@webpieces/core-util 0.4.700 → 0.4.701

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/core-util",
-  "version": "0.4.700",
+  "version": "0.4.701",
   "description": "Utility functions for WebPieces - works in browser and Node.js",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",

package/src/http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders.d.ts

@@ -162,12 +162,10 @@ export declare class WebpiecesCoreHeaders {
      * });
      * ```
      *
-     * ONLY a client whose `ClientConfig` names a runtime host policy reads it — `new
-     * ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', new RuntimeHostFromContext(new DnsAddressResolver()))`. A client bound to a deployed
-     * service (`new DeployedServiceHost()`) IGNORES this key entirely, which is what stops an
-     * ambient value re-pointing every other client in the same fan-out loop at a partner's server.
-     * Opting in is a named class at the construction site, so `grep -rn RuntimeHostFromContext`
-     * enumerates every client that can be re-pointed at all.
+     * ONLY a client carrying a `ContextBaseUrlFilter` reads it. Every other client IGNORES this key
+     * entirely, which is what stops an ambient value re-pointing every other client in the same
+     * fan-out loop at a partner's server. Installing that ONE filter IS the opt-in, so
+     * `grep -rn ContextBaseUrlFilter` enumerates every client that can be re-pointed at all.
      *
      * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire, and that is load-bearing. This value
      *   names where THIS hop goes. If it travelled, the callee would inherit it and re-point ITS
@@ -177,7 +175,8 @@ export declare class WebpiecesCoreHeaders {
      *   line when one fails.
      *
      * UNTRUSTED, necessarily: it comes from a database column a partner edited. That is precisely
-     * why {@link RuntimeHostFromContext} ships an SSRF policy on by default rather than trusting it.
+     * why re-pointing a request ARMS the framework's SSRF guard, automatically, rather than trusting
+     * it — the guard sits beneath every app filter and reads the fact that the request was moved.
      */
     static readonly OVERRIDE_BASE_URL: ContextKey<string, "untrusted">;
     /**

package/src/http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders.js

@@ -165,12 +165,10 @@ class WebpiecesCoreHeaders {
      * });
      * ```
      *
-     * ONLY a client whose `ClientConfig` names a runtime host policy reads it — `new
-     * ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', new RuntimeHostFromContext(new DnsAddressResolver()))`. A client bound to a deployed
-     * service (`new DeployedServiceHost()`) IGNORES this key entirely, which is what stops an
-     * ambient value re-pointing every other client in the same fan-out loop at a partner's server.
-     * Opting in is a named class at the construction site, so `grep -rn RuntimeHostFromContext`
-     * enumerates every client that can be re-pointed at all.
+     * ONLY a client carrying a `ContextBaseUrlFilter` reads it. Every other client IGNORES this key
+     * entirely, which is what stops an ambient value re-pointing every other client in the same
+     * fan-out loop at a partner's server. Installing that ONE filter IS the opt-in, so
+     * `grep -rn ContextBaseUrlFilter` enumerates every client that can be re-pointed at all.
      *
      * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire, and that is load-bearing. This value
      *   names where THIS hop goes. If it travelled, the callee would inherit it and re-point ITS
@@ -180,7 +178,8 @@ class WebpiecesCoreHeaders {
      *   line when one fails.
      *
      * UNTRUSTED, necessarily: it comes from a database column a partner edited. That is precisely
-     * why {@link RuntimeHostFromContext} ships an SSRF policy on by default rather than trusting it.
+     * why re-pointing a request ARMS the framework's SSRF guard, automatically, rather than trusting
+     * it — the guard sits beneath every app filter and reads the fact that the request was moved.
