@webpieces/core-context 0.4.665 → 0.4.667

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@webpieces/core-context",
-  "version": "0.4.665",
+  "version": "0.4.667",
   "description": "AsyncLocalStorage-based context management for request-scoped data",
   "type": "commonjs",
   "main": "./src/index.js",
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.665",
+    "@webpieces/core-util": "0.4.667",
     "@inversifyjs/binding-decorators": "1.1.5",
     "inversify": "7.10.4",
     "reflect-metadata": "0.2.2"

package/src/HttpRequest.d.ts

@@ -42,3 +42,18 @@ export declare class HttpRequest {
     /** All values of a header. */
     getHeaderValues(key: AnyContextKey | string): string[] | undefined;
 }
+/**
+ * RawHttpRequest - an {@link HttpRequest} on a `@Endpoint(..., { rawBody: true })` route, where
+ * {@link HttpRequest.raw} is PRESENT rather than optional.
+ *
+ * It exists so a vendor's webhook hook never writes `request.raw!` or an `if (!raw) throw`. The
+ * absence of the bytes is checked in exactly ONE place — `AuthFilter` 401s before it calls the hook —
+ * and this type is what carries the result of that check into the signature, so the bad state is
+ * unrepresentable downstream instead of re-guarded at every implementor.
+ *
+ * A TYPE, not a class: it narrows a field of an existing class rather than describing new data, so
+ * the transports keep building the one `HttpRequest` they always built.
+ */
+export type RawHttpRequest = HttpRequest & {
+    readonly raw: RawRequest;
+};

package/src/HttpRequest.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"HttpRequest.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/core/core-context/src/HttpRequest.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAGA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAa,WAAW;IAEA;IACA;IAEA;IAQA;IAZpB,YACoB,MAAc,EACd,IAAY;IAC5B,iFAAiF;IACjE,OAA8B;IAC9C;;;;;;OAMG;IACa,GAAgB;QAXhB,WAAM,GAAN,MAAM,CAAQ;QACd,SAAI,GAAJ,IAAI,CAAQ;QAEZ,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAuB;QAQ9B,QAAG,GAAH,GAAG,CAAa;IACjC,CAAC;IAEJ,8FAA8F;IAC9F,SAAS,CAAC,GAA2B;QACjC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACzC,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IAC/D,CAAC;IAED,8BAA8B;IAC9B,eAAe,CAAC,GAA2B;QACvC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;QACxF,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAClC,CAAC;CACJ;AA3BD,kCA2BC","sourcesContent":["import { ContextKey, AnyContextKey } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { RawRequest } from './RawRequest';\n\n/**\n * HttpRequest - webpieces' TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL inbound request.\n *\n * This is @webpieces/http-routing's own request type (http-routing re-exports it), NOT\n * express's `req`. Each transport adapter (the express adapter in @webpieces/http-server, or\n * any other TypeScript web framework) builds an HttpRequest from its native request and hands\n * it to the router. Filters and the auth layer read it via `RequestContext.getRequest()`\n * instead of touching express — which is what lets the SAME filter chain run over HTTP and\n * in-process (tests build an HttpRequest carrying their credential).\n *\n * It lives in core-context (alongside RequestContext, which stores it in AsyncLocalStorage)\n * to avoid a core-context → http-routing cycle; it is a pure data holder (no express, no DI).\n */\nexport class HttpRequest {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly method: string,\n        public readonly path: string,\n        /** Header name (lowercased) -> values (HTTP allows multiple values per name). */\n        public readonly headers: Map<string, string[]>,\n        /**\n         * The verbatim bytes + absolute url, present ONLY on an `@Endpoint(..., { rawBody: true })`\n         * route (see {@link RawRequest}). Absent everywhere else, and absent is the SAFE state:\n         * `@AuthWebhook` has nothing to verify without it and 401s rather than waving the call\n         * through. A spec driving a webhook route in-process supplies one here, the same way a spec\n         * today supplies an `authorization` header.\n         */\n        public readonly raw?: RawRequest,\n    ) {}\n\n    /** First value of a header, looked up by ContextKey.httpHeader (or a raw lowercased name). */\n    getHeader(key: AnyContextKey | string): string | undefined {\n        const values = this.getHeaderValues(key);\n        return values && values.length > 0 ? values[0] : undefined;\n    }\n\n    /** All values of a header. */\n    getHeaderValues(key: AnyContextKey | string): string[] | undefined {\n        const name = (typeof key === 'string' ? key : key.httpHeader ?? key.name).toLowerCase();\n        return this.headers.get(name);\n    }\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"HttpRequest.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/core/core-context/src/HttpRequest.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAGA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAa,WAAW;IAEA;IACA;IAEA;IAQA;IAZpB,YACoB,MAAc,EACd,IAAY;IAC5B,iFAAiF;IACjE,OAA8B;IAC9C;;;;;;OAMG;IACa,GAAgB;QAXhB,WAAM,GAAN,MAAM,CAAQ;QACd,SAAI,GAAJ,IAAI,CAAQ;QAEZ,YAAO,GAAP,OAAO,CAAuB;QAQ9B,QAAG,GAAH,GAAG,CAAa;IACjC,CAAC;IAEJ,8FAA8F;IAC9F,SAAS,CAAC,GAA2B;QACjC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACzC,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IAC/D,CAAC;IAED,8BAA8B;IAC9B,eAAe,CAAC,GAA2B;QACvC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;QACxF,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAClC,CAAC;CACJ;AA3BD,kCA2BC","sourcesContent":["import { ContextKey, AnyContextKey } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { RawRequest } from './RawRequest';\n\n/**\n * HttpRequest - webpieces' TRANSPORT-NEUTRAL inbound request.\n *\n * This is @webpieces/http-routing's own request type (http-routing re-exports it), NOT\n * express's `req`. Each transport adapter (the express adapter in @webpieces/http-server, or\n * any other TypeScript web framework) builds an HttpRequest from its native request and hands\n * it to the router. Filters and the auth layer read it via `RequestContext.getRequest()`\n * instead of touching express — which is what lets the SAME filter chain run over HTTP and\n * in-process (tests build an HttpRequest carrying their credential).\n *\n * It lives in core-context (alongside RequestContext, which stores it in AsyncLocalStorage)\n * to avoid a core-context → http-routing cycle; it is a pure data holder (no express, no DI).\n */\nexport class HttpRequest {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly method: string,\n        public readonly path: string,\n        /** Header name (lowercased) -> values (HTTP allows multiple values per name). */\n        public readonly headers: Map<string, string[]>,\n        /**\n         * The verbatim bytes + absolute url, present ONLY on an `@Endpoint(..., { rawBody: true })`\n         * route (see {@link RawRequest}). Absent everywhere else, and absent is the SAFE state:\n         * `@AuthWebhook` has nothing to verify without it and 401s rather than waving the call\n         * through. A spec driving a webhook route in-process supplies one here, the same way a spec\n         * today supplies an `authorization` header.\n         */\n        public readonly raw?: RawRequest,\n    ) {}\n\n    /** First value of a header, looked up by ContextKey.httpHeader (or a raw lowercased name). */\n    getHeader(key: AnyContextKey | string): string | undefined {\n        const values = this.getHeaderValues(key);\n        return values && values.length > 0 ? values[0] : undefined;\n    }\n\n    /** All values of a header. */\n    getHeaderValues(key: AnyContextKey | string): string[] | undefined {\n        const name = (typeof key === 'string' ? key : key.httpHeader ?? key.name).toLowerCase();\n        return this.headers.get(name);\n    }\n}\n\n/**\n * RawHttpRequest - an {@link HttpRequest} on a `@Endpoint(..., { rawBody: true })` route, where\n * {@link HttpRequest.raw} is PRESENT rather than optional.\n *\n * It exists so a vendor's webhook hook never writes `request.raw!` or an `if (!raw) throw`. The\n * absence of the bytes is checked in exactly ONE place — `AuthFilter` 401s before it calls the hook —\n * and this type is what carries the result of that check into the signature, so the bad state is\n * unrepresentable downstream instead of re-guarded at every implementor.\n *\n * A TYPE, not a class: it narrows a field of an existing class rather than describing new data, so\n * the transports keep building the one `HttpRequest` they always built.\n */\nexport type RawHttpRequest = HttpRequest & { readonly raw: RawRequest };\n"]}

