@webpieces/http-client-node 0.4.923 → 0.4.925

package/README.md

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ for (const webhook of webhooks) {
   refused rather than obeyed. The one relaxation — testing the partner path against a local fake —
   has to be said out loud, with a reason:
   `new ContextFullUrlFilter(new SsrfTestingPolicy('local fake in the delivery e2e'))`.
-- **Every auth mode still works.** `oidc(...)` mints for the FINAL base URL, `sharedSecret(...)`
+- **Every auth mode still works.** `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` mint for the FINAL base URL, `sharedSecret(...)`
   sends the value this client holds (N services implementing one contract behind one agreed secret is
   a real topology), and `@WpAuth([webhook(name)])` calls your bound `WebhookSignerCallback`. The minter runs
   BELOW the SSRF guard, so a destination that is going to be refused never causes a credential to be
@@ -126,13 +126,14 @@ for (const webhook of webhooks) {
   as its own node on the runtime architecture graph, and two services delivering over the same
   contract converge on one box.
 
-## `oidc(...)`: generate the credential the Cloud Run edge expects
+## `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs([...])`: generate the credential the Cloud Run edge expects
 
 The shared contract tells `OutboundAuthFilter` to mint a Google ID token for the final
 base URL and send it in `Authorization: Bearer`. A private Cloud Run service verifies
-that invocation token and enforces invoker IAM before the container runs. Webpieces retains
-supplementary server checks; its empty caller list relies on edge authorization. Off-GCP
-clients mint unsigned synthetic tokens for local tests. See [Cloud Run OIDC](../../../docs/architecture/cloud-run-oidc.md)
+that invocation token and enforces invoker IAM before the container runs. The server then
+checks the caller itself: `oidcSameProject()` admits service accounts of its own GCP project,
+`oidcSvcs([...])` only the listed ones. Off-GCP clients mint unsigned synthetic tokens for local
+tests, which a server on GCP refuses. See [Cloud Run OIDC](../../../docs/architecture/cloud-run-oidc.md)
 for deployment assumptions and why a direct application-verifier test does not test the edge.
 
 ## Signing an OUTBOUND webhook — `webhook(...)`, the other way round

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/http-client-node",
-  "version": "0.4.923",
+  "version": "0.4.925",
   "description": "Server-side HTTP client for webpieces: inversify-wired, reads RequestContext directly, mints OIDC/shared-secret delivery auth, resolves Cloud Run URLs from a service name",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.923",
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.923",
-    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.923",
-    "@webpieces/http-client-core": "0.4.923",
+    "@webpieces/core-context": "0.4.925",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.925",
+    "@webpieces/gcp-identity": "0.4.925",
+    "@webpieces/http-client-core": "0.4.925",
     "inversify": "7.10.4",
     "reflect-metadata": "0.2.2"
   }

package/src/NodeProxyClient.d.ts

@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ export declare class NodeProxyClient extends ProxyClient {
      * Straight from the RequestContext. Throws when there is no active request scope.
      *
      * `destination` rides through unchanged: this is the ONE client that can legitimately propagate a
-     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidc(...) /
-     * sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and
+     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidcSameProject() /
+     * oidcSvcs(...) / sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and
      * friends instead of shipping headers that endpoint's AuthFilter is obliged to reject.
      */
     protected outboundContextHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string>;

package/src/NodeProxyClient.js

@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@ let NodeProxyClient = class NodeProxyClient extends http_client_core_1.ProxyClie
      * Straight from the RequestContext. Throws when there is no active request scope.
      *
      * `destination` rides through unchanged: this is the ONE client that can legitimately propagate a
-     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidc(...) /
-     * sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and
+     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidcSameProject() /
+     * oidcSvcs(...) / sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and
      * friends instead of shipping headers that endpoint's AuthFilter is obliged to reject.
      */
     outboundContextHeaders(destination) {

