@webpieces/http-client-node 0.4.964 → 0.4.966

package/README.md

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ for (const webhook of webhooks) {
   `new ContextFullUrlFilter(new SsrfTestingPolicy('local fake in the delivery e2e'))`.
 - **Every auth mode still works.** `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` mint for the FINAL base URL, `sharedSecret(...)`
   sends the value this client holds (N services implementing one contract behind one agreed secret is
-  a real topology), and `@WpAuth([vendorAuth(name)])` calls your bound `VendorAuthHook.mint`. The minter runs
+  a real topology), and `@WpAuth([vendorAuth(name)])` calls your bound `VendorAuthMinter.mint`. The minter runs
   BELOW the SSRF guard, so a destination that is going to be refused never causes a credential to be
   created.
 - **The hop is VISIBLE.** `@externalSystem runtime <identity>` on the contract draws the destination
@@ -138,37 +138,73 @@ for deployment assumptions and why a direct application-verifier test does not t
 
 ## A vendor's credential, both ways — `vendorAuth(...)`
 
-`@WpAuth([vendorAuth(name)])` names a vendor's credential SCHEME, not a direction. ONE app-bound
-`VendorAuthHook` (in `@webpieces/core-context`, re-exported here and by `@webpieces/http-routing`)
-serves both ends: `verify` when the vendor calls US, `mint` when WE call the vendor (a per-merchant
-OAuth bearer, a partner's HMAC over the final URL and the exact wire bytes), and `refresh` when the
-vendor answers our call with a `401`:
+`@WpAuth([vendorAuth(name)])` names a vendor's credential SCHEME, not a direction. The direction is
+decided by whether THIS runtime is sending or receiving, and each direction is its OWN optional DI
+role (both defined in `@webpieces/core-context`):
+
+| role | token | methods | who binds it | re-exported by |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `VendorAuthMinter` | `VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER` | `mint`, `refresh` | a process that SENDS `vendorAuth(...)` calls (a CLI, a worker, a server calling a vendor) | `@webpieces/http-client-node` |
+| `VendorAuthVerifier` | `VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER` | `verify` | a server that RECEIVES `vendorAuth(...)` calls | `@webpieces/http-routing` |
+
+A process binds neither, one, or both. `mint` produces the credential WE present when we call the
+vendor (a per-merchant OAuth bearer, a partner's HMAC over the final URL and the exact wire bytes),
+and `refresh` renews it when the vendor answers our call with a `401`:
 
 ```ts
 @provideSingleton()
-export class PartnerAuth extends VendorAuthHook {
+export class PartnerAuthMinter extends VendorAuthMinter {
     async mint(name: string, request: SignableRequest): Promise<Map<string, string>> {
         const mac = createHmac('sha256', secretFor(name)).update(request.body ?? '').digest('hex');
         return new Map([['x-partner-signature', `sha256=${mac}`]]);
     }
     async refresh(name: string): Promise<void> { /* renew the OAuth token, log in again */ }
-    async verify(name: string, request: RawHttpRequest): Promise<AuthenticatedCaller> { /* ... */ }
 }
 
-// AppModule.ts
-options.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK).to(PartnerAuth);
+// the SENDING process's BindModule
+binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER).to(PartnerAuthMinter).inSingletonScope();
 ```
 
+**Why two roles (#1358).** Every typed RPC client this package builds is a `NodeProxyClient`, and it
+depends on the OUTBOUND role only. When one `VendorAuthHook` served both directions, every proxy —
+including an ordinary `oidcSameProject()` client — constructed the server's inbound verifier, and a
+verifier that looks a credential up through such a client closed a DI cycle
+(`Circular dependency found`) before the server could listen. With the roles split, a
+`VendorAuthVerifier` may depend on any RPC client, in any binding order, and the graph stays acyclic.
+
+| configuration | minter required? | verifier required? |
+|---|---|---|
+| OIDC-only or public-only outbound client | no | no |
+| outbound call selecting `vendorAuth(name)` | yes, to send that call | no |
+| server receiving a `vendorAuth(name)` request | no | yes |
+| server receiving vendor calls and calling an OIDC-only API downstream | no (not for the OIDC hop) | yes |
+| process both sending and receiving vendor calls | yes | yes |
+
+### Migrating from `VendorAuthHook` / `VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK`
+
+The unified hook is DELETED (no alias): the old import stops compiling, which is the migration.
+
+- A CLIENT process (e.g. a CLI holding a worker token): `extends VendorAuthMinter`, keep `mint` and
+  `refresh`, delete the meaningless `verify`, and bind `VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER`. The minter keeps reading
+  the credential it already holds — it never validates it server-side.
+- A SERVER process: `extends VendorAuthVerifier`, keep `verify`, delete the meaningless
+  `mint`/`refresh`, and bind `VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER`. Its constructor may inject the typed
+  `oidcSameProject()` RPC client it uses to check the credential.
+- `MissingVendorAuthHookError` is now `MissingVendorAuthMinterError`.
+- Contracts are unchanged: `@WpAuth([vendorAuth(name)])` keeps its meaning.
+
 On a raw `401`, `OutboundAuthFilter` cancels the 401's body, calls `refresh(name)` ONCE, mints again
 and re-sends ONCE — never for a streaming upload, and once per logical call (the SSRF redirect loop
 re-enters the filter). A second `401` fails the call exactly as before. Serializing a refresh across
-instances (single-use refresh tokens) is the hook's job.
+instances (single-use refresh tokens) is the minter's job.
 
 The framework ships no vendor crypto, deliberately: Twilio signs the full URL with sorted params,
-Slack signs `v0:{ts}:{body}`, Meta signs the raw body. The scheme lives in your hook and the vendor on
-the contract. With **no** `VendorAuthHook` bound, every outbound `vendorAuth(...)` call THROWS
-(`MissingVendorAuthHookError`) rather than sending unauthenticated — the mirror of an unbound hook
-401ing every inbound one.
+Slack signs `v0:{ts}:{body}`, Meta signs the raw body. The scheme lives in your minter / verifier and
+the vendor on the contract. With **no** `VendorAuthMinter` bound, every outbound `vendorAuth(...)`
+call THROWS (`MissingVendorAuthMinterError`) before anything is sent, rather than sending
+unauthenticated — the mirror of an unbound `VendorAuthVerifier` 401ing every inbound one. A bound
+verifier never counts as a minter, and an unbound minter never breaks an OIDC, shared-secret or
+public call.
 
 Calls have a **30-second default timeout**, including URL resolution, filters/auth, fetch and body
 reading. `ClientRegistry` from `@webpieces/core-util` shares ALL, API and API-method overrides with the

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/http-client-node",
-  "version": "0.4.964",
+  "version": "0.4.966",
   "description": "Server-side HTTP client for webpieces: inversify-wired, reads RequestContext directly, mints OIDC/shared-secret delivery auth, resolves Cloud Run URLs from a service name",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.964",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.964",
-    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.964",
-    "@webpieces/http-client-core": "0.4.964",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.966",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.966",
+    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.966",
+    "@webpieces/http-client-core": "0.4.966",
     "inversify": "7.10.4",
     "reflect-metadata": "0.2.2"
   }

package/src/ClientHttpFactory.d.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import { NodeProxyClient } from './NodeProxyClient';
  * ]);
  * ```
  * The SSRF guard arms itself the moment that filter re-points a request, and the contract's
- * `vendorAuth(name)` selects the app's bound `VendorAuthHook` to mint over the exact bytes —
+ * `vendorAuth(name)` selects the app's bound `VendorAuthMinter` to mint over the exact bytes —
  * neither is something the app registers, orders, or can displace.
  *
  * Every client it builds shares one {@link NodeProxyClient} *shape* but never one instance: the

package/src/ClientHttpFactory.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const NodeProxyClient_1 = require("./NodeProxyClient");
  * ]);
  * ```
  * The SSRF guard arms itself the moment that filter re-points a request, and the contract's
- * `vendorAuth(name)` selects the app's bound `VendorAuthHook` to mint over the exact bytes —
+ * `vendorAuth(name)` selects the app's bound `VendorAuthMinter` to mint over the exact bytes —
  * neither is something the app registers, orders, or can displace.
  *
  * Every client it builds shares one {@link NodeProxyClient} *shape* but never one instance: the

