@wdprlib/render 1.4.0 → 2.1.0

package/src/escape.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@
+/**
+ *
+ * HTML, CSS, URL, and attribute sanitization utilities for the render pipeline.
+ *
+ * Every piece of user-supplied content that flows into the HTML output must
+ * pass through one of these functions to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
+ * and CSS injection attacks.
+ *
+ * The module provides several layers of defense:
+ * - Text escaping ({@link escapeHtml}, {@link escapeAttr}, {@link escapeJsString})
+ * - URL scheme blocking ({@link isDangerousUrl}) against `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`
+ * - Attribute allowlisting ({@link isSafeAttribute}) to block event handlers (`on*`)
+ * - CSS value sanitization ({@link isDangerousCssValue}, {@link sanitizeStyleValue})
+ *   with normalization to defeat CSS escape/comment bypass techniques
+ * - Composite attribute sanitization ({@link sanitizeAttributes}) combining all checks
+ *
+ * @module
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Escape the three HTML-special characters (`&`, `<`, `>`) in text content.
+ *
+ * Suitable for text nodes. For attribute values, use {@link escapeAttr}
+ * which additionally escapes quotation marks.
+ *
+ * @param text - The raw text to escape.
+ * @returns The escaped string safe for embedding in HTML text content.
+ */
+export function escapeHtml(text: string): string {
+  return text.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Escape a string for safe use inside an HTML attribute value.
+ *
+ * Stricter than {@link escapeHtml}: in addition to `&`, `<`, and `>`,
+ * this also escapes both double and single quotes to prevent attribute
+ * breakout regardless of which quote character delimits the attribute.
+ *
+ * @param value - The raw attribute value to escape.
+ * @returns The escaped string safe for embedding in an HTML attribute.
+ */
+export function escapeAttr(value: string): string {
+  return value
+    .replace(/&/g, "&amp;")
+    .replace(/</g, "&lt;")
+    .replace(/>/g, "&gt;")
+    .replace(/"/g, "&quot;")
+    .replace(/'/g, "&#39;");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Escape content destined for a `<style>` tag to prevent tag breakout.
+ *
+ * An attacker could include `</style><script>...` inside CSS to close
+ * the style element and inject a script. This function replaces every
+ * occurrence of `</style` (case-insensitive) with `<\/style`, which
+ * is harmless in CSS but prevents the HTML parser from seeing a
+ * closing `</style>` tag.
+ *
+ * @param css - The raw CSS text to sanitize.
+ * @returns The sanitized CSS string safe for embedding inside `<style>`.
+ */
+export function escapeStyleContent(css: string): string {
+  return css.replace(/<\/style/gi, "<\\/style");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Escape a value for safe embedding inside a JavaScript string literal
+ * that itself appears within an HTML attribute (e.g. `onclick="fn('...')"` ).
+ *
+ * Uses hex escapes (`\xNN`) and unicode escapes (`\uNNNN`) for characters
+ * that could break either the JavaScript string or the enclosing HTML
+ * attribute context: backslash, quotes, angle brackets, ampersand,
+ * newlines, and the Unicode line/paragraph separators (U+2028/U+2029).
+ *
+ * @param value - The raw string to escape.
+ * @returns The escaped string safe for use inside a JS string literal in HTML.
+ */
+export function escapeJsString(value: string): string {
+  return value
+    .replace(/\\/g, "\\\\")
+    .replace(/'/g, "\\x27")
+    .replace(/"/g, "\\x22")
+    .replace(/</g, "\\x3c")
+    .replace(/>/g, "\\x3e")
+    .replace(/&/g, "\\x26")
+    .replace(/\n/g, "\\n")
+    .replace(/\r/g, "\\r")
+    .replace(/\u2028/g, "\\u2028")
+    .replace(/\u2029/g, "\\u2029");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allowlist of HTML attribute names considered safe for rendering.
+ *
+ * Based on the attributes that Wikidot permits users to set via markup.