package/src/NodeProxyClient.js.map

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{ inject, optional } from 'inversify';\nimport { once } from 'node:events';\nimport { request as httpRequest, IncomingMessage } from 'node:http';\nimport { request as httpsRequest } from 'node:https';\nimport { Readable } from 'node:stream';\nimport {\n    ClientRegistry,\n    DestinationTrust,\n    ApiImplementationError,\n    RecordedEndpoint,\n    RecordedError,\n    LogApiCallImpl,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    Secrets,\n    SECRETS,\n    TestCaseRecorder,\n    toError,\n    ClientRole,\n} from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport {\n    RequestContext,\n    RequestContextApiCallContext,\n    RequestContextHeaders,\n    provideFrameworkTransient,\n} from '@webpieces/core-context';\nimport { GcpOidc } from '@webpieces/gcp-identity';\nimport {\n    ApiPrototype,\n    ByteReadableStream,\n    ClientRequest,\n    ClientFilterDefinition,\n    ProxyClient,\n} from '@webpieces/http-client-core';\nimport { AddressResolver } from './AddressResolver';\nimport { ClientConfig } from './ClientConfig';\nimport { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';\nimport { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';\nimport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\nimport { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';\nimport { SsrfPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';\nimport { WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK, WebhookSignerCallback } from './WebhookSignerCallback';\n\n/**\n * The two framework built-ins' priorities, RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER and to nothing else — they are\n * ordered beneath every app filter structurally, not by number (see `ProxyClient.initRoutes`).\n *\n * The guard is OUTSIDE the minter deliberately: a destination that is going to be refused must be\n * refused BEFORE a credential is minted for it, so a hostile URL never causes a token to exist.\n */\nconst SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY = 900;\nconst OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY = 800;\n\n/**\n * The server-side {@link ProxyClient}. Everything a browser cannot do lives here: reading the\n * ambient RequestContext, minting OIDC tokens, holding shared secrets, and recording test cases.\n *\n * TRANSIENT on purpose. Every `createRpcClient(api, config)` needs its own instance, because `init()`\n * binds one instance to exactly one API contract and one target. {@link ProxyClientProvider} hands\n * them out — see its doc.\n */\n@provideFrameworkTransient()\nexport class NodeProxyClient extends ProxyClient {\n    protected override selectAuthMethod(route: import('@webpieces/core-util').RouteMetadata): import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode {\n        const methods = route.authMeta?.methods;\n        if (!methods) throw new Error('Endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        const selected = methods.find((method: import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode) =>\n            method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'public' ||\n            (method.kind === 'shared-secret' && !!this.secrets?.get(method.secretKey)) ||\n            (method.kind === 'webhook' && !!this.webhookSigner));\n        if (selected) return selected;\n        if (methods.length === 1) return methods[0];\n        throw new Error('No configured Node client credential can satisfy this endpoint; bind a declared service credential.');\n    }\n    private config!: ClientConfig;\n\n    constructor(\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(RequestContextHeaders) private readonly headers: RequestContextHeaders,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(GcpOidc) private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(AddressResolver) private readonly addressResolver: AddressResolver,\n        // @optional: only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; the client sends its bound value.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional() @inject(SECRETS) private readonly secrets?: Secrets,\n        // @optional: only webhook(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW\n        // rather than deliver unsigned — see WebhookSignerCallback.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional()\n        @inject(WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK)\n        private readonly webhookSigner?: WebhookSignerCallback,\n    ) {\n        // This package is node-only and already depends on core-context, so it builds the\n        // RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext itself. No startup install, and therefore nothing a\n        // non-webpieces host (plain NestJS/Express) can forget.\n        super(new LogApiCallImpl(new RequestContextApiCallContext()));\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Bind this client to one API contract + target, with the app's outbound filters (url\n     * rewriting, header editing, logging, per-call re-pointing).\n     */\n    init(\n        apiPrototype: ApiPrototype<object>,\n        config: ClientConfig,\n        appFilters: ClientFilterDefinition[],\n    ): void {\n        this.config = config;\n        this.initRoutes(apiPrototype, appFilters);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The same chain every client runs — a ClientRegistry mapping, else the installed deriver — but\n     * with NODE's fallback: THROW. A server has no \"own origin\" to fall back to the way a browser\n     * does, so an unresolvable peer is a setup bug and must fail loudly (the error names the fixes).\n     *\n     * Resolved per call, never at construction, so building a client stays synchronous. Any metadata\n     * read beneath a deriver is memoized process-wide, so only the first call pays.\n     */\n    protected override clientRole(): ClientRole {\n        return this.config.role;\n    }\n\n    protected override resolveBaseUrl(): Promise<string> {\n        return ClientRegistry.resolve(this.config.svcName);\n    }\n\n    /** Node/undici supports a live ReadableStream body when fetch is given `duplex: 'half'`. */\n    protected override supportsConcurrentDuplexFetch(): boolean {\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Node's native HTTP stream is genuinely concurrent: unlike browser Fetch, an early response\n     * does not cancel the still-open upload. The returned Web Response keeps parsing isomorphic.