@warlock.js/auth 5.24.0 → 5.26.0

package/esm/models/auth-token-family/auth-token-family.model.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"auth-token-family.model.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../auth/src/models/auth-token-family/auth-token-family.model.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Model } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { v } from \"@warlock.js/seal\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../auth.model\";\n\n/** Durable revision authority for one refresh-token rotation family. */\nexport const authTokenFamilySchema = v.object({\n  family_id: v.string().required(),\n  user_id: v.scalar().required(),\n  user_type: v.string().required(),\n  revision: v.number().default(0),\n  revoked_at: v.date().optional(),\n});\n\n/** Coordinates family-wide refresh, replay containment, and logout transitions. */\nexport class AuthTokenFamily extends Model {\n  public static table = \"auth_token_families\";\n\n  public static schema = authTokenFamilySchema;\n\n  /** Whether a family-wide revoke has made every member unusable. */\n  public get isRevoked(): boolean {\n    return Boolean(this.get(\"revoked_at\"));\n  }\n\n  /** Create the durable family record before its first token pair is issued. */\n  public static issue(user: Auth, familyId: string) {\n    return this.create({\n      family_id: familyId,\n      user_id: user.id,\n      user_type: user.userType,\n      revision: 0,\n    });\n  }\n\n  public static findByFamilyId(familyId: string): Promise<AuthTokenFamily | null> {\n    return this.first({ family_id: familyId });\n  }\n\n  /** Add a durable row for an existing lineage through a driver-native upsert. */\n  public static async ensure(user: Auth, familyId: string): Promise<AuthTokenFamily> {\n    await this.atomic(\n      { family_id: familyId },\n      { $setOnInsert: { user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revision: 0 } },\n      { upsert: true },\n    );\n\n    const family = await this.findByFamilyId(familyId);\n\n    if (!family) throw new Error(\"Token family upsert did not return a family\");\n\n    if (family.get(\"user_id\") !== user.id || family.get<string>(\"user_type\") !== user.userType) {\n      throw new Error(\"Token family belongs to a different user\");\n    }\n\n    return family;\n  }\n\n  /** Every non-revoked family for a user, including a rotated refresh row. */\n  public static activeFor(user: Auth): Promise<AuthTokenFamily[]> {\n    return this.query()\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\n      .get();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Compare-and-set the family revision. A zero result is a concurrent family\n   * transition, never a successful no-op.\n   */\n  public static advanceRevision(familyId: string, expectedRevision: number): Promise<number> {\n    return this.atomic(\n      { family_id: familyId, revision: expectedRevision, revoked_at: null },\n      { $inc: { revision: 1 } },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Stamp the durable family revoke marker after a successful CAS. */\n  public static revoke(familyId: string, expectedRevision: number): Promise<number> {\n    return this.atomic(\n      { family_id: familyId, revision: expectedRevision + 1, revoked_at: null },\n      { $set: { revoked_at: new Date() } },\n    );\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAKA,MAAa,wBAAwB,EAAE,OAAO;CAC5C,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/B,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;CAC9B,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;AAChC,CAAC;;AAGD,IAAa,kBAAb,cAAqC,MAAM;;eACnB;;;gBAEC;;;CAGvB,IAAW,YAAqB;EAC9B,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;CACvC;;CAGA,OAAc,MAAM,MAAY,UAAkB;EAChD,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;GACjB,WAAW;GACX,SAAS,KAAK;GACd,WAAW,KAAK;GAChB,UAAU;EACZ,CAAC;CACH;CAEA,OAAc,eAAe,UAAmD;EAC9E,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;CAC3C;;CAGA,aAAoB,OAAO,MAAY,UAA4C;EACjF,MAAM,KAAK,OACT,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,GACtB,EAAE,cAAc;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,UAAU;EAAE,EAAE,GAC5E,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,CACjB;EAEA,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ;EAEjD,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6CAA6C;EAE1E,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAY,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,UAChF,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0CAA0C;EAG5D,OAAO;CACT;;CAGA,OAAc,UAAU,MAAwC;EAC9D,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAChB,MAAM;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,YAAY;EAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CACvE,IAAI;CACT;;;;;CAMA,OAAc,gBAAgB,UAAkB,kBAA2C;EACzF,OAAO,KAAK,OACV;GAAE,WAAW;GAAU,UAAU;GAAkB,YAAY;EAAK,GACpE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAC1B;CACF;;CAGA,OAAc,OAAO,UAAkB,kBAA2C;EAChF,OAAO,KAAK,OACV;GAAE,WAAW;GAAU,UAAU,mBAAmB;GAAG,YAAY;EAAK,GACxE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,4BAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CACrC;CACF;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"auth-token-family.model.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../auth/src/models/auth-token-family/auth-token-family.model.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Model } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { v } from \"@warlock.js/seal\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../auth.model\";\n\n/** Durable revision authority for one refresh-token rotation family. */\nexport const authTokenFamilySchema = v.object({\n  family_id: v.string().required(),\n  user_id: v.scalar().required(),\n  user_type: v.string().required(),\n  revision: v.number().default(0),\n  revoked_at: v.date().optional(),\n});\n\n/** Coordinates family-wide refresh, replay containment, and logout transitions. */\nexport class AuthTokenFamily extends Model {\n  public static table = \"auth_token_families\";\n\n  public static schema = authTokenFamilySchema;\n\n  /** Whether a family-wide revoke has made every member unusable. */\n  public get isRevoked(): boolean {\n    return Boolean(this.get(\"revoked_at\"));\n  }\n\n  /** Create the durable family record before its first token pair is issued. */\n  public static issue(user: Auth, familyId: string) {\n    return this.create({\n      family_id: familyId,\n      user_id: user.id,\n      user_type: user.userType,\n      revision: 0,\n    });\n  }\n\n  public static findByFamilyId(familyId: string): Promise<AuthTokenFamily | null> {\n    return this.first({ family_id: familyId });\n  }\n\n  /** Add a durable row for an existing lineage through a driver-native upsert. */\n  public static async ensure(user: Auth, familyId: string): Promise<AuthTokenFamily> {\n    const existing = await this.findByFamilyId(familyId);\n\n    if (existing) {\n      if (\n        existing.get(\"user_id\") !== user.id ||\n        existing.get<string>(\"user_type\") !== user.userType\n      ) {\n        throw new Error(\"Token family belongs to a different user\");\n      }\n\n      return existing;\n    }\n\n    await this.atomic(\n      { family_id: familyId },\n      { $setOnInsert: { user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revision: 0 } },\n      { upsert: true },\n    );\n\n    const family = await this.findByFamilyId(familyId);\n\n    if (!family) throw new Error(\"Token family upsert did not return a family\");\n\n    if (family.get(\"user_id\") !== user.id || family.get<string>(\"user_type\") !== user.userType) {\n      throw new Error(\"Token family belongs to a different user\");\n    }\n\n    return family;\n  }\n\n  /** Every non-revoked family for a user, including a rotated refresh row. */\n  public static activeFor(user: Auth): Promise<AuthTokenFamily[]> {\n    return this.query()\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\n      .get();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Compare-and-set the family revision. A zero result is a concurrent family\n   * transition, never a successful no-op.\n   */\n  public static advanceRevision(familyId: string, expectedRevision: number): Promise<number> {\n    return this.atomic(\n      { family_id: familyId, revision: expectedRevision, revoked_at: null },\n      { $inc: { revision: 1 } },\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Stamp the durable family revoke marker after a successful CAS. */\n  public static revoke(familyId: string, expectedRevision: number): Promise<number> {\n    return this.atomic(\n      { family_id: familyId, revision: expectedRevision + 1, revoked_at: null },\n      { $set: { revoked_at: new Date() } },\n    );\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAKA,MAAa,wBAAwB,EAAE,OAAO;CAC5C,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/B,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;CAC9B,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;AAChC,CAAC;;AAGD,IAAa,kBAAb,cAAqC,MAAM;;eACnB;;;gBAEC;;;CAGvB,IAAW,YAAqB;EAC9B,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;CACvC;;CAGA,OAAc,MAAM,MAAY,UAAkB;EAChD,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;GACjB,WAAW;GACX,SAAS,KAAK;GACd,WAAW,KAAK;GAChB,UAAU;EACZ,CAAC;CACH;CAEA,OAAc,eAAe,UAAmD;EAC9E,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;CAC3C;;CAGA,aAAoB,OAAO,MAAY,UAA4C;EACjF,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ;EAEnD,IAAI,UAAU;GACZ,IACE,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MACjC,SAAS,IAAY,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,UAE3C,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0CAA0C;GAG5D,OAAO;EACT;EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,OACT,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,GACtB,EAAE,cAAc;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,UAAU;EAAE,EAAE,GAC5E,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,CACjB;EAEA,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ;EAEjD,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6CAA6C;EAE1E,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAY,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,UAChF,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0CAA0C;EAG5D,OAAO;CACT;;CAGA,OAAc,UAAU,MAAwC;EAC9D,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAChB,MAAM;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,YAAY;EAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CACvE,IAAI;CACT;;;;;CAMA,OAAc,gBAAgB,UAAkB,kBAA2C;EACzF,OAAO,KAAK,OACV;GAAE,WAAW;GAAU,UAAU;GAAkB,YAAY;EAAK,GACpE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAC1B;CACF;;CAGA,OAAc,OAAO,UAAkB,kBAA2C;EAChF,OAAO,KAAK,OACV;GAAE,WAAW;GAAU,UAAU,mBAAmB;GAAG,YAAY;EAAK,GACxE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,4BAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CACrC;CACF;AACF"}

package/esm/models/auth.model.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"auth.model.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/models/auth.model.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { type ChildModel, Model, type ModelSchema } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\r\nimport type { Authenticable } from \"../contracts/auth-contract\";\r\nimport type { AccessTokenOutput, DeviceInfo, TokenPair } from \"../contracts/types\";\r\nimport { authService } from \"../services\";\r\nimport type { RefreshToken } from \"./refresh-token/refresh-token.model\";\r\n\r\nexport abstract class Auth<Schema extends ModelSchema = ModelSchema>\r\n  extends Model<Schema>\r\n  implements Authenticable\r\n{\r\n  /**\r\n   * Get user type\r\n   */\r\n  public abstract get userType(): string;\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Get access token payload\r\n   */\r\n  public accessTokenPayload() {\r\n    return authService.buildAccessTokenPayload(this);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Create both access and refresh tokens\r\n   */\r\n  public async createTokenPair(deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<TokenPair> {\r\n    return authService.createTokenPair(this, deviceInfo);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Generate access token\r\n   */\r\n  public async generateAccessToken(data?: any): Promise<AccessTokenOutput> {\r\n    return authService.generateAccessToken(this, data);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Generate refresh token\r\n   */\r\n  public async generateRefreshToken(deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<RefreshToken | undefined> {\r\n    return authService.createRefreshToken(this, deviceInfo);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Remove current access token\r\n   */\r\n  public async removeAccessToken(token: string): Promise<void> {\r\n    return authService.removeAccessToken(this, token);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Remove refresh token\r\n   */\r\n  public async removeRefreshToken(token: string): Promise<void> {\r\n    return authService.removeRefreshToken(this, token);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Remove all access tokens\r\n   */\r\n  public async removeAllAccessTokens(): Promise<void> {\r\n    return authService.removeAllAccessTokens(this);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Revoke all tokens (logout from all devices)\r\n   */\r\n  public async revokeAllTokens(): Promise<void> {\r\n    return authService.revokeAllTokens(this);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Get active sessions\r\n   */\r\n  public async activeSessions(): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\r\n    return authService.getActiveSessions(this);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Attempt to login the user\r\n   */\r\n  public static async attempt(this: ChildModel<Auth>, data: any): Promise<Auth | null> {\r\n    return authService.attemptLogin(this, data);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Confirm password\r\n   */\r\n  public async confirmPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {\r\n    return authService.verifyPassword(password, this.string(\"password\")!);\r\n  }\r\n}\r\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAMA,IAAsB,OAAtB,cACU,MAEV;;;;CASE,AAAO,qBAAqB;EAC1B,OAAO,YAAY,wBAAwB,IAAI;CACjD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,gBAAgB,YAA6C;EACxE,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAgB,MAAM,UAAU;CACrD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,oBAAoB,MAAwC;EACvE,OAAO,YAAY,oBAAoB,MAAM,IAAI;CACnD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,qBAAqB,YAA4D;EAC5F,OAAO,YAAY,mBAAmB,MAAM,UAAU;CACxD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,kBAAkB,OAA8B;EAC3D,OAAO,YAAY,kBAAkB,MAAM,KAAK;CAClD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,mBAAmB,OAA8B;EAC5D,OAAO,YAAY,mBAAmB,MAAM,KAAK;CACnD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,wBAAuC;EAClD,OAAO,YAAY,sBAAsB,IAAI;CAC/C;;;;CAKA,MAAa,kBAAiC;EAC5C,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI;CACzC;;;;CAKA,MAAa,iBAA0C;EACrD,OAAO,YAAY,kBAAkB,IAAI;CAC3C;;;;CAKA,aAAoB,QAAgC,MAAiC;EACnF,OAAO,YAAY,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI;CAC5C;;;;CAKA,MAAa,gBAAgB,UAAoC;EAC/D,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU,CAAE;CACtE;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"auth.model.