      */
     static OVERRIDE_BASE_URL = ContextKey_1.ContextKey.untrusted('overrideBaseUrl', 
     /*httpHeader*/ undefined, 

package/src/http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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The first service to see a request without an `x-request-id`\n * generates one (RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest); every hop copies it onward verbatim. Grep that id and you\n * have the whole call tree. There is no per-hop id and no parent pointer: a chain of ids you must\n * stitch back together buys nothing a single shared id does not already give you.\n *\n * Lives in core-util (browser-safe) so both the http clients and http-server can reference it.\n *\n * Exposed as {@link HeaderRegistry.DEFAULT_HEADERS} — a service opts into these by\n * passing `platformHeaders=true` to `HeaderRegistry.configure(...)`.\n *\n * Each key's `name` is the logical/log name; `httpHeader` is the wire name.\n */\nexport class WebpiecesCoreHeaders {\n    /**\n     * The id that correlates every hop of one request, and every log line of every hop.\n     * Generated by the first service to see a request without one; propagated unchanged after that.\n     */\n    static readonly REQUEST_ID = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('requestId', 'x-request-id');\n\n    /**\n     * WHICH SERVICE MINTED {@link REQUEST_ID} — the name from {@link ServiceInfo}, stamped by\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` ONLY on the branch that generates a new id (i.e. when\n     * the inbound request carried no `x-request-id`). It answers the question the id alone cannot:\n     * \"this trace starts here — is that right?\" An id appearing with no source means it came from\n     * outside; an id sourced by a service that should never be an entry point is a routing bug.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire, and that is the WHOLE POINT. If it\n     *   travelled, hop 2 would inherit it, hop 3 would inherit it, and \"who started this trace\"\n     *   would be indistinguishable from \"who passed it along\" — the origin, the one fact this key\n     *   carries, would be lost. It is absent on every hop that did NOT mint the id, which is exactly\n     *   the signal: present == I am the origin.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted as a plain string at `jsonPayload.requestIdSource`.\n     */\n    static readonly REQUEST_ID_SOURCE = ContextKey.untrusted<string>(\n        'requestIdSource',\n        /*httpHeader*/ undefined\n    );\n\n    /**\n     * The CALLER's build version — so a downstream server's logs record which build of the client\n     * called it (surfaces as `jsonPayload.clientVersion`). Distinct from the log line's own `version`\n     * (this service's build): `version` answers \"which build wrote this line?\", `clientVersion`\n     * answers \"which build asked us to?\".\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` SET → transferred over the wire, BUT unlike a normal transferred key it is NOT\n     *   copied from the context onward. Each hop OVERWRITES it with its OWN `ServiceInfo.getVersion()`\n     *   as it becomes the client to the next hop (see `buildOutboundHeaders`), so on any given server\n     *   `clientVersion` is always the IMMEDIATE caller's version, never a stale grand-caller's.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → the inbound value lands in the context and flows through the normal log\n     *   field map; no backend change needed.\n     */\n    static readonly CLIENT_VERSION = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('clientVersion', 'x-webpieces-client-version');\n\n    /**\n     * A frontend/app-minted correlation id that groups every request triggered by ONE user ACTION.\n     *\n     * An \"action\" is a single thing the user did in the GUI — a CLICK on a button/link, or TYPING in a\n     * field — or a background poller tick: anything that may fan out into MULTIPLE remote calls. That one\n     * action fires 1..N browser HTTP calls, each of which gets its own framework-minted {@link REQUEST_ID}\n     * (one per HTTP call, shared within that call's server→server subtree). `actionId` sits ABOVE\n     * `requestId` and is what stitches those N requests back to the single action that caused them:\n     *\n     *     actionId  (app-minted, ONE per user action, rides EVERY call of that action)\n     *        └── 1..N requestId  (framework-minted, ONE per HTTP call)\n     *\n     * Grep one `actionId` in the logs → every `requestId` it spawned, and every log line of the whole\n     * action. Minted and refreshed by the app (a UI concern), carried under `x-webpieces-actionid`.\n     *\n     * Browser/app-minted ONLY: unlike {@link REQUEST_ID}, the framework transfers and logs it but must\n     * NOT auto-mint one server-side. Absent `actionId` ⇒ a non-action flow (system / cron / task), which\n     * is the correct signal.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` SET → transferred: copied off the inbound request into context and re-emitted on\n     *   outbound hops, so the id follows the action across services.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted as a plain string on every log line of the request.