@webability/core 1.17.1 → 1.18.0

package/dist/engine.d.cts

@@ -37,6 +37,96 @@ declare function htmlRequestPolicy(target: string, opts?: {
     scripts?: boolean;
 }): HtmlRequestPolicy;
 
+/**
+ * Fix Manifest Validator — Three-Layer Safety Architecture
+ *
+ * Every fix passes through three layers before reaching the DB:
+ *
+ *   Layer 1: Structural validation (selector, attribute, value safety)
+ *   Layer 2: Protected element check (don't touch third-party/admin/consent UI)
+ *   Layer 3: Risk classification (additive vs modifier vs destructive)
+ *
+ * Layer 3 output feeds into the repository's status logic:
+ *   - additive   → normal confidence gate (>= 0.85 → approved)
+ *   - modifier   → always 'pending' (human review required)
+ *   - destructive → rejected (unless source is 'manual')
+ */
+interface ValidationResult {
+    ok: boolean;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+type FixRiskTier = 'additive' | 'modifier' | 'destructive';
+interface FixClassification {
+    tier: FixRiskTier;
+    reason: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate a `role` attribute value.
+ *   - case-sensitive: must be lowercase (rejects "Main", "Breadcrumb", "Navigation")
+ *   - every space-separated token must be a real concrete ARIA role
+ *   - empty / whitespace-only is invalid
+ */
+declare function validateRoleValue(value: string): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * The one fix the `<html>` root takes: `lang` (WCAG 3.1.1 — the document
+ * language lives on `<html>` and nowhere else). afe1654ed rejected every bare
+ * `html` selector as structural hardening (its case: `html { style:
+ * filter:invert(1) }` repaints every page); `lang` writes no style, no markup
+ * and no behaviour, so it is the single exception. Every other attribute on
+ * `html` stays rejected. Exact attribute name, no case folding.
+ */
+declare function isHtmlLangFix(selector: string | null | undefined, attribute: string | null | undefined): boolean;
+/**
+ * Selector check for a fix whose attribute is known. `html` + `lang` passes
+ * (the root is one element, never protected UI); everything else takes
+ * validateSelector, where a bare `html` is still rejected.
+ */
+declare function validateSelectorForAttribute(selector: string, attribute: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * Would the browser's querySelectorAll parse this selector? (LEDGER row 78 —
+ * served selectors that throw are swallowed per fix by the widget and stay
+ * approved forever.) Two layers: the character/escape rules below refuse an
+ * unescaped `/`, `%`, `!` or a Tailwind `:variant` exactly as the browser
+ * does; then a real tokeniser (css-what) refuses unbalanced brackets, an
+ * unterminated string, an empty `:not()`, a dangling `#`, and `astParses`
+ * refuses what css-what tolerates but the browser does not (`#hero >`,
+ * `a||b`, `li:nth-child(2n+)`, `button::part()`).
+ */
+declare function selectorParses(selector: string): boolean;
+/** Which protected-element registry a writer consults. The scan path runs the
+ *  full registry against a DOM it rendered; the ingest path keeps the narrower
+ *  admin/overlay check because the full registry's SUBSTRING vendor patterns
+ *  (crisp-, hubspot-) false-match attribute VALUES in live approved fixes
+ *  (img[src=".../apple-cranberry-crisp-…jpg"], body.hubspot-disable-focus-styles). */
+type ProtectedScope = 'full' | 'dead-region';
+declare function validateSelector(selector: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
+declare function validateAttribute(attr: string): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * Hint codes from simple checks on an aria-label or alt value. A hint is a reason for an agent to look closer, never
+ * a verdict: the agent reads the element and decides (a hint alone never rejects, its absence never approves).
+ * validateTextValue never rejects a label for a hint: only injection, the size cap and the HTML spec checks block.
+ */
+type LabelSignal = 'markup' | 'url_like' | 'mailto' | 'tel_uri' | 'long_label' | 'no_letters' | 'filename' | 'field_index' | 'generic_field' | 'dimension_suffix' | 'query_or_hash' | 'ip_like' | 'no_destination' | 'vague_word';
+declare function labelSignals(value: string, attribute?: string): LabelSignal[];
+declare function validateTextValue(value: string, attribute?: string): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * Classify a fix into a risk tier:
+ *   - additive: adds information that wasn't there (aria-label, alt, role, scope, etc.)
