@warlock.js/auth 5.14.0 → 5.16.0

package/esm/providers/provider-state-cookie.mjs

@@ -19,41 +19,60 @@ function sign(payload) {
 	return createHmac("sha256", createHmac("sha256", authConfig.accessToken.secret()).update("@warlock.js/auth:provider-state").digest()).update(payload).digest("base64url");
 }
 /**
-* Write the signed, 10-minute state cookie for a provider login. Attribute
-* flags (`HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, `Secure` outside dev) come from the
-* `response.cookie()` secure defaults; `Lax` still rides the provider's
-* top-level GET redirect back to the app.
+* Write the signed, 10-minute state cookie for a provider login. `HttpOnly`
+* comes from the `response.cookie()` secure defaults. `callbackMode` picks
+* the `SameSite`/`Secure` pair: `"query"` (default) keeps the framework's
+* `SameSite=Lax`, which still rides a top-level GET redirect back to the app;
+* `"form_post"` (Apple) overrides to `SameSite=None; Secure`, since a browser
+* drops a `Lax` cookie on the provider's cross-site POST callback. Either
+* way, the signed `state`/`nonce`/PKCE values — not the cookie's SameSite
+* attribute — are what actually defend against CSRF here.
 */
-function writeProviderState(response, provider, state) {
+function writeProviderState(response, provider, state, callbackMode = "query") {
 	const stored = {
 		...state,
 		provider,
-		expiresAt: Date.now() + PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS * 1e3
+		expiresAt: Date.now() + PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS * 1e3,
+		callbackMode
 	};
 	const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored)).toString("base64url");
 	response.cookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, `${payload}.${sign(payload)}`, {
 		raw: true,
 		path: "/",
-		maxAge: PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS
+		maxAge: PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS,
+		...callbackMode === "form_post" ? {
+			sameSite: "none",
+			secure: true
+		} : {}
 	});
 }
 /**
 * Read AND clear the state cookie, so a started login completes at most once.
 * Resolves `undefined` for an absent, forged (bad MAC), malformed or expired
-* cookie.
+* cookie. The clearing `Set-Cookie` repeats whatever `SameSite`/`Secure` pair
+* the cookie was WRITTEN with (recovered from the decoded payload itself, so
+* this needs no mode passed in) — a browser only honours a clearing cookie
+* when it matches the original's attributes, and for a `form_post` (Apple)
+* cookie that means `SameSite=None; Secure` too, or the original survives.
 */
 function takeProviderState(request, response) {
 	const raw = request.cookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE);
-	response.clearCookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, { path: "/" });
-	if (typeof raw !== "string") return void 0;
-	const [payload, signature, ...rest] = raw.split(".");
-	if (!payload || !signature || rest.length > 0 || !safeEqual(signature, sign(payload))) return;
 	let stored;
-	try {
-		stored = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
-	} catch {
-		return;
+	if (typeof raw === "string") {
+		const [payload, signature, ...rest] = raw.split(".");
+		if (payload && signature && rest.length === 0 && safeEqual(signature, sign(payload))) try {
+			stored = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
+		} catch {
+			stored = void 0;
+		}
 	}
+	response.clearCookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, {
+		path: "/",
+		...stored?.callbackMode === "form_post" ? {
+			sameSite: "none",
+			secure: true
+		} : {}
+	});
 	if (typeof stored?.state !== "string" || typeof stored.nonce !== "string" || typeof stored.codeVerifier !== "string" || typeof stored.provider !== "string" || typeof stored.expiresAt !== "number" || stored.expiresAt <= Date.now()) return;
 	return stored;
 }

package/esm/providers/provider-state-cookie.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"provider-state-cookie.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/providers/provider-state-cookie.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Request, Response } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\nimport { createHmac, randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { ProviderAuthorizationState } from \"../contracts/providers\";\nimport { authConfig } from \"../services/auth-config\";\nimport { safeEqual } from \"../utils/safe-equal\";\n\n/** Cookie carrying a redirect login's state from the start to the callback. */\nexport const PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE = \"auth_provider_state\";\n\n/** How long a started provider login stays completable. */\nconst PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;\n\n/** What the signed cookie holds. */\nexport type StoredProviderState = ProviderAuthorizationState & {\n  provider: string;\n  expiresAt: number;\n};\n\n/** 32 random bytes, base64url — used for `state`, `nonce` and the PKCE verifier. */\nexport function randomUrlSafe(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * HMAC over the payload with a key DERIVED from the access-token secret, so\n * the state cookie never shares a MAC key with the JWTs themselves.\n */\nfunction sign(payload: string): string {\n  const key = createHmac(\"sha256\", authConfig.accessToken.secret())\n    .update(\"@warlock.js/auth:provider-state\")\n    .digest();\n\n  return createHmac(\"sha256\", key).update(payload).digest(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Write the signed, 10-minute state cookie for a provider login. Attribute\n * flags (`HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, `Secure` outside dev) come from the\n * `response.cookie()` secure defaults; `Lax` still rides the provider's\n * top-level GET redirect back to the app.\n */\nexport function writeProviderState(\n  response: Response,\n  provider: string,\n  state: ProviderAuthorizationState,\n): void {\n  const stored: StoredProviderState = {\n    ...state,\n    provider,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS * 1000,\n  };\n  const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored)).toString(\"base64url\");\n\n  response.cookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, `${payload}.${sign(payload)}`, {\n    raw: true,\n    path: \"/\",\n    maxAge: PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Read AND clear the state cookie, so a started login completes at most once.\n * Resolves `undefined` for an absent, forged (bad MAC), malformed or expired\n * cookie.\n */\nexport function takeProviderState(\n  request: Request,\n  response: Response,\n): StoredProviderState | undefined {\n  const raw: unknown = request.cookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE);\n\n  response.clearCookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, { path: \"/\" });\n\n  if (typeof raw !== \"string\") return undefined;\n\n  const [payload, signature, ...rest] = raw.split(\".\");\n\n  if (!payload || !signature || rest.length > 0 || !safeEqual(signature, sign(payload))) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  let stored: Partial<StoredProviderState> | undefined;\n\n  try {\n    stored = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, \"base64url\").toString(\"utf8\"));\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  if (\n    typeof stored?.state !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.nonce !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.codeVerifier !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.provider !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.expiresAt !== \"number\" ||\n    stored.expiresAt <= Date.now()\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  return stored as StoredProviderState;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAOA,MAAa,wBAAwB;;AAGrC,MAAM,6BAA6B;;AASnC,SAAgB,gBAAwB;CACtC,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW;AAC7C;;;;;AAMA,SAAS,KAAK,SAAyB;CAKrC,OAAO,WAAW,UAJN,WAAW,UAAU,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAC9D,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CACzC,OAE2B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,WAAW;AACrE;;;;;;;AAQA,SAAgB,mBACd,UACA,UACA,OACM;CACN,MAAM,SAA8B;EAClC,GAAG;EACH;EACA,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,6BAA6B;CACvD;CACA,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW;CAExE,SAAS,OAAO,uBAAuB,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK;EACpE,KAAK;EACL,MAAM;EACN,QAAQ;CACV,CAAC;AACH;;;;;;AAOA,SAAgB,kBACd,SACA,UACiC;CACjC,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,OAAO,qBAAqB;CAEzD,SAAS,YAAY,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;CAEzD,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAO;CAEpC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;CAEnD,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,GAClF;CAGF,IAAI;CAEJ,IAAI;EACF,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC;CACxE,QAAQ;EACN;CACF;CAEA,IACE,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,YACzB,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YACxB,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB,YAC/B,OAAO,OAAO,aAAa,YAC3B,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,YAC5B,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAE7B;CAGF,OAAO;AACT"}