package/src/ClientHttpFactory.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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NodeProxyClient is bound TRANSIENT\n// (@provideFrameworkTransient), so each provider.get() constructs a new one.\nbindFrameworkProvider(NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER, NodeProxyClient);\n\n/**\n * ClientHttpFactory - builds type-safe HTTP clients from API prototypes carrying\n * @ApiPath/@Endpoint decorators. The SERVER-side factory.\n *\n * This is the client-side equivalent of ApiRoutingFactory:\n * - Server routing: ApiRoutingFactory reads decorators -> routes HTTP requests to controllers\n * - Server client:  ClientHttpFactory reads decorators -> generates HTTP requests from method calls\n *\n * Inject it and ask for a typed client per contract:\n * ```typescript\n * // same project + region as this container; the URL is derived, you maintain nothing\n * const server2 = factory.createRpcClient(Server2Api, new ClientConfig('server2', ClientRole.SERVER));\n *\n * // to reach somewhere derivation cannot describe (other region/project, non-Cloud-Run, localhost),\n * // register it once at startup — the client still carries only the svcName:\n * //   ClientRegistry.addUrlMapping('legacy', 'https://legacy.corp');\n * const legacy = factory.createRpcClient(LegacyApi, new ClientConfig('legacy', ClientRole.SERVER));\n *\n * const response = await server2.fetchValue(req);   // inside a RequestContext\n * ```\n *\n * A destination that is DATA rather than deployment — a URL a partner registered — is a FILTER, not\n * a different kind of client. Install `ContextBaseUrlFilter` on the one client that may be\n * re-pointed, and set the URL per call:\n * ```typescript\n * const partner = factory.createRpcClient(PartnerWebhookApi, new ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', ClientRole.SERVER), [\n *     new ClientFilterDefinition(1000, new ContextBaseUrlFilter()),\n * ]);\n * ```\n * The SSRF guard arms itself the moment that filter re-points a request, and the contract's\n * `vendorAuth(name)` selects the app's bound `VendorAuthHook` to mint over the exact bytes —\n * neither is something the app registers, orders, or can displace.\n *\n * Every client it builds shares one {@link NodeProxyClient} *shape* but never one instance: the\n * injected `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` hands out a fresh one per contract, which `createRpcClient`\n * then `init`s. Their collaborators (RequestContextHeaders, Secrets) come from the container, so\n * the whole dependency graph is visible in this package's design.html.\n *\n * Unlike @webpieces/http-client-browser this package is Node-only, so the factory IS the inversify\n * entry point and the magic context is read straight from the RequestContext. A call made outside\n * `RequestContext.run(...)` throws rather than silently dropping the trace.\n */\n@DocumentDesign()\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class ClientHttpFactory {\n    constructor(\n        @inject(NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER)\n        private readonly proxyClientProvider: Provider<NodeProxyClient>,\n    ) {}\n\n    /**\n     * Create a type-safe RPC (HTTP) client for one API contract.\n     *\n     * @param apiPrototype - The API prototype class with @ApiPath/@Endpoint decorators\n     * @param config - This client's state: its svcName, which is what `ClientRegistry` resolves\n     * @param filters - This client's own OUTBOUND filters, each with the priority it runs at\n     *        (highest OUTERMOST). They wrap the send, so a filter may rewrite the URL, add or remove\n     *        headers, log, or replace `ClientRequest.body` — the exact bytes transmitted. What goes\n     *        here is APP behaviour: url rewriting, headers, logging, and `ContextBaseUrlFilter` when\n     *        this client's destination arrives per call.\n     *\n     *        OPTIONAL, and omitting it is not a statement about security: the framework's own SSRF\n     *        guard and credential minter are installed on every client regardless, BENEATH anything\n     *        passed here, so there is nothing an app can decline by writing nothing.\n     *\n     *        A PLAIN OPTIONAL ARRAY, deliberately. Omitting it, passing `[]`, and passing a list you\n     *        built up conditionally all mean the same thing and all compile — because the normal way\n     *        an app arrives at a filter list is to declare a `ClientFilterDefinition[]` and push to\n     *        it under `if`s, and the declared type of such a local can never be non-empty. A\n     *        non-empty tuple here would reject that ordinary code and force a cast at the call site.\n     *        `filters === undefined ? [] : [...filters]` below normalizes the two empty spellings to\n     *        one value before anything downstream sees them. Pinned in\n     *        {@link CreateRpcClientCompileAssertions}.\n     */\n    createRpcClient<T extends object>(\n        apiPrototype: ApiPrototype<T>,\n        config: ClientConfig,\n        filters?: readonly ClientFilterDefinition[],\n    ): T {\n        assertNotInternalApi(apiPrototype, 'ClientHttpFactory');\n        // Fresh instance per contract — NodeProxyClient is transient. init() binds it to this\n        // contract + target; the collaborators already came from the container.\n        const proxyClient = this.proxyClientProvider.get();\n        proxyClient.init(apiPrototype, config, filters === undefined ? [] : [...filters]);\n        return buildClientProxy(apiPrototype, proxyClient);\n    }\n}\n"]}
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NodeProxyClient is bound TRANSIENT\n// (@provideFrameworkTransient), so each provider.get() constructs a new one.\nbindFrameworkProvider(NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER, NodeProxyClient);\n\n/**\n * ClientHttpFactory - builds type-safe HTTP clients from API prototypes carrying\n * @ApiPath/@Endpoint decorators. The SERVER-side factory.\n *\n * This is the client-side equivalent of ApiRoutingFactory:\n * - Server routing: ApiRoutingFactory reads decorators -> routes HTTP requests to controllers\n * - Server client:  ClientHttpFactory reads decorators -> generates HTTP requests from method calls\n *\n * Inject it and ask for a typed client per contract:\n * ```typescript\n * // same project + region as this container; the URL is derived, you maintain nothing\n * const server2 = factory.createRpcClient(Server2Api, new ClientConfig('server2', ClientRole.SERVER));\n *\n * // to reach somewhere derivation cannot describe (other region/project, non-Cloud-Run, localhost),\n * // register it once at startup — the client still carries only the svcName:\n * //   ClientRegistry.addUrlMapping('legacy', 'https://legacy.corp');\n * const legacy = factory.createRpcClient(LegacyApi, new ClientConfig('legacy', ClientRole.SERVER));\n *\n * const response = await server2.fetchValue(req);   // inside a RequestContext\n * ```\n *\n * A destination that is DATA rather than deployment — a URL a partner registered — is a FILTER, not\n * a different kind of client. Install `ContextBaseUrlFilter` on the one client that may be\n * re-pointed, and set the URL per call:\n * ```typescript\n * const partner = factory.createRpcClient(PartnerWebhookApi, new ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', ClientRole.SERVER), [\n *     new ClientFilterDefinition(1000, new ContextBaseUrlFilter()),\n * ]);\n * ```\n * The SSRF guard arms itself the moment that filter re-points a request, and the contract's\n * `vendorAuth(name)` selects the app's bound `VendorAuthMinter` to mint over the exact bytes —\n * neither is something the app registers, orders, or can displace.\n *\n * Every client it builds shares one {@link NodeProxyClient} *shape* but never one instance: the\n * injected `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` hands out a fresh one per contract, which `createRpcClient`\n * then `init`s. Their collaborators (RequestContextHeaders, Secrets) come from the container, so\n * the whole dependency graph is visible in this package's design.html.\n *\n * Unlike @webpieces/http-client-browser this package is Node-only, so the factory IS the inversify\n * entry point and the magic context is read straight from the RequestContext. A call made outside\n * `RequestContext.run(...)` throws rather than silently dropping the trace.\n */\n@DocumentDesign()\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class ClientHttpFactory {\n    constructor(\n        @inject(NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER)\n        private readonly proxyClientProvider: Provider<NodeProxyClient>,\n    ) {}\n\n    /**\n     * Create a type-safe RPC (HTTP) client for one API contract.\n     *\n     * @param apiPrototype - The API prototype class with @ApiPath/@Endpoint decorators\n     * @param config - This client's state: its svcName, which is what `ClientRegistry` resolves\n     * @param filters - This client's own OUTBOUND filters, each with the priority it runs at\n     *        (highest OUTERMOST). They wrap the send, so a filter may rewrite the URL, add or remove\n     *        headers, log, or replace `ClientRequest.body` — the exact bytes transmitted. What goes\n     *        here is APP behaviour: url rewriting, headers, logging, and `ContextBaseUrlFilter` when\n     *        this client's destination arrives per call.\n     *\n     *        OPTIONAL, and omitting it is not a statement about security: the framework's own SSRF\n     *        guard and credential minter are installed on every client regardless, BENEATH anything\n     *        passed here, so there is nothing an app can decline by writing nothing.\n     *\n     *        A PLAIN OPTIONAL ARRAY, deliberately. Omitting it, passing `[]`, and passing a list you\n     *        built up conditionally all mean the same thing and all compile — because the normal way\n     *        an app arrives at a filter list is to declare a `ClientFilterDefinition[]` and push to\n     *        it under `if`s, and the declared type of such a local can never be non-empty. A\n     *        non-empty tuple here would reject that ordinary code and force a cast at the call site.\n     *        `filters === undefined ? [] : [...filters]` below normalizes the two empty spellings to\n     *        one value before anything downstream sees them. Pinned in\n     *        {@link CreateRpcClientCompileAssertions}.\n     */\n    createRpcClient<T extends object>(\n        apiPrototype: ApiPrototype<T>,\n        config: ClientConfig,\n        filters?: readonly ClientFilterDefinition[],\n    ): T {\n        assertNotInternalApi(apiPrototype, 'ClientHttpFactory');\n        // Fresh instance per contract — NodeProxyClient is transient. init() binds it to this\n        // contract + target; the collaborators already came from the container.\n        const proxyClient = this.proxyClientProvider.get();\n        proxyClient.init(apiPrototype, config, filters === undefined ? [] : [...filters]);\n        return buildClientProxy(apiPrototype, proxyClient);\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.d.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,18 @@
+import { VendorAuthVerifier } from '@webpieces/core-context';
+import { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';
 /**
- * COMPILE-TIME proof that the outbound half of `webhook(name)` stays deleted (#1339): ONE
- * `VendorAuthHook` (core-context) now mints, refreshes and verifies. Each `@ts-expect-error` fails
- * the build (TS2578) the moment its symbol is exported again. A compiled file, never a `.spec.ts`,
- * because vitest strips types and a spec's `@ts-expect-error` is inert.
+ * COMPILE-TIME proof that the deleted outbound auth spellings stay deleted. The outbound half of
+ * `webhook(name)` (#1339) and the unified `VendorAuthHook` that replaced it (#1358) are both gone:
+ * this client mints with the OUTBOUND role `VendorAuthMinter` (core-context) and nothing else. Each
+ * `@ts-expect-error` fails the build (TS2578) the moment its symbol is exported or accepted again. A
+ * compiled file, never a `.spec.ts`, because vitest strips types and a spec's `@ts-expect-error` is
+ * inert.
  */
 export declare class DeletedAuthCompileAssertions {
     removedExports(): void;
+    /**
+     * The outbound filter takes the OUTBOUND role only. Handing it the server's inbound verifier —
+     * the shape that put the verifier into every RPC proxy's construction (#1358) — must not compile.
+     */
+    outboundFilterRefusesTheVerifier(oidc: GcpOidc, verifier: VendorAuthVerifier): void;
 }

package/src/DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.js

@@ -3,20 +3,39 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.DeletedAuthCompileAssertions = void 0;
 const tslib_1 = require("tslib");
 const ClientNode = tslib_1.__importStar(require("./index"));
+const OutboundAuthFilter_1 = require("./OutboundAuthFilter");
 /**
- * COMPILE-TIME proof that the outbound half of `webhook(name)` stays deleted (#1339): ONE
- * `VendorAuthHook` (core-context) now mints, refreshes and verifies. Each `@ts-expect-error` fails
- * the build (TS2578) the moment its symbol is exported again. A compiled file, never a `.spec.ts`,
- * because vitest strips types and a spec's `@ts-expect-error` is inert.
+ * COMPILE-TIME proof that the deleted outbound auth spellings stay deleted. The outbound half of
+ * `webhook(name)` (#1339) and the unified `VendorAuthHook` that replaced it (#1358) are both gone:
+ * this client mints with the OUTBOUND role `VendorAuthMinter` (core-context) and nothing else. Each
+ * `@ts-expect-error` fails the build (TS2578) the moment its symbol is exported or accepted again. A
+ * compiled file, never a `.spec.ts`, because vitest strips types and a spec's `@ts-expect-error` is
+ * inert.
  */
 class DeletedAuthCompileAssertions {
     removedExports() {
-        // @ts-expect-error WebhookSignerCallback is replaced by VendorAuthHook.mint (bind VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK)
+        // @ts-expect-error WebhookSignerCallback is replaced by VendorAuthMinter.mint (bind VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)
         void ClientNode.WebhookSignerCallback;
-        // @ts-expect-error WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK is replaced by VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK
+        // @ts-expect-error WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK is replaced by VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER
         void ClientNode.WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK;
-        // @ts-expect-error MissingWebhookSignerError is replaced by MissingVendorAuthHookError
+        // @ts-expect-error MissingWebhookSignerError is replaced by MissingVendorAuthMinterError
         void ClientNode.MissingWebhookSignerError;
+        // @ts-expect-error VendorAuthHook is DELETED: the client binds the OUTBOUND role VendorAuthMinter
+        void ClientNode.VendorAuthHook;
+        // @ts-expect-error VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK is DELETED: bind VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER
+        void ClientNode.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK;
+        // @ts-expect-error MissingVendorAuthHookError is RENAMED to MissingVendorAuthMinterError
+        void ClientNode.MissingVendorAuthHookError;
+        // @ts-expect-error the INBOUND role is the server's (http-routing); a client package never exports it
+        void ClientNode.VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The outbound filter takes the OUTBOUND role only. Handing it the server's inbound verifier —
+     * the shape that put the verifier into every RPC proxy's construction (#1358) — must not compile.
+     */
+    outboundFilterRefusesTheVerifier(oidc, verifier) {
+        // @ts-expect-error a VendorAuthVerifier cannot mint: OutboundAuthFilter takes a VendorAuthMinter
+        void new OutboundAuthFilter_1.OutboundAuthFilter(oidc, undefined, verifier);
     }
 }
 exports.DeletedAuthCompileAssertions = DeletedAuthCompileAssertions;