+ * Event handler attributes (`on*`) are explicitly blocked in
+ * {@link isSafeAttribute}. The `aria-*` and `data-*` prefixes are
+ * allowed dynamically rather than being listed here.
+ */
+const SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
+  "accept",
+  "align",
+  "alt",
+  "autocapitalize",
+  "autoplay",
+  "background",
+  "bgcolor",
+  "border",
+  "buffered",
+  "checked",
+  "cite",
+  "class",
+  "cols",
+  "colspan",
+  "contenteditable",
+  "controls",
+  "coords",
+  "datetime",
+  "decoding",
+  "default",
+  "dir",
+  "dirname",
+  "disabled",
+  "download",
+  "draggable",
+  "for",
+  "form",
+  "headers",
+  "height",
+  "hidden",
+  "high",
+  "href",
+  "hreflang",
+  "id",
+  "inputmode",
+  "ismap",
+  "itemprop",
+  "kind",
+  "label",
+  "lang",
+  "list",
+  "loop",
+  "low",
+  "max",
+  "maxlength",
+  "min",
+  "minlength",
+  "multiple",
+  "muted",
+  "name",
+  "optimum",
+  "pattern",
+  "placeholder",
+  "poster",
+  "preload",
+  "readonly",
+  "required",
+  "reversed",
+  "role",
+  "rows",
+  "rowspan",
+  "scope",
+  "selected",
+  "shape",
+  "size",
+  "sizes",
+  "span",
+  "spellcheck",
+  "src",
+  "srclang",
+  "srcset",
+  "start",
+  "step",
+  "style",
+  "tabindex",
+  "target",
+  "title",
+  "translate",
+  "type",
+  "usemap",
+  "value",
+  "width",
+  "wrap",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Check whether an HTML attribute name is safe to include in rendered output.
+ *
+ * The check applies three rules in order:
+ * 1. Block all event handlers (`on*` prefix) unconditionally
+ * 2. Allow accessibility (`aria-*`) and custom data (`data-*`) attributes
+ * 3. Allow only attributes in the `SAFE_ATTRIBUTES` allowlist
+ *
+ * @param name - The attribute name to validate (case-insensitive).
+ * @returns `true` if the attribute is safe to render.
+ */
+export function isSafeAttribute(name: string): boolean {
+  const lower = name.toLowerCase();
+  // Block all event handlers
+  if (lower.startsWith("on")) return false;
+  // Allow aria-* and data-* prefixes
+  if (lower.startsWith("aria-") || lower.startsWith("data-")) return true;
+  return SAFE_ATTRIBUTES.has(lower);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check whether a URL contains a dangerous scheme (`javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`).
+ *
+ * Before testing, the value is stripped of all whitespace and control
+ * characters (U+0000-U+001F, U+007F-U+009F) to defeat evasion techniques
+ * such as `"java\nscript:"` or `"java\x00script:"` that exploit browser
+ * whitespace tolerance in URL parsing.
+ *
+ * @param value - The URL string to check.
+ * @returns `true` if the URL uses a dangerous scheme and should be blocked.
+ */
+export function isDangerousUrl(value: string): boolean {
+  const normalized = value.replace(/[\s\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f]/g, "");
+  return /^(javascript|data|vbscript):/i.test(normalized);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Complete set of CSS Level 4 named colors plus CSS-wide keywords
+ * (`transparent`, `currentcolor`, `inherit`, `initial`, `unset`).
+ *
+ * Used by {@link isValidCssColor} to validate color values without
+ * allowing arbitrary CSS expressions.
