@webpieces/core-context 0.4.605 → 0.4.607

package/src/RequestContext.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.RequestContext = void 0;
 const async_hooks_1 = require("async_hooks");
 const core_util_1 = require("@webpieces/core-util");
+const CapturedContext_1 = require("./CapturedContext");
 /** Reserved context key under which the current HttpRequest is stored. */
 const HTTP_REQUEST_KEY = '__webpieces_http_request__';
 /**
@@ -35,30 +36,117 @@ class RequestContextImpl {
      * With this guard the setup is right or it is loud. It mirrors
      * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest()`, which throws when there is NO active scope.
      *
+     * If you genuinely WANT a fresh empty scope inside an active one — work that must not inherit the
+     * surrounding request's actionId/requestId — that is {@link runDetachedScope}, which says so by
+     * name. This guard exists to stop the ACCIDENTAL empty scope, not the deliberate one.
+     *
      * @throws Error when a RequestContext is already active.
      */
     run(fn) {
         if (this.isActive()) {
             throw new Error('RequestContext.run(...) called inside an active RequestContext. Nesting installs a ' +
                 'fresh empty context that shadows the outer one: its values go invisible and a second ' +
-                'request id is minted. Exactly ONE scope per request — the transport opens it.');
+                'request id is minted. Exactly ONE scope per request — the transport opens it. If you ' +
+                'MEANT a fresh empty scope that does not inherit this one (a browser-log line, work ' +
+                'reconstructed from an external payload), use RequestContext.runDetachedScope(fn) and ' +
+                'write its values inside the closure with putTrusted/putUntrusted.');
         }
         // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)
         const store = new Map();
         return this.storage.run(store, fn);
     }
     /**
-     * Run a function with a specific context — the restore half of {@link copyContext}, used to carry
-     * a context across an async boundary (XPromise).
-     *
-     * FRAMEWORK-INTERNAL. Unlike the raw string accessors, this deliberately CANNOT be guarded against
-     * registered key names: a restored context legitimately contains trusted values, since restoring
-     * them is the entire purpose. So the guarantee here is narrower and worth stating plainly — the
-     * Map must be one this class produced via `copyContext()`, never one assembled by hand. Handing it
-     * a hand-built Map forges whatever it contains, and no type or check will stop you.
+     * Open a NEW scope pre-loaded with a snapshot — the restore half of {@link copyContext}, for work
+     * whose async chain was broken and re-rooted elsewhere (a queued job drained by a background loop,
+     * a batch flushed on a timer, an event listener fired from a socket the request does not own). See
+     * {@link CapturedContext} for the full list and for why the payload is opaque.
+     *
+     * A restored context legitimately contains TRUSTED values — reinstating what the original scope
+     * proved is the entire point — so this cannot type-check its contents the way the trust verbs do.
+     * The guarantee instead comes from the PAYLOAD: a {@link RestorableContext} can only be narrowed
+     * out of a {@link CapturedContext}, which only {@link copyContext} produces, so there is no
+     * hand-assembled Map to hand it and no way to forge one.
+     *
+     * The caller must SAY whether the proven identity travels — `snapshot.withTrusted()` (runs as that
+     * user) or `snapshot.withoutTrusted()` (runs as the system, keeping only the trace fields). A bare
+     * `CapturedContext` is deliberately not accepted; see {@link CapturedContext} for the three-case
+     * table and why the wide branch is spelled out rather than defaulted.
+     *
+     * The snapshot is copied into a fresh store, so writes inside `fn` stay inside `fn` and the
+     * snapshot stays reusable.
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT guarded against nesting the way {@link run} is. `run`'s guard exists because a
+     * second EMPTY scope shadowing the first is always a bug; here the inner scope is a faithful copy
+     * of a real one, which is the whole point — a worker that restores a snapshot inside a scope it
+     * opened per job is correct, not a mistake. Prefer this over {@link restoreContext} unless you
+     * specifically need the CURRENT scope overwritten in place.
+     */
+    runWithContext(captured, fn) {
+        return this.storage.run(captured.toFreshStore(CapturedContext_1.ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL), fn);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Open a FRESH, EMPTY, NESTED scope. Nothing is inherited from the enclosing scope, and nothing
+     * crosses the boundary as data — every value the work runs under is WRITTEN INSIDE `fn`, through
+     * the ordinary trust-typed verbs:
+     *
+     * ```typescript
+     * RequestContext.runDetachedScope(() => {
+     *     RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ACTION_ID, line.actionId);
+     *     emit();   // runs under exactly what this closure wrote, and nothing else
+     * });
+     * ```
+     *
+     * ## When you want THIS and not {@link runWithContext}
+     *
+     * The two look similar and are opposites. `runWithContext` faithfully RE-ROOTS a real snapshot of a
+     * real scope, for work whose async chain was broken (a queued job, a timer flush) — it exists to
+     * PRESERVE a context. This one exists to DISCARD one: the values do not come from any scope this
+     * process ever had, they were reconstructed from somewhere else, and inheriting the ambient scope
+     * would be actively wrong.
+     *
+     * The live case is a browser-log shipper. A batch of browser lines arrives on one HTTP request; each
+     * line carries the context the BROWSER captured when it was written, and a single batch routinely
+     * spans several user actions. Emitting a line under the shipping request's own scope would stamp
+     * every line with that request's actionId and requestId, silently destroying the ability to grep an
+     * action while the feature still appeared to work. So each line is emitted detached, under exactly
+     * the keys the closure re-stated from the browser's payload.
+     *
+     * ## Why it MAY nest when {@link run} may not
+     *
+     * `run`'s nesting guard is right and is not softened here. It refuses a second EMPTY scope because
+     * there an empty scope is always an ACCIDENT — a transport opening the request scope twice, whose
+     * only effect is to hide the outer scope's values and mint a second request id. Here an empty scope
+     * is the thing that was ASKED for, in a distinctly-named verb, and the caller is normally already
+     * inside a request scope (the shipper's own). A guard would refuse the only situation the method has.
+     *
+     * ## No Map-taking form, ever
+     *
+     * There is deliberately no overload accepting a `Map`, an object, or an array of entries. That was
+     * the DELETED `runWithContext(map, fn)`, and it was a forgery path: a hand-built map is
+     * indistinguishable from a genuine snapshot, so `new Map([['userId','victim']])` minted a proven
+     * identity in one line without ever typing a trust verb. Writing the values INSIDE the closure is
+     * what closes it — a loop over a mixed `AnyContextKey[]` must branch on `key.isTrusted()` before it
+     * can write anything, and `putUntrusted` does not compile for a trusted key, so code fed by a
+     * BROWSER (which proves nothing) cannot fabricate a proven value. (See
+     * `DetachedScopeCompileAssertions`.)
+     *
+     * That is a limit on the SOURCE, not on the key. `putTrusted` inside a detached scope is ordinary
+     * and correct whenever the caller has actually proven the value — a verified JWT claim, or the
+     * signed-webhook case where Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number and the app looks up the
+     * userId. Trust is tamper-resistance, not secrecy (a trusted `userId` is a plain, fully-logged
+     * GUID; redaction is the separate `maskInLogs` axis on the key).
+     *
+     * SYNC AND ASYNC BOTH: `fn` may return a promise, and the detached scope follows every `await`
+     * inside it exactly as `run`/`runWithContext` do — same `AsyncLocalStorage.run` underneath. The
+     * enclosing scope is reinstated for everything after the synchronous return, INCLUDING when `fn`
+     * throws (AsyncLocalStorage unwinds the store as the frame unwinds); an async `fn` that is not
+     * awaited will therefore keep the detached scope for its own continuation while the caller has
+     * already resumed under the enclosing one, which is the intended and only sane reading of "detached".
      */
-    runWithContext(context, fn) {
-        return this.storage.run(context, fn);
+    runDetachedScope(fn) {
+        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)
+        const store = new Map();
+        return this.storage.run(store, fn);
     }
     /**
      * Read a value the framework PROVED — a verified JWT claim, or a fact an app derived from a
@@ -323,39 +411,48 @@ class RequestContextImpl {
         store?.clear();
     }
     /**
-     * Copy the current context to a new Map.
-     * Used by XPromise to preserve context across async boundaries.
+     * Snapshot this scope so the work you are about to hand off keeps its request id, log fields and
+     * proven identity. The ONLY producer of a {@link CapturedContext} — which is what makes the
+     * restore side unforgeable, since there is no other way to obtain the payload it accepts.