+ *   - modifier: changes visibility/interactivity (aria-hidden, tabindex, style)
+ *   - destructive: removes or empties functional attributes
+ */
+declare function classifyFixRisk(fix: {
+    attribute: string;
+    value: string;
+}): FixClassification;
+declare function validateFix(fix: {
+    selector: string;
+    attribute: string;
+    value: string;
+    issueType?: string | null;
+    context?: string | null;
+}, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
+
 /**
  * The one engine's contract: two injected drivers in, one result out.
  *
@@ -278,6 +368,13 @@ interface EngineFix {
     /** What the fix rests on: the finding's message and the element markup. */
     evidence: string;
     engineVersion: string;
+    /**
+     * Label hint codes for the caller's judge (see `labelSignals`): the value of
+     * an aria-label or alt write that looks off (a vague word, a URL, a very long
+     * label...). A hint is not a verdict. A fix with signals should not auto-apply
+     * without a judge reading the element. Absent when there are none.
+     */
+    signals?: LabelSignal[];
     /**
      * Post-fix verification: 'verified' (applied on the page, axe found no new
      * violation on it, its ancestors or descendants); 'not_verifiable' (a
@@ -578,89 +675,6 @@ declare function fromPuppeteer(p: PuppeteerPageLike, opts?: {
     interceptDocument?: boolean;
 }): Page;
 
-/**
- * Fix Manifest Validator — Three-Layer Safety Architecture
- *
- * Every fix passes through three layers before reaching the DB:
- *
- *   Layer 1: Structural validation (selector, attribute, value safety)
- *   Layer 2: Protected element check (don't touch third-party/admin/consent UI)
- *   Layer 3: Risk classification (additive vs modifier vs destructive)
- *
- * Layer 3 output feeds into the repository's status logic:
- *   - additive   → normal confidence gate (>= 0.85 → approved)
- *   - modifier   → always 'pending' (human review required)
- *   - destructive → rejected (unless source is 'manual')
- */
-interface ValidationResult {
-    ok: boolean;
-    reason?: string;
-}
-type FixRiskTier = 'additive' | 'modifier' | 'destructive';
-interface FixClassification {
-    tier: FixRiskTier;
-    reason: string;
-}
-/**
- * Validate a `role` attribute value.
- *   - case-sensitive: must be lowercase (rejects "Main", "Breadcrumb", "Navigation")
- *   - every space-separated token must be a real concrete ARIA role
- *   - empty / whitespace-only is invalid
- */
-declare function validateRoleValue(value: string): ValidationResult;
-/**
- * The one fix the `<html>` root takes: `lang` (WCAG 3.1.1 — the document
- * language lives on `<html>` and nowhere else). afe1654ed rejected every bare
- * `html` selector as structural hardening (its case: `html { style:
- * filter:invert(1) }` repaints every page); `lang` writes no style, no markup
- * and no behaviour, so it is the single exception. Every other attribute on
- * `html` stays rejected. Exact attribute name, no case folding.
- */
-declare function isHtmlLangFix(selector: string | null | undefined, attribute: string | null | undefined): boolean;
-/**
- * Selector check for a fix whose attribute is known. `html` + `lang` passes
- * (the root is one element, never protected UI); everything else takes
- * validateSelector, where a bare `html` is still rejected.
- */
-declare function validateSelectorForAttribute(selector: string, attribute: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
-/**
- * Would the browser's querySelectorAll parse this selector? (LEDGER row 78 —
- * served selectors that throw are swallowed per fix by the widget and stay
- * approved forever.) Two layers: the character/escape rules below refuse an
- * unescaped `/`, `%`, `!` or a Tailwind `:variant` exactly as the browser
- * does; then a real tokeniser (css-what) refuses unbalanced brackets, an
- * unterminated string, an empty `:not()`, a dangling `#`, and `astParses`
- * refuses what css-what tolerates but the browser does not (`#hero >`,
- * `a||b`, `li:nth-child(2n+)`, `button::part()`).