\n     */\n    protected override sendStreamingTransport(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        signal: AbortSignal,\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        return new Promise<Response>(\n            (resolve: (response: Response) => void, reject: (error: Error) => void) => {\n                const url = new URL(request.url);\n                const send = url.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;\n                const outgoing = send(\n                    url,\n                    {\n                        method: 'POST',\n                        headers: request.headersAsRecord(),\n                        signal,\n                    },\n                    (incoming: IncomingMessage): void => {\n                        const headers = new Headers();\n                        for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(incoming.headers)) {\n                            if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n                                for (const item of value) headers.append(name, item);\n                            } else if (value !== undefined) {\n                                headers.set(name, value);\n                            }\n                        }\n                        const responseBody = Readable.toWeb(incoming) as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;\n                        resolve(\n                            new Response(responseBody, {\n                                status: incoming.statusCode ?? 500,\n                                statusText: incoming.statusMessage,\n                                headers,\n                            }),\n                        );\n                    },\n                );\n                outgoing.once('error', reject);\n                // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- a native socket/write rejection is normalized by toError\n                void this.pumpStreamingRequest(body, outgoing).catch((err: unknown) => {\n                    const error = toError(err);\n                    outgoing.destroy(error);\n                });\n            },\n        );\n    }\n\n    private async pumpStreamingRequest(\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n        outgoing: import('node:http').ClientRequest,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const reader = body.getReader();\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- socket errors reject writer acknowledgements\n        try {\n            for (;;) {\n                const part = await reader.read();\n                if (part.done) break;\n                if (!outgoing.write(part.value)) await once(outgoing, 'drain');\n            }\n            outgoing.end();\n        } finally {\n            reader.releaseLock();\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The two framework built-ins, installed on EVERY client this package builds and ordered\n     * beneath every app filter by {@link ProxyClient.initRoutes}.\n     *\n     * They are unconditional rather than opt-in because neither costs anything on the path that\n     * does not need it: the SSRF guard steps aside when nothing re-pointed the request, and the\n     * auth filter does nothing for a `@WpAuthPublic` endpoint. An app therefore cannot forget to install\n     * the guard on the one client that takes runtime URLs — the ACT of re-pointing is what arms it.\n     */\n    protected override clientFilters(): ClientFilterDefinition[] {\n        return [\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY,\n                new SsrfGuardFilter(this.ssrfPolicy(), this.addressResolver),\n            ),\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY,\n                new OutboundAuthFilter(this.gcpOidc, this.secrets, this.webhookSigner),\n            ),\n        ];\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * WHICH policy the guard applies when something does re-point this client.\n     *\n     * Read off an installed {@link ContextBaseUrlFilter} or {@link ContextFullUrlFilter}, because\n     * that filter is where an app says\n     * \"this client may be re-pointed\", and the single legitimate relaxation\n     * ({@link SsrfTestingPolicy}) belongs at the same construction site as that decision rather\n     * than in a second place a reader has to correlate. No such filter — or one built with the\n     * default — means {@link SsrfPolicy} (the strict one), so the safe answer is what an app gets by saying\n     * nothing.\n     */\n    private ssrfPolicy(): SsrfPolicy {\n        for (const definition of this.appFilters) {\n            const filter = definition.filter;\n            if (filter instanceof ContextBaseUrlFilter || filter instanceof ContextFullUrlFilter) {\n                return filter.ssrfPolicy;\n            }\n        }\n        return new SsrfPolicy();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight from the RequestContext. Throws when there is no active request scope.\n     *\n     * `destination` rides through unchanged: this is the ONE client that can legitimately propagate a\n     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidc(...) /\n     * sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and\n     * friends instead of shipping headers that endpoint's AuthFilter is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    protected override outboundContextHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        return this.headers.buildOutboundHeaders(destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight into the ambient RequestContext — the reason a value a callee set climbs the call\n     * tree: after this returns, the CALLER's context holds it, and the caller's own response (and its\n     * own outbound calls) carry it onward.\n     *\n     * `destination` is the trust gate, and it is the mirror of the inbound problem rather than a\n     * restatement of it: a response is another process's ASSERTION. Untrusted response keys are\n     * admitted; a TRUSTED one is admitted only from a destination this client authenticated to, and\n     * is otherwise dropped — see `RequestContextHeaders.acceptResponseHeaders`.