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/models/auth.model.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { type ChildModel, Model, type ModelSchema } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport type { Authenticable } from \"../contracts/auth-contract\";\nimport type { AccessTokenOutput, DeviceInfo, TokenPair } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport { authService } from \"../services\";\nimport type { RefreshToken } from \"./refresh-token/refresh-token.model\";\n\nexport abstract class Auth<Schema extends ModelSchema = ModelSchema>\n  extends Model<Schema>\n  implements Authenticable\n{\n  /**\n   * Get user type\n   */\n  public abstract get userType(): string;\n\n  /**\n   * Get access token payload\n   */\n  public accessTokenPayload() {\n    return authService.buildAccessTokenPayload(this);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Create both access and refresh tokens\n   */\n  public async createTokenPair(deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<TokenPair> {\n    return authService.createTokenPair(this, deviceInfo);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Generate access token\n   */\n  public async generateAccessToken(data?: any): Promise<AccessTokenOutput> {\n    return authService.generateAccessToken(this, data);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Generate refresh token\n   */\n  public async generateRefreshToken(deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo): Promise<RefreshToken | undefined> {\n    return authService.createRefreshToken(this, deviceInfo);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Remove current access token\n   */\n  public async removeAccessToken(token: string): Promise<void> {\n    return authService.removeAccessToken(this, token);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Remove refresh token\n   */\n  public async removeRefreshToken(token: string): Promise<void> {\n    return authService.removeRefreshToken(this, token);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Remove all access tokens\n   */\n  public async removeAllAccessTokens(): Promise<void> {\n    return authService.removeAllAccessTokens(this);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Revoke all tokens (logout from all devices)\n   */\n  public async revokeAllTokens(): Promise<void> {\n    return authService.revokeAllTokens(this);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get active sessions\n   */\n  public async activeSessions(): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    return authService.getActiveSessions(this);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Attempt to login the user\n   */\n  public static async attempt(this: ChildModel<Auth>, data: any): Promise<Auth | null> {\n    return authService.attemptLogin(this, data);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Confirm password\n   */\n  public async confirmPassword(password: string): Promise<boolean> {\n    return authService.verifyPassword(password, this.string(\"password\")!);\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAMA,IAAsB,OAAtB,cACU,MAEV;;;;CASE,AAAO,qBAAqB;EAC1B,OAAO,YAAY,wBAAwB,IAAI;CACjD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,gBAAgB,YAA6C;EACxE,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAgB,MAAM,UAAU;CACrD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,oBAAoB,MAAwC;EACvE,OAAO,YAAY,oBAAoB,MAAM,IAAI;CACnD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,qBAAqB,YAA4D;EAC5F,OAAO,YAAY,mBAAmB,MAAM,UAAU;CACxD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,kBAAkB,OAA8B;EAC3D,OAAO,YAAY,kBAAkB,MAAM,KAAK;CAClD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,mBAAmB,OAA8B;EAC5D,OAAO,YAAY,mBAAmB,MAAM,KAAK;CACnD;;;;CAKA,MAAa,wBAAuC;EAClD,OAAO,YAAY,sBAAsB,IAAI;CAC/C;;;;CAKA,MAAa,kBAAiC;EAC5C,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI;CACzC;;;;CAKA,MAAa,iBAA0C;EACrD,OAAO,YAAY,kBAAkB,IAAI;CAC3C;;;;CAKA,aAAoB,QAAgC,MAAiC;EACnF,OAAO,YAAY,aAAa,MAAM,IAAI;CAC5C;;;;CAKA,MAAa,gBAAgB,UAAoC;EAC/D,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU,CAAE;CACtE;AACF"}

package/esm/models/refresh-token/migration.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"migration.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../auth/src/models/refresh-token/migration.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { migrate } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\r\nimport { RefreshToken } from \"./refresh-token.model\";\r\n\r\nexport const RefreshTokenMigration = migrate(RefreshToken, {\r\n  name: \"refreshToken\",\r\n  up() {\r\n    // Create table\r\n    this.createTableIfNotExists();\r\n\r\n    // Primary key\r\n    this.primaryUuid();\r\n\r\n    // Token fields\r\n    this.text(\"token\").unique();\r\n    // `foreignId` matches the DataSource's default primary-key type so the\r\n    // column stays compatible with the user model's `id` (integer by default,\r\n    // or uuid) — hardcoding uuid here 500'd login on integer-PK apps (5e47bdb3).\r\n    this.foreignId(\"user_id\").index();\r\n    this.string(\"user_type\", 50).nullable();\r\n    this.text(\"family_id\").index().nullable();\r\n    this.timestamp(\"expires_at\").index().nullable();\r\n    this.timestamp(\"last_used_at\").nullable();\r\n    this.timestamp(\"revoked_at\").nullable();\r\n    this.json(\"device_info\").nullable();\r\n\r\n    // Composite index for the per-user active-session lookups\r\n    // (revokeAllFor / enforceMax / activeFor all filter on user_id + user_type).\r\n    this.index([\"user_id\", \"user_type\"]);\r\n\r\n    // Timestamps\r\n    this.timestamps();\r\n  },\r\n  down() {\r\n    this.dropTableIfExists();\r\n  },\r\n});\r\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAGA,MAAa,wBAAwB,QAAQ,cAAc;CACzD,MAAM;CACN,KAAK;EAEH,KAAK,uBAAuB;EAG5B,KAAK,YAAY;EAGjB,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO;EAI1B,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM;EAChC,KAAK,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACtC,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACxC,KAAK,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EAC9C,KAAK,UAAU,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACxC,KAAK,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACtC,KAAK,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EAIlC,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC;EAGnC,KAAK,WAAW;CAClB;CACA,OAAO;EACL,KAAK,kBAAkB;CACzB;AACF,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"migration.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../auth/src/models/refresh-token/migration.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { migrate } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { RefreshToken } from \"./refresh-token.model\";\n\nexport const RefreshTokenMigration = migrate(RefreshToken, {\n  name: \"refreshToken\",\n  up() {\n    // Create table\n    this.createTableIfNotExists();\n\n    // Primary key\n    this.primaryUuid();\n\n    // Token fields\n    this.text(\"token\").unique();\n    // `foreignId` matches the DataSource's default primary-key type so the\n    // column stays compatible with the user model's `id` (integer by default,\n    // or uuid) — hardcoding uuid here 500'd login on integer-PK apps (5e47bdb3).\n    this.foreignId(\"user_id\").index();\n    this.string(\"user_type\", 50).nullable();\n    this.text(\"family_id\").index().nullable();\n    this.timestamp(\"expires_at\").index().nullable();\n    this.timestamp(\"last_used_at\").nullable();\n    this.timestamp(\"revoked_at\").nullable();\n    this.json(\"device_info\").nullable();\n\n    // Composite index for the per-user active-session lookups\n    // (revokeAllFor / enforceMax / activeFor all filter on user_id + user_type).\n    this.index([\"user_id\", \"user_type\"]);\n\n    // Timestamps\n    this.timestamps();\n  },\n  down() {\n    this.dropTableIfExists();\n  },\n});\n"],"mappings":";;;;AAGA,MAAa,wBAAwB,QAAQ,cAAc;CACzD,MAAM;CACN,KAAK;EAEH,KAAK,uBAAuB;EAG5B,KAAK,YAAY;EAGjB,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO;EAI1B,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM;EAChC,KAAK,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACtC,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACxC,KAAK,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EAC9C,KAAK,UAAU,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACxC,KAAK,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EACtC,KAAK,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;EAIlC,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC;EAGnC,KAAK,WAAW;CAClB;CACA,OAAO;EACL,KAAK,kBAAkB;CACzB;AACF,CAAC"}

package/esm/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"refresh-token.model.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../auth/src/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Model } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\r\nimport { v } from \"@warlock.js/seal\";\r\nimport type { DeviceInfo } from \"../../contracts/types\";\r\nimport { isNeverExpiring, isUsableExpiry } from \"../../utils/token-expiry\";\r\nimport type { Auth } from \"../auth.model\";\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Seal schema for the persisted refresh-token record. Exported so an override\r\n * can spread it and add columns (e.g. a tenant key) without re-declaring the\r\n * base shape:\r\n *\r\n * @example\r\n * export class AppRefreshToken extends RefreshToken {\r\n *   public static schema = refreshTokenSchema.extend({\r\n *     organization_id: v.string().required(),\r\n *   });\r\n * }\r\n */\r\nexport const refreshTokenSchema = v.object({\r\n  token: v.string().required(),\r\n  user_id: v.scalar().required(),\r\n  user_type: v.string().required(),\r\n  family_id: v.string().required(),\r\n  expires_at: v.date().required(),\r\n  last_used_at: v.date().default(() => new Date()),\r\n  revoked_at: v.date().optional(),\r\n  /** The successor pair a bounded concurrent renewal may reuse. */\r\n  successor_access_token_id: v.string().optional(),\r\n  successor_refresh_token_id: v.string().optional(),\r\n  device_info: v.record(v.any()).optional(),\r\n});\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Extra attributes captured when a refresh token is issued.\r\n */\r\nexport type RefreshTokenIssueOptions = {\r\n  familyId: string;\r\n  expiresAt: string;\r\n  deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo;\r\n};\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Persisted refresh-token record + the data layer for refresh tokens.\r\n *\r\n * **Role.** Owns every refresh-token read, write, and lifecycle transition.\r\n * The auth service drives refresh-token state exclusively through this model's\r\n * named statics and instance methods, so it never hard-codes a column name —\r\n * which is what makes a snake/camel mismatch (the historical `userId` bug)\r\n * structurally impossible and lets an override rename or add columns by\r\n * extending this class and registering it under `config.auth.refreshToken.model`.\r\n */\r\nexport class RefreshToken extends Model {\r\n  public static table = \"refresh_tokens\";\r\n\r\n  public static schema = refreshTokenSchema;\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * The raw signed refresh JWT is a bearer credential — never serialize it.\r\n   * `hidden` only strips it from `toJSON()` / `JSON.stringify(model)` (e.g. a\r\n   * session list returned via `response.json`); `get(\"token\")`,\r\n   * `findByToken` / `findForUser` and every query still read the column.\r\n   */\r\n  public static hidden = [\"token\"];\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Permanent regardless of the data source default — Mongo's driver default\r\n   * is `\"trash\"`, which would copy live credential material (the JWT itself)\r\n   * into `refresh_tokensTrash` on every `destroy()` (expiry purge,\r\n   * never-expiring purge). A purged refresh token must not survive anywhere.