@webpieces/core-util 0.4.603 → 0.4.605

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/core-util",
-  "version": "0.4.603",
+  "version": "0.4.605",
   "description": "Utility functions for WebPieces - works in browser and Node.js",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",

package/src/http/ContextMgr.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { ContextReader } from './ContextReader';
+import { DestinationTrust } from './DestinationTrust';
 /**
  * ContextMgr - propagates the magic context onto outbound BROWSER requests.
  *
@@ -30,14 +31,26 @@ export declare class ContextMgr {
     contextReader: ContextReader);
     /**
      * Build the headers to send on an outbound request: every transferred key (httpHeader set)
-     * with a non-empty value, emitted under its `httpHeader` wire name.
+     * with a non-empty value THAT THIS DESTINATION MAY RECEIVE, emitted under its `httpHeader`
+     * wire name.
      *
      * NO request-id chaining. A browser ORIGINATES a trace — it has no inbound request to point
      * back at. If the app puts an `x-request-id` on the store it goes out as-is, and the server's
      * inbound transfer adopts it as hop 1's own id. Chaining is a server concern; see
      * RequestContextHeaders.
      *
+     * `destination` gates TRUSTED keys exactly as it does on the server side (see
+     * {@link DestinationTrust}). In practice a browser never reaches the permissive branch — twice
+     * over: `BrowserProxyClient.assertEndpointSupported` refuses to bind an `@AuthOidc` /
+     * `@AuthSharedSecret` contract at all, so every browser destination is `@AuthJwt` or `@Public`.
+     * The rule is applied here anyway rather than argued away, because the OTHER guarantee people
+     * reach for — "`MutableContextStore.set` only accepts an untrusted key, so a browser store
+     * cannot HOLD a trusted value" — is true of that store and NOT of the seam: {@link ContextMgr}
+     * takes any app-supplied {@link ContextReader}, whose `read` is handed an `AnyContextKey`. One
+     * enforced rule in both builders beats a browser-only exemption resting on an implementation
+     * detail of one implementation.
+     *
      * Values are RAW (unmasked) — this map goes on the wire, not in logs.
      */
-    buildOutboundHeaders(): Map<string, string>;
+    buildOutboundHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string>;
 }

package/src/http/ContextMgr.js

@@ -36,18 +36,33 @@ class ContextMgr {
     }
     /**
      * Build the headers to send on an outbound request: every transferred key (httpHeader set)
-     * with a non-empty value, emitted under its `httpHeader` wire name.
+     * with a non-empty value THAT THIS DESTINATION MAY RECEIVE, emitted under its `httpHeader`
+     * wire name.
      *
      * NO request-id chaining. A browser ORIGINATES a trace — it has no inbound request to point
      * back at. If the app puts an `x-request-id` on the store it goes out as-is, and the server's
      * inbound transfer adopts it as hop 1's own id. Chaining is a server concern; see
      * RequestContextHeaders.
      *
+     * `destination` gates TRUSTED keys exactly as it does on the server side (see
+     * {@link DestinationTrust}). In practice a browser never reaches the permissive branch — twice
+     * over: `BrowserProxyClient.assertEndpointSupported` refuses to bind an `@AuthOidc` /
+     * `@AuthSharedSecret` contract at all, so every browser destination is `@AuthJwt` or `@Public`.
+     * The rule is applied here anyway rather than argued away, because the OTHER guarantee people
+     * reach for — "`MutableContextStore.set` only accepts an untrusted key, so a browser store
+     * cannot HOLD a trusted value" — is true of that store and NOT of the seam: {@link ContextMgr}
+     * takes any app-supplied {@link ContextReader}, whose `read` is handed an `AnyContextKey`. One
+     * enforced rule in both builders beats a browser-only exemption resting on an implementation
+     * detail of one implementation.
+     *
      * Values are RAW (unmasked) — this map goes on the wire, not in logs.