\n     */\n    protected override acceptResponseContext(\n        headers: Headers,\n        destination: DestinationTrust,\n    ): void {\n        this.headers.acceptResponseHeaders(headers, destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Test-case recording hook (mirror of Java HttpsJsonClientInvokeHandler): if a recorder is\n     * travelling in the magic context, capture this outbound call + its result so it becomes a mock\n     * in the generated test. Absent a recorder this is exactly the base behavior.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    protected override async execute(\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        // Preserve the context precondition before logging, which also requires an active scope.\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No active RequestContext. Run the client call inside RequestContext.run(...).',\n            );\n        }\n        const recorder = this.headers.findRecorder();\n        if (!recorder) {\n            return super.execute(route, requestDto, method);\n        }\n        return this.recordCall(recorder, route, requestDto, method);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Execute the call while recording it (args + masked ctx snapshot + result).\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a FIXTURE field, not a log line, so it is built here rather than handed down\n     * from the call path — a logging backend stamps its own fields and never sees this.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    private async recordCall(\n        recorder: TestCaseRecorder,\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        const ctxSnapshot: Record<string, string> = {};\n        for (const entry of RequestContext.buildLogFields().entries()) {\n            ctxSnapshot[entry[0]] = entry[1];\n        }\n        const recorded = new RecordedEndpoint(\n            this.contractName(),\n            route.methodName,\n            [requestDto],\n            ctxSnapshot,\n        );\n        recorder.addEndpointInfo(recorded);\n\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- capture failure into the recording, then rethrow unchanged\n        try {\n            const response = await super.execute(route, requestDto, method);\n            recorded.successResponse = response;\n            return response;\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            recorded.failureResponse = new RecordedError(error.name, error.message);\n            throw err;\n        }\n    }\n\n}\n\n/**\n * DI token for the `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` that hands out RPC clients — one per API contract.\n * `Provider<T>` is erased at runtime, so it cannot be its own token; this Symbol names T.\n *\n * Because NodeProxyClient is bound TRANSIENT, every `get()` constructs a new one. (Were it bound\n * `@provideFrameworkSingleton`, the very same Provider would instead hand back one lazily-created\n * instance — the provider caches nothing, so the target's scope decides.)\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- Provider<T> is erased at runtime; the Symbol names T\nexport const NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER = Symbol.for('Provider<NodeProxyClient>');\n"]}
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'./ClientConfig';\nimport { ContextBaseUrlFilter } from './ContextBaseUrlFilter';\nimport { ContextFullUrlFilter } from './ContextFullUrlFilter';\nimport { OutboundAuthFilter } from './OutboundAuthFilter';\nimport { SsrfGuardFilter } from './SsrfGuardFilter';\nimport { SsrfPolicy } from './SsrfPolicy';\nimport { WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK, WebhookSignerCallback } from './WebhookSignerCallback';\n\n/**\n * The two framework built-ins' priorities, RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER and to nothing else — they are\n * ordered beneath every app filter structurally, not by number (see `ProxyClient.initRoutes`).\n *\n * The guard is OUTSIDE the minter deliberately: a destination that is going to be refused must be\n * refused BEFORE a credential is minted for it, so a hostile URL never causes a token to exist.\n */\nconst SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY = 900;\nconst OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY = 800;\n\n/**\n * The server-side {@link ProxyClient}. Everything a browser cannot do lives here: reading the\n * ambient RequestContext, minting OIDC tokens, holding shared secrets, and recording test cases.\n *\n * TRANSIENT on purpose. Every `createRpcClient(api, config)` needs its own instance, because `init()`\n * binds one instance to exactly one API contract and one target. {@link ProxyClientProvider} hands\n * them out — see its doc.\n */\n@provideFrameworkTransient()\nexport class NodeProxyClient extends ProxyClient {\n    protected override selectAuthMethod(route: import('@webpieces/core-util').RouteMetadata): import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode {\n        const methods = route.authMeta?.methods;\n        if (!methods) throw new Error('Endpoint requires @WpAuth or @WpAuthPublic.');\n        const selected = methods.find((method: import('@webpieces/core-util').AuthMode) =>\n            method.kind === 'oidc' || method.kind === 'public' ||\n            (method.kind === 'shared-secret' && !!this.secrets?.get(method.secretKey)) ||\n            (method.kind === 'webhook' && !!this.webhookSigner));\n        if (selected) return selected;\n        if (methods.length === 1) return methods[0];\n        throw new Error('No configured Node client credential can satisfy this endpoint; bind a declared service credential.');\n    }\n    private config!: ClientConfig;\n\n    constructor(\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(RequestContextHeaders) private readonly headers: RequestContextHeaders,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(GcpOidc) private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @inject(AddressResolver) private readonly addressResolver: AddressResolver,\n        // @optional: only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; the client sends its bound value.