@warlock.js/auth 5.31.0 → 5.32.0

package/esm/models/refresh-token/index.mjs

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 import { RefreshToken, refreshTokenSchema } from "./refresh-token.model.mjs";
 
-export {  };
+export { RefreshToken, refreshTokenSchema };

package/esm/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.d.mts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 import { Auth } from "../auth.model.mjs";
 import { DeviceInfo } from "../../contracts/types.mjs";
 import { Model } from "@warlock.js/cascade";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.d.ts
 /**
  * Seal schema for the persisted refresh-token record. Exported so an override
@@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ import { Model } from "@warlock.js/cascade";
  *   });
  * }
  */
-declare const refreshTokenSchema: import("@warlock.js/seal").ObjectValidator<{
+export declare const refreshTokenSchema: import("@warlock.js/seal").ObjectValidator<{
   token: import("@warlock.js/seal").StringValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<string, string>;
   user_id: import("@warlock.js/seal").ScalarValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<string | number | boolean, string | number | boolean>;
   user_type: import("@warlock.js/seal").StringValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<string, string>;
@@ -26,7 +25,8 @@ declare const refreshTokenSchema: import("@warlock.js/seal").ObjectValidator<{
   };
   revoked_at: import("@warlock.js/seal").DateValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<Date, Date> & {
     isOptional: true;
-  }; /** The successor pair a bounded concurrent renewal may reuse. */
+  };
+  /** The successor pair a bounded concurrent renewal may reuse. */
   successor_access_token_id: import("@warlock.js/seal").StringValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<string, string> & {
     isOptional: true;
   };
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ declare const refreshTokenSchema: import("@warlock.js/seal").ObjectValidator<{
 /**
  * Extra attributes captured when a refresh token is issued.
  */
-type RefreshTokenIssueOptions = {
+export type RefreshTokenIssueOptions = {
   familyId: string;
   expiresAt: string;
   deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo;
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ type RefreshTokenIssueOptions = {
  * structurally impossible and lets an override rename or add columns by
  * extending this class and registering it under `config.auth.refreshToken.model`.
  */
-declare class RefreshToken extends Model {
+export declare class RefreshToken extends Model {
   static table: string;
   static schema: import("@warlock.js/seal").ObjectValidator<{
     token: import("@warlock.js/seal").StringValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<string, string>;
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ declare class RefreshToken extends Model {
     };
     revoked_at: import("@warlock.js/seal").DateValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<Date, Date> & {
       isOptional: true;
-    }; /** The successor pair a bounded concurrent renewal may reuse. */
+    };
+    /** The successor pair a bounded concurrent renewal may reuse. */
     successor_access_token_id: import("@warlock.js/seal").StringValidator & import("@warlock.js/seal").StandardSchemaV1<string, string> & {
       isOptional: true;
     };
@@ -208,5 +209,4 @@ declare class RefreshToken extends Model {
   static purgeNeverExpiring(): Promise<RefreshToken[]>;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { RefreshToken, RefreshTokenIssueOptions, refreshTokenSchema };
 //# sourceMappingURL=refresh-token.model.d.mts.map

package/esm/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"refresh-token.model.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;qBAkBa,+CAAkB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;YAiBnB;EACV;EACA;EACA,aAAa;;;;;;;;;;;;qBAaF,qBAAqB;SAClB;SAEA,mCAAM;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;SAQN;;;;;;;SAQA;;MAGH;;;;;;;;;;;MAcA;;;;;MAYA;;MAKA;;MAKA;;;;EAOE,UAAU;;;;;;;;EAWV,kBAAkB;;;;EAclB,cAAc;;;;SAOb,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,eAAe,SAAS,2BAAwB,QAAA;;;;SAoBlE,YAAY,gBAAgB,QAAQ;;;;;SAQpC,YAAY,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ;;SAKhD,aAAa,mBAAmB,QAAQ;;;;;SAQxC,gBAAgB,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;;;;SAOrC,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAa;;;;SAOvC,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;SAgBzB,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;;;;;SAgBlC,aAAa,mBAAmB,QAAQ;;;;;;SAexC,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,cAAc;;;;;;SAoBrC,gBAAgB,QAAQ;;;;;;;SAgBxB,qBAAqB,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;SAe7B,sBAAsB,QAAQ"}

package/esm/otp/index.d.mts

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-import { requestOtp, verifyOtp } from "./otp.mjs";
+import { requestOtp, verifyOtp } from "./otp.mjs";
+export { requestOtp, verifyOtp };

package/esm/otp/index.mjs

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 import { requestOtp, verifyOtp } from "./otp.mjs";
 
-export {  };
+export { requestOtp, verifyOtp };

package/esm/otp/otp.d.mts

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 import { Auth } from "../models/auth.model.mjs";
 import { DeviceInfo, LoginResult } from "../contracts/types.mjs";
 import { ChildModel } from "@warlock.js/cascade";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/otp/otp.d.ts
 /**
  * Send a 6-digit login code to the account whose `auth.otp.phoneField`
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import { ChildModel } from "@warlock.js/cascade";
  * @throws AuthProviderSdkMissingError when `@warlock.js/notifications` is not
  *   installed and no `auth.otp.send` is configured.
  */
-declare function requestOtp<T extends Auth>(Model: ChildModel<T>, phone: string, options?: {
+export declare function requestOtp<T extends Auth>(Model: ChildModel<T>, phone: string, options?: {
   channel?: string;
 }): Promise<void>;
 /**
@@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ declare function requestOtp<T extends Auth>(Model: ChildModel<T>, phone: string,
  * @throws InvalidOneTimeTokenError (400, EC008) — the same for an unknown
  *   phone, a wrong, expired, used or exhausted code.
  */
-declare function verifyOtp<T extends Auth>(Model: ChildModel<T>, phone: string, code: string, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<LoginResult<T>>;
+export declare function verifyOtp<T extends Auth>(Model: ChildModel<T>, phone: string, code: string, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<LoginResult<T>>;
 //#endregion
-export { requestOtp, verifyOtp };
 //# sourceMappingURL=otp.d.mts.map

package/esm/otp/otp.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"otp.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/otp/otp.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAuFA;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAAsB,UAAA,WAAqB,IAAA,EACzC,KAAA,EAAO,UAAA,CAAW,CAAA,GAClB,KAAA,UACA,OAAA;EAAW,OAAA;AAAA,IACV,OAAA;;;;;AAAO;AAkCV;;;;;;;iBAAsB,SAAA,WAAoB,IAAA,EACxC,KAAA,EAAO,UAAA,CAAW,CAAA,GAClB,KAAA,UACA,IAAA,UACA,UAAA,GAAa,UAAA,GACZ,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,CAAY,CAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"otp.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/otp/otp.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;wBAuFsB,WAAW,UAAU,MACzC,OAAO,WAAW,IAClB,eACA;EAAW;IACV;;;;;;;;;;;;;wBAkCmB,UAAU,UAAU,MACxC,OAAO,WAAW,IAClB,eACA,cACA,aAAa,aACZ,QAAQ,YAAY"}

