@WpAuthApiKey` endpoint,\n * exactly as it does for an unbound JwtHook. There is no framework default and there never will be\n * one: the key regime lives in the app's datastore, under the app's hashing scheme, behind the app's\n * choice of header names.\n *\n * THE ONE THING THIS HAS THAT `JwtHook.parseJwt` DOES NOT: it receives the whole {@link HttpRequest},\n * not one pre-extracted token. A real key regime validates the key TOGETHER WITH a second header — the\n * organization the caller is acting for — and a hook handed one header's value physically cannot do\n * that cross-check. The framework therefore EXTRACTS no api-key header: which headers carry the\n * credential is the app's business, and `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues` read as many as the regime\n * needs. The contract's `credentials` list DECLARES those header names for readers and spec\n * generators — it is documentation of the regime, never an instruction to this hook, so the hook\n * stays the single place the pair is actually validated. (Being ASYNC is no longer a difference — every hook here is, and for the same reason: an\n * app's strategy reaches the network.)\n *\n * ONE hook serves EVERY regime: `regime` selects which, so a server with a partner-api regime and an\n * internal-tooling regime switches on it rather than binding a token per regime.\n */\nexport abstract class ApiKeyHook {\n    /**\n     * AUTHENTICATE one inbound request. Return who the caller is plus the {@link AuthenticatedCaller.entries}\n     * the framework seeds into `RequestContext` via `putTrusted`, or throw\n     * {@link ApiUnauthorizedError} to deny.\n     *\n     * NOTE the seeded entries are TRUSTED context keys, so return only what THIS hook proved from the\n     * credential it just verified. Anything the caller merely asserted on the wire is not admitted by\n     * `@WpAuthApiKey` — the mode is deliberately caller-NOT-verified (see `AuthFilter.verifiesCaller`),\n     * because a customer is not an internal service.\n     *\n     * @param regime  the first argument of the contract's `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)` — which key\n     *                regime this route belongs to.\n     * @param request the inbound request; read as many headers as the regime needs with\n     *                `getHeader` / `getHeaderValues`, either by raw name or by {@link ContextKey}.\n     */\n    abstract verifyApiKey(regime: string, request: HttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller>;\n}\n\n/**\n * DI identifier for the optional {@link ApiKeyHook} binding. It is a Symbol (not the class) so the app\n * container's inversify autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping `@optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK)`\n * correct — undefined when unbound. The ApiKeyHook class stays the TYPE and the impl base.\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- optional DI token: must be a Symbol so the app container's autobind never auto-constructs this token, keeping @optional() @inject(...) correct (undefined when unbound)\nexport const API_KEY_HOOK = Symbol.for('ApiKeyHook');\n"]}

package/src/DefaultJwtHook.js

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ class DefaultJwtHook extends AuthHooks_1.JwtHook {
         const payload = this.verifyToken(token);
         const userId = payload.sub;
         if (!userId) {
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('JWT is missing the required "sub" (subject) claim');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('JWT is missing the required "sub" (subject) claim');
         }
         return new AuthConfig_1.AuthenticatedCaller(userId, this.extractRoles(payload), [], payload);
     }
@@ -40,16 +40,16 @@ class DefaultJwtHook extends AuthHooks_1.JwtHook {
         try {
             const decoded = (0, jsonwebtoken_1.verify)(token, this.secret, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
             if (typeof decoded === 'string') {
-                throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('JWT payload must be a JSON object, not a string');
+                throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('JWT payload must be a JSON object, not a string');
             }
             return decoded;
         }
         catch (err) {
             const error = (0, core_util_1.toError)(err);
-            if (error instanceof core_util_1.UnauthorizedError) {
+            if (error instanceof core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError) {
                 throw error;
             }
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('JWT verification failed', undefined, error);
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('JWT verification failed', undefined, error);
         }
     }
     extractRoles(payload) {

package/src/DefaultJwtHook.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"DefaultJwtHook.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/DefaultJwtHook.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAAA,+CAAkD;AAClD,oDAAqE;AACrE,2CAAsC;AACtC,6CAAmD;AAEnD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAa,cAAe,SAAQ,mBAAO;IACtB,MAAM,CAAS;IAEhC,YAAY,MAAc;QACtB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACR,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,CAAC;IAEQ,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAa;QACjC,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QACxC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;QAC3B,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACV,MAAM,IAAI,gCAAoB,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC,CAAC;QACxF,CAAC;QACD,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAmB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACpF,CAAC;IAED,gGAAgG;IACxF,WAAW,CAAC,KAAa;QAC7B,8QAA8Q;QAC9Q,IAAI,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAA,qBAAM,EAAC,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;YACtE,IAAI,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC9B,MAAM,IAAI,gCAAoB,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC,CAAC;YACtF,CAAC;YACD,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;QACnB,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,GAAY,EAAE,CAAC;YACpB,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAA,mBAAO,EAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;YAC3B,IAAI,KAAK,YAAY,gCAAoB,EAAE,CAAC;gBACxC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;YAChB,CAAC;YACD,MAAM,IAAI,gCAAoB,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAChF,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;IAEO,YAAY,CAAC,OAAmB;QACpC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAC/B,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACvB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAY,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;QACpE,CAAC;QACD,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;CACJ;AA1CD,wCA0CC","sourcesContent":["import { verify, JwtPayload } from 'jsonwebtoken';\nimport { ApiUnauthorizedError, toError } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { JwtHook } from './AuthHooks';\nimport { AuthenticatedCaller } from './AuthConfig';\n\n/**\n * DefaultJwtHook - a batteries-included {@link JwtHook} for the common case: HS256 user JWTs signed\n * with ONE shared secret. Construct it with the secret and bind it — `new DefaultJwtHook(secret)` —\n * and `@WpAuthJwt` endpoints work with NO custom verification code.\n *\n * `parseJwt` verifies the signature + expiry (jsonwebtoken, HS256 only) and maps standard claims:\n * `sub` → userId, a string[] `roles` claim → roles, the whole payload → claims. `authorizeJwt`\n * (role enforcement) is inherited from JwtHook. For RS256 + JWKS, a provider SDK, or a non-standard\n * payload, write your own JwtHook subclass instead.\n *\n * It satisfies {@link JwtHook}'s ASYNC signature with a body that awaits NOTHING, and that is the\n * point rather than an oversight: HS256 against a local secret is pure CPU. The signature is async\n * because the hook is the APP's seam and an app's strategy reaches the network — not because this\n * implementation does. No fake await is added to justify it.\n */\nexport class DefaultJwtHook extends JwtHook {\n    private readonly secret: string;\n\n    constructor(secret: string) {\n        super();\n        this.secret = secret;\n    }\n\n    override async parseJwt(token: string): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> {\n        const payload = this.verifyToken(token);\n        const userId = payload.sub;\n        if (!userId) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('JWT is missing the required \"sub\" (subject) claim');\n        }\n        return new AuthenticatedCaller(userId, this.extractRoles(payload), [], payload);\n    }\n\n    /** Verify HS256 signature + expiry; translate jsonwebtoken's raw error into a framework 401. */\n    private verifyToken(token: string): JwtPayload {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- AUTH TRANSLATION CHOKEPOINT: jsonwebtoken.verify throws on a bad/expired token; that must surface as a 401 Unauthorized, not bubble to the global handler as a 500. The original error is chained via cause.\n        try {\n            const decoded = verify(token, this.secret, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });\n            if (typeof decoded === 'string') {\n                throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('JWT payload must be a JSON object, not a string');\n            }\n            return decoded;\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            if (error instanceof ApiUnauthorizedError) {\n                throw error;\n            }\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('JWT verification failed', undefined, error);\n        }\n    }\n\n    private extractRoles(payload: JwtPayload): string[] {\n        const roles = payload['roles'];\n        if (Array.isArray(roles)) {\n            return roles.filter((role: string) => typeof role === 'string');\n        }\n        return [];\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/DefaultOidcVerifier.js

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ let DefaultOidcVerifier = class DefaultOidcVerifier {
         // would reject a legitimate cross-SA caller the edge already admitted.