      */
-    buildOutboundHeaders() {
+    buildOutboundHeaders(destination) {
         const outbound = new Map();
         for (const key of HeaderRegistry_1.HeaderRegistry.get().getTransferredKeys()) {
+            if (!destination.allows(key)) {
+                continue;
+            }
             const value = this.contextReader.read(key);
             if (value !== undefined && value !== null && value !== '') {
                 outbound.set(key.httpHeader, value);

package/src/http/ContextMgr.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Only @webpieces/http-client-browser may name this class. The server reads\n * `RequestContext` directly through `RequestContextHeaders` (in @webpieces/core-context) — a\n * `ContextReader` indirection buys a server nothing, because there is exactly one right answer there.\n *\n * Browsers have no AsyncLocalStorage, so the app holds a `MutableContextStore` and sets values as\n * they become known (login token, tenant). Every transferred key (httpHeader set) in the GLOBAL\n * {@link HeaderRegistry} is read from it and added to outbound requests. The registry is a process\n * global configured once at startup (like LogManager) and is browser-safe: it is the key SCHEMA,\n * not the value store.\n *\n * Example usage:\n * ```typescript\n * // startup, before bootstrap:\n * HeaderRegistry.configure(CompanyHeaders.ALL_HEADERS, true);\n *\n * const store = new MutableContextStore();\n * const factory = new ClientHttpBrowserFactory(store);\n * const client = factory.createRpcClient(SaveApi, new ClientConfig('http://api.example.com'));\n * ```\n */\nexport class ContextMgr {\n\n    constructor(\n        /** The app-held store that provides context-key values. */\n        public readonly contextReader: ContextReader,\n    ) {}\n\n    /**\n     * Build the headers to send on an outbound request: every transferred key (httpHeader set)\n     * with a non-empty value THAT THIS DESTINATION MAY RECEIVE, emitted under its `httpHeader`\n     * wire name.\n     *\n     * NO request-id chaining. A browser ORIGINATES a trace — it has no inbound request to point\n     * back at. If the app puts an `x-request-id` on the store it goes out as-is, and the server's\n     * inbound transfer adopts it as hop 1's own id. Chaining is a server concern; see\n     * RequestContextHeaders.\n     *\n     * `destination` gates TRUSTED keys exactly as it does on the server side (see\n     * {@link DestinationTrust}). In practice a browser never reaches the permissive branch — twice\n     * over: `BrowserProxyClient.assertEndpointSupported` refuses to bind an `@AuthOidc` /\n     * `@AuthSharedSecret` contract at all, so every browser destination is `@AuthJwt` or `@Public`.\n     * The rule is applied here anyway rather than argued away, because the OTHER guarantee people\n     * reach for — \"`MutableContextStore.set` only accepts an untrusted key, so a browser store\n     * cannot HOLD a trusted value\" — is true of that store and NOT of the seam: {@link ContextMgr}\n     * takes any app-supplied {@link ContextReader}, whose `read` is handed an `AnyContextKey`. One\n     * enforced rule in both builders beats a browser-only exemption resting on an implementation\n     * detail of one implementation.\n     *\n     * Values are RAW (unmasked) — this map goes on the wire, not in logs.\n     */\n    buildOutboundHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        const outbound = new Map<string, string>();\n\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getTransferredKeys()) {\n            if (!destination.allows(key)) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            const value = this.contextReader.read(key);\n            if (value !== undefined && value !== null && value !== '') {\n                outbound.set(key.httpHeader!, value);\n            }\n        }\n\n        // CLIENT_VERSION: a browser ORIGINATES a call, so it sends its OWN app build version (from\n        // ServiceInfo) and the server logs which client build called it — same rule as the server-side\n        // RequestContextHeaders. Our version wins; absent if this app was never identified via setInfo.\n        const myVersion = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        const clientVersionHeader = WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CLIENT_VERSION.httpHeader!;\n        if (myVersion) {\n            outbound.set(clientVersionHeader, myVersion);\n        } else {\n            outbound.delete(clientVersionHeader);\n        }\n\n        return outbound;\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/http/DestinationTrust.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+import { AnyContextKey } from '../ContextKey';
+import { AuthMode } from './decorators';
+/**
+ * DestinationTrust - the OUTBOUND half of the trust model: may a TRUSTED context key
+ * ({@link ContextKey.trusted}) ride to the endpoint we are about to call?
+ *
+ * ## Why the client has to answer this at all
+ *
+ * The server already decided (see `PendingWireTrust`): an inbound `x-user-id` is admitted only on a
+ * route that verified WHO called it — `@AuthOidc` / `@AuthSharedSecret`. On a `@AuthJwt` or `@Public`
+ * route the same header must match what the authenticator independently derived, or the request is
+ * REJECTED with a 401.
+ *
+ * That rule is correct, and it means a client that ships `x-user-id` to a `@Public` endpoint is
+ * building a request the callee is obliged to reject. Before this class the outbound builders
+ * forwarded EVERY transferred key with no idea what the destination was, so an internal service
+ * calling another service's public or JWT endpoint 401'd itself. The fix belongs on the producing
+ * side: don't send what cannot possibly be believed.
+ *
+ * ## Why it is a class with a private constructor and no boolean parameter
+ *
+ * `buildOutboundHeaders(sendTrusted = true)` would have been three characters of work and exactly the
+ * "widening that is an ABSENCE rather than a token" CLAUDE.md rejects — the permissive answer would be
+ * what you get by not typing anything. There is no way to build a DestinationTrust except from the
+ * destination endpoint's own {@link AuthMode}, so the caller cannot assert a posture the route does
+ * not actually have, and `grep -rn DestinationTrust.forAuthMode` lists every place the question is
+ * asked. The two instances are PRIVATE for the same reason: exposing them would be a second spelling
+ * that skips the derivation.
+ *
+ * Per CLAUDE.md: data-only structure, so a class rather than an interface or a bare boolean.
+ */
+export declare class DestinationTrust {
+    private readonly verifiesCaller;
+    /**
+     * The destination authenticates its CALLER (@AuthOidc / @AuthSharedSecret), so it is entitled to
+     * believe context WE vouch for — this is the service-to-service identity propagation that trusted
+     * keys keep an `httpHeader` for.
+     */
+    private static readonly VERIFIES_CALLER;
+    /**
+     * The destination cannot tell us from a browser with curl (@AuthJwt / @Public / an endpoint with
+     * no declared mode), so trusted keys are omitted. Untrusted keys still travel.