\n     */\n    static readonly ACTION_ID = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('actionId', 'x-webpieces-actionid');\n\n    /**\n     * WHO the request is acting as, and WHAT they may do. All three are TRUSTED keys: they are the\n     * inputs to authorization decisions, so a reader must be able to tell \"the framework proved\n     * this\" from \"the caller typed this\" — see the trust section of the {@link ContextKey} doc.\n     *\n     * They keep their `httpHeader`, because propagating a verified identity to the next internal\n     * service is the point. What makes that safe is not the header being absent, it is WHO is\n     * allowed to have set it: an inbound value is held PENDING by\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` and admitted by `AuthFilter` only on a route that\n     * verified its CALLER (`@AuthOidc` / `@AuthSharedSecret`). On a browser-reachable route\n     * (`@AuthJwt` / public) the value must match what the authenticator itself derived, or the\n     * request is rejected.\n     *\n     * `provenance` says \"an app-bound JwtHook\" rather than naming one hook, because the framework\n     * default ({@link DefaultJwtHook}) stamps NO context entries at all — an app supplies a hook that\n     * returns {@link ContextTuple}s for the keys it can vouch for. Any of these three that an app's\n     * hook does NOT stamp will be rejected when a caller supplies it, which is the correct and loud\n     * outcome: nothing is vouching for it.\n     */\n    static readonly ORG_ID = ContextKey.trusted<string>(\n        'orgId',\n        'derived from a verified credential by an app-bound JwtHook (a ContextTuple in AuthenticatedCaller)',\n        'x-org-id',\n    );\n\n    static readonly USER_ID = ContextKey.trusted<string>(\n        'userId',\n        'derived from a verified credential by an app-bound JwtHook (a ContextTuple in AuthenticatedCaller)',\n        'x-user-id',\n    );\n\n    static readonly USER_ROLES = ContextKey.trusted<string>(\n        'roles',\n        'derived from a verified credential by an app-bound JwtHook (a ContextTuple in AuthenticatedCaller)',\n        'x-webpieces-roles',\n    );\n\n    /**\n     * Turns on test-case recording for this request (Java: x-webpieces-recording).\n     * Transferred so recording follows the request across service hops.\n     */\n    static readonly RECORDING = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('recording', 'x-webpieces-recording');\n\n    /**\n     * The structured API-call tag ({@link ApiCallInfo}) stamped by {@link LogApiCall} around every\n     * outbound (client) / inbound (server) call. It rides the magic context so EVERY log line emitted\n     * during the call inherits a filterable `api` object, surfacing in GCP as nested\n     * `jsonPayload.api.{side,type,result,path,method}`.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire. Per-hop only: each server/client hop\n     *   stamps its own tag, so a downstream server records `side:'server'`, never the caller's `side:'client'`.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted by the logging backends. It carries an OBJECT value, so the backends\n     *   read it via {@link HeaderRegistry.buildStructuredLogFields} (object-aware); the flat\n     *   `buildLogFields()` string map deliberately skips it (typeof-string guard).\n     */\n    static readonly API_CALL_INFO = ContextKey.untrusted<ApiCallInfo>('api', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    /**\n     * The inbound request's HTTP method and path, stamped ONCE from the {@link HttpRequest} by\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` (the atomic inbound choke point every transport funnels\n     * through). They surface as top-level `jsonPayload.httpMethod` / `jsonPayload.requestPath` so every\n     * log line of the request carries them — they used to ride inside {@link ApiCallInfo} (`api.path` /\n     * `api.method`) but that coupled a per-CALL logger to the per-REQUEST transport shape.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire: a downstream hop stamps its OWN inbound\n     *   method/path, never the caller's. Outbound client calls never set these (no inbound path).\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted by the logging backends as plain strings.\n     */\n    static readonly HTTP_METHOD = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('httpMethod', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    static readonly REQUEST_PATH = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('requestPath', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    /**\n     * The routed endpoint's IMPLEMENTATION identity: the concrete controller class name\n     * ({@link RouteMetadata.controllerClassName}, e.g. `LoginController`) and the handler method NAME\n     * ({@link RouteMetadata.methodName}, e.g. `login`), stamped once per request by {@link LogApiFilter}\n     * after route matching so every subsequent log line of the request carries them.