package/src/PendingWireTrust.d.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ export declare class PendingTrustedValue {
  * identity.
  *
  * That is not hypothetical on this codebase: the framework's own {@link DefaultJwtHook} returns an
- * EMPTY `AuthValues.entries`, so a fully verified `@AuthJwt` request stamps no context entries at
+ * EMPTY `AuthenticatedCaller.entries`, so a fully verified `@AuthJwt` request stamps no context entries at
  * all and would leave a forged `x-user-id` completely unopposed.
  *
  * ## The fix

package/src/PendingWireTrust.js

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ exports.PendingTrustedValue = PendingTrustedValue;
  * identity.
  *
  * That is not hypothetical on this codebase: the framework's own {@link DefaultJwtHook} returns an
- * EMPTY `AuthValues.entries`, so a fully verified `@AuthJwt` request stamps no context entries at
+ * EMPTY `AuthenticatedCaller.entries`, so a fully verified `@AuthJwt` request stamps no context entries at
  * all and would leave a forged `x-user-id` completely unopposed.
  *
  * ## The fix

package/src/PendingWireTrust.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"PendingWireTrust.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/core/core-context/src/PendingWireTrust.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AACA,qDAAkD;AAElD;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAElE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAa,mBAAmB;IAER;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,GAAyB,EACzB,KAAa;QADb,QAAG,GAAH,GAAG,CAAsB;QACzB,UAAK,GAAL,KAAK,CAAQ;IAC9B,CAAC;CACP;AALD,kDAKC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8CG;AACH,MAAM,oBAAoB;IACtB;;;OAGG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,GAAyB,EAAE,KAAa;QAC1C,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,EAA+B,CAAC;QACzE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,+BAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACxD,CAAC;IAED;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO;QACH,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACd,CAAC;QACD,+BAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC;IAEO,OAAO;QACX,OAAO,+BAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAmC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;IACxF,CAAC;CACJ;AAED,sEAAsE;AACzD,QAAA,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,oBAAoB,EAAE,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { AnyTrustedContextKey } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { RequestContext } from './RequestContext';\n\n/**\n * Reserved (deliberately UNREGISTERED) slot holding the pending map. Not a ContextKey: it is\n * framework plumbing that exists only between the inbound fill and the AuthFilter, and giving it a\n * ContextKey would make it transferrable/loggable, neither of which it should ever be.\n */\nconst PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY = '__webpieces_pending_wire_trust__';\n\n/**\n * One trusted key that ARRIVED ON THE WIRE and has not yet been vouched for. Data-only (a class,\n * per the guidelines). Carries the key as well as the value so a rejection message can name the\n * HTTP header the caller actually sent, not just the context name.\n */\nexport class PendingTrustedValue {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly key: AnyTrustedContextKey,\n        public readonly value: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * PendingWireTrust - the holding pen between \"a trusted key arrived on the wire\" and \"we know\n * whether we may believe it\".\n *\n * ## The hole this closes\n *\n * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` runs at the TRANSPORT level (`ExpressWrapper`), and\n * `AuthFilter` runs later, as a filter. So the wire always gets to write first and the authenticator\n * second. If the inbound loop wrote trusted keys straight into the context, then for the entire\n * window before AuthFilter ran — and forever after, on any route where the authenticator does not\n * happen to stamp that particular key — a value typed by whoever sent the request would be sitting\n * in the slot that `getTrusted` reads. `curl -H 'x-user-id: victim'` would be an authenticated\n * identity.\n *\n * That is not hypothetical on this codebase: the framework's own {@link DefaultJwtHook} returns an\n * EMPTY `AuthValues.entries`, so a fully verified `@AuthJwt` request stamps no context entries at\n * all and would leave a forged `x-user-id` completely unopposed.\n *\n * ## The fix\n *\n * Inbound trusted values never enter the context. They are stashed HERE, and `AuthFilter` decides\n * what to do with them once it knows who the caller is:\n *\n * - `@AuthOidc` / `@AuthSharedSecret` — the CALLER's own identity was verified, so this is an\n *   internal service passing along context it already holds. Admit the pending values as trusted.\n *   This is what makes service-to-service propagation of a verified userId work, and it is the whole\n *   reason trusted keys are allowed to have an `httpHeader` at all.\n * - `@AuthJwt` / public — the caller may be a browser or anyone with curl. A pending value is\n *   admitted ONLY if the authenticator independently derived the SAME value. Anything else — a\n *   different value, or a value nothing vouched for — rejects the request.\n *\n * Note the deliberate asymmetry with a \"strip it and carry on\" design: a mismatch is not merely\n * neutralized, it FAILS. Rate limiters commonly bucket on the inbound header rather than on the JWT,\n * so a request whose header says `alice` and whose JWT says `bob` was rate-limited as the wrong\n * principal. Letting the JWT quietly win would turn every forged header into a free rate-limit\n * bypass. There is no legitimate caller that sends a header contradicting its own credential.\n *\n * ## If nothing reconciles\n *\n * `AuthFilter` is auto-installed on every route, so reconciliation always happens on a webpieces\n * server. Should a non-webpieces transport ever call `fillFromRequest` without one, the pending\n * values simply never arrive — the trusted key reads as absent. That is the fail-SAFE direction, and\n * it is intentional: silence beats an unvouched value.\n *\n * Module-global instance (like {@link RequestContext} itself) rather than a DI singleton — it is\n * stateless plumbing over the ambient context, used by one class on each side of the boundary.\n */\nclass PendingWireTrustImpl {\n    /**\n     * Hold an inbound wire value for a trusted key. Called by the inbound fill INSTEAD of writing it\n     * into the context.\n     */\n    stash(key: AnyTrustedContextKey, value: string): void {\n        const pending = this.current() ?? new Map<string, PendingTrustedValue>();\n        pending.set(key.name, new PendingTrustedValue(key, value));\n        RequestContext.put(PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY, pending);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Everything stashed for this request, and CLEAR the pen in the same step — so reconciliation\n     * cannot run twice and a value cannot be re-admitted later by anything else.\n     */\n    takeAll(): PendingTrustedValue[] {\n        const pending = this.current();\n        if (!pending) {\n            return [];\n        }\n        RequestContext.remove(PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY);\n        return Array.from(pending.values());\n    }\n\n    private current(): Map<string, PendingTrustedValue> | undefined {\n        return RequestContext.get<Map<string, PendingTrustedValue>>(PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY);\n    }\n}\n\n/** The process-wide holding pen. See {@link PendingWireTrustImpl}. */\nexport const PendingWireTrust = new PendingWireTrustImpl();\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"PendingWireTrust.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../packages/core/core-context/src/PendingWireTrust.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AACA,qDAAkD;AAElD;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAElE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAa,mBAAmB;IAER;IACA;IAFpB,YACoB,GAAyB,EACzB,KAAa;QADb,QAAG,GAAH,GAAG,CAAsB;QACzB,UAAK,GAAL,KAAK,CAAQ;IAC9B,CAAC;CACP;AALD,kDAKC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8CG;AACH,MAAM,oBAAoB;IACtB;;;OAGG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,GAAyB,EAAE,KAAa;QAC1C,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,EAA+B,CAAC;QACzE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3D,+BAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACxD,CAAC;IAED;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO;QACH,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACd,CAAC;QACD,+BAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC;IAEO,OAAO;QACX,OAAO,+BAAc,CAAC,GAAG,CAAmC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;IACxF,CAAC;CACJ;AAED,sEAAsE;AACzD,QAAA,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,oBAAoB,EAAE,CAAC","sourcesContent":["import { AnyTrustedContextKey } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { RequestContext } from './RequestContext';\n\n/**\n * Reserved (deliberately UNREGISTERED) slot holding the pending map. Not a ContextKey: it is\n * framework plumbing that exists only between the inbound fill and the AuthFilter, and giving it a\n * ContextKey would make it transferrable/loggable, neither of which it should ever be.\n */\nconst PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY = '__webpieces_pending_wire_trust__';\n\n/**\n * One trusted key that ARRIVED ON THE WIRE and has not yet been vouched for. Data-only (a class,\n * per the guidelines). Carries the key as well as the value so a rejection message can name the\n * HTTP header the caller actually sent, not just the context name.\n */\nexport class PendingTrustedValue {\n    constructor(\n        public readonly key: AnyTrustedContextKey,\n        public readonly value: string,\n    ) {}\n}\n\n/**\n * PendingWireTrust - the holding pen between \"a trusted key arrived on the wire\" and \"we know\n * whether we may believe it\".\n *\n * ## The hole this closes\n *\n * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest` runs at the TRANSPORT level (`ExpressWrapper`), and\n * `AuthFilter` runs later, as a filter. So the wire always gets to write first and the authenticator\n * second. If the inbound loop wrote trusted keys straight into the context, then for the entire\n * window before AuthFilter ran — and forever after, on any route where the authenticator does not\n * happen to stamp that particular key — a value typed by whoever sent the request would be sitting\n * in the slot that `getTrusted` reads. `curl -H 'x-user-id: victim'` would be an authenticated\n * identity.\n *\n * That is not hypothetical on this codebase: the framework's own {@link DefaultJwtHook} returns an\n * EMPTY `AuthenticatedCaller.entries`, so a fully verified `@AuthJwt` request stamps no context entries at\n * all and would leave a forged `x-user-id` completely unopposed.\n *\n * ## The fix\n *\n * Inbound trusted values never enter the context. They are stashed HERE, and `AuthFilter` decides\n * what to do with them once it knows who the caller is:\n *\n * - `@AuthOidc` / `@AuthSharedSecret` — the CALLER's own identity was verified, so this is an\n *   internal service passing along context it already holds. Admit the pending values as trusted.\n *   This is what makes service-to-service propagation of a verified userId work, and it is the whole\n *   reason trusted keys are allowed to have an `httpHeader` at all.\n * - `@AuthJwt` / public — the caller may be a browser or anyone with curl. A pending value is\n *   admitted ONLY if the authenticator independently derived the SAME value. Anything else — a\n *   different value, or a value nothing vouched for — rejects the request.\n *\n * Note the deliberate asymmetry with a \"strip it and carry on\" design: a mismatch is not merely\n * neutralized, it FAILS. Rate limiters commonly bucket on the inbound header rather than on the JWT,\n * so a request whose header says `alice` and whose JWT says `bob` was rate-limited as the wrong\n * principal. Letting the JWT quietly win would turn every forged header into a free rate-limit\n * bypass. There is no legitimate caller that sends a header contradicting its own credential.\n *\n * ## If nothing reconciles\n *\n * `AuthFilter` is auto-installed on every route, so reconciliation always happens on a webpieces\n * server. Should a non-webpieces transport ever call `fillFromRequest` without one, the pending\n * values simply never arrive — the trusted key reads as absent. That is the fail-SAFE direction, and\n * it is intentional: silence beats an unvouched value.\n *\n * Module-global instance (like {@link RequestContext} itself) rather than a DI singleton — it is\n * stateless plumbing over the ambient context, used by one class on each side of the boundary.\n */\nclass PendingWireTrustImpl {\n    /**\n     * Hold an inbound wire value for a trusted key. Called by the inbound fill INSTEAD of writing it\n     * into the context.\n     */\n    stash(key: AnyTrustedContextKey, value: string): void {\n        const pending = this.current() ?? new Map<string, PendingTrustedValue>();\n        pending.set(key.name, new PendingTrustedValue(key, value));\n        RequestContext.put(PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY, pending);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Everything stashed for this request, and CLEAR the pen in the same step — so reconciliation\n     * cannot run twice and a value cannot be re-admitted later by anything else.\n     */\n    takeAll(): PendingTrustedValue[] {\n        const pending = this.current();\n        if (!pending) {\n            return [];\n        }\n        RequestContext.remove(PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY);\n        return Array.from(pending.values());\n    }\n\n    private current(): Map<string, PendingTrustedValue> | undefined {\n        return RequestContext.get<Map<string, PendingTrustedValue>>(PENDING_WIRE_TRUST_KEY);\n    }\n}\n\n/** The process-wide holding pen. See {@link PendingWireTrustImpl}. */\nexport const PendingWireTrust = new PendingWireTrustImpl();\n"]}