         const result = await this.gcpOidc.verifyFromCallers(token, callers);
         if (!result.ok) {
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError(`OIDC rejected: ${result.reason ?? 'not an allowed caller'}`);
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError(`OIDC rejected: ${result.reason ?? 'not an allowed caller'}`);
         }
     }
 };

package/src/DefaultOidcVerifier.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"DefaultOidcVerifier.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/DefaultOidcVerifier.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;AAAA,yCAAmC;AACnC,0DAAoE;AACpE,oDAAyD;AACzD,0DAAkD;AAElD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AAEI,IAAM,mBAAmB,GAAzB,MAAM,mBAAmB;IAGU;IAFtC,YAEsC,OAAgB;QAAhB,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAS;IACnD,CAAC;IAEJ,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,OAAiB;QACzC,2FAA2F;QAC3F,2FAA2F;QAC3F,uEAAuE;QACvE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACpE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YACb,MAAM,IAAI,6BAAiB,CACvB,kBAAkB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,EAAE,CAC/D,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ,CAAA;AAjBY,kDAAmB;8BAAnB,mBAAmB;IAD/B,IAAA,wCAAyB,GAAE;IAInB,mBAAA,IAAA,kBAAM,EAAC,sBAAO,CAAC,CAAA;6CAA2B,sBAAO;GAH7C,mBAAmB,CAiB/B","sourcesContent":["import { inject } from 'inversify';\nimport { provideFrameworkSingleton } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { UnauthorizedError } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';\n\n/**\n * DefaultOidcVerifier - the framework's built-in Google OIDC verifier, injected into\n * {@link AuthFilter} and run directly whenever no app {@link OidcHook} is bound. It is what makes\n * OIDC \"just work\" with ZERO wiring: http-routing depends on @webpieces/gcp-identity ON PURPOSE so a\n * server that binds nothing still verifies service-to-service OIDC.\n *\n * `verify` honors the endpoint's `@WpAuthOidc(...callers)` contract exactly: EMPTY (a bare `@WpAuthOidc()`)\n * = TRUST THE EDGE — verify the token is genuinely Google-signed and let the deployment's `run.invoker`\n * IAM restrict WHO (gcp-identity warns loudly, once, if the service is actually public and thus the\n * edge is NOT the gate). A non-empty list (`@WpAuthOidc('svc-a')`) enforces that explicit app-level\n * allow-list as defense-in-depth. Off-GCP, gcp-identity mints + accepts a dev token so local dev needs\n * no GCP. Framework code reads NO process.env — an app that wants an env-driven allow-list binds an\n * {@link OidcHook} instead (env read at its composition root), keeping this default env-free and tests\n * parallel-safe.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class DefaultOidcVerifier {\n    constructor(\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(GcpOidc) private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n    ) {}\n\n    async verify(token: string, callers: string[]): Promise<void> {\n        // callers pass straight through: EMPTY (@WpAuthOidc() with no callers) = TRUST THE EDGE, a\n        // non-empty list enforces the explicit allow-list. Do NOT inject a ['self'] default — that\n        // would reject a legitimate cross-SA caller the edge already admitted.\n        const result = await this.gcpOidc.verifyFromCallers(token, callers);\n        if (!result.ok) {\n            throw new UnauthorizedError(\n                `OIDC rejected: ${result.reason ?? 'not an allowed caller'}`,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"DefaultOidcVerifier.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-routing/src/DefaultOidcVerifier.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;AAAA,yCAAmC;AACnC,0DAAoE;AACpE,oDAA4D;AAC5D,0DAAkD;AAElD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AAEI,IAAM,mBAAmB,GAAzB,MAAM,mBAAmB;IAGU;IAFtC,YAEsC,OAAgB;QAAhB,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAS;IACnD,CAAC;IAEJ,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,OAAiB;QACzC,2FAA2F;QAC3F,2FAA2F;QAC3F,uEAAuE;QACvE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QACpE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;YACb,MAAM,IAAI,gCAAoB,CAC1B,kBAAkB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,EAAE,CAC/D,CAAC;QACN,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACJ,CAAA;AAjBY,kDAAmB;8BAAnB,mBAAmB;IAD/B,IAAA,wCAAyB,GAAE;IAInB,mBAAA,IAAA,kBAAM,EAAC,sBAAO,CAAC,CAAA;6CAA2B,sBAAO;GAH7C,mBAAmB,CAiB/B","sourcesContent":["import { inject } from 'inversify';\nimport { provideFrameworkSingleton } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { ApiUnauthorizedError } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';\n\n/**\n * DefaultOidcVerifier - the framework's built-in Google OIDC verifier, injected into\n * {@link AuthFilter} and run directly whenever no app {@link OidcHook} is bound. It is what makes\n * OIDC \"just work\" with ZERO wiring: http-routing depends on @webpieces/gcp-identity ON PURPOSE so a\n * server that binds nothing still verifies service-to-service OIDC.\n *\n * `verify` honors the endpoint's `@WpAuthOidc(...callers)` contract exactly: EMPTY (a bare `@WpAuthOidc()`)\n * = TRUST THE EDGE — verify the token is genuinely Google-signed and let the deployment's `run.invoker`\n * IAM restrict WHO (gcp-identity warns loudly, once, if the service is actually public and thus the\n * edge is NOT the gate). A non-empty list (`@WpAuthOidc('svc-a')`) enforces that explicit app-level\n * allow-list as defense-in-depth. Off-GCP, gcp-identity mints + accepts a dev token so local dev needs\n * no GCP. Framework code reads NO process.env — an app that wants an env-driven allow-list binds an\n * {@link OidcHook} instead (env read at its composition root), keeping this default env-free and tests\n * parallel-safe.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class DefaultOidcVerifier {\n    constructor(\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(GcpOidc) private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n    ) {}\n\n    async verify(token: string, callers: string[]): Promise<void> {\n        // callers pass straight through: EMPTY (@WpAuthOidc() with no callers) = TRUST THE EDGE, a\n        // non-empty list enforces the explicit allow-list. Do NOT inject a ['self'] default — that\n        // would reject a legitimate cross-SA caller the edge already admitted.\n        const result = await this.gcpOidc.verifyFromCallers(token, callers);\n        if (!result.ok) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                `OIDC rejected: ${result.reason ?? 'not an allowed caller'}`,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.js

@@ -129,16 +129,16 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         if (!this.webhookAuthCallback) {
             log.warn(`Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no WebhookAuthCallback is bound. ` +
                 `Bind one (options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(YourWebhookAuthCallback)) to enable webhook verification.`);
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('Webhook auth is not enabled on this server');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Webhook auth is not enabled on this server');
         }
         const request = core_context_1.RequestContext.getRequest();
         if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {
             log.warn(`Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +
                 `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(path, 'external', { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +
                 `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`);
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained');
         }
-        // Throws UnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is
+        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is
         // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.
         const caller = await this.webhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook(name, request);
         this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);
@@ -172,16 +172,16 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
         if (!this.apiKeyHook) {
             log.warn(`Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +
                 `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`);
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');
         }
         const request = core_context_1.RequestContext.getRequest();
         if (!request) {
             log.warn(`Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +
                 `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +
                 `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`);
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published');
         }
-        // Throws UnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check
+        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check
         // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).
         const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);
         this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
     rethrowDeferredBodyError() {
         const parseError = core_context_1.RequestContext.getRequest()?.raw?.bodyParseError;
         if (parseError) {
-            throw new core_util_1.BadRequestError('Request body is not valid JSON', undefined, undefined, parseError);
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiBadRequestError('Request body is not valid JSON', undefined, undefined, parseError);
         }
     }
     /**
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
                 ? 'vouched for no such value'
                 : 'derived a different value') +
             '.');
-        throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError(`Header '${item.key.httpHeader}' cannot be supplied by the caller on this endpoint`);
+        throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError(`Header '${item.key.httpHeader}' cannot be supplied by the caller on this endpoint`);
     }
     /**
      * `@WpAuthLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the
@@ -334,24 +334,24 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
                 : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +
                     'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'));
         // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.