+     *
+     * Outside a `run(...)` block this returns an EMPTY snapshot rather than throwing: capturing "no
+     * context" is a legitimate thing for a background caller to do, and restoring it simply installs
+     * nothing.
+     *
+     * The snapshot is a defensive COPY — writes to this context after capturing do not reach it.
      */
     copyContext() {
         const store = this.storage.getStore();
-        if (!store) {
-            return new Map();
-        }
-        return new Map(store);
+        return CapturedContext_1.CapturedContext.capture(CapturedContext_1.ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store ?? new Map());
     }
     /**
-     * Set the entire context from a Map. Used by XPromise to restore context.
+     * Overwrite the ACTIVE scope with a snapshot. The in-place twin of {@link runWithContext}, and the
+     * one you almost never want: prefer `runWithContext`, which gives the restored work its OWN scope
+     * and cannot disturb the caller's. Reach for this only when something else owns the scope and it
+     * must be re-pointed in place.
+     *
+     * OVERWRITE, not merge — `clear()` runs first, so every entry the active scope holds and the
+     * snapshot does not is DROPPED. That includes the empty case:
+     * `restoreContext(copyContext().withTrusted())` taken outside a scope wipes the request id and
+     * every proven identity from a live request, and says nothing. That is faithful (a snapshot
+     * restores exactly what it captured) but it is the sharp edge of this method and the reason
+     * `runWithContext` is the default.
      *
-     * Same FRAMEWORK-INTERNAL caveat as {@link runWithContext}: the Map must have come from
-     * `copyContext()`. It cannot be trust-checked, because a faithful restore has to reinstate the
-     * trusted values the original scope had proven.
+     * Takes only a {@link RestorableContext} for the reason spelled out there — the DELETED Map-taking
+     * form let `new Map([['userId','victim']])` forge a proven identity in one line — and that type
+     * exists only via `withTrusted()` / `withoutTrusted()`, so this call site states whether the proven
+     * identity survives the re-point.
+     *
+     * @throws Error when no RequestContext is active.
      */
-    setContext(context) {
+    restoreContext(captured) {
         const store = this.storage.getStore();
         if (!store) {
-            throw new Error('No context available. Did you call Context.run() first?');
+            throw new Error('No context available to restore into. Either open one with RequestContext.run(...) ' +
+                'first, or use RequestContext.runWithContext(captured.withTrusted(), fn) — or ' +
+                '.withoutTrusted() — which opens its own.');
         }
-        store.clear();
-        context.forEach((value, key) => {
-            store.set(key, value);
-        });
-    }
-    /**
-     * Get all context entries.
-     */
-    getAll() {
-        const store = this.storage.getStore();
-        return store ? new Map(store) : new Map();
+        captured.restoreInto(CapturedContext_1.ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store);
     }
     /**
      * Check if a key exists in the context.

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{ AsyncLocalStorage } from 'async_hooks';\nimport { ContextKey, AnyContextKey, HeaderRegistry, ServiceInfo } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { HttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';\n\n/** Reserved context key under which the current HttpRequest is stored. */\nconst HTTP_REQUEST_KEY = '__webpieces_http_request__';\n\n/**\n * Context management using AsyncLocalStorage.\n * Similar to Java WebPieces Context class that uses ThreadLocal.\n *\n * This allows storing request-scoped data that is automatically available\n * throughout the async call chain, similar to MDC (Mapped Diagnostic Context).\n *\n * Example usage:\n * ```typescript\n * Context.put('REQUEST_ID', '12345');\n * await someAsyncOperation();\n * const id = Context.get('REQUEST_ID'); // Still available!\n * ```\n */\nclass RequestContextImpl {\n    private storage: AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>;\n\n    constructor() {\n        this.storage = new AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open THE request scope. A transport calls this once, at the beginning of a request.\n     *\n     * Nesting is a bug, not a feature, so it throws. AsyncLocalStorage would happily let a second\n     * `run()` install a fresh empty Map that SHADOWS the outer one: every value the outer scope\n     * holds becomes invisible, `fillFromRequest` mints a second request id, and the two halves of a\n     * request end up in different traces. Nothing would tell you.\n     *\n     * With this guard the setup is right or it is loud. It mirrors\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest()`, which throws when there is NO active scope.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when a RequestContext is already active.\n     */\n    run<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        if (this.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'RequestContext.run(...) called inside an active RequestContext. Nesting installs a ' +\n                'fresh empty context that shadows the outer one: its values go invisible and a second ' +\n                'request id is minted. Exactly ONE scope per request — the transport opens it.',\n            );\n        }\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Run a function with a specific context — the restore half of {@link copyContext}, used to carry\n     * a context across an async boundary (XPromise).\n     *\n     * FRAMEWORK-INTERNAL. Unlike the raw string accessors, this deliberately CANNOT be guarded against\n     * registered key names: a restored context legitimately contains trusted values, since restoring\n     * them is the entire purpose. So the guarantee here is narrower and worth stating plainly — the\n     * Map must be one this class produced via `copyContext()`, never one assembled by hand. Handing it\n     * a hand-built Map forges whatever it contains, and no type or check will stop you.\n     */\n    runWithContext<T>(context: Map<string, any>, fn: () => T): T {\n        return this.storage.run(context, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value the framework PROVED — a verified JWT claim, or a fact an app derived from a\n     * verified credential. Does not compile for an untrusted key, so a reader can never mistake a\n     * caller-asserted value for an authenticated one.\n     *\n     * This is the ONLY read that is safe to feed into an authorization decision. If you find\n     * yourself wanting `getUntrusted` for that, the fix is to make the key trusted and have an\n     * authenticator vouch for it — not to use the other verb.\n     *\n     * The return type is the key's OWN value type `V` — `string` for wire/log keys, `ApiCallInfo`\n     * for the api tag, `TestCaseRecorder` for the recorder — INFERRED from the key, never asserted\n     * by the caller. This is the typed public surface over the deliberately type-erased backing Map.\n     */\n    getTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value a caller merely ASSERTED — a browser-minted actionId, a recording flag, an\n     * in-process log tag. Does not compile for a trusted key: reading a proven fact through the\n     * untrusted verb would under-claim and hide, at the call site, that the value IS reliable.\n     *\n     * Treat everything this returns as attacker-controlled. It is fine for logging, tracing,\n     * routing hints and rate-limit bucketing; it is never an input to \"may they do this?\".\n     */\n    getUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value the framework PROVED. A distinct, greppable verb precisely so that writing a\n     * trusted value is something code has to do ON PURPOSE — `grep -rn putTrusted` lists every place\n     * in the repo that claims to have proven something, which is a reviewable set.\n     *\n     * Callers are the framework `AuthFilter` (stamping {@link ContextTuple}s an app's JwtHook derived\n     * from a verified credential) and app code that has itself verified something out-of-band — the\n     * signed-webhook case: Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number, the app looks up the userId, and\n     * that userId is every bit as proven as a JWT claim.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for an untrusted key.\n     */\n    putTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a caller-asserted value. `value` is type-checked against the key's value type `V`, so you\n     * cannot put a number under a `ContextKey<string>` or a raw object under a typed key.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for a trusted key — which is what stops the inbound-header path, the api-tag\n     * seam and ordinary app code from being side doors that forge a trusted value.\n     */\n    putUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a key of ANY trust level and ANY value type, as `unknown`.\n     *\n     * FRAMEWORK SERIALIZATION ONLY — the log-field builders below, the outbound header builder, and\n     * the {@link ContextReader} seam. Those loop over `HeaderRegistry` key arrays that are mixed in\n     * both value type and trust, and they are not making a trust DECISION: they are copying values to\n     * a log line or to the wire.\n     *\n     * It is deliberately read-only and has no write twin. A `putAny` would re-open the exact hole the\n     * typed verbs close, because forging a trusted value is the dangerous direction; reading one\n     * without saying `getTrusted` only costs you the `unknown` return type.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- key-agnostic serialization read: the key array is mixed in value type, so unknown is the honest return\n    getAny(key: AnyContextKey): unknown {\n        return this.readByName<unknown>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /** Clear one context key. Used by the api-tag seam's set → log → remove span (see LogApiCall). */\n    removeKey(key: AnyContextKey): void {\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key.name);\n    }\n\n    hasKey(key: AnyContextKey): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key.name) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Build the masked field map for LOGGING: every logged key in the global\n     * {@link HeaderRegistry} read straight from this context, secured values\n     * masked (via {@link ContextKey.maskForLogs}), keyed by each key's `name`.