package/src/RequestContext.d.ts

@@ -230,9 +230,12 @@ declare class RequestContextImpl {
     getRequest(): HttpRequest | undefined;
     /**
      * Store a value under a RAW STRING key — the escape hatch for the framework's own reserved,
-     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the AuthFilter principal, the Cloud Tasks
-     * schedule frame). Those are internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and
-     * no trust level.
+     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the Cloud Tasks schedule frame). Those are
+     * internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and no trust level.
+     *
+     * The AuthFilter principal used to be one of these and is NOT any more: it is a proven fact, so
+     * it goes through `putTrusted` under `AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY` like every other proven value.
+     * Reach for this only when the value genuinely has no trust level to state.
      *
      * REJECTS any name that belongs to a registered {@link ContextKey}. Without that check this
      * method is a complete bypass of the trust system — `put('userId', req.body.userId)` would forge

package/src/RequestContext.js

@@ -333,9 +333,12 @@ class RequestContextImpl {
     }
     /**
      * Store a value under a RAW STRING key — the escape hatch for the framework's own reserved,
-     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the AuthFilter principal, the Cloud Tasks
-     * schedule frame). Those are internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and
-     * no trust level.
+     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the Cloud Tasks schedule frame). Those are
+     * internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and no trust level.
+     *
+     * The AuthFilter principal used to be one of these and is NOT any more: it is a proven fact, so
+     * it goes through `putTrusted` under `AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY` like every other proven value.
+     * Reach for this only when the value genuinely has no trust level to state.
      *
      * REJECTS any name that belongs to a registered {@link ContextKey}. Without that check this
      * method is a complete bypass of the trust system — `put('userId', req.body.userId)` would forge