-        throw new core_util_1.EndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);
+        throw new core_util_1.ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);
     }
     async enforceJwt(header, requirement) {
         const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);
         if (!token) {
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('Authentication required');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');
         }
         if (!this.jwtHook) {
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');
         }
-        const caller = await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token); // AUTHENTICATE — throws UnauthorizedError if invalid
+        const caller = await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token); // AUTHENTICATE — throws ApiUnauthorizedError if invalid
         this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);
-        await this.jwtHook.authorizeJwt(caller, requirement); // AUTHORIZE — app policy; throws ForbiddenError to deny
+        await this.jwtHook.authorizeJwt(caller, requirement); // AUTHORIZE — app policy; throws ApiForbiddenError to deny
     }
     async enforceOidc(header, callers) {
         const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);
         if (!token) {
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token for @WpAuthOidc endpoint');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token for @WpAuthOidc endpoint');
         }
         // App-bound OidcHook overrides the caller policy; otherwise the framework default runs directly.
         if (this.oidcHook) {
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ let AuthFilter = AuthFilter_1 = class AuthFilter extends core_util_2.Filter {
     enforceSharedSecret(provided, secretKey) {
         const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];
         if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {
-            throw new core_util_1.UnauthorizedError('Invalid shared secret for @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoint');
+            throw new core_util_1.ApiUnauthorizedError('Invalid shared secret for @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoint');
         }
     }
     /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */

package/src/filters/AuthFilter.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    HttpRequest,\n    PendingWireTrust,\n    PendingTrustedValue,\n    RawHttpRequest,\n    RequestContext,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport {\n    AuthMode,\n    EndpointNotFoundError,\n    BadRequestError,\n    UnauthorizedError,\n    JwtRequirement,\n    LogManager,\n    RuntimeLocality,\n    toError,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';\nimport { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';\nimport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from '../AuthConfig';\nimport {\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n    JwtHook,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    WebhookAuthCallback,\n    WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK,\n} from '../AuthHooks';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');\n\n/**\n * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a ContextKey: a ContextKey with an httpHeader is a TRANSFERRED key, which would\n * put the caller's credential into RequestContext and hence onto every outbound call this service\n * makes, and onto every Cloud Task it enqueues. A credential belongs to ONE request hop.\n */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'authorization';\n\n/**\n * The scheme (first word of the Authorization value) names WHICH credential follows, so a secret\n * can never be mistaken for a token, nor accepted where the other was expected:\n *\n *   Authorization: Bearer <user JWT | service OIDC token>\n *   Authorization: Webpieces <@WpAuthSharedSecret value>\n *\n * The scheme is REQUIRED. A bare value with no scheme is rejected.\n */\nconst BEARER_SCHEME = 'Bearer';\nconst SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';\n\n/**\n * AuthFilter - the ONE framework auth filter, auto-installed just below the error filter on every\n * route. It is TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL: it reads the raw credential from the {@link HttpRequest} in\n * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.\n *\n * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC\n * default:\n *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No\n *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).\n *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt` + `authorizeJwt`, both awaited — an app's\n *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → \"not enabled\"\n *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.\n *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC.\n *  - webhook       → the bound {@link WebhookAuthCallback} verifies the VENDOR's signature over the retained\n *                    raw request. No WebhookAuthCallback bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified webhook is\n *                    never waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole\n *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.\n *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so\n *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.\n *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's\n *                    machine; otherwise 404, indistinguishable from the route not existing (which,\n *                    off-local, it does not — `ApiRoutingFactory` never registered it).\n *\n * Zero wiring = OIDC just works; an app only binds the hooks it actually uses.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    constructor(\n        // Framework default, always available — verifies Google OIDC with zero app wiring.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- AuthFilter is DI-resolved via the esbuild/vitest path, which elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so every param needs its explicit token\n        @inject(DefaultOidcVerifier) private readonly oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an AuthConfig to enable @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG) private readonly authConfig?: AuthConfig,\n        // @optional: only bind a JwtHook to enable @WpAuthJwt endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK) private readonly jwtHook?: JwtHook,\n        // @optional: only bind an OidcHook to OVERRIDE the DefaultOidcVerifier caller policy.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK) private readonly oidcHook?: OidcHook,\n        // @optional: only bind a WebhookAuthCallback to enable @WpAuthWebhook endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, which is the ONE default that must not be the other way round.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional()\n        @inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)\n        private readonly webhookAuthCallback?: WebhookAuthCallback,\n        // @optional: only bind an ApiKeyHook to enable @WpAuthApiKey endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, for the same reason as the webhook hook above.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK) private readonly apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    override async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const mode = meta.routeMeta.authMeta?.mode;\n        const authHeader = RequestContext.getRequest()?.getHeader(AUTHORIZATION_HEADER);\n\n        if (!mode || mode.kind === 'public') {\n            // Public: best-effort parse so a logged-out page can still know the logged-in user.\n            await this.bestEffortJwt(authHeader);\n            this.reconcileWireTrust(/*callerVerified*/ false);\n            this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                await this.enforceJwt(authHeader, mode.requirement);\n                break;\n            case 'oidc':\n                await this.enforceOidc(authHeader, mode.callers);\n                break;\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                this.enforceSharedSecret(\n                    this.credential(authHeader, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME),\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n                break;\n            case 'webhook':\n                await this.enforceWebhook(mode.name, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'apikey':\n                await this.enforceApiKey(mode.regime, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'local-only':\n                this.enforceLocalOnly(meta);\n                break;\n        }\n        this.reconcileWireTrust(AuthFilter.verifiesCaller(mode));\n        this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n        return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthWebhook(name)`: hand the app's {@link WebhookAuthCallback} the verbatim request and let it call the\n     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;\n     *    an unverified webhook must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryWebhookEndpointRetainsRawBody`\n     *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or\n     *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The\n     *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the signature did not verify.\n     *\n     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to\n     * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the hook's signature promises `raw` is present and\n     * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    private async enforceWebhook(name: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.webhookAuthCallback) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no WebhookAuthCallback is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(YourWebhookAuthCallback)) to enable webhook verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new UnauthorizedError('Webhook auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +\n                    `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(path, 'external', { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +\n                    `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`,\n            );\n            throw new UnauthorizedError(\n                'Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws UnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is\n        // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.\n        const caller = await this.webhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook(name, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The ONE place the framework decides a request carries the verbatim bytes. A TYPE PREDICATE, so\n     * the `true` branch hands {@link enforceWebhook} a {@link RawHttpRequest} with no cast and no\n     * non-null assertion — the bad state stops being representable past this line rather than being\n     * re-thrown about by every hook.