\n     *\n     * Callers: RecordingFilter + NodeProxyClient.recordCall, which snapshot the context into a\n     * test FIXTURE. The @webpieces/winston and @webpieces/bunyan backends also stamp these fields\n     * onto every record, and they own the \"log emitted outside RequestContext.run(...)\" complaint —\n     * reporting it HERE would recurse (the error line itself re-enters buildLogFields).\n     *\n     * Returns an EMPTY map outside a `run(...)` block rather than throwing: a fixture snapshot or a\n     * log line is never worth crashing a request over.\n     */\n    buildLogFields(): Map<string, string> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string>();\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // The registry owns WHICH keys log (getLoggedKeys); we read each straight from THIS context\n        // and each ContextKey masks its own secured value. String-only — this map feeds wire/MDC +\n        // recorder fixtures — so an object-valued key (API_CALL_INFO) is guarded out by the\n        // typeof-string check; objects ride buildStructuredLogFields instead. (Was a HeaderRegistry\n        // method taking a read callback; only the server ever called it, so the seam was dead weight.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            // getLoggedKeys() is AnyContextKey[] — mixed in BOTH value type and trust — so this reads\n            // through getAny (serialization, not a trust decision) and narrows with the typeof-string\n            // guard rather than asserting a value type per key.\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (typeof value === 'string' && value) {\n                fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The STRUCTURED field map for the node logging backends: like {@link buildLogFields}, but values\n     * may be OBJECTS, so an object-valued logged key ({@link WebpiecesCoreHeaders.API_CALL_INFO} holding\n     * an {@link ApiCallInfo}) survives as an object and the winston/bunyan backends nest it into\n     * `jsonPayload.api`. Reads values UNTYPED (not `<string>`) so the object comes through intact.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block it returns just the `svcName` + `version` entries below (not a fully\n     * empty map): a log line is never worth crashing over, and startup/background lines must still say\n     * which service and build emitted them.\n     *\n     * PLUS this service's `svcName` and this build's `version` from {@link ServiceInfo}. Neither is a\n     * {@link ContextKey} — they are process-global identity facts, added HERE (BEFORE the active-context\n     * check) so EVERY log line of BOTH node backends (winston/bunyan read this one map) says which\n     * service and build emitted it — request path, startup, and background jobs alike — with no\n     * per-backend duplication. This is the SINGLE place both are stamped, keeping the two backends\n     * symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version). Read via the non-throwing\n     * {@link ServiceInfo.getName} / {@link ServiceInfo.getVersion}, so each is simply ABSENT until\n     * `setInfo` has run — logging keeps working before the service is identified, then the fields start\n     * appearing. Caller-set `svcName`/`version` headers (there are none by convention) would be\n     * overwritten here; that is intentional — the ServiceInfo identity is authoritative.\n     */\n    buildStructuredLogFields(): Map<string, string | object> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string | object>();\n        // This service's `svcName` + this build's `version` from ServiceInfo — NOT ContextKeys, they are\n        // process-global identity facts. Added FIRST, BEFORE the active-context check, so they ride EVERY\n        // line of both node backends (they read this one map) — including startup and background-job lines\n        // emitted with NO active RequestContext. Treated identically and read per-record via the\n        // non-throwing getters, so each is simply ABSENT until setInfo has run, then starts appearing —\n        // even if setInfo runs after a backend was constructed. This is the ONE place both facts are\n        // stamped, so winston and bunyan stay symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version).\n        const svcName = ServiceInfo.getName();\n        if (svcName) {\n            fields.set('svcName', svcName);\n        }\n        const version = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        if (version) {\n            fields.set('version', version);\n        }\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // Like buildLogFields, but values may be OBJECTS (API_CALL_INFO): read UNTYPED so the object\n        // survives and winston/bunyan nest it into jsonPayload.<name>. Secured STRING values are still\n        // masked per key; non-string primitives are ignored rather than String()-flattened. (Inlined\n        // from HeaderRegistry for the same reason as buildLogFields — only the server called it.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (value === undefined || value === null) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            if (typeof value === 'string') {\n                if (value) {\n                    fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n                }\n            } else if (typeof value === 'object') {\n                fields.set(key.name, value);\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n\n    /**\n     * Store the transport-neutral {@link HttpRequest} for this request. Called once, above the\n     * api boundary, by whichever transport is driving the router (the express adapter, or the\n     * in-process client). Filters/auth read it back via {@link getRequest} so they never touch\n     * express — the same chain then runs over HTTP and in-process.\n     */\n    setRequest(request: HttpRequest): void {\n        this.put(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY, request);\n    }\n\n    /** The current {@link HttpRequest}, or undefined if none was set for this context. */\n    getRequest(): HttpRequest | undefined {\n        return this.get<HttpRequest>(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value under a RAW STRING key — the escape hatch for the framework's own reserved,\n     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the AuthFilter principal, the Cloud Tasks\n     * schedule frame). Those are internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and\n     * no trust level.\n     *\n     * REJECTS any name that belongs to a registered {@link ContextKey}. Without that check this\n     * method is a complete bypass of the trust system — `put('userId', req.body.userId)` would forge\n     * a trusted value while never typing `putTrusted`, and an agent picks whatever compiles. The\n     * check is necessarily a RUNTIME one: the registry is populated at `configure()` time, so \"is\n     * this string a registered key name\" is not a fact a type can express.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous (HttpRequest, principal, schedule frame)\n    put(key: string, value: any): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'putTrusted / putUntrusted');\n        this.writeByName(key, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Retrieve a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Same reserved-slot purpose, and the same\n     * rejection, as {@link put} — reading `get('userId')` would hand back a trusted value without the\n     * call site ever saying `getTrusted`, which is exactly the ambiguity this whole change removes.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous; callers name the concrete type\n    get<T = any>(key: string): T | undefined {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'getTrusted / getUntrusted / getAny');\n        return this.readByName<T>(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Remove a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Registered names are rejected here too: deleting\n     * a trusted key out from under a reader is a trust decision, so it goes through {@link removeKey}\n     * with the key in hand.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    remove(key: string): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'removeKey(key)');\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The guard behind the three raw-string accessors above. Silent (a no-op) until\n     * `HeaderRegistry.configure(...)` has run, which is correct rather than lax: with no registry\n     * there are no registered keys, so there is no trusted value to launder.\n     */\n    private rejectRegisteredName(name: string, useInstead: string): void {\n        if (!HeaderRegistry.isConfigured()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const key = HeaderRegistry.get().findByName(name);\n        if (key) {\n            throw new Error(\n                `RequestContext string accessors cannot touch '${name}' — it is a registered ` +\n                `ContextKey (trust: '${key.trust}'). The raw string form hides whether the value is ` +\n                `a proven fact or something a caller asserted, so it is a bypass of the trust ` +\n                `system. Use ${useInstead} with the ContextKey itself.`,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased read. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else reads the store. */\n    private readByName<T>(name: string): T | undefined {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.get(name);\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased write. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else writes the store. */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n    private writeByName(name: string, value: any): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error('No context available. Did you call Context.run() first?');\n        }\n        store.set(name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Clear all values from the current context.\n     */\n    clear(): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        store?.clear();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Copy the current context to a new Map.\n     * Used by XPromise to preserve context across async boundaries.\n     */\n    copyContext(): Map<string, any> {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            return new Map();\n        }\n        return new Map(store);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Set the entire context from a Map. Used by XPromise to restore context.\n     *\n     * Same FRAMEWORK-INTERNAL caveat as {@link runWithContext}: the Map must have come from\n     * `copyContext()`. It cannot be trust-checked, because a faithful restore has to reinstate the\n     * trusted values the original scope had proven.\n     */\n    setContext(context: Map<string, any>): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error('No context available. Did you call Context.run() first?');\n        }\n        store.clear();\n        context.forEach((value, key) => {\n            store.set(key, value);\n        });\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Get all context entries.\n     */\n    getAll(): Map<string, any> {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        return store ? new Map(store) : new Map();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if a key exists in the context.\n     */\n    /**\n     * Presence of a value under a RAW STRING key. Guarded like its three siblings: `has('userId')`\n     * alongside `hasKey(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ID)` would be a second spelling of one question,\n     * and the string form is the one that says nothing about whether the value can be believed.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    has(key: string): boolean {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'hasKey(key)');\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if RequestContext is currently active.\n     * Returns true if we're inside a RequestContext.run() block, false otherwise.\n     *\n     * Useful for tests to verify context is set up before making API calls.\n     */\n    isActive(): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore() !== undefined;\n    }\n\n}\n\n\n\n/**\n * Global singleton instance of RequestContext.\n * Use this throughout your application.\n */\nexport const RequestContext = new RequestContextImpl();\n"]}