package/esm/otp/otp.mjs

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ function invalidCode() {
 * value unique.
 */
 function macCode(user, salt, code) {
-	return createHmac("sha256", createHmac("sha256", authConfig.accessToken.secret()).update("@warlock.js/auth:otp").digest()).update(`${salt}:${user.userType}:${user.id}:${code}`).digest("base64url");
+	const key = createHmac("sha256", authConfig.accessToken.secret()).update("@warlock.js/auth:otp").digest();
+	return createHmac("sha256", key).update(`${salt}:${user.userType}:${user.id}:${code}`).digest("base64url");
 }
 /** Stored form: `<salt>.<mac>` — 16 + 1 + 43 chars, inside the 64-char `token_hash` column. */
 function storedCodeHash(user, code) {

package/esm/otp/otp.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"otp.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/otp/otp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { ChildModel } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { createHmac, randomBytes, randomInt } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { OtpMessage, OtpSender } from \"../contracts/providers\";\nimport type { DeviceInfo, LoginResult } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport { InvalidOneTimeTokenError } from \"../errors/invalid-one-time-token.error\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\nimport { authConfig } from \"../services/auth-config\";\nimport { authService } from \"../services/auth.service\";\nimport { oneTimeTokenModel } from \"../services/one-time-tokens\";\nimport { loadOptionalPeer } from \"../services/optional-peer\";\nimport { safeEqual } from \"../utils/safe-equal\";\n\n/** The slice of `@warlock.js/notifications` OTP delivery uses (an optional peer). */\ntype NotifyModule = {\n  notify: {\n    channel: (name: string) => { send: (to: string, payload: unknown) => Promise<unknown> };\n  };\n};\n\nconst CODE_PATTERN = /^\\d{6}$/;\n\n/** One error for every rejection: unknown phone, no code, wrong, expired, used, over the cap. */\nfunction invalidCode(): InvalidOneTimeTokenError {\n  return new InvalidOneTimeTokenError(\"Invalid or expired code.\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Keyed hash of a code. A plain SHA-256 of a 6-digit code is reversed by\n * trying all million values, so the MAC key (derived from the access-token\n * secret) is what keeps a leaked table useless. `salt` makes each stored\n * value unique.\n */\nfunction macCode(user: Auth, salt: string, code: string): string {\n  const key = createHmac(\"sha256\", authConfig.accessToken.secret())\n    .update(\"@warlock.js/auth:otp\")\n    .digest();\n\n  return createHmac(\"sha256\", key)\n    .update(`${salt}:${user.userType}:${user.id}:${code}`)\n    .digest(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/** Stored form: `<salt>.<mac>` — 16 + 1 + 43 chars, inside the 64-char `token_hash` column. */\nfunction storedCodeHash(user: Auth, code: string): string {\n  const salt = randomBytes(12).toString(\"base64url\");\n\n  return `${salt}.${macCode(user, salt, code)}`;\n}\n\nfunction codeMatches(user: Auth, stored: string, code: string): boolean {\n  const [salt, mac] = stored.split(\".\");\n\n  return !!salt && !!mac && safeEqual(mac, macCode(user, salt, code));\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve how a code is sent: `auth.otp.send`, else the app's notifications\n * channel. Resolved BEFORE the user lookup, so a missing notifications package\n * fails identically for known and unknown phones.\n */\nasync function resolveDelivery(channel: string): Promise<OtpSender> {\n  const custom = authConfig.otp.send();\n\n  if (custom) return custom;\n\n  const { notify } = await loadOptionalPeer<NotifyModule>(\n    \"@warlock.js/notifications\",\n    \"notifications\",\n  );\n\n  return (phone, message, channelName) => notify.channel(channelName).send(phone, message);\n}\n\n/**\n * Send a 6-digit login code to the account whose `auth.otp.phoneField`\n * (default `phone`) equals `phone`, through the notifications channel named by\n * `options.channel` / `auth.otp.channel` (default `\"sms\"`). Auth ships no\n * SMS/WhatsApp driver — the app registers that channel.\n *\n * The code is stored only as a keyed hash in `one_time_tokens` (purpose\n * `otp`), expires after `auth.otp.expiresIn` (default 5m), and replaces any\n * earlier unused code. **Anti-enumeration:** an unknown phone resolves the same\n * way and sends nothing. Throttle the route with `otpRequestThrottleMiddleware()`.\n *\n * @throws AuthProviderSdkMissingError when `@warlock.js/notifications` is not\n *   installed and no `auth.otp.send` is configured.\n */\nexport async function requestOtp<T extends Auth>(\n  Model: ChildModel<T>,\n  phone: string,\n  options: { channel?: string } = {},\n): Promise<void> {\n  const channel = options.channel ?? authConfig.otp.channel();\n  const deliver = await resolveDelivery(channel);\n\n  if (typeof phone !== \"string\" || phone.length === 0) return;\n\n  const user = (await Model.first({ [authConfig.otp.phoneField()]: phone })) as T | null;\n\n  if (!user) return;\n\n  const code = String(randomInt(0, 1_000_000)).padStart(6, \"0\");\n  const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + authConfig.otp.expiresInMs());\n  const TokenModel = oneTimeTokenModel();\n\n  await TokenModel.invalidateActiveFor(user, \"otp\");\n  await TokenModel.issue(user, \"otp\", storedCodeHash(user, code), expiresAt);\n\n  const message: OtpMessage = { body: authConfig.otp.message(code), code, expiresAt };\n\n  await deliver(phone, message, channel);\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a phone login code and log the user in through\n * `authService.completeLogin` — the same outcome as password login.\n *\n * Each check first counts an attempt atomically; once `auth.otp.maxAttempts`\n * (default 5) have been counted the code is invalidated, so it is compared at\n * most that many times even under concurrent guesses. 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+{"version":3,"file":"otp.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/otp/otp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { ChildModel } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { createHmac, randomBytes, randomInt } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { OtpMessage, OtpSender } from \"../contracts/providers\";\nimport type { DeviceInfo, LoginResult } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport { InvalidOneTimeTokenError } from \"../errors/invalid-one-time-token.error\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\nimport { authConfig } from \"../services/auth-config\";\nimport { authService } from \"../services/auth.service\";\nimport { oneTimeTokenModel } from \"../services/one-time-tokens\";\nimport { loadOptionalPeer } from \"../services/optional-peer\";\nimport { safeEqual } from \"../utils/safe-equal\";\n\n/** The slice of `@warlock.js/notifications` OTP delivery uses (an optional peer). */\ntype NotifyModule = {\n  notify: {\n    channel: (name: string) => { send: (to: string, payload: unknown) => Promise<unknown> };\n  };\n};\n\nconst CODE_PATTERN = /^\\d{6}$/;\n\n/** One error for every rejection: unknown phone, no code, wrong, expired, used, over the cap. */\nfunction invalidCode(): InvalidOneTimeTokenError {\n  return new InvalidOneTimeTokenError(\"Invalid or expired code.\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Keyed hash of a code. A plain SHA-256 of a 6-digit code is reversed by\n * trying all million values, so the MAC key (derived from the access-token\n * secret) is what keeps a leaked table useless. `salt` makes each stored\n * value unique.\n */\nfunction macCode(user: Auth, salt: string, code: string): string {\n  const key = createHmac(\"sha256\", authConfig.accessToken.secret())\n    .update(\"@warlock.js/auth:otp\")\n    .digest();\n\n  return createHmac(\"sha256\", key)\n    .update(`${salt}:${user.userType}:${user.id}:${code}`)\n    .digest(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/** Stored form: `<salt>.<mac>` — 16 + 1 + 43 chars, inside the 64-char `token_hash` column. */\nfunction storedCodeHash(user: Auth, code: string): string {\n  const salt = randomBytes(12).toString(\"base64url\");\n\n  return `${salt}.