package/src/RequestContext.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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{ AsyncLocalStorage } from 'async_hooks';\nimport { ContextKey, AnyContextKey, HeaderRegistry, ServiceInfo } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { HttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';\nimport { CapturedContext, ContextCaptureAuthority, RestorableContext } from './CapturedContext';\n\n/** Reserved context key under which the current HttpRequest is stored. */\nconst HTTP_REQUEST_KEY = '__webpieces_http_request__';\n\n/**\n * Context management using AsyncLocalStorage.\n * Similar to Java WebPieces Context class that uses ThreadLocal.\n *\n * This allows storing request-scoped data that is automatically available\n * throughout the async call chain, similar to MDC (Mapped Diagnostic Context).\n *\n * Example usage:\n * ```typescript\n * Context.put('REQUEST_ID', '12345');\n * await someAsyncOperation();\n * const id = Context.get('REQUEST_ID'); // Still available!\n * ```\n */\nclass RequestContextImpl {\n    private storage: AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>;\n\n    constructor() {\n        this.storage = new AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open THE request scope. A transport calls this once, at the beginning of a request.\n     *\n     * Nesting is a bug, not a feature, so it throws. AsyncLocalStorage would happily let a second\n     * `run()` install a fresh empty Map that SHADOWS the outer one: every value the outer scope\n     * holds becomes invisible, `fillFromRequest` mints a second request id, and the two halves of a\n     * request end up in different traces. Nothing would tell you.\n     *\n     * With this guard the setup is right or it is loud. It mirrors\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest()`, which throws when there is NO active scope.\n     *\n     * If you genuinely WANT a fresh empty scope inside an active one — work that must not inherit the\n     * surrounding request's actionId/requestId — that is {@link runDetachedScope}, which says so by\n     * name. This guard exists to stop the ACCIDENTAL empty scope, not the deliberate one.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when a RequestContext is already active.\n     */\n    run<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        if (this.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'RequestContext.run(...) called inside an active RequestContext. Nesting installs a ' +\n                'fresh empty context that shadows the outer one: its values go invisible and a second ' +\n                'request id is minted. Exactly ONE scope per request — the transport opens it. If you ' +\n                'MEANT a fresh empty scope that does not inherit this one (a browser-log line, work ' +\n                'reconstructed from an external payload), use RequestContext.runDetachedScope(fn) and ' +\n                'write its values inside the closure with putTrusted/putUntrusted.',\n            );\n        }\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open a NEW scope pre-loaded with a snapshot — the restore half of {@link copyContext}, for work\n     * whose async chain was broken and re-rooted elsewhere (a queued job drained by a background loop,\n     * a batch flushed on a timer, an event listener fired from a socket the request does not own). See\n     * {@link CapturedContext} for the full list and for why the payload is opaque.\n     *\n     * A restored context legitimately contains TRUSTED values — reinstating what the original scope\n     * proved is the entire point — so this cannot type-check its contents the way the trust verbs do.\n     * The guarantee instead comes from the PAYLOAD: a {@link RestorableContext} can only be narrowed\n     * out of a {@link CapturedContext}, which only {@link copyContext} produces, so there is no\n     * hand-assembled Map to hand it and no way to forge one.\n     *\n     * The caller must SAY whether the proven identity travels — `snapshot.withTrusted()` (runs as that\n     * user) or `snapshot.withoutTrusted()` (runs as the system, keeping only the trace fields). A bare\n     * `CapturedContext` is deliberately not accepted; see {@link CapturedContext} for the three-case\n     * table and why the wide branch is spelled out rather than defaulted.\n     *\n     * The snapshot is copied into a fresh store, so writes inside `fn` stay inside `fn` and the\n     * snapshot stays reusable.\n     *\n     * Deliberately NOT guarded against nesting the way {@link run} is. `run`'s guard exists because a\n     * second EMPTY scope shadowing the first is always a bug; here the inner scope is a faithful copy\n     * of a real one, which is the whole point — a worker that restores a snapshot inside a scope it\n     * opened per job is correct, not a mistake. Prefer this over {@link restoreContext} unless you\n     * specifically need the CURRENT scope overwritten in place.\n     */\n    runWithContext<T>(captured: RestorableContext, fn: () => T): T {\n        return this.storage.run(captured.toFreshStore(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL), fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open a FRESH, EMPTY, NESTED scope. Nothing is inherited from the enclosing scope, and nothing\n     * crosses the boundary as data — every value the work runs under is WRITTEN INSIDE `fn`, through\n     * the ordinary trust-typed verbs:\n     *\n     * ```typescript\n     * RequestContext.runDetachedScope(() => {\n     *     RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ACTION_ID, line.actionId);\n     *     emit();   // runs under exactly what this closure wrote, and nothing else\n     * });\n     * ```\n     *\n     * ## When you want THIS and not {@link runWithContext}\n     *\n     * The two look similar and are opposites. `runWithContext` faithfully RE-ROOTS a real snapshot of a\n     * real scope, for work whose async chain was broken (a queued job, a timer flush) — it exists to\n     * PRESERVE a context. This one exists to DISCARD one: the values do not come from any scope this\n     * process ever had, they were reconstructed from somewhere else, and inheriting the ambient scope\n     * would be actively wrong.\n     *\n     * The live case is a browser-log shipper. A batch of browser lines arrives on one HTTP request; each\n     * line carries the context the BROWSER captured when it was written, and a single batch routinely\n     * spans several user actions. Emitting a line under the shipping request's own scope would stamp\n     * every line with that request's actionId and requestId, silently destroying the ability to grep an\n     * action while the feature still appeared to work. So each line is emitted detached, under exactly\n     * the keys the closure re-stated from the browser's payload.\n     *\n     * ## Why it MAY nest when {@link run} may not\n     *\n     * `run`'s nesting guard is right and is not softened here. It refuses a second EMPTY scope because\n     * there an empty scope is always an ACCIDENT — a transport opening the request scope twice, whose\n     * only effect is to hide the outer scope's values and mint a second request id. Here an empty scope\n     * is the thing that was ASKED for, in a distinctly-named verb, and the caller is normally already\n     * inside a request scope (the shipper's own). A guard would refuse the only situation the method has.\n     *\n     * ## No Map-taking form, ever\n     *\n     * There is deliberately no overload accepting a `Map`, an object, or an array of entries. That was\n     * the DELETED `runWithContext(map, fn)`, and it was a forgery path: a hand-built map is\n     * indistinguishable from a genuine snapshot, so `new Map([['userId','victim']])` minted a proven\n     * identity in one line without ever typing a trust verb. Writing the values INSIDE the closure is\n     * what closes it — a loop over a mixed `AnyContextKey[]` must branch on `key.isTrusted()` before it\n     * can write anything, and `putUntrusted` does not compile for a trusted key, so code fed by a\n     * BROWSER (which proves nothing) cannot fabricate a proven value. (See\n     * `DetachedScopeCompileAssertions`.)\n     *\n     * That is a limit on the SOURCE, not on the key. `putTrusted` inside a detached scope is ordinary\n     * and correct whenever the caller has actually proven the value — a verified JWT claim, or the\n     * signed-webhook case where Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number and the app looks up the\n     * userId. Trust is tamper-resistance, not secrecy (a trusted `userId` is a plain, fully-logged\n     * GUID; redaction is the separate `maskInLogs` axis on the key).\n     *\n     * SYNC AND ASYNC BOTH: `fn` may return a promise, and the detached scope follows every `await`\n     * inside it exactly as `run`/`runWithContext` do — same `AsyncLocalStorage.run` underneath. The\n     * enclosing scope is reinstated for everything after the synchronous return, INCLUDING when `fn`\n     * throws (AsyncLocalStorage unwinds the store as the frame unwinds); an async `fn` that is not\n     * awaited will therefore keep the detached scope for its own continuation while the caller has\n     * already resumed under the enclosing one, which is the intended and only sane reading of \"detached\".\n     */\n    runDetachedScope<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value the framework PROVED — a verified JWT claim, or a fact an app derived from a\n     * verified credential. Does not compile for an untrusted key, so a reader can never mistake a\n     * caller-asserted value for an authenticated one.\n     *\n     * This is the ONLY read that is safe to feed into an authorization decision. If you find\n     * yourself wanting `getUntrusted` for that, the fix is to make the key trusted and have an\n     * authenticator vouch for it — not to use the other verb.\n     *\n     * The return type is the key's OWN value type `V` — `string` for wire/log keys, `ApiCallInfo`\n     * for the api tag, `TestCaseRecorder` for the recorder — INFERRED from the key, never asserted\n     * by the caller. This is the typed public surface over the deliberately type-erased backing Map.\n     */\n    getTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value a caller merely ASSERTED — a browser-minted actionId, a recording flag, an\n     * in-process log tag. Does not compile for a trusted key: reading a proven fact through the\n     * untrusted verb would under-claim and hide, at the call site, that the value IS reliable.\n     *\n     * Treat everything this returns as attacker-controlled. It is fine for logging, tracing,\n     * routing hints and rate-limit bucketing; it is never an input to \"may they do this?\".\n     */\n    getUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value the framework PROVED. A distinct, greppable verb precisely so that writing a\n     * trusted value is something code has to do ON PURPOSE — `grep -rn putTrusted` lists every place\n     * in the repo that claims to have proven something, which is a reviewable set.