+{"version":3,"file":"provider-state-cookie.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/providers/provider-state-cookie.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Request, Response } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\nimport { createHmac, randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport type { ProviderAuthorizationState } from \"../contracts/providers\";\nimport { authConfig } from \"../services/auth-config\";\nimport { safeEqual } from \"../utils/safe-equal\";\n\n/** Cookie carrying a redirect login's state from the start to the callback. */\nexport const PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE = \"auth_provider_state\";\n\n/** How long a started provider login stays completable. */\nconst PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 600;\n\n/** What the signed cookie holds. */\nexport type StoredProviderState = ProviderAuthorizationState & {\n  provider: string;\n  expiresAt: number;\n  callbackMode: \"query\" | \"form_post\";\n};\n\n/** 32 random bytes, base64url — used for `state`, `nonce` and the PKCE verifier. */\nexport function randomUrlSafe(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * HMAC over the payload with a key DERIVED from the access-token secret, so\n * the state cookie never shares a MAC key with the JWTs themselves.\n */\nfunction sign(payload: string): string {\n  const key = createHmac(\"sha256\", authConfig.accessToken.secret())\n    .update(\"@warlock.js/auth:provider-state\")\n    .digest();\n\n  return createHmac(\"sha256\", key).update(payload).digest(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Write the signed, 10-minute state cookie for a provider login. `HttpOnly`\n * comes from the `response.cookie()` secure defaults. `callbackMode` picks\n * the `SameSite`/`Secure` pair: `\"query\"` (default) keeps the framework's\n * `SameSite=Lax`, which still rides a top-level GET redirect back to the app;\n * `\"form_post\"` (Apple) overrides to `SameSite=None; Secure`, since a browser\n * drops a `Lax` cookie on the provider's cross-site POST callback. Either\n * way, the signed `state`/`nonce`/PKCE values — not the cookie's SameSite\n * attribute — are what actually defend against CSRF here.\n */\nexport function writeProviderState(\n  response: Response,\n  provider: string,\n  state: ProviderAuthorizationState,\n  callbackMode: \"query\" | \"form_post\" = \"query\",\n): void {\n  const stored: StoredProviderState = {\n    ...state,\n    provider,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS * 1000,\n    callbackMode,\n  };\n  const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored)).toString(\"base64url\");\n\n  response.cookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, `${payload}.${sign(payload)}`, {\n    raw: true,\n    path: \"/\",\n    maxAge: PROVIDER_STATE_TTL_SECONDS,\n    ...(callbackMode === \"form_post\" ? { sameSite: \"none\", secure: true } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Read AND clear the state cookie, so a started login completes at most once.\n * Resolves `undefined` for an absent, forged (bad MAC), malformed or expired\n * cookie. The clearing `Set-Cookie` repeats whatever `SameSite`/`Secure` pair\n * the cookie was WRITTEN with (recovered from the decoded payload itself, so\n * this needs no mode passed in) — a browser only honours a clearing cookie\n * when it matches the original's attributes, and for a `form_post` (Apple)\n * cookie that means `SameSite=None; Secure` too, or the original survives.\n */\nexport function takeProviderState(\n  request: Request,\n  response: Response,\n): StoredProviderState | undefined {\n  const raw: unknown = request.cookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE);\n\n  let stored: Partial<StoredProviderState> | undefined;\n\n  if (typeof raw === \"string\") {\n    const [payload, signature, ...rest] = raw.split(\".\");\n\n    if (payload && signature && rest.length === 0 && safeEqual(signature, sign(payload))) {\n      try {\n        stored = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, \"base64url\").toString(\"utf8\"));\n      } catch {\n        stored = undefined;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  response.clearCookie(PROVIDER_STATE_COOKIE, {\n    path: \"/\",\n    ...(stored?.callbackMode === \"form_post\" ? { sameSite: \"none\", secure: true } : {}),\n  });\n\n  if (\n    typeof stored?.state !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.nonce !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.codeVerifier !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.provider !== \"string\" ||\n    typeof stored.expiresAt !== \"number\" ||\n    stored.expiresAt <= Date.now()\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  return stored as StoredProviderState;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAOA,MAAa,wBAAwB;;AAGrC,MAAM,6BAA6B;;AAUnC,SAAgB,gBAAwB;CACtC,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW;AAC7C;;;;;AAMA,SAAS,KAAK,SAAyB;CAKrC,OAAO,WAAW,UAJN,WAAW,UAAU,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAC9D,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CACzC,OAE2B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,WAAW;AACrE;;;;;;;;;;;AAYA,SAAgB,mBACd,UACA,UACA,OACA,eAAsC,SAChC;CACN,MAAM,SAA8B;EAClC,GAAG;EACH;EACA,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,6BAA6B;EACrD;CACF;CACA,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW;CAExE,SAAS,OAAO,uBAAuB,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK;EACpE,KAAK;EACL,MAAM;EACN,QAAQ;EACR,GAAI,iBAAiB,cAAc;GAAE,UAAU;GAAQ,QAAQ;EAAK,IAAI,CAAC;CAC3E,CAAC;AACH;;;;;;;;;;AAWA,SAAgB,kBACd,SACA,UACiC;CACjC,MAAM,MAAe,QAAQ,OAAO,qBAAqB;CAEzD,IAAI;CAEJ,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;EAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;EAEnD,IAAI,WAAW,aAAa,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,UAAU,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,GACjF,IAAI;GACF,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC;EACxE,QAAQ;GACN,SAAS;EACX;CAEJ;CAEA,SAAS,YAAY,uBAAuB;EAC1C,MAAM;EACN,GAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,cAAc;GAAE,UAAU;GAAQ,QAAQ;EAAK,IAAI,CAAC;CACnF,CAAC;CAED,IACE,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,YACzB,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YACxB,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB,YAC/B,OAAO,OAAO,aAAa,YAC3B,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,YAC5B,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAE7B;CAGF,OAAO;AACT"}

package/esm/providers/x-provider.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+import { AuthProvider, ProviderAuthorizationState, ProviderCallbackParams, ProviderProfile, XProviderConfig } from "../contracts/providers.mjs";
+
+//#region ../auth/src/providers/x-provider.d.ts
+/**
+ * X (Twitter) sign-in: OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow with PKCE (S256). X
+ * is not OpenID Connect — there is no `id_token`. X's confidential clients
+ * authenticate the token request with HTTP Basic auth (`client_id:client_secret`),
+ * on top of PKCE — both are required together, per X's developer docs (this
+ * package has no X test app, so the exchange itself is unverified against a
+ * live endpoint). The access token is then redeemed once against
+ * `GET /2/users/me`.