+     */
+    private static readonly CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER;
+    private constructor();
+    /**
+     * The ONLY way to obtain one: state the destination endpoint's auth mode. `undefined` (an
+     * endpoint that declared no mode) is treated as un-verifying, i.e. the SAFE answer — an absent
+     * declaration must never be the widest one.
+     */
+    static forAuthMode(mode: AuthMode | undefined): DestinationTrust;
+    /**
+     * May this key go on the wire to this destination? Untrusted keys always may — nobody was ever
+     * going to make a security decision on them. A trusted key may only when the destination will
+     * authenticate US, because that is the only case its `AuthFilter` will admit it.
+     */
+    allows(key: AnyContextKey): boolean;
+}

package/src/http/DestinationTrust.js

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.DestinationTrust = void 0;
+/**
+ * DestinationTrust - the OUTBOUND half of the trust model: may a TRUSTED context key
+ * ({@link ContextKey.trusted}) ride to the endpoint we are about to call?
+ *
+ * ## Why the client has to answer this at all
+ *
+ * The server already decided (see `PendingWireTrust`): an inbound `x-user-id` is admitted only on a
+ * route that verified WHO called it — `@AuthOidc` / `@AuthSharedSecret`. On a `@AuthJwt` or `@Public`
+ * route the same header must match what the authenticator independently derived, or the request is
+ * REJECTED with a 401.
+ *
+ * That rule is correct, and it means a client that ships `x-user-id` to a `@Public` endpoint is
+ * building a request the callee is obliged to reject. Before this class the outbound builders
+ * forwarded EVERY transferred key with no idea what the destination was, so an internal service
+ * calling another service's public or JWT endpoint 401'd itself. The fix belongs on the producing
+ * side: don't send what cannot possibly be believed.
+ *
+ * ## Why it is a class with a private constructor and no boolean parameter
+ *
+ * `buildOutboundHeaders(sendTrusted = true)` would have been three characters of work and exactly the
+ * "widening that is an ABSENCE rather than a token" CLAUDE.md rejects — the permissive answer would be
+ * what you get by not typing anything. There is no way to build a DestinationTrust except from the
+ * destination endpoint's own {@link AuthMode}, so the caller cannot assert a posture the route does
+ * not actually have, and `grep -rn DestinationTrust.forAuthMode` lists every place the question is
+ * asked. The two instances are PRIVATE for the same reason: exposing them would be a second spelling
+ * that skips the derivation.
+ *
+ * Per CLAUDE.md: data-only structure, so a class rather than an interface or a bare boolean.
+ */
+class DestinationTrust {
+    verifiesCaller;
+    /**
+     * The destination authenticates its CALLER (@AuthOidc / @AuthSharedSecret), so it is entitled to
+     * believe context WE vouch for — this is the service-to-service identity propagation that trusted
+     * keys keep an `httpHeader` for.
+     */
+    static VERIFIES_CALLER = new DestinationTrust(true);
+    /**
+     * The destination cannot tell us from a browser with curl (@AuthJwt / @Public / an endpoint with
+     * no declared mode), so trusted keys are omitted. Untrusted keys still travel.
+     */
+    static CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER = new DestinationTrust(false);
+    constructor(verifiesCaller) {
+        this.verifiesCaller = verifiesCaller;
+    }
+    /**
+     * The ONLY way to obtain one: state the destination endpoint's auth mode. `undefined` (an
+     * endpoint that declared no mode) is treated as un-verifying, i.e. the SAFE answer — an absent
+     * declaration must never be the widest one.
+     */
+    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static factory replacing the (now private) constructor, exactly as ContextKey.trusted/untrusted do: the destination's auth mode must be part of the CALL, and a DI-injected instance method would let a caller hold one without ever naming a route
+    static forAuthMode(mode) {
+        if (mode === undefined) {
+            return DestinationTrust.CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER;
+        }
+        switch (mode.kind) {
+            case 'oidc':
+            case 'shared-secret':
+                return DestinationTrust.VERIFIES_CALLER;
+            case 'jwt':
+            case 'public':
+                return DestinationTrust.CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * May this key go on the wire to this destination? Untrusted keys always may — nobody was ever
+     * going to make a security decision on them. A trusted key may only when the destination will
+     * authenticate US, because that is the only case its `AuthFilter` will admit it.