\n     *\n     * These say WHICH CODE ran, which is what you actually grep for — far more useful than the raw\n     * `requestPath`. They are the top-level, filterable twin of what previously only lived nested in\n     * {@link ApiCallInfo} (`api.method.controllerName` / `api.method.methodName`). The local console\n     * formatters render them together as a compact `[Controller.method]` bracket; GCP keeps them as two\n     * separate `jsonPayload.controller` / `jsonPayload.method` fields.\n     *\n     * NOTE: `method` here is the CODE method name (e.g. `login`), NOT the HTTP verb — that is\n     * {@link HTTP_METHOD} (`httpMethod`).\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred: each hop stamps its OWN routed controller/method.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted by the logging backends as plain strings.\n     */\n    static readonly CONTROLLER = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('controller', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    static readonly METHOD = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('method', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    /**\n     * The base URL ONE outbound call should go to, overriding whatever the client's `ClientConfig`\n     * bound at construction — the answer to \"POST our published contract to a URL the PARTNER\n     * registered at runtime\" (an `OrganizationWebhook.url` column, an OAuth callback, a per-tenant\n     * or self-hosted host). The destination is DATA, not deployment, so it cannot be a svcName and\n     * there is nothing to register in {@link ClientRegistry}.\n     *\n     * ```ts\n     * RequestContext.run(() => {\n     *     RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.OVERRIDE_BASE_URL, webhook.url);\n     *     return partnerWebhookClient.deliver(envelope);\n     * });\n     * ```\n     *\n     * ONLY a client whose `ClientConfig` names a runtime host policy reads it — `new\n     * ClientConfig('partner-webhooks', new RuntimeHostFromContext(new DnsAddressResolver()))`. A client bound to a deployed\n     * service (`new DeployedServiceHost()`) IGNORES this key entirely, which is what stops an\n     * ambient value re-pointing every other client in the same fan-out loop at a partner's server.\n     * Opting in is a named class at the construction site, so `grep -rn RuntimeHostFromContext`\n     * enumerates every client that can be re-pointed at all.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire, and that is load-bearing. This value\n     *   names where THIS hop goes. If it travelled, the callee would inherit it and re-point ITS\n     *   own outbound calls at the same host — one partner-supplied URL turning into an SSRF pivot\n     *   across the whole call tree. It is per-hop, always.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → the destination of a partner delivery is exactly what you want in the log\n     *   line when one fails.\n     *\n     * UNTRUSTED, necessarily: it comes from a database column a partner edited. That is precisely\n     * why {@link RuntimeHostFromContext} ships an SSRF policy on by default rather than trusting it.\n     */\n    static readonly OVERRIDE_BASE_URL = ContextKey.untrusted<string>(\n        'overrideBaseUrl',\n        /*httpHeader*/ undefined,\n        /*maskInLogs*/ false,\n        /*isLogged*/ true,\n    );\n\n    /**\n     * NO CREDENTIAL KEYS LIVE HERE.\n     *\n     * `authorization` and `x-webpieces-shared-secret` used to be ContextKeys. That made them\n     * TRANSFERRED keys, so the inbound transfer copied them off the request into the\n     * RequestContext, and every outbound RPC call and enqueued Cloud Task then carried the\n     * caller's credential onward — to services that had no business seeing it.\n     *\n     * A credential belongs to ONE request hop. It is read straight off the {@link HttpRequest}\n     * by the framework AuthFilter, and written straight onto the outbound request by the client\n     * that mints it (NodeProxyClient, GcpTaskInvoker, InMemoryTaskInvoker). It never enters the\n     * magic context, so nothing can propagate it by accident.\n     *\n     * An app that genuinely wants a credential to travel can still register its own ContextKey for\n     * it — but that is now an explicit, visible decision rather than the default.\n     */\n\n    /**\n     * All core context keys (the platform DEFAULT_HEADERS set). A `static readonly` CONSTANT, not a\n     * method: it is compile-time data — a list of the key definitions above — read once at the startup\n     * composition root (`HeaderRegistry.configure` / `HeaderRegistry.DEFAULT_HEADERS`). A method here\n     * would be un-injectable behavior the DI design graph can't reach; a constant is honest data.\n     */\n    static readonly ALL_HEADERS: AnyContextKey[] = [\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID_SOURCE,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CLIENT_VERSION,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ACTION_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ORG_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ROLES,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.RECORDING,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.API_CALL_INFO,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.HTTP_METHOD,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_PATH,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CONTROLLER,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.METHOD,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.OVERRIDE_BASE_URL,\n    ];\n}\n"]}