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional() @inject(SECRETS) private readonly secrets?: Secrets,\n        // @optional: only webhook(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW\n        // rather than deliver unsigned — see WebhookSignerCallback.\n        // webpieces-disable inject-annotation-not-needed-for-concrete-class -- DI-resolved param; the esbuild/vitest path elides type-only imports (no design:paramtypes), so the explicit token is required\n        @optional()\n        @inject(WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK)\n        private readonly webhookSigner?: WebhookSignerCallback,\n    ) {\n        // This package is node-only and already depends on core-context, so it builds the\n        // RequestContext-backed ApiCallContext itself. No startup install, and therefore nothing a\n        // non-webpieces host (plain NestJS/Express) can forget.\n        super(new LogApiCallImpl(new RequestContextApiCallContext()));\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Bind this client to one API contract + target, with the app's outbound filters (url\n     * rewriting, header editing, logging, per-call re-pointing).\n     */\n    init(\n        apiPrototype: ApiPrototype<object>,\n        config: ClientConfig,\n        appFilters: ClientFilterDefinition[],\n    ): void {\n        this.config = config;\n        this.initRoutes(apiPrototype, appFilters);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The same chain every client runs — a ClientRegistry mapping, else the installed deriver — but\n     * with NODE's fallback: THROW. A server has no \"own origin\" to fall back to the way a browser\n     * does, so an unresolvable peer is a setup bug and must fail loudly (the error names the fixes).\n     *\n     * Resolved per call, never at construction, so building a client stays synchronous. Any metadata\n     * read beneath a deriver is memoized process-wide, so only the first call pays.\n     */\n    protected override clientRole(): ClientRole {\n        return this.config.role;\n    }\n\n    protected override resolveBaseUrl(): Promise<string> {\n        return ClientRegistry.resolve(this.config.svcName);\n    }\n\n    /** Node/undici supports a live ReadableStream body when fetch is given `duplex: 'half'`. */\n    protected override supportsConcurrentDuplexFetch(): boolean {\n        return true;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Node's native HTTP stream is genuinely concurrent: unlike browser Fetch, an early response\n     * does not cancel the still-open upload. The returned Web Response keeps parsing isomorphic.\n     */\n    protected override sendStreamingTransport(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        signal: AbortSignal,\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        return new Promise<Response>(\n            (resolve: (response: Response) => void, reject: (error: Error) => void) => {\n                const url = new URL(request.url);\n                const send = url.protocol === 'https:' ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;\n                const outgoing = send(\n                    url,\n                    {\n                        method: 'POST',\n                        headers: request.headersAsRecord(),\n                        signal,\n                    },\n                    (incoming: IncomingMessage): void => {\n                        const headers = new Headers();\n                        for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(incoming.headers)) {\n                            if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n                                for (const item of value) headers.append(name, item);\n                            } else if (value !== undefined) {\n                                headers.set(name, value);\n                            }\n                        }\n                        const responseBody = Readable.toWeb(incoming) as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;\n                        resolve(\n                            new Response(responseBody, {\n                                status: incoming.statusCode ?? 500,\n                                statusText: incoming.statusMessage,\n                                headers,\n                            }),\n                        );\n                    },\n                );\n                outgoing.once('error', reject);\n                // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- a native socket/write rejection is normalized by toError\n                void this.pumpStreamingRequest(body, outgoing).catch((err: unknown) => {\n                    const error = toError(err);\n                    outgoing.destroy(error);\n                });\n            },\n        );\n    }\n\n    private async pumpStreamingRequest(\n        body: ByteReadableStream,\n        outgoing: import('node:http').ClientRequest,\n    ): Promise<void> {\n        const reader = body.getReader();\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- socket errors reject writer acknowledgements\n        try {\n            for (;;) {\n                const part = await reader.read();\n                if (part.done) break;\n                if (!outgoing.write(part.value)) await once(outgoing, 'drain');\n            }\n            outgoing.end();\n        } finally {\n            reader.releaseLock();\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The two framework built-ins, installed on EVERY client this package builds and ordered\n     * beneath every app filter by {@link ProxyClient.initRoutes}.\n     *\n     * They are unconditional rather than opt-in because neither costs anything on the path that\n     * does not need it: the SSRF guard steps aside when nothing re-pointed the request, and the\n     * auth filter does nothing for a `@WpAuthPublic` endpoint. An app therefore cannot forget to install\n     * the guard on the one client that takes runtime URLs — the ACT of re-pointing is what arms it.