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{ AsyncLocalStorage } from 'async_hooks';\nimport { ContextKey, AnyContextKey, HeaderRegistry, ServiceInfo } from '@webpieces/core-util';\nimport { HttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';\nimport { CapturedContext, ContextCaptureAuthority, RestorableContext } from './CapturedContext';\n\n/** Reserved context key under which the current HttpRequest is stored. */\nconst HTTP_REQUEST_KEY = '__webpieces_http_request__';\n\n/**\n * Context management using AsyncLocalStorage.\n * Similar to Java WebPieces Context class that uses ThreadLocal.\n *\n * This allows storing request-scoped data that is automatically available\n * throughout the async call chain, similar to MDC (Mapped Diagnostic Context).\n *\n * Example usage:\n * ```typescript\n * Context.put('REQUEST_ID', '12345');\n * await someAsyncOperation();\n * const id = Context.get('REQUEST_ID'); // Still available!\n * ```\n */\nclass RequestContextImpl {\n    private storage: AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>;\n\n    constructor() {\n        this.storage = new AsyncLocalStorage<Map<string, any>>();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open THE request scope. A transport calls this once, at the beginning of a request.\n     *\n     * Nesting is a bug, not a feature, so it throws. AsyncLocalStorage would happily let a second\n     * `run()` install a fresh empty Map that SHADOWS the outer one: every value the outer scope\n     * holds becomes invisible, `fillFromRequest` mints a second request id, and the two halves of a\n     * request end up in different traces. Nothing would tell you.\n     *\n     * With this guard the setup is right or it is loud. It mirrors\n     * `RequestContextHeaders.fillFromRequest()`, which throws when there is NO active scope.\n     *\n     * If you genuinely WANT a fresh empty scope inside an active one — work that must not inherit the\n     * surrounding request's actionId/requestId — that is {@link runDetachedScope}, which says so by\n     * name. This guard exists to stop the ACCIDENTAL empty scope, not the deliberate one.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when a RequestContext is already active.\n     */\n    run<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        if (this.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'RequestContext.run(...) called inside an active RequestContext. Nesting installs a ' +\n                'fresh empty context that shadows the outer one: its values go invisible and a second ' +\n                'request id is minted. Exactly ONE scope per request — the transport opens it. If you ' +\n                'MEANT a fresh empty scope that does not inherit this one (a browser-log line, work ' +\n                'reconstructed from an external payload), use RequestContext.runDetachedScope(fn) and ' +\n                'write its values inside the closure with putTrusted/putUntrusted.',\n            );\n        }\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open a NEW scope pre-loaded with a snapshot — the restore half of {@link copyContext}, for work\n     * whose async chain was broken and re-rooted elsewhere (a queued job drained by a background loop,\n     * a batch flushed on a timer, an event listener fired from a socket the request does not own). See\n     * {@link CapturedContext} for the full list and for why the payload is opaque.\n     *\n     * A restored context legitimately contains TRUSTED values — reinstating what the original scope\n     * proved is the entire point — so this cannot type-check its contents the way the trust verbs do.\n     * The guarantee instead comes from the PAYLOAD: a {@link RestorableContext} can only be narrowed\n     * out of a {@link CapturedContext}, which only {@link copyContext} produces, so there is no\n     * hand-assembled Map to hand it and no way to forge one.\n     *\n     * The caller must SAY whether the proven identity travels — `snapshot.withTrusted()` (runs as that\n     * user) or `snapshot.withoutTrusted()` (runs as the system, keeping only the trace fields). A bare\n     * `CapturedContext` is deliberately not accepted; see {@link CapturedContext} for the three-case\n     * table and why the wide branch is spelled out rather than defaulted.\n     *\n     * The snapshot is copied into a fresh store, so writes inside `fn` stay inside `fn` and the\n     * snapshot stays reusable.\n     *\n     * Deliberately NOT guarded against nesting the way {@link run} is. `run`'s guard exists because a\n     * second EMPTY scope shadowing the first is always a bug; here the inner scope is a faithful copy\n     * of a real one, which is the whole point — a worker that restores a snapshot inside a scope it\n     * opened per job is correct, not a mistake. Prefer this over {@link restoreContext} unless you\n     * specifically need the CURRENT scope overwritten in place.\n     */\n    runWithContext<T>(captured: RestorableContext, fn: () => T): T {\n        return this.storage.run(captured.toFreshStore(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL), fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Open a FRESH, EMPTY, NESTED scope. Nothing is inherited from the enclosing scope, and nothing\n     * crosses the boundary as data — every value the work runs under is WRITTEN INSIDE `fn`, through\n     * the ordinary trust-typed verbs:\n     *\n     * ```typescript\n     * RequestContext.runDetachedScope(() => {\n     *     RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.ACTION_ID, line.actionId);\n     *     emit();   // runs under exactly what this closure wrote, and nothing else\n     * });\n     * ```\n     *\n     * ## When you want THIS and not {@link runWithContext}\n     *\n     * The two look similar and are opposites. `runWithContext` faithfully RE-ROOTS a real snapshot of a\n     * real scope, for work whose async chain was broken (a queued job, a timer flush) — it exists to\n     * PRESERVE a context. This one exists to DISCARD one: the values do not come from any scope this\n     * process ever had, they were reconstructed from somewhere else, and inheriting the ambient scope\n     * would be actively wrong.\n     *\n     * The live case is a browser-log shipper. A batch of browser lines arrives on one HTTP request; each\n     * line carries the context the BROWSER captured when it was written, and a single batch routinely\n     * spans several user actions. Emitting a line under the shipping request's own scope would stamp\n     * every line with that request's actionId and requestId, silently destroying the ability to grep an\n     * action while the feature still appeared to work. So each line is emitted detached, under exactly\n     * the keys the closure re-stated from the browser's payload.\n     *\n     * ## Why it MAY nest when {@link run} may not\n     *\n     * `run`'s nesting guard is right and is not softened here. It refuses a second EMPTY scope because\n     * there an empty scope is always an ACCIDENT — a transport opening the request scope twice, whose\n     * only effect is to hide the outer scope's values and mint a second request id. Here an empty scope\n     * is the thing that was ASKED for, in a distinctly-named verb, and the caller is normally already\n     * inside a request scope (the shipper's own). A guard would refuse the only situation the method has.\n     *\n     * ## No Map-taking form, ever\n     *\n     * There is deliberately no overload accepting a `Map`, an object, or an array of entries. That was\n     * the DELETED `runWithContext(map, fn)`, and it was a forgery path: a hand-built map is\n     * indistinguishable from a genuine snapshot, so `new Map([['userId','victim']])` minted a proven\n     * identity in one line without ever typing a trust verb. Writing the values INSIDE the closure is\n     * what closes it — a loop over a mixed `AnyContextKey[]` must branch on `key.isTrusted()` before it\n     * can write anything, and `putUntrusted` does not compile for a trusted key, so code fed by a\n     * BROWSER (which proves nothing) cannot fabricate a proven value. (See\n     * `DetachedScopeCompileAssertions`.)\n     *\n     * That is a limit on the SOURCE, not on the key. `putTrusted` inside a detached scope is ordinary\n     * and correct whenever the caller has actually proven the value — a verified JWT claim, or the\n     * signed-webhook case where Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number and the app looks up the\n     * userId. Trust is tamper-resistance, not secrecy (a trusted `userId` is a plain, fully-logged\n     * GUID; redaction is the separate `maskInLogs` axis on the key).\n     *\n     * SYNC AND ASYNC BOTH: `fn` may return a promise, and the detached scope follows every `await`\n     * inside it exactly as `run`/`runWithContext` do — same `AsyncLocalStorage.run` underneath. The\n     * enclosing scope is reinstated for everything after the synchronous return, INCLUDING when `fn`\n     * throws (AsyncLocalStorage unwinds the store as the frame unwinds); an async `fn` that is not\n     * awaited will therefore keep the detached scope for its own continuation while the caller has\n     * already resumed under the enclosing one, which is the intended and only sane reading of \"detached\".