package/src/DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-client-node/src/DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;AAAA,4DAAsC;AAEtC;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAa,4BAA4B;IACrC,cAAc;QACV,oGAAoG;QACpG,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;QACtC,2EAA2E;QAC3E,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC;QACxC,uFAAuF;QACvF,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;IAC9C,CAAC;CACJ;AATD,oEASC","sourcesContent":["import * as ClientNode from './index';\n\n/**\n * COMPILE-TIME proof that the outbound half of `webhook(name)` stays deleted (#1339): ONE\n * `VendorAuthHook` (core-context) now mints, refreshes and verifies. Each `@ts-expect-error` fails\n * the build (TS2578) the moment its symbol is exported again. A compiled file, never a `.spec.ts`,\n * because vitest strips types and a spec's `@ts-expect-error` is inert.\n */\nexport class DeletedAuthCompileAssertions {\n    removedExports(): void {\n        // @ts-expect-error WebhookSignerCallback is replaced by VendorAuthHook.mint (bind VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK)\n        void ClientNode.WebhookSignerCallback;\n        // @ts-expect-error WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK is replaced by VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK\n        void ClientNode.WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK;\n        // @ts-expect-error MissingWebhookSignerError is replaced by MissingVendorAuthHookError\n        void ClientNode.MissingWebhookSignerError;\n    }\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-client-node/src/DeletedAuthCompileAssertions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;;AAEA,4DAAsC;AACtC,6DAA0D;AAE1D;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAa,4BAA4B;IACrC,cAAc;QACV,wGAAwG;QACxG,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;QACtC,6EAA6E;QAC7E,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC;QACxC,yFAAyF;QACzF,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,yBAAyB,CAAC;QAC1C,kGAAkG;QAClG,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAC/B,wEAAwE;QACxE,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;QACjC,yFAAyF;QACzF,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,0BAA0B,CAAC;QAC3C,sGAAsG;QACtG,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC;IACzC,CAAC;IAED;;;OAGG;IACH,gCAAgC,CAAC,IAAa,EAAE,QAA4B;QACxE,iGAAiG;QACjG,KAAK,IAAI,uCAAkB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3D,CAAC;CACJ;AA1BD,oEA0BC","sourcesContent":["import { VendorAuthVerifier } from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';\nimport * as ClientNode from './index';\nimport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\n\n/**\n * COMPILE-TIME proof that the deleted outbound auth spellings stay deleted. The outbound half of\n * `webhook(name)` (#1339) and the unified `VendorAuthHook` that replaced it (#1358) are both gone:\n * this client mints with the OUTBOUND role `VendorAuthMinter` (core-context) and nothing else. Each\n * `@ts-expect-error` fails the build (TS2578) the moment its symbol is exported or accepted again. A\n * compiled file, never a `.spec.ts`, because vitest strips types and a spec's `@ts-expect-error` is\n * inert.\n */\nexport class DeletedAuthCompileAssertions {\n    removedExports(): void {\n        // @ts-expect-error WebhookSignerCallback is replaced by VendorAuthMinter.mint (bind VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)\n        void ClientNode.WebhookSignerCallback;\n        // @ts-expect-error WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK is replaced by VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER\n        void ClientNode.WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK;\n        // @ts-expect-error MissingWebhookSignerError is replaced by MissingVendorAuthMinterError\n        void ClientNode.MissingWebhookSignerError;\n        // @ts-expect-error VendorAuthHook is DELETED: the client binds the OUTBOUND role VendorAuthMinter\n        void ClientNode.VendorAuthHook;\n        // @ts-expect-error VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK is DELETED: bind VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER\n        void ClientNode.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK;\n        // @ts-expect-error MissingVendorAuthHookError is RENAMED to MissingVendorAuthMinterError\n        void ClientNode.MissingVendorAuthHookError;\n        // @ts-expect-error the INBOUND role is the server's (http-routing); a client package never exports it\n        void ClientNode.VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The outbound filter takes the OUTBOUND role only. Handing it the server's inbound verifier —\n     * the shape that put the verifier into every RPC proxy's construction (#1358) — must not compile.\n     */\n    outboundFilterRefusesTheVerifier(oidc: GcpOidc, verifier: VendorAuthVerifier): void {\n        // @ts-expect-error a VendorAuthVerifier cannot mint: OutboundAuthFilter takes a VendorAuthMinter\n        void new OutboundAuthFilter(oidc, undefined, verifier);\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/NodeProxyClient.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { DestinationTrust, RouteMetadata, Secrets, ClientRole, HttpCallFactsHolder } from '@webpieces/core-util';
-import { RequestContextHeaders, VendorAuthHook } from '@webpieces/core-context';
+import { RequestContextHeaders, VendorAuthMinter } from '@webpieces/core-context';
 import { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';
 import { ApiPrototype, ByteReadableStream, ClientRequest, ClientFilterDefinition, ProxyClient } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';
 import { AddressResolver } from './AddressResolver';
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ export declare class NodeProxyClient extends ProxyClient {
     private readonly gcpOidc;
     private readonly addressResolver;
     private readonly secrets?;
-    private readonly vendorAuthHook?;
+    private readonly vendorAuthMinter?;
     protected selectAuthMethod(route: import('@webpieces/core-util').RouteMetadata): import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode;
     private config;
-    constructor(headers: RequestContextHeaders, gcpOidc: GcpOidc, addressResolver: AddressResolver, secrets?: Secrets | undefined, vendorAuthHook?: VendorAuthHook | undefined);
+    constructor(headers: RequestContextHeaders, gcpOidc: GcpOidc, addressResolver: AddressResolver, secrets?: Secrets | undefined, vendorAuthMinter?: VendorAuthMinter | undefined);
     /**
      * Bind this client to one API contract + target, with the app's outbound filters (url
      * rewriting, header editing, logging, per-call re-pointing).

package/src/NodeProxyClient.js

@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ let NodeProxyClient = class NodeProxyClient extends http_client_core_1.ProxyClie
     gcpOidc;
     addressResolver;
     secrets;
-    vendorAuthHook;
+    vendorAuthMinter;
     selectAuthMethod(route) {
         const methods = route.authMeta?.methods;
         if (!methods)
             throw new Error('Endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');
         const selected = methods.find((method) => method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'public' ||
             (method.kind === 'shared-secret' && !!this.secrets?.get(method.secretKey)) ||
-            (method.kind === 'vendorAuth' && !!this.vendorAuthHook));
+            (method.kind === 'vendorAuth' && !!this.vendorAuthMinter));
         if (selected)
             return selected;
         if (methods.length === 1)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ let NodeProxyClient = class NodeProxyClient extends http_client_core_1.ProxyClie
         throw new Error('No configured Node client credential can satisfy this endpoint; bind a declared service credential.');
     }
     config;
-    constructor(headers, gcpOidc, addressResolver, secrets, vendorAuthHook) {
+    constructor(headers, gcpOidc, addressResolver, secrets, vendorAuthMinter) {
         // This package is node-only and already depends on core-context, so it builds the
         // RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext itself. No startup install, and therefore nothing a
         // non-webpieces host (plain NestJS/Express) can forget.
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ let NodeProxyClient = class NodeProxyClient extends http_client_core_1.ProxyClie
         this.gcpOidc = gcpOidc;
         this.addressResolver = addressResolver;
         this.secrets = secrets;
-        this.vendorAuthHook = vendorAuthHook;
+        this.vendorAuthMinter = vendorAuthMinter;
     }
     /**
      * Bind this client to one API contract + target, with the app's outbound filters (url
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ let NodeProxyClient = class NodeProxyClient extends http_client_core_1.ProxyClie
     clientFilters() {
         return [
             new http_client_core_1.ClientFilterDefinition(SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY, new SsrfGuardFilter_1.SsrfGuardFilter(this.ssrfPolicy(), this.addressResolver)),
-            new http_client_core_1.ClientFilterDefinition(OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY, new OutboundAuthFilter_1.OutboundAuthFilter(this.gcpOidc, this.secrets, this.vendorAuthHook)),
+            new http_client_core_1.ClientFilterDefinition(OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY, new OutboundAuthFilter_1.OutboundAuthFilter(this.gcpOidc, this.secrets, this.vendorAuthMinter)),
         ];
     }
     /**
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ exports.NodeProxyClient = NodeProxyClient = tslib_1.__decorate([
     tslib_1.__param(3, (0, inversify_1.optional)()),
     tslib_1.__param(3, (0, inversify_1.inject)(core_util_1.SECRETS)),
     tslib_1.__param(4, (0, inversify_1.optional)()),
-    tslib_1.__param(4, (0, inversify_1.inject)(core_context_1.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK)),
+    tslib_1.__param(4, (0, inversify_1.inject)(core_context_1.VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)),
     tslib_1.__metadata("design:paramtypes", [core_context_1.RequestContextHeaders,
         gcp_identity_1.GcpOidc,
         AddressResolver_1.AddressResolver,
         core_util_1.Secrets,
-        core_context_1.VendorAuthHook])
+        core_context_1.VendorAuthMinter])
 ], NodeProxyClient);
 /**
  * DI token for the `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` that hands out RPC clients — one per API contract.