+     */
+    allows(key) {
+        return this.verifiesCaller || !key.isTrusted();
+    }
+}
+exports.DestinationTrust = DestinationTrust;
+//# sourceMappingURL=DestinationTrust.js.map

package/src/http/DestinationTrust.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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On a `@AuthJwt` or `@Public`\n * route the same header must match what the authenticator independently derived, or the request is\n * REJECTED with a 401.\n *\n * That rule is correct, and it means a client that ships `x-user-id` to a `@Public` endpoint is\n * building a request the callee is obliged to reject. Before this class the outbound builders\n * forwarded EVERY transferred key with no idea what the destination was, so an internal service\n * calling another service's public or JWT endpoint 401'd itself. The fix belongs on the producing\n * side: don't send what cannot possibly be believed.\n *\n * ## Why it is a class with a private constructor and no boolean parameter\n *\n * `buildOutboundHeaders(sendTrusted = true)` would have been three characters of work and exactly the\n * \"widening that is an ABSENCE rather than a token\" CLAUDE.md rejects — the permissive answer would be\n * what you get by not typing anything. There is no way to build a DestinationTrust except from the\n * destination endpoint's own {@link AuthMode}, so the caller cannot assert a posture the route does\n * not actually have, and `grep -rn DestinationTrust.forAuthMode` lists every place the question is\n * asked. The two instances are PRIVATE for the same reason: exposing them would be a second spelling\n * that skips the derivation.\n *\n * Per CLAUDE.md: data-only structure, so a class rather than an interface or a bare boolean.\n */\nexport class DestinationTrust {\n    /**\n     * The destination authenticates its CALLER (@AuthOidc / @AuthSharedSecret), so it is entitled to\n     * believe context WE vouch for — this is the service-to-service identity propagation that trusted\n     * keys keep an `httpHeader` for.\n     */\n    private static readonly VERIFIES_CALLER = new DestinationTrust(true);\n\n    /**\n     * The destination cannot tell us from a browser with curl (@AuthJwt / @Public / an endpoint with\n     * no declared mode), so trusted keys are omitted. Untrusted keys still travel.\n     */\n    private static readonly CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER = new DestinationTrust(false);\n\n    private constructor(private readonly verifiesCaller: boolean) {}\n\n    /**\n     * The ONLY way to obtain one: state the destination endpoint's auth mode. `undefined` (an\n     * endpoint that declared no mode) is treated as un-verifying, i.e. the SAFE answer — an absent\n     * declaration must never be the widest one.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-function-outside-class -- static factory replacing the (now private) constructor, exactly as ContextKey.trusted/untrusted do: the destination's auth mode must be part of the CALL, and a DI-injected instance method would let a caller hold one without ever naming a route\n    static forAuthMode(mode: AuthMode | undefined): DestinationTrust {\n        if (mode === undefined) {\n            return DestinationTrust.CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER;\n        }\n        switch (mode.kind) {\n            case 'oidc':\n            case 'shared-secret':\n                return DestinationTrust.VERIFIES_CALLER;\n            case 'jwt':\n            case 'public':\n                return DestinationTrust.CANNOT_VERIFY_CALLER;\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * May this key go on the wire to this destination? Untrusted keys always may — nobody was ever\n     * going to make a security decision on them. A trusted key may only when the destination will\n     * authenticate US, because that is the only case its `AuthFilter` will admit it.\n     */\n    allows(key: AnyContextKey): boolean {\n        return this.verifiesCaller || !key.isTrusted();\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/index.d.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ export { WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier, WEBPIECES_DEFAULT_FAILURE_CLASSIFIER
 export { templateDeriver } from './http/templateDeriver';
 export { WebpiecesCoreHeaders } from './http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders';
 export { ContextReader } from './http/ContextReader';
+export { DestinationTrust } from './http/DestinationTrust';
 export { ContextMgr } from './http/ContextMgr';
 export { LogApiCall, LogApiCallImpl } from './http/LogApiCall';
 export { MaskSpec } from './http/LogFieldMask';

package/src/index.js

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.ExternalCaller = exports.DEFAULT_CALLER_KIND = exports.EXTERNAL_SYSTEM_KINDS = exports.METADATA_KEYS = exports.RouteMetadata = exports.AuthMeta = exports.validateNoConflictingDecorators = exports.getQueueName = exports.assertPubSubConventions = exports.assertApiKind = exports.getApiKind = exports.assertEveryExternalEndpointDeclaresCaller = exports.assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode = exports.getAuthMode = exports.getAuthMeta = exports.isApiPath = exports.isFormPost = exports.getMaskSpec = exports.ENDPOINT_KINDS_BY_API_KIND = exports.getEndpointKinds = exports.getEndpointKind = exports.getEndpointOptions = exports.getEndpoints = exports.getApiPath = exports.MaskLog = exports.Queue = exports.PubSub = exports.Rpc = exports.AuthSharedSecret = exports.AuthOidc = exports.MISSING_AUTH_DECORATOR_FIX = exports.rolesRequired = exports.AuthJwt = exports.Public = exports.Endpoint = exports.ApiPath = exports.GCP_LOG_BUDGET_BYTES = exports.MAX_GCP_LOG_BYTES = exports.LogChunkInfo = exports.LogChunkerImpl = exports.LogChunker = exports.LogManager = exports.ConsoleLoggerFactory = exports.ConsoleLogger = exports.DESIGN_METADATA_KEYS = exports.isDocumentDesign = exports.DocumentDesign = exports.ContextTuple = exports.ContextKey = exports.toError = void 0;