\n     */\n    runDetachedScope<T>(fn: () => T): T {\n        // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n        const store = new Map<string, any>();\n        return this.storage.run(store, fn);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value the framework PROVED — a verified JWT claim, or a fact an app derived from a\n     * verified credential. Does not compile for an untrusted key, so a reader can never mistake a\n     * caller-asserted value for an authenticated one.\n     *\n     * This is the ONLY read that is safe to feed into an authorization decision. If you find\n     * yourself wanting `getUntrusted` for that, the fix is to make the key trusted and have an\n     * authenticator vouch for it — not to use the other verb.\n     *\n     * The return type is the key's OWN value type `V` — `string` for wire/log keys, `ApiCallInfo`\n     * for the api tag, `TestCaseRecorder` for the recorder — INFERRED from the key, never asserted\n     * by the caller. This is the typed public surface over the deliberately type-erased backing Map.\n     */\n    getTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a value a caller merely ASSERTED — a browser-minted actionId, a recording flag, an\n     * in-process log tag. Does not compile for a trusted key: reading a proven fact through the\n     * untrusted verb would under-claim and hide, at the call site, that the value IS reliable.\n     *\n     * Treat everything this returns as attacker-controlled. It is fine for logging, tracing,\n     * routing hints and rate-limit bucketing; it is never an input to \"may they do this?\".\n     */\n    getUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>): V | undefined {\n        return this.readByName<V>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value the framework PROVED. A distinct, greppable verb precisely so that writing a\n     * trusted value is something code has to do ON PURPOSE — `grep -rn putTrusted` lists every place\n     * in the repo that claims to have proven something, which is a reviewable set.\n     *\n     * Callers are the framework `AuthFilter` (stamping {@link ContextTuple}s an app's JwtHook derived\n     * from a verified credential) and app code that has itself verified something out-of-band — the\n     * signed-webhook case: Twilio/WhatsApp proves the phone number, the app looks up the userId, and\n     * that userId is every bit as proven as a JWT claim.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for an untrusted key.\n     */\n    putTrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'trusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a caller-asserted value. `value` is type-checked against the key's value type `V`, so you\n     * cannot put a number under a `ContextKey<string>` or a raw object under a typed key.\n     *\n     * Does not compile for a trusted key — which is what stops the inbound-header path, the api-tag\n     * seam and ordinary app code from being side doors that forge a trusted value.\n     */\n    putUntrusted<V>(key: ContextKey<V, 'untrusted'>, value: V): void {\n        this.writeByName(key.name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Read a key of ANY trust level and ANY value type, as `unknown`.\n     *\n     * FRAMEWORK SERIALIZATION ONLY — the log-field builders below, the outbound header builder, and\n     * the {@link ContextReader} seam. Those loop over `HeaderRegistry` key arrays that are mixed in\n     * both value type and trust, and they are not making a trust DECISION: they are copying values to\n     * a log line or to the wire.\n     *\n     * It is deliberately read-only and has no write twin. A `putAny` would re-open the exact hole the\n     * typed verbs close, because forging a trusted value is the dangerous direction; reading one\n     * without saying `getTrusted` only costs you the `unknown` return type.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- key-agnostic serialization read: the key array is mixed in value type, so unknown is the honest return\n    getAny(key: AnyContextKey): unknown {\n        return this.readByName<unknown>(key.name);\n    }\n\n    /** Clear one context key. Used by the api-tag seam's set → log → remove span (see LogApiCall). */\n    removeKey(key: AnyContextKey): void {\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key.name);\n    }\n\n    hasKey(key: AnyContextKey): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key.name) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Build the masked field map for LOGGING: every logged key in the global\n     * {@link HeaderRegistry} read straight from this context, secured values\n     * masked (via {@link ContextKey.maskForLogs}), keyed by each key's `name`.\n     *\n     * Callers: RecordingFilter + NodeProxyClient.recordCall, which snapshot the context into a\n     * test FIXTURE. The @webpieces/winston and @webpieces/bunyan backends also stamp these fields\n     * onto every record, and they own the \"log emitted outside RequestContext.run(...)\" complaint —\n     * reporting it HERE would recurse (the error line itself re-enters buildLogFields).\n     *\n     * Returns an EMPTY map outside a `run(...)` block rather than throwing: a fixture snapshot or a\n     * log line is never worth crashing a request over.\n     */\n    buildLogFields(): Map<string, string> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string>();\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // The registry owns WHICH keys log (getLoggedKeys); we read each straight from THIS context\n        // and each ContextKey masks its own secured value. String-only — this map feeds wire/MDC +\n        // recorder fixtures — so an object-valued key (API_CALL_INFO) is guarded out by the\n        // typeof-string check; objects ride buildStructuredLogFields instead. (Was a HeaderRegistry\n        // method taking a read callback; only the server ever called it, so the seam was dead weight.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            // getLoggedKeys() is AnyContextKey[] — mixed in BOTH value type and trust — so this reads\n            // through getAny (serialization, not a trust decision) and narrows with the typeof-string\n            // guard rather than asserting a value type per key.\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (typeof value === 'string' && value) {\n                fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The STRUCTURED field map for the node logging backends: like {@link buildLogFields}, but values\n     * may be OBJECTS, so an object-valued logged key ({@link WebpiecesCoreHeaders.API_CALL_INFO} holding\n     * an {@link ApiCallInfo}) survives as an object and the winston/bunyan backends nest it into\n     * `jsonPayload.api`. Reads values UNTYPED (not `<string>`) so the object comes through intact.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block it returns just the `svcName` + `version` entries below (not a fully\n     * empty map): a log line is never worth crashing over, and startup/background lines must still say\n     * which service and build emitted them.\n     *\n     * PLUS this service's `svcName` and this build's `version` from {@link ServiceInfo}. Neither is a\n     * {@link ContextKey} — they are process-global identity facts, added HERE (BEFORE the active-context\n     * check) so EVERY log line of BOTH node backends (winston/bunyan read this one map) says which\n     * service and build emitted it — request path, startup, and background jobs alike — with no\n     * per-backend duplication. This is the SINGLE place both are stamped, keeping the two backends\n     * symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version). Read via the non-throwing\n     * {@link ServiceInfo.getName} / {@link ServiceInfo.getVersion}, so each is simply ABSENT until\n     * `setInfo` has run — logging keeps working before the service is identified, then the fields start\n     * appearing. Caller-set `svcName`/`version` headers (there are none by convention) would be\n     * overwritten here; that is intentional — the ServiceInfo identity is authoritative.\n     */\n    buildStructuredLogFields(): Map<string, string | object> {\n        const fields = new Map<string, string | object>();\n        // This service's `svcName` + this build's `version` from ServiceInfo — NOT ContextKeys, they are\n        // process-global identity facts. Added FIRST, BEFORE the active-context check, so they ride EVERY\n        // line of both node backends (they read this one map) — including startup and background-job lines\n        // emitted with NO active RequestContext. Treated identically and read per-record via the\n        // non-throwing getters, so each is simply ABSENT until setInfo has run, then starts appearing —\n        // even if setInfo runs after a backend was constructed. This is the ONE place both facts are\n        // stamped, so winston and bunyan stay symmetrical (jsonPayload.svcName + jsonPayload.version).\n        const svcName = ServiceInfo.getName();\n        if (svcName) {\n            fields.set('svcName', svcName);\n        }\n        const version = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        if (version) {\n            fields.set('version', version);\n        }\n        if (!this.isActive()) {\n            return fields;\n        }\n        // Like buildLogFields, but values may be OBJECTS (API_CALL_INFO): read UNTYPED so the object\n        // survives and winston/bunyan nest it into jsonPayload.<name>. Secured STRING values are still\n        // masked per key; non-string primitives are ignored rather than String()-flattened. (Inlined\n        // from HeaderRegistry for the same reason as buildLogFields — only the server called it.)\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getLoggedKeys()) {\n            const value = this.getAny(key);\n            if (value === undefined || value === null) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            if (typeof value === 'string') {\n                if (value) {\n                    fields.set(key.name, key.maskForLogs(value));\n                }\n            } else if (typeof value === 'object') {\n                fields.set(key.name, value);\n            }\n        }\n        return fields;\n    }\n\n\n    /**\n     * Store the transport-neutral {@link HttpRequest} for this request. Called once, above the\n     * api boundary, by whichever transport is driving the router (the express adapter, or the\n     * in-process client). Filters/auth read it back via {@link getRequest} so they never touch\n     * express — the same chain then runs over HTTP and in-process.