\n     *\n     * Callers are the framework `AuthFilter` (stamping {@link ContextTuple}s an app's JwtHook derived\n     * from a verified credential) and app code that has itself verified something out-of-band — the\n     * signed-webhook case: Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number, the app looks up the userId, and\n     * that userId is every bit as proven as a JWT claim.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for an untrusted key.\n     */\n    putTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a caller-asserted value. `value` is type-checked against the key's value type `V`, so you\n     * cannot put a number under a `ContextKey<string>` or a raw object under a typed key.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for a trusted key — which is what stops the inbound-header path, the api-tag\n     * seam and ordinary app code from being side doors that forge a trusted value.\n     */\n    putUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a key of ANY trust level and ANY value type, as `unknown`.\n     *\n     * FRAMEWORK SERIALIZATION ONLY — the log-field builders below, the outbound header builder, and\n     * the {@link ContextReader} seam. Those loop over `HeaderRegistry` key arrays that are mixed in\n     * both value type and trust, and they are not making a trust DECISION: they are copying values to\n     * a log line or to the wire.\n     *\n     * It is deliberately read-only and has no write twin. A `putAny` would re-open the exact hole the\n     * typed verbs close, because forging a trusted value is the dangerous direction; reading one\n     * without saying `getTrusted` only costs you the `unknown` return type.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- key-agnostic serialization read: the key array is mixed in value type, so unknown is the honest return\n    getAny(key: AnyContextKey): unknown {\n        return this.readByName<unknown>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /** Clear one context key. Used by the api-tag seam's set → log → remove span (see LogApiCall). */\n    removeKey(key: AnyContextKey): void {\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key.name);\n    }\n\n    hasKey(key: AnyContextKey): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key.name) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Build the masked field map for LOGGING: every logged key in the global\n     * {@link HeaderRegistry} read straight from this context, secured values\n     * masked (via {@link ContextKey.maskForLogs}), keyed by each key's `name`.\n     *\n     * Callers: RecordingFilter + NodeProxyClient.recordCall, which snapshot the context into a\n     * test FIXTURE. The @webpieces/winston and @webpieces/bunyan backends also stamp these fields\n     * onto every record, and they own the \"log emitted outside RequestContext.run(...)\" complaint —\n     * reporting it HERE would recurse (the error line itself re-enters buildLogFields).\n     *\n     * Returns an EMPTY map outside a `run(...)` block rather than throwing: a fixture snapshot or a\n     * log line is never worth crashing a request over.\n     */\n    buildLogFields(): Map<string, string> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string>();\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // The registry owns WHICH keys log (getLoggedKeys); we read each straight from THIS context\n        // and each ContextKey masks its own secured value. String-only — this map feeds wire/MDC +\n        // recorder fixtures — so an object-valued key (API_CALL_INFO) is guarded out by the\n        // typeof-string check; objects ride buildStructuredLogFields instead. (Was a HeaderRegistry\n        // method taking a read callback; only the server ever called it, so the seam was dead weight.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            // getLoggedKeys() is AnyContextKey[] — mixed in BOTH value type and trust — so this reads\n            // through getAny (serialization, not a trust decision) and narrows with the typeof-string\n            // guard rather than asserting a value type per key.\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (typeof value === 'string' && value) {\n                fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The STRUCTURED field map for the node logging backends: like {@link buildLogFields}, but values\n     * may be OBJECTS, so an object-valued logged key ({@link WebpiecesCoreHeaders.API_CALL_INFO} holding\n     * an {@link ApiCallInfo}) survives as an object and the winston/bunyan backends nest it into\n     * `jsonPayload.api`. Reads values UNTYPED (not `<string>`) so the object comes through intact.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block it returns just the `svcName` + `version` entries below (not a fully\n     * empty map): a log line is never worth crashing over, and startup/background lines must still say\n     * which service and build emitted them.\n     *\n     * PLUS this service's `svcName` and this build's `version` from {@link ServiceInfo}. Neither is a\n     * {@link ContextKey} — they are process-global identity facts, added HERE (BEFORE the active-context\n     * check) so EVERY log line of BOTH node backends (winston/bunyan read this one map) says which\n     * service and build emitted it — request path, startup, and background jobs alike — with no\n     * per-backend duplication. This is the SINGLE place both are stamped, keeping the two backends\n     * symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version). Read via the non-throwing\n     * {@link ServiceInfo.getName} / {@link ServiceInfo.getVersion}, so each is simply ABSENT until\n     * `setInfo` has run — logging keeps working before the service is identified, then the fields start\n     * appearing. Caller-set `svcName`/`version` headers (there are none by convention) would be\n     * overwritten here; that is intentional — the ServiceInfo identity is authoritative.\n     */\n    buildStructuredLogFields(): Map<string, string | object> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string | object>();\n        // This service's `svcName` + this build's `version` from ServiceInfo — NOT ContextKeys, they are\n        // process-global identity facts. Added FIRST, BEFORE the active-context check, so they ride EVERY\n        // line of both node backends (they read this one map) — including startup and background-job lines\n        // emitted with NO active RequestContext. Treated identically and read per-record via the\n        // non-throwing getters, so each is simply ABSENT until setInfo has run, then starts appearing —\n        // even if setInfo runs after a backend was constructed. This is the ONE place both facts are\n        // stamped, so winston and bunyan stay symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version).\n        const svcName = ServiceInfo.getName();\n        if (svcName) {\n            fields.set('svcName', svcName);\n        }\n        const version = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        if (version) {\n            fields.set('version', version);\n        }\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // Like buildLogFields, but values may be OBJECTS (API_CALL_INFO): read UNTYPED so the object\n        // survives and winston/bunyan nest it into jsonPayload.<name>. Secured STRING values are still\n        // masked per key; non-string primitives are ignored rather than String()-flattened. (Inlined\n        // from HeaderRegistry for the same reason as buildLogFields — only the server called it.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (value === undefined || value === null) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            if (typeof value === 'string') {\n                if (value) {\n                    fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n                }\n            } else if (typeof value === 'object') {\n                fields.set(key.name, value);\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n\n    /**\n     * Store the transport-neutral {@link HttpRequest} for this request. Called once, above the\n     * api boundary, by whichever transport is driving the router (the express adapter, or the\n     * in-process client). Filters/auth read it back via {@link getRequest} so they never touch\n     * express — the same chain then runs over HTTP and in-process.\n     */\n    setRequest(request: HttpRequest): void {\n        this.put(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY, request);\n    }\n\n    /** The current {@link HttpRequest}, or undefined if none was set for this context. */\n    getRequest(): HttpRequest | undefined {\n        return this.get<HttpRequest>(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value under a RAW STRING key — the escape hatch for the framework's own reserved,\n     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the AuthFilter principal, the Cloud Tasks\n     * schedule frame). Those are internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and\n     * no trust level.\n     *\n     * REJECTS any name that belongs to a registered {@link ContextKey}. Without that check this\n     * method is a complete bypass of the trust system — `put('userId', req.body.userId)` would forge\n     * a trusted value while never typing `putTrusted`, and an agent picks whatever compiles. The\n     * check is necessarily a RUNTIME one: the registry is populated at `configure()` time, so \"is\n     * this string a registered key name\" is not a fact a type can express.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous (HttpRequest, principal, schedule frame)\n    put(key: string, value: any): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'putTrusted / putUntrusted');\n        this.writeByName(key, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Retrieve a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Same reserved-slot purpose, and the same\n     * rejection, as {@link put} — reading `get('userId')` would hand back a trusted value without the\n     * call site ever saying `getTrusted`, which is exactly the ambiguity this whole change removes.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous; callers name the concrete type\n    get<T = any>(key: string): T | undefined {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'getTrusted / getUntrusted / getAny');\n        return this.readByName<T>(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Remove a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Registered names are rejected here too: deleting\n     * a trusted key out from under a reader is a trust decision, so it goes through {@link removeKey}\n     * with the key in hand.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    remove(key: string): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'removeKey(key)');\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The guard behind the three raw-string accessors above. Silent (a no-op) until\n     * `HeaderRegistry.configure(...)` has run, which is correct rather than lax: with no registry\n     * there are no registered keys, so there is no trusted value to launder.