\r\n   */\r\n  public static deleteStrategy = \"permanent\" as const;\r\n\r\n  /** Token family this row belongs to (rotation / replay grouping). */\r\n  public get familyId(): string {\r\n    return this.get(\"family_id\");\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Whether the token's `expires_at` is in the past.\r\n   *\r\n   * **Fails closed as of 4.12.0**: a missing or unparseable `expires_at` now\r\n   * counts as expired. It previously answered `false` for both — \"no expiry\r\n   * recorded ⇒ never expires\" — which handed an unlimited life to precisely the\r\n   * malformed rows, including the `Invalid Date` a pre-4.12.0 unparseable\r\n   * `expiresIn` could write. `expires_at` is `required` in the schema, so a row\r\n   * that cannot say when it dies is malformed, not immortal.\r\n   */\r\n  public get isExpired(): boolean {\r\n    const expiresAt = this.get(\"expires_at\");\r\n\r\n    if (!isUsableExpiry(expiresAt)) return true;\r\n\r\n    return new Date().getTime() > new Date(expiresAt).getTime();\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Whether nothing can ever retire this row — an unusable `expires_at`, or a\r\n   * token carrying no `exp` claim. See {@link isNeverExpiring}.\r\n   */\r\n  public get neverExpires(): boolean {\r\n    return isNeverExpiring(this.get(\"token\"), this.get(\"expires_at\"));\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /** Whether the token has been revoked. */\r\n  public get isRevoked(): boolean {\r\n    return !!this.get(\"revoked_at\");\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /** Whether the token is still usable (not expired and not revoked). */\r\n  public get isValid(): boolean {\r\n    return !this.isExpired && !this.isRevoked;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Unconditionally stamp `revoked_at` on this token.\r\n   */\r\n  public async revoke(): Promise<this> {\r\n    return this.merge({ revoked_at: new Date() }).save();\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Atomically revoke this token ONLY if it is still active. Resolves to `true`\r\n   * when this call performed the revoke, `false` when a concurrent request had\r\n   * already revoked it — the win/lose signal that powers rotation replay\r\n   * detection. Uses a conditional UPDATE so two concurrent rotations of the\r\n   * same token can never both succeed.\r\n   */\r\n  public async revokeIfActive(): Promise<boolean> {\r\n    const modelClass = this.constructor as typeof RefreshToken;\r\n\r\n    const revokedCount = await modelClass.atomic(\r\n      { id: this.id, revoked_at: null },\r\n      { $set: { revoked_at: new Date() } },\r\n    );\r\n\r\n    return revokedCount > 0;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Touch `last_used_at` without revoking — the non-rotating refresh path.\r\n   */\r\n  public async markAsUsed(): Promise<void> {\r\n    await this.merge({ last_used_at: new Date() }).save();\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Persist a freshly-signed refresh token for the user.\r\n   */\r\n  public static issue(user: Auth, token: string, options: RefreshTokenIssueOptions) {\r\n    return this.create({\r\n      token,\r\n      user_id: user.id,\r\n      user_type: user.userType,\r\n      family_id: options.familyId,\r\n      expires_at: options.expiresAt,\r\n      device_info: options.deviceInfo\r\n        ? {\r\n            userAgent: options.deviceInfo.userAgent,\r\n            ip: options.deviceInfo.ip,\r\n            deviceId: options.deviceInfo.deviceId,\r\n          }\r\n        : undefined,\r\n    });\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Find a refresh-token row by its raw token string.\r\n   */\r\n  public static findByToken(token: string): Promise<RefreshToken | null> {\r\n    return this.first({ token });\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Find a refresh token scoped to a user — used by logout so a caller can only\r\n   * revoke a token that actually belongs to them.\r\n   */\r\n  public static findForUser(user: Auth, token: string): Promise<RefreshToken | null> {\r\n    return this.first({ token, user_id: user.id });\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /** Find any member of a family, including an already-revoked legacy member. */\r\n  public static findInFamily(familyId: string): Promise<RefreshToken | null> {\r\n    return this.first({ family_id: familyId });\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Every refresh lineage for a user, including rotated rows. Logout uses this\r\n   * to bootstrap durable family records before it starts family revocations.\r\n   */\r\n  public static familiesForUser(user: Auth): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\r\n    return this.query().where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType }).get();\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Delete a specific refresh token belonging to the user.\r\n   */\r\n  public static deleteForUser(user: Auth, token: string) {\r\n    return this.delete({ token, user_id: user.id });\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Active, unexpired sessions for the user, newest first.\r\n   */\r\n  public static activeFor(user: Auth): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\r\n    return this.query()\r\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\r\n      .where(\"expires_at\", \">\", new Date())\r\n      .orderBy(\"created_at\", \"desc\")\r\n      .get();\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Revoke every still-active refresh token for the user, returning the rows\r\n   * that were revoked so the caller can emit a per-token event for each.\r\n   *\r\n   * Rows are fetched BEFORE they are revoked: a bulk `findAndUpdate` keyed on\r\n   * `revoked_at: null` would re-query the same predicate after the update and\r\n   * match nothing, returning an empty set.\r\n   */\r\n  public static async revokeAllFor(user: Auth): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\r\n    const tokens = await this.query()\r\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\r\n      .get();\r\n\r\n    for (const token of tokens) {\r\n      await token.revoke();\r\n    }\r\n\r\n    return tokens;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Revoke every still-active token in a family (rotation breach containment),\r\n   * returning the revoked rows (fetched before revocation — see `revokeAllFor`).\r\n   */\r\n  public static async revokeFamily(familyId: string): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\r\n    const tokens = await this.query().where({ family_id: familyId, revoked_at: null }).get();\r\n\r\n    for (const token of tokens) {\r\n      await token.revoke();\r\n    }\r\n\r\n    return tokens;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Revoke the oldest active tokens so at most `max - 1` remain — making room\r\n   * for the about-to-be-issued one. Bounded by `max`, so the per-row loop is\r\n   * small.\r\n   */\r\n  public static async enforceMax(user: Auth, max: number): Promise<void> {\r\n    const activeTokens = await this.query()\r\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\r\n      .orderBy(\"created_at\", \"asc\")\r\n      .get();\r\n\r\n    if (activeTokens.length < max) return;\r\n\r\n    const tokensToRevoke = activeTokens.slice(0, activeTokens.length - max + 1);\r\n\r\n    for (const token of tokensToRevoke) {\r\n      await token.revoke();\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Hard-delete every expired refresh token, returning the deleted rows so the\r\n   * caller can emit a per-token event. Runs from the `auth.cleanup` CLI command\r\n   * (a cold batch path).\r\n   */\r\n  public static async purgeExpired(): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\r\n    const expiredTokens = await this.query().where(\"expires_at\", \"<\", new Date()).get();\r\n\r\n    for (const token of expiredTokens) {\r\n      await token.destroy();\r\n    }\r\n\r\n    return expiredTokens;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Every row that can never retire itself — see {@link neverExpires}. 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+{"version":3,"file":"refresh-token.model.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../../auth/src/models/refresh-token/refresh-token.model.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Model } from \"@warlock.js/cascade\";\nimport { v } from \"@warlock.js/seal\";\nimport type { DeviceInfo } from \"../../contracts/types\";\nimport { isNeverExpiring, isUsableExpiry } from \"../../utils/token-expiry\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../auth.model\";\n\n/**\n * Seal schema for the persisted refresh-token record. Exported so an override\n * can spread it and add columns (e.g. a tenant key) without re-declaring the\n * base shape:\n *\n * @example\n * export class AppRefreshToken extends RefreshToken {\n *   public static schema = refreshTokenSchema.extend({\n *     organization_id: v.string().required(),\n *   });\n * }\n */\nexport const refreshTokenSchema = v.object({\n  token: v.string().required(),\n  user_id: v.scalar().required(),\n  user_type: v.string().required(),\n  family_id: v.string().required(),\n  expires_at: v.date().required(),\n  last_used_at: v.date().default(() => new Date()),\n  revoked_at: v.date().optional(),\n  /** The successor pair a bounded concurrent renewal may reuse. */\n  successor_access_token_id: v.string().optional(),\n  successor_refresh_token_id: v.string().optional(),\n  device_info: v.record(v.any()).optional(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Extra attributes captured when a refresh token is issued.\n */\nexport type RefreshTokenIssueOptions = {\n  familyId: string;\n  expiresAt: string;\n  deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo;\n};\n\n/**\n * Persisted refresh-token record + the data layer for refresh tokens.\n *\n * **Role.** Owns every refresh-token read, write, and lifecycle transition.\n * The auth service drives refresh-token state exclusively through this model's\n * named statics and instance methods, so it never hard-codes a column name —\n * which is what makes a snake/camel mismatch (the historical `userId` bug)\n * structurally impossible and lets an override rename or add columns by\n * extending this class and registering it under `config.auth.refreshToken.model`.\n */\nexport class RefreshToken extends Model {\n  public static table = \"refresh_tokens\";\n\n  public static schema = refreshTokenSchema;\n\n  /**\n   * The raw signed refresh JWT is a bearer credential — never serialize it.\n   * `hidden` only strips it from `toJSON()` / `JSON.stringify(model)` (e.g. a\n   * session list returned via `response.json`); `get(\"token\")`,\n   * `findByToken` / `findForUser` and every query still read the column.\n   */\n  public static hidden = [\"token\"];\n\n  /**\n   * Permanent regardless of the data source default — Mongo's driver default\n   * is `\"trash\"`, which would copy live credential material (the JWT itself)\n   * into `refresh_tokensTrash` on every `destroy()` (expiry purge,\n   * never-expiring purge). A purged refresh token must not survive anywhere.\n   */\n  public static deleteStrategy = \"permanent\" as const;\n\n  /** Token family this row belongs to (rotation / replay grouping). */\n  public get familyId(): string {\n    return this.get(\"family_id\");\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the token's `expires_at` is in the past.\n   *\n   * **Fails closed as of 4.12.0**: a missing or unparseable `expires_at` now\n   * counts as expired. It previously answered `false` for both — \"no expiry\n   * recorded ⇒ never expires\" — which handed an unlimited life to precisely the\n   * malformed rows, including the `Invalid Date` a pre-4.12.0 unparseable\n   * `expiresIn` could write. `expires_at` is `required` in the schema, so a row\n   * that cannot say when it dies is malformed, not immortal.\n   */\n  public get isExpired(): boolean {\n    const expiresAt = this.get(\"expires_at\");\n\n    if (!isUsableExpiry(expiresAt)) return true;\n\n    return new Date().getTime() > new Date(expiresAt).getTime();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Whether nothing can ever retire this row — an unusable `expires_at`, or a\n   * token carrying no `exp` claim. See {@link isNeverExpiring}.\n   */\n  public get neverExpires(): boolean {\n    return isNeverExpiring(this.get(\"token\"), this.get(\"expires_at\"));\n  }\n\n  /** Whether the token has been revoked. */\n  public get isRevoked(): boolean {\n    return !!this.get(\"revoked_at\");\n  }\n\n  /** Whether the token is still usable (not expired and not revoked). */\n  public get isValid(): boolean {\n    return !this.isExpired && !this.isRevoked;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Unconditionally stamp `revoked_at` on this token.\n   */\n  public async revoke(): Promise<this> {\n    return this.merge({ revoked_at: new Date() }).save();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Atomically revoke this token ONLY if it is still active. Resolves to `true`\n   * when this call performed the revoke, `false` when a concurrent request had\n   * already revoked it — the win/lose signal that powers rotation replay\n   * detection. Uses a conditional UPDATE so two concurrent rotations of the\n   * same token can never both succeed.