${macCode(user, salt, code)}`;\n}\n\nfunction codeMatches(user: Auth, stored: string, code: string): boolean {\n  const [salt, mac] = stored.split(\".\");\n\n  return !!salt && !!mac && safeEqual(mac, macCode(user, salt, code));\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve how a code is sent: `auth.otp.send`, else the app's notifications\n * channel. Resolved BEFORE the user lookup, so a missing notifications package\n * fails identically for known and unknown phones.\n */\nasync function resolveDelivery(channel: string): Promise<OtpSender> {\n  const custom = authConfig.otp.send();\n\n  if (custom) return custom;\n\n  const { notify } = await loadOptionalPeer<NotifyModule>(\n    \"@warlock.js/notifications\",\n    \"notifications\",\n  );\n\n  return (phone, message, channelName) => notify.channel(channelName).send(phone, message);\n}\n\n/**\n * Send a 6-digit login code to the account whose `auth.otp.phoneField`\n * (default `phone`) equals `phone`, through the notifications channel named by\n * `options.channel` / `auth.otp.channel` (default `\"sms\"`). Auth ships no\n * SMS/WhatsApp driver — the app registers that channel.\n *\n * The code is stored only as a keyed hash in `one_time_tokens` (purpose\n * `otp`), expires after `auth.otp.expiresIn` (default 5m), and replaces any\n * earlier unused code. **Anti-enumeration:** an unknown phone resolves the same\n * way and sends nothing. Throttle the route with `otpRequestThrottleMiddleware()`.\n *\n * @throws AuthProviderSdkMissingError when `@warlock.js/notifications` is not\n *   installed and no `auth.otp.send` is configured.\n */\nexport async function requestOtp<T extends Auth>(\n  Model: ChildModel<T>,\n  phone: string,\n  options: { channel?: string } = {},\n): Promise<void> {\n  const channel = options.channel ?? authConfig.otp.channel();\n  const deliver = await resolveDelivery(channel);\n\n  if (typeof phone !== \"string\" || phone.length === 0) return;\n\n  const user = (await Model.first({ [authConfig.otp.phoneField()]: phone })) as T | null;\n\n  if (!user) return;\n\n  const code = String(randomInt(0, 1_000_000)).padStart(6, \"0\");\n  const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + authConfig.otp.expiresInMs());\n  const TokenModel = oneTimeTokenModel();\n\n  await TokenModel.invalidateActiveFor(user, \"otp\");\n  await TokenModel.issue(user, \"otp\", storedCodeHash(user, code), expiresAt);\n\n  const message: OtpMessage = { body: authConfig.otp.message(code), code, expiresAt };\n\n  await deliver(phone, message, channel);\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a phone login code and log the user in through\n * `authService.completeLogin` — the same outcome as password login.\n *\n * Each check first counts an attempt atomically; once `auth.otp.maxAttempts`\n * (default 5) have been counted the code is invalidated, so it is compared at\n * most that many times even under concurrent guesses. A correct code is\n * consumed single-use. Throttle the route with `otpVerifyThrottleMiddleware()`.\n *\n * @throws InvalidOneTimeTokenError (400, EC008) — the same for an unknown\n *   phone, a wrong, expired, used or exhausted code.\n */\nexport async function verifyOtp<T extends Auth>(\n  Model: ChildModel<T>,\n  phone: string,\n  code: string,\n  deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo,\n): Promise<LoginResult<T>> {\n  if (typeof phone !== \"string\" || phone.length === 0) throw invalidCode();\n  if (typeof code !== \"string\" || !CODE_PATTERN.test(code)) throw invalidCode();\n\n  const user = (await Model.first({ [authConfig.otp.phoneField()]: phone })) as T | null;\n\n  if (!user) throw invalidCode();\n\n  const row = await oneTimeTokenModel().findActiveFor(user, \"otp\");\n\n  if (!row || row.isConsumed || row.isExpired) throw invalidCode();\n\n  if (!(await row.recordAttempt(authConfig.otp.maxAttempts()))) {\n    await row.consumeIfActive();\n\n    throw invalidCode();\n  }\n\n  if (!codeMatches(user, String(row.get(\"token_hash\") ?? \"\"), code)) throw invalidCode();\n\n  if (!(await row.consumeIfActive())) throw invalidCode();\n\n  return authService.completeLogin(user, deviceInfo);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;AAmBA,MAAM,eAAe;;AAGrB,SAAS,cAAwC;CAC/C,OAAO,IAAI,yBAAyB,0BAA0B;AAChE;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAS,QAAQ,MAAY,MAAc,MAAsB;CAC/D,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAC9D,OAAO,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAC9B,OAAO;CAEV,OAAO,WAAW,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,CAC7B,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,CACrD,OAAO,WAAW;AACvB;;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAY,MAAsB;CACxD,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW;CAEjD,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI;AAC5C;AAEA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAY,QAAgB,MAAuB;CACtE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG;CAEpC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AACpE;;;;;;AAOA,eAAe,gBAAgB,SAAqC;CAClE,MAAM,SAAS,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK;CAEnC,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO;CAEnB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM,iBACvB,6BACA,eACF;CAEA,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,OAAO;AACzF;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgBA,eAAsB,WACpB,OACA,OACA,UAAgC,CAAC,GAClB;CACf,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ;CAC1D,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO;CAE7C,IAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;CAErD,MAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC;CAExE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;CAEX,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,GAAG,GAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;CAC5D,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;CACpE,MAAM,aAAa,kBAAkB;CAErC,MAAM,WAAW,oBAAoB,MAAM,KAAK;CAChD,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,eAAe,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS;CAIzE,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;EAFS,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;EAAG;EAAM;CAE7C,GAAG,OAAO;AACvC;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAcA,eAAsB,UACpB,OACA,OACA,MACA,YACyB;CACzB,IAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM,YAAY;CACvE,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,YAAY;CAE5E,MAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC;CAExE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,YAAY;CAE7B,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK;CAE/D,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY;CAE/D,IAAI,CAAE,MAAM,IAAI,cAAc,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,GAAI;EAC5D,MAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB;EAE1B,MAAM,YAAY;CACpB;CAEA,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,YAAY;CAErF,IAAI,CAAE,MAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,GAAI,MAAM,YAAY;CAEtD,OAAO,YAAY,cAAc,MAAM,UAAU;AACnD"}

package/esm/passkeys/index.d.mts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 import { PasskeyOptionsJSON, PasskeyResponseJSON } from "./simplewebauthn.mjs";
 import { generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions, verifyPasskeyAuthentication } from "./passkey-authentication.mjs";
-import { generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions, verifyPasskeyRegistration } from "./passkey-registration.mjs";
+import { generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions, verifyPasskeyRegistration } from "./passkey-registration.mjs";
+export { type PasskeyOptionsJSON, type PasskeyResponseJSON, generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions, generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions, verifyPasskeyAuthentication, verifyPasskeyRegistration };

package/esm/passkeys/index.mjs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 import { generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions, verifyPasskeyAuthentication } from "./passkey-authentication.mjs";
 import { generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions, verifyPasskeyRegistration } from "./passkey-registration.mjs";
 