\n     */\n    private hasRawBytes(request: HttpRequest | undefined): request is RawHttpRequest {\n        return request?.raw !== undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound\n     * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they\n     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all\n     * before the controller:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an\n     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That\n     *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather\n     *    than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.\n     *\n     * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is\n     * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.\n     */\n    private async enforceApiKey(regime: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.apiKeyHook) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new UnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!request) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +\n                    `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +\n                    `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`,\n            );\n            throw new UnauthorizedError(\n                'API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws UnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check\n        // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).\n        const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * A body that failed to parse is held on the {@link RawRequest} and surfaces HERE, after auth, as\n     * the 400 it always was — never before it.\n     *\n     * The order is the whole point. A malformed body from an unauthenticated caller must answer 401,\n     * because \"your JSON was bad\" also says \"I got past auth\", and on a webhook endpoint — whose url\n     * is public by construction — that is a free oracle for anyone probing. Parsing first made the\n     * framework hand that out for nothing.\n     *\n     * Only routes that retain raw bytes can defer at all; every other route still fails at parse time\n     * in the transport, exactly as before.\n     */\n    private rethrowDeferredBodyError(): void {\n        const parseError = RequestContext.getRequest()?.raw?.bodyParseError;\n        if (parseError) {\n            throw new BadRequestError(\n                'Request body is not valid JSON',\n                undefined,\n                undefined,\n                parseError,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Does this mode authenticate the CALLER ITSELF (as opposed to a user, or nobody)? The INBOUND\n     * twin of {@link DestinationTrust.forAuthMode}, and deliberately the same question: the client\n     * omits trusted keys for a destination that cannot verify it, and the server rejects trusted keys\n     * on a route that cannot verify the sender. One rule, two ends — if they disagreed, every call\n     * would fail with a 401 that looks like a framework bug.\n     *\n     * - `oidc` / `shared-secret` → TRUE. An internal service is on the other end and the trusted\n     *   context it forwarded may be believed. This is what makes cross-service identity propagation\n     *   work.\n     * - `jwt` / `public` → FALSE. A user JWT proves who the USER is; the SENDER is still whoever\n     *   holds the token, i.e. a browser.\n     * - `local-only` → FALSE. It verifies WHERE WE ARE RUNNING, not who is calling — anything on\n     *   localhost reaches it, and it has no authenticator, so nothing can ever vouch for an inbound\n     *   trusted header. Any such header therefore rejects the request, which is exactly right.\n     *\n     * - `apikey` → FALSE. See the comment on that branch: the sender is a CUSTOMER.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, returning on every branch: a new AuthMode kind is a\n     * COMPILE error here (TS7030, no ending return) rather than silently landing on one posture. The\n     * boolean expression this replaced defaulted every future mode to \"not verified\" — the safe\n     * answer, but arrived at by accident rather than by decision.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors DestinationTrust.forAuthMode)\n    private static verifiesCaller(mode: AuthMode): boolean {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return true;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n            // `webhook` DOES authenticate its sender — but the sender is an outside VENDOR, not a\n            // peer in this repo, and a vendor neither speaks nor forwards webpieces context headers.\n            // So there is no forwarded identity to believe, and admitting one would mean trusting a\n            // key a vendor's payload could carry. Same answer as the OUTBOUND half\n            // (DestinationTrust.forAuthMode), which is the invariant that keeps the two ends agreeing.\n            case 'webhook':\n            // `apikey` authenticates the SENDER — but the sender is a CUSTOMER's codebase, not a peer\n            // service in this repo, so its forwarded trusted context is exactly what must NOT be\n            // believed: admitting it would let a partner assert another customer's org id on the wire.\n            // The hook's OWN derived entries still land (applyAuthenticatedCaller), and reconcileWireTrust then\n            // admits an inbound trusted header only when the hook independently derived the same value.\n            case 'apikey':\n            case 'local-only':\n                return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Decide what happens to the trusted keys that arrived on the WIRE and were held back by\n     * {@link PendingWireTrust} (read that class for why they are held rather than written).\n     *\n     * `callerVerified` — the endpoint authenticated the SENDER **as a peer service** (`@WpAuthOidc`,\n     * `@WpAuthSharedSecret`).\n     * The sender is a service we trust, this is the service-to-service hop, and its forwarded\n     * identity is admitted as-is. This is the case that makes propagating a verified userId across\n     * internal services work.\n     *\n     * Otherwise the sender is a browser or anyone else with curl, and the ONLY acceptable inbound\n     * trusted value is one the authenticator independently derived to the same value. Everything\n     * else is rejected — see {@link requireVouched}.\n     *\n     * Runs AFTER the mode enforcement above, because that is what stamps the authenticator's own\n     * values (`applyAuthenticatedCaller`); comparing before it ran would compare against nothing.\n     */\n    private reconcileWireTrust(callerVerified: boolean): void {\n        const pending = PendingWireTrust.takeAll();\n        for (const item of pending) {\n            if (callerVerified) {\n                RequestContext.putTrusted(item.key, item.value);\n            } else {\n                this.requireVouched(item);\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * On a browser-reachable route, an inbound trusted header must match what the authenticator\n     * itself derived, or the request dies. Both failure shapes are rejections, not repairs:\n     *\n     * - DIFFERENT value — the caller said `alice`, the credential says `bob`. Silently letting the\n     *   credential win is not safe, because upstream rate limiters commonly bucket on the header\n     *   rather than the token: the request was already counted against the wrong principal, so\n     *   every forged header would be a free rate-limit bypass. No honest caller contradicts its own\n     *   credential.\n     * - NOTHING vouched for it — nobody derived this key at all, so there is no evidence behind a\n     *   value a stranger typed. This is the common case, not the exotic one: the framework's\n     *   {@link DefaultJwtHook} stamps NO entries, and an app hook (jwt or api-key) only stamps the keys it can prove,\n     *   so any other trusted key a caller sends lands here.\n     *\n     * The pending value is discarded either way — the throw is what leaves the request.\n     */\n    private requireVouched(item: PendingTrustedValue): void {\n        const vouched = RequestContext.getTrusted(item.key);\n        if (vouched === item.value) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.error(\n            `Rejecting inbound '${item.key.httpHeader}': it is a TRUSTED context key, this route does ` +\n                `not authenticate its caller, and the credential ` +\n                (vouched === undefined\n                    ? 'vouched for no such value'\n                    : 'derived a different value') +\n                '.',\n        );\n        throw new UnauthorizedError(\n            `Header '${item.key.httpHeader}' cannot be supplied by the caller on this endpoint`,\n        );\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the\n     * endpoint did not exist.\n     *\n     * WHY 404 AND NOT THE 403 APPS HAND-ROLLED. Off-local the route is not registered at all\n     * (`ApiRoutingFactory` skips it), so the ordinary way to reach this path already answers 404. A\n     * 403 from here would be a DIFFERENT answer from the same framework for the same endpoint, and\n     * the difference is itself the leak: 403 confirms \"this path exists in production, you merely\n     * lack permission\", which is a map of the dev-only surface for anyone probing. A local-only\n     * endpoint should not admit it exists. Both gates therefore return the same 404, and this one is\n     * the backstop for routes registered by hand through `RouteBuilder` rather than by\n     * `ApiRoutingFactory`.\n     *\n     * The log line names WHICH reason applies, because \"you are deployed\" and \"nobody declared a\n     * locality\" have completely different fixes and both look like a bare 404 from outside.\n     */\n    private enforceLocalOnly(meta: MethodMeta): void {\n        if (RuntimeLocality.isLocalDevelopment()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.warn(\n            `Refusing @WpAuthLocalOnly endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: ` +\n                (RuntimeLocality.isDeclared()\n                    ? 'this process declared itself DEPLOYED.'\n                    : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +\n                      'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'),\n        );\n        // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.