package/src/NodeProxyClient.js.map

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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { once } from 'node:events';\nimport { request as httpRequest, IncomingMessage } from 'node:http';\nimport { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';\nimport { Readable } from 'node:stream';\nimport {\n    ClientRegistry,\n    DestinationTrust,\n    ApiImplementationError,\n    RecordedEndpoint,\n    RecordedError,\n    LogApiCallImpl,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    Secrets,\n    SECRETS,\n    TestCaseRecorder,\n    toError,\n    ClientRole,\n    HttpCallFactsHolder,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport {\n    RequestContext,\n    RequestContextApiCallContext,\n    RequestContextHeaders,\n    provideFrameworkTransient,\n    VendorAuthHook,\n    VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';\nimport {\n    ApiPrototype,\n    ByteReadableStream,\n    ClientRequest,\n    ClientFilterDefinition,\n    ProxyClient,\n} from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nimport { AddressResolver } from './AddressResolver';\nimport { ClientConfig } from './ClientConfig';\nimport { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';\nimport { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';\nimport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\nimport { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';\nimport { SsrfPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';\n\n/**\n * The two framework built-ins' priorities, RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER and to nothing else — they are\n * ordered beneath every app filter structurally, not by number (see `ProxyClient.initRoutes`).\n *\n * The guard is OUTSIDE the minter deliberately: a destination that is going to be refused must be\n * refused BEFORE a credential is minted for it, so a hostile URL never causes a token to exist.\n */\nconst SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY = 900;\nconst OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY = 800;\n\n/**\n * The server-side {@link ProxyClient}. Everything a browser cannot do lives here: reading the\n * ambient RequestContext, minting OIDC tokens, holding shared secrets, and recording test cases.\n *\n * TRANSIENT on purpose. Every `createRpcClient(api, config)` needs its own instance, because `init()`\n * binds one instance to exactly one API contract and one target. {@link ProxyClientProvider} hands\n * them out — see its doc.\n */\n@provideFrameworkTransient()\nexport class NodeProxyClient extends ProxyClient {\n    protected override selectAuthMethod(route: import('@webpieces/core-util').RouteMetadata): import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode {\n        const methods = route.authMeta?.methods;\n        if (!methods) throw new Error('Endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        const selected = methods.find((method: import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode) =>\n            method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'public' ||\n            (method.kind === 'shared-secret' && !!this.secrets?.get(method.secretKey)) ||\n            (method.kind === 'vendorAuth' && !!this.vendorAuthHook));\n        if (selected) return selected;\n        if (methods.length === 1) return methods[0];\n        throw new Error('No configured Node client credential can satisfy this endpoint; bind a declared service credential.');\n    }\n    private config!: ClientConfig;\n\n    constructor(\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(RequestContextHeaders) private readonly headers: RequestContextHeaders,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(GcpOidc) private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(AddressResolver) private readonly addressResolver: AddressResolver,\n        // @optional: only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; the client sends its bound value.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional() @inject(SECRETS) private readonly secrets?: Secrets,\n        // @optional: only vendorAuth(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW\n        // rather than send unauthenticated — see VendorAuthHook.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional()\n        @inject(VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK)\n        private readonly vendorAuthHook?: VendorAuthHook,\n    ) {\n        // This package is node-only and already depends on core-context, so it builds the\n        // RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext itself. No startup install, and therefore nothing a\n        // non-webpieces host (plain NestJS/Express) can forget.\n        super(new LogApiCallImpl(new RequestContextApiCallContext()));\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Bind this client to one API contract + target, with the app's outbound filters (url\n     * rewriting, header editing, logging, per-call re-pointing).\n     */\n    init(\n        apiPrototype: ApiPrototype<object>,\n        config: ClientConfig,\n        appFilters: ClientFilterDefinition[],\n    ): void {\n        this.config = config;\n        this.initRoutes(apiPrototype, appFilters);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The same chain every client runs — a ClientRegistry mapping, else the installed deriver — but\n     * with NODE's fallback: THROW. A server has no \"own origin\" to fall back to the way a browser\n     * does, so an unresolvable peer is a setup bug and must fail loudly (the error names the fixes).\n     *\n     * Resolved per call, never at construction, so building a client stays synchronous. Any metadata\n     * read beneath a deriver is memoized process-wide, so only the first call pays.\n     */\n    protected override clientRole(): ClientRole {\n        return this.config.role;\n    }\n\n    protected override resolveBaseUrl(): Promise<string> {\n        return ClientRegistry.resolve(this.config.svcName);\n    }\n\n    /** Node/undici supports a live ReadableStream body when fetch is given `duplex: 'half'`. */\n    protected override supportsConcurrentDuplexFetch(): boolean {\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Node's native HTTP stream is genuinely concurrent: unlike browser Fetch, an early response\n     * does not cancel the still-open upload. The returned Web Response keeps parsing isomorphic.\n     */\n    protected override sendStreamingTransport(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        signal: AbortSignal,\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        return new Promise<Response>(\n            (resolve: (response: Response) => void, reject: (error: Error) => void) => {\n                const url = new URL(request.url);\n                const send = url.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;\n                const outgoing = send(\n                    url,\n                    {\n                        method: 'POST',\n                        headers: request.headersAsRecord(),\n                        signal,\n                    },\n                    (incoming: IncomingMessage): void => {\n                        const headers = new Headers();\n                        for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(incoming.headers)) {\n                            if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n                                for (const item of value) headers.append(name, item);\n                            } else if (value !== undefined) {\n                                headers.set(name, value);\n                            }\n                        }\n                        const responseBody = Readable.toWeb(incoming) as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;\n                        resolve(\n                            new Response(responseBody, {\n                                status: incoming.statusCode ?? 500,\n                                statusText: incoming.statusMessage,\n                                headers,\n                            }),\n                        );\n                    },\n                );\n                outgoing.once('error', reject);\n                // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- a native socket/write rejection is normalized by toError\n                void this.pumpStreamingRequest(body, outgoing).catch((err: unknown) => {\n                    const error = toError(err);\n                    outgoing.destroy(error);\n                });\n            },\n        );\n    }\n\n    private async pumpStreamingRequest(\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n        outgoing: import('node:http').ClientRequest,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const reader = body.getReader();\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- socket errors reject writer acknowledgements\n        try {\n            for (;;) {\n                const part = await reader.read();\n                if (part.done) break;\n                if (!outgoing.write(part.value)) await once(outgoing, 'drain');\n            }\n            outgoing.end();\n        } finally {\n            reader.releaseLock();\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The two framework built-ins, installed on EVERY client this package builds and ordered\n     * beneath every app filter by {@link ProxyClient.initRoutes}.\n     *\n     * They are unconditional rather than opt-in because neither costs anything on the path that\n     * does not need it: the SSRF guard steps aside when nothing re-pointed the request, and the\n     * auth filter does nothing for a `@WpAuthPublic` endpoint. An app therefore cannot forget to install\n     * the guard on the one client that takes runtime URLs — the ACT of re-pointing is what arms it.\n     */\n    protected override clientFilters(): ClientFilterDefinition[] {\n        return [\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY,\n                new SsrfGuardFilter(this.ssrfPolicy(), this.addressResolver),\n            ),\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY,\n                new OutboundAuthFilter(this.gcpOidc, this.secrets, this.vendorAuthHook),\n            ),\n        ];\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * WHICH policy the guard applies when something does re-point this client.\n     *\n     * Read off an installed {@link ContextBaseUrlFilter} or {@link ContextFullUrlFilter}, because\n     * that filter is where an app says\n     * \"this client may be re-pointed\", and the single legitimate relaxation\n     * ({@link SsrfTestingPolicy}) belongs at the same construction site as that decision rather\n     * than in a second place a reader has to correlate. No such filter — or one built with the\n     * default — means {@link SsrfPolicy} (the strict one), so the safe answer is what an app gets by saying\n     * nothing.\n     */\n    private ssrfPolicy(): SsrfPolicy {\n        for (const definition of this.appFilters) {\n            const filter = definition.filter;\n            if (filter instanceof ContextBaseUrlFilter || filter instanceof ContextFullUrlFilter) {\n                return filter.ssrfPolicy;\n            }\n        }\n        return new SsrfPolicy();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight from the RequestContext. Throws when there is no active request scope.\n     *\n     * `destination` rides through unchanged: this is the ONE client that can legitimately propagate a\n     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidcSameProject() /\n     * oidcSvcs(...) / sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and\n     * friends instead of shipping headers that endpoint's AuthFilter is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    protected override outboundContextHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        return this.headers.buildOutboundHeaders(destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight into the ambient RequestContext — the reason a value a callee set climbs the call\n     * tree: after this returns, the CALLER's context holds it, and the caller's own response (and its\n     * own outbound calls) carry it onward.\n     *\n     * `destination` is the trust gate, and it is the mirror of the inbound problem rather than a\n     * restatement of it: a response is another process's ASSERTION. Untrusted response keys are\n     * admitted; a TRUSTED one is admitted only from a destination this client authenticated to, and\n     * is otherwise dropped — see `RequestContextHeaders.acceptResponseHeaders`.\n     */\n    protected override acceptResponseContext(\n        headers: Headers,\n        destination: DestinationTrust,\n    ): void {\n        this.headers.acceptResponseHeaders(headers, destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Test-case recording hook (mirror of Java HttpsJsonClientInvokeHandler): if a recorder is\n     * travelling in the magic context, capture this outbound call + its result so it becomes a mock\n     * in the generated test. Absent a recorder this is exactly the base behavior.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    protected override async execute(\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        http?: HttpCallFactsHolder,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        // Preserve the context precondition before logging, which also requires an active scope.\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No active RequestContext. Run the client call inside RequestContext.run(...).',\n            );\n        }\n        const recorder = this.headers.findRecorder();\n        if (!recorder) {\n            return super.execute(route, requestDto, method, http);\n        }\n        return this.recordCall(recorder, route, requestDto, method, http);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Execute the call while recording it (args + masked ctx snapshot + result).\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a FIXTURE field, not a log line, so it is built here rather than handed down\n     * from the call path — a logging backend stamps its own fields and never sees this.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    private async recordCall(\n        recorder: TestCaseRecorder,\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        http: HttpCallFactsHolder | undefined,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        const ctxSnapshot: Record<string, string> = {};\n        for (const entry of RequestContext.buildLogFields().entries()) {\n            ctxSnapshot[entry[0]] = entry[1];\n        }\n        const recorded = new RecordedEndpoint(\n            this.contractName(),\n            route.methodName,\n            [requestDto],\n            ctxSnapshot,\n        );\n        recorder.addEndpointInfo(recorded);\n\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- capture failure into the recording, then rethrow unchanged\n        try {\n            const response = await super.execute(route, requestDto, method, http);\n            recorded.successResponse = response;\n            return response;\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            recorded.failureResponse = new RecordedError(error.name, error.message);\n            throw err;\n        }\n    }\n\n}\n\n/**\n * DI token for the `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` that hands out RPC clients — one per API contract.\n * `Provider<T>` is erased at runtime, so it cannot be its own token; this Symbol names T.\n *\n * Because NodeProxyClient is bound TRANSIENT, every `get()` constructs a new one. (Were it bound\n * `@provideFrameworkSingleton`, the very same Provider would instead hand back one lazily-created\n * instance — the provider caches nothing, so the target's scope decides.)\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- Provider<T> is erased at runtime; the Symbol names T\nexport const NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER = Symbol.for('Provider<NodeProxyClient>');\n"]}
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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { once } from 'node:events';\nimport { request as httpRequest, IncomingMessage } from 'node:http';\nimport { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';\nimport { Readable } from 'node:stream';\nimport {\n    ClientRegistry,\n    DestinationTrust,\n    ApiImplementationError,\n    RecordedEndpoint,\n    RecordedError,\n    LogApiCallImpl,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    Secrets,\n    SECRETS,\n    TestCaseRecorder,\n    toError,\n    ClientRole,\n    HttpCallFactsHolder,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport {\n    RequestContext,\n    RequestContextApiCallContext,\n    RequestContextHeaders,\n    provideFrameworkTransient,\n    VendorAuthMinter,\n    VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';\nimport {\n    ApiPrototype,\n    ByteReadableStream,\n    ClientRequest,\n    ClientFilterDefinition,\n    ProxyClient,\n} from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nimport { AddressResolver } from './AddressResolver';\nimport { ClientConfig } from './ClientConfig';\nimport { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';\nimport { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';\nimport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\nimport { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';\nimport { SsrfPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';\n\n/**\n * The two framework built-ins' priorities, RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER and to nothing else — they are\n * ordered beneath every app filter structurally, not by number (see `ProxyClient.initRoutes`).\n *\n * The guard is OUTSIDE the minter deliberately: a destination that is going to be refused must be\n * refused BEFORE a credential is minted for it, so a hostile URL never causes a token to exist.\n */\nconst SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY = 900;\nconst OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY = 800;\n\n/**\n * The server-side {@link ProxyClient}. Everything a browser cannot do lives here: reading the\n * ambient RequestContext, minting OIDC tokens, holding shared secrets, and recording test cases.\n *\n * TRANSIENT on purpose. Every `createRpcClient(api, config)` needs its own instance, because `init()`\n * binds one instance to exactly one API contract and one target. {@link ProxyClientProvider} hands\n * them out — see its doc.\n */\n@provideFrameworkTransient()\nexport class NodeProxyClient extends ProxyClient {\n    protected override selectAuthMethod(route: import('@webpieces/core-util').RouteMetadata): import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode {\n        const methods = route.authMeta?.methods;\n        if (!methods) throw new Error('Endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        const selected = methods.find((method: import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode) =>\n            method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'public' ||\n            (method.kind === 'shared-secret' && !!this.secrets?.get(method.secretKey)) ||\n            (method.kind === 'vendorAuth' && !!this.vendorAuthMinter));\n        if (selected) return selected;\n        if (methods.length === 1) return methods[0];\n        throw new Error('No configured Node client credential can satisfy this endpoint; bind a declared service credential.');\n    }\n    private config!: ClientConfig;\n\n    constructor(\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(RequestContextHeaders) private readonly headers: RequestContextHeaders,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(GcpOidc) private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(AddressResolver) private readonly addressResolver: AddressResolver,\n        // @optional: only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; the client sends its bound value.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional() @inject(SECRETS) private readonly secrets?: Secrets,\n        // @optional: only OUTBOUND vendorAuth(...) calls need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW\n        // rather than send unauthenticated — see VendorAuthMinter. The OUTBOUND role ONLY: this\n        // client must never depend on the server's inbound VendorAuthVerifier, because a verifier\n        // that itself uses an RPC client would then close a construction cycle (#1358).\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional()\n        @inject(VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)\n        private readonly vendorAuthMinter?: VendorAuthMinter,\n    ) {\n        // This package is node-only and already depends on core-context, so it builds the\n        // RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext itself. No startup install, and therefore nothing a\n        // non-webpieces host (plain NestJS/Express) can forget.\n        super(new LogApiCallImpl(new RequestContextApiCallContext()));\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Bind this client to one API contract + target, with the app's outbound filters (url\n     * rewriting, header editing, logging, per-call re-pointing).\n     */\n    init(\n        apiPrototype: ApiPrototype<object>,\n        config: ClientConfig,\n        appFilters: ClientFilterDefinition[],\n    ): void {\n        this.config = config;\n        this.initRoutes(apiPrototype, appFilters);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The same chain every client runs — a ClientRegistry mapping, else the installed deriver — but\n     * with NODE's fallback: THROW. A server has no \"own origin\" to fall back to the way a browser\n     * does, so an unresolvable peer is a setup bug and must fail loudly (the error names the fixes).\n     *\n     * Resolved per call, never at construction, so building a client stays synchronous. Any metadata\n     * read beneath a deriver is memoized process-wide, so only the first call pays.\n     */\n    protected override clientRole(): ClientRole {\n        return this.config.role;\n    }\n\n    protected override resolveBaseUrl(): Promise<string> {\n        return ClientRegistry.resolve(this.config.svcName);\n    }\n\n    /** Node/undici supports a live ReadableStream body when fetch is given `duplex: 'half'`. */\n    protected override supportsConcurrentDuplexFetch(): boolean {\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Node's native HTTP stream is genuinely concurrent: unlike browser Fetch, an early response\n     * does not cancel the still-open upload. The returned Web Response keeps parsing isomorphic.\n     */\n    protected override sendStreamingTransport(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        signal: AbortSignal,\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        return new Promise<Response>(\n            (resolve: (response: Response) => void, reject: (error: Error) => void) => {\n                const url = new URL(request.url);\n                const send = url.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;\n                const outgoing = send(\n                    url,\n                    {\n                        method: 'POST',\n                        headers: request.headersAsRecord(),\n                        signal,\n                    },\n                    (incoming: IncomingMessage): void => {\n                        const headers = new Headers();\n                        for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(incoming.headers)) {\n                            if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n                                for (const item of value) headers.append(name, item);\n                            } else if (value !== undefined) {\n                                headers.set(name, value);\n                            }\n                        }\n                        const responseBody = Readable.toWeb(incoming) as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;\n                        resolve(\n                            new Response(responseBody, {\n                                status: incoming.statusCode ?? 500,\n                                statusText: incoming.statusMessage,\n                                headers,\n                            }),\n                        );\n                    },\n                );\n                outgoing.once('error', reject);\n                // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- a native socket/write rejection is normalized by toError\n                void this.pumpStreamingRequest(body, outgoing).catch((err: unknown) => {\n                    const error = toError(err);\n                    outgoing.destroy(error);\n                });\n            },\n        );\n    }\n\n    private async pumpStreamingRequest(\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n        outgoing: import('node:http').ClientRequest,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const reader = body.getReader();\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- socket errors reject writer acknowledgements\n        try {\n            for (;;) {\n                const part = await reader.read();\n                if (part.done) break;\n                if (!outgoing.write(part.value)) await once(outgoing, 'drain');\n            }\n            outgoing.end();\n        } finally {\n            reader.releaseLock();\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The two framework built-ins, installed on EVERY client this package builds and ordered\n     * beneath every app filter by {@link ProxyClient.initRoutes}.\n     *\n     * They are unconditional rather than opt-in because neither costs anything on the path that\n     * does not need it: the SSRF guard steps aside when nothing re-pointed the request, and the\n     * auth filter does nothing for a `@WpAuthPublic` endpoint. An app therefore cannot forget to install\n     * the guard on the one client that takes runtime URLs — the ACT of re-pointing is what arms it.\n     */\n    protected override clientFilters(): ClientFilterDefinition[] {\n        return [\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY,\n                new SsrfGuardFilter(this.ssrfPolicy(), this.addressResolver),\n            ),\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY,\n                new OutboundAuthFilter(this.gcpOidc, this.secrets, this.vendorAuthMinter),\n            ),\n        ];\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * WHICH policy the guard applies when something does re-point this client.\n     *\n     * Read off an installed {@link ContextBaseUrlFilter} or {@link ContextFullUrlFilter}, because\n     * that filter is where an app says\n     * \"this client may be re-pointed\", and the single legitimate relaxation\n     * ({@link SsrfTestingPolicy}) belongs at the same construction site as that decision rather\n     * than in a second place a reader has to correlate. No such filter — or one built with the\n     * default — means {@link SsrfPolicy} (the strict one), so the safe answer is what an app gets by saying\n     * nothing.\n     */\n    private ssrfPolicy(): SsrfPolicy {\n        for (const definition of this.appFilters) {\n            const filter = definition.filter;\n            if (filter instanceof ContextBaseUrlFilter || filter instanceof ContextFullUrlFilter) {\n                return filter.ssrfPolicy;\n            }\n        }\n        return new SsrfPolicy();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight from the RequestContext. Throws when there is no active request scope.\n     *\n     * `destination` rides through unchanged: this is the ONE client that can legitimately propagate a\n     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidcSameProject() /\n     * oidcSvcs(...) / sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and\n     * friends instead of shipping headers that endpoint's AuthFilter is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    protected override outboundContextHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        return this.headers.buildOutboundHeaders(destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight into the ambient RequestContext — the reason a value a callee set climbs the call\n     * tree: after this returns, the CALLER's context holds it, and the caller's own response (and its\n     * own outbound calls) carry it onward.\n     *\n     * `destination` is the trust gate, and it is the mirror of the inbound problem rather than a\n     * restatement of it: a response is another process's ASSERTION. Untrusted response keys are\n     * admitted; a TRUSTED one is admitted only from a destination this client authenticated to, and\n     * is otherwise dropped — see `RequestContextHeaders.acceptResponseHeaders`.\n     */\n    protected override acceptResponseContext(\n        headers: Headers,\n        destination: DestinationTrust,\n    ): void {\n        this.headers.acceptResponseHeaders(headers, destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Test-case recording hook (mirror of Java HttpsJsonClientInvokeHandler): if a recorder is\n     * travelling in the magic context, capture this outbound call + its result so it becomes a mock\n     * in the generated test. Absent a recorder this is exactly the base behavior.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    protected override async execute(\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        http?: HttpCallFactsHolder,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        // Preserve the context precondition before logging, which also requires an active scope.\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No active RequestContext. Run the client call inside RequestContext.run(...).',\n            );\n        }\n        const recorder = this.headers.findRecorder();\n        if (!recorder) {\n            return super.execute(route, requestDto, method, http);\n        }\n        return this.recordCall(recorder, route, requestDto, method, http);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Execute the call while recording it (args + masked ctx snapshot + result).\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a FIXTURE field, not a log line, so it is built here rather than handed down\n     * from the call path — a logging backend stamps its own fields and never sees this.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    private async recordCall(\n        recorder: TestCaseRecorder,\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        http: HttpCallFactsHolder | undefined,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        const ctxSnapshot: Record<string, string> = {};\n        for (const entry of RequestContext.buildLogFields().entries()) {\n            ctxSnapshot[entry[0]] = entry[1];\n        }\n        const recorded = new RecordedEndpoint(\n            this.contractName(),\n            route.methodName,\n            [requestDto],\n            ctxSnapshot,\n        );\n        recorder.addEndpointInfo(recorded);\n\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- capture failure into the recording, then rethrow unchanged\n        try {\n            const response = await super.execute(route, requestDto, method, http);\n            recorded.successResponse = response;\n            return response;\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            recorded.failureResponse = new RecordedError(error.name, error.message);\n            throw err;\n        }\n    }\n\n}\n\n/**\n * DI token for the `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` that hands out RPC clients — one per API contract.\n * `Provider<T>` is erased at runtime, so it cannot be its own token; this Symbol names T.\n *\n * Because NodeProxyClient is bound TRANSIENT, every `get()` constructs a new one. (Were it bound\n * `@provideFrameworkSingleton`, the very same Provider would instead hand back one lazily-created\n * instance — the provider caches nothing, so the target's scope decides.)\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- Provider<T> is erased at runtime; the Symbol names T\nexport const NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER = Symbol.for('Provider<NodeProxyClient>');\n"]}