\n     */\n    setRequest(request: HttpRequest): void {\n        this.put(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY, request);\n    }\n\n    /** The current {@link HttpRequest}, or undefined if none was set for this context. */\n    getRequest(): HttpRequest | undefined {\n        return this.get<HttpRequest>(HTTP_REQUEST_KEY);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Store a value under a RAW STRING key — the escape hatch for the framework's own reserved,\n     * UNREGISTERED slots ('__webpieces_http_request__', the AuthFilter principal, the Cloud Tasks\n     * schedule frame). Those are internal plumbing, not context keys, so they have no ContextKey and\n     * no trust level.\n     *\n     * REJECTS any name that belongs to a registered {@link ContextKey}. Without that check this\n     * method is a complete bypass of the trust system — `put('userId', req.body.userId)` would forge\n     * a trusted value while never typing `putTrusted`, and an agent picks whatever compiles. The\n     * check is necessarily a RUNTIME one: the registry is populated at `configure()` time, so \"is\n     * this string a registered key name\" is not a fact a type can express.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous (HttpRequest, principal, schedule frame)\n    put(key: string, value: any): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'putTrusted / putUntrusted');\n        this.writeByName(key, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Retrieve a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Same reserved-slot purpose, and the same\n     * rejection, as {@link put} — reading `get('userId')` would hand back a trusted value without the\n     * call site ever saying `getTrusted`, which is exactly the ambiguity this whole change removes.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name — naming the verb to use instead.\n     */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- reserved-slot values are heterogeneous; callers name the concrete type\n    get<T = any>(key: string): T | undefined {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'getTrusted / getUntrusted / getAny');\n        return this.readByName<T>(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Remove a value stored under a RAW STRING key. Registered names are rejected here too: deleting\n     * a trusted key out from under a reader is a trust decision, so it goes through {@link removeKey}\n     * with the key in hand.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    remove(key: string): void {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'removeKey(key)');\n        this.storage.getStore()?.delete(key);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The guard behind the three raw-string accessors above. Silent (a no-op) until\n     * `HeaderRegistry.configure(...)` has run, which is correct rather than lax: with no registry\n     * there are no registered keys, so there is no trusted value to launder.\n     */\n    private rejectRegisteredName(name: string, useInstead: string): void {\n        if (!HeaderRegistry.isConfigured()) {\n            return;\n        }\n        const key = HeaderRegistry.get().findByName(name);\n        if (key) {\n            throw new Error(\n                `RequestContext string accessors cannot touch '${name}' — it is a registered ` +\n                `ContextKey (trust: '${key.trust}'). The raw string form hides whether the value is ` +\n                `a proven fact or something a caller asserted, so it is a bypass of the trust ` +\n                `system. Use ${useInstead} with the ContextKey itself.`,\n            );\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased read. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else reads the store. */\n    private readByName<T>(name: string): T | undefined {\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.get(name);\n    }\n\n    /** The type-erased write. Every typed verb above funnels here; nothing else writes the store. */\n    // webpieces-disable no-any-unknown -- context values are heterogeneous (strings, recorder, meta objects)\n    private writeByName(name: string, value: any): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error('No context available. Did you call Context.run() first?');\n        }\n        store.set(name, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Clear all values from the current context.\n     */\n    clear(): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        store?.clear();\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Snapshot this scope so the work you are about to hand off keeps its request id, log fields and\n     * proven identity. The ONLY producer of a {@link CapturedContext} — which is what makes the\n     * restore side unforgeable, since there is no other way to obtain the payload it accepts.\n     *\n     * Outside a `run(...)` block this returns an EMPTY snapshot rather than throwing: capturing \"no\n     * context\" is a legitimate thing for a background caller to do, and restoring it simply installs\n     * nothing.\n     *\n     * The snapshot is a defensive COPY — writes to this context after capturing do not reach it.\n     */\n    copyContext(): CapturedContext {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        return CapturedContext.capture(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store ?? new Map());\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Overwrite the ACTIVE scope with a snapshot. The in-place twin of {@link runWithContext}, and the\n     * one you almost never want: prefer `runWithContext`, which gives the restored work its OWN scope\n     * and cannot disturb the caller's. Reach for this only when something else owns the scope and it\n     * must be re-pointed in place.\n     *\n     * OVERWRITE, not merge — `clear()` runs first, so every entry the active scope holds and the\n     * snapshot does not is DROPPED. That includes the empty case:\n     * `restoreContext(copyContext().withTrusted())` taken outside a scope wipes the request id and\n     * every proven identity from a live request, and says nothing. That is faithful (a snapshot\n     * restores exactly what it captured) but it is the sharp edge of this method and the reason\n     * `runWithContext` is the default.\n     *\n     * Takes only a {@link RestorableContext} for the reason spelled out there — the DELETED Map-taking\n     * form let `new Map([['userId','victim']])` forge a proven identity in one line — and that type\n     * exists only via `withTrusted()` / `withoutTrusted()`, so this call site states whether the proven\n     * identity survives the re-point.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when no RequestContext is active.\n     */\n    restoreContext(captured: RestorableContext): void {\n        const store = this.storage.getStore();\n        if (!store) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No context available to restore into. Either open one with RequestContext.run(...) ' +\n                'first, or use RequestContext.runWithContext(captured.withTrusted(), fn) — or ' +\n                '.withoutTrusted() — which opens its own.',\n            );\n        }\n        captured.restoreInto(ContextCaptureAuthority.INTERNAL, store);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if a key exists in the context.\n     */\n    /**\n     * Presence of a value under a RAW STRING key. Guarded like its three siblings: `has('userId')`\n     * alongside `hasKey(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.USER_ID)` would be a second spelling of one question,\n     * and the string form is the one that says nothing about whether the value can be believed.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when `key` is a registered ContextKey name.\n     */\n    has(key: string): boolean {\n        this.rejectRegisteredName(key, 'hasKey(key)');\n        return this.storage.getStore()?.has(key) ?? false;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Check if RequestContext is currently active.\n     * Returns true if we're inside a RequestContext.run() block, false otherwise.\n     *\n     * Useful for tests to verify context is set up before making API calls.\n     */\n    isActive(): boolean {\n        return this.storage.getStore() !== undefined;\n    }\n\n}\n\n\n\n/**\n * Global singleton instance of RequestContext.\n * Use this throughout your application.\n */\nexport const RequestContext = new RequestContextImpl();\n"]}

package/src/RequestContextHeaders.d.ts

@@ -67,9 +67,12 @@ export declare class RequestContextHeaders {
      * the full rationale — this two-step is the reason trusted keys can safely keep an `httpHeader`
      * and therefore the reason service-to-service identity propagation works at all.
      *
-     * The cast is the one place trust is narrowed from the registry's mixed `AnyContextKey`: the
-     * runtime `isTrusted()` check IS the evidence for it, and it is confined to this single line
-     * rather than spread across every caller.
+     * There is NO cast here. `isTrusted()` / `isUntrusted()` are type predicates, so each branch holds
+     * the narrowed key already — the runtime check produces the type it proves. Two positive `if`s
+     * rather than an `if/else` because TypeScript cannot narrow the NEGATIVE of a predicate over
+     * `AnyContextKey` (it is `ContextKey<unknown, Trust>`, one type rather than a union, so there is
+     * nothing to `Exclude`); see {@link ContextKey.isUntrusted}. There is no third trust level, so the
+     * fall-through is unreachable, not a silent drop.
      */
     private acceptInbound;
     /**

package/src/RequestContextHeaders.js

@@ -121,16 +121,21 @@ let RequestContextHeaders = class RequestContextHeaders {
      * the full rationale — this two-step is the reason trusted keys can safely keep an `httpHeader`
      * and therefore the reason service-to-service identity propagation works at all.
      *
-     * The cast is the one place trust is narrowed from the registry's mixed `AnyContextKey`: the
-     * runtime `isTrusted()` check IS the evidence for it, and it is confined to this single line
-     * rather than spread across every caller.
+     * There is NO cast here. `isTrusted()` / `isUntrusted()` are type predicates, so each branch holds
+     * the narrowed key already — the runtime check produces the type it proves. Two positive `if`s
+     * rather than an `if/else` because TypeScript cannot narrow the NEGATIVE of a predicate over
+     * `AnyContextKey` (it is `ContextKey<unknown, Trust>`, one type rather than a union, so there is
+     * nothing to `Exclude`); see {@link ContextKey.isUntrusted}. There is no third trust level, so the
+     * fall-through is unreachable, not a silent drop.