\n   */\n  public async revokeIfActive(): Promise<boolean> {\n    const modelClass = this.constructor as typeof RefreshToken;\n\n    const revokedCount = await modelClass.atomic(\n      { id: this.id, revoked_at: null },\n      { $set: { revoked_at: new Date() } },\n    );\n\n    return revokedCount > 0;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Touch `last_used_at` without revoking — the non-rotating refresh path.\n   */\n  public async markAsUsed(): Promise<void> {\n    await this.merge({ last_used_at: new Date() }).save();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Persist a freshly-signed refresh token for the user.\n   */\n  public static issue(user: Auth, token: string, options: RefreshTokenIssueOptions) {\n    return this.create({\n      token,\n      user_id: user.id,\n      user_type: user.userType,\n      family_id: options.familyId,\n      expires_at: options.expiresAt,\n      device_info: options.deviceInfo\n        ? {\n            userAgent: options.deviceInfo.userAgent,\n            ip: options.deviceInfo.ip,\n            deviceId: options.deviceInfo.deviceId,\n          }\n        : undefined,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Find a refresh-token row by its raw token string.\n   */\n  public static findByToken(token: string): Promise<RefreshToken | null> {\n    return this.first({ token });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Find a refresh token scoped to a user — used by logout so a caller can only\n   * revoke a token that actually belongs to them.\n   */\n  public static findForUser(user: Auth, token: string): Promise<RefreshToken | null> {\n    return this.first({ token, user_id: user.id });\n  }\n\n  /** Find any member of a family, including an already-revoked legacy member. */\n  public static findInFamily(familyId: string): Promise<RefreshToken | null> {\n    return this.first({ family_id: familyId });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every refresh lineage for a user, including rotated rows. Logout uses this\n   * to bootstrap durable family records before it starts family revocations.\n   */\n  public static familiesForUser(user: Auth): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    return this.query().where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType }).get();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Delete a specific refresh token belonging to the user.\n   */\n  public static deleteForUser(user: Auth, token: string) {\n    return this.delete({ token, user_id: user.id });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Active, unexpired sessions for the user, newest first.\n   */\n  public static activeFor(user: Auth): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    return this.query()\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\n      .where(\"expires_at\", \">\", new Date())\n      .orderBy(\"created_at\", \"desc\")\n      .get();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Revoke every still-active refresh token for the user, returning the rows\n   * that were revoked so the caller can emit a per-token event for each.\n   *\n   * Rows are fetched BEFORE they are revoked: a bulk `findAndUpdate` keyed on\n   * `revoked_at: null` would re-query the same predicate after the update and\n   * match nothing, returning an empty set.\n   */\n  public static async revokeAllFor(user: Auth): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    const tokens = await this.query()\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\n      .get();\n\n    for (const token of tokens) {\n      await token.revoke();\n    }\n\n    return tokens;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Revoke every still-active token in a family (rotation breach containment),\n   * returning the revoked rows (fetched before revocation — see `revokeAllFor`).\n   */\n  public static async revokeFamily(familyId: string): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    const tokens = await this.query().where({ family_id: familyId, revoked_at: null }).get();\n\n    for (const token of tokens) {\n      await token.revoke();\n    }\n\n    return tokens;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Revoke the oldest active tokens so at most `max - 1` remain — making room\n   * for the about-to-be-issued one. Bounded by `max`, so the per-row loop is\n   * small.\n   */\n  public static async enforceMax(user: Auth, max: number): Promise<void> {\n    const activeTokens = await this.query()\n      .where({ user_id: user.id, user_type: user.userType, revoked_at: null })\n      .orderBy(\"created_at\", \"asc\")\n      .get();\n\n    if (activeTokens.length < max) return;\n\n    const tokensToRevoke = activeTokens.slice(0, activeTokens.length - max + 1);\n\n    for (const token of tokensToRevoke) {\n      await token.revoke();\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Hard-delete every expired refresh token, returning the deleted rows so the\n   * caller can emit a per-token event. Runs from the `auth.cleanup` CLI command\n   * (a cold batch path).\n   */\n  public static async purgeExpired(): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    const expiredTokens = await this.query().where(\"expires_at\", \"<\", new Date()).get();\n\n    for (const token of expiredTokens) {\n      await token.destroy();\n    }\n\n    return expiredTokens;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Every row that can never retire itself — see {@link neverExpires}. A full\n   * scan filtered in memory, for the reason given on\n   * {@link AccessToken.findNeverExpiring}: neither an `Invalid Date` nor a\n   * missing `exp` claim is expressible as a `where`.\n   */\n  public static async findNeverExpiring(): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    const tokens = await this.query().get();\n\n    return tokens.filter((token: RefreshToken) => token.neverExpires);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Hard-delete every never-expiring row, returning the rows removed.\n   *\n   * Deleted rather than `revoked_at`-stamped: a revoked row is still a row this\n   * table has to carry, and one of the two shapes being removed is a row whose\n   * date column cannot be compared at all — leaving it in place keeps a\n   * permanently unpurgeable record. Rotation replay-detection is unaffected;\n   * these rows can no longer be presented successfully either way.\n   */\n  public static async purgeNeverExpiring(): Promise<RefreshToken[]> {\n    const tokens = await this.findNeverExpiring();\n\n    for (const token of tokens) {\n      await token.destroy();\n    }\n\n    return tokens;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkBA,MAAa,qBAAqB,EAAE,OAAO;CACzC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC7B,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/B,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/B,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC9B,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,8BAAc,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;CAC/C,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;;CAE9B,2BAA2B,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAC/C,4BAA4B,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;CAChD,aAAa,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;AAC1C,CAAC;;;;;;;;;;;AAqBD,IAAa,eAAb,cAAkC,MAAM;;eAChB;;;gBAEC;;;gBAQA,CAAC,OAAO;;;wBAQA;;;CAG/B,IAAW,WAAmB;EAC5B,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW;CAC7B;;;;;;;;;;;CAYA,IAAW,YAAqB;EAC9B,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY;EAEvC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO;EAEvC,wBAAO,IAAI,KAAK,EAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ;CAC5D;;;;;CAMA,IAAW,eAAwB;EACjC,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC;CAClE;;CAGA,IAAW,YAAqB;EAC9B,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY;CAChC;;CAGA,IAAW,UAAmB;EAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK;CAClC;;;;CAKA,MAAa,SAAwB;EACnC,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,4BAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK;CACrD;;;;;;;;CASA,MAAa,iBAAmC;EAQ9C,OAAO,MAPY,KAAK,YAEc,OACpC;GAAE,IAAI,KAAK;GAAI,YAAY;EAAK,GAChC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,4BAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,CACrC,IAEsB;CACxB;;;;CAKA,MAAa,aAA4B;EACvC,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,8BAAc,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK;CACtD;;;;CAKA,OAAc,MAAM,MAAY,OAAe,SAAmC;EAChF,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;GACjB;GACA,SAAS,KAAK;GACd,WAAW,KAAK;GAChB,WAAW,QAAQ;GACnB,YAAY,QAAQ;GACpB,aAAa,QAAQ,aACjB;IACE,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW;IAC9B,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;IACvB,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;GAC/B,IACA;EACN,CAAC;CACH;;;;CAKA,OAAc,YAAY,OAA6C;EACrE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC7B;;;;;CAMA,OAAc,YAAY,MAAY,OAA6C;EACjF,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;GAAE;GAAO,SAAS,KAAK;EAAG,CAAC;CAC/C;;CAGA,OAAc,aAAa,UAAgD;EACzE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;CAC3C;;;;;CAMA,OAAc,gBAAgB,MAAqC;EACjE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;EAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI;CAChF;;;;CAKA,OAAc,cAAc,MAAY,OAAe;EACrD,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;GAAE;GAAO,SAAS,KAAK;EAAG,CAAC;CAChD;;;;CAKA,OAAc,UAAU,MAAqC;EAC3D,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAChB,MAAM;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,YAAY;EAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CACvE,MAAM,cAAc,qBAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CACpC,QAAQ,cAAc,MAAM,CAAC,CAC7B,IAAI;CACT;;;;;;;;;CAUA,aAAoB,aAAa,MAAqC;EACpE,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAC9B,MAAM;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,YAAY;EAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CACvE,IAAI;EAEP,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,QAClB,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;EAGrB,OAAO;CACT;;;;;CAMA,aAAoB,aAAa,UAA2C;EAC1E,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM;GAAE,WAAW;GAAU,YAAY;EAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI;EAEvF,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,QAClB,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;EAGrB,OAAO;CACT;;;;;;CAOA,aAAoB,WAAW,MAAY,KAA4B;EACrE,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CACpC,MAAM;GAAE,SAAS,KAAK;GAAI,WAAW,KAAK;GAAU,YAAY;EAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CACvE,QAAQ,cAAc,KAAK,CAAC,CAC5B,IAAI;EAEP,IAAI,aAAa,SAAS,KAAK;EAE/B,MAAM,iBAAiB,aAAa,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC;EAE1E,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,gBAClB,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;CAEvB;;;;;;CAOA,aAAoB,eAAwC;EAC1D,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,qBAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI;EAElF,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,eAClB,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ;EAGtB,OAAO;CACT;;;;;;;CAQA,aAAoB,oBAA6C;EAG/D,QAAO,MAFc,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAEzB,CAAC,QAAQ,UAAwB,MAAM,YAAY;CAClE;;;;;;;;;;CAWA,aAAoB,qBAA8C;EAChE,MAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,kBAAkB;EAE5C,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,QAClB,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ;EAGtB,OAAO;CACT;AACF"}

package/esm/services/auth-config.mjs

@@ -124,7 +124,9 @@ const authConfig = {
 		/** Refresh-token cookie name the session cookie helpers use. @default "refresh_token" */
 		refreshName: () => config.key("auth.cookie.refreshName", "refresh_token"),
 		/** Cookie `Path` attribute `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default "/" */
-		path: () => config.key("auth.cookie.path", "/")
+		path: () => config.key("auth.cookie.path", "/"),
+		/** Select the request-scoped cookie Domain; undefined keeps it host-only. */
+		cookieDomain: () => config.key("auth.cookie.cookieDomain")
 	},
 	csrf: { 
 	/**