\n     */\n    protected override clientFilters(): ClientFilterDefinition[] {\n        return [\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                SSRF_GUARD_PRIORITY,\n                new SsrfGuardFilter(this.ssrfPolicy(), this.addressResolver),\n            ),\n            new ClientFilterDefinition(\n                OUTBOUND_AUTH_PRIORITY,\n                new OutboundAuthFilter(this.gcpOidc, this.secrets, this.webhookSigner),\n            ),\n        ];\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * WHICH policy the guard applies when something does re-point this client.\n     *\n     * Read off an installed {@link ContextBaseUrlFilter} or {@link ContextFullUrlFilter}, because\n     * that filter is where an app says\n     * \"this client may be re-pointed\", and the single legitimate relaxation\n     * ({@link SsrfTestingPolicy}) belongs at the same construction site as that decision rather\n     * than in a second place a reader has to correlate. No such filter — or one built with the\n     * default — means {@link SsrfPolicy} (the strict one), so the safe answer is what an app gets by saying\n     * nothing.\n     */\n    private ssrfPolicy(): SsrfPolicy {\n        for (const definition of this.appFilters) {\n            const filter = definition.filter;\n            if (filter instanceof ContextBaseUrlFilter || filter instanceof ContextFullUrlFilter) {\n                return filter.ssrfPolicy;\n            }\n        }\n        return new SsrfPolicy();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight from the RequestContext. Throws when there is no active request scope.\n     *\n     * `destination` rides through unchanged: this is the ONE client that can legitimately propagate a\n     * verified identity, and it does so exactly when the callee will authenticate us (oidcSameProject() /\n     * oidcSvcs(...) / sharedSecret(...)). Calling a peer's @WpAuthPublic or jwt() endpoint now omits `x-user-id` and\n     * friends instead of shipping headers that endpoint's AuthFilter is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    protected override outboundContextHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        return this.headers.buildOutboundHeaders(destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Straight into the ambient RequestContext — the reason a value a callee set climbs the call\n     * tree: after this returns, the CALLER's context holds it, and the caller's own response (and its\n     * own outbound calls) carry it onward.\n     *\n     * `destination` is the trust gate, and it is the mirror of the inbound problem rather than a\n     * restatement of it: a response is another process's ASSERTION. Untrusted response keys are\n     * admitted; a TRUSTED one is admitted only from a destination this client authenticated to, and\n     * is otherwise dropped — see `RequestContextHeaders.acceptResponseHeaders`.\n     */\n    protected override acceptResponseContext(\n        headers: Headers,\n        destination: DestinationTrust,\n    ): void {\n        this.headers.acceptResponseHeaders(headers, destination);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Test-case recording hook (mirror of Java HttpsJsonClientInvokeHandler): if a recorder is\n     * travelling in the magic context, capture this outbound call + its result so it becomes a mock\n     * in the generated test. Absent a recorder this is exactly the base behavior.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    protected override async execute(\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        // Preserve the context precondition before logging, which also requires an active scope.\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No active RequestContext. Run the client call inside RequestContext.run(...).',\n            );\n        }\n        const recorder = this.headers.findRecorder();\n        if (!recorder) {\n            return super.execute(route, requestDto, method);\n        }\n        return this.recordCall(recorder, route, requestDto, method);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Execute the call while recording it (args + masked ctx snapshot + result).\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a FIXTURE field, not a log line, so it is built here rather than handed down\n     * from the call path — a logging backend stamps its own fields and never sees this.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    private async recordCall(\n        recorder: TestCaseRecorder,\n        route: RouteMetadata,\n        requestDto: unknown,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n        method: () => Promise<unknown>,\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- DTO types are erased at the proxy boundary\n    ): Promise<unknown> {\n        const ctxSnapshot: Record<string, string> = {};\n        for (const entry of RequestContext.buildLogFields().entries()) {\n            ctxSnapshot[entry[0]] = entry[1];\n        }\n        const recorded = new RecordedEndpoint(\n            this.contractName(),\n            route.methodName,\n            [requestDto],\n            ctxSnapshot,\n        );\n        recorder.addEndpointInfo(recorded);\n\n        // eslint-disable-next-line @webpieces/no-unmanaged-exceptions -- capture failure into the recording, then rethrow unchanged\n        try {\n            const response = await super.execute(route, requestDto, method);\n            recorded.successResponse = response;\n            return response;\n        } catch (err: unknown) {\n            const error = toError(err);\n            recorded.failureResponse = new RecordedError(error.name, error.message);\n            throw err;\n        }\n    }\n\n}\n\n/**\n * DI token for the `Provider<NodeProxyClient>` that hands out RPC clients — one per API contract.\n * `Provider<T>` is erased at runtime, so it cannot be its own token; this Symbol names T.\n *\n * Because NodeProxyClient is bound TRANSIENT, every `get()` constructs a new one. (Were it bound\n * `@provideFrameworkSingleton`, the very same Provider would instead hand back one lazily-created\n * instance — the provider caches nothing, so the target's scope decides.)\n */\n// webpieces-disable no-symbol-di-tokens -- Provider<T> is erased at runtime; the Symbol names T\nexport const NODE_PROXY_CLIENT_PROVIDER = Symbol.for('Provider<NodeProxyClient>');\n"]}