package/src/OutboundAuthErrors.d.ts

@@ -24,12 +24,12 @@ export declare class MissingSharedSecretError extends Error {
     secretKey: string);
 }
 /**
- * A `vendorAuth(name)` endpoint was called outbound with no `VendorAuthHook` bound, so nothing can
- * mint the credential the vendor checks. Thrown at CALL time, from `OutboundAuthFilter`, rather than
- * sending unauthenticated — the mirror of the inbound side, where an unbound hook 401s every served
- * `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint instead of admitting it.
+ * A `vendorAuth(name)` endpoint was called outbound with no `VendorAuthMinter` (VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)
+ * bound, so nothing can mint the credential the vendor checks. Thrown at CALL time, from
+ * `OutboundAuthFilter`, BEFORE anything is sent — the mirror of the inbound side, where an unbound
+ * `VendorAuthVerifier` 401s every served `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint instead of admitting it.
  */
-export declare class MissingVendorAuthHookError extends Error {
+export declare class MissingVendorAuthMinterError extends Error {
     /** `Contract.method`, so the log line names the call without a stack read. */
     readonly endpoint: string;
     /** The vendor on the contract's `vendorAuth(name)`, which selects the scheme. */

package/src/OutboundAuthErrors.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * auth mode requires is simply absent.
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.MissingVendorAuthHookError = exports.MissingSharedSecretError = void 0;
+exports.MissingVendorAuthMinterError = exports.MissingSharedSecretError = void 0;
 /**
  * An `sharedSecret(key)` endpoint was called by a client whose bound `Secrets` holds no value
  * for that key. Thrown at CALL time, from `OutboundAuthFilter`.
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ class MissingSharedSecretError extends Error {
 }
 exports.MissingSharedSecretError = MissingSharedSecretError;
 /**
- * A `vendorAuth(name)` endpoint was called outbound with no `VendorAuthHook` bound, so nothing can
- * mint the credential the vendor checks. Thrown at CALL time, from `OutboundAuthFilter`, rather than
- * sending unauthenticated — the mirror of the inbound side, where an unbound hook 401s every served
- * `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint instead of admitting it.
+ * A `vendorAuth(name)` endpoint was called outbound with no `VendorAuthMinter` (VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)
+ * bound, so nothing can mint the credential the vendor checks. Thrown at CALL time, from
+ * `OutboundAuthFilter`, BEFORE anything is sent — the mirror of the inbound side, where an unbound
+ * `VendorAuthVerifier` 401s every served `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint instead of admitting it.
  */
-class MissingVendorAuthHookError extends Error {
+class MissingVendorAuthMinterError extends Error {
     endpoint;
     vendorName;
     constructor(message, 
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ class MissingVendorAuthHookError extends Error {
         super(message);
         this.endpoint = endpoint;
         this.vendorName = vendorName;
-        this.name = 'MissingVendorAuthHookError';
+        this.name = 'MissingVendorAuthMinterError';
     }
 }
-exports.MissingVendorAuthHookError = MissingVendorAuthHookError;
+exports.MissingVendorAuthMinterError = MissingVendorAuthMinterError;
 //# sourceMappingURL=OutboundAuthErrors.js.map