+ */
+const CSS_NAMED_COLORS = new Set([
+  "aliceblue",
+  "antiquewhite",
+  "aqua",
+  "aquamarine",
+  "azure",
+  "beige",
+  "bisque",
+  "black",
+  "blanchedalmond",
+  "blue",
+  "blueviolet",
+  "brown",
+  "burlywood",
+  "cadetblue",
+  "chartreuse",
+  "chocolate",
+  "coral",
+  "cornflowerblue",
+  "cornsilk",
+  "crimson",
+  "cyan",
+  "darkblue",
+  "darkcyan",
+  "darkgoldenrod",
+  "darkgray",
+  "darkgreen",
+  "darkgrey",
+  "darkkhaki",
+  "darkmagenta",
+  "darkolivegreen",
+  "darkorange",
+  "darkorchid",
+  "darkred",
+  "darksalmon",
+  "darkseagreen",
+  "darkslateblue",
+  "darkslategray",
+  "darkslategrey",
+  "darkturquoise",
+  "darkviolet",
+  "deeppink",
+  "deepskyblue",
+  "dimgray",
+  "dimgrey",
+  "dodgerblue",
+  "firebrick",
+  "floralwhite",
+  "forestgreen",
+  "fuchsia",
+  "gainsboro",
+  "ghostwhite",
+  "gold",
+  "goldenrod",
+  "gray",
+  "green",
+  "greenyellow",
+  "grey",
+  "honeydew",
+  "hotpink",
+  "indianred",
+  "indigo",
+  "ivory",
+  "khaki",
+  "lavender",
+  "lavenderblush",
+  "lawngreen",
+  "lemonchiffon",
+  "lightblue",
+  "lightcoral",
+  "lightcyan",
+  "lightgoldenrodyellow",
+  "lightgray",
+  "lightgreen",
+  "lightgrey",
+  "lightpink",
+  "lightsalmon",
+  "lightseagreen",
+  "lightskyblue",
+  "lightslategray",
+  "lightslategrey",
+  "lightsteelblue",
+  "lightyellow",
+  "lime",
+  "limegreen",
+  "linen",
+  "magenta",
+  "maroon",
+  "mediumaquamarine",
+  "mediumblue",
+  "mediumorchid",
+  "mediumpurple",
+  "mediumseagreen",
+  "mediumslateblue",
+  "mediumspringgreen",
+  "mediumturquoise",
+  "mediumvioletred",
+  "midnightblue",
+  "mintcream",
+  "mistyrose",
+  "moccasin",
+  "navajowhite",
+  "navy",
+  "oldlace",
+  "olive",
+  "olivedrab",
+  "orange",
+  "orangered",
+  "orchid",
+  "palegoldenrod",
+  "palegreen",
+  "paleturquoise",
+  "palevioletred",
+  "papayawhip",
+  "peachpuff",
+  "peru",
+  "pink",
+  "plum",
+  "powderblue",
+  "purple",
+  "rebeccapurple",
+  "red",
+  "rosybrown",
+  "royalblue",
+  "saddlebrown",
+  "salmon",
+  "sandybrown",
+  "seagreen",
+  "seashell",
+  "sienna",
+  "silver",
+  "skyblue",
+  "slateblue",
+  "slategray",
+  "slategrey",
+  "snow",
+  "springgreen",
+  "steelblue",
+  "tan",
+  "teal",
+  "thistle",
+  "tomato",
+  "turquoise",
+  "violet",
+  "wheat",
+  "white",
+  "whitesmoke",
+  "yellow",
+  "yellowgreen",
+  // Special values
+  "transparent",
+  "currentcolor",
+  "inherit",
+  "initial",
+  "unset",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Validate that a string is a safe CSS color value.
+ *
+ * Accepts named colors, hex notation (`#RGB`, `#RGBA`, `#RRGGBB`,
+ * `#RRGGBBAA`), and functional notation (`rgb()`, `rgba()`, `hsl()`,
+ * `hsla()`) with strictly numeric arguments.
+ *
+ * Rejects anything else -- including semicolons, `url()`, `expression()`,
+ * and any other pattern that could be used for CSS injection.
+ *
+ * @param color - The CSS color value to validate.
+ * @returns `true` if the value is a recognized safe color format.