+ *
+ * X does not return an email address from this API at all — there is no
+ * "email" scope to request it with — so `email` is always left `undefined`
+ * rather than invented, and `resolveProviderUser` rejects it the same way it
+ * rejects any other missing email.
+ */
+declare class XProvider implements AuthProvider {
+  private readonly settings;
+  readonly name = "x";
+  constructor(settings: XProviderConfig);
+  authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string;
+  handleCallback({
+    query,
+    expected
+  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile>;
+  /** Basic-auth credential for the confidential-client token request. */
+  private basicAuth;
+  /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an access token. */
+  private exchangeCode;
+  private fetchUser;
+}
+//#endregion
+export { XProvider };
+//# sourceMappingURL=x-provider.d.mts.map

package/esm/providers/x-provider.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"x-provider.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/providers/x-provider.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;AAoCA;;;;;;;;;;;;cAAa,SAAA,YAAqB,YAAA;EAAA,iBAGI,QAAA;EAAA,SAFpB,IAAA;cAEoB,QAAA,EAAU,eAAA;EAEvC,gBAAA,CAAiB,KAAA,EAAO,0BAAA;EAclB,cAAA;IACX,KAAA;IACA;EAAA,GACC,sBAAA,GAAyB,OAAA,CAAQ,eAAA;EAnBA;EAAA,QA8C5B,SAAA;EA5CuB;EAAA,QAmDjB,YAAA;EAAA,QAuCA,SAAA;AAAA"}

package/esm/providers/x-provider.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+import { InvalidProviderCallbackError } from "../errors/invalid-provider-callback.error.mjs";
+import { pkceChallenge } from "./google-provider.mjs";
+
+//#region ../auth/src/providers/x-provider.ts
+const AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT = "https://twitter.com/i/oauth2/authorize";
+const TOKEN_ENDPOINT = "https://api.twitter.com/2/oauth2/token";
+const USER_ENDPOINT = "https://api.twitter.com/2/users/me";
+const DEFAULT_SCOPES = ["tweet.read", "users.read"];
+/**
+* X (Twitter) sign-in: OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow with PKCE (S256). X
+* is not OpenID Connect — there is no `id_token`. X's confidential clients
+* authenticate the token request with HTTP Basic auth (`client_id:client_secret`),
+* on top of PKCE — both are required together, per X's developer docs (this
+* package has no X test app, so the exchange itself is unverified against a
+* live endpoint). The access token is then redeemed once against
+* `GET /2/users/me`.
+*
+* X does not return an email address from this API at all — there is no
+* "email" scope to request it with — so `email` is always left `undefined`
+* rather than invented, and `resolveProviderUser` rejects it the same way it
+* rejects any other missing email.
+*/
+var XProvider = class {
+	constructor(settings) {
+		this.settings = settings;
+		this.name = "x";
+	}
+	authorizationUrl(state) {
+		const url = new URL(AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT);
+		url.searchParams.set("client_id", this.settings.clientId);
+		url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", this.settings.redirectUri);
+		url.searchParams.set("response_type", "code");
+		url.searchParams.set("scope", (this.settings.scopes ?? DEFAULT_SCOPES).join(" "));
+		url.searchParams.set("state", state.state);
+		url.searchParams.set("code_challenge", pkceChallenge(state.codeVerifier));
+		url.searchParams.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
+		return url.toString();
+	}
+	async handleCallback({ query, expected }) {
+		const code = query.code;
+		if (typeof code !== "string" || code.length === 0) throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError("missing-code");
+		const accessToken = await this.exchangeCode(code, expected.codeVerifier);
+		const user = await this.fetchUser(accessToken);
+		if (typeof user.id !== "string" || user.id.length === 0) throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError("missing-subject");
+		return {
+			provider: this.name,
+			providerUserId: user.id,
+			email: void 0,
+			emailVerified: false,
+			name: user.name ?? user.username,
+			avatar: user.profile_image_url,
+			raw: user
+		};
+	}
+	/** Basic-auth credential for the confidential-client token request. */
+	basicAuth() {
+		return Buffer.from(`${this.settings.clientId}:${this.settings.clientSecret}`).toString("base64");
+	}
+	/** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an access token. */
+	async exchangeCode(code, codeVerifier) {
+		let body;
+		try {
+			const response = await fetch(TOKEN_ENDPOINT, {
+				method: "POST",
+				headers: {
+					"content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+					authorization: `Basic ${this.basicAuth()}`
+				},
+				body: new URLSearchParams({
+					code,
+					client_id: this.settings.clientId,
+					redirect_uri: this.settings.redirectUri,
+					grant_type: "authorization_code",
+					code_verifier: codeVerifier
+				})
+			});
+			if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`X token endpoint answered ${response.status}`);
+			body = await response.json();
+		} catch (error) {
+			throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError("code-exchange-failed", error);
+		}
+		if (body.error) throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError("code-exchange-failed", body.error);
+		if (typeof body.access_token !== "string" || body.access_token.length === 0) throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError("missing-access-token");
+		return body.access_token;
+	}
+	async fetchUser(accessToken) {
+		try {
+			const url = new URL(USER_ENDPOINT);
+			url.searchParams.set("user.fields", "profile_image_url");
+			const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` } });
+			if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`X /2/users/me endpoint answered ${response.status}`);
+			return (await response.json()).data ?? {};
+		} catch (error) {
+			throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError("profile-fetch-failed", error);
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+//#endregion
+export { XProvider };
+//# sourceMappingURL=x-provider.mjs.map