      */
     acceptInbound(key, value) {
         if (key.isTrusted()) {
             PendingWireTrust_1.PendingWireTrust.stash(key, value);
             return;
         }
-        RequestContext_1.RequestContext.putUntrusted(key, value);
+        if (key.isUntrusted()) {
+            RequestContext_1.RequestContext.putUntrusted(key, value);
+        }
     }
     /**
      * Record that WE minted the id — only ever called from the generate branch above, so the key is

package/src/RequestContextHeaders.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Both directions live here:\n *\n *   inbound   {@link fillFromRequest}       the published HttpRequest's headers -> the context\n *   outbound  {@link buildOutboundHeaders}  the context -> the next hop's headers\n *\n * Reads the AsyncLocalStorage-backed {@link RequestContext} straight through — no ContextReader,\n * no ContextMgr, no abstract base. A server has exactly one place its context lives, and the\n * indirection only hid the failure below. (The browser's answer is `ContextMgr` in\n * @webpieces/core-util, which reads an app-held store because a browser has no ambient scope.)\n *\n * FAILS FAST outside a RequestContext. Silently sending an outbound call with NO request id or\n * tenant is far worse than a loud error — the trace just disappears and you find out in production. Every server-side client (RPC and Cloud Tasks) therefore only works\n * inside `RequestContext.run(...)`, which a top-level server filter normally establishes for you.\n *\n * Stateless once built, so it binds as a framework singleton every server-side client shares.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class RequestContextHeaders {\n    /**\n     * Every transferred key with a non-empty value THAT THIS DESTINATION MAY RECEIVE, under its wire\n     * name. Nothing is rewritten.\n     *\n     * That includes `x-request-id`, which propagates unchanged: one id correlates the whole call\n     * tree, so the callee keeps ours rather than minting its own. ({@link fillFromRequest} only\n     * generates an id when the inbound request carries none.)\n     *\n     * TRUSTED keys are the exception, and `destination` is why this method takes an argument at all.\n     * The callee's `AuthFilter` admits an inbound `x-user-id` only on a route that authenticated its\n     * CALLER, so shipping one to a `@Public` / `@AuthJwt` endpoint builds a request the callee is\n     * obliged to 401. {@link DestinationTrust} answers that from the destination endpoint's own\n     * AuthMode — there is no \"send everything\" default to fall into. Untrusted keys always travel.\n     *\n     * Values are RAW (unmasked) — this map goes on the wire, not in logs.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when called outside `RequestContext.run(...)` — see the class doc.\n     */\n    buildOutboundHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        this.requireActiveContext();\n\n        const headers = new Map<string, string>();\n        // getTransferredKeys() is precomputed at configure() time.\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getTransferredKeys()) {\n            if (!destination.allows(key)) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            // getTransferredKeys() is AnyContextKey[] — mixed in both value type and trust — so this\n            // reads through getAny (serialization to the wire, not a trust decision) and narrows with\n            // the typeof-string guard; every transferred value is a wire string.\n            const value = RequestContext.getAny(key);\n            if (typeof value === 'string' && value !== '') {\n                headers.set(key.httpHeader!, value);\n            }\n        }\n\n        // CLIENT_VERSION is transferred, but each hop sends ITS OWN build version (not the inherited\n        // one) so a downstream server logs which build actually called it. Overwrite whatever the loop\n        // copied from an inbound clientVersion with ours; if THIS service has no version, drop it\n        // rather than forward the caller's as if it were ours. Non-throwing read — absent before setInfo.\n        const myVersion = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        const clientVersionHeader = WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CLIENT_VERSION.httpHeader!;\n        if (myVersion) {\n            headers.set(clientVersionHeader, myVersion);\n        } else {\n            headers.delete(clientVersionHeader);\n        }\n\n        return headers;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * INBOUND — the exact inverse of {@link buildOutboundHeaders}. Publish the request, move every\n     * transferrable header off it into the context (read by wire name, stored under the key's\n     * `name`), and mint an `x-request-id` if the caller sent none.\n     *\n     * The request is a PARAMETER, not something we fish back out of the context. Publishing and\n     * filling are therefore one atomic step that cannot be half-done or done out of order — the\n     * older `setRequest()` + `fillContext()` pair could silently skip the transfer entirely when a\n     * caller forgot the first half.\n     *\n     * This is a PRECONDITION of calling into http-routing, and it belongs ABOVE the api boundary.\n     * `WebpiecesMiddleware` does it for every HTTP request; a non-webpieces transport (or a test\n     * driving `createApiClient` directly) must do the same. The api proxy only checks that a\n     * request scope exists — it never builds one.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when called outside `RequestContext.run(...)`.\n     */\n    fillFromRequest(request: HttpRequest): void {\n        this.requireActiveContext();\n\n        RequestContext.setRequest(request);\n\n        // Stamp the inbound method+path as top-level logged keys (jsonPayload.httpMethod / requestPath)\n        // so EVERY log line of this request carries them. Sourced from the just-published HttpRequest;\n        // NOT transferred over the wire, so a downstream hop stamps its own inbound values.\n        RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.HTTP_METHOD, request.method);\n        RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_PATH, request.path);\n\n        // getTransferredKeys() is precomputed at configure() time.\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getTransferredKeys()) {\n            const values = request.getHeaderValues(key);\n            if (values && values.length > 0) {\n                this.acceptInbound(key, values[0]);\n            }\n        }\n\n        if (!RequestContext.hasKey(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID)) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID, this.generateRequestId());\n            this.stampRequestIdSource();\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * ONE inbound header -> the context, routed by the key's TRUST.\n     *\n     * An untrusted key goes straight in — nobody was ever going to make a security decision on it.\n     *\n     * A TRUSTED key does NOT. This transport-level fill runs BEFORE any filter, so at this instant\n     * nothing has verified who the caller is; writing the value now would mean `getTrusted` could\n     * return a header a stranger typed. It is stashed in {@link PendingWireTrust} instead and\n     * admitted (or rejected) by `AuthFilter`, which knows the route's auth mode. See that class for\n     * the full rationale — this two-step is the reason trusted keys can safely keep an `httpHeader`\n     * and therefore the reason service-to-service identity propagation works at all.\n     *\n     * The cast is the one place trust is narrowed from the registry's mixed `AnyContextKey`: the\n     * runtime `isTrusted()` check IS the evidence for it, and it is confined to this single line\n     * rather than spread across every caller.\n     */\n    private acceptInbound(key: AnyContextKey, value: string): void {\n        if (key.isTrusted()) {\n            PendingWireTrust.stash(key as AnyTrustedContextKey, value);\n            return;\n        }\n        RequestContext.putUntrusted(key as AnyUntrustedContextKey, value);\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Record that WE minted the id — only ever called from the generate branch above, so the key is\n     * ABSENT on a hop that inherited the caller's id. Present == this service is the trace's origin.\n     *\n     * Uses the non-throwing `getName()`: this runs PER REQUEST, and a missing log field must not 500\n     * live traffic. A server that booted already ran `setupRuntime`, which calls `ServiceInfo.setInfo`\n     * with its required name+version, so the name is always there in practice; only a test driving the\n     * context directly sees undefined.\n     */\n    private stampRequestIdSource(): void {\n        const svcName = ServiceInfo.getName();\n        if (svcName) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID_SOURCE, svcName);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** The id every log line of this request, and every downstream hop, will carry. */\n    private generateRequestId(): string {\n        return `svrGenReqId-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).substring(2, 15)}`;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The recorder travelling in the context, when a test is recording this call. Absent in normal\n     * operation, and ALWAYS absent in a browser — which is why recording lives on the server-side\n     * client and never in the isomorphic core.\n     */\n    findRecorder(): TestCaseRecorder | undefined {\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        return RequestContext.getUntrusted<TestCaseRecorder>(RecorderKeys.RECORDER);\n    }\n\n    /** Guard both directions: no ambient request scope means there is no context to fill or read. */\n    private requireActiveContext(): void {\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No active RequestContext. A webpieces server-side client only works inside ' +\n                'RequestContext.run(...), which a top-level server filter normally establishes. ' +\n                'In a test, wrap the call: await RequestContext.run(async () => client.foo(req));',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}