+ */
+export function isValidCssColor(color: string): boolean {
+  const trimmed = color.trim().toLowerCase();
+
+  // Empty is invalid
+  if (!trimmed) return false;
+
+  // Named colors
+  if (CSS_NAMED_COLORS.has(trimmed)) return true;
+
+  // Hex colors: #RGB, #RGBA, #RRGGBB, #RRGGBBAA
+  if (/^#[0-9a-f]{3}([0-9a-f])?$/.test(trimmed) || /^#[0-9a-f]{6}([0-9a-f]{2})?$/.test(trimmed)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Extract function name and args separately to avoid ReDoS from repeated \s* quantifiers.
+  // Only strip whitespace from args, keeping function name validation strict.
+  const fnMatch = trimmed.match(/^(rgba?|hsla?)\(([^)]*)\)$/);
+  if (fnMatch) {
+    const fn = fnMatch[1]!;
+    // Only trim whitespace around commas (structural delimiters), not within tokens
+    const args = fnMatch[2]!
+      .split(",")
+      .map((s) => s.trim())
+      .join(",");
+    if (fn.startsWith("rgb")) {
+      if (/^\d{1,3},\d{1,3},\d{1,3}(,(0|1|0?\.\d+))?$/.test(args)) return true;
+    } else {
+      if (/^\d{1,3},\d{1,3}%,\d{1,3}%(,(0|1|0?\.\d+))?$/.test(args)) return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Reject everything else (including semicolons, url(), expression(), etc.)
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize a CSS color value, returning a fallback if validation fails.
+ *
+ * Delegates to {@link isValidCssColor} for validation. If the color
+ * is not a recognized safe format, the fallback value is returned
+ * instead (defaulting to `"inherit"`).
+ *
+ * @param color - The CSS color value to sanitize.
+ * @param fallback - The value to return if validation fails (default `"inherit"`).
+ * @returns The original color if valid, otherwise the fallback.
+ */
+export function sanitizeCssColor(color: string, fallback = "inherit"): string {
+  return isValidCssColor(color) ? color : fallback;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Normalize a CSS value by resolving escape sequences, removing comments,
+ * stripping whitespace and control characters, and lowercasing.
+ *
+ * This normalization is critical for security: attackers can use CSS
+ * comments (`/* ... *​/`), escape sequences (`\75rl` for `url`), and
+ * line continuations to disguise dangerous patterns. By normalizing
+ * first, the downstream checks in {@link isDangerousCssValue} operate
+ * on a canonical representation.
+ *
+ * @param value - The raw CSS property value.
+ * @returns The normalized, lowercase, whitespace-free representation.
+ */
+function normalizeCssValue(value: string): string {
+  let result = value;
+
+  // Remove CSS comments: /* ... */
+  result = result.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "");
+
+  // Remove CSS line continuations: backslash followed by newline
+  result = result.replace(/\\(?:\r\n|[\n\r\f])/g, "");
+
+  // Decode CSS escapes: \XX (hex) or \char
+  // CSS allows \0-\10FFFF with optional trailing whitespace
+  result = result.replace(/\\([0-9a-f]{1,6})\s?/gi, (_, hex) => {
+    const code = Number.parseInt(hex, 16);
+    return code > 0 && code <= 0x10ffff ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : "";
+  });
+
+  // Remove remaining backslash escapes: \char -> char
+  result = result.replace(/\\(.)/g, "$1");
+
+  // Remove whitespace and control characters
+  result = result.replace(/[\s\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f]/g, "");
+
+  // Lowercase at the end to catch decoded uppercase chars (e.g., \55 -> U)
+  return result.toLowerCase();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allowlist check for a raw URL string extracted from a `url(...)` token.