-exports.ApiMethodInfo = exports.LOG_API_CALL_LOGGER_NAME = exports.ApiCallLogNameImpl = exports.ApiCallLogName = exports.ApiCallInfo = exports.MaskSpec = exports.LogApiCallImpl = exports.LogApiCall = exports.ContextMgr = exports.WebpiecesCoreHeaders = exports.templateDeriver = exports.WEBPIECES_DEFAULT_FAILURE_CLASSIFIER = exports.WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier = exports.KeyedFailureClassifier = exports.ErrorWireForm = exports.ServiceInfo = exports.ClientRegistry = exports.HeaderRegistry = exports.DateTimeUtil = exports.TimeUtil = exports.DateUtil = exports.InstantUtil = exports.NetworkRejectClassifier = exports.NO_REG_CODE = exports.WRONG_COMPANY = exports.WRONG_DOMAIN = exports.EMAIL_NOT_CONFIRMED = exports.NOT_APPROVED = exports.WRONG_LOGIN = exports.WRONG_LOGIN_TYPE = exports.ENTITY_NOT_FOUND = exports.OfflineError = exports.HttpUserError = exports.HttpVendorError = exports.HttpTooManyRequestsError = exports.HttpInternalServerError = exports.HttpGatewayTimeoutError = exports.HttpBadGatewayError = exports.HttpTimeoutError = exports.HttpForbiddenError = exports.HttpUnauthorizedError = exports.HttpBadRequestError = exports.EndpointNotFoundError = exports.HttpNotFoundError = exports.HttpError = exports.ProtocolError = exports.SECRETS = exports.Secrets = exports.getEndpointCaller = exports.isExternalSystemKind = void 0;
-exports.SerializedError = exports.SerializedMap = exports.RecordSerializer = exports.getDoNotRecordFields = exports.DoNotRecord = exports.RecordedTestCase = exports.RecordedError = exports.RecordedEndpoint = exports.RecorderKeys = exports.ApiCallContextHolder = void 0;
+exports.LOG_API_CALL_LOGGER_NAME = exports.ApiCallLogNameImpl = exports.ApiCallLogName = exports.ApiCallInfo = exports.MaskSpec = exports.LogApiCallImpl = exports.LogApiCall = exports.ContextMgr = exports.DestinationTrust = exports.WebpiecesCoreHeaders = exports.templateDeriver = exports.WEBPIECES_DEFAULT_FAILURE_CLASSIFIER = exports.WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier = exports.KeyedFailureClassifier = exports.ErrorWireForm = exports.ServiceInfo = exports.ClientRegistry = exports.HeaderRegistry = exports.DateTimeUtil = exports.TimeUtil = exports.DateUtil = exports.InstantUtil = exports.NetworkRejectClassifier = exports.NO_REG_CODE = exports.WRONG_COMPANY = exports.WRONG_DOMAIN = exports.EMAIL_NOT_CONFIRMED = exports.NOT_APPROVED = exports.WRONG_LOGIN = exports.WRONG_LOGIN_TYPE = exports.ENTITY_NOT_FOUND = exports.OfflineError = exports.HttpUserError = exports.HttpVendorError = exports.HttpTooManyRequestsError = exports.HttpInternalServerError = exports.HttpGatewayTimeoutError = exports.HttpBadGatewayError = exports.HttpTimeoutError = exports.HttpForbiddenError = exports.HttpUnauthorizedError = exports.HttpBadRequestError = exports.EndpointNotFoundError = exports.HttpNotFoundError = exports.HttpError = exports.ProtocolError = exports.SECRETS = exports.Secrets = exports.getEndpointCaller = exports.isExternalSystemKind = void 0;
+exports.SerializedError = exports.SerializedMap = exports.RecordSerializer = exports.getDoNotRecordFields = exports.DoNotRecord = exports.RecordedTestCase = exports.RecordedError = exports.RecordedEndpoint = exports.RecorderKeys = exports.ApiCallContextHolder = exports.ApiMethodInfo = void 0;
 var errorUtils_1 = require("./lib/errorUtils");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "toError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return errorUtils_1.toError; } });
 var ContextKey_1 = require("./ContextKey");
@@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ var templateDeriver_1 = require("./http/templateDeriver");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "templateDeriver", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return templateDeriver_1.templateDeriver; } });
 var WebpiecesCoreHeaders_1 = require("./http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "WebpiecesCoreHeaders", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return WebpiecesCoreHeaders_1.WebpiecesCoreHeaders; } });
+// The OUTBOUND half of the trust model: whether a TRUSTED context key may ride to the endpoint being
+// called. Built ONLY from the destination endpoint's AuthMode — see the class doc.
+var DestinationTrust_1 = require("./http/DestinationTrust");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "DestinationTrust", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return DestinationTrust_1.DestinationTrust; } });
 // BROWSER-ONLY outbound-header propagation (app-held store + registry -> outbound HTTP headers).
 // Only @webpieces/http-client-browser may name it; the server reads RequestContext directly via
 // RequestContextHeaders in the Node-only @webpieces/core-context.