\n     */\n    private rejectRegisteredName(name: string, useInstead: string): void {\n        if (!HeaderRegistry.isConfigured()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const key = HeaderRegistry.get().findByName(name);\n        if (key) {\n            throw new Error(\n                `RequestContext string accessors cannot touch '${name}' — it is a registered ` +\n                `ContextKey (trust: '${key.trust}'). The raw string form hides whether the value is ` +\n                `a proven fact or something a caller asserted, so it is a bypass of the trust ` +\n                `system. Use ${useInstead} with the ContextKey itself.`,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased read. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else reads the store. */\n    private readByName<T>(name: string): T | undefined {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.get(name);\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased write. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else writes the store. */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n    private writeByName(name: string, value: any): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error('No context available. Did you call Context.run() first?');\n        }\n        store.set(name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Clear all values from the current context.\n     */\n    clear(): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        store?.clear();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Snapshot this scope so the work you are about to hand off keeps its request id, log fields and\n     * proven identity. The ONLY producer of a {@link CapturedContext} — which is what makes the\n     * restore side unforgeable, since there is no other way to obtain the payload it accepts.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block this returns an EMPTY snapshot rather than throwing: capturing \"no\n     * context\" is a legitimate thing for a background caller to do, and restoring it simply installs\n     * nothing.\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a defensive COPY — writes to this context after capturing do not reach it.\n     */\n    copyContext(): CapturedContext {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        return CapturedContext.capture(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store ?? new Map());\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Overwrite the ACTIVE scope with a snapshot. The in-place twin of {@link runWithContext}, and the\n     * one you almost never want: prefer `runWithContext`, which gives the restored work its OWN scope\n     * and cannot disturb the caller's. Reach for this only when something else owns the scope and it\n     * must be re-pointed in place.\n     *\n     * OVERWRITE, not merge — `clear()` runs first, so every entry the active scope holds and the\n     * snapshot does not is DROPPED. That includes the empty case:\n     * `restoreContext(copyContext().withTrusted())` taken outside a scope wipes the request id and\n     * every proven identity from a live request, and says nothing. That is faithful (a snapshot\n     * restores exactly what it captured) but it is the sharp edge of this method and the reason\n     * `runWithContext` is the default.\n     *\n     * Takes only a {@link RestorableContext} for the reason spelled out there — the DELETED Map-taking\n     * form let `new Map([['userId','victim']])` forge a proven identity in one line — and that type\n     * exists only via `withTrusted()` / `withoutTrusted()`, so this call site states whether the proven\n     * identity survives the re-point.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when no RequestContext is active.\n     */\n    restoreContext(captured: RestorableContext): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No context available to restore into. Either open one with RequestContext.run(...) ' +\n                'first, or use RequestContext.runWithContext(captured.withTrusted(), fn) — or ' +\n                '.withoutTrusted() — which opens its own.',\n            );\n        }\n        captured.restoreInto(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if a key exists in the context.\n     */\n    /**\n     * Presence of a value under a RAW STRING key. Guarded like its three siblings: `has('userId')`\n     * alongside `hasKey(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ID)` would be a second spelling of one question,\n     * and the string form is the one that says nothing about whether the value can be believed.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    has(key: string): boolean {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'hasKey(key)');\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if RequestContext is currently active.\n     * Returns true if we're inside a RequestContext.run() block, false otherwise.\n     *\n     * Useful for tests to verify context is set up before making API calls.\n     */\n    isActive(): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore() !== undefined;\n    }\n\n}\n\n\n\n/**\n * Global singleton instance of RequestContext.\n * Use this throughout your application.\n */\nexport const RequestContext = new RequestContextImpl();\n"]}
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{ AsyncLocalStorage } from 'async_hooks';\nimport { ContextKey, AnyContextKey, HeaderRegistry, ServiceInfo } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { HttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';\nimport { CapturedContext, ContextCaptureAuthority, RestorableContext } from './CapturedContext';\n\n/** Reserved context key under which the current HttpRequest is stored. */\nconst HTTP_REQUEST_KEY = '__webpieces_http_request__';\n\n/**\n * Context management using AsyncLocalStorage.\n * Similar to Java WebPieces Context class that uses ThreadLocal.\n *\n * This allows storing request-scoped data that is automatically available\n * throughout the async call chain, similar to MDC (Mapped Diagnostic Context).\n *\n * Example usage:\n * ```typescript\n * Context.put('REQUEST_ID', '12345');\n * await someAsyncOperation();\n * const id = Context.get('REQUEST_ID'); // Still available!\n * ```\n */\nclass RequestContextImpl {\n    private storage: AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>;\n\n    constructor() {\n        this.storage = new AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open THE request scope. A transport calls this once, at the beginning of a request.\n     *\n     * Nesting is a bug, not a feature, so it throws. AsyncLocalStorage would happily let a second\n     * `run()` install a fresh empty Map that SHADOWS the outer one: every value the outer scope\n     * holds becomes invisible, `fillFromRequest` mints a second request id, and the two halves of a\n     * request end up in different traces. Nothing would tell you.\n     *\n     * With this guard the setup is right or it is loud. It mirrors\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest()`, which throws when there is NO active scope.\n     *\n     * If you genuinely WANT a fresh empty scope inside an active one — work that must not inherit the\n     * surrounding request's actionId/requestId — that is {@link runDetachedScope}, which says so by\n     * name. This guard exists to stop the ACCIDENTAL empty scope, not the deliberate one.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when a RequestContext is already active.\n     */\n    run<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        if (this.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'RequestContext.run(...) called inside an active RequestContext. Nesting installs a ' +\n                'fresh empty context that shadows the outer one: its values go invisible and a second ' +\n                'request id is minted. Exactly ONE scope per request — the transport opens it. If you ' +\n                'MEANT a fresh empty scope that does not inherit this one (a browser-log line, work ' +\n                'reconstructed from an external payload), use RequestContext.runDetachedScope(fn) and ' +\n                'write its values inside the closure with putTrusted/putUntrusted.',\n            );\n        }\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open a NEW scope pre-loaded with a snapshot — the restore half of {@link copyContext}, for work\n     * whose async chain was broken and re-rooted elsewhere (a queued job drained by a background loop,\n     * a batch flushed on a timer, an event listener fired from a socket the request does not own). See\n     * {@link CapturedContext} for the full list and for why the payload is opaque.\n     *\n     * A restored context legitimately contains TRUSTED values — reinstating what the original scope\n     * proved is the entire point — so this cannot type-check its contents the way the trust verbs do.\n     * The guarantee instead comes from the PAYLOAD: a {@link RestorableContext} can only be narrowed\n     * out of a {@link CapturedContext}, which only {@link copyContext} produces, so there is no\n     * hand-assembled Map to hand it and no way to forge one.\n     *\n     * The caller must SAY whether the proven identity travels — `snapshot.withTrusted()` (runs as that\n     * user) or `snapshot.withoutTrusted()` (runs as the system, keeping only the trace fields). A bare\n     * `CapturedContext` is deliberately not accepted; see {@link CapturedContext} for the three-case\n     * table and why the wide branch is spelled out rather than defaulted.\n     *\n     * The snapshot is copied into a fresh store, so writes inside `fn` stay inside `fn` and the\n     * snapshot stays reusable.\n     *\n     * Deliberately NOT guarded against nesting the way {@link run} is. `run`'s guard exists because a\n     * second EMPTY scope shadowing the first is always a bug; here the inner scope is a faithful copy\n     * of a real one, which is the whole point — a worker that restores a snapshot inside a scope it\n     * opened per job is correct, not a mistake. Prefer this over {@link restoreContext} unless you\n     * specifically need the CURRENT scope overwritten in place.\n     */\n    runWithContext<T>(captured: RestorableContext, fn: () => T): T {\n        return this.storage.run(captured.toFreshStore(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL), fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open a FRESH, EMPTY, NESTED scope. Nothing is inherited from the enclosing scope, and nothing\n     * crosses the boundary as data — every value the work runs under is WRITTEN INSIDE `fn`, through\n     * the ordinary trust-typed verbs:\n     *\n     * ```typescript\n     * RequestContext.runDetachedScope(() => {\n     *     RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ACTION_ID, line.actionId);\n     *     emit();   // runs under exactly what this closure wrote, and nothing else\n     * });\n     * ```\n     *\n     * ## When you want THIS and not {@link runWithContext}\n     *\n     * The two look similar and are opposites. `runWithContext` faithfully RE-ROOTS a real snapshot of a\n     * real scope, for work whose async chain was broken (a queued job, a timer flush) — it exists to\n     * PRESERVE a context. This one exists to DISCARD one: the values do not come from any scope this\n     * process ever had, they were reconstructed from somewhere else, and inheriting the ambient scope\n     * would be actively wrong.