- */
-declare function selectorParses(selector: string): boolean;
-/** Which protected-element registry a writer consults. The scan path runs the
- *  full registry against a DOM it rendered; the ingest path keeps the narrower
- *  admin/overlay check because the full registry's SUBSTRING vendor patterns
- *  (crisp-, hubspot-) false-match attribute VALUES in live approved fixes
- *  (img[src=".../apple-cranberry-crisp-…jpg"], body.hubspot-disable-focus-styles). */
-type ProtectedScope = 'full' | 'dead-region';
-declare function validateSelector(selector: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
-declare function validateAttribute(attr: string): ValidationResult;
-declare function validateTextValue(value: string, attribute?: string): ValidationResult;
-/**
- * Classify a fix into a risk tier:
- *   - additive: adds information that wasn't there (aria-label, alt, role, scope, etc.)
- *   - modifier: changes visibility/interactivity (aria-hidden, tabindex, style)
- *   - destructive: removes or empties functional attributes
- */
-declare function classifyFixRisk(fix: {
-    attribute: string;
-    value: string;
-}): FixClassification;
-declare function validateFix(fix: {
-    selector: string;
-    attribute: string;
-    value: string;
-    issueType?: string | null;
-    context?: string | null;
-}, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
-
 /**
  * Hiding-hazard guard
  * ───────────────────
@@ -959,4 +973,4 @@ declare function listHiddenCandidates(page: PageLike, opts?: {
     max?: number;
 }): Promise<HiddenCandidateList>;
 
-export { BARE_TAGS, type BackdropKind, DEFAULT_MAX_CANDIDATES, type EngineFinding, type EngineFix, type EngineInput, type EngineIssue, type EngineOptions, type EngineResult, type EngineStats, FORM_CONTROL_ROLES, type HazardElementView, type HiddenCandidate, type HiddenCandidateList, type HiddenCause, type HiddenKind, type HiddenText, type HtmlDecision, type HtmlRequest, type HtmlRequestPolicy, InternalBug, type JudgedFix, LABEL_IN_NAME_JS, type Model, type ModelRequest, type ModelResponse, type NearbyInteractive, type Page, type PlaywrightPageLike, type ProtectedScope, type PuppeteerPageLike, SERVED_FIX_KEYS, TOKEN_QUERY_KEY, classifyFixRisk, detectPageLanguage, dropHazardousHidingFixes, foldContains, foldLabel, fromPlaywright, fromPuppeteer, htmlRequestPolicy, isHidingFix, isHtmlLangFix, isInteractiveOrContainsFocusable, isLabelText, labelContainsText, labelInNameCheck, languageFromText, languageFromUrl, listHiddenCandidates, loadSnapshot, normalizeVisibleText, parseContext, primaryLanguage, runEngine, scoreSelectorQuality, selectorParses, toPageLike, validateAttribute, validateFix, validateRoleValue, validateSelector, validateSelectorForAttribute, validateTextValue };
+export { BARE_TAGS, type BackdropKind, DEFAULT_MAX_CANDIDATES, type EngineFinding, type EngineFix, type EngineInput, type EngineIssue, type EngineOptions, type EngineResult, type EngineStats, FORM_CONTROL_ROLES, type HazardElementView, type HiddenCandidate, type HiddenCandidateList, type HiddenCause, type HiddenKind, type HiddenText, type HtmlDecision, type HtmlRequest, type HtmlRequestPolicy, InternalBug, type JudgedFix, LABEL_IN_NAME_JS, type LabelSignal, type Model, type ModelRequest, type ModelResponse, type NearbyInteractive, type Page, type PlaywrightPageLike, type ProtectedScope, type PuppeteerPageLike, SERVED_FIX_KEYS, TOKEN_QUERY_KEY, classifyFixRisk, detectPageLanguage, dropHazardousHidingFixes, foldContains, foldLabel, fromPlaywright, fromPuppeteer, htmlRequestPolicy, isHidingFix, isHtmlLangFix, isInteractiveOrContainsFocusable, isLabelText, labelContainsText, labelInNameCheck, labelSignals, languageFromText, languageFromUrl, listHiddenCandidates, loadSnapshot, normalizeVisibleText, parseContext, primaryLanguage, runEngine, scoreSelectorQuality, selectorParses, toPageLike, validateAttribute, validateFix, validateRoleValue, validateSelector, validateSelectorForAttribute, validateTextValue };

package/dist/engine.d.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,96 @@ declare function htmlRequestPolicy(target: string, opts?: {
     scripts?: boolean;
 }): HtmlRequestPolicy;
 
+/**
+ * Fix Manifest Validator — Three-Layer Safety Architecture
+ *
+ * Every fix passes through three layers before reaching the DB:
+ *
+ *   Layer 1: Structural validation (selector, attribute, value safety)
+ *   Layer 2: Protected element check (don't touch third-party/admin/consent UI)
+ *   Layer 3: Risk classification (additive vs modifier vs destructive)
+ *
+ * Layer 3 output feeds into the repository's status logic:
+ *   - additive   → normal confidence gate (>= 0.85 → approved)
+ *   - modifier   → always 'pending' (human review required)
+ *   - destructive → rejected (unless source is 'manual')
+ */
+interface ValidationResult {
+    ok: boolean;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+type FixRiskTier = 'additive' | 'modifier' | 'destructive';
+interface FixClassification {
+    tier: FixRiskTier;
+    reason: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate a `role` attribute value.