package/esm/providers/x-provider.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"x-provider.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/providers/x-provider.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type {\n  AuthProvider,\n  ProviderAuthorizationState,\n  ProviderCallbackParams,\n  ProviderProfile,\n  XProviderConfig,\n} from \"../contracts/providers\";\nimport { InvalidProviderCallbackError } from \"../errors/invalid-provider-callback.error\";\nimport { pkceChallenge } from \"./google-provider\";\n\nconst AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT = \"https://twitter.com/i/oauth2/authorize\";\nconst TOKEN_ENDPOINT = \"https://api.twitter.com/2/oauth2/token\";\nconst USER_ENDPOINT = \"https://api.twitter.com/2/users/me\";\nconst DEFAULT_SCOPES = [\"tweet.read\", \"users.read\"];\n\ntype XUser = {\n  id: string;\n  name?: string;\n  username?: string;\n  profile_image_url?: string;\n};\n\n/**\n * X (Twitter) sign-in: OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow with PKCE (S256). X\n * is not OpenID Connect — there is no `id_token`. X's confidential clients\n * authenticate the token request with HTTP Basic auth (`client_id:client_secret`),\n * on top of PKCE — both are required together, per X's developer docs (this\n * package has no X test app, so the exchange itself is unverified against a\n * live endpoint). The access token is then redeemed once against\n * `GET /2/users/me`.\n *\n * X does not return an email address from this API at all — there is no\n * \"email\" scope to request it with — so `email` is always left `undefined`\n * rather than invented, and `resolveProviderUser` rejects it the same way it\n * rejects any other missing email.\n */\nexport class XProvider implements AuthProvider {\n  public readonly name = \"x\";\n\n  public constructor(private readonly settings: XProviderConfig) {}\n\n  public authorizationUrl(state: ProviderAuthorizationState): string {\n    const url = new URL(AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT);\n\n    url.searchParams.set(\"client_id\", this.settings.clientId);\n    url.searchParams.set(\"redirect_uri\", this.settings.redirectUri);\n    url.searchParams.set(\"response_type\", \"code\");\n    url.searchParams.set(\"scope\", (this.settings.scopes ?? DEFAULT_SCOPES).join(\" \"));\n    url.searchParams.set(\"state\", state.state);\n    url.searchParams.set(\"code_challenge\", pkceChallenge(state.codeVerifier));\n    url.searchParams.set(\"code_challenge_method\", \"S256\");\n\n    return url.toString();\n  }\n\n  public async handleCallback({\n    query,\n    expected,\n  }: ProviderCallbackParams): Promise<ProviderProfile> {\n    const code = query.code;\n\n    if (typeof code !== \"string\" || code.length === 0) {\n      throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError(\"missing-code\");\n    }\n\n    const accessToken = await this.exchangeCode(code, expected.codeVerifier);\n    const user = await this.fetchUser(accessToken);\n\n    if (typeof user.id !== \"string\" || user.id.length === 0) {\n      throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError(\"missing-subject\");\n    }\n\n    return {\n      provider: this.name,\n      providerUserId: user.id,\n      // X does not hand back an email address from this API.\n      email: undefined,\n      emailVerified: false,\n      name: user.name ?? user.username,\n      avatar: user.profile_image_url,\n      raw: user,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /** Basic-auth credential for the confidential-client token request. */\n  private basicAuth(): string {\n    return Buffer.from(`${this.settings.clientId}:${this.settings.clientSecret}`).toString(\n      \"base64\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** Redeem the authorization code (with the PKCE verifier) for an access token. */\n  private async exchangeCode(code: string, codeVerifier: string): Promise<string> {\n    let body: { access_token?: unknown; error?: unknown };\n\n    try {\n      const response = await fetch(TOKEN_ENDPOINT, {\n        method: \"POST\",\n        headers: {\n          \"content-type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\",\n          authorization: `Basic ${this.basicAuth()}`,\n        },\n        body: new URLSearchParams({\n          code,\n          client_id: this.settings.clientId,\n          redirect_uri: this.settings.redirectUri,\n          grant_type: \"authorization_code\",\n          code_verifier: codeVerifier,\n        }),\n      });\n\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        throw new Error(`X token endpoint answered ${response.status}`);\n      }\n\n      body = (await response.json()) as { access_token?: unknown; error?: unknown };\n    } catch (error) {\n      throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError(\"code-exchange-failed\", error);\n    }\n\n    if (body.error) {\n      throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError(\"code-exchange-failed\", body.error);\n    }\n\n    if (typeof body.access_token !== \"string\" || body.access_token.length === 0) {\n      throw new InvalidProviderCallbackError(\"missing-access-token\");\n    }\n\n    return body.access_token;\n  }\n\n  private async fetchUser(accessToken: string): Promise<XUser> {\n    try {\n      const url = new URL(USER_ENDPOINT);\n\n      url.searchParams.set(\"user.fields\", \"profile_image_url\");\n\n      const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {\n        headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` },\n      });\n\n      if (!response.ok) {\n        throw new Error(`X /2/users/me endpoint answered ${response.status}`);\n      }\n\n      const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: XUser };\n\n      return body.data ?? 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package/esm/services/auth-config.mjs

@@ -155,8 +155,23 @@ allowedOrigins: () => config.key("auth.csrf.allowedOrigins", []) },
 	providers: {
 		/** `auth.providers.google`, when configured. */
 		google: () => config.key("auth.providers.google"),
+		/** `auth.providers.github`, when configured. */
+		github: () => config.key("auth.providers.github"),
+		/** `auth.providers.discord`, when configured. */
+		discord: () => config.key("auth.providers.discord"),
+		/** `auth.providers.linkedin`, when configured. */
+		linkedin: () => config.key("auth.providers.linkedin"),
+		/** `auth.providers.apple`, when configured. */
+		apple: () => config.key("auth.providers.apple"),
+		/** `auth.providers.facebook`, when configured. */
+		facebook: () => config.key("auth.providers.facebook"),
+		/** `auth.providers.x`, when configured. */
+		x: () => config.key("auth.providers.x"),