package/src/OutboundAuthErrors.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"OutboundAuthErrors.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-client-node/src/OutboundAuthErrors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;;;AAEH;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAa,wBAAyB,SAAQ,KAAK;IAI3B;IAEA;IALpB,YACI,OAAe;IACf,8EAA8E;IAC9D,QAAgB;IAChC,8EAA8E;IAC9D,SAAiB;QAEjC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAJC,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAQ;QAEhB,cAAS,GAAT,SAAS,CAAQ;QAGjC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;IAC3C,CAAC;CACJ;AAXD,4DAWC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAa,0BAA2B,SAAQ,KAAK;IAI7B;IAEA;IALpB,YACI,OAAe;IACf,8EAA8E;IAC9D,QAAgB;IAChC,iFAAiF;IACjE,UAAkB;QAElC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAJC,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAQ;QAEhB,eAAU,GAAV,UAAU,CAAQ;QAGlC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,4BAA4B,CAAC;IAC7C,CAAC;CACJ;AAXD,gEAWC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The two ways outbound auth refuses to send, each its own type for the reason\n * {@link MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError} is one: a delivery worker has to tell these apart from\n * {@link SsrfRefusedError}. Both mean THIS SERVICE is misconfigured — page somebody, retrying is\n * pointless — where an SSRF refusal means a partner registered something hostile and the delivery\n * should be dead-lettered. A bare `Error` forces that decision to be made by matching message text.\n *\n * Neither is thrown for anything a caller can influence: they fire when the binding a contract's\n * auth mode requires is simply absent.\n */\n\n/**\n * An `sharedSecret(key)` endpoint was called by a client whose bound `Secrets` holds no value\n * for that key. Thrown at CALL time, from `OutboundAuthFilter`.\n */\nexport class MissingSharedSecretError extends Error {\n    constructor(\n        message: string,\n        /** `Contract.method`, so the log line names the call without a stack read. */\n        public readonly endpoint: string,\n        /** The `sharedSecret(...)` key that had no value, so the fix names itself. */\n        public readonly secretKey: string,\n    ) {\n        super(message);\n        this.name = 'MissingSharedSecretError';\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * A `vendorAuth(name)` endpoint was called outbound with no `VendorAuthHook` bound, so nothing can\n * mint the credential the vendor checks. Thrown at CALL time, from `OutboundAuthFilter`, rather than\n * sending unauthenticated — the mirror of the inbound side, where an unbound hook 401s every served\n * `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint instead of admitting it.\n */\nexport class MissingVendorAuthHookError extends Error {\n    constructor(\n        message: string,\n        /** `Contract.method`, so the log line names the call without a stack read. */\n        public readonly endpoint: string,\n        /** The vendor on the contract's `vendorAuth(name)`, which selects the scheme. */\n        public readonly vendorName: string,\n    ) {\n        super(message);\n        this.name = 'MissingVendorAuthHookError';\n    }\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"OutboundAuthErrors.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-client-node/src/OutboundAuthErrors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;;;AAEH;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAa,wBAAyB,SAAQ,KAAK;IAI3B;IAEA;IALpB,YACI,OAAe;IACf,8EAA8E;IAC9D,QAAgB;IAChC,8EAA8E;IAC9D,SAAiB;QAEjC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAJC,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAQ;QAEhB,cAAS,GAAT,SAAS,CAAQ;QAGjC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,0BAA0B,CAAC;IAC3C,CAAC;CACJ;AAXD,4DAWC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAa,4BAA6B,SAAQ,KAAK;IAI/B;IAEA;IALpB,YACI,OAAe;IACf,8EAA8E;IAC9D,QAAgB;IAChC,iFAAiF;IACjE,UAAkB;QAElC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAJC,aAAQ,GAAR,QAAQ,CAAQ;QAEhB,eAAU,GAAV,UAAU,CAAQ;QAGlC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC;IAC/C,CAAC;CACJ;AAXD,oEAWC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The two ways outbound auth refuses to send, each its own type for the reason\n * {@link MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError} is one: a delivery worker has to tell these apart from\n * {@link SsrfRefusedError}. Both mean THIS SERVICE is misconfigured — page somebody, retrying is\n * pointless — where an SSRF refusal means a partner registered something hostile and the delivery\n * should be dead-lettered. A bare `Error` forces that decision to be made by matching message text.\n *\n * Neither is thrown for anything a caller can influence: they fire when the binding a contract's\n * auth mode requires is simply absent.\n */\n\n/**\n * An `sharedSecret(key)` endpoint was called by a client whose bound `Secrets` holds no value\n * for that key. Thrown at CALL time, from `OutboundAuthFilter`.\n */\nexport class MissingSharedSecretError extends Error {\n    constructor(\n        message: string,\n        /** `Contract.method`, so the log line names the call without a stack read. */\n        public readonly endpoint: string,\n        /** The `sharedSecret(...)` key that had no value, so the fix names itself. */\n        public readonly secretKey: string,\n    ) {\n        super(message);\n        this.name = 'MissingSharedSecretError';\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * A `vendorAuth(name)` endpoint was called outbound with no `VendorAuthMinter` (VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER)\n * bound, so nothing can mint the credential the vendor checks. Thrown at CALL time, from\n * `OutboundAuthFilter`, BEFORE anything is sent — the mirror of the inbound side, where an unbound\n * `VendorAuthVerifier` 401s every served `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint instead of admitting it.\n */\nexport class MissingVendorAuthMinterError extends Error {\n    constructor(\n        message: string,\n        /** `Contract.method`, so the log line names the call without a stack read. */\n        public readonly endpoint: string,\n        /** The vendor on the contract's `vendorAuth(name)`, which selects the scheme. */\n        public readonly vendorName: string,\n    ) {\n        super(message);\n        this.name = 'MissingVendorAuthMinterError';\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/OutboundAuthFilter.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { Filter, Secrets, Service } from '@webpieces/core-util';
-import { VendorAuthHook } from '@webpieces/core-context';
+import { VendorAuthMinter } from '@webpieces/core-context';
 import { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';
 import { ClientRequest } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';
 /**
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ import { ClientRequest } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';
  * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.
  *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed
  *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.
- * - `vendorAuth(name)` → the app's bound {@link VendorAuthHook} `mint`s the headers (a vendor's
+ * - `vendorAuth(name)` → the app's bound {@link VendorAuthMinter} `mint`s the headers (a vendor's
  *   OAuth bearer, a partner's HMAC signature — the scheme is the app's). On a raw `401` it is the ONE
  *   mode that retries: cancel the 401's body, `refresh(name)` once, `mint` again and re-send ONCE.
  *   Never for a streaming upload (its body cannot be replayed), and once per logical call — the SSRF
@@ -42,13 +42,19 @@ export declare class OutboundAuthFilter extends Filter<ClientRequest, Response>
     private readonly gcpOidc;
     /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */
     private readonly secrets;
-    /** Only vendorAuth(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW. */
-    private readonly vendorAuthHook;
+    /**
+     * The OUTBOUND role only. Only vendorAuth(...) calls need it, and an unbound one makes them
+     * THROW. Never the inbound VendorAuthVerifier: sending a request verifies nothing (#1358).
+     */
+    private readonly vendorAuthMinter;
     constructor(gcpOidc: GcpOidc, 
     /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */
     secrets: Secrets | undefined, 
-    /** Only vendorAuth(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW. */
-    vendorAuthHook: VendorAuthHook | undefined);
+    /**
+     * The OUTBOUND role only. Only vendorAuth(...) calls need it, and an unbound one makes them
+     * THROW. Never the inbound VendorAuthVerifier: sending a request verifies nothing (#1358).
+     */
+    vendorAuthMinter: VendorAuthMinter | undefined);
     /** Requests that already spent their one refresh — keyed by the request, so redirect hops share it. */
     private readonly refreshed;
     filter(request: ClientRequest, nextFilter: Service<ClientRequest, Response>): Promise<Response>;
@@ -56,10 +62,10 @@ export declare class OutboundAuthFilter extends Filter<ClientRequest, Response>
     private uploadsAStream;
     private attach;
     /**
-     * @throws MissingVendorAuthHookError when no {@link VendorAuthHook} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,
-     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound hook 401s every served `vendorAuth(...)`
-     *         endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so it must also refuse to SEND rather than
-     *         deliver something the vendor is obliged to reject.
+     * @throws MissingVendorAuthMinterError when no {@link VendorAuthMinter} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,
+     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound verifier 401s every served
+     *         `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so an unbound minter
+     *         must also refuse to SEND rather than deliver something the vendor is obliged to reject.
      */
     private mintVendorAuth;
 }

package/src/OutboundAuthFilter.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const OutboundAuthErrors_1 = require("./OutboundAuthErrors");
  * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.
  *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed
  *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.
- * - `vendorAuth(name)` → the app's bound {@link VendorAuthHook} `mint`s the headers (a vendor's
+ * - `vendorAuth(name)` → the app's bound {@link VendorAuthMinter} `mint`s the headers (a vendor's
  *   OAuth bearer, a partner's HMAC signature — the scheme is the app's). On a raw `401` it is the ONE
  *   mode that retries: cancel the 401's body, `refresh(name)` once, `mint` again and re-send ONCE.
  *   Never for a streaming upload (its body cannot be replayed), and once per logical call — the SSRF
@@ -43,16 +43,19 @@ const OutboundAuthErrors_1 = require("./OutboundAuthErrors");
 class OutboundAuthFilter extends core_util_1.Filter {
     gcpOidc;
     secrets;
-    vendorAuthHook;
+    vendorAuthMinter;
     constructor(gcpOidc, 
     /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */
     secrets, 
-    /** Only vendorAuth(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW. */
-    vendorAuthHook) {
+    /**
+     * The OUTBOUND role only. Only vendorAuth(...) calls need it, and an unbound one makes them
+     * THROW. Never the inbound VendorAuthVerifier: sending a request verifies nothing (#1358).
+     */
+    vendorAuthMinter) {
         super();
         this.gcpOidc = gcpOidc;
         this.secrets = secrets;
-        this.vendorAuthHook = vendorAuthHook;
+        this.vendorAuthMinter = vendorAuthMinter;
     }
     /** Requests that already spent their one refresh — keyed by the request, so redirect hops share it. */
     refreshed = new WeakSet();
@@ -69,7 +72,7 @@ class OutboundAuthFilter extends core_util_1.Filter {
         this.refreshed.add(request);
         // The 401's body is never read: release the connection before the second attempt.
         await response.body?.cancel();
-        await this.vendorAuthHook.refresh(mode.name);
+        await this.vendorAuthMinter.refresh(mode.name);
         await this.mintVendorAuth(request, mode.name);
         return nextFilter.invoke(request);
     }
@@ -103,22 +106,23 @@ class OutboundAuthFilter extends core_util_1.Filter {
         }
     }
     /**
-     * @throws MissingVendorAuthHookError when no {@link VendorAuthHook} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,
-     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound hook 401s every served `vendorAuth(...)`
-     *         endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so it must also refuse to SEND rather than
-     *         deliver something the vendor is obliged to reject.
+     * @throws MissingVendorAuthMinterError when no {@link VendorAuthMinter} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,
+     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound verifier 401s every served
+     *         `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so an unbound minter
+     *         must also refuse to SEND rather than deliver something the vendor is obliged to reject.
      */
     async mintVendorAuth(request, name) {
-        if (this.vendorAuthHook === undefined) {
-            throw new OutboundAuthErrors_1.MissingVendorAuthHookError(`${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is vendorAuth('${name}'), so this ` +
-                `client must present ${name}'s credential — but no VendorAuthHook is bound, so there is ` +
-                `nothing to mint it. Bind one:\n` +
-                `    options.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK).to(MyVendorAuthHook);\n` +
+        if (this.vendorAuthMinter === undefined) {
+            throw new OutboundAuthErrors_1.MissingVendorAuthMinterError(`${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is vendorAuth('${name}'), so this ` +
+                `client must present ${name}'s credential — but no VendorAuthMinter is bound, so there ` +
+                `is nothing to mint it. Bind the OUTBOUND role in this process:\n` +
+                `    binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER).to(MyVendorAuthMinter).inSingletonScope();\n` +
+                `(A VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER binding does not count: it verifies inbound calls and never sends.)\n` +
                 `Refusing to send is deliberate: an unauthenticated call is one the vendor will reject, ` +
                 `and sending it anyway would hide the missing binding until they complained.`, `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`, name);
         }
         const signable = new core_context_1.SignableRequest(request.url, request.route.httpMethod, request.body, request.headers, request.contractName, request.route.methodName);
-        const minted = await this.vendorAuthHook.mint(name, signable);
+        const minted = await this.vendorAuthMinter.mint(name, signable);
         for (const entry of minted.entries()) {
             request.headers.set(entry[0], entry[1]);
         }