+ *
+ * Wikidot itself allows arbitrary URLs (including `javascript:` and
+ * `expression()`) in `style` attributes, but we cannot match that
+ * exactly without re-introducing XSS. The schemes permitted below are
+ * the ones a CSS-side `url(...)` needs to actually fetch an image or
+ * background — anything else either has no visual effect or carries
+ * code-execution risk:
+ *
+ * - `http://`, `https://`, `//host/...` — load over the network.
+ * - `/path`, `./path`, `../path` — load relative to the document.
+ * - `#fragment` — same-document SVG / gradient reference.
+ * - `data:image/{png,jpeg,jpg,gif,webp}` — inline raster image.
+ *   SVG is excluded because SVG documents can embed `<script>` and
+ *   event handlers; treating an inline SVG as a `url()` payload is
+ *   indistinguishable from running attacker-supplied JavaScript.
+ *
+ * Everything else (`javascript:`, `vbscript:`, `data:text/...`,
+ * `data:application/...`, `data:image/svg+xml`) is rejected — those
+ * payloads either execute scripts directly or are interpreted as
+ * markup that can host them.
+ *
+ * The input is assumed to come from a normalised CSS value (escapes,
+ * comments, whitespace, control chars stripped and lowercased), so this
+ * function only needs to handle surrounding `"` / `'` quotes.
+ */
+function isUrlAllowed(rawUrl: string): boolean {
+  let url = rawUrl;
+
+  // Strip a single layer of matched surrounding quotes if present
+  if (url.length >= 2) {
+    const first = url[0];
+    const last = url[url.length - 1];
+    if ((first === '"' && last === '"') || (first === "'" && last === "'")) {
+      url = url.slice(1, -1);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Empty url() is treated as harmless (Wikidot pass-through)
+  if (url === "") return true;
+
+  // Fragment
+  if (url.startsWith("#")) return true;
+
+  // Path-relative
+  if (url.startsWith("./") || url.startsWith("../")) return true;
+
+  // Protocol-relative `//host/...`
+  if (url.startsWith("//")) return true;
+
+  // Root-relative `/path`. Does not match `//` (handled above).
+  if (url.startsWith("/")) return true;
+
+  if (url.startsWith("http://") || url.startsWith("https://")) return true;
+
+  // data: URLs — only raster image MIME types.
+  // Match `data:image/<mime>` followed by `;` (params) or `,` (start of data),
+  // so `data:image/png+xml` or `data:image/pngsomething` cannot sneak through
+  // the allowlist with a misleading prefix.
+  if (url.startsWith("data:image/")) {
+    const after = url.slice("data:image/".length);
+    const sep = Math.min(
+      after.indexOf(";") === -1 ? after.length : after.indexOf(";"),
+      after.indexOf(",") === -1 ? after.length : after.indexOf(","),
+    );
+    const mime = after.slice(0, sep);
+    if (mime === "png" || mime === "jpeg" || mime === "jpg" || mime === "gif" || mime === "webp") {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract every `url(...)` invocation from a normalised CSS value and
+ * yield each raw inner string (parentheses excluded).
+ *
+ * The walker tracks `"` and `'` quoted regions so that `)` inside a
+ * quoted URL string (e.g. `url("https://example.com/a)b.png")`) does
+ * not close the `url(` prematurely. Within a quoted region paren
+ * tracking is suspended.
+ *
+ * Returns an iterator of `{ inner, malformed }` records. `malformed`
+ * is `true` when a `url(` had no matching closing `)`, which the
+ * caller should treat as dangerous (fail-closed).
+ */
+function* iterateUrls(normalized: string): Generator<{ inner: string; malformed: boolean }> {
+  let searchPos = 0;
+  while (searchPos < normalized.length) {
+    const idx = normalized.indexOf("url(", searchPos);
+    if (idx === -1) return;
+
+    let depth = 1;
+    let quoteChar: string | null = null;
+    let i = idx + 4;
+    while (i < normalized.length && depth > 0) {
+      const ch = normalized[i];
+      if (quoteChar !== null) {
+        if (ch === quoteChar) quoteChar = null;
+      } else if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
+        quoteChar = ch;
+      } else if (ch === "(") {
+        depth++;
+      } else if (ch === ")") {
+        depth--;
+      }
+      i++;
+    }
+
+    if (depth > 0) {
+      // Unclosed url(
+      yield { inner: normalized.slice(idx + 4), malformed: true };
+      return;
+    }
+
+    yield { inner: normalized.slice(idx + 4, i - 1), malformed: false };
+    searchPos = i;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check whether a CSS property value contains dangerous patterns that
+ * could enable script execution or external resource loading.