 		/** An app-registered provider under `auth.providers.custom.<name>`. */
-		custom: (name) => config.key("auth.providers.custom", {})[name],
+		custom: (name) => {
+			const providers = config.key("auth.providers.custom", {});
+			return Object.hasOwn(providers, name) ? providers[name] : void 0;
+		},
 		/** User attribute a verified provider email is matched against. @default "email" */
 		emailField: () => config.key("auth.providers.emailField", "email"),
 		/** App-owned user creation for a first provider login. */

package/esm/services/auth-config.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"auth-config.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/services/auth-config.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { config } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\r\nimport { log } from \"@warlock.js/logger\";\r\nimport { type Algorithm } from \"fast-jwt\";\r\nimport ms from \"ms\";\r\nimport type {\r\n  AuthNotification,\r\n  CanAuthenticate,\r\n  LogoutWithoutTokenBehavior,\r\n  OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder,\r\n  PasswordSetter,\r\n} from \"../contracts/types\";\r\nimport type {\r\n  AuthProvider,\r\n  GoogleProviderConfig,\r\n  OtpSender,\r\n  PasskeysConfig,\r\n  ProviderUserCreator,\r\n} from \"../contracts/providers\";\r\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\r\n\r\nconst warnedLegacyKeys = new Set<string>();\r\n\r\nconst permitAuthentication: CanAuthenticate = (): boolean => true;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * `ms` accepts anything at runtime and answers `undefined` for a string it\r\n * cannot parse (`\"30dayz\"`), a *formatted string* for a number (`2592000` ⇒\r\n * `\"43m\"`), and throws for `\"\"`. Its published types claim the far narrower\r\n * `(value: ms.StringValue) => number`, which is exactly what let an\r\n * `as ms.StringValue` cast smuggle arbitrary config text past the compiler and\r\n * hand `undefined` to the JWT signer. Declare the honest runtime signature once,\r\n * here, so every caller is forced to deal with the `undefined`.\r\n */\r\nconst parseMs = ms as unknown as (value: unknown) => number | string | undefined;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Turn a configured lifetime into a positive number of milliseconds, or throw\r\n * naming the key.\r\n *\r\n * A token lifetime is a security boundary, so an unusable value is a hard error\r\n * rather than a silent fallback: substituting a default would trade one\r\n * unintended lifetime for another, just as quietly — and quiet is the whole\r\n * problem. Every non-positive, non-finite or non-numeric parse is rejected:\r\n *\r\n * - `\"30dayz\"` / `\"thirty days\"` ⇒ `undefined` ⇒ a JWT signed with **no `exp`\r\n *   claim** and an `Invalid Date` written to the token row.\r\n * - `\"0d\"` ⇒ parses cleanly to `0`, which `fast-jwt` treats as falsy and also\r\n *   emits with **no `exp` claim** — it survives any guard that only rejects\r\n *   `undefined`. `\"-1h\"` signs an already-expired token.\r\n * - `2592000` (a bare number) ⇒ `ms` *formats* it as `\"43m\"`, a string, which\r\n *   then turns `Date.now() + expiresIn` into an `Invalid Date`.\r\n */\r\nfunction parseDuration(key: string, raw: unknown): number {\r\n  let parsed: number | string | undefined;\r\n\r\n  try {\r\n    parsed = parseMs(raw);\r\n  } catch {\r\n    // ms throws (rather than returning undefined) for \"\" and non-strings\r\n    parsed = undefined;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  if (typeof parsed !== \"number\" || !Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) {\r\n    throw new Error(\r\n      `auth.${key}: ${JSON.stringify(raw)} is not a valid ms duration — ` +\r\n        `use a positive duration string such as \"1h\", \"7d\", or NO_EXPIRATION.`,\r\n    );\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return parsed;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/** Email-verification token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN = \"24h\";\r\n\r\n/** Password-reset token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN = \"60m\";\r\n\r\n/** Passkey challenge lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\r\n\r\n/** OTP lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\r\n\r\n/** Access-token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = \"1h\";\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Resolve an auth setting, preferring the new `auth.accessToken.*` /\r\n * `auth.refreshToken.*` key and falling back to the deprecated `auth.jwt.*`\r\n * shape — warning once per legacy key. Returns `fallback` when neither is set.\r\n *\r\n * This is the backward-compatible shim that lets existing `auth.jwt.*` configs\r\n * keep working after the config split.\r\n */\r\nfunction resolve<T>(newKey: string, legacyKey: string, fallback?: T): T {\r\n  const fromNew = config.key(`auth.${newKey}`);\r\n\r\n  if (fromNew !== undefined && fromNew !== null) {\r\n    return fromNew as T;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  const fromLegacy = config.key(`auth.${legacyKey}`);\r\n\r\n  if (fromLegacy !== undefined && fromLegacy !== null) {\r\n    if (!warnedLegacyKeys.has(legacyKey)) {\r\n      warnedLegacyKeys.add(legacyKey);\r\n      log.warn(\r\n        \"auth\",\r\n        \"config-deprecation\",\r\n        `auth.${legacyKey} is deprecated — use auth.${newKey}`,\r\n      );\r\n    }\r\n\r\n    return fromLegacy as T;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return fallback as T;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Typed, backward-compatible access to auth configuration. The service and the\r\n * jwt signer read configuration exclusively through here, so the new split\r\n * config and the legacy `auth.jwt.*` shape both resolve the same way.\r\n */\r\nexport const authConfig = {\r\n  canAuthenticate: async (user: Auth): Promise<boolean> => {\r\n    const canAuthenticate = config.key<CanAuthenticate>(\r\n      \"auth.canAuthenticate\",\r\n      permitAuthentication,\r\n    );\r\n\r\n    return canAuthenticate(user);\r\n  },\r\n  accessToken: {\r\n    /** Signing secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.secret`). Throws if neither is set. */\r\n    secret: (): string => {\r\n      const secret = resolve<string | undefined>(\"accessToken.secret\", \"jwt.secret\");\r\n\r\n      if (!secret) {\r\n        throw new Error(\"auth: no JWT secret configured — set `auth.accessToken.secret`.