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The first service to see a request without an `x-request-id`\n * generates one (RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest); every hop copies it onward verbatim. Grep that id and you\n * have the whole call tree. There is no per-hop id and no parent pointer: a chain of ids you must\n * stitch back together buys nothing a single shared id does not already give you.\n *\n * Lives in core-util (browser-safe) so both the http clients and http-server can reference it.\n *\n * Exposed as {@link HeaderRegistry.DEFAULT_HEADERS} — a service opts into these by\n * passing `platformHeaders=true` to `HeaderRegistry.configure(...)`.\n *\n * Each key's `name` is the logical/log name; `httpHeader` is the wire name.\n */\nexport class WebpiecesCoreHeaders {\n    /**\n     * The id that correlates every hop of one request, and every log line of every hop.\n     * Generated by the first service to see a request without one; propagated unchanged after that.\n     */\n    static readonly REQUEST_ID = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('requestId', 'x-request-id');\n\n    /**\n     * WHICH SERVICE MINTED {@link REQUEST_ID} — the name from {@link ServiceInfo}, stamped by\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` ONLY on the branch that generates a new id (i.e. when\n     * the inbound request carried no `x-request-id`). It answers the question the id alone cannot:\n     * \"this trace starts here — is that right?\" An id appearing with no source means it came from\n     * outside; an id sourced by a service that should never be an entry point is a routing bug.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire, and that is the WHOLE POINT. If it\n     *   travelled, hop 2 would inherit it, hop 3 would inherit it, and \"who started this trace\"\n     *   would be indistinguishable from \"who passed it along\" — the origin, the one fact this key\n     *   carries, would be lost. It is absent on every hop that did NOT mint the id, which is exactly\n     *   the signal: present == I am the origin.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted as a plain string at `jsonPayload.requestIdSource`.\n     */\n    static readonly REQUEST_ID_SOURCE = ContextKey.untrusted<string>(\n        'requestIdSource',\n        /*httpHeader*/ undefined\n    );\n\n    /**\n     * The CALLER's build version — so a downstream server's logs record which build of the client\n     * called it (surfaces as `jsonPayload.clientVersion`). Distinct from the log line's own `version`\n     * (this service's build): `version` answers \"which build wrote this line?\", `clientVersion`\n     * answers \"which build asked us to?\".\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` SET → transferred over the wire, BUT unlike a normal transferred key it is NOT\n     *   copied from the context onward. Each hop OVERWRITES it with its OWN `ServiceInfo.getVersion()`\n     *   as it becomes the client to the next hop (see `buildOutboundHeaders`), so on any given server\n     *   `clientVersion` is always the IMMEDIATE caller's version, never a stale grand-caller's.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → the inbound value lands in the context and flows through the normal log\n     *   field map; no backend change needed.\n     */\n    static readonly CLIENT_VERSION = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('clientVersion', 'x-webpieces-client-version');\n\n    /**\n     * A frontend/app-minted correlation id that groups every request triggered by ONE user ACTION.\n     *\n     * An \"action\" is a single thing the user did in the GUI — a CLICK on a button/link, or TYPING in a\n     * field — or a background poller tick: anything that may fan out into MULTIPLE remote calls. That one\n     * action fires 1..N browser HTTP calls, each of which gets its own framework-minted {@link REQUEST_ID}\n     * (one per HTTP call, shared within that call's server→server subtree). `actionId` sits ABOVE\n     * `requestId` and is what stitches those N requests back to the single action that caused them:\n     *\n     *     actionId  (app-minted, ONE per user action, rides EVERY call of that action)\n     *        └── 1..N requestId  (framework-minted, ONE per HTTP call)\n     *\n     * Grep one `actionId` in the logs → every `requestId` it spawned, and every log line of the whole\n     * action. Minted and refreshed by the app (a UI concern), carried under `x-webpieces-actionid`.\n     *\n     * Browser/app-minted ONLY: unlike {@link REQUEST_ID}, the framework transfers and logs it but must\n     * NOT auto-mint one server-side. Absent `actionId` ⇒ a non-action flow (system / cron / task), which\n     * is the correct signal.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` SET → transferred: copied off the inbound request into context and re-emitted on\n     *   outbound hops, so the id follows the action across services.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted as a plain string on every log line of the request.