package/src/OutboundAuthFilter.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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That is wrong the moment a filter can re-point the request: an OIDC token's audience is the\n * callee's base URL, and a token minted for our own service name and then sent to a partner's\n * server is a credential handed to the wrong party.\n *\n * As the innermost filter (`ProxyClient.initRoutes` puts the framework's built-ins beneath every app\n * filter, and no app priority can get under them) it reads `request.baseUrl` / `request.url` after\n * everything has settled, which makes the audience correct by construction rather than by\n * convention. The SSRF guard sits immediately ABOVE it, so a destination that is going to be refused\n * is refused BEFORE any credential is minted for it.\n *\n * ## The three modes, and why none of them is restricted to a fixed host\n *\n * - `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.\n * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.\n *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed\n *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.\n * - `vendorAuth(name)` → the app's bound {@link VendorAuthHook} `mint`s the headers (a vendor's\n *   OAuth bearer, a partner's HMAC signature — the scheme is the app's). On a raw `401` it is the ONE\n *   mode that retries: cancel the 401's body, `refresh(name)` once, `mint` again and re-send ONCE.\n *   Never for a streaming upload (its body cannot be replayed), and once per logical call — the SSRF\n *   guard's redirect loop re-enters this filter for each hop, and a second 401 goes up the chain to\n *   `ClientErrorTranslator` exactly as before, because a service that cannot log in to its vendor\n *   twice running is a bug in THAT service.\n *\n * Both credential-minting modes ride in the ONE `Authorization` header under their own scheme —\n * `Bearer <oidc>` / `Webpieces <secret>` — which is never a context key, so neither can leak onto\n * the next hop.\n */\nexport class OutboundAuthFilter extends Filter<ClientRequest, Response> {\n    constructor(\n        private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */\n        private readonly secrets: Secrets | undefined,\n        /** Only vendorAuth(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW. */\n        private readonly vendorAuthHook: VendorAuthHook | undefined,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    /** Requests that already spent their one refresh — keyed by the request, so redirect hops share it. */\n    private readonly refreshed = new WeakSet<ClientRequest>();\n\n    override async filter(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        nextFilter: Service<ClientRequest, Response>,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        await this.attach(request);\n        const response = await nextFilter.invoke(request);\n        const mode = request.route.authMeta?.methods[0];\n        if (\n            response.status !== 401 ||\n            mode?.kind !== 'vendorAuth' ||\n            this.refreshed.has(request) ||\n            this.uploadsAStream(request)\n        ) {\n            return response;\n        }\n        this.refreshed.add(request);\n        // The 401's body is never read: release the connection before the second attempt.\n        await response.body?.cancel();\n        await this.vendorAuthHook!.refresh(mode.name);\n        await this.mintVendorAuth(request, mode.name);\n        return nextFilter.invoke(request);\n    }\n\n    /** A request-streaming call's body is a one-shot stream, so it can never be re-sent. */\n    private uploadsAStream(request: ClientRequest): boolean {\n        const streaming = request.route.streaming;\n        return streaming !== undefined && streaming.direction !== StreamDirection.RESPONSE;\n    }\n\n    private async attach(request: ClientRequest): Promise<void> {\n        const mode = request.route.authMeta?.methods[0];\n        if (mode?.kind === 'oidc') {\n            request.headers.set(\n                'Authorization',\n                `Bearer ${await this.gcpOidc.mintIdToken(request.baseUrl)}`,\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'shared-secret') {\n            const secret = this.secrets?.get(mode.secretKey);\n            if (!secret) {\n                throw new MissingSharedSecretError(\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is ` +\n                        `sharedSecret('${mode.secretKey}'), but this client's bound Secrets holds no ` +\n                        `value for that key, so there is no credential to send. Bind a Secrets carrying ` +\n                        `'${mode.secretKey}'. Refusing to send is deliberate: the callee is obliged to 401 an ` +\n                        `unauthenticated request, so sending it would report as the peer's failure.`,\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n            }\n            // Same header as a JWT/OIDC token, but its OWN scheme, so a secret can never be\n            // mistaken for a token nor accepted where one was expected.\n            request.headers.set('Authorization', `Webpieces ${secret}`);\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'vendorAuth') {\n            await this.mintVendorAuth(request, mode.name);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @throws MissingVendorAuthHookError when no {@link VendorAuthHook} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,\n     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound hook 401s every served `vendorAuth(...)`\n     *         endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so it must also refuse to SEND rather than\n     *         deliver something the vendor is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    private async mintVendorAuth(request: ClientRequest, name: string): Promise<void> {\n        if (this.vendorAuthHook === undefined) {\n            throw new MissingVendorAuthHookError(\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is vendorAuth('${name}'), so this ` +\n                    `client must present ${name}'s credential — but no VendorAuthHook is bound, so there is ` +\n                    `nothing to mint it. Bind one:\\n` +\n                    `    options.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK).to(MyVendorAuthHook);\\n` +\n                    `Refusing to send is deliberate: an unauthenticated call is one the vendor will reject, ` +\n                    `and sending it anyway would hide the missing binding until they complained.`,\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                name,\n            );\n        }\n        const signable = new SignableRequest(\n            request.url,\n            request.route.httpMethod,\n            request.body,\n            request.headers,\n            request.contractName,\n            request.route.methodName,\n        );\n        const minted = await this.vendorAuthHook.mint(name, signable);\n        for (const entry of minted.entries()) {\n            request.headers.set(entry[0], entry[1]);\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}
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That is wrong the moment a filter can re-point the request: an OIDC token's audience is the\n * callee's base URL, and a token minted for our own service name and then sent to a partner's\n * server is a credential handed to the wrong party.\n *\n * As the innermost filter (`ProxyClient.initRoutes` puts the framework's built-ins beneath every app\n * filter, and no app priority can get under them) it reads `request.baseUrl` / `request.url` after\n * everything has settled, which makes the audience correct by construction rather than by\n * convention. The SSRF guard sits immediately ABOVE it, so a destination that is going to be refused\n * is refused BEFORE any credential is minted for it.\n *\n * ## The three modes, and why none of them is restricted to a fixed host\n *\n * - `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.\n * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.\n *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed\n *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.\n * - `vendorAuth(name)` → the app's bound {@link VendorAuthMinter} `mint`s the headers (a vendor's\n *   OAuth bearer, a partner's HMAC signature — the scheme is the app's). On a raw `401` it is the ONE\n *   mode that retries: cancel the 401's body, `refresh(name)` once, `mint` again and re-send ONCE.\n *   Never for a streaming upload (its body cannot be replayed), and once per logical call — the SSRF\n *   guard's redirect loop re-enters this filter for each hop, and a second 401 goes up the chain to\n *   `ClientErrorTranslator` exactly as before, because a service that cannot log in to its vendor\n *   twice running is a bug in THAT service.\n *\n * Both credential-minting modes ride in the ONE `Authorization` header under their own scheme —\n * `Bearer <oidc>` / `Webpieces <secret>` — which is never a context key, so neither can leak onto\n * the next hop.\n */\nexport class OutboundAuthFilter extends Filter<ClientRequest, Response> {\n    constructor(\n        private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */\n        private readonly secrets: Secrets | undefined,\n        /**\n         * The OUTBOUND role only. Only vendorAuth(...) calls need it, and an unbound one makes them\n         * THROW. Never the inbound VendorAuthVerifier: sending a request verifies nothing (#1358).\n         */\n        private readonly vendorAuthMinter: VendorAuthMinter | undefined,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    /** Requests that already spent their one refresh — keyed by the request, so redirect hops share it. */\n    private readonly refreshed = new WeakSet<ClientRequest>();\n\n    override async filter(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        nextFilter: Service<ClientRequest, Response>,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        await this.attach(request);\n        const response = await nextFilter.invoke(request);\n        const mode = request.route.authMeta?.methods[0];\n        if (\n            response.status !== 401 ||\n            mode?.kind !== 'vendorAuth' ||\n            this.refreshed.has(request) ||\n            this.uploadsAStream(request)\n        ) {\n            return response;\n        }\n        this.refreshed.add(request);\n        // The 401's body is never read: release the connection before the second attempt.\n        await response.body?.cancel();\n        await this.vendorAuthMinter!.refresh(mode.name);\n        await this.mintVendorAuth(request, mode.name);\n        return nextFilter.invoke(request);\n    }\n\n    /** A request-streaming call's body is a one-shot stream, so it can never be re-sent. */\n    private uploadsAStream(request: ClientRequest): boolean {\n        const streaming = request.route.streaming;\n        return streaming !== undefined && streaming.direction !== StreamDirection.RESPONSE;\n    }\n\n    private async attach(request: ClientRequest): Promise<void> {\n        const mode = request.route.authMeta?.methods[0];\n        if (mode?.kind === 'oidc') {\n            request.headers.set(\n                'Authorization',\n                `Bearer ${await this.gcpOidc.mintIdToken(request.baseUrl)}`,\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'shared-secret') {\n            const secret = this.secrets?.get(mode.secretKey);\n            if (!secret) {\n                throw new MissingSharedSecretError(\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is ` +\n                        `sharedSecret('${mode.secretKey}'), but this client's bound Secrets holds no ` +\n                        `value for that key, so there is no credential to send. Bind a Secrets carrying ` +\n                        `'${mode.secretKey}'. Refusing to send is deliberate: the callee is obliged to 401 an ` +\n                        `unauthenticated request, so sending it would report as the peer's failure.`,\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n            }\n            // Same header as a JWT/OIDC token, but its OWN scheme, so a secret can never be\n            // mistaken for a token nor accepted where one was expected.\n            request.headers.set('Authorization', `Webpieces ${secret}`);\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'vendorAuth') {\n            await this.mintVendorAuth(request, mode.name);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @throws MissingVendorAuthMinterError when no {@link VendorAuthMinter} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,\n     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound verifier 401s every served\n     *         `vendorAuth(...)` endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so an unbound minter\n     *         must also refuse to SEND rather than deliver something the vendor is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    private async mintVendorAuth(request: ClientRequest, name: string): Promise<void> {\n        if (this.vendorAuthMinter === undefined) {\n            throw new MissingVendorAuthMinterError(\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is vendorAuth('${name}'), so this ` +\n                    `client must present ${name}'s credential — but no VendorAuthMinter is bound, so there ` +\n                    `is nothing to mint it. Bind the OUTBOUND role in this process:\\n` +\n                    `    binder.bind(VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER).to(MyVendorAuthMinter).inSingletonScope();\\n` +\n                    `(A VENDOR_AUTH_VERIFIER binding does not count: it verifies inbound calls and never sends.)\\n` +\n                    `Refusing to send is deliberate: an unauthenticated call is one the vendor will reject, ` +\n                    `and sending it anyway would hide the missing binding until they complained.`,\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                name,\n            );\n        }\n        const signable = new SignableRequest(\n            request.url,\n            request.route.httpMethod,\n            request.body,\n            request.headers,\n            request.contractName,\n            request.route.methodName,\n        );\n        const minted = await this.vendorAuthMinter.mint(name, signable);\n        for (const entry of minted.entries()) {\n            request.headers.set(entry[0], entry[1]);\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/index.d.ts