package/src/index.js.map

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Applies to ANY project kind (server\n// controllers AND library impl classes), so it lives here (browser + Node) rather\n// than in a server-only routing package.\nexport { DocumentDesign, isDocumentDesign, DESIGN_METADATA_KEYS } from './DocumentDesign';\n\n// Logging (merged from former @webpieces/wp-logging).\n// Pluggable logging interface + a browser-safe console default; apps plug in\n// bunyan/winston/pino/etc. via LogManager.setFactory(...). Browser + Node.\nexport type { Logger, LogLevel } from './logging/Logger';\nexport type { LoggerFactory } from './logging/LoggerFactory';\nexport { ConsoleLogger } from './logging/ConsoleLogger';\nexport { ConsoleLoggerFactory } from './logging/ConsoleLoggerFactory';\nexport { LogManager } from './logging/LogManager';\nexport { LogChunker, LogChunkerImpl, LogChunkInfo, MAX_GCP_LOG_BYTES, GCP_LOG_BUDGET_BYTES } from './logging/LogChunker';\n\n// HTTP API contract (merged from former @webpieces/http-api).\n// Shared HTTP API definition consumed by both client and server: REST\n// decorators, the HttpError hierarchy, datetime DTOs, platform-header\n// registry/readers, ValidateImplementation, and the test-case recorder\n// contract. Pure definitions — express-free, browser + Node safe.\n\n// API definition decorators\nexport {\n    ApiPath,\n    Endpoint,\n    // Auth mode decorators (clean service-to-service + user JWT model)\n    Public,\n    AuthJwt,\n    rolesRequired,\n    MISSING_AUTH_DECORATOR_FIX,\n    AuthOidc,\n    AuthSharedSecret,\n    // API kind (RPC vs PubSub/Cloud Tasks) + queue naming\n    Rpc,\n    PubSub,\n    Queue,\n    MaskLog,\n    getApiPath,\n    getEndpoints,\n    getEndpointOptions,\n    getEndpointKind,\n    getEndpointKinds,\n    ENDPOINT_KINDS_BY_API_KIND,\n    getMaskSpec,\n    isFormPost,\n    isApiPath,\n    getAuthMeta,\n    getAuthMode,\n    assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode,\n    assertEveryExternalEndpointDeclaresCaller,\n    getApiKind,\n    assertApiKind,\n    assertPubSubConventions,\n    getQueueName,\n    validateNoConflictingDecorators,\n    AuthMeta,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    METADATA_KEYS,\n} from './http/decorators';\nexport type { AuthMode, ApiKind, EndpointKind, JwtRoles, JwtRequirement, EndpointOptions, ExternalEndpointOptions } from './http/decorators';\n// WHO calls an `external` endpoint — the caller declaration @Endpoint(..., 'external', {calledBy})\n// requires, and the reader for it.\nexport { EXTERNAL_SYSTEM_KINDS, DEFAULT_CALLER_KIND, ExternalCaller, isExternalSystemKind, getEndpointCaller } from './http/external-caller';\nexport type { ExternalSystemKind } from './http/external-caller';\n// Client-side shared-secret store (the value THIS service sends per @AuthSharedSecret key).\nexport { Secrets, SECRETS } from './http/Secrets';\n\n// Type validators\nexport { ValidateImplementation } from './http/validators';\n\n// HTTP errors\nexport {\n    ProtocolError,\n    HttpError,\n    HttpNotFoundError,\n    EndpointNotFoundError,\n    HttpBadRequestError,\n    HttpUnauthorizedError,\n    HttpForbiddenError,\n    HttpTimeoutError,\n    HttpBadGatewayError,\n    HttpGatewayTimeoutError,\n    HttpInternalServerError,\n    HttpTooManyRequestsError,\n    HttpVendorError,\n    HttpUserError,\n    OfflineError,\n    // Error subtype constants\n    ENTITY_NOT_FOUND,\n    WRONG_LOGIN_TYPE,\n    WRONG_LOGIN,\n    NOT_APPROVED,\n    EMAIL_NOT_CONFIRMED,\n    WRONG_DOMAIN,\n    WRONG_COMPANY,\n    NO_REG_CODE,\n} from './http/errors';\n\nexport { NetworkRejectClassifier } from './http/networkReject';\n\n// Date/Time DTOs and Utilities (inspired by Java Time / JSR-310)\nexport {\n    InstantDto,\n    DateDto,\n    TimeDto,\n    DateTimeDto,\n    InstantUtil,\n    DateUtil,\n    TimeUtil,\n    DateTimeUtil,\n} from './http/datetime';\n\n// Context keys + registry (the global magic-context header system)\nexport { HeaderRegistry } from './http/HeaderRegistry';\nexport { ClientRegistry } from './http/ClientRegistry';\nexport type { ServiceUrlDeriver } from './http/ClientRegistry';\n\n// \"What service am I\" — set once at startup, read by the logging backends and by\n// RequestContextHeaders (to stamp requestIdSource on ids this service mints).\nexport { ServiceInfo } from './http/ServiceInfo';\n// Pluggable, bidirectional error translation (app exception <-> wire form). Registered on\n// ClientRegistry at startup; consulted before the built-in webpieces mapping on BOTH sides.\nexport { ErrorWireForm } from './http/ErrorTranslation';\nexport type { ErrorTranslation } from './http/ErrorTranslation';\n// Pluggable per-client failure classification (is a thrown API-call error a real failure or an\n// expected non-failure?). Registered on ClientRegistry at startup; consulted by LogApiCall.