-export {  };
+export { generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions, generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions, verifyPasskeyAuthentication, verifyPasskeyRegistration };

package/esm/passkeys/passkey-authentication.d.mts

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { Auth } from "../models/auth.model.mjs";
 import { DeviceInfo, LoginResult } from "../contracts/types.mjs";
 import { PasskeyOptionsJSON, PasskeyResponseJSON } from "./simplewebauthn.mjs";
 import { Request } from "@warlock.js/core";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-authentication.d.ts
 /**
  * Authentication options for a passkey login. No user is identified yet
@@ -13,7 +12,7 @@ import { Request } from "@warlock.js/core";
  * // POST /auth/passkeys/login/options
  * response.success(await generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions());
  */
-declare function generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions(): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJSON>;
+export declare function generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions(): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJSON>;
 /**
  * Verify a passkey assertion and log its owner in through
  * `authService.completeLogin` — the same outcome as password login.
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ declare function generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions(): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJ
  *
  * @throws InvalidPasskeyError (400, EC011) on any rejection.
  */
-declare function verifyPasskeyAuthentication(request: Request, credential: PasskeyResponseJSON, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<LoginResult<Auth>>;
+export declare function verifyPasskeyAuthentication(request: Request, credential: PasskeyResponseJSON, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<LoginResult<Auth>>;
 //#endregion
-export { generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions, verifyPasskeyAuthentication };
 //# sourceMappingURL=passkey-authentication.d.mts.map

package/esm/passkeys/passkey-authentication.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"passkey-authentication.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-authentication.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;wBAiDsB,wCAAwC,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;wBA0BhD,4BACpB,SAAS,SACT,YAAY,qBACZ,aAAa,aACZ,QAAQ,YAAY"}

package/esm/passkeys/passkey-authentication.mjs

@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ async function verifyPasskeyAuthentication(request, credential, deviceInfo) {
 			requireUserVerification: false
 		});
 	} catch (error) {
-		throw new InvalidPasskeyError(counterRegressed(stored.counter, presentedCounter(credential)) ? "counter-regression" : "authentication-verification-failed", error);
+		const reason = counterRegressed(stored.counter, presentedCounter(credential)) ? "counter-regression" : "authentication-verification-failed";
+		throw new InvalidPasskeyError(reason, error);
 	}
 	if (!verification.verified) throw new InvalidPasskeyError("authentication-not-verified");
 	const previous = stored.counter;