\n     */\n    static readonly ACTION_ID = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('actionId', 'x-webpieces-actionid');\n\n    /**\n     * WHO the request is acting as, and WHAT they may do. All three are TRUSTED keys: they are the\n     * inputs to authorization decisions, so a reader must be able to tell \"the framework proved\n     * this\" from \"the caller typed this\" — see the trust section of the {@link ContextKey} doc.\n     *\n     * They keep their `httpHeader`, because propagating a verified identity to the next internal\n     * service is the point. What makes that safe is not the header being absent, it is WHO is\n     * allowed to have set it: an inbound value is held PENDING by\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` and admitted by `AuthFilter` only on a route that\n     * verified its CALLER (`@AuthOidc` / `@AuthSharedSecret`). On a browser-reachable route\n     * (`@AuthJwt` / public) the value must match what the authenticator itself derived, or the\n     * request is rejected.\n     *\n     * `provenance` says \"an app-bound JwtHook\" rather than naming one hook, because the framework\n     * default ({@link DefaultJwtHook}) stamps NO context entries at all — an app supplies a hook that\n     * returns {@link ContextTuple}s for the keys it can vouch for. Any of these three that an app's\n     * hook does NOT stamp will be rejected when a caller supplies it, which is the correct and loud\n     * outcome: nothing is vouching for it.\n     */\n    static readonly ORG_ID = ContextKey.trusted<string>(\n        'orgId',\n        'derived from a verified credential by an app-bound JwtHook (a ContextTuple in AuthenticatedCaller)',\n        'x-org-id',\n    );\n\n    static readonly USER_ID = ContextKey.trusted<string>(\n        'userId',\n        'derived from a verified credential by an app-bound JwtHook (a ContextTuple in AuthenticatedCaller)',\n        'x-user-id',\n    );\n\n    static readonly USER_ROLES = ContextKey.trusted<string>(\n        'roles',\n        'derived from a verified credential by an app-bound JwtHook (a ContextTuple in AuthenticatedCaller)',\n        'x-webpieces-roles',\n    );\n\n    /**\n     * Turns on test-case recording for this request (Java: x-webpieces-recording).\n     * Transferred so recording follows the request across service hops.\n     */\n    static readonly RECORDING = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('recording', 'x-webpieces-recording');\n\n    /**\n     * The structured API-call tag ({@link ApiCallInfo}) stamped by {@link LogApiCall} around every\n     * outbound (client) / inbound (server) call. It rides the magic context so EVERY log line emitted\n     * during the call inherits a filterable `api` object, surfacing in GCP as nested\n     * `jsonPayload.api.{side,type,result,path,method}`.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire. Per-hop only: each server/client hop\n     *   stamps its own tag, so a downstream server records `side:'server'`, never the caller's `side:'client'`.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted by the logging backends. It carries an OBJECT value, so the backends\n     *   read it via {@link HeaderRegistry.buildStructuredLogFields} (object-aware); the flat\n     *   `buildLogFields()` string map deliberately skips it (typeof-string guard).\n     */\n    static readonly API_CALL_INFO = ContextKey.untrusted<ApiCallInfo>('api', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    /**\n     * The inbound request's HTTP method and path, stamped ONCE from the {@link HttpRequest} by\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` (the atomic inbound choke point every transport funnels\n     * through). They surface as top-level `jsonPayload.httpMethod` / `jsonPayload.requestPath` so every\n     * log line of the request carries them — they used to ride inside {@link ApiCallInfo} (`api.path` /\n     * `api.method`) but that coupled a per-CALL logger to the per-REQUEST transport shape.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire: a downstream hop stamps its OWN inbound\n     *   method/path, never the caller's. Outbound client calls never set these (no inbound path).\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted by the logging backends as plain strings.\n     */\n    static readonly HTTP_METHOD = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('httpMethod', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    static readonly REQUEST_PATH = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('requestPath', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    /**\n     * The routed endpoint's IMPLEMENTATION identity: the concrete controller class name\n     * ({@link RouteMetadata.controllerClassName}, e.g. `LoginController`) and the handler method NAME\n     * ({@link RouteMetadata.methodName}, e.g. `login`), stamped once per request by {@link LogApiFilter}\n     * after route matching so every subsequent log line of the request carries them.\n     *\n     * These say WHICH CODE ran, which is what you actually grep for — far more useful than the raw\n     * `requestPath`. They are the top-level, filterable twin of what previously only lived nested in\n     * {@link ApiCallInfo} (`api.method.controllerName` / `api.method.methodName`). The local console\n     * formatters render them together as a compact `[Controller.method]` bracket; GCP keeps them as two\n     * separate `jsonPayload.controller` / `jsonPayload.method` fields.