\nexport type { FailureClassifier } from './http/FailureClassifier';\nexport { KeyedFailureClassifier } from './http/FailureClassifier';\nexport {\n    WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier,\n    WEBPIECES_DEFAULT_FAILURE_CLASSIFIER,\n} from './http/WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier';\nexport { templateDeriver } from './http/templateDeriver';\nexport { WebpiecesCoreHeaders } from './http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders';\nexport { ContextReader } from './http/ContextReader';\n\n// BROWSER-ONLY outbound-header propagation (app-held store + registry -> outbound HTTP headers).\n// Only @webpieces/http-client-browser may name it; the server reads RequestContext directly via\n// RequestContextHeaders in the Node-only @webpieces/core-context.\nexport { ContextMgr } from './http/ContextMgr';\n\n// API-call logging helper (uses LogManager above). Singleton: use the LogApiCall constant, not `new`.\nexport { LogApiCall, LogApiCallImpl } from './http/LogApiCall';\n\n// Opt-in field masking for the LogApiCall log path — declare per-api sensitive fields so secrets\n// (OAuth refresh tokens, id-token JWTs) are masked in the logs while the real value stays on the wire.\nexport { MaskSpec } from './http/LogFieldMask';\nexport type { MaskMode } from './http/LogFieldMask';\n\n// The structured `api` tag + the context-writer seam LogApiCall stamps through. The Node\n// RequestContext-backed impl is installed by @webpieces/core-context; the browser gets the no-op.\nexport { ApiCallInfo } from './http/ApiCallInfo';\nexport type { ApiType, ApiResult } from './http/ApiCallInfo';\n// Console-render bridge: turns LogApiCall's [LogApiCall] bracket into [API.{side}.{phase}] locally.\nexport { ApiCallLogName, ApiCallLogNameImpl, LOG_API_CALL_LOGGER_NAME } from './http/ApiCallLogName';\nexport { ApiMethodInfo } from './http/ApiMethodInfo';\nexport type { ApiSide } from './http/ApiMethodInfo';\nexport { ApiCallContextHolder } from './http/ApiCallContext';\nexport type { ApiCallContext } from './http/ApiCallContext';\n\n// Test-case recording contract (impl lives in http-server; hooks in http-client)\nexport { TestCaseRecorder, RecorderKeys } from './http/recorder/TestCaseRecorder';\nexport { RecordedEndpoint, RecordedError, RecordedTestCase } from './http/recorder/RecordedEndpoint';\nexport { DoNotRecord, getDoNotRecordFields } from './http/recorder/DoNotRecord';\nexport { RecordSerializer, SerializedMap, SerializedError } from './http/recorder/RecordSerializer';\n"]}
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Applies to ANY project kind (server\n// controllers AND library impl classes), so it lives here (browser + Node) rather\n// than in a server-only routing package.\nexport { DocumentDesign, isDocumentDesign, DESIGN_METADATA_KEYS } from './DocumentDesign';\n\n// Logging (merged from former @webpieces/wp-logging).\n// Pluggable logging interface + a browser-safe console default; apps plug in\n// bunyan/winston/pino/etc. via LogManager.setFactory(...). Browser + Node.\nexport type { Logger, LogLevel } from './logging/Logger';\nexport type { LoggerFactory } from './logging/LoggerFactory';\nexport { ConsoleLogger } from './logging/ConsoleLogger';\nexport { ConsoleLoggerFactory } from './logging/ConsoleLoggerFactory';\nexport { LogManager } from './logging/LogManager';\nexport { LogChunker, LogChunkerImpl, LogChunkInfo, MAX_GCP_LOG_BYTES, GCP_LOG_BUDGET_BYTES } from './logging/LogChunker';\n\n// HTTP API contract (merged from former @webpieces/http-api).\n// Shared HTTP API definition consumed by both client and server: REST\n// decorators, the HttpError hierarchy, datetime DTOs, platform-header\n// registry/readers, ValidateImplementation, and the test-case recorder\n// contract. Pure definitions — express-free, browser + Node safe.\n\n// API definition decorators\nexport {\n    ApiPath,\n    Endpoint,\n    // Auth mode decorators (clean service-to-service + user JWT model)\n    Public,\n    AuthJwt,\n    rolesRequired,\n    MISSING_AUTH_DECORATOR_FIX,\n    AuthOidc,\n    AuthSharedSecret,\n    // API kind (RPC vs PubSub/Cloud Tasks) + queue naming\n    Rpc,\n    PubSub,\n    Queue,\n    MaskLog,\n    getApiPath,\n    getEndpoints,\n    getEndpointOptions,\n    getEndpointKind,\n    getEndpointKinds,\n    ENDPOINT_KINDS_BY_API_KIND,\n    getMaskSpec,\n    isFormPost,\n    isApiPath,\n    getAuthMeta,\n    getAuthMode,\n    assertEveryEndpointHasAuthMode,\n    assertEveryExternalEndpointDeclaresCaller,\n    getApiKind,\n    assertApiKind,\n    assertPubSubConventions,\n    getQueueName,\n    validateNoConflictingDecorators,\n    AuthMeta,\n    RouteMetadata,\n    METADATA_KEYS,\n} from './http/decorators';\nexport type { AuthMode, ApiKind, EndpointKind, JwtRoles, JwtRequirement, EndpointOptions, ExternalEndpointOptions } from './http/decorators';\n// WHO calls an `external` endpoint — the caller declaration @Endpoint(..., 'external', {calledBy})\n// requires, and the reader for it.