package/esm/passkeys/passkey-authentication.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"passkey-authentication.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-authentication.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { ChildModel } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { config, type Request } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\nimport type { DeviceInfo, LoginResult } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport { InvalidPasskeyError } from \"../errors/invalid-passkey.error\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\nimport { PasskeyCredential } from \"../models/passkey-credential\";\nimport { authConfig } from \"../services/auth-config\";\nimport { authService } from \"../services/auth.service\";\nimport {\n  assertPasskeyOrigin,\n  storePasskeyChallenge,\n  takePasskeyChallenge,\n} from \"./passkey-challenges\";\nimport {\n  loadSimpleWebAuthn,\n  type PasskeyOptionsJSON,\n  type PasskeyResponseJSON,\n} from \"./simplewebauthn\";\n\n/** A counter that did not advance past the stored one (when either is non-zero): a cloned authenticator. */\nfunction counterRegressed(stored: number, presented: number | undefined): boolean {\n  if (presented === undefined) return false;\n\n  return (stored > 0 || presented > 0) && !(presented > stored);\n}\n\n/**\n * The signature counter an assertion CLAIMS (bytes 33–36 of authenticatorData).\n * Unverified — only used to label a rejection the SDK already made.\n */\nfunction presentedCounter(credential: PasskeyResponseJSON): number | undefined {\n  const encoded = credential.response.authenticatorData;\n\n  if (typeof encoded !== \"string\") return undefined;\n\n  const authData = Buffer.from(encoded, \"base64url\");\n\n  return authData.length >= 37 ? authData.readUInt32BE(33) : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication options for a passkey login. No user is identified yet\n * (discoverable credentials), so the stored single-use challenge has no owner;\n * the credential the browser returns decides the user.\n *\n * @example\n * // POST /auth/passkeys/login/options\n * response.success(await generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions());\n */\nexport async function generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions(): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJSON> {\n  const webauthn = await loadSimpleWebAuthn();\n\n  const options = await webauthn.generateAuthenticationOptions({\n    rpID: authConfig.passkeys.settings().rpID,\n    userVerification: \"preferred\",\n  });\n\n  await storePasskeyChallenge(\"passkey-authentication\", options.challenge);\n\n  return options;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a passkey assertion and log its owner in through\n * `authService.completeLogin` — the same outcome as password login.\n *\n * Checks, in order: the request `Origin` (CSRF), the single-use challenge\n * (consumed even if what follows fails), the credential is registered, the\n * assertion via `@simplewebauthn/server`, then that the signature counter\n * ADVANCED — a counter that did not move past the stored one (when either is\n * non-zero) means a cloned authenticator and is rejected. The new counter is\n * written with a compare-and-set.\n *\n * @throws InvalidPasskeyError (400, EC011) on any rejection.\n */\nexport async function verifyPasskeyAuthentication(\n  request: Request,\n  credential: PasskeyResponseJSON,\n  deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo,\n): Promise<LoginResult<Auth>> {\n  const webauthn = await loadSimpleWebAuthn();\n  const origins = assertPasskeyOrigin(request);\n  const { challenge } = await takePasskeyChallenge(\"passkey-authentication\", credential);\n\n  const stored =\n    typeof credential.id === \"string\"\n      ? await PasskeyCredential.findByCredentialId(credential.id)\n      : null;\n\n  if (!stored) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"unknown-credential\");\n  }\n\n  let verification: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof webauthn.verifyAuthenticationResponse>>;\n\n  try {\n    verification = await webauthn.verifyAuthenticationResponse({\n      response: credential,\n      expectedChallenge: challenge,\n      expectedOrigin: origins,\n      expectedRPID: authConfig.passkeys.settings().rpID,\n      credential: {\n        id: stored.credentialId,\n        publicKey: new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(String(stored.get(\"public_key\")), \"base64url\")),\n        counter: stored.counter,\n        transports: stored.get(\"transports\") ?? undefined,\n      },\n      requireUserVerification: false,\n    });\n  } catch (error) {\n    // The SDK enforces the counter rule itself and throws a generic Error for\n    // it; keep clone detection visible as its own reason in the logs.\n    const reason = counterRegressed(stored.counter, presentedCounter(credential))\n      ? \"counter-regression\"\n      : \"authentication-verification-failed\";\n\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(reason, error);\n  }\n\n  if (!verification.verified) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"authentication-not-verified\");\n  }\n\n  const previous = stored.counter;\n  const next = Number(verification.authenticationInfo.newCounter);\n\n  if (counterRegressed(previous, next)) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"counter-regression\");\n  }\n\n  if (!(await stored.advanceCounter(previous, next))) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"counter-changed-concurrently\");\n  }\n\n  const UserModel = config.key<ChildModel<Auth> | undefined>(`auth.userType.${stored.userType}`);\n  const user = UserModel ? 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+{"version":3,"file":"passkey-authentication.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-authentication.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { ChildModel } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { config, type Request } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\nimport type { DeviceInfo, LoginResult } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport { InvalidPasskeyError } from \"../errors/invalid-passkey.error\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\nimport { PasskeyCredential } from \"../models/passkey-credential\";\nimport { authConfig } from \"../services/auth-config\";\nimport { authService } from \"../services/auth.service\";\nimport {\n  assertPasskeyOrigin,\n  storePasskeyChallenge,\n  takePasskeyChallenge,\n} from \"./passkey-challenges\";\nimport {\n  loadSimpleWebAuthn,\n  type PasskeyOptionsJSON,\n  type PasskeyResponseJSON,\n} from \"./simplewebauthn\";\n\n/** A counter that did not advance past the stored one (when either is non-zero): a cloned authenticator. */\nfunction counterRegressed(stored: number, presented: number | undefined): boolean {\n  if (presented === undefined) return false;\n\n  return (stored > 0 || presented > 0) && !(presented > stored);\n}\n\n/**\n * The signature counter an assertion CLAIMS (bytes 33–36 of authenticatorData).\n * Unverified — only used to label a rejection the SDK already made.\n */\nfunction presentedCounter(credential: PasskeyResponseJSON): number | undefined {\n  const encoded = credential.response.authenticatorData;\n\n  if (typeof encoded !== \"string\") return undefined;\n\n  const authData = Buffer.from(encoded, \"base64url\");\n\n  return authData.length >= 37 ? authData.readUInt32BE(33) : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Authentication options for a passkey login. No user is identified yet\n * (discoverable credentials), so the stored single-use challenge has no owner;\n * the credential the browser returns decides the user.\n *\n * @example\n * // POST /auth/passkeys/login/options\n * response.success(await generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions());\n */\nexport async function generatePasskeyAuthenticationOptions(): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJSON> {\n  const webauthn = await loadSimpleWebAuthn();\n\n  const options = await webauthn.generateAuthenticationOptions({\n    rpID: authConfig.passkeys.settings().rpID,\n    userVerification: \"preferred\",\n  });\n\n  await storePasskeyChallenge(\"passkey-authentication\", options.challenge);\n\n  return options;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a passkey assertion and log its owner in through\n * `authService.completeLogin` — the same outcome as password login.\n *\n * Checks, in order: the request `Origin` (CSRF), the single-use challenge\n * (consumed even if what follows fails), the credential is registered, the\n * assertion via `@simplewebauthn/server`, then that the signature counter\n * ADVANCED — a counter that did not move past the stored one (when either is\n * non-zero) means a cloned authenticator and is rejected. The new counter is\n * written with a compare-and-set.\n *\n * @throws InvalidPasskeyError (400, EC011) on any rejection.\n */\nexport async function verifyPasskeyAuthentication(\n  request: Request,\n  credential: PasskeyResponseJSON,\n  deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo,\n): Promise<LoginResult<Auth>> {\n  const webauthn = await loadSimpleWebAuthn();\n  const origins = assertPasskeyOrigin(request);\n  const { challenge } = await takePasskeyChallenge(\"passkey-authentication\", credential);\n\n  const stored =\n    typeof credential.id === \"string\"\n      ? await PasskeyCredential.findByCredentialId(credential.id)\n      : null;\n\n  if (!stored) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"unknown-credential\");\n  }\n\n  let verification: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof webauthn.verifyAuthenticationResponse>>;\n\n  try {\n    verification = await webauthn.verifyAuthenticationResponse({\n      response: credential,\n      expectedChallenge: challenge,\n      expectedOrigin: origins,\n      expectedRPID: authConfig.passkeys.settings().rpID,\n      credential: {\n        id: stored.credentialId,\n        publicKey: new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(String(stored.get(\"public_key\")), \"base64url\")),\n        counter: stored.counter,\n        transports: stored.get(\"transports\") ?? undefined,\n      },\n      requireUserVerification: false,\n    });\n  } catch (error) {\n    // The SDK enforces the counter rule itself and throws a generic Error for\n    // it; keep clone detection visible as its own reason in the logs.\n    const reason = counterRegressed(stored.counter, presentedCounter(credential))\n      ? \"counter-regression\"\n      : \"authentication-verification-failed\";\n\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(reason, error);\n  }\n\n  if (!verification.verified) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"authentication-not-verified\");\n  }\n\n  const previous = stored.counter;\n  const next = Number(verification.authenticationInfo.newCounter);\n\n  if (counterRegressed(previous, next)) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"counter-regression\");\n  }\n\n  if (!(await stored.advanceCounter(previous, next))) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"counter-changed-concurrently\");\n  }\n\n  const UserModel = config.key<ChildModel<Auth> | undefined>(`auth.userType.${stored.userType}`);\n  const user = UserModel ? ((await UserModel.find(stored.userId)) as Auth | null) : null;\n\n  if (!user) {\n    throw new InvalidPasskeyError(\"credential-owner-missing\");\n  }\n\n  return authService.completeLogin(user, deviceInfo);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AAoBA,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAgB,WAAwC;CAChF,IAAI,cAAc,QAAW,OAAO;CAEpC,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY;AACxD;;;;;AAMA,SAAS,iBAAiB,YAAqD;CAC7E,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS;CAEpC,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,UAAU,OAAO;CAExC,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,WAAW;CAEjD,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI;AAC7D;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,eAAsB,uCAAoE;CAGxF,MAAM,UAAU,OAAM,MAFC,mBAAmB,EAEZ,CAAC,8BAA8B;EAC3D,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;EACrC,kBAAkB;CACpB,CAAC;CAED,MAAM,sBAAsB,0BAA0B,QAAQ,SAAS;CAEvE,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAeA,eAAsB,4BACpB,SACA,YACA,YAC4B;CAC5B,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB;CAC1C,MAAM,UAAU,oBAAoB,OAAO;CAC3C,MAAM,EAAE,cAAc,MAAM,qBAAqB,0BAA0B,UAAU;CAErF,MAAM,SACJ,OAAO,WAAW,OAAO,WACrB,MAAM,kBAAkB,mBAAmB,WAAW,EAAE,IACxD;CAEN,IAAI,CAAC,QACH,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,oBAAoB;CAGpD,IAAI;CAEJ,IAAI;EACF,eAAe,MAAM,SAAS,6BAA6B;GACzD,UAAU;GACV,mBAAmB;GACnB,gBAAgB;GAChB,cAAc,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;GAC7C,YAAY;IACV,IAAI,OAAO;IACX,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC;IACpF,SAAS,OAAO;IAChB,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK;GAC1C;GACA,yBAAyB;EAC3B,CAAC;CACH,SAAS,OAAO;EAGd,MAAM,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAO,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAU,CAAC,IACxE,uBACA;EAEJ,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,QAAQ,KAAK;CAC7C;CAEA,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAChB,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,6BAA6B;CAG7D,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO;CACxB,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,aAAa,mBAAmB,UAAU;CAE9D,IAAI,iBAAiB,UAAU,IAAI,GACjC,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,oBAAoB;CAGpD,IAAI,CAAE,MAAM,OAAO,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,GAC9C,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,8BAA8B;CAG9D,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,IAAkC,iBAAiB,OAAO,UAAU;CAC7F,MAAM,OAAO,YAAc,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,IAAqB;CAElF,IAAI,CAAC,MACH,MAAM,IAAI,oBAAoB,0BAA0B;CAG1D,OAAO,YAAY,cAAc,MAAM,UAAU;AACnD"}