\n        throw new EndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);\n    }\n\n    private async enforceJwt(\n        header: string | undefined,\n        requirement: JwtRequirement,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new UnauthorizedError('Authentication required');\n        }\n        if (!this.jwtHook) {\n            throw new UnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const caller = await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token); // AUTHENTICATE — throws UnauthorizedError if invalid\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n        await this.jwtHook.authorizeJwt(caller, requirement); // AUTHORIZE — app policy; throws ForbiddenError to deny\n    }\n\n    private async enforceOidc(header: string | undefined, callers: string[]): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new UnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token for @WpAuthOidc endpoint');\n        }\n        // App-bound OidcHook overrides the caller policy; otherwise the framework default runs directly.\n        if (this.oidcHook) {\n            await this.oidcHook.verifyOidc(token, callers);\n        } else {\n            await this.oidcVerifier.verify(token, callers);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */\n    private enforceSharedSecret(provided: string | undefined, secretKey: string): void {\n        const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];\n        if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {\n            throw new UnauthorizedError('Invalid shared secret for @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoint');\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */\n    private matchesEither(provided: string, accepted: SharedSecrets): boolean {\n        return (\n            (accepted.secret1 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret1)) ||\n            (accepted.secret2 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret2))\n        );\n    }\n\n    /** Parse a JWT if one is present, else do nothing — used on public routes; never throws. */\n    private async bestEffortJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!this.jwtHook || !token) {\n            return;\n        }\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- best-effort on a public route: a bad/absent token just means \"not logged in\", must not fail the request\n        try {\n            this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            log.debug(\n                'Best-effort JWT parse on a public endpoint failed (treating as anonymous): ',\n                error,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp the authenticated caller's context entries + the caller itself into the RequestContext.\n     * ONE path for all three authenticating hooks — jwt, api-key and webhook — so a vendor hook that\n     * proved which account a payload belongs to seeds context exactly as a JwtHook does.\n     */\n    private applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller: AuthenticatedCaller): void {\n        for (const entry of caller.entries) {\n            // ContextTuple.key is a TRUSTED key by type, so this is the one sanctioned write of a\n            // proven identity: the app's hook derived it from a credential we just verified.\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(entry.key, entry.value);\n        }\n        // A real TRUSTED ContextKey, not a raw string slot: the caller IS the framework's own proof,\n        // so it is written with the same typed verb every other proven value goes through.\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY, caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The credential value IF the header carries the expected scheme, else undefined.\n     *\n     * Strict: a bare value with no scheme, or a value under the WRONG scheme (a shared secret sent\n     * where a JWT is expected), yields undefined and the caller 401s.\n     */\n    private credential(header: string | undefined, scheme: string): string | undefined {\n        if (!header) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        const prefix = `${scheme} `;\n        return header.startsWith(prefix) ? header.substring(prefix.length) : undefined;\n    }\n\n    private constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n        const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');\n        const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');\n        if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n    }\n}\n"]}
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n    provideFrameworkSingleton,\n    HttpRequest,\n    PendingWireTrust,\n    PendingTrustedValue,\n    RawHttpRequest,\n    RequestContext,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport {\n    AuthMode,\n    ApiEndpointNotFoundError,\n    ApiBadRequestError,\n    ApiUnauthorizedError,\n    JwtRequirement,\n    LogManager,\n    RuntimeLocality,\n    toError,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { Filter, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { WpResponse } from '../WpResponse';\nimport { MethodMeta } from '../MethodMeta';\nimport {\n    AuthConfig,\n    AUTH_CONFIG,\n    AuthenticatedCaller,\n    AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY,\n    SharedSecrets,\n} from '../AuthConfig';\nimport {\n    ApiKeyHook,\n    API_KEY_HOOK,\n    JwtHook,\n    JWT_HOOK,\n    OidcHook,\n    OIDC_HOOK,\n    WebhookAuthCallback,\n    WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK,\n} from '../AuthHooks';\nimport { DefaultOidcVerifier } from '../DefaultOidcVerifier';\n\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('AuthFilter');\n\n/**\n * The ONE credential header, read straight off the inbound HttpRequest.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a ContextKey: a ContextKey with an httpHeader is a TRANSFERRED key, which would\n * put the caller's credential into RequestContext and hence onto every outbound call this service\n * makes, and onto every Cloud Task it enqueues. A credential belongs to ONE request hop.\n */\nconst AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'authorization';\n\n/**\n * The scheme (first word of the Authorization value) names WHICH credential follows, so a secret\n * can never be mistaken for a token, nor accepted where the other was expected:\n *\n *   Authorization: Bearer <user JWT | service OIDC token>\n *   Authorization: Webpieces <@WpAuthSharedSecret value>\n *\n * The scheme is REQUIRED. A bare value with no scheme is rejected.\n */\nconst BEARER_SCHEME = 'Bearer';\nconst SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME = 'Webpieces';\n\n/**\n * AuthFilter - the ONE framework auth filter, auto-installed just below the error filter on every\n * route. It is TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL: it reads the raw credential from the {@link HttpRequest} in\n * RequestContext (never express), so the SAME check runs over HTTP and via createApiClient.\n *\n * It enforces the endpoint's AuthMode from separately-bound pieces, each OPTIONAL except the OIDC\n * default:\n *  - shared-secret → constant-time compare vs the {@link AuthConfig} secret VALUE (state). No\n *                    AuthConfig bound → no accepted secret → fail fast (401).\n *  - jwt           → the bound {@link JwtHook} (`parseJwt` + `authorizeJwt`, both awaited — an app's\n *                    strategy may reach a JWKS or a datastore). No JwtHook bound → \"not enabled\"\n *                    (401): JWT needs an app secret + payload shape.\n *  - oidc          → the bound {@link OidcHook} if any, else the framework {@link DefaultOidcVerifier}\n *                    run DIRECTLY — so a server that wires NOTHING still verifies Google OIDC.\n *  - webhook       → the bound {@link WebhookAuthCallback} verifies the VENDOR's signature over the retained\n *                    raw request. No WebhookAuthCallback bound → 401, like jwt: an unverified webhook is\n *                    never waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n *  - apikey        → the bound {@link ApiKeyHook} looks the CUSTOMER's key up (async, over the whole\n *                    header set) and returns the context to seed. No ApiKeyHook bound → 401, like jwt.\n *  - public        → BEST-EFFORT jwt parse (only if a JwtHook is bound): stamp the user's context so\n *                    a logged-out page still knows who is logged in; never fails.\n *  - local-only    → serve only when {@link RuntimeLocality} says this process is a developer's\n *                    machine; otherwise 404, indistinguishable from the route not existing (which,\n *                    off-local, it does not — `ApiRoutingFactory` never registered it).\n *\n * Zero wiring = OIDC just works; an app only binds the hooks it actually uses.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class AuthFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    constructor(\n        // Framework default, always available — verifies Google OIDC with zero app wiring.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- AuthFilter is DI-resolved via the esbuild/vitest path, which elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so every param needs its explicit token\n        @inject(DefaultOidcVerifier) private readonly oidcVerifier: DefaultOidcVerifier,\n        // @optional: only bind an AuthConfig to enable @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(AUTH_CONFIG) private readonly authConfig?: AuthConfig,\n        // @optional: only bind a JwtHook to enable @WpAuthJwt endpoints.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(JWT_HOOK) private readonly jwtHook?: JwtHook,\n        // @optional: only bind an OidcHook to OVERRIDE the DefaultOidcVerifier caller policy.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(OIDC_HOOK) private readonly oidcHook?: OidcHook,\n        // @optional: only bind a WebhookAuthCallback to enable @WpAuthWebhook endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, which is the ONE default that must not be the other way round.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional()\n        @inject(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK)\n        private readonly webhookAuthCallback?: WebhookAuthCallback,\n        // @optional: only bind an ApiKeyHook to enable @WpAuthApiKey endpoints. Unbound = every such\n        // endpoint 401s, for the same reason as the webhook hook above.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- see above: explicit token required for DI-resolved param\n        @optional() @inject(API_KEY_HOOK) private readonly apiKeyHook?: ApiKeyHook,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    override async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        const mode = meta.routeMeta.authMeta?.mode;\n        const authHeader = RequestContext.getRequest()?.getHeader(AUTHORIZATION_HEADER);\n\n        if (!mode || mode.kind === 'public') {\n            // Public: best-effort parse so a logged-out page can still know the logged-in user.