\nexport { EXTERNAL_SYSTEM_KINDS, DEFAULT_CALLER_KIND, ExternalCaller, isExternalSystemKind, getEndpointCaller } from './http/external-caller';\nexport type { ExternalSystemKind } from './http/external-caller';\n// Client-side shared-secret store (the value THIS service sends per @AuthSharedSecret key).\nexport { Secrets, SECRETS } from './http/Secrets';\n\n// Type validators\nexport { ValidateImplementation } from './http/validators';\n\n// HTTP errors\nexport {\n    ProtocolError,\n    HttpError,\n    HttpNotFoundError,\n    EndpointNotFoundError,\n    HttpBadRequestError,\n    HttpUnauthorizedError,\n    HttpForbiddenError,\n    HttpTimeoutError,\n    HttpBadGatewayError,\n    HttpGatewayTimeoutError,\n    HttpInternalServerError,\n    HttpTooManyRequestsError,\n    HttpVendorError,\n    HttpUserError,\n    OfflineError,\n    // Error subtype constants\n    ENTITY_NOT_FOUND,\n    WRONG_LOGIN_TYPE,\n    WRONG_LOGIN,\n    NOT_APPROVED,\n    EMAIL_NOT_CONFIRMED,\n    WRONG_DOMAIN,\n    WRONG_COMPANY,\n    NO_REG_CODE,\n} from './http/errors';\n\nexport { NetworkRejectClassifier } from './http/networkReject';\n\n// Date/Time DTOs and Utilities (inspired by Java Time / JSR-310)\nexport {\n    InstantDto,\n    DateDto,\n    TimeDto,\n    DateTimeDto,\n    InstantUtil,\n    DateUtil,\n    TimeUtil,\n    DateTimeUtil,\n} from './http/datetime';\n\n// Context keys + registry (the global magic-context header system)\nexport { HeaderRegistry } from './http/HeaderRegistry';\nexport { ClientRegistry } from './http/ClientRegistry';\nexport type { ServiceUrlDeriver } from './http/ClientRegistry';\n\n// \"What service am I\" — set once at startup, read by the logging backends and by\n// RequestContextHeaders (to stamp requestIdSource on ids this service mints).\nexport { ServiceInfo } from './http/ServiceInfo';\n// Pluggable, bidirectional error translation (app exception <-> wire form). Registered on\n// ClientRegistry at startup; consulted before the built-in webpieces mapping on BOTH sides.\nexport { ErrorWireForm } from './http/ErrorTranslation';\nexport type { ErrorTranslation } from './http/ErrorTranslation';\n// Pluggable per-client failure classification (is a thrown API-call error a real failure or an\n// expected non-failure?). Registered on ClientRegistry at startup; consulted by LogApiCall.\nexport type { FailureClassifier } from './http/FailureClassifier';\nexport { KeyedFailureClassifier } from './http/FailureClassifier';\nexport {\n    WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier,\n    WEBPIECES_DEFAULT_FAILURE_CLASSIFIER,\n} from './http/WebpiecesDefaultFailureClassifier';\nexport { templateDeriver } from './http/templateDeriver';\nexport { WebpiecesCoreHeaders } from './http/WebpiecesCoreHeaders';\nexport { ContextReader } from './http/ContextReader';\n\n// The OUTBOUND half of the trust model: whether a TRUSTED context key may ride to the endpoint being\n// called. Built ONLY from the destination endpoint's AuthMode — see the class doc.\nexport { DestinationTrust } from './http/DestinationTrust';\n\n// BROWSER-ONLY outbound-header propagation (app-held store + registry -> outbound HTTP headers).\n// Only @webpieces/http-client-browser may name it; the server reads RequestContext directly via\n// RequestContextHeaders in the Node-only @webpieces/core-context.\nexport { ContextMgr } from './http/ContextMgr';\n\n// API-call logging helper (uses LogManager above). Singleton: use the LogApiCall constant, not `new`.\nexport { LogApiCall, LogApiCallImpl } from './http/LogApiCall';\n\n// Opt-in field masking for the LogApiCall log path — declare per-api sensitive fields so secrets\n// (OAuth refresh tokens, id-token JWTs) are masked in the logs while the real value stays on the wire.\nexport { MaskSpec } from './http/LogFieldMask';\nexport type { MaskMode } from './http/LogFieldMask';\n\n// The structured `api` tag + the context-writer seam LogApiCall stamps through. The Node\n// RequestContext-backed impl is installed by @webpieces/core-context; the browser gets the no-op.\nexport { ApiCallInfo } from './http/ApiCallInfo';\nexport type { ApiType, ApiResult } from './http/ApiCallInfo';\n// Console-render bridge: turns LogApiCall's [LogApiCall] bracket into [API.{side}.{phase}] locally.\nexport { ApiCallLogName, ApiCallLogNameImpl, LOG_API_CALL_LOGGER_NAME } from './http/ApiCallLogName';\nexport { ApiMethodInfo } from './http/ApiMethodInfo';\nexport type { ApiSide } from './http/ApiMethodInfo';\nexport { ApiCallContextHolder } from './http/ApiCallContext';\nexport type { ApiCallContext } from './http/ApiCallContext';\n\n// Test-case recording contract (impl lives in http-server; hooks in http-client)\nexport { TestCaseRecorder, RecorderKeys } from './http/recorder/TestCaseRecorder';\nexport { RecordedEndpoint, RecordedError, RecordedTestCase } from './http/recorder/RecordedEndpoint';\nexport { DoNotRecord, getDoNotRecordFields } from './http/recorder/DoNotRecord';\nexport { RecordSerializer, SerializedMap, SerializedError } from './http/recorder/RecordSerializer';\n"]}