\");\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return secret;\r\n    },\r\n    /** Signing algorithm (legacy: `auth.jwt.algorithm`). */\r\n    algorithm: (): Algorithm => resolve(\"accessToken.algorithm\", \"jwt.algorithm\", \"HS256\"),\r\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.expiresIn`). */\r\n    expiresIn: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"accessToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.expiresIn\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. Defaults\r\n     * to 1 hour when unset; throws naming the key when the configured value is\r\n     * not a positive `ms` duration. See {@link parseDuration}.\r\n     */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"accessToken.expiresIn\",\r\n        authConfig.accessToken.expiresIn() ?? DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,\r\n      ),\r\n  },\r\n  pageAuth: {\r\n    /**\r\n     * Login path a guarded PAGE route redirects a logged-out browser to.\r\n     *\r\n     * Unset (the default) ⇒ page-route auth failures keep the JSON 401 API\r\n     * contract, so existing apps see NO behavior change. Set it (e.g. \"/login\")\r\n     * to opt a browser-facing app into login-redirect UX: a logged-out human\r\n     * navigating to a guarded page lands on the login screen instead of reading\r\n     * a raw JSON error blob. Finding b9ab9804.\r\n     */\r\n    loginPath: (): string | undefined => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.loginPath\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Query parameter the redirect carries the originally-requested path in, so\r\n     * the login flow can send the user back where they were headed. Defaults to\r\n     * `\"returnUrl\"`.\r\n     */\r\n    returnUrlParam: (): string => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.returnUrlParam\", \"returnUrl\"),\r\n  },\r\n  cookie: {\r\n    /** Cookie name `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"access_token\" */\r\n    name: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.name\", \"access_token\"),\r\n    /** Cookie `Path` attribute `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"/\" */\r\n    path: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.path\", \"/\"),\r\n  },\r\n  csrf: {\r\n    /**\r\n     * Extra origins allowed on a cookie-authenticated unsafe-method request,\r\n     * beyond the request's own origin. @default []\r\n     */\r\n    allowedOrigins: (): string[] => config.key(\"auth.csrf.allowedOrigins\", []),\r\n  },\r\n  verification: {\r\n    /** Lifetime in ms of an email-verification token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"24h\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"verification.expiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.verification.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n    /** User attribute stamped with the verification date. @default \"emailVerifiedAt\" */\r\n    field: (): string => config.key(\"auth.verification.field\", \"emailVerifiedAt\"),\r\n    /** App notification replacing the default verification email. */\r\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.notification\"),\r\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\r\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.url\"),\r\n  },\r\n  passwordReset: {\r\n    /** Lifetime in ms of a password-reset token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"60m\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"passwordReset.expiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n    /** User attribute `requestPasswordReset` looks the account up by. @default \"email\" */\r\n    identifierField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.identifierField\", \"email\"),\r\n    /** App notification replacing the default reset email. */\r\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.notification\"),\r\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\r\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.url\"),\r\n    /** App-owned password writer replacing the default. */\r\n    setPassword: (): PasswordSetter | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.setPassword\"),\r\n  },\r\n  providers: {\r\n    /** `auth.providers.google`, when configured. */\r\n    google: (): GoogleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.google\"),\r\n    /** An app-registered provider under `auth.providers.custom.<name>`. */\r\n    custom: (name: string): AuthProvider | undefined =>\r\n      config.key<Record<string, AuthProvider>>(\"auth.providers.custom\", {})[name],\r\n    /** User attribute a verified provider email is matched against. @default \"email\" */\r\n    emailField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.providers.emailField\", \"email\"),\r\n    /** App-owned user creation for a first provider login. */\r\n    createUser: (): ProviderUserCreator | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.createUser\"),\r\n  },\r\n  passkeys: {\r\n    /** `auth.passkeys`; throws naming the keys when `rpID`, `rpName` or `origin` is missing. */\r\n    settings: (): PasskeysConfig => {\r\n      const settings = config.key<PasskeysConfig | undefined>(\"auth.passkeys\");\r\n\r\n      if (!settings?.rpID || !settings.rpName || !settings.origin) {\r\n        throw new Error(\r\n          \"@warlock.js/auth: passkeys need `auth.passkeys.rpID`, `auth.passkeys.rpName` and `auth.passkeys.origin`.\",\r\n        );\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return settings;\r\n    },\r\n    /** Allowed ceremony origins, as a list. */\r\n    origins: (): string[] => {\r\n      const { origin } = authConfig.passkeys.settings();\r\n\r\n      return Array.isArray(origin) ? origin : [origin];\r\n    },\r\n    /** Challenge lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\r\n    challengeExpiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n  },\r\n  otp: {\r\n    /** Notifications channel the code is sent through. @default \"sms\" */\r\n    channel: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.channel\", \"sms\"),\r\n    /** User attribute holding the phone number. @default \"phone\" */\r\n    phoneField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.phoneField\", \"phone\"),\r\n    /** Code lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\"otp.expiresIn\", config.key(\"auth.otp.