\n     *\n     * NOTE: `method` here is the CODE method name (e.g. `login`), NOT the HTTP verb — that is\n     * {@link HTTP_METHOD} (`httpMethod`).\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred: each hop stamps its OWN routed controller/method.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → emitted by the logging backends as plain strings.\n     */\n    static readonly CONTROLLER = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('controller', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    static readonly METHOD = ContextKey.untrusted<string>('method', /*httpHeader*/ undefined, /*maskInLogs*/ false, /*isLogged*/ true);\n\n    /**\n     * The base URL ONE outbound call should go to, overriding whatever the client's `ClientConfig`\n     * bound at construction — the answer to \"POST our published contract to a URL the PARTNER\n     * registered at runtime\" (an `OrganizationWebhook.url` column, an OAuth callback, a per-tenant\n     * or self-hosted host). The destination is DATA, not deployment, so it cannot be a svcName and\n     * there is nothing to register in {@link ClientRegistry}.\n     *\n     * ```ts\n     * RequestContext.run(() => {\n     *     RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.OVERRIDE_BASE_URL, webhook.url);\n     *     return partnerWebhookClient.deliver(envelope);\n     * });\n     * ```\n     *\n     * ONLY a client carrying a `ContextBaseUrlFilter` reads it. Every other client IGNORES this key\n     * entirely, which is what stops an ambient value re-pointing every other client in the same\n     * fan-out loop at a partner's server. Installing that ONE filter IS the opt-in, so\n     * `grep -rn ContextBaseUrlFilter` enumerates every client that can be re-pointed at all.\n     *\n     * - `httpHeader` UNDEFINED → NOT transferred over the wire, and that is load-bearing. This value\n     *   names where THIS hop goes. If it travelled, the callee would inherit it and re-point ITS\n     *   own outbound calls at the same host — one partner-supplied URL turning into an SSRF pivot\n     *   across the whole call tree. It is per-hop, always.\n     * - `isLogged` TRUE → the destination of a partner delivery is exactly what you want in the log\n     *   line when one fails.\n     *\n     * UNTRUSTED, necessarily: it comes from a database column a partner edited. That is precisely\n     * why re-pointing a request ARMS the framework's SSRF guard, automatically, rather than trusting\n     * it — the guard sits beneath every app filter and reads the fact that the request was moved.\n     */\n    static readonly OVERRIDE_BASE_URL = ContextKey.untrusted<string>(\n        'overrideBaseUrl',\n        /*httpHeader*/ undefined,\n        /*maskInLogs*/ false,\n        /*isLogged*/ true,\n    );\n\n    /**\n     * NO CREDENTIAL KEYS LIVE HERE.\n     *\n     * `authorization` and `x-webpieces-shared-secret` used to be ContextKeys. That made them\n     * TRANSFERRED keys, so the inbound transfer copied them off the request into the\n     * RequestContext, and every outbound RPC call and enqueued Cloud Task then carried the\n     * caller's credential onward — to services that had no business seeing it.\n     *\n     * A credential belongs to ONE request hop. It is read straight off the {@link HttpRequest}\n     * by the framework AuthFilter, and written straight onto the outbound request by the client\n     * that mints it (NodeProxyClient, GcpTaskInvoker, InMemoryTaskInvoker). It never enters the\n     * magic context, so nothing can propagate it by accident.\n     *\n     * An app that genuinely wants a credential to travel can still register its own ContextKey for\n     * it — but that is now an explicit, visible decision rather than the default.\n     */\n\n    /**\n     * All core context keys (the platform DEFAULT_HEADERS set). A `static readonly` CONSTANT, not a\n     * method: it is compile-time data — a list of the key definitions above — read once at the startup\n     * composition root (`HeaderRegistry.configure` / `HeaderRegistry.DEFAULT_HEADERS`). A method here\n     * would be un-injectable behavior the DI design graph can't reach; a constant is honest data.\n     */\n    static readonly ALL_HEADERS: AnyContextKey[] = [\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID_SOURCE,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CLIENT_VERSION,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ACTION_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ORG_ID,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ROLES,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.RECORDING,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.API_CALL_INFO,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.HTTP_METHOD,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_PATH,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CONTROLLER,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.METHOD,\n        WebpiecesCoreHeaders.OVERRIDE_BASE_URL,\n    ];\n}\n"]}