package/src/OutboundAuthFilter.d.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import { WebhookSignerCallback } from './WebhookSignerCallback';
  *
  * ## The three modes, and why none of them is restricted to a fixed host
  *
- * - `oidc(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.
+ * - `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.
  * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.
  *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed
  *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.

package/src/OutboundAuthFilter.js

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const WebhookSignerCallback_1 = require("./WebhookSignerCallback");
  *
  * ## The three modes, and why none of them is restricted to a fixed host
  *
- * - `oidc(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.
+ * - `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.
  * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.
  *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed
  *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.

package/src/OutboundAuthFilter.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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That is wrong the moment a filter can re-point the request: an OIDC token's audience is the\n * callee's base URL, and a token minted for our own service name and then sent to a partner's\n * server is a credential handed to the wrong party.\n *\n * As the innermost filter (`ProxyClient.initRoutes` puts the framework's built-ins beneath every app\n * filter, and no app priority can get under them) it reads `request.baseUrl` / `request.url` after\n * everything has settled, which makes the audience correct by construction rather than by\n * convention. The SSRF guard sits immediately ABOVE it, so a destination that is going to be refused\n * is refused BEFORE any credential is minted for it.\n *\n * ## The three modes, and why none of them is restricted to a fixed host\n *\n * - `oidc(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.\n * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.\n *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed\n *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.\n * - `webhook(name)` → the app's bound {@link WebhookSignerCallback} produces the headers. WE\n *   are the vendor on this side; see that class.\n *\n * Both credential-minting modes ride in the ONE `Authorization` header under their own scheme —\n * `Bearer <oidc>` / `Webpieces <secret>` — which is never a context key, so neither can leak onto\n * the next hop.\n */\nexport class OutboundAuthFilter extends Filter<ClientRequest, Response> {\n    constructor(\n        private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */\n        private readonly secrets: Secrets | undefined,\n        /** Only webhook(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW. */\n        private readonly webhookSigner: WebhookSignerCallback | undefined,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    override async filter(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        nextFilter: Service<ClientRequest, Response>,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        await this.attach(request);\n        return nextFilter.invoke(request);\n    }\n\n    private async attach(request: ClientRequest): Promise<void> {\n        const mode = request.route.authMeta?.methods[0];\n        if (mode?.kind === 'oidc') {\n            request.headers.set(\n                'Authorization',\n                `Bearer ${await this.gcpOidc.mintIdToken(request.baseUrl)}`,\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'shared-secret') {\n            const secret = this.secrets?.get(mode.secretKey);\n            if (!secret) {\n                throw new MissingSharedSecretError(\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is ` +\n                        `sharedSecret('${mode.secretKey}'), but this client's bound Secrets holds no ` +\n                        `value for that key, so there is no credential to send. Bind a Secrets carrying ` +\n                        `'${mode.secretKey}'. Refusing to send is deliberate: the callee is obliged to 401 an ` +\n                        `unauthenticated request, so sending it would report as the peer's failure.`,\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n            }\n            // Same header as a JWT/OIDC token, but its OWN scheme, so a secret can never be\n            // mistaken for a token nor accepted where one was expected.\n            request.headers.set('Authorization', `Webpieces ${secret}`);\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'webhook') {\n            await this.signWebhook(request, mode.name);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @throws MissingWebhookSignerError when no {@link WebhookSignerCallback} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,\n     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound `WebhookAuthCallback` 401s every\n     *         `webhook(...)` endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so an unbound signer must\n     *         refuse to send rather than deliver something the partner is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    private async signWebhook(request: ClientRequest, name: string): Promise<void> {\n        if (this.webhookSigner === undefined) {\n            throw new MissingWebhookSignerError(\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is webhook('${name}'), so this ` +\n                    `client must SIGN the request the way ${name} verifies it — but no WebhookSignerCallback ` +\n                    `is bound, so there is nothing to produce the signature. Bind one:\\n` +\n                    `    options.bind(WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK).to(MyWebhookSigner);\\n` +\n                    `Refusing to send is deliberate: an unsigned delivery is one the partner will reject, ` +\n                    `and sending it anyway would hide the missing binding until they complained.`,\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                name,\n            );\n        }\n        const signable = new SignableRequest(\n            request.url,\n            request.route.httpMethod,\n            request.body,\n            request.headers,\n            request.contractName,\n            request.route.methodName,\n        );\n        const signed = await this.webhookSigner.sign(name, signable);\n        for (const entry of signed.entries()) {\n            request.headers.set(entry[0], entry[1]);\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}