\n            await this.bestEffortJwt(authHeader);\n            this.reconcileWireTrust(/*callerVerified*/ false);\n            this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n            return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n        }\n\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'jwt':\n                await this.enforceJwt(authHeader, mode.requirement);\n                break;\n            case 'oidc':\n                await this.enforceOidc(authHeader, mode.callers);\n                break;\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                this.enforceSharedSecret(\n                    this.credential(authHeader, SHARED_SECRET_SCHEME),\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n                break;\n            case 'webhook':\n                await this.enforceWebhook(mode.name, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'apikey':\n                await this.enforceApiKey(mode.regime, meta);\n                break;\n            case 'local-only':\n                this.enforceLocalOnly(meta);\n                break;\n        }\n        this.reconcileWireTrust(AuthFilter.verifiesCaller(mode));\n        this.rethrowDeferredBodyError();\n        return nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthWebhook(name)`: hand the app's {@link WebhookAuthCallback} the verbatim request and let it call the\n     * VENDOR's own validator. Three ways to fail, all 401, all before the controller is entered:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior;\n     *    an unverified webhook must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO raw request — the transport kept no bytes. `assertEveryWebhookEndpointRetainsRawBody`\n     *    normally makes this a startup error, so reaching it means either a hand-registered route or\n     *    an in-process caller (a spec) that published an HttpRequest with no {@link RawRequest}. The\n     *    message says which fix applies rather than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the signature did not verify.\n     *\n     * Case 2 is checked HERE and nowhere else. {@link hasRawBytes} narrows the request to\n     * {@link RawHttpRequest} at this one gate, so the hook's signature promises `raw` is present and\n     * no vendor implementation ever writes `raw!` or a guard of its own.\n     */\n    private async enforceWebhook(name: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.webhookAuthCallback) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no WebhookAuthCallback is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(WEBHOOK_AUTH_CALLBACK).to(YourWebhookAuthCallback)) to enable webhook verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Webhook auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!this.hasRawBytes(request)) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthWebhook('${name}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: the inbound request carries ` +\n                    `no raw bytes. Declare @Endpoint(path, 'external', { calledBy: '${name}', rawBody: true }); a ` +\n                    `spec driving this route in-process must publish an HttpRequest built with a RawRequest.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Webhook signature cannot be verified: no raw request was retained',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. On success the vendor account the signature proved is\n        // stamped through the SAME path a jwt or api-key caller takes.\n        const caller = await this.webhookAuthCallback.verifyWebhook(name, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The ONE place the framework decides a request carries the verbatim bytes. A TYPE PREDICATE, so\n     * the `true` branch hands {@link enforceWebhook} a {@link RawHttpRequest} with no cast and no\n     * non-null assertion — the bad state stops being representable past this line rather than being\n     * re-thrown about by every hook.\n     */\n    private hasRawBytes(request: HttpRequest | undefined): request is RawHttpRequest {\n        return request?.raw !== undefined;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthApiKey(regime, credentials)`: hand the app's {@link ApiKeyHook} the regime name and the inbound\n     * headers and let it look the CUSTOMER's key up. The declared `credentials` are NOT read here — they\n     * describe the contract for generators; the hook owns extraction. Three ways to fail, all 401, all\n     * before the controller:\n     *\n     * 1. NO hook bound — the endpoint is not enabled. Matches {@link JwtHook}'s documented behavior; an\n     *    unverified partner request must never be waved through because wiring was forgotten.\n     * 2. NO inbound request in scope — there are no headers to read, so there is nothing to verify. That\n     *    means a caller drove this route without publishing an HttpRequest; the message says so rather\n     *    than leaving a bare 401.\n     * 3. The hook threw — the key, or the key/organization pair, did not check out.\n     *\n     * On success the hook's {@link AuthenticatedCaller} is stamped exactly as a jwt parse's is, which is\n     * what puts the resolved organization into `RequestContext` for every downstream repository call.\n     */\n    private async enforceApiKey(regime: string, meta: MethodMeta): Promise<void> {\n        if (!this.apiKeyHook) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no ApiKeyHook is bound. ` +\n                    `Bind one (options.bind(API_KEY_HOOK).to(YourApiKeyHook)) to enable api-key verification.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('API-key auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const request = RequestContext.getRequest();\n        if (!request) {\n            log.warn(\n                `Refusing @WpAuthApiKey('${regime}') endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: no inbound HttpRequest is ` +\n                    `in scope, so the hook has no headers to read. A spec driving this route in-process must ` +\n                    `publish an HttpRequest carrying the api-key headers.`,\n            );\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'API key cannot be verified: no inbound request was published',\n            );\n        }\n        // Throws ApiUnauthorizedError to deny. The hook gets the WHOLE request so it can cross-check\n        // the key against a second header (the organization the customer is acting for).\n        const caller = await this.apiKeyHook.verifyApiKey(regime, request);\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * A body that failed to parse is held on the {@link RawRequest} and surfaces HERE, after auth, as\n     * the 400 it always was — never before it.\n     *\n     * The order is the whole point. A malformed body from an unauthenticated caller must answer 401,\n     * because \"your JSON was bad\" also says \"I got past auth\", and on a webhook endpoint — whose url\n     * is public by construction — that is a free oracle for anyone probing. Parsing first made the\n     * framework hand that out for nothing.\n     *\n     * Only routes that retain raw bytes can defer at all; every other route still fails at parse time\n     * in the transport, exactly as before.\n     */\n    private rethrowDeferredBodyError(): void {\n        const parseError = RequestContext.getRequest()?.raw?.bodyParseError;\n        if (parseError) {\n            throw new ApiBadRequestError(\n                'Request body is not valid JSON',\n                undefined,\n                undefined,\n                parseError,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Does this mode authenticate the CALLER ITSELF (as opposed to a user, or nobody)? The INBOUND\n     * twin of {@link DestinationTrust.forAuthMode}, and deliberately the same question: the client\n     * omits trusted keys for a destination that cannot verify it, and the server rejects trusted keys\n     * on a route that cannot verify the sender. One rule, two ends — if they disagreed, every call\n     * would fail with a 401 that looks like a framework bug.\n     *\n     * - `oidc` / `shared-secret` → TRUE. An internal service is on the other end and the trusted\n     *   context it forwarded may be believed. This is what makes cross-service identity propagation\n     *   work.\n     * - `jwt` / `public` → FALSE. A user JWT proves who the USER is; the SENDER is still whoever\n     *   holds the token, i.e. a browser.\n     * - `local-only` → FALSE. It verifies WHERE WE ARE RUNNING, not who is calling — anything on\n     *   localhost reaches it, and it has no authenticator, so nothing can ever vouch for an inbound\n     *   trusted header. Any such header therefore rejects the request, which is exactly right.\n     *\n     * - `apikey` → FALSE. See the comment on that branch: the sender is a CUSTOMER.\n     *\n     * An exhaustive switch with NO `default`, returning on every branch: a new AuthMode kind is a\n     * COMPILE error here (TS7030, no ending return) rather than silently landing on one posture. The\n     * boolean expression this replaced defaulted every future mode to \"not verified\" — the safe\n     * answer, but arrived at by accident rather than by decision.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static pure mapping from the AuthMode union, kept beside its only caller (mirrors DestinationTrust.forAuthMode)\n    private static verifiesCaller(mode: AuthMode): boolean {\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return true;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n            // `webhook` DOES authenticate its sender — but the sender is an outside VENDOR, not a\n            // peer in this repo, and a vendor neither speaks nor forwards webpieces context headers.\n            // So there is no forwarded identity to believe, and admitting one would mean trusting a\n            // key a vendor's payload could carry. Same answer as the OUTBOUND half\n            // (DestinationTrust.forAuthMode), which is the invariant that keeps the two ends agreeing.\n            case 'webhook':\n            // `apikey` authenticates the SENDER — but the sender is a CUSTOMER's codebase, not a peer\n            // service in this repo, so its forwarded trusted context is exactly what must NOT be\n            // believed: admitting it would let a partner assert another customer's org id on the wire.\n            // The hook's OWN derived entries still land (applyAuthenticatedCaller), and reconcileWireTrust then\n            // admits an inbound trusted header only when the hook independently derived the same value.\n            case 'apikey':\n            case 'local-only':\n                return false;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Decide what happens to the trusted keys that arrived on the WIRE and were held back by\n     * {@link PendingWireTrust} (read that class for why they are held rather than written).