package/esm/services/auth-config.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"auth-config.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/services/auth-config.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { config } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\r\nimport { log } from \"@warlock.js/logger\";\r\nimport { type Algorithm } from \"fast-jwt\";\r\nimport ms from \"ms\";\r\nimport type {\r\n  AuthNotification,\r\n  CanAuthenticate,\r\n  LogoutWithoutTokenBehavior,\r\n  OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder,\r\n  PasswordSetter,\r\n} from \"../contracts/types\";\r\nimport type {\r\n  AppleProviderConfig,\r\n  AuthProvider,\r\n  DiscordProviderConfig,\r\n  FacebookProviderConfig,\r\n  GitHubProviderConfig,\r\n  GoogleProviderConfig,\r\n  LinkedInProviderConfig,\r\n  OtpSender,\r\n  PasskeysConfig,\r\n  ProviderUserCreator,\r\n  XProviderConfig,\r\n} from \"../contracts/providers\";\r\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\r\n\r\nconst warnedLegacyKeys = new Set<string>();\r\n\r\nconst permitAuthentication: CanAuthenticate = (): boolean => true;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * `ms` accepts anything at runtime and answers `undefined` for a string it\r\n * cannot parse (`\"30dayz\"`), a *formatted string* for a number (`2592000` ⇒\r\n * `\"43m\"`), and throws for `\"\"`. Its published types claim the far narrower\r\n * `(value: ms.StringValue) => number`, which is exactly what let an\r\n * `as ms.StringValue` cast smuggle arbitrary config text past the compiler and\r\n * hand `undefined` to the JWT signer. Declare the honest runtime signature once,\r\n * here, so every caller is forced to deal with the `undefined`.\r\n */\r\nconst parseMs = ms as unknown as (value: unknown) => number | string | undefined;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Turn a configured lifetime into a positive number of milliseconds, or throw\r\n * naming the key.\r\n *\r\n * A token lifetime is a security boundary, so an unusable value is a hard error\r\n * rather than a silent fallback: substituting a default would trade one\r\n * unintended lifetime for another, just as quietly — and quiet is the whole\r\n * problem. Every non-positive, non-finite or non-numeric parse is rejected:\r\n *\r\n * - `\"30dayz\"` / `\"thirty days\"` ⇒ `undefined` ⇒ a JWT signed with **no `exp`\r\n *   claim** and an `Invalid Date` written to the token row.\r\n * - `\"0d\"` ⇒ parses cleanly to `0`, which `fast-jwt` treats as falsy and also\r\n *   emits with **no `exp` claim** — it survives any guard that only rejects\r\n *   `undefined`. `\"-1h\"` signs an already-expired token.\r\n * - `2592000` (a bare number) ⇒ `ms` *formats* it as `\"43m\"`, a string, which\r\n *   then turns `Date.now() + expiresIn` into an `Invalid Date`.\r\n */\r\nfunction parseDuration(key: string, raw: unknown): number {\r\n  let parsed: number | string | undefined;\r\n\r\n  try {\r\n    parsed = parseMs(raw);\r\n  } catch {\r\n    // ms throws (rather than returning undefined) for \"\" and non-strings\r\n    parsed = undefined;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  if (typeof parsed !== \"number\" || !Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) {\r\n    throw new Error(\r\n      `auth.${key}: ${JSON.stringify(raw)} is not a valid ms duration — ` +\r\n        `use a positive duration string such as \"1h\", \"7d\", or NO_EXPIRATION.`,\r\n    );\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return parsed;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/** Email-verification token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN = \"24h\";\r\n\r\n/** Password-reset token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN = \"60m\";\r\n\r\n/** Passkey challenge lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\r\n\r\n/** OTP lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\r\n\r\n/** Access-token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = \"1h\";\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Resolve an auth setting, preferring the new `auth.accessToken.*` /\r\n * `auth.refreshToken.*` key and falling back to the deprecated `auth.jwt.*`\r\n * shape — warning once per legacy key. Returns `fallback` when neither is set.\r\n *\r\n * This is the backward-compatible shim that lets existing `auth.jwt.*` configs\r\n * keep working after the config split.\r\n */\r\nfunction resolve<T>(newKey: string, legacyKey: string, fallback?: T): T {\r\n  const fromNew = config.key(`auth.${newKey}`);\r\n\r\n  if (fromNew !== undefined && fromNew !== null) {\r\n    return fromNew as T;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  const fromLegacy = config.key(`auth.${legacyKey}`);\r\n\r\n  if (fromLegacy !== undefined && fromLegacy !== null) {\r\n    if (!warnedLegacyKeys.has(legacyKey)) {\r\n      warnedLegacyKeys.add(legacyKey);\r\n      log.warn(\r\n        \"auth\",\r\n        \"config-deprecation\",\r\n        `auth.${legacyKey} is deprecated — use auth.${newKey}`,\r\n      );\r\n    }\r\n\r\n    return fromLegacy as T;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return fallback as T;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Typed, backward-compatible access to auth configuration. The service and the\r\n * jwt signer read configuration exclusively through here, so the new split\r\n * config and the legacy `auth.jwt.*` shape both resolve the same way.\r\n */\r\nexport const authConfig = {\r\n  canAuthenticate: async (user: Auth): Promise<boolean> => {\r\n    const canAuthenticate = config.key<CanAuthenticate>(\r\n      \"auth.canAuthenticate\",\r\n      permitAuthentication,\r\n    );\r\n\r\n    return canAuthenticate(user);\r\n  },\r\n  accessToken: {\r\n    /** Signing secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.secret`). Throws if neither is set. */\r\n    secret: (): string => {\r\n      const secret = resolve<string | undefined>(\"accessToken.secret\", \"jwt.secret\");\r\n\r\n      if (!secret) {\r\n        throw new Error(\"auth: no JWT secret configured — set `auth.accessToken.secret`.\");\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return secret;\r\n    },\r\n    /** Signing algorithm (legacy: `auth.jwt.algorithm`). */\r\n    algorithm: (): Algorithm => resolve(\"accessToken.algorithm\", \"jwt.algorithm\", \"HS256\"),\r\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.expiresIn`). */\r\n    expiresIn: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"accessToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.expiresIn\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. Defaults\r\n     * to 1 hour when unset; throws naming the key when the configured value is\r\n     * not a positive `ms` duration. See {@link parseDuration}.\r\n     */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"accessToken.expiresIn\",\r\n        authConfig.accessToken.expiresIn() ?? DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,\r\n      ),\r\n  },\r\n  pageAuth: {\r\n    /**\r\n     * Login path a guarded PAGE route redirects a logged-out browser to.\r\n     *\r\n     * Unset (the default) ⇒ page-route auth failures keep the JSON 401 API\r\n     * contract, so existing apps see NO behavior change. Set it (e.g. \"/login\")\r\n     * to opt a browser-facing app into login-redirect UX: a logged-out human\r\n     * navigating to a guarded page lands on the login screen instead of reading\r\n     * a raw JSON error blob. Finding b9ab9804.\r\n     */\r\n    loginPath: (): string | undefined => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.loginPath\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Query parameter the redirect carries the originally-requested path in, so\r\n     * the login flow can send the user back where they were headed. Defaults to\r\n     * `\"returnUrl\"`.\r\n     */\r\n    returnUrlParam: (): string => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.returnUrlParam\", \"returnUrl\"),\r\n  },\r\n  cookie: {\r\n    /** Cookie name `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"access_token\" */\r\n    name: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.name\", \"access_token\"),\r\n    /** Refresh-token cookie name the session cookie helpers use. @default \"refresh_token\" */\r\n    refreshName: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.refreshName\", \"refresh_token\"),\r\n    /** Cookie `Path` attribute `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"/\" */\r\n    path: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.path\", \"/\"),\r\n  },\r\n  csrf: {\r\n    /**\r\n     * Extra origins allowed on a cookie-authenticated unsafe-method request,\r\n     * beyond the request's own origin. @default []\r\n     */\r\n    allowedOrigins: (): string[] => config.key(\"auth.csrf.allowedOrigins\", []),\r\n  },\r\n  verification: {\r\n    /** Lifetime in ms of an email-verification token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"24h\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"verification.expiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.verification.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n    /** User attribute stamped with the verification date. @default \"emailVerifiedAt\" */\r\n    field: (): string => config.key(\"auth.verification.field\", \"emailVerifiedAt\"),\r\n    /** App notification replacing the default verification email. */\r\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.notification\"),\r\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\r\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.url\"),\r\n  },\r\n  passwordReset: {\r\n    /** Lifetime in ms of a password-reset token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"60m\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"passwordReset.expiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n    /** User attribute `requestPasswordReset` looks the account up by. @default \"email\" */\r\n    identifierField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.identifierField\", \"email\"),\r\n    /** App notification replacing the default reset email. */\r\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.notification\"),\r\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\r\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.url\"),\r\n    /** App-owned password writer replacing the default. */\r\n    setPassword: (): PasswordSetter | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.setPassword\"),\r\n  },\r\n  providers: {\r\n    /** `auth.providers.google`, when configured. */\r\n    google: (): GoogleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.google\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.github`, when configured. */\r\n    github: (): GitHubProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.github\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.discord`, when configured. */\r\n    discord: (): DiscordProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.discord\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.linkedin`, when configured. */\r\n    linkedin: (): LinkedInProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.linkedin\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.apple`, when configured. */\r\n    apple: (): AppleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.apple\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.facebook`, when configured. */\r\n    facebook: (): FacebookProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.facebook\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.x`, when configured. */\r\n    x: (): XProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.x\"),\r\n    /** An app-registered provider under `auth.providers.custom.<name>`. */\r\n    custom: (name: string): AuthProvider | undefined => {\r\n      const providers = config.key<Record<string, AuthProvider>>(\"auth.providers.custom\", {});\r\n\r\n      // Own keys only: `name` arrives from a URL, and \"constructor\" must not resolve to Object.\r\n      return Object.hasOwn(providers, name) ? providers[name] : undefined;\r\n    },\r\n    /** User attribute a verified provider email is matched against. @default \"email\" */\r\n    emailField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.providers.emailField\", \"email\"),\r\n    /** App-owned user creation for a first provider login. */\r\n    createUser: (): ProviderUserCreator | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.createUser\"),\r\n  },\r\n  passkeys: {\r\n    /** `auth.passkeys`; throws naming the keys when `rpID`, `rpName` or `origin` is missing. */\r\n    settings: (): PasskeysConfig => {\r\n      const settings = config.key<PasskeysConfig | undefined>(\"auth.passkeys\");\r\n\r\n      if (!settings?.rpID || !settings.rpName || !settings.origin) {\r\n        throw new Error(\r\n          \"@warlock.js/auth: passkeys need `auth.passkeys.rpID`, `auth.passkeys.rpName` and `auth.passkeys.origin`.\",\r\n        );\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return settings;\r\n    },\r\n    /** Allowed ceremony origins, as a list. */\r\n    origins: (): string[] => {\r\n      const { origin } = authConfig.passkeys.settings();\r\n\r\n      return Array.isArray(origin) ? origin : [origin];\r\n    },\r\n    /** Challenge lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\r\n    challengeExpiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n  },\r\n  otp: {\r\n    /** Notifications channel the code is sent through. @default \"sms\" */\r\n    channel: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.channel\", \"sms\"),\r\n    /** User attribute holding the phone number. @default \"phone\" */\r\n    phoneField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.phoneField\", \"phone\"),\r\n    /** Code lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\"otp.expiresIn\", config.key(\"auth.otp.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN)),\r\n    /** Verify attempts before the code is invalidated. @default 5 */\r\n    maxAttempts: (): number => config.key(\"auth.otp.maxAttempts\", 5),\r\n    /** The message text for a code. */\r\n    message: (code: string): string => {\r\n      const build = config.key<((code: string) => string) | undefined>(\"auth.otp.message\");\r\n\r\n      return build ? build(code) : `Your verification code is ${code}`;\r\n    },\r\n    /** App-owned delivery replacing the notifications channel send. */\r\n    send: (): OtpSender | undefined => config.key(\"auth.otp.send\"),\r\n  },\r\n  refreshToken: {\r\n    /** Separate refresh secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.secret`); empty ⇒ fall back to the access secret. */\r\n    secret: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"refreshToken.secret\", \"jwt.refresh.secret\"),\r\n    /** Whether refresh tokens are enabled (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.enabled`). */\r\n    enabled: (): boolean => resolve(\"refreshToken.enabled\", \"jwt.refresh.enabled\", true),\r\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.expiresIn`). */\r\n    expiresIn: (): string => resolve(\"refreshToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.refresh.expiresIn\", \"7d\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. 