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Both directions live here:\n *\n *   inbound   {@link fillFromRequest}       the published HttpRequest's headers -> the context\n *   outbound  {@link buildOutboundHeaders}  the context -> the next hop's headers\n *\n * Reads the AsyncLocalStorage-backed {@link RequestContext} straight through — no ContextReader,\n * no ContextMgr, no abstract base. A server has exactly one place its context lives, and the\n * indirection only hid the failure below. (The browser's answer is `ContextMgr` in\n * @webpieces/core-util, which reads an app-held store because a browser has no ambient scope.)\n *\n * FAILS FAST outside a RequestContext. Silently sending an outbound call with NO request id or\n * tenant is far worse than a loud error — the trace just disappears and you find out in production. Every server-side client (RPC and Cloud Tasks) therefore only works\n * inside `RequestContext.run(...)`, which a top-level server filter normally establishes for you.\n *\n * Stateless once built, so it binds as a framework singleton every server-side client shares.\n */\n@provideFrameworkSingleton()\nexport class RequestContextHeaders {\n    /**\n     * Every transferred key with a non-empty value THAT THIS DESTINATION MAY RECEIVE, under its wire\n     * name. Nothing is rewritten.\n     *\n     * That includes `x-request-id`, which propagates unchanged: one id correlates the whole call\n     * tree, so the callee keeps ours rather than minting its own. ({@link fillFromRequest} only\n     * generates an id when the inbound request carries none.)\n     *\n     * TRUSTED keys are the exception, and `destination` is why this method takes an argument at all.\n     * The callee's `AuthFilter` admits an inbound `x-user-id` only on a route that authenticated its\n     * CALLER, so shipping one to a `@Public` / `@AuthJwt` endpoint builds a request the callee is\n     * obliged to 401. {@link DestinationTrust} answers that from the destination endpoint's own\n     * AuthMode — there is no \"send everything\" default to fall into. Untrusted keys always travel.\n     *\n     * Values are RAW (unmasked) — this map goes on the wire, not in logs.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when called outside `RequestContext.run(...)` — see the class doc.\n     */\n    buildOutboundHeaders(destination: DestinationTrust): Map<string, string> {\n        this.requireActiveContext();\n\n        const headers = new Map<string, string>();\n        // getTransferredKeys() is precomputed at configure() time.\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getTransferredKeys()) {\n            if (!destination.allows(key)) {\n                continue;\n            }\n            // getTransferredKeys() is AnyContextKey[] — mixed in both value type and trust — so this\n            // reads through getAny (serialization to the wire, not a trust decision) and narrows with\n            // the typeof-string guard; every transferred value is a wire string.\n            const value = RequestContext.getAny(key);\n            if (typeof value === 'string' && value !== '') {\n                headers.set(key.httpHeader!, value);\n            }\n        }\n\n        // CLIENT_VERSION is transferred, but each hop sends ITS OWN build version (not the inherited\n        // one) so a downstream server logs which build actually called it. Overwrite whatever the loop\n        // copied from an inbound clientVersion with ours; if THIS service has no version, drop it\n        // rather than forward the caller's as if it were ours. Non-throwing read — absent before setInfo.\n        const myVersion = ServiceInfo.getVersion();\n        const clientVersionHeader = WebpiecesCoreHeaders.CLIENT_VERSION.httpHeader!;\n        if (myVersion) {\n            headers.set(clientVersionHeader, myVersion);\n        } else {\n            headers.delete(clientVersionHeader);\n        }\n\n        return headers;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * INBOUND — the exact inverse of {@link buildOutboundHeaders}. Publish the request, move every\n     * transferrable header off it into the context (read by wire name, stored under the key's\n     * `name`), and mint an `x-request-id` if the caller sent none.\n     *\n     * The request is a PARAMETER, not something we fish back out of the context. Publishing and\n     * filling are therefore one atomic step that cannot be half-done or done out of order — the\n     * older `setRequest()` + `fillContext()` pair could silently skip the transfer entirely when a\n     * caller forgot the first half.\n     *\n     * This is a PRECONDITION of calling into http-routing, and it belongs ABOVE the api boundary.\n     * `WebpiecesMiddleware` does it for every HTTP request; a non-webpieces transport (or a test\n     * driving `createApiClient` directly) must do the same. The api proxy only checks that a\n     * request scope exists — it never builds one.\n     *\n     * @throws Error when called outside `RequestContext.run(...)`.\n     */\n    fillFromRequest(request: HttpRequest): void {\n        this.requireActiveContext();\n\n        RequestContext.setRequest(request);\n\n        // Stamp the inbound method+path as top-level logged keys (jsonPayload.httpMethod / requestPath)\n        // so EVERY log line of this request carries them. Sourced from the just-published HttpRequest;\n        // NOT transferred over the wire, so a downstream hop stamps its own inbound values.\n        RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.HTTP_METHOD, request.method);\n        RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_PATH, request.path);\n\n        // getTransferredKeys() is precomputed at configure() time.\n        for (const key of HeaderRegistry.get().getTransferredKeys()) {\n            const values = request.getHeaderValues(key);\n            if (values && values.length > 0) {\n                this.acceptInbound(key, values[0]);\n            }\n        }\n\n        if (!RequestContext.hasKey(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID)) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID, this.generateRequestId());\n            this.stampRequestIdSource();\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * ONE inbound header -> the context, routed by the key's TRUST.\n     *\n     * An untrusted key goes straight in — nobody was ever going to make a security decision on it.\n     *\n     * A TRUSTED key does NOT. This transport-level fill runs BEFORE any filter, so at this instant\n     * nothing has verified who the caller is; writing the value now would mean `getTrusted` could\n     * return a header a stranger typed. It is stashed in {@link PendingWireTrust} instead and\n     * admitted (or rejected) by `AuthFilter`, which knows the route's auth mode. See that class for\n     * the full rationale — this two-step is the reason trusted keys can safely keep an `httpHeader`\n     * and therefore the reason service-to-service identity propagation works at all.\n     *\n     * There is NO cast here. `isTrusted()` / `isUntrusted()` are type predicates, so each branch holds\n     * the narrowed key already — the runtime check produces the type it proves. Two positive `if`s\n     * rather than an `if/else` because TypeScript cannot narrow the NEGATIVE of a predicate over\n     * `AnyContextKey` (it is `ContextKey<unknown, Trust>`, one type rather than a union, so there is\n     * nothing to `Exclude`); see {@link ContextKey.isUntrusted}. There is no third trust level, so the\n     * fall-through is unreachable, not a silent drop.\n     */\n    private acceptInbound(key: AnyContextKey, value: string): void {\n        if (key.isTrusted()) {\n            PendingWireTrust.stash(key, value);\n            return;\n        }\n        if (key.isUntrusted()) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(key, value);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * Record that WE minted the id — only ever called from the generate branch above, so the key is\n     * ABSENT on a hop that inherited the caller's id. Present == this service is the trace's origin.\n     *\n     * Uses the non-throwing `getName()`: this runs PER REQUEST, and a missing log field must not 500\n     * live traffic. A server that booted already ran `setupRuntime`, which calls `ServiceInfo.setInfo`\n     * with its required name+version, so the name is always there in practice; only a test driving the\n     * context directly sees undefined.\n     */\n    private stampRequestIdSource(): void {\n        const svcName = ServiceInfo.getName();\n        if (svcName) {\n            RequestContext.putUntrusted(WebpiecesCoreHeaders.REQUEST_ID_SOURCE, svcName);\n        }\n    }\n\n    /** The id every log line of this request, and every downstream hop, will carry. */\n    private generateRequestId(): string {\n        return `svrGenReqId-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).substring(2, 15)}`;\n    }\n\n    /**\n     * The recorder travelling in the context, when a test is recording this call. Absent in normal\n     * operation, and ALWAYS absent in a browser — which is why recording lives on the server-side\n     * client and never in the isomorphic core.\n     */\n    findRecorder(): TestCaseRecorder | undefined {\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            return undefined;\n        }\n        return RequestContext.getUntrusted<TestCaseRecorder>(RecorderKeys.RECORDER);\n    }\n\n    /** Guard both directions: no ambient request scope means there is no context to fill or read. */\n    private requireActiveContext(): void {\n        if (!RequestContext.isActive()) {\n            throw new Error(\n                'No active RequestContext. A webpieces server-side client only works inside ' +\n                'RequestContext.run(...), which a top-level server filter normally establishes. ' +\n                'In a test, wrap the call: await RequestContext.run(async () => client.foo(req));',\n            );\n        }\n    }\n}\n"]}

package/src/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 export { RequestContext } from './RequestContext';
+export type { CapturedContext } from './CapturedContext';
+export type { RestorableContext } from './CapturedContext';
 export { RequestContextApiCallContext } from './RequestContextApiCallContext';
 export { HttpRequest } from './HttpRequest';
 export { provideSingletonDefaultForApi } from './provide';

package/src/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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