+ *
+ * The value is first normalized via `normalizeCssValue()` to resolve
+ * CSS escapes and comments, then checked against a blocklist:
+ * - `url(...)` -- only allowed when the inner URL passes
+ *   {@link isUrlAllowed} (raster images, http(s), relative paths).
+ *   Malformed `url(` (no closing paren) is treated as dangerous.
+ * - `expression()` -- blocks IE's CSS expression evaluation
+ * - `-moz-binding` -- blocks Firefox XBL binding injection
+ * - `behavior:` -- blocks IE behavior attachment
+ * - `@import` -- blocks external stylesheet loading
+ *
+ * @param value - The CSS property value to check.
+ * @returns `true` if the value contains a dangerous pattern and should be removed.
+ */
+export function isDangerousCssValue(value: string): boolean {
+  const normalized = normalizeCssValue(value);
+
+  for (const { inner, malformed } of iterateUrls(normalized)) {
+    if (malformed) return true;
+    if (!isUrlAllowed(inner)) return true;
+  }
+
+  // Block expression() (IE)
+  if (normalized.includes("expression(")) return true;
+
+  // Block -moz-binding (Firefox)
+  if (normalized.includes("-moz-binding")) return true;
+
+  // Block behavior (IE)
+  if (normalized.includes("behavior:")) return true;
+
+  // Block @import (can load external stylesheets)
+  if (normalized.includes("@import")) return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize a `style` attribute value by removing dangerous declarations
+ * while preserving safe ones.
+ *
+ * Splits the value on semicolons into individual declarations, checks
+ * each declaration's value via {@link isDangerousCssValue}, and drops
+ * any that fail. Also blocks the `-moz-binding` and `behavior`
+ * property names directly.
+ *
+ * The original formatting is preserved: if the input ended with a
+ * semicolon, the output will too (matching Wikidot's pass-through
+ * behavior for user-authored styles).
+ *
+ * @param style - The raw `style` attribute value.
+ * @returns The sanitized style string with dangerous declarations removed,
+ *   or an empty string if nothing is safe.
+ */
+/**
+ * Split a CSS style attribute value into individual declarations,
+ * respecting parentheses and quoted strings.
+ *
+ * A simple `split(";")` would corrupt declarations whose value
+ * contains `;` inside a `url(...)` invocation, e.g. a base64 data URL
+ * passed via a CSS custom property:
+ *
+ * ```css
+ * --logo: url(...)
+ * ```
+ *
+ * This walker only splits on `;` when not inside `(...)` and not inside
+ * a `"..."` / `'...'` string.