package/esm/passkeys/passkey-registration.d.mts

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 import { Auth } from "../models/auth.model.mjs";
 import { PasskeyCredential } from "../models/passkey-credential/passkey-credential.model.mjs";
+import "../models/passkey-credential/index.mjs";
 import { PasskeyOptionsJSON, PasskeyResponseJSON } from "./simplewebauthn.mjs";
 import { Request } from "@warlock.js/core";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-registration.d.ts
 /**
  * Registration options for a LOGGED-IN user adding a passkey. The challenge is
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import { Request } from "@warlock.js/core";
  * // POST /auth/passkeys/register/options  (authMiddleware)
  * response.success(await generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions(request.locals.user));
  */
-declare function generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions(user: Auth): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJSON>;
+export declare function generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions(user: Auth): Promise<PasskeyOptionsJSON>;
 /**
  * Verify the browser's registration response and store the credential.
  * Checks, in order: the request `Origin` (CSRF), the single-use challenge
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ declare function generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions(user: Auth): Promise<Passkey
  *
  * @throws InvalidPasskeyError (400, EC011) on any rejection.
  */
-declare function verifyPasskeyRegistration(request: Request, user: Auth, credential: PasskeyResponseJSON): Promise<PasskeyCredential>;
+export declare function verifyPasskeyRegistration(request: Request, user: Auth, credential: PasskeyResponseJSON): Promise<PasskeyCredential>;
 //#endregion
-export { generatePasskeyRegistrationOptions, verifyPasskeyRegistration };
 //# sourceMappingURL=passkey-registration.d.mts.map

package/esm/passkeys/passkey-registration.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"passkey-registration.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-registration.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;AAoCA;;;;;;iBAAsB,kCAAA,CAAmC,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,GAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,kBAAA;;;;;;;AAAkB;AAgChG;;iBAAsB,yBAAA,CACpB,OAAA,EAAS,OAAA,EACT,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,EACN,UAAA,EAAY,mBAAA,GACX,OAAA,CAAQ,iBAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"passkey-registration.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/passkey-registration.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;wBAoCsB,mCAAmC,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;;;;;;;;;;wBAgCxD,0BACpB,SAAS,SACT,MAAM,MACN,YAAY,sBACX,QAAQ"}

package/esm/passkeys/simplewebauthn.d.mts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/simplewebauthn.d.ts
 /** The browser's JSON-serialized credential (`startRegistration` / `startAuthentication` result). */
-type PasskeyResponseJSON = {
+export type PasskeyResponseJSON = {
   id: string;
   rawId: string;
   type: string;
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ type PasskeyResponseJSON = {
   [key: string]: unknown;
 };
 /** Options JSON handed to the browser; `challenge` is what auth stores. */
-type PasskeyOptionsJSON = {
+export type PasskeyOptionsJSON = {
   challenge: string;
   [key: string]: unknown;
 };
 //#endregion
-export { PasskeyOptionsJSON, PasskeyResponseJSON };
 //# sourceMappingURL=simplewebauthn.d.mts.map

package/esm/passkeys/simplewebauthn.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"simplewebauthn.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/simplewebauthn.ts"],"mappings":";;KAMY,mBAAA;EACV,EAAA;EACA,KAAA;EACA,IAAA;EACA,QAAA;IACE,cAAA;IACA,UAAA;IAAA,CACC,GAAA;EAAA;EAAA,CAEF,GAAA;AAAA;AAAW;AAAA,KAIF,kBAAA;EACV,SAAA;EAAA,CACC,GAAW;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"simplewebauthn.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/passkeys/simplewebauthn.ts"],"mappings":";;YAMY;EACV;EACA;EACA;EACA;IACE;IACA;KACC;;GAEF;;;YAIS;EACV;GACC"}

package/esm/passkeys/simplewebauthn.mjs

@@ -9,5 +9,5 @@ function loadSimpleWebAuthn() {
 }
 
 //#endregion
-export { loadSimpleWebAuthn };
+export { PASSKEYS_FEATURE, loadSimpleWebAuthn };
 //# sourceMappingURL=simplewebauthn.mjs.map