+ *   - case-sensitive: must be lowercase (rejects "Main", "Breadcrumb", "Navigation")
+ *   - every space-separated token must be a real concrete ARIA role
+ *   - empty / whitespace-only is invalid
+ */
+declare function validateRoleValue(value: string): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * The one fix the `<html>` root takes: `lang` (WCAG 3.1.1 — the document
+ * language lives on `<html>` and nowhere else). afe1654ed rejected every bare
+ * `html` selector as structural hardening (its case: `html { style:
+ * filter:invert(1) }` repaints every page); `lang` writes no style, no markup
+ * and no behaviour, so it is the single exception. Every other attribute on
+ * `html` stays rejected. Exact attribute name, no case folding.
+ */
+declare function isHtmlLangFix(selector: string | null | undefined, attribute: string | null | undefined): boolean;
+/**
+ * Selector check for a fix whose attribute is known. `html` + `lang` passes
+ * (the root is one element, never protected UI); everything else takes
+ * validateSelector, where a bare `html` is still rejected.
+ */
+declare function validateSelectorForAttribute(selector: string, attribute: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * Would the browser's querySelectorAll parse this selector? (LEDGER row 78 —
+ * served selectors that throw are swallowed per fix by the widget and stay
+ * approved forever.) Two layers: the character/escape rules below refuse an
+ * unescaped `/`, `%`, `!` or a Tailwind `:variant` exactly as the browser
+ * does; then a real tokeniser (css-what) refuses unbalanced brackets, an
+ * unterminated string, an empty `:not()`, a dangling `#`, and `astParses`
+ * refuses what css-what tolerates but the browser does not (`#hero >`,
+ * `a||b`, `li:nth-child(2n+)`, `button::part()`).
+ */
+declare function selectorParses(selector: string): boolean;
+/** Which protected-element registry a writer consults. The scan path runs the
+ *  full registry against a DOM it rendered; the ingest path keeps the narrower
+ *  admin/overlay check because the full registry's SUBSTRING vendor patterns
+ *  (crisp-, hubspot-) false-match attribute VALUES in live approved fixes
+ *  (img[src=".../apple-cranberry-crisp-…jpg"], body.hubspot-disable-focus-styles). */
+type ProtectedScope = 'full' | 'dead-region';
+declare function validateSelector(selector: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
+declare function validateAttribute(attr: string): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * Hint codes from simple checks on an aria-label or alt value. A hint is a reason for an agent to look closer, never
+ * a verdict: the agent reads the element and decides (a hint alone never rejects, its absence never approves).
+ * validateTextValue never rejects a label for a hint: only injection, the size cap and the HTML spec checks block.
+ */
+type LabelSignal = 'markup' | 'url_like' | 'mailto' | 'tel_uri' | 'long_label' | 'no_letters' | 'filename' | 'field_index' | 'generic_field' | 'dimension_suffix' | 'query_or_hash' | 'ip_like' | 'no_destination' | 'vague_word';
+declare function labelSignals(value: string, attribute?: string): LabelSignal[];
+declare function validateTextValue(value: string, attribute?: string): ValidationResult;
+/**
+ * Classify a fix into a risk tier:
+ *   - additive: adds information that wasn't there (aria-label, alt, role, scope, etc.)