\n     *\n     * The live case is a browser-log shipper. A batch of browser lines arrives on one HTTP request; each\n     * line carries the context the BROWSER captured when it was written, and a single batch routinely\n     * spans several user actions. Emitting a line under the shipping request's own scope would stamp\n     * every line with that request's actionId and requestId, silently destroying the ability to grep an\n     * action while the feature still appeared to work. So each line is emitted detached, under exactly\n     * the keys the closure re-stated from the browser's payload.\n     *\n     * ## Why it MAY nest when {@link run} may not\n     *\n     * `run`'s nesting guard is right and is not softened here. It refuses a second EMPTY scope because\n     * there an empty scope is always an ACCIDENT — a transport opening the request scope twice, whose\n     * only effect is to hide the outer scope's values and mint a second request id. Here an empty scope\n     * is the thing that was ASKED for, in a distinctly-named verb, and the caller is normally already\n     * inside a request scope (the shipper's own). A guard would refuse the only situation the method has.\n     *\n     * ## No Map-taking form, ever\n     *\n     * There is deliberately no overload accepting a `Map`, an object, or an array of entries. That was\n     * the DELETED `runWithContext(map, fn)`, and it was a forgery path: a hand-built map is\n     * indistinguishable from a genuine snapshot, so `new Map([['userId','victim']])` minted a proven\n     * identity in one line without ever typing a trust verb. Writing the values INSIDE the closure is\n     * what closes it — a loop over a mixed `AnyContextKey[]` must branch on `key.isTrusted()` before it\n     * can write anything, and `putUntrusted` does not compile for a trusted key, so code fed by a\n     * BROWSER (which proves nothing) cannot fabricate a proven value. (See\n     * `DetachedScopeCompileAssertions`.)\n     *\n     * That is a limit on the SOURCE, not on the key. `putTrusted` inside a detached scope is ordinary\n     * and correct whenever the caller has actually proven the value — a verified JWT claim, or the\n     * signed-webhook case where Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number and the app looks up the\n     * userId. Trust is tamper-resistance, not secrecy (a trusted `userId` is a plain, fully-logged\n     * GUID; redaction is the separate `maskInLogs` axis on the key).\n     *\n     * SYNC AND ASYNC BOTH: `fn` may return a promise, and the detached scope follows every `await`\n     * inside it exactly as `run`/`runWithContext` do — same `AsyncLocalStorage.run` underneath. The\n     * enclosing scope is reinstated for everything after the synchronous return, INCLUDING when `fn`\n     * throws (AsyncLocalStorage unwinds the store as the frame unwinds); an async `fn` that is not\n     * awaited will therefore keep the detached scope for its own continuation while the caller has\n     * already resumed under the enclosing one, which is the intended and only sane reading of \"detached\".\n     */\n    runDetachedScope<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value the framework PROVED — a verified JWT claim, or a fact an app derived from a\n     * verified credential. Does not compile for an untrusted key, so a reader can never mistake a\n     * caller-asserted value for an authenticated one.\n     *\n     * This is the ONLY read that is safe to feed into an authorization decision. If you find\n     * yourself wanting `getUntrusted` for that, the fix is to make the key trusted and have an\n     * authenticator vouch for it — not to use the other verb.\n     *\n     * The return type is the key's OWN value type `V` — `string` for wire/log keys, `ApiCallInfo`\n     * for the api tag, `TestCaseRecorder` for the recorder — INFERRED from the key, never asserted\n     * by the caller. This is the typed public surface over the deliberately type-erased backing Map.\n     */\n    getTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value a caller merely ASSERTED — a browser-minted actionId, a recording flag, an\n     * in-process log tag. Does not compile for a trusted key: reading a proven fact through the\n     * untrusted verb would under-claim and hide, at the call site, that the value IS reliable.\n     *\n     * Treat everything this returns as attacker-controlled. It is fine for logging, tracing,\n     * routing hints and rate-limit bucketing; it is never an input to \"may they do this?\".\n     */\n    getUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value the framework PROVED. A distinct, greppable verb precisely so that writing a\n     * trusted value is something code has to do ON PURPOSE — `grep -rn putTrusted` lists every place\n     * in the repo that claims to have proven something, which is a reviewable set.\n     *\n     * Callers are the framework `AuthFilter` (stamping {@link ContextTuple}s an app's JwtHook derived\n     * from a verified credential) and app code that has itself verified something out-of-band — the\n     * signed-webhook case: Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number, the app looks up the userId, and\n     * that userId is every bit as proven as a JWT claim.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for an untrusted key.\n     */\n    putTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a caller-asserted value. `value` is type-checked against the key's value type `V`, so you\n     * cannot put a number under a `ContextKey<string>` or a raw object under a typed key.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for a trusted key — which is what stops the inbound-header path, the api-tag\n     * seam and ordinary app code from being side doors that forge a trusted value.\n     */\n    putUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a key of ANY trust level and ANY value type, as `unknown`.\n     *\n     * FRAMEWORK SERIALIZATION ONLY — the log-field builders below, the outbound header builder, and\n     * the {@link ContextReader} seam. Those loop over `HeaderRegistry` key arrays that are mixed in\n     * both value type and trust, and they are not making a trust DECISION: they are copying values to\n     * a log line or to the wire.\n     *\n     * It is deliberately read-only and has no write twin. A `putAny` would re-open the exact hole the\n     * typed verbs close, because forging a trusted value is the dangerous direction; reading one\n     * without saying `getTrusted` only costs you the `unknown` return type.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- key-agnostic serialization read: the key array is mixed in value type, so unknown is the honest return\n    getAny(key: AnyContextKey): unknown {\n        return this.readByName<unknown>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /** Clear one context key. Used by the api-tag seam's set → log → remove span (see LogApiCall). */\n    removeKey(key: AnyContextKey): void {\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key.name);\n    }\n\n    hasKey(key: AnyContextKey): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key.name) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Build the masked field map for LOGGING: every logged key in the global\n     * {@link HeaderRegistry} read straight from this context, secured values\n     * masked (via {@link ContextKey.maskForLogs}), keyed by each key's `name`.\n     *\n     * Callers: RecordingFilter + NodeProxyClient.recordCall, which snapshot the context into a\n     * test FIXTURE. The @webpieces/winston and @webpieces/bunyan backends also stamp these fields\n     * onto every record, and they own the \"log emitted outside RequestContext.run(...)\" complaint —\n     * reporting it HERE would recurse (the error line itself re-enters buildLogFields).\n     *\n     * Returns an EMPTY map outside a `run(...)` block rather than throwing: a fixture snapshot or a\n     * log line is never worth crashing a request over.\n     */\n    buildLogFields(): Map<string, string> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string>();\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // The registry owns WHICH keys log (getLoggedKeys); we read each straight from THIS context\n        // and each ContextKey masks its own secured value. String-only — this map feeds wire/MDC +\n        // recorder fixtures — so an object-valued key (API_CALL_INFO) is guarded out by the\n        // typeof-string check; objects ride buildStructuredLogFields instead. (Was a HeaderRegistry\n        // method taking a read callback; only the server ever called it, so the seam was dead weight.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            // getLoggedKeys() is AnyContextKey[] — mixed in BOTH value type and trust — so this reads\n            // through getAny (serialization, not a trust decision) and narrows with the typeof-string\n            // guard rather than asserting a value type per key.\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (typeof value === 'string' && value) {\n                fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The STRUCTURED field map for the node logging backends: like {@link buildLogFields}, but values\n     * may be OBJECTS, so an object-valued logged key ({@link WebpiecesCoreHeaders.API_CALL_INFO} holding\n     * an {@link ApiCallInfo}) survives as an object and the winston/bunyan backends nest it into\n     * `jsonPayload.api`. Reads values UNTYPED (not `<string>`) so the object comes through intact.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block it returns just the `svcName` + `version` entries below (not a fully\n     * empty map): a log line is never worth crashing over, and startup/background lines must still say\n     * which service and build emitted them.\n     *\n     * PLUS this service's `svcName` and this build's `version` from {@link ServiceInfo}. Neither is a\n     * {@link ContextKey} — they are process-global identity facts, added HERE (BEFORE the active-context\n     * check) so EVERY log line of BOTH node backends (winston/bunyan read this one map) says which\n     * service and build emitted it — request path, startup, and background jobs alike — with no\n     * per-backend duplication. This is the SINGLE place both are stamped, keeping the two backends\n     * symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version). Read via the non-throwing\n     * {@link ServiceInfo.getName} / {@link ServiceInfo.getVersion}, so each is simply ABSENT until\n     * `setInfo` has run — logging keeps working before the service is identified, then the fields start\n     * appearing. Caller-set `svcName`/`version` headers (there are none by convention) would be\n     * overwritten here; that is intentional — the ServiceInfo identity is authoritative.