package/esm/providers/apple-provider.d.mts

@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
 import { AppleProviderConfig, AuthProvider, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
 import { JoseModule } from "./google-provider.mjs";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/providers/apple-provider.d.ts
 /** The `warlock add` feature that installs `jose`. */
-declare const APPLE_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-apple";
+export declare const APPLE_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-apple";
 type AppleSignJwtBuilder = {
   setIssuer: (issuer: string) => AppleSignJwtBuilder;
   setIssuedAt: () => AppleSignJwtBuilder;
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ type AppleSignJwtBuilder = {
  * `importPKCS8` and `SignJWT` sign the ES256 client-secret JWT Apple requires
  * instead of a static client secret.
  */
-type AppleJoseModule = JoseModule & {
+export type AppleJoseModule = JoseModule & {
   importPKCS8: (pkcs8: string, alg: string) => Promise<unknown>;
   SignJWT: new (payload: Record<string, unknown>) => {
     setProtectedHeader: (header: Record<string, unknown>) => AppleSignJwtBuilder;
@@ -51,17 +50,14 @@ type AppleJoseModule = JoseModule & {
  * `false`) as unverified. A private-relay address (`@privaterelay.appleid.com`)
  * is still a real, working forwarding address and is accepted as any other.
  */
-declare class AppleProvider implements AuthProvider {
+export declare class AppleProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private readonly settings;
   readonly name = "apple";
   /** Apple's default scopes (`name`, `email`) force `response_mode=form_post`. */
   readonly callbackMode = "form_post";
   constructor(settings: AppleProviderConfig);
   authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
-  handleCallback({
-    query,
-    expected
-  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  handleCallback({ query, expected }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
   /** Sign a fresh ES256 client-secret JWT — Apple has no static one. */
   private clientSecret;
   /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an id_token. */
@@ -70,5 +66,5 @@ declare class AppleProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private verifyIdToken;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { APPLE_AUTH_FEATURE, AppleJoseModule, AppleProvider };
+export {};
 //# sourceMappingURL=apple-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/apple-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"apple-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/apple-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;cAqBa,kBAAA;AAAA,KAER,mBAAA;EACH,SAAA,GAAY,MAAA,aAAmB,mBAAA;EAC/B,WAAA,QAAmB,mBAAA;EACnB,iBAAA,GAAoB,IAAA,aAAiB,mBAAA;EACrC,WAAA,GAAc,QAAA,aAAqB,mBAAA;EACnC,UAAA,GAAa,OAAA,aAAoB,mBAAA;EACjC,IAAA,GAAO,GAAA,cAAiB,OAAA;AAAA;;;;;;KAQd,eAAA,GAAkB,UAAA;EAC5B,WAAA,GAAc,KAAA,UAAe,GAAA,aAAgB,OAAA;EAC7C,OAAA,OAAc,OAAA,EAAS,MAAA;IACrB,kBAAA,GAAqB,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA,sBAA4B,mBAAA;EAAA;AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAX5B;AAQjC;;;;;;;;;;;;cAsCa,aAAA,YAAyB,YAAA;EAAA,iBAKA,QAAA;EAAA,SAJpB,IAAA;EArChB;EAAA,SAuCgB,YAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,mBAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAqBlB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EAlEb;EAAA,QAkGT,YAAA;EAlGgE;EAAA,QAqHhE,YAAA;EAlFH;EAAA,QAyHG,aAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"apple-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/apple-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;qBAqBa;KAER;EACH,YAAY,mBAAmB;EAC/B,mBAAmB;EACnB,oBAAoB,iBAAiB;EACrC,cAAc,qBAAqB;EACnC,aAAa,oBAAoB;EACjC,OAAO,iBAAiB;;;;;;;YAQd,kBAAkB;EAC5B,cAAc,eAAe,gBAAgB;EAC7C,cAAc,SAAS;IACrB,qBAAqB,QAAQ,4BAA4B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;qBAmChD,yBAAyB;mBAKA;WAJpB;;WAEA;EAEhB,YAAoC,UAAU;EAEvC,iBAAiB,OAAO;EAqBlB,iBACX,OACA,YACC,yBAAyB,QAAQ;;UAgCtB;;UAmBA;;UAuCA"}

package/esm/providers/discord-provider.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import { AuthProvider, DiscordProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/providers/discord-provider.d.ts
 /**
  * Discord sign-in: plain OAuth 2 authorization code flow with PKCE (S256).
@@ -7,19 +6,15 @@ import { AuthProvider, DiscordProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, Provid
  * access token is redeemed once for `/users/@me` over a direct HTTPS call.
  * No vendor SDK is involved.
  */
-declare class DiscordProvider implements AuthProvider {
+export declare class DiscordProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private readonly settings;
   readonly name = "discord";
   constructor(settings: DiscordProviderConfig);
   authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
-  handleCallback({
-    query,
-    expected
-  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  handleCallback({ query, expected }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
   /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an access token. */
   private exchangeCode;
   private fetchUser;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { DiscordProvider };
 //# sourceMappingURL=discord-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/discord-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"discord-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/discord-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;AA8BA;;;;cAAa,eAAA,YAA2B,YAAA;EAAA,iBAGF,QAAA;EAAA,SAFpB,IAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,qBAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAclB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EAtBE;EAAA,QAkDxB,YAAA;EAAA,QAiCA,SAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"discord-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/discord-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;qBA8Ba,2BAA2B;mBAGF;WAFpB;EAEhB,YAAoC,UAAU;EAEvC,iBAAiB,OAAO;EAclB,iBACX,OACA,YACC,yBAAyB,QAAQ;;UA4BtB;UAiCA"}

package/esm/providers/facebook-provider.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import { AuthProvider, FacebookProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/providers/facebook-provider.d.ts
 /**
  * Facebook sign-in: plain OAuth 2 authorization code flow with PKCE (S256).
@@ -18,19 +17,15 @@ import { AuthProvider, FacebookProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, Provi
  * already rejects as an unverified/missing email, the same path GitHub's
  * unverified addresses take.
  */
-declare class FacebookProvider implements AuthProvider {
+export declare class FacebookProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private readonly settings;
   readonly name = "facebook";
   constructor(settings: FacebookProviderConfig);
   authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
-  handleCallback({
-    query,
-    expected
-  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  handleCallback({ query, expected }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
   /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an access token. */
   private exchangeCode;
   private fetchUser;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { FacebookProvider };
 //# sourceMappingURL=facebook-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/facebook-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"facebook-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/facebook-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;AAuCA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;cAAa,gBAAA,YAA4B,YAAA;EAAA,iBAGH,QAAA;EAAA,SAFpB,IAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,sBAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAclB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EAjBZ;EAAA,QA4CV,YAAA;EAAA,QAkCA,SAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"facebook-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/facebook-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;qBAuCa,4BAA4B;mBAGH;WAFpB;EAEhB,YAAoC,UAAU;EAEvC,iBAAiB,OAAO;EAclB,iBACX,OACA,YACC,yBAAyB,QAAQ;;UA2BtB;UAkCA"}

package/esm/providers/github-provider.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 import { AuthProvider, GitHubProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/providers/github-provider.d.ts
 /**
  * GitHub sign-in: plain OAuth 2 authorization code flow with PKCE (S256).
@@ -11,15 +10,12 @@ import { AuthProvider, GitHubProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, Provide
  * `/user.email` is `null` unless the user made it public — the emails
  * endpoint is also where GitHub reports whether an address is verified.
  */
-declare class GitHubProvider implements AuthProvider {
+export declare class GitHubProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private readonly settings;
   readonly name = "github";
   constructor(settings: GitHubProviderConfig);
   authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
-  handleCallback({
-    query,
-    expected
-  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  handleCallback({ query, expected }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
   /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an access token. */
   private exchangeCode;
   private fetchUser;
@@ -27,5 +23,4 @@ declare class GitHubProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private fetchPrimaryEmail;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { GitHubProvider };
 //# sourceMappingURL=github-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/github-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"github-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/github-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;AA0CA;;;;;;;;cAAa,cAAA,YAA0B,YAAA;EAAA,iBAGD,QAAA;EAAA,SAFpB,IAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,oBAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAclB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EAnBA;EAAA,QA8CtB,YAAA;EAAA,QAwCA,SAAA;EAtFgC;EAAA,QA2GhC,iBAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"github-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/github-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;qBA0Ca,0BAA0B;mBAGD;WAFpB;EAEhB,YAAoC,UAAU;EAEvC,iBAAiB,OAAO;EAclB,iBACX,OACA,YACC,yBAAyB,QAAQ;;UA2BtB;UAwCA;;UAqBA"}