+ *   - modifier: changes visibility/interactivity (aria-hidden, tabindex, style)
+ *   - destructive: removes or empties functional attributes
+ */
+declare function classifyFixRisk(fix: {
+    attribute: string;
+    value: string;
+}): FixClassification;
+declare function validateFix(fix: {
+    selector: string;
+    attribute: string;
+    value: string;
+    issueType?: string | null;
+    context?: string | null;
+}, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
+
 /**
  * The one engine's contract: two injected drivers in, one result out.
  *
@@ -278,6 +368,13 @@ interface EngineFix {
     /** What the fix rests on: the finding's message and the element markup. */
     evidence: string;
     engineVersion: string;
+    /**
+     * Label hint codes for the caller's judge (see `labelSignals`): the value of
+     * an aria-label or alt write that looks off (a vague word, a URL, a very long
+     * label...). A hint is not a verdict. A fix with signals should not auto-apply
+     * without a judge reading the element. Absent when there are none.
+     */
+    signals?: LabelSignal[];
     /**
      * Post-fix verification: 'verified' (applied on the page, axe found no new
      * violation on it, its ancestors or descendants); 'not_verifiable' (a
@@ -578,89 +675,6 @@ declare function fromPuppeteer(p: PuppeteerPageLike, opts?: {
     interceptDocument?: boolean;
 }): Page;
 
-/**
- * Fix Manifest Validator — Three-Layer Safety Architecture
- *
- * Every fix passes through three layers before reaching the DB:
- *
- *   Layer 1: Structural validation (selector, attribute, value safety)
- *   Layer 2: Protected element check (don't touch third-party/admin/consent UI)
- *   Layer 3: Risk classification (additive vs modifier vs destructive)
- *
- * Layer 3 output feeds into the repository's status logic:
- *   - additive   → normal confidence gate (>= 0.85 → approved)
- *   - modifier   → always 'pending' (human review required)
- *   - destructive → rejected (unless source is 'manual')
- */
-interface ValidationResult {
-    ok: boolean;
-    reason?: string;
-}
-type FixRiskTier = 'additive' | 'modifier' | 'destructive';
-interface FixClassification {
-    tier: FixRiskTier;
-    reason: string;
-}
-/**
- * Validate a `role` attribute value.
- *   - case-sensitive: must be lowercase (rejects "Main", "Breadcrumb", "Navigation")
- *   - every space-separated token must be a real concrete ARIA role
- *   - empty / whitespace-only is invalid
- */
-declare function validateRoleValue(value: string): ValidationResult;
-/**
- * The one fix the `<html>` root takes: `lang` (WCAG 3.1.1 — the document
- * language lives on `<html>` and nowhere else). afe1654ed rejected every bare
- * `html` selector as structural hardening (its case: `html { style:
- * filter:invert(1) }` repaints every page); `lang` writes no style, no markup
- * and no behaviour, so it is the single exception. Every other attribute on
- * `html` stays rejected. Exact attribute name, no case folding.
- */
-declare function isHtmlLangFix(selector: string | null | undefined, attribute: string | null | undefined): boolean;
-/**
- * Selector check for a fix whose attribute is known. `html` + `lang` passes
- * (the root is one element, never protected UI); everything else takes
- * validateSelector, where a bare `html` is still rejected.
- */
-declare function validateSelectorForAttribute(selector: string, attribute: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
-/**
- * Would the browser's querySelectorAll parse this selector? (LEDGER row 78 —
- * served selectors that throw are swallowed per fix by the widget and stay
- * approved forever.) Two layers: the character/escape rules below refuse an
- * unescaped `/`, `%`, `!` or a Tailwind `:variant` exactly as the browser
- * does; then a real tokeniser (css-what) refuses unbalanced brackets, an
- * unterminated string, an empty `:not()`, a dangling `#`, and `astParses`
- * refuses what css-what tolerates but the browser does not (`#hero >`,
- * `a||b`, `li:nth-child(2n+)`, `button::part()`).