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ export { ClientRole } from '@webpieces/core-util';
 export { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';
 export { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';
 export { MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError } from './MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError';
-export { MissingSharedSecretError, MissingVendorAuthHookError } from './OutboundAuthErrors';
-export { VendorAuthHook, VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK, SignableRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';
+export { MissingSharedSecretError, MissingVendorAuthMinterError } from './OutboundAuthErrors';
+export { VendorAuthMinter, VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER, SignableRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';
 export { SsrfPolicy, SsrfTestingPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';
 export { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';
 export { SsrfRefusedError } from './SsrfRefusedError';

package/src/index.js

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  * ```
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.WiringPolicy = exports.StreamingCapabilityError = exports.ClientFilterDefinition = exports.ClientRequest = exports.ClientErrorTranslator = exports.ProxyClient = exports.DnsAddressResolver = exports.AddressResolver = exports.InternalAddressRules = exports.OutboundAuthFilter = exports.SsrfRefusedError = exports.SsrfGuardFilter = exports.SsrfTestingPolicy = exports.SsrfPolicy = exports.SignableRequest = exports.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK = exports.VendorAuthHook = exports.MissingVendorAuthHookError = exports.MissingSharedSecretError = exports.MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError = exports.ContextFullUrlFilter = exports.ContextBaseUrlFilter = exports.ClientRole = exports.ClientConfig = exports.NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER = exports.NodeProxyClient = exports.ClientHttpFactory = void 0;
+exports.WiringPolicy = exports.StreamingCapabilityError = exports.ClientFilterDefinition = exports.ClientRequest = exports.ClientErrorTranslator = exports.ProxyClient = exports.DnsAddressResolver = exports.AddressResolver = exports.InternalAddressRules = exports.OutboundAuthFilter = exports.SsrfRefusedError = exports.SsrfGuardFilter = exports.SsrfTestingPolicy = exports.SsrfPolicy = exports.SignableRequest = exports.VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER = exports.VendorAuthMinter = exports.MissingVendorAuthMinterError = exports.MissingSharedSecretError = exports.MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError = exports.ContextFullUrlFilter = exports.ContextBaseUrlFilter = exports.ClientRole = exports.ClientConfig = exports.NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER = exports.NodeProxyClient = exports.ClientHttpFactory = void 0;
 var ClientHttpFactory_1 = require("./ClientHttpFactory");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "ClientHttpFactory", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ClientHttpFactory_1.ClientHttpFactory; } });
 var NodeProxyClient_1 = require("./NodeProxyClient");
@@ -51,13 +51,14 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError", { enumerable: true,
 // hostile' (SsrfRefusedError) without matching message text.
 var OutboundAuthErrors_1 = require("./OutboundAuthErrors");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "MissingSharedSecretError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return OutboundAuthErrors_1.MissingSharedSecretError; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "MissingVendorAuthHookError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return OutboundAuthErrors_1.MissingVendorAuthHookError; } });
-// vendorAuth(name): ONE hook mints (and refreshes once on a 401) here and verifies on the server.
-// Defined in @webpieces/core-context; bind it, or every outbound vendorAuth(...) call throws rather
-// than sending unauthenticated.
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "MissingVendorAuthMinterError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return OutboundAuthErrors_1.MissingVendorAuthMinterError; } });
+// vendorAuth(name), OUTBOUND role: the minter mints (and refreshes once on a 401) what this client
+// sends. Defined in @webpieces/core-context; bind VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER, or every outbound
+// vendorAuth(...) call throws rather than sending unauthenticated. The INBOUND VendorAuthVerifier is
+// http-routing's, and no client ever depends on it (#1358).
 var core_context_1 = require("@webpieces/core-context");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "VendorAuthHook", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_1.VendorAuthHook; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_1.VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "VendorAuthMinter", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_1.VendorAuthMinter; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_1.VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER; } });
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "SignableRequest", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return core_context_1.SignableRequest; } });
 // The SSRF policy a re-pointed URL is judged under, and the refusal it produces. Automatic, armed by
 // the ACT of re-pointing; the ONLY way to relax it is naming SsrfTestingPolicy at a call site.

package/src/index.js.map

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Reads an API contract's decorators and generates type-safe HTTP\n * clients from it — the same contract the callee's controller implements.\n *\n * Node-only, so unlike @webpieces/http-client-browser it is fully inversify-wired and reads the\n * magic context straight out of the AsyncLocalStorage-backed RequestContext. There is no\n * ContextReader indirection, because a server has exactly one right answer, and a call made\n * OUTSIDE `RequestContext.run(...)` throws instead of silently dropping the trace.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```typescript\n * import { ClientHttpFactory, ClientConfig } from '@webpieces/http-client-node';\n *\n * // inject the factory, then one client per contract\n * const server2 = factory.createRpcClient(Server2Api, new ClientConfig('server2', ClientRole.SERVER));\n * const response = await server2.fetchValue(req);\n *\n * // a client whose destination arrives per call: ONE filter, and nothing else changes\n * const partner = factory.createRpcClient(PartnerWebhookApi, new ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', ClientRole.SERVER), [\n *     new ClientFilterDefinition(1000, new ContextFullUrlFilter()),\n * ]);\n * ```\n */\n\nexport { ClientHttpFactory } from './ClientHttpFactory';\nexport { NodeProxyClient, NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER } from './NodeProxyClient';\nexport { ClientConfig } from './ClientConfig';\n// ClientConfig's required `role` argument, re-exported so a client is set up from one import.\nexport { ClientRole } from '@webpieces/core-util';\n\n// Install this on the ONE client whose destination is data. Installing it IS the opt-in; a client\n// without it ignores an ambient OVERRIDE_BASE_URL entirely.\nexport { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';\n// The same opt-in for a COMPLETE stored url (host + path + query), sent verbatim with no contract\n// path appended — the usual partner-webhook shape. Reads OVERRIDE_FULL_URL.\nexport { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';\nexport { MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError } from './MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError';\n\n// The two ways outbound auth refuses to send: a binding a contract's auth mode requires is absent.\n// Typed, so a delivery worker tells 'we are misconfigured' from 'the partner registered something\n// hostile' (SsrfRefusedError) without matching message text.\nexport { MissingSharedSecretError, MissingVendorAuthHookError } from './OutboundAuthErrors';\n\n// vendorAuth(name): ONE hook mints (and refreshes once on a 401) here and verifies on the server.\n// Defined in @webpieces/core-context; bind it, or every outbound vendorAuth(...) call throws rather\n// than sending unauthenticated.\nexport { VendorAuthHook, VENDOR_AUTH_HOOK, SignableRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// The SSRF policy a re-pointed URL is judged under, and the refusal it produces. Automatic, armed by\n// the ACT of re-pointing; the ONLY way to relax it is naming SsrfTestingPolicy at a call site.\nexport { SsrfPolicy, SsrfTestingPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';\nexport { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';\nexport { SsrfRefusedError } from './SsrfRefusedError';\nexport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\nexport { InternalAddressRules } from './InternalAddressRules';\nexport { AddressResolver, DnsAddressResolver } from './AddressResolver';\n\n// The isomorphic engine, re-exported so a server app needs one import.\nexport { ProxyClient, ClientErrorTranslator } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport { ClientRequest, ClientFilterDefinition } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport type { ClientFilter } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport type { ApiPrototype } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport { StreamingCapabilityError } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\n\nexport { WiringPolicy } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/http/http-client-node/src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;;;AAEH,yDAAwD;AAA/C,sHAAA,iBAAiB,OAAA;AAC1B,qDAAgF;AAAvE,kHAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AAAE,6HAAA,0BAA0B,OAAA;AACpD,+CAA8C;AAArC,4GAAA,YAAY,OAAA;AACrB,8FAA8F;AAC9F,kDAAkD;AAAzC,uGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AAEnB,kGAAkG;AAClG,4DAA4D;AAC5D,+DAA8D;AAArD,4HAAA,oBAAoB,OAAA;AAC7B,kGAAkG;AAClG,4EAA4E;AAC5E,+DAA8D;AAArD,4HAAA,oBAAoB,OAAA;AAC7B,2EAA0E;AAAjE,wIAAA,0BAA0B,OAAA;AAEnC,mGAAmG;AACnG,kGAAkG;AAClG,6DAA6D;AAC7D,2DAA8F;AAArF,8HAAA,wBAAwB,OAAA;AAAE,kIAAA,4BAA4B,OAAA;AAE/D,mGAAmG;AACnG,wFAAwF;AACxF,qGAAqG;AACrG,4DAA4D;AAC5D,wDAAgG;AAAvF,gHAAA,gBAAgB,OAAA;AAAE,kHAAA,kBAAkB,OAAA;AAAE,+GAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AAE9D,qGAAqG;AACrG,+FAA+F;AAC/F,2CAA6D;AAApD,wGAAA,UAAU,OAAA;AAAE,+GAAA,iBAAiB,OAAA;AACtC,qDAAoD;AAA3C,kHAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AACxB,uDAAsD;AAA7C,oHAAA,gBAAgB,OAAA;AACzB,2DAA0D;AAAjD,wHAAA,kBAAkB,OAAA;AAC3B,+DAA8D;AAArD,4HAAA,oBAAoB,OAAA;AAC7B,qDAAwE;AAA/D,kHAAA,eAAe,OAAA;AAAE,qHAAA,kBAAkB,OAAA;AAE5C,uEAAuE;AACvE,gEAAiF;AAAxE,+GAAA,WAAW,OAAA;AAAE,yHAAA,qBAAqB,OAAA;AAC3C,gEAAoF;AAA3E,iHAAA,aAAa,OAAA;AAAE,0HAAA,sBAAsB,OAAA;AAG9C,gEAAuE;AAA9D,4HAAA,wBAAwB,OAAA;AAEjC,gEAA2D;AAAlD,gHAAA,YAAY,OAAA","sourcesContent":["/**\n * @webpieces/http-client-node\n *\n * The SERVER-side HTTP client. Reads an API contract's decorators and generates type-safe HTTP\n * clients from it — the same contract the callee's controller implements.\n *\n * Node-only, so unlike @webpieces/http-client-browser it is fully inversify-wired and reads the\n * magic context straight out of the AsyncLocalStorage-backed RequestContext. There is no\n * ContextReader indirection, because a server has exactly one right answer, and a call made\n * OUTSIDE `RequestContext.run(...)` throws instead of silently dropping the trace.\n *\n * Usage:\n * ```typescript\n * import { ClientHttpFactory, ClientConfig } from '@webpieces/http-client-node';\n *\n * // inject the factory, then one client per contract\n * const server2 = factory.createRpcClient(Server2Api, new ClientConfig('server2', ClientRole.SERVER));\n * const response = await server2.fetchValue(req);\n *\n * // a client whose destination arrives per call: ONE filter, and nothing else changes\n * const partner = factory.createRpcClient(PartnerWebhookApi, new ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', ClientRole.SERVER), [\n *     new ClientFilterDefinition(1000, new ContextFullUrlFilter()),\n * ]);\n * ```\n */\n\nexport { ClientHttpFactory } from './ClientHttpFactory';\nexport { NodeProxyClient, NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER } from './NodeProxyClient';\nexport { ClientConfig } from './ClientConfig';\n// ClientConfig's required `role` argument, re-exported so a client is set up from one import.\nexport { ClientRole } from '@webpieces/core-util';\n\n// Install this on the ONE client whose destination is data. Installing it IS the opt-in; a client\n// without it ignores an ambient OVERRIDE_BASE_URL entirely.\nexport { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';\n// The same opt-in for a COMPLETE stored url (host + path + query), sent verbatim with no contract\n// path appended — the usual partner-webhook shape. Reads OVERRIDE_FULL_URL.\nexport { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';\nexport { MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError } from './MissingRuntimeBaseUrlError';\n\n// The two ways outbound auth refuses to send: a binding a contract's auth mode requires is absent.\n// Typed, so a delivery worker tells 'we are misconfigured' from 'the partner registered something\n// hostile' (SsrfRefusedError) without matching message text.\nexport { MissingSharedSecretError, MissingVendorAuthMinterError } from './OutboundAuthErrors';\n\n// vendorAuth(name), OUTBOUND role: the minter mints (and refreshes once on a 401) what this client\n// sends. Defined in @webpieces/core-context; bind VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER, or every outbound\n// vendorAuth(...) call throws rather than sending unauthenticated. The INBOUND VendorAuthVerifier is\n// http-routing's, and no client ever depends on it (#1358).\nexport { VendorAuthMinter, VENDOR_AUTH_MINTER, SignableRequest } from '@webpieces/core-context';\n\n// The SSRF policy a re-pointed URL is judged under, and the refusal it produces. Automatic, armed by\n// the ACT of re-pointing; the ONLY way to relax it is naming SsrfTestingPolicy at a call site.\nexport { SsrfPolicy, SsrfTestingPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';\nexport { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';\nexport { SsrfRefusedError } from './SsrfRefusedError';\nexport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\nexport { InternalAddressRules } from './InternalAddressRules';\nexport { AddressResolver, DnsAddressResolver } from './AddressResolver';\n\n// The isomorphic engine, re-exported so a server app needs one import.\nexport { ProxyClient, ClientErrorTranslator } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport { ClientRequest, ClientFilterDefinition } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport type { ClientFilter } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport type { ApiPrototype } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nexport { StreamingCapabilityError } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\n\nexport { WiringPolicy } from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\n"]}