package/esm/providers/google-provider.d.mts

@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
 import { AuthProvider, GoogleProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/providers/google-provider.d.ts
 /** The `warlock add` feature that installs `jose`. */
-declare const GOOGLE_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-google";
+export declare const GOOGLE_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-google";
 /** The slice of `jose` the Google provider uses — declared locally because `jose` is an optional peer. */
-type JoseModule = {
+export type JoseModule = {
   createRemoteJWKSet: (url: URL) => unknown;
   jwtVerify: (token: string, key: unknown, options: {
     issuer: string[];
@@ -14,27 +13,23 @@ type JoseModule = {
   }>;
 };
 /** PKCE S256 code challenge for a verifier. */
-declare function pkceChallenge(codeVerifier: string): string;
+export declare function pkceChallenge(codeVerifier: string): string;
 /**
  * Google sign-in: OpenID Connect authorization code flow with PKCE (S256),
  * `state` and `nonce`. The code is exchanged with plain `fetch`; the id_token
  * is verified with `jose` against Google's JWKS (signature, `iss`, `aud` = the
  * client id, `exp`), then its `nonce` is compared. No Google SDK.
  */
-declare class GoogleProvider implements AuthProvider {
+export declare class GoogleProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private readonly settings;
   readonly name = "google";
   constructor(settings: GoogleProviderConfig);
   authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
-  handleCallback({
-    query,
-    expected
-  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  handleCallback({ query, expected }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
   /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an id_token. */
   private exchangeCode;
   /** Verify signature, issuer, audience and expiry; resolve the claims. */
   private verifyIdToken;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { GOOGLE_AUTH_FEATURE, GoogleProvider, JoseModule, pkceChallenge };
 //# sourceMappingURL=google-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/google-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"google-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/google-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;cAkBa,mBAAA;AAAb;AAAA,KAGY,UAAA;EACV,kBAAA,GAAqB,GAAA,EAAK,GAAA;EAC1B,SAAA,GACE,KAAA,UACA,GAAA,WACA,OAAA;IAAW,MAAA;IAAkB,QAAA;EAAA,MAC1B,OAAA;IAAU,OAAA,EAAS,MAAA;EAAA;AAAA;;iBAOV,aAAA,CAAc,YAAoB;;;;;;;cAUrC,cAAA,YAA0B,YAAA;EAAA,iBAGD,QAAA;EAAA,SAFpB,IAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,oBAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAelB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EAxCZ;EAAA,QA0EV,YAAA;EA1EgB;EAAA,QA4GhB,aAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"google-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/google-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;qBAkBa;;YAGD;EACV,qBAAqB,KAAK;EAC1B,YACE,eACA,cACA;IAAW;IAAkB;QAC1B;IAAU,SAAS;;;;wBAOV,cAAc;;;;;;;qBAUjB,0BAA0B;mBAGD;WAFpB;EAEhB,YAAoC,UAAU;EAEvC,iBAAiB,OAAO;EAelB,iBACX,OACA,YACC,yBAAyB,QAAQ;;UAkCtB;;UAkCA"}

package/esm/providers/index.d.mts

@@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ import { FacebookProvider } from "./facebook-provider.mjs";
 import { GitHubProvider } from "./github-provider.mjs";
 import { LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE, LinkedInProvider } from "./linkedin-provider.mjs";
 import { completeProviderLogin, resolveAuthProvider, startProviderLogin } from "./provider-login.mjs";
-import { XProvider } from "./x-provider.mjs";
+import { XProvider } from "./x-provider.mjs";
+export { APPLE_AUTH_FEATURE, AppleJoseModule, AppleProvider, DiscordProvider, FacebookProvider, GOOGLE_AUTH_FEATURE, GitHubProvider, GoogleProvider, JoseModule, LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE, LinkedInProvider, XProvider, completeProviderLogin, pkceChallenge, resolveAuthProvider, startProviderLogin };

package/esm/providers/index.mjs

@@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ import { LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE, LinkedInProvider } from "./linkedin-provider.mjs
 import { XProvider } from "./x-provider.mjs";
 import { completeProviderLogin, resolveAuthProvider, startProviderLogin } from "./provider-login.mjs";
 
-export {  };
+export { APPLE_AUTH_FEATURE, AppleProvider, DiscordProvider, FacebookProvider, GOOGLE_AUTH_FEATURE, GitHubProvider, GoogleProvider, LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE, LinkedInProvider, XProvider, completeProviderLogin, pkceChallenge, resolveAuthProvider, startProviderLogin };

package/esm/providers/linkedin-provider.d.mts

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 import { AuthProvider, LinkedInProviderConfig, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
-
 //#region ../../packages/auth/src/providers/linkedin-provider.d.ts
 /** The `warlock add` feature that installs `jose`. */
-declare const LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-linkedin";
+export declare const LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-linkedin";
 /**
  * LinkedIn sign-in: OpenID Connect authorization code flow with PKCE (S256)
  * and `state` and `nonce` — LinkedIn's "Sign In with LinkedIn using OpenID
@@ -16,20 +15,16 @@ declare const LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE = "auth-linkedin";
  * OIDC docs, not from a live exchange — this package has no LinkedIn test
  * credentials. See the worker report for what is and is not proven.
  */
-declare class LinkedInProvider implements AuthProvider {
+export declare class LinkedInProvider implements AuthProvider {
   private readonly settings;
   readonly name = "linkedin";
   constructor(settings: LinkedInProviderConfig);
   authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
-  handleCallback({
-    query,
-    expected
-  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  handleCallback({ query, expected }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
   /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an id_token. */
   private exchangeCode;
   /** Verify signature, issuer, audience and expiry; resolve the claims. */
   private verifyIdToken;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { LINKEDIN_AUTH_FEATURE, LinkedInProvider };
 //# sourceMappingURL=linkedin-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/linkedin-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"linkedin-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/linkedin-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;cAmBa,qBAAA;AAAb;;;;AAAkC;AAkBlC;;;;;;;;AAlBA,cAkBa,gBAAA,YAA4B,YAAA;EAAA,iBAGH,QAAA;EAAA,SAFpB,IAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,sBAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAelB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EApBA;EAAA,QAsDtB,YAAA;;UAkCA,aAAA;AAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"linkedin-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/auth/src/providers/linkedin-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;qBAmBa;;;;;;;;;;;;;;qBAkBA,4BAA4B;mBAGH;WAFpB;EAEhB,YAAoC,UAAU;EAEvC,iBAAiB,OAAO;EAelB,iBACX,OACA,YACC,yBAAyB,QAAQ;;UAkCtB;;UAkCA"}