- */
-declare function selectorParses(selector: string): boolean;
-/** Which protected-element registry a writer consults. The scan path runs the
- *  full registry against a DOM it rendered; the ingest path keeps the narrower
- *  admin/overlay check because the full registry's SUBSTRING vendor patterns
- *  (crisp-, hubspot-) false-match attribute VALUES in live approved fixes
- *  (img[src=".../apple-cranberry-crisp-…jpg"], body.hubspot-disable-focus-styles). */
-type ProtectedScope = 'full' | 'dead-region';
-declare function validateSelector(selector: string, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
-declare function validateAttribute(attr: string): ValidationResult;
-declare function validateTextValue(value: string, attribute?: string): ValidationResult;
-/**
- * Classify a fix into a risk tier:
- *   - additive: adds information that wasn't there (aria-label, alt, role, scope, etc.)
- *   - modifier: changes visibility/interactivity (aria-hidden, tabindex, style)
- *   - destructive: removes or empties functional attributes
- */
-declare function classifyFixRisk(fix: {
-    attribute: string;
-    value: string;
-}): FixClassification;
-declare function validateFix(fix: {
-    selector: string;
-    attribute: string;
-    value: string;
-    issueType?: string | null;
-    context?: string | null;
-}, protectedScope?: ProtectedScope): ValidationResult;
-
 /**
  * Hiding-hazard guard
  * ───────────────────
@@ -959,4 +973,4 @@ declare function listHiddenCandidates(page: PageLike, opts?: {
     max?: number;
 }): Promise<HiddenCandidateList>;
 
-export { BARE_TAGS, type BackdropKind, DEFAULT_MAX_CANDIDATES, type EngineFinding, type EngineFix, type EngineInput, type EngineIssue, type EngineOptions, type EngineResult, type EngineStats, FORM_CONTROL_ROLES, type HazardElementView, type HiddenCandidate, type HiddenCandidateList, type HiddenCause, type HiddenKind, type HiddenText, type HtmlDecision, type HtmlRequest, type HtmlRequestPolicy, InternalBug, type JudgedFix, LABEL_IN_NAME_JS, type Model, type ModelRequest, type ModelResponse, type NearbyInteractive, type Page, type PlaywrightPageLike, type ProtectedScope, type PuppeteerPageLike, SERVED_FIX_KEYS, TOKEN_QUERY_KEY, classifyFixRisk, detectPageLanguage, dropHazardousHidingFixes, foldContains, foldLabel, fromPlaywright, fromPuppeteer, htmlRequestPolicy, isHidingFix, isHtmlLangFix, isInteractiveOrContainsFocusable, isLabelText, labelContainsText, labelInNameCheck, languageFromText, languageFromUrl, listHiddenCandidates, loadSnapshot, normalizeVisibleText, parseContext, primaryLanguage, runEngine, scoreSelectorQuality, selectorParses, toPageLike, validateAttribute, validateFix, validateRoleValue, validateSelector, validateSelectorForAttribute, validateTextValue };
+export { BARE_TAGS, type BackdropKind, DEFAULT_MAX_CANDIDATES, type EngineFinding, type EngineFix, type EngineInput, type EngineIssue, type EngineOptions, type EngineResult, type EngineStats, FORM_CONTROL_ROLES, type HazardElementView, type HiddenCandidate, type HiddenCandidateList, type HiddenCause, type HiddenKind, type HiddenText, type HtmlDecision, type HtmlRequest, type HtmlRequestPolicy, InternalBug, type JudgedFix, LABEL_IN_NAME_JS, type LabelSignal, type Model, type ModelRequest, type ModelResponse, type NearbyInteractive, type Page, type PlaywrightPageLike, type ProtectedScope, type PuppeteerPageLike, SERVED_FIX_KEYS, TOKEN_QUERY_KEY, classifyFixRisk, detectPageLanguage, dropHazardousHidingFixes, foldContains, foldLabel, fromPlaywright, fromPuppeteer, htmlRequestPolicy, isHidingFix, isHtmlLangFix, isInteractiveOrContainsFocusable, isLabelText, labelContainsText, labelInNameCheck, labelSignals, languageFromText, languageFromUrl, listHiddenCandidates, loadSnapshot, normalizeVisibleText, parseContext, primaryLanguage, runEngine, scoreSelectorQuality, selectorParses, toPageLike, validateAttribute, validateFix, validateRoleValue, validateSelector, validateSelectorForAttribute, validateTextValue };