+ */
+function splitDeclarations(style: string): string[] {
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  let buf = "";
+  let parenDepth = 0;
+  let quoteChar: string | null = null;
+
+  for (const ch of style) {
+    if (quoteChar !== null) {
+      buf += ch;
+      if (ch === quoteChar) quoteChar = null;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
+      quoteChar = ch;
+      buf += ch;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === "(") {
+      parenDepth++;
+      buf += ch;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === ")") {
+      if (parenDepth > 0) parenDepth--;
+      buf += ch;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === ";" && parenDepth === 0) {
+      out.push(buf);
+      buf = "";
+      continue;
+    }
+    buf += ch;
+  }
+  if (buf.length > 0) out.push(buf);
+  return out;
+}
+
+export function sanitizeStyleValue(style: string): string {
+  // Remember if original ends with semicolon (Wikidot preserves this)
+  const endsWithSemicolon = style.trimEnd().endsWith(";");
+
+  // Split by semicolon (respecting parens/quotes) into individual declarations
+  const declarations = splitDeclarations(style)
+    .map((d) => d.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean);
+  const safe: string[] = [];
+
+  for (const decl of declarations) {
+    const colonIdx = decl.indexOf(":");
+    if (colonIdx === -1) continue;
+
+    const property = decl.slice(0, colonIdx).trim();
+    const value = decl.slice(colonIdx + 1).trim();
+
+    // Skip if value contains dangerous patterns
+    if (isDangerousCssValue(value)) continue;
+
+    // Skip dangerous properties. CSS allows escape sequences inside
+    // property names too (e.g. `-mo\7a-binding` → `-moz-binding`), so we
+    // run them through the same normaliser as values before matching.
+    const normalisedProperty = normalizeCssValue(property);
+    if (normalisedProperty.startsWith("-moz-binding")) continue;
+    if (normalisedProperty === "behavior") continue;
+
+    // Keep original format (Wikidot outputs input as is)
+    safe.push(decl);
+  }
+
+  if (safe.length === 0) return "";
+
+  // Preserve original trailing semicolon format
+  return endsWithSemicolon ? safe.join(";") + ";" : safe.join(";");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate that a string looks like a safe email address.
+ *
+ * Uses a deliberately simple pattern that accepts the vast majority of
+ * real-world addresses while blocking characters that could enable
+ * injection attacks when the address is used in a `mailto:` link.
+ *
+ * The percent character (`%`) is intentionally disallowed because
+ * `mailto:` URLs undergo percent-decoding, allowing an attacker to
+ * inject headers (e.g. `a%0d%0abcc%3aevil@example.com` decodes to
+ * a BCC header injection).
+ *
+ * @param email - The email string to validate.
+ * @returns `true` if the email matches the safe pattern.
+ */
+export function isValidEmail(email: string): boolean {
+  // Simple email pattern: local@domain
+  // - local: alphanumeric, dots, underscores, hyphens, plus signs (NO percent)
+  // - domain: alphanumeric, dots, hyphens
+  // Does NOT allow: spaces, colons, angle brackets, percent, or other special chars
+  return /^[a-zA-Z0-9._+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$/.test(email);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set of HTML attribute names whose values are interpreted as URLs
+ * by the browser. Values of these attributes must be checked via
+ * {@link isDangerousUrl} before rendering.
+ */
+const URL_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
+  "href",
+  "src",
+  "action",
+  "formaction",
+  "srcset",
+  "poster",
+  "background",
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize a map of HTML attributes, returning a new map containing
+ * only entries that pass all safety checks.
+ *
+ * For each attribute, this function:
+ * 1. Drops attributes that fail {@link isSafeAttribute} (event handlers, unknown names)
+ * 2. Drops URL-bearing attributes whose values fail {@link isDangerousUrl}
+ * 3. Sanitizes `style` values via {@link sanitizeStyleValue}, dropping them entirely
+ *    if the result is empty
+ * 4. Passes all other safe attributes through unchanged
+ *
+ * @param attributes - The raw attribute name-value map to sanitize.
+ * @returns A new map containing only the safe attributes and their (possibly sanitized) values.
+ */
+export function sanitizeAttributes(attributes: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {
+  const result: Record<string, string> = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(attributes)) {
+    if (!isSafeAttribute(key)) continue;
+    const lower = key.toLowerCase();
+    // Check URL attributes for dangerous schemes
+    if (URL_ATTRIBUTES.has(lower) && isDangerousUrl(value)) continue;
+    // Sanitize style attribute
+    if (lower === "style") {
+      const sanitized = sanitizeStyleValue(value);
+      if (sanitized) {
+        result[key] = sanitized;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    result[key] = value;
+  }
+  return result;
+}