\n     *\n     * `callerVerified` — the endpoint authenticated the SENDER **as a peer service** (`@WpAuthOidc`,\n     * `@WpAuthSharedSecret`).\n     * The sender is a service we trust, this is the service-to-service hop, and its forwarded\n     * identity is admitted as-is. This is the case that makes propagating a verified userId across\n     * internal services work.\n     *\n     * Otherwise the sender is a browser or anyone else with curl, and the ONLY acceptable inbound\n     * trusted value is one the authenticator independently derived to the same value. Everything\n     * else is rejected — see {@link requireVouched}.\n     *\n     * Runs AFTER the mode enforcement above, because that is what stamps the authenticator's own\n     * values (`applyAuthenticatedCaller`); comparing before it ran would compare against nothing.\n     */\n    private reconcileWireTrust(callerVerified: boolean): void {\n        const pending = PendingWireTrust.takeAll();\n        for (const item of pending) {\n            if (callerVerified) {\n                RequestContext.putTrusted(item.key, item.value);\n            } else {\n                this.requireVouched(item);\n            }\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * On a browser-reachable route, an inbound trusted header must match what the authenticator\n     * itself derived, or the request dies. Both failure shapes are rejections, not repairs:\n     *\n     * - DIFFERENT value — the caller said `alice`, the credential says `bob`. Silently letting the\n     *   credential win is not safe, because upstream rate limiters commonly bucket on the header\n     *   rather than the token: the request was already counted against the wrong principal, so\n     *   every forged header would be a free rate-limit bypass. No honest caller contradicts its own\n     *   credential.\n     * - NOTHING vouched for it — nobody derived this key at all, so there is no evidence behind a\n     *   value a stranger typed. This is the common case, not the exotic one: the framework's\n     *   {@link DefaultJwtHook} stamps NO entries, and an app hook (jwt or api-key) only stamps the keys it can prove,\n     *   so any other trusted key a caller sends lands here.\n     *\n     * The pending value is discarded either way — the throw is what leaves the request.\n     */\n    private requireVouched(item: PendingTrustedValue): void {\n        const vouched = RequestContext.getTrusted(item.key);\n        if (vouched === item.value) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.error(\n            `Rejecting inbound '${item.key.httpHeader}': it is a TRUSTED context key, this route does ` +\n                `not authenticate its caller, and the credential ` +\n                (vouched === undefined\n                    ? 'vouched for no such value'\n                    : 'derived a different value') +\n                '.',\n        );\n        throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n            `Header '${item.key.httpHeader}' cannot be supplied by the caller on this endpoint`,\n        );\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * `@WpAuthLocalOnly`: serve only on a developer's machine, and off-local behave EXACTLY as if the\n     * endpoint did not exist.\n     *\n     * WHY 404 AND NOT THE 403 APPS HAND-ROLLED. Off-local the route is not registered at all\n     * (`ApiRoutingFactory` skips it), so the ordinary way to reach this path already answers 404. A\n     * 403 from here would be a DIFFERENT answer from the same framework for the same endpoint, and\n     * the difference is itself the leak: 403 confirms \"this path exists in production, you merely\n     * lack permission\", which is a map of the dev-only surface for anyone probing. A local-only\n     * endpoint should not admit it exists. Both gates therefore return the same 404, and this one is\n     * the backstop for routes registered by hand through `RouteBuilder` rather than by\n     * `ApiRoutingFactory`.\n     *\n     * The log line names WHICH reason applies, because \"you are deployed\" and \"nobody declared a\n     * locality\" have completely different fixes and both look like a bare 404 from outside.\n     */\n    private enforceLocalOnly(meta: MethodMeta): void {\n        if (RuntimeLocality.isLocalDevelopment()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        log.warn(\n            `Refusing @WpAuthLocalOnly endpoint ${meta.routeMeta.path}: ` +\n                (RuntimeLocality.isDeclared()\n                    ? 'this process declared itself DEPLOYED.'\n                    : 'no startup declared a RuntimeLocality, so this process is treated as DEPLOYED. ' +\n                      'Pass the locality into RuntimeSetupOptions if this really is a developer machine.'),\n        );\n        // Same shape as an unregistered route — see the method doc for why this is not a 403.\n        throw new ApiEndpointNotFoundError(`No endpoint at ${meta.routeMeta.path}`);\n    }\n\n    private async enforceJwt(\n        header: string | undefined,\n        requirement: JwtRequirement,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Authentication required');\n        }\n        if (!this.jwtHook) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('User-JWT auth is not enabled on this server');\n        }\n        const caller = await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token); // AUTHENTICATE — throws ApiUnauthorizedError if invalid\n        this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller);\n        await this.jwtHook.authorizeJwt(caller, requirement); // AUTHORIZE — app policy; throws ApiForbiddenError to deny\n    }\n\n    private async enforceOidc(header: string | undefined, callers: string[]): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!token) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError('Missing OIDC bearer token for @WpAuthOidc endpoint');\n        }\n        // App-bound OidcHook overrides the caller policy; otherwise the framework default runs directly.\n        if (this.oidcHook) {\n            await this.oidcHook.verifyOidc(token, callers);\n        } else {\n            await this.oidcVerifier.verify(token, callers);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** `provided` is the Authorization bearer value — the secret itself, same header as a JWT. */\n    private enforceSharedSecret(provided: string | undefined, secretKey: string): void {\n        const accepted = this.authConfig?.sharedSecrets[secretKey];\n        if (!accepted || !provided || !this.matchesEither(provided, accepted)) {\n            throw new ApiUnauthorizedError(\n                'Invalid shared secret for @WpAuthSharedSecret endpoint',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** EITHER secret1 or secret2 passes — the rotation window. Constant-time on each non-empty slot. */\n    private matchesEither(provided: string, accepted: SharedSecrets): boolean {\n        return (\n            (accepted.secret1 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret1)) ||\n            (accepted.secret2 !== '' && this.constantTimeEquals(provided, accepted.secret2))\n        );\n    }\n\n    /** Parse a JWT if one is present, else do nothing — used on public routes; never throws. */\n    private async bestEffortJwt(header: string | undefined): Promise<void> {\n        const token = this.credential(header, BEARER_SCHEME);\n        if (!this.jwtHook || !token) {\n            return;\n        }\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- best-effort on a public route: a bad/absent token just means \"not logged in\", must not fail the request\n        try {\n            this.applyAuthenticatedCaller(await this.jwtHook.parseJwt(token));\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            log.debug(\n                'Best-effort JWT parse on a public endpoint failed (treating as anonymous): ',\n                error,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Stamp the authenticated caller's context entries + the caller itself into the RequestContext.\n     * ONE path for all three authenticating hooks — jwt, api-key and webhook — so a vendor hook that\n     * proved which account a payload belongs to seeds context exactly as a JwtHook does.\n     */\n    private applyAuthenticatedCaller(caller: AuthenticatedCaller): void {\n        for (const entry of caller.entries) {\n            // ContextTuple.key is a TRUSTED key by type, so this is the one sanctioned write of a\n            // proven identity: the app's hook derived it from a credential we just verified.\n            RequestContext.putTrusted(entry.key, entry.value);\n        }\n        // A real TRUSTED ContextKey, not a raw string slot: the caller IS the framework's own proof,\n        // so it is written with the same typed verb every other proven value goes through.\n        RequestContext.putTrusted(AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY, caller);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The credential value IF the header carries the expected scheme, else undefined.\n     *\n     * Strict: a bare value with no scheme, or a value under the WRONG scheme (a shared secret sent\n     * where a JWT is expected), yields undefined and the caller 401s.\n     */\n    private credential(header: string | undefined, scheme: string): string | undefined {\n        if (!header) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        const prefix = `${scheme} `;\n        return header.startsWith(prefix) ? header.substring(prefix.length) : undefined;\n    }\n\n    private constantTimeEquals(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n        const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');\n        const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');\n        if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {\n            return false;\n        }\n        return timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/filters/LogApiFilter.js

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ const WpResponse_1 = require("../WpResponse");
  * - [API-server-resp-FAIL] Class.method error=... (server errors: 500, 502, 504)
  * - [API-server-resp-OTHER] Class.method errorType=... (user errors: 400, 401, 403, 404, 266)
  *
- * User errors (UnauthorizedError, BadRequestError, etc.) are logged as OTHER, not FAIL,
+ * User errors (ApiUnauthorizedError, ApiBadRequestError, etc.) are logged as OTHER, not FAIL,
  * because they are expected behavior from the server's perspective. LogApiCall re-throws the
  * error unchanged; the transport (express adapter, or another framework's adapter) maps
- * HttpError subclasses → HTTP status, so in-process and HTTP paths log identically.