\n     */\n    buildStructuredLogFields(): Map<string, string | object> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string | object>();\n        // This service's `svcName` + this build's `version` from ServiceInfo — NOT ContextKeys, they are\n        // process-global identity facts. Added FIRST, BEFORE the active-context check, so they ride EVERY\n        // line of both node backends (they read this one map) — including startup and background-job lines\n        // emitted with NO active RequestContext. Treated identically and read per-record via the\n        // non-throwing getters, so each is simply ABSENT until setInfo has run, then starts appearing —\n        // even if setInfo runs after a backend was constructed. This is the ONE place both facts are\n        // stamped, so winston and bunyan stay symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version).\n        const svcName = ServiceInfo.getName();\n        if (svcName) {\n            fields.set('svcName', svcName);\n        }\n        const version = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        if (version) {\n            fields.set('version', version);\n        }\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // Like buildLogFields, but values may be OBJECTS (API_CALL_INFO): read UNTYPED so the object\n        // survives and winston/bunyan nest it into jsonPayload.<name>. Secured STRING values are still\n        // masked per key; non-string primitives are ignored rather than String()-flattened. (Inlined\n        // from HeaderRegistry for the same reason as buildLogFields — only the server called it.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (value === undefined || value === null) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            if (typeof value === 'string') {\n                if (value) {\n                    fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n                }\n            } else if (typeof value === 'object') {\n                fields.set(key.name, value);\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n\n    /**\n     * Store the transport-neutral {@link HttpRequest} for this request. Called once, above the\n     * api boundary, by whichever transport is driving the router (the express adapter, or the\n     * in-process client). Filters/auth read it back via {@link getRequest} so they never touch\n     * express — the same chain then runs over HTTP and in-process.\n     */\n    setRequest(request: HttpRequest): void {\n        this.put(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY, request);\n    }\n\n    /** The current {@link HttpRequest}, or undefined if none was set for this context. */\n    getRequest(): HttpRequest | undefined {\n        return this.get<HttpRequest>(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value under a RAW STRING key — the escape hatch for the framework's own reserved,\n     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the Cloud Tasks schedule frame). Those are\n     * internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and no trust level.\n     *\n     * The AuthFilter principal used to be one of these and is NOT any more: it is a proven fact, so\n     * it goes through `putTrusted` under `AUTHENTICATED_CALLER_KEY` like every other proven value.\n     * Reach for this only when the value genuinely has no trust level to state.\n     *\n     * REJECTS any name that belongs to a registered {@link ContextKey}. Without that check this\n     * method is a complete bypass of the trust system — `put('userId', req.body.userId)` would forge\n     * a trusted value while never typing `putTrusted`, and an agent picks whatever compiles. The\n     * check is necessarily a RUNTIME one: the registry is populated at `configure()` time, so \"is\n     * this string a registered key name\" is not a fact a type can express.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous (HttpRequest, principal, schedule frame)\n    put(key: string, value: any): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'putTrusted / putUntrusted');\n        this.writeByName(key, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Retrieve a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Same reserved-slot purpose, and the same\n     * rejection, as {@link put} — reading `get('userId')` would hand back a trusted value without the\n     * call site ever saying `getTrusted`, which is exactly the ambiguity this whole change removes.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous; callers name the concrete type\n    get<T = any>(key: string): T | undefined {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'getTrusted / getUntrusted / getAny');\n        return this.readByName<T>(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Remove a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Registered names are rejected here too: deleting\n     * a trusted key out from under a reader is a trust decision, so it goes through {@link removeKey}\n     * with the key in hand.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    remove(key: string): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'removeKey(key)');\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The guard behind the three raw-string accessors above. Silent (a no-op) until\n     * `HeaderRegistry.configure(...)` has run, which is correct rather than lax: with no registry\n     * there are no registered keys, so there is no trusted value to launder.\n     */\n    private rejectRegisteredName(name: string, useInstead: string): void {\n        if (!HeaderRegistry.isConfigured()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const key = HeaderRegistry.get().findByName(name);\n        if (key) {\n            throw new Error(\n                `RequestContext string accessors cannot touch '${name}' — it is a registered ` +\n                `ContextKey (trust: '${key.trust}'). The raw string form hides whether the value is ` +\n                `a proven fact or something a caller asserted, so it is a bypass of the trust ` +\n                `system. Use ${useInstead} with the ContextKey itself.`,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased read. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else reads the store. */\n    private readByName<T>(name: string): T | undefined {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.get(name);\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased write. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else writes the store. */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n    private writeByName(name: string, value: any): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error('No context available. Did you call Context.run() first?');\n        }\n        store.set(name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Clear all values from the current context.\n     */\n    clear(): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        store?.clear();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Snapshot this scope so the work you are about to hand off keeps its request id, log fields and\n     * proven identity. The ONLY producer of a {@link CapturedContext} — which is what makes the\n     * restore side unforgeable, since there is no other way to obtain the payload it accepts.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block this returns an EMPTY snapshot rather than throwing: capturing \"no\n     * context\" is a legitimate thing for a background caller to do, and restoring it simply installs\n     * nothing.\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a defensive COPY — writes to this context after capturing do not reach it.\n     */\n    copyContext(): CapturedContext {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        return CapturedContext.capture(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store ?? new Map());\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Overwrite the ACTIVE scope with a snapshot. The in-place twin of {@link runWithContext}, and the\n     * one you almost never want: prefer `runWithContext`, which gives the restored work its OWN scope\n     * and cannot disturb the caller's. Reach for this only when something else owns the scope and it\n     * must be re-pointed in place.\n     *\n     * OVERWRITE, not merge — `clear()` runs first, so every entry the active scope holds and the\n     * snapshot does not is DROPPED. That includes the empty case:\n     * `restoreContext(copyContext().withTrusted())` taken outside a scope wipes the request id and\n     * every proven identity from a live request, and says nothing. That is faithful (a snapshot\n     * restores exactly what it captured) but it is the sharp edge of this method and the reason\n     * `runWithContext` is the default.\n     *\n     * Takes only a {@link RestorableContext} for the reason spelled out there — the DELETED Map-taking\n     * form let `new Map([['userId','victim']])` forge a proven identity in one line — and that type\n     * exists only via `withTrusted()` / `withoutTrusted()`, so this call site states whether the proven\n     * identity survives the re-point.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when no RequestContext is active.\n     */\n    restoreContext(captured: RestorableContext): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No context available to restore into. Either open one with RequestContext.run(...) ' +\n                'first, or use RequestContext.runWithContext(captured.withTrusted(), fn) — or ' +\n                '.withoutTrusted() — which opens its own.',\n            );\n        }\n        captured.restoreInto(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if a key exists in the context.\n     */\n    /**\n     * Presence of a value under a RAW STRING key. Guarded like its three siblings: `has('userId')`\n     * alongside `hasKey(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ID)` would be a second spelling of one question,\n     * and the string form is the one that says nothing about whether the value can be believed.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    has(key: string): boolean {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'hasKey(key)');\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if RequestContext is currently active.\n     * Returns true if we're inside a RequestContext.run() block, false otherwise.\n     *\n     * Useful for tests to verify context is set up before making API calls.\n     */\n    isActive(): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore() !== undefined;\n    }\n\n}\n\n\n\n/**\n * Global singleton instance of RequestContext.\n * Use this throughout your application.\n */\nexport const RequestContext = new RequestContextImpl();\n"]}

package/src/index.d.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ export { RequestContext } from './RequestContext';
 export type { CapturedContext } from './CapturedContext';
 export type { RestorableContext } from './CapturedContext';
 export { RequestContextApiCallContext } from './RequestContextApiCallContext';
-export { HttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';
+export { HttpRequest, RawHttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';
 export { RawRequest } from './RawRequest';
 export { provideSingletonDefaultForApi } from './provide';
 export { Provider } from './provide';

package/src/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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