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+{"version":3,"file":"auth-config.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/services/auth-config.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { config } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\nimport type { CookieDomainResolver } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport { log } from \"@warlock.js/logger\";\nimport { type Algorithm } from \"fast-jwt\";\nimport ms from \"ms\";\nimport type {\n  AuthNotification,\n  CanAuthenticate,\n  LogoutWithoutTokenBehavior,\n  OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder,\n  PasswordSetter,\n} from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport type {\n  AppleProviderConfig,\n  AuthProvider,\n  DiscordProviderConfig,\n  FacebookProviderConfig,\n  GitHubProviderConfig,\n  GoogleProviderConfig,\n  LinkedInProviderConfig,\n  OtpSender,\n  PasskeysConfig,\n  ProviderUserCreator,\n  XProviderConfig,\n} from \"../contracts/providers\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\n\nconst warnedLegacyKeys = new Set<string>();\n\nconst permitAuthentication: CanAuthenticate = (): boolean => true;\n\n/**\n * `ms` accepts anything at runtime and answers `undefined` for a string it\n * cannot parse (`\"30dayz\"`), a *formatted string* for a number (`2592000` ⇒\n * `\"43m\"`), and throws for `\"\"`. Its published types claim the far narrower\n * `(value: ms.StringValue) => number`, which is exactly what let an\n * `as ms.StringValue` cast smuggle arbitrary config text past the compiler and\n * hand `undefined` to the JWT signer. Declare the honest runtime signature once,\n * here, so every caller is forced to deal with the `undefined`.\n */\nconst parseMs = ms as unknown as (value: unknown) => number | string | undefined;\n\n/**\n * Turn a configured lifetime into a positive number of milliseconds, or throw\n * naming the key.\n *\n * A token lifetime is a security boundary, so an unusable value is a hard error\n * rather than a silent fallback: substituting a default would trade one\n * unintended lifetime for another, just as quietly — and quiet is the whole\n * problem. Every non-positive, non-finite or non-numeric parse is rejected:\n *\n * - `\"30dayz\"` / `\"thirty days\"` ⇒ `undefined` ⇒ a JWT signed with **no `exp`\n *   claim** and an `Invalid Date` written to the token row.\n * - `\"0d\"` ⇒ parses cleanly to `0`, which `fast-jwt` treats as falsy and also\n *   emits with **no `exp` claim** — it survives any guard that only rejects\n *   `undefined`. `\"-1h\"` signs an already-expired token.\n * - `2592000` (a bare number) ⇒ `ms` *formats* it as `\"43m\"`, a string, which\n *   then turns `Date.now() + expiresIn` into an `Invalid Date`.\n */\nfunction parseDuration(key: string, raw: unknown): number {\n  let parsed: number | string | undefined;\n\n  try {\n    parsed = parseMs(raw);\n  } catch {\n    // ms throws (rather than returning undefined) for \"\" and non-strings\n    parsed = undefined;\n  }\n\n  if (typeof parsed !== \"number\" || !Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `auth.${key}: ${JSON.stringify(raw)} is not a valid ms duration — ` +\n        `use a positive duration string such as \"1h\", \"7d\", or NO_EXPIRATION.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  return parsed;\n}\n\n/** Email-verification token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\nconst DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN = \"24h\";\n\n/** Password-reset token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\nconst DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN = \"60m\";\n\n/** Passkey challenge lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\nconst DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\n\n/** OTP lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\nconst DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\n\n/** Access-token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\nconst DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = \"1h\";\n\n/**\n * Resolve an auth setting, preferring the new `auth.accessToken.*` /\n * `auth.refreshToken.*` key and falling back to the deprecated `auth.jwt.*`\n * shape — warning once per legacy key. Returns `fallback` when neither is set.\n *\n * This is the backward-compatible shim that lets existing `auth.jwt.*` configs\n * keep working after the config split.\n */\nfunction resolve<T>(newKey: string, legacyKey: string, fallback?: T): T {\n  const fromNew = config.key(`auth.${newKey}`);\n\n  if (fromNew !== undefined && fromNew !== null) {\n    return fromNew as T;\n  }\n\n  const fromLegacy = config.key(`auth.${legacyKey}`);\n\n  if (fromLegacy !== undefined && fromLegacy !== null) {\n    if (!warnedLegacyKeys.has(legacyKey)) {\n      warnedLegacyKeys.add(legacyKey);\n      log.warn(\n        \"auth\",\n        \"config-deprecation\",\n        `auth.${legacyKey} is deprecated — use auth.${newKey}`,\n      );\n    }\n\n    return fromLegacy as T;\n  }\n\n  return fallback as T;\n}\n\n/**\n * Typed, backward-compatible access to auth configuration. The service and the\n * jwt signer read configuration exclusively through here, so the new split\n * config and the legacy `auth.jwt.*` shape both resolve the same way.\n */\nexport const authConfig = {\n  canAuthenticate: async (user: Auth): Promise<boolean> => {\n    const canAuthenticate = config.key<CanAuthenticate>(\n      \"auth.canAuthenticate\",\n      permitAuthentication,\n    );\n\n    return canAuthenticate(user);\n  },\n  accessToken: {\n    /** Signing secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.secret`). Throws if neither is set. */\n    secret: (): string => {\n      const secret = resolve<string | undefined>(\"accessToken.secret\", \"jwt.secret\");\n\n      if (!secret) {\n        throw new Error(\"auth: no JWT secret configured — set `auth.accessToken.secret`.\");\n      }\n\n      return secret;\n    },\n    /** Signing algorithm (legacy: `auth.jwt.algorithm`). */\n    algorithm: (): Algorithm => resolve(\"accessToken.algorithm\", \"jwt.algorithm\", \"HS256\"),\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.expiresIn`). */\n    expiresIn: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"accessToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.expiresIn\"),\n    /**\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. Defaults\n     * to 1 hour when unset; throws naming the key when the configured value is\n     * not a positive `ms` duration. See {@link parseDuration}.\n     */\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\n      parseDuration(\n        \"accessToken.expiresIn\",\n        authConfig.accessToken.expiresIn() ?? DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,\n      ),\n  },\n  pageAuth: {\n    /**\n     * Login path a guarded PAGE route redirects a logged-out browser to.\n     *\n     * Unset (the default) ⇒ page-route auth failures keep the JSON 401 API\n     * contract, so existing apps see NO behavior change. Set it (e.g. \"/login\")\n     * to opt a browser-facing app into login-redirect UX: a logged-out human\n     * navigating to a guarded page lands on the login screen instead of reading\n     * a raw JSON error blob. Finding b9ab9804.\n     */\n    loginPath: (): string | undefined => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.loginPath\"),\n    /**\n     * Query parameter the redirect carries the originally-requested path in, so\n     * the login flow can send the user back where they were headed. Defaults to\n     * `\"returnUrl\"`.\n     */\n    returnUrlParam: (): string => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.returnUrlParam\", \"returnUrl\"),\n  },\n  cookie: {\n    /** Cookie name `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"access_token\" */\n    name: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.name\", \"access_token\"),\n    /** Refresh-token cookie name the session cookie helpers use. @default \"refresh_token\" */\n    refreshName: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.refreshName\", \"refresh_token\"),\n    /** Cookie `Path` attribute `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"/\" */\n    path: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.path\", \"/\"),\n    /** Select the request-scoped cookie Domain; undefined keeps it host-only. */\n    cookieDomain: (): CookieDomainResolver | undefined => config.key(\"auth.cookie.cookieDomain\"),\n  },\n  csrf: {\n    /**\n     * Extra origins allowed on a cookie-authenticated unsafe-method request,\n     * beyond the request's own origin. @default []\n     */\n    allowedOrigins: (): string[] => config.key(\"auth.csrf.allowedOrigins\", []),\n  },\n  verification: {\n    /** Lifetime in ms of an email-verification token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"24h\" */\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\n      parseDuration(\n        \"verification.expiresIn\",\n        config.key(\"auth.verification.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN),\n      ),\n    /** User attribute stamped with the verification date. @default \"emailVerifiedAt\" */\n    field: (): string => config.key(\"auth.verification.field\", \"emailVerifiedAt\"),\n    /** App notification replacing the default verification email. */\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.notification\"),\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.url\"),\n  },\n  passwordReset: {\n    /** Lifetime in ms of a password-reset token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"60m\" */\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\n      parseDuration(\n        \"passwordReset.expiresIn\",\n        config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN),\n      ),\n    /** User attribute `requestPasswordReset` looks the account up by. @default \"email\" */\n    identifierField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.identifierField\", \"email\"),\n    /** App notification replacing the default reset email. */\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.notification\"),\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.url\"),\n    /** App-owned password writer replacing the default. */\n    setPassword: (): PasswordSetter | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.setPassword\"),\n  },\n  providers: {\n    /** `auth.providers.google`, when configured. */\n    google: (): GoogleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.google\"),\n    /** `auth.providers.github`, when configured. */\n    github: (): GitHubProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.github\"),\n    /** `auth.providers.discord`, when configured. */\n    discord: (): DiscordProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.discord\"),\n    /** `auth.providers.linkedin`, when configured. */\n    linkedin: (): LinkedInProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.linkedin\"),\n    /** `auth.providers.apple`, when configured. */\n    apple: (): AppleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.apple\"),\n    /** `auth.providers.facebook`, when configured. */\n    facebook: (): FacebookProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.facebook\"),\n    /** `auth.providers.x`, when configured. */\n    x: (): XProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.x\"),\n    /** An app-registered provider under `auth.providers.custom.<name>`. */\n    custom: (name: string): AuthProvider | undefined => {\n      const providers = config.key<Record<string, AuthProvider>>(\"auth.providers.custom\", {});\n\n      // Own keys only: `name` arrives from a URL, and \"constructor\" must not resolve to Object.\n      return Object.hasOwn(providers, name) ? providers[name] : undefined;\n    },\n    /** User attribute a verified provider email is matched against. @default \"email\" */\n    emailField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.providers.emailField\", \"email\"),\n    /** App-owned user creation for a first provider login. */\n    createUser: (): ProviderUserCreator | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.createUser\"),\n  },\n  passkeys: {\n    /** `auth.passkeys`; throws naming the keys when `rpID`, `rpName` or `origin` is missing. */\n    settings: (): PasskeysConfig => {\n      const settings = config.key<PasskeysConfig | undefined>(\"auth.passkeys\");\n\n      if (!settings?.rpID || !settings.rpName || !settings.origin) {\n        throw new Error(\n          \"@warlock.js/auth: passkeys need `auth.passkeys.rpID`, `auth.passkeys.rpName` and `auth.passkeys.origin`.\",\n        );\n      }\n\n      return settings;\n    },\n    /** Allowed ceremony origins, as a list. */\n    origins: (): string[] => {\n      const { origin } = authConfig.passkeys.settings();\n\n      return Array.isArray(origin) ? origin : [origin];\n    },\n    /** Challenge lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\n    challengeExpiresInMs: (): number =>\n      parseDuration(\n        \"passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\",\n        config.key(\"auth.passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN),\n      ),\n  },\n  otp: {\n    /** Notifications channel the code is sent through. @default \"sms\" */\n    channel: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.channel\", \"sms\"),\n    /** User attribute holding the phone number. @default \"phone\" */\n    phoneField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.phoneField\", \"phone\"),\n    /** Code lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\n      parseDuration(\"otp.expiresIn\", config.key(\"auth.otp.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN)),\n    /** Verify attempts before the code is invalidated. @default 5 */\n    maxAttempts: (): number => config.key(\"auth.otp.maxAttempts\", 5),\n    /** The message text for a code. */\n    message: (code: string): string => {\n      const build = config.key<((code: string) => string) | undefined>(\"auth.otp.message\");\n\n      return build ? build(code) : `Your verification code is ${code}`;\n    },\n    /** App-owned delivery replacing the notifications channel send. */\n    send: (): OtpSender | undefined => config.key(\"auth.otp.send\"),\n  },\n  refreshToken: {\n    /** Separate refresh secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.secret`); empty ⇒ fall back to the access secret. */\n    secret: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"refreshToken.secret\", \"jwt.refresh.secret\"),\n    /** Whether refresh tokens are enabled (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.enabled`). */\n    enabled: (): boolean => resolve(\"refreshToken.enabled\", \"jwt.refresh.enabled\", true),\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.expiresIn`). */\n    expiresIn: (): string => resolve(\"refreshToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.refresh.expiresIn\", \"7d\"),\n    /**\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. 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package/esm/services/auth-events.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"auth-events.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/services/auth-events.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import events, { type EventSubscription } from \"@mongez/events\";\r\nimport { log } from \"@warlock.js/logger\";\r\nimport type { DeviceInfo, TokenPair } from \"../contracts/types\";\r\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\r\nimport type { RefreshToken } from \"../models/refresh-token\";\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Auth event payload types\r\n */\r\nexport type AuthEventPayloads = {\r\n  // Login events\r\n  \"login.success\": [user: Auth, tokenPair: TokenPair, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo];\r\n  \"login.failed\": [credentials: { email?: string; username?: string }, reason: string];\r\n  \"login.attempt\": [credentials: { email?: string; username?: string }];\r\n\r\n  // Logout events\r\n  logout: [user: Auth];\r\n  \"logout.all\": [user: Auth];\r\n  \"logout.failsafe\": [user: Auth];\r\n\r\n  // Token events\r\n  \"token.created\": [user: Auth, tokenPair: TokenPair];\r\n  \"token.refreshed\": [user: Auth, newTokenPair: TokenPair, oldRefreshToken: RefreshToken];\r\n  \"token.revoked\": [user: Auth, token: RefreshToken];\r\n  \"token.expired\": [token: RefreshToken];\r\n  \"token.familyRevoked\": [familyId: string, tokens: RefreshToken[]];\r\n\r\n  // Password events\r\n  \"password.changed\": [user: Auth];\r\n  \"password.resetRequested\": [user: Auth, resetToken: string];\r\n  \"password.reset\": [user: Auth];\r\n\r\n  // Session events\r\n  \"session.created\": [user: Auth, refreshToken: RefreshToken, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo];\r\n  \"session.destroyed\": [user: Auth, refreshToken: RefreshToken];\r\n\r\n  // Cleanup events\r\n  \"cleanup.completed\": [expiredCount: number];\r\n};\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Auth event names\r\n */\r\nexport type AuthEventName = keyof AuthEventPayloads;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Callback type for a specific event\r\n */\r\nexport type AuthEventCallback<T extends AuthEventName> = (\r\n  ...args: AuthEventPayloads[T]\r\n) => void | Promise<void>;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Event namespace prefix for auth events\r\n */\r\nconst AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX = \"auth.\";\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Type-safe auth events manager\r\n *\r\n * @example\r\n * ```typescript\r\n * // Subscribe to events with full autocomplete\r\n * authEvents.on(\"login.success\", (user, tokenPair, deviceInfo) => {\r\n *   console.log(`User ${user.id} logged in`);\r\n * });\r\n *\r\n * authEvents.on(\"token.refreshed\", (user, newPair, oldToken) => {\r\n *   console.log(`Token refreshed for user ${user.id}`);\r\n * });\r\n *\r\n * // Trigger events\r\n * authEvents.emit(\"login.success\", user, tokenPair, deviceInfo);\r\n * ```\r\n */\r\nexport const authEvents = {\r\n  /**\r\n   * Subscribe to an auth event\r\n   */\r\n  on<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, callback: AuthEventCallback<T>): EventSubscription {\r\n    return events.subscribe(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX + event, callback as Function);\r\n  },\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Subscribe to an auth event (alias for `on`)\r\n   */\r\n  subscribe<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, callback: AuthEventCallback<T>): EventSubscription {\r\n    return this.on(event, callback);\r\n  },\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Emit an auth event\r\n   */\r\n  emit<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, ...args: AuthEventPayloads[T]): void {\r\n    try {\r\n      events.trigger(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX + event, ...args);\r\n    } catch (error) {\r\n      // Auth events are fire-and-forget notifications: a throwing listener must\r\n      // never break the flow that emitted it (e.g. turn a completed login into a\r\n      // 500). Log and swallow. NOTE: this guards synchronous listener throws;\r\n      // async listener rejections and \"later listeners still run\" need a fix in\r\n      // @mongez/events (tracked separately).\r\n      log.error(\"auth\", \"event\", error);\r\n    }\r\n  },\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Emit an auth event (alias for `emit`)\r\n   */\r\n  trigger<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, ...args: AuthEventPayloads[T]): void {\r\n    this.emit(event, ...args);\r\n  },\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Unsubscribe from all auth events\r\n   */\r\n  unsubscribeAll(): void {\r\n    events.unsubscribeNamespace(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX.slice(0, -1));\r\n  },\r\n\r\n  /**\r\n   * Unsubscribe from a specific auth event\r\n   */\r\n  off(event?: AuthEventName): void {\r\n    if (event) {\r\n      events.unsubscribe(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX + event);\r\n    } else {\r\n      this.unsubscribeAll();\r\n    }\r\n  },\r\n};\r\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAuDA,MAAM,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoB1B,MAAa,aAAa;;;;CAIxB,GAA4B,OAAU,UAAmD;EACvF,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,oBAAoB,OAAO,QAAoB;CACzE;;;;CAKA,UAAmC,OAAU,UAAmD;EAC9F,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,QAAQ;CAChC;;;;CAKA,KAA8B,OAAU,GAAG,MAAkC;EAC3E,IAAI;GACF,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI;EACnD,SAAS,OAAO;GAMd,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK;EAClC;CACF;;;;CAKA,QAAiC,OAAU,GAAG,MAAkC;EAC9E,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI;CAC1B;;;;CAKA,iBAAuB;EACrB,OAAO,qBAAqB,kBAAkB,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;CAC5D;;;;CAKA,IAAI,OAA6B;EAC/B,IAAI,OACF,OAAO,YAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK;OAE5C,KAAK,eAAe;CAExB;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"auth-events.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/services/auth-events.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import events, { type EventSubscription } from \"@mongez/events\";\nimport { log } from \"@warlock.js/logger\";\nimport type { DeviceInfo, TokenPair } from \"../contracts/types\";\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\nimport type { RefreshToken } from \"../models/refresh-token\";\n\n/**\n * Auth event payload types\n */\nexport type AuthEventPayloads = {\n  // Login events\n  \"login.success\": [user: Auth, tokenPair: TokenPair, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo];\n  \"login.failed\": [credentials: { email?: string; username?: string }, reason: string];\n  \"login.attempt\": [credentials: { email?: string; username?: string }];\n\n  // Logout events\n  logout: [user: Auth];\n  \"logout.all\": [user: Auth];\n  \"logout.failsafe\": [user: Auth];\n\n  // Token events\n  \"token.created\": [user: Auth, tokenPair: TokenPair];\n  \"token.refreshed\": [user: Auth, newTokenPair: TokenPair, oldRefreshToken: RefreshToken];\n  \"token.revoked\": [user: Auth, token: RefreshToken];\n  \"token.expired\": [token: RefreshToken];\n  \"token.familyRevoked\": [familyId: string, tokens: RefreshToken[]];\n\n  // Password events\n  \"password.changed\": [user: Auth];\n  \"password.resetRequested\": [user: Auth, resetToken: string];\n  \"password.reset\": [user: Auth];\n\n  // Session events\n  \"session.created\": [user: Auth, refreshToken: RefreshToken, deviceInfo?: DeviceInfo];\n  \"session.destroyed\": [user: Auth, refreshToken: RefreshToken];\n\n  // Cleanup events\n  \"cleanup.completed\": [expiredCount: number];\n};\n\n/**\n * Auth event names\n */\nexport type AuthEventName = keyof AuthEventPayloads;\n\n/**\n * Callback type for a specific event\n */\nexport type AuthEventCallback<T extends AuthEventName> = (\n  ...args: AuthEventPayloads[T]\n) => void | Promise<void>;\n\n/**\n * Event namespace prefix for auth events\n */\nconst AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX = \"auth.\";\n\n/**\n * Type-safe auth events manager\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * // Subscribe to events with full autocomplete\n * authEvents.on(\"login.success\", (user, tokenPair, deviceInfo) => {\n *   console.log(`User ${user.id} logged in`);\n * });\n *\n * authEvents.on(\"token.refreshed\", (user, newPair, oldToken) => {\n *   console.log(`Token refreshed for user ${user.id}`);\n * });\n *\n * // Trigger events\n * authEvents.emit(\"login.success\", user, tokenPair, deviceInfo);\n * ```\n */\nexport const authEvents = {\n  /**\n   * Subscribe to an auth event\n   */\n  on<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, callback: AuthEventCallback<T>): EventSubscription {\n    return events.subscribe(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX + event, callback as Function);\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Subscribe to an auth event (alias for `on`)\n   */\n  subscribe<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, callback: AuthEventCallback<T>): EventSubscription {\n    return this.on(event, callback);\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Emit an auth event\n   */\n  emit<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, ...args: AuthEventPayloads[T]): void {\n    try {\n      events.trigger(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX + event, ...args);\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Auth events are fire-and-forget notifications: a throwing listener must\n      // never break the flow that emitted it (e.g. turn a completed login into a\n      // 500). Log and swallow. NOTE: this guards synchronous listener throws;\n      // async listener rejections and \"later listeners still run\" need a fix in\n      // @mongez/events (tracked separately).\n      log.error(\"auth\", \"event\", error);\n    }\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Emit an auth event (alias for `emit`)\n   */\n  trigger<T extends AuthEventName>(event: T, ...args: AuthEventPayloads[T]): void {\n    this.emit(event, ...args);\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Unsubscribe from all auth events\n   */\n  unsubscribeAll(): void {\n    events.unsubscribeNamespace(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX.slice(0, -1));\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Unsubscribe from a specific auth event\n   */\n  off(event?: AuthEventName): void {\n    if (event) {\n      events.unsubscribe(AUTH_EVENT_PREFIX + event);\n    } else {\n      this.unsubscribeAll();\n    }\n  },\n};\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAuDA,MAAM,oBAAoB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAoB1B,MAAa,aAAa;;;;CAIxB,GAA4B,OAAU,UAAmD;EACvF,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,oBAAoB,OAAO,QAAoB;CACzE;;;;CAKA,UAAmC,OAAU,UAAmD;EAC9F,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,QAAQ;CAChC;;;;CAKA,KAA8B,OAAU,GAAG,MAAkC;EAC3E,IAAI;GACF,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI;EACnD,SAAS,OAAO;GAMd,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK;EAClC;CACF;;;;CAKA,QAAiC,OAAU,GAAG,MAAkC;EAC9E,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI;CAC1B;;;;CAKA,iBAAuB;EACrB,OAAO,qBAAqB,kBAAkB,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;CAC5D;;;;CAKA,IAAI,OAA6B;EAC/B,IAAI,OACF,OAAO,YAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK;OAE5C,KAAK,eAAe;CAExB;AACF"}

package/esm/services/auth.service.d.mts

@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ import { Request, Response } from "@warlock.js/core";
 import { ChildModel } from "@warlock.js/cascade";
 
 //#region ../auth/src/services/auth.service.d.ts
+/** Thrown when a request-scoped cookie Domain cannot be resolved safely. */
+declare class CookieDomainRequestRequiredError extends Error {
+  constructor(method: string);
+}
 declare class AuthService {
   /**
    * Resolve the active access-token model — the package default, or a subclass
@@ -195,6 +199,7 @@ declare class AuthService {
    * string (a session cookie) or an unparseable `expiresAt`.
    */
   private cookieMaxAgeFromToken;
+  private cookieDomainFor;
   /**
    * Write the auth cookie on `response` — the write side of the `cookie:<name>`
    * token source `authMiddleware([], "cookie:<name>")` already reads. An explicit
@@ -227,7 +232,7 @@ declare class AuthService {
    * await authService.logout(user, accessToken, refreshToken);
    * authService.clearAuthCookie(response);
    */
-  clearAuthCookie(response: { [K in "cookie" | "clearCookie"]: (...args: Parameters<Response[K]>) => unknown }, options?: ClearAuthCookieOptions): void;
+  clearAuthCookie(response: { [K in "cookie" | "clearCookie"]: (...args: Parameters<Response[K]>) => unknown }, options?: ClearAuthCookieOptions, request?: Request): void;
   /**
    * Write the access and refresh cookies of a browser session. Both are
    * `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, `Path=/` (the refresh cookie must reach every
@@ -242,14 +247,14 @@ declare class AuthService {
   setSessionCookies(response: { [K in "cookie" | "clearCookie"]: (...args: Parameters<Response[K]>) => unknown }, tokens: {
     accessToken: AccessTokenOutput;
     refreshToken: AccessTokenOutput;
-  }): void;
+  }, request?: Request): void;
   /**
    * Clear both session cookies {@link setSessionCookies} wrote, on `Path=/`.
    * Pair it with {@link logout} after the token rows are revoked.
    */
-  clearSessionCookies(response: { [K in "cookie" | "clearCookie"]: (...args: Parameters<Response[K]>) => unknown }): void;
+  clearSessionCookies(response: { [K in "cookie" | "clearCookie"]: (...args: Parameters<Response[K]>) => unknown }, request?: Request): void;
 }
 declare const authService: AuthService;
 //#endregion
-export { authService };
+export { CookieDomainRequestRequiredError, authService };
 //# sourceMappingURL=auth.service.d.mts.map

package/esm/services/auth.service.d.mts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/esm/services/auth.service.mjs

@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ import { ForbiddenError, config, hashPassword, verifyPassword } from "@warlock.j
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 
 //#region ../auth/src/services/auth.service.ts
+/** Thrown when a request-scoped cookie Domain cannot be resolved safely. */
+var CookieDomainRequestRequiredError = class extends Error {
+	constructor(method) {
+		super(`${method} requires the request when auth.cookie.cookieDomain is configured because the cookie Domain must be resolved for that request.`);
+		this.name = "CookieDomainRequestRequiredError";
+	}
+};
 var AuthService = class {
 	/**
 	* Resolve the active access-token model — the package default, or a subclass
@@ -79,11 +86,11 @@ var AuthService = class {
 		await this.assertCanAuthenticate(user);
 		return this.issueAccessToken(user, payload);
 	}
-	async issueRefreshToken(user, deviceInfo) {
+	async issueRefreshToken(user, deviceInfo, ensuredFamily) {
 		if (!authConfig.refreshToken.enabled()) return;
 		const expiresIn = authConfig.refreshToken.expiresInMs();
 		const familyId = deviceInfo?.familyId || Random.string(32);
-		if ((await AuthTokenFamily.ensure(user, familyId)).isRevoked) throw new Error("Cannot issue tokens for a revoked token family");
+		if ((ensuredFamily ?? await AuthTokenFamily.ensure(user, familyId)).isRevoked) throw new Error("Cannot issue tokens for a revoked token family");
 		const payload = {
 			userId: user.id,
 			userType: user.userType,
@@ -108,7 +115,7 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	async issueInSuppliedFamily(user, familyId, issue) {
 		if ((await AuthTokenFamily.ensure(user, familyId)).isRevoked) throw new Error("Cannot issue tokens for a revoked token family");
 		try {
-			return await runTokenFamilyOperation(familyId, async () => issue());
+			return await runTokenFamilyOperation(familyId, issue);
 		} catch (error) {
 			if (error instanceof TokenFamilyUnavailableError) throw new Error("Cannot issue tokens for a revoked token family");
 			throw error;
@@ -121,20 +128,21 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	async createRefreshToken(user, deviceInfo) {
 		if (!authConfig.refreshToken.enabled()) return;
 		await this.assertCanAuthenticate(user);
-		if (deviceInfo?.familyId) return this.issueInSuppliedFamily(user, deviceInfo.familyId, () => this.issueRefreshToken(user, deviceInfo));
+		if (deviceInfo?.familyId) return this.issueInSuppliedFamily(user, deviceInfo.familyId, (family) => this.issueRefreshToken(user, deviceInfo, family));
 		return this.issueRefreshToken(user, deviceInfo);
 	}
-	async issueTokenPair(user, deviceInfo) {
+	async issueTokenPair(user, deviceInfo, ensuredFamily) {
 		const refreshEnabled = authConfig.refreshToken.enabled();
 		const familyId = deviceInfo?.familyId || Random.string(32);
-		if (refreshEnabled) {
-			if ((await AuthTokenFamily.ensure(user, familyId)).isRevoked) throw new Error("Cannot issue tokens for a revoked token family");
+		const family = refreshEnabled ? ensuredFamily ?? await AuthTokenFamily.ensure(user, familyId) : void 0;
+		if (family) {
+			if (family.isRevoked) throw new Error("Cannot issue tokens for a revoked token family");
 		}
 		const accessToken = await this.issueAccessToken(user, deviceInfo?.payload, refreshEnabled ? familyId : void 0);
 		const refreshToken = await this.issueRefreshToken(user, refreshEnabled ? {
 			...deviceInfo,
 			familyId
-		} : deviceInfo);
+		} : deviceInfo, family);
 		const tokenPair = {
 			accessToken,
 			refreshToken: refreshToken ? {
@@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	*/
 	async createTokenPair(user, deviceInfo) {
 		await this.assertCanAuthenticate(user);
-		if (authConfig.refreshToken.enabled() && deviceInfo?.familyId) return this.issueInSuppliedFamily(user, deviceInfo.familyId, () => this.issueTokenPair(user, deviceInfo));
+		if (authConfig.refreshToken.enabled() && deviceInfo?.familyId) return this.issueInSuppliedFamily(user, deviceInfo.familyId, (family) => this.issueTokenPair(user, deviceInfo, family));
 		return this.issueTokenPair(user, deviceInfo);
 	}
 	/**
@@ -386,8 +394,8 @@ var AuthService = class {
 		if (result.tokens.refreshToken) this.setSessionCookies(response, {
 			accessToken: result.tokens.accessToken,
 			refreshToken: result.tokens.refreshToken
-		});
-		else this.setAuthCookie(response, result.tokens.accessToken);
+		}, request);
+		else this.setAuthCookie(response, result.tokens.accessToken, { domain: this.cookieDomainFor("loginWithSessionCookies", request) });
 		return result;
 	}
 	/** The one token-issuing tail every login method shares. */
@@ -568,6 +576,12 @@ var AuthService = class {
 		if (Number.isNaN(expiresAt)) return void 0;
 		return Math.max(0, Math.round((expiresAt - Date.now()) / 1e3));
 	}
+	cookieDomainFor(method, request) {
+		const resolver = authConfig.cookie.cookieDomain();
+		if (!resolver) return;
+		if (!request) throw new CookieDomainRequestRequiredError(method);
+		return resolver(request);
+	}
 	/**
 	* Write the auth cookie on `response` — the write side of the `cookie:<name>`
 	* token source `authMiddleware([], "cookie:<name>")` already reads. An explicit
@@ -597,6 +611,7 @@ var AuthService = class {
 		response.cookie(name, tokenValue, {
 			raw: true,
 			path,
+			...options.domain !== void 0 ? { domain: options.domain } : {},
 			...maxAge !== void 0 ? { maxAge } : {}
 		});
 	}
@@ -610,9 +625,14 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	* await authService.logout(user, accessToken, refreshToken);
 	* authService.clearAuthCookie(response);
 	*/
-	clearAuthCookie(response, options = {}) {
+	clearAuthCookie(response, options = {}, request) {
 		const name = options.name ?? authConfig.cookie.name();
 		const path = options.path ?? authConfig.cookie.path();
+		const domain = this.cookieDomainFor("clearAuthCookie", request);
+		if (domain !== void 0) response.clearCookie(name, {
+			path,
+			domain
+		});
 		response.clearCookie(name, { path });
 	}
 	/**
@@ -626,7 +646,8 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	* const { tokens } = await authService.login(User, credentials);
 	* authService.setSessionCookies(response, tokens);
 	*/
-	setSessionCookies(response, tokens) {
+	setSessionCookies(response, tokens, request) {
+		const domain = this.cookieDomainFor("setSessionCookies", request);
 		const cookies = [[authConfig.cookie.name(), tokens.accessToken], [authConfig.cookie.refreshName(), tokens.refreshToken]];
 		for (const [name, token] of cookies) {
 			const maxAge = this.cookieMaxAgeFromToken(token);
@@ -635,6 +656,7 @@ var AuthService = class {
 				httpOnly: true,
 				sameSite: "lax",
 				path: "/",
+				...domain !== void 0 ? { domain } : {},
 				...maxAge !== void 0 ? { maxAge } : {}
 			});
 		}
@@ -643,13 +665,19 @@ var AuthService = class {
 	* Clear both session cookies {@link setSessionCookies} wrote, on `Path=/`.
 	* Pair it with {@link logout} after the token rows are revoked.
 	*/
-	clearSessionCookies(response) {
-		response.clearCookie(authConfig.cookie.name(), { path: "/" });
-		response.clearCookie(authConfig.cookie.refreshName(), { path: "/" });
+	clearSessionCookies(response, request) {
+		const domain = this.cookieDomainFor("clearSessionCookies", request);
+		for (const name of [authConfig.cookie.name(), authConfig.cookie.refreshName()]) {
+			if (domain !== void 0) response.clearCookie(name, {
+				path: "/",
+				domain
+			});
+			response.clearCookie(name, { path: "/" });
+		}
 	}
 };
 const authService = new AuthService();
 
 //#endregion
-export { authService };
+export { CookieDomainRequestRequiredError, authService };
 //# sourceMappingURL=auth.service.mjs.map