+ * API error subclasses → HTTP status, so in-process and HTTP paths log identically.
  *
  * Headers are read from RequestContext (NOT from meta.requestHeaders which is undefined
  * after ContextFilter runs).

package/src/filters/LogApiFilter.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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It logs the request AND the response/failure for EVERY call —\n * over HTTP or via createApiClient — and stamps the routed controller identity so every log line\n * of the request carries [Controller.method].\n *\n * Being outermost is deliberate: a request rejected by AuthFilter (401), or any other below-it\n * filter, is STILL logged here with its request body and controller identity. (The former\n * ErrorLogFilter sat above auth but logged only a bare error line — no request, no identity;\n * LogApiFilter replaces it and subsumes its error-logging via LogApiCall.)\n *\n * Logging patterns (via LogApiCall):\n * - [API-server-req] Class.method request={...}\n * - [API-server-resp-SUCCESS] Class.method response={...}\n * - [API-server-resp-FAIL] Class.method error=... (server errors: 500, 502, 504)\n * - [API-server-resp-OTHER] Class.method errorType=... (user errors: 400, 401, 403, 404, 266)\n *\n * User errors (UnauthorizedError, BadRequestError, etc.) are logged as OTHER, not FAIL,\n * because they are expected behavior from the server's perspective. LogApiCall re-throws the\n * error unchanged; the transport (express adapter, or another framework's adapter) maps\n * HttpError subclasses → HTTP status, so in-process and HTTP paths log identically.\n *\n * Headers are read from RequestContext (NOT from meta.requestHeaders which is undefined\n * after ContextFilter runs).\n */\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('LogApiFilter');\n\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class LogApiFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n\n    /**\n     * The SERVER's api-call log seam, built here around the RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext.\n     * This is the server's inbound construction point; the outbound ones live in each client package\n     * (NodeProxyClient, TaskProxyClient, BrowserProxyClient).\n     */\n    private readonly logApiCall = new LogApiCallImpl(new RequestContextApiCallContext());\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        // Wrap nextFilter.invoke in a method that returns the response\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- response DTO is erased at the api/proxy boundary\n        const method = async (): Promise<unknown> => {\n            const wpResponse = await nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n            return wpResponse.response;\n        };\n\n        // LogApiCall logs the text lines AND stamps the\n        // structured `api={method:{side:'server',...},...}` tag into RequestContext, so every log line\n        // during the request carries jsonPayload.api. Correlation fields (requestId, ...) are added by\n        // the backend. apiClass is the CONTRACT name (routeMeta.apiName, e.g. 'SaveApi') so a server log\n        // line MATCHES the client's for the same call; controllerName keeps the impl (e.g. 'SaveController').\n        const rm = meta.routeMeta;\n\n        // Stamp the routed endpoint's IMPLEMENTATION identity onto the request context so EVERY log line\n        // of this request (not just the api req/resp lines) carries the concrete controller class +\n        // handler method name — what you actually grep for, and more useful than the raw requestPath. GCP\n        // gets them as separate jsonPayload.controller / jsonPayload.method; the local console formatters\n        // render them together as a compact [Controller.method] bracket. They clear with the request scope.\n        if (rm.controllerClassName) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CONTROLLER, rm.controllerClassName);\n        }\n        if (rm.methodName) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.METHOD, rm.methodName);\n        }\n\n        const info = new ApiMethodInfo(\n            'server',\n            rm.apiName ?? rm.controllerClassName ?? 'Unknown',\n            rm.methodName,\n            rm.controllerClassName,\n            rm.mask,\n        );\n        const response = await this.logApiCall.execute(info, meta.requestDto, method);\n        return new WpResponse(response);\n    }\n}\n"]}
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It logs the request AND the response/failure for EVERY call —\n * over HTTP or via createApiClient — and stamps the routed controller identity so every log line\n * of the request carries [Controller.method].\n *\n * Being outermost is deliberate: a request rejected by AuthFilter (401), or any other below-it\n * filter, is STILL logged here with its request body and controller identity. (The former\n * ErrorLogFilter sat above auth but logged only a bare error line — no request, no identity;\n * LogApiFilter replaces it and subsumes its error-logging via LogApiCall.)\n *\n * Logging patterns (via LogApiCall):\n * - [API-server-req] Class.method request={...}\n * - [API-server-resp-SUCCESS] Class.method response={...}\n * - [API-server-resp-FAIL] Class.method error=... (server errors: 500, 502, 504)\n * - [API-server-resp-OTHER] Class.method errorType=... (user errors: 400, 401, 403, 404, 266)\n *\n * User errors (ApiUnauthorizedError, ApiBadRequestError, etc.) are logged as OTHER, not FAIL,\n * because they are expected behavior from the server's perspective. LogApiCall re-throws the\n * error unchanged; the transport (express adapter, or another framework's adapter) maps\n * API error subclasses → HTTP status, so in-process and HTTP paths log identically.\n *\n * Headers are read from RequestContext (NOT from meta.requestHeaders which is undefined\n * after ContextFilter runs).\n */\nconst log = LogManager.getLogger('LogApiFilter');\n\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\n// webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\nexport class LogApiFilter extends Filter<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>> {\n    /**\n     * The SERVER's api-call log seam, built here around the RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext.\n     * This is the server's inbound construction point; the outbound ones live in each client package\n     * (NodeProxyClient, TaskProxyClient, BrowserProxyClient).\n     */\n    private readonly logApiCall = new LogApiCallImpl(new RequestContextApiCallContext());\n\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- Filter generic params use unknown for response flexibility\n    async filter(\n        meta: MethodMeta,\n        nextFilter: Service<MethodMeta, WpResponse<unknown>>,\n    ): Promise<WpResponse<unknown>> {\n        // Wrap nextFilter.invoke in a method that returns the response\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- response DTO is erased at the api/proxy boundary\n        const method = async (): Promise<unknown> => {\n            const wpResponse = await nextFilter.invoke(meta);\n            return wpResponse.response;\n        };\n\n        // LogApiCall logs the text lines AND stamps the\n        // structured `api={method:{side:'server',...},...}` tag into RequestContext, so every log line\n        // during the request carries jsonPayload.api. Correlation fields (requestId, ...) are added by\n        // the backend. apiClass is the CONTRACT name (routeMeta.apiName, e.g. 'SaveApi') so a server log\n        // line MATCHES the client's for the same call; controllerName keeps the impl (e.g. 'SaveController').\n        const rm = meta.routeMeta;\n\n        // Stamp the routed endpoint's IMPLEMENTATION identity onto the request context so EVERY log line\n        // of this request (not just the api req/resp lines) carries the concrete controller class +\n        // handler method name — what you actually grep for, and more useful than the raw requestPath. GCP\n        // gets them as separate jsonPayload.controller / jsonPayload.method; the local console formatters\n        // render them together as a compact [Controller.method] bracket. They clear with the request scope.\n        if (rm.controllerClassName) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CONTROLLER, rm.controllerClassName);\n        }\n        if (rm.methodName) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.METHOD, rm.methodName);\n        }\n\n        const info = new ApiMethodInfo(\n            'server',\n            rm.apiName ?? rm.controllerClassName ?? 'Unknown',\n            rm.methodName,\n            rm.controllerClassName,\n            rm.mask,\n        );\n        const response = await this.logApiCall.execute(info, meta.requestDto, method);\n        return new WpResponse(response);\n    }\n}\n"]}