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That is wrong the moment a filter can re-point the request: an OIDC token's audience is the\n * callee's base URL, and a token minted for our own service name and then sent to a partner's\n * server is a credential handed to the wrong party.\n *\n * As the innermost filter (`ProxyClient.initRoutes` puts the framework's built-ins beneath every app\n * filter, and no app priority can get under them) it reads `request.baseUrl` / `request.url` after\n * everything has settled, which makes the audience correct by construction rather than by\n * convention. The SSRF guard sits immediately ABOVE it, so a destination that is going to be refused\n * is refused BEFORE any credential is minted for it.\n *\n * ## The three modes, and why none of them is restricted to a fixed host\n *\n * - `oidcSameProject()` / `oidcSvcs(...)` → a bearer token minted as this caller's runtime SA, audience = the final base URL.\n * - `sharedSecret(...)` → the value this client holds for that key, as `Authorization: Webpieces …`.\n *   Legitimate against a re-pointed URL: N services implementing ONE contract behind ONE agreed\n *   secret is a real and common topology, and often stands in for OIDC where OIDC is not available.\n * - `webhook(name)` → the app's bound {@link WebhookSignerCallback} produces the headers. WE\n *   are the vendor on this side; see that class.\n *\n * Both credential-minting modes ride in the ONE `Authorization` header under their own scheme —\n * `Bearer <oidc>` / `Webpieces <secret>` — which is never a context key, so neither can leak onto\n * the next hop.\n */\nexport class OutboundAuthFilter extends Filter<ClientRequest, Response> {\n    constructor(\n        private readonly gcpOidc: GcpOidc,\n        /** Only sharedSecret(...) endpoints need it; a server that has none binds nothing. */\n        private readonly secrets: Secrets | undefined,\n        /** Only webhook(...) endpoints need it, and an unbound one makes them THROW. */\n        private readonly webhookSigner: WebhookSignerCallback | undefined,\n    ) {\n        super();\n    }\n\n    override async filter(\n        request: ClientRequest,\n        nextFilter: Service<ClientRequest, Response>,\n    ): Promise<Response> {\n        await this.attach(request);\n        return nextFilter.invoke(request);\n    }\n\n    private async attach(request: ClientRequest): Promise<void> {\n        const mode = request.route.authMeta?.methods[0];\n        if (mode?.kind === 'oidc') {\n            request.headers.set(\n                'Authorization',\n                `Bearer ${await this.gcpOidc.mintIdToken(request.baseUrl)}`,\n            );\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'shared-secret') {\n            const secret = this.secrets?.get(mode.secretKey);\n            if (!secret) {\n                throw new MissingSharedSecretError(\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is ` +\n                        `sharedSecret('${mode.secretKey}'), but this client's bound Secrets holds no ` +\n                        `value for that key, so there is no credential to send. Bind a Secrets carrying ` +\n                        `'${mode.secretKey}'. Refusing to send is deliberate: the callee is obliged to 401 an ` +\n                        `unauthenticated request, so sending it would report as the peer's failure.`,\n                    `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                    mode.secretKey,\n                );\n            }\n            // Same header as a JWT/OIDC token, but its OWN scheme, so a secret can never be\n            // mistaken for a token nor accepted where one was expected.\n            request.headers.set('Authorization', `Webpieces ${secret}`);\n            return;\n        }\n        if (mode?.kind === 'webhook') {\n            await this.signWebhook(request, mode.name);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * @throws MissingWebhookSignerError when no {@link WebhookSignerCallback} is bound. FAIL CLOSED,\n     *         matching the inbound side exactly: an unbound `WebhookAuthCallback` 401s every\n     *         `webhook(...)` endpoint rather than admitting it unverified, so an unbound signer must\n     *         refuse to send rather than deliver something the partner is obliged to reject.\n     */\n    private async signWebhook(request: ClientRequest, name: string): Promise<void> {\n        if (this.webhookSigner === undefined) {\n            throw new MissingWebhookSignerError(\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName} is webhook('${name}'), so this ` +\n                    `client must SIGN the request the way ${name} verifies it — but no WebhookSignerCallback ` +\n                    `is bound, so there is nothing to produce the signature. Bind one:\\n` +\n                    `    options.bind(WEBHOOK_SIGNER_CALLBACK).to(MyWebhookSigner);\\n` +\n                    `Refusing to send is deliberate: an unsigned delivery is one the partner will reject, ` +\n                    `and sending it anyway would hide the missing binding until they complained.`,\n                `${request.contractName}.${request.route.methodName}`,\n                name,\n            );\n        }\n        const signable = new SignableRequest(\n            request.url,\n            request.route.httpMethod,\n            request.body,\n            request.headers,\n            request.contractName,\n            request.route.methodName,\n        );\n        const signed = await this.webhookSigner.sign(name, signable);\n        for (const entry of signed.entries()) {\n            request.headers.set(entry[0], entry[1]);\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}