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN)),\r\n    /** Verify attempts before the code is invalidated. @default 5 */\r\n    maxAttempts: (): number => config.key(\"auth.otp.maxAttempts\", 5),\r\n    /** The message text for a code. */\r\n    message: (code: string): string => {\r\n      const build = config.key<((code: string) => string) | undefined>(\"auth.otp.message\");\r\n\r\n      return build ? build(code) : `Your verification code is ${code}`;\r\n    },\r\n    /** App-owned delivery replacing the notifications channel send. */\r\n    send: (): OtpSender | undefined => config.key(\"auth.otp.send\"),\r\n  },\r\n  refreshToken: {\r\n    /** Separate refresh secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.secret`); empty ⇒ fall back to the access secret. */\r\n    secret: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"refreshToken.secret\", \"jwt.refresh.secret\"),\r\n    /** Whether refresh tokens are enabled (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.enabled`). */\r\n    enabled: (): boolean => resolve(\"refreshToken.enabled\", \"jwt.refresh.enabled\", true),\r\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.expiresIn`). */\r\n    expiresIn: (): string => resolve(\"refreshToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.refresh.expiresIn\", \"7d\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. Throws\r\n     * naming the key when the configured value is not a positive `ms` duration.\r\n     */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\"refreshToken.expiresIn\", authConfig.refreshToken.expiresIn()),\r\n    /** Rotate-on-use (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.rotation`). */\r\n    rotation: (): boolean => resolve(\"refreshToken.rotation\", \"jwt.refresh.rotation\", true),\r\n    /** Max active tokens per user (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.maxPerUser`). */\r\n    maxPerUser: (): number => resolve(\"refreshToken.maxPerUser\", \"jwt.refresh.maxPerUser\", 5),\r\n    /** Logout-without-token behavior (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.logoutWithoutToken`). */\r\n    logoutWithoutToken: (): LogoutWithoutTokenBehavior =>\r\n      resolve(\"refreshToken.logoutWithoutToken\", \"jwt.refresh.logoutWithoutToken\", \"revoke-all\"),\r\n  },\r\n};\r\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAoBA,MAAM,mCAAmB,IAAI,IAAY;AAEzC,MAAM,6BAAuD;;;;;;;;;;AAW7D,MAAM,UAAU;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmBhB,SAAS,cAAc,KAAa,KAAsB;CACxD,IAAI;CAEJ,IAAI;EACF,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;CACtB,QAAQ;EAEN,SAAS;CACX;CAEA,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,GACtE,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG,EAAE,mGAEtC;CAGF,OAAO;AACT;;AAGA,MAAM,kCAAkC;;AAGxC,MAAM,oCAAoC;;AAG1C,MAAM,uCAAuC;;AAG7C,MAAM,yBAAyB;;AAG/B,MAAM,kCAAkC;;;;;;;;;AAUxC,SAAS,QAAW,QAAgB,WAAmB,UAAiB;CACtE,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAE3C,IAAI,YAAY,UAAa,YAAY,MACvC,OAAO;CAGT,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;CAEjD,IAAI,eAAe,UAAa,eAAe,MAAM;EACnD,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG;GACpC,iBAAiB,IAAI,SAAS;GAC9B,IAAI,KACF,QACA,sBACA,QAAQ,UAAU,4BAA4B,QAChD;EACF;EAEA,OAAO;CACT;CAEA,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;AAOA,MAAa,aAAa;CACxB,iBAAiB,OAAO,SAAiC;EAMvD,OALwB,OAAO,IAC7B,wBACA,oBAGmB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI;CAC7B;CACA,aAAa;;EAEX,cAAsB;GACpB,MAAM,SAAS,QAA4B,sBAAsB,YAAY;GAE7E,IAAI,CAAC,QACH,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iEAAiE;GAGnF,OAAO;EACT;;EAEA,iBAA4B,QAAQ,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,OAAO;;EAErF,iBAAqC,QAAQ,yBAAyB,eAAe;;;;;;EAMrF,mBACE,cACE,yBACA,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU,KAAK,+BACxC;CACJ;CACA,UAAU;;;;;;;;;;EAUR,iBAAqC,OAAO,IAAI,yBAAyB;;;;;;EAMzE,sBAA8B,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC,WAAW;CACtF;CACA,QAAQ;;EAEN,YAAoB,OAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,cAAc;;EAEjE,YAAoB,OAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,GAAG;CACxD;CACA,MAAM;;;;;AAKJ,sBAAgC,OAAO,IAAI,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,EAC3E;CACA,cAAc;;EAEZ,mBACE,cACE,0BACA,OAAO,IAAI,+BAA+B,+BAA+B,CAC3E;;EAEF,aAAqB,OAAO,IAAI,2BAA2B,iBAAiB;;EAE5E,oBAAkD,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC;;EAE7F,WAA+C,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB;CACnF;CACA,eAAe;;EAEb,mBACE,cACE,2BACA,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC,iCAAiC,CAC9E;;EAEF,uBAA+B,OAAO,IAAI,sCAAsC,OAAO;;EAEvF,oBAAkD,OAAO,IAAI,iCAAiC;;EAE9F,WAA+C,OAAO,IAAI,wBAAwB;;EAElF,mBAA+C,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC;CAC5F;CACA,WAAW;;EAET,cAAgD,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB;;EAElF,SAAS,SACP,OAAO,IAAkC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;;EAExE,kBAA0B,OAAO,IAAI,6BAA6B,OAAO;;EAEzE,kBAAmD,OAAO,IAAI,2BAA2B;CAC3F;CACA,UAAU;;EAER,gBAAgC;GAC9B,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,IAAgC,eAAe;GAEvE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,QACnD,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,0GACF;GAGF,OAAO;EACT;;EAEA,eAAyB;GACvB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS;GAEhD,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;EACjD;;EAEA,4BACE,cACE,+BACA,OAAO,IAAI,oCAAoC,oCAAoC,CACrF;CACJ;CACA,KAAK;;EAEH,eAAuB,OAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,KAAK;;EAE3D,kBAA0B,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB,OAAO;;EAEnE,mBACE,cAAc,iBAAiB,OAAO,IAAI,sBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC;;EAEzF,mBAA2B,OAAO,IAAI,wBAAwB,CAAC;;EAE/D,UAAU,SAAyB;GACjC,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,IAA4C,kBAAkB;GAEnF,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,6BAA6B;EAC5D;;EAEA,YAAmC,OAAO,IAAI,eAAe;CAC/D;CACA,cAAc;;EAEZ,cAAkC,QAAQ,uBAAuB,oBAAoB;;EAErF,eAAwB,QAAQ,wBAAwB,uBAAuB,IAAI;;EAEnF,iBAAyB,QAAQ,0BAA0B,yBAAyB,IAAI;;;;;EAKxF,mBACE,cAAc,0BAA0B,WAAW,aAAa,UAAU,CAAC;;EAE7E,gBAAyB,QAAQ,yBAAyB,wBAAwB,IAAI;;EAEtF,kBAA0B,QAAQ,2BAA2B,0BAA0B,CAAC;;EAExF,0BACE,QAAQ,mCAAmC,kCAAkC,YAAY;CAC7F;AACF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"auth-config.mjs","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../auth/src/services/auth-config.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { config } from \"@warlock.js/core\";\r\nimport { log } from \"@warlock.js/logger\";\r\nimport { type Algorithm } from \"fast-jwt\";\r\nimport ms from \"ms\";\r\nimport type {\r\n  AuthNotification,\r\n  CanAuthenticate,\r\n  LogoutWithoutTokenBehavior,\r\n  OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder,\r\n  PasswordSetter,\r\n} from \"../contracts/types\";\r\nimport type {\r\n  AppleProviderConfig,\r\n  AuthProvider,\r\n  DiscordProviderConfig,\r\n  FacebookProviderConfig,\r\n  GitHubProviderConfig,\r\n  GoogleProviderConfig,\r\n  LinkedInProviderConfig,\r\n  OtpSender,\r\n  PasskeysConfig,\r\n  ProviderUserCreator,\r\n  XProviderConfig,\r\n} from \"../contracts/providers\";\r\nimport type { Auth } from \"../models/auth.model\";\r\n\r\nconst warnedLegacyKeys = new Set<string>();\r\n\r\nconst permitAuthentication: CanAuthenticate = (): boolean => true;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * `ms` accepts anything at runtime and answers `undefined` for a string it\r\n * cannot parse (`\"30dayz\"`), a *formatted string* for a number (`2592000` ⇒\r\n * `\"43m\"`), and throws for `\"\"`. Its published types claim the far narrower\r\n * `(value: ms.StringValue) => number`, which is exactly what let an\r\n * `as ms.StringValue` cast smuggle arbitrary config text past the compiler and\r\n * hand `undefined` to the JWT signer. Declare the honest runtime signature once,\r\n * here, so every caller is forced to deal with the `undefined`.\r\n */\r\nconst parseMs = ms as unknown as (value: unknown) => number | string | undefined;\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Turn a configured lifetime into a positive number of milliseconds, or throw\r\n * naming the key.\r\n *\r\n * A token lifetime is a security boundary, so an unusable value is a hard error\r\n * rather than a silent fallback: substituting a default would trade one\r\n * unintended lifetime for another, just as quietly — and quiet is the whole\r\n * problem. Every non-positive, non-finite or non-numeric parse is rejected:\r\n *\r\n * - `\"30dayz\"` / `\"thirty days\"` ⇒ `undefined` ⇒ a JWT signed with **no `exp`\r\n *   claim** and an `Invalid Date` written to the token row.\r\n * - `\"0d\"` ⇒ parses cleanly to `0`, which `fast-jwt` treats as falsy and also\r\n *   emits with **no `exp` claim** — it survives any guard that only rejects\r\n *   `undefined`. `\"-1h\"` signs an already-expired token.\r\n * - `2592000` (a bare number) ⇒ `ms` *formats* it as `\"43m\"`, a string, which\r\n *   then turns `Date.now() + expiresIn` into an `Invalid Date`.\r\n */\r\nfunction parseDuration(key: string, raw: unknown): number {\r\n  let parsed: number | string | undefined;\r\n\r\n  try {\r\n    parsed = parseMs(raw);\r\n  } catch {\r\n    // ms throws (rather than returning undefined) for \"\" and non-strings\r\n    parsed = undefined;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  if (typeof parsed !== \"number\" || !Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed <= 0) {\r\n    throw new Error(\r\n      `auth.${key}: ${JSON.stringify(raw)} is not a valid ms duration — ` +\r\n        `use a positive duration string such as \"1h\", \"7d\", or NO_EXPIRATION.`,\r\n    );\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return parsed;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/** Email-verification token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN = \"24h\";\r\n\r\n/** Password-reset token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN = \"60m\";\r\n\r\n/** Passkey challenge lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\r\n\r\n/** OTP lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN = \"5m\";\r\n\r\n/** Access-token lifetime used when nothing is configured. */\r\nconst DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = \"1h\";\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Resolve an auth setting, preferring the new `auth.accessToken.*` /\r\n * `auth.refreshToken.*` key and falling back to the deprecated `auth.jwt.*`\r\n * shape — warning once per legacy key. Returns `fallback` when neither is set.\r\n *\r\n * This is the backward-compatible shim that lets existing `auth.jwt.*` configs\r\n * keep working after the config split.\r\n */\r\nfunction resolve<T>(newKey: string, legacyKey: string, fallback?: T): T {\r\n  const fromNew = config.key(`auth.${newKey}`);\r\n\r\n  if (fromNew !== undefined && fromNew !== null) {\r\n    return fromNew as T;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  const fromLegacy = config.key(`auth.${legacyKey}`);\r\n\r\n  if (fromLegacy !== undefined && fromLegacy !== null) {\r\n    if (!warnedLegacyKeys.has(legacyKey)) {\r\n      warnedLegacyKeys.add(legacyKey);\r\n      log.warn(\r\n        \"auth\",\r\n        \"config-deprecation\",\r\n        `auth.${legacyKey} is deprecated — use auth.${newKey}`,\r\n      );\r\n    }\r\n\r\n    return fromLegacy as T;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return fallback as T;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Typed, backward-compatible access to auth configuration. The service and the\r\n * jwt signer read configuration exclusively through here, so the new split\r\n * config and the legacy `auth.jwt.*` shape both resolve the same way.\r\n */\r\nexport const authConfig = {\r\n  canAuthenticate: async (user: Auth): Promise<boolean> => {\r\n    const canAuthenticate = config.key<CanAuthenticate>(\r\n      \"auth.canAuthenticate\",\r\n      permitAuthentication,\r\n    );\r\n\r\n    return canAuthenticate(user);\r\n  },\r\n  accessToken: {\r\n    /** Signing secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.secret`). Throws if neither is set. */\r\n    secret: (): string => {\r\n      const secret = resolve<string | undefined>(\"accessToken.secret\", \"jwt.secret\");\r\n\r\n      if (!secret) {\r\n        throw new Error(\"auth: no JWT secret configured — set `auth.accessToken.secret`.\");\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return secret;\r\n    },\r\n    /** Signing algorithm (legacy: `auth.jwt.algorithm`). */\r\n    algorithm: (): Algorithm => resolve(\"accessToken.algorithm\", \"jwt.algorithm\", \"HS256\"),\r\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.expiresIn`). */\r\n    expiresIn: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"accessToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.expiresIn\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. Defaults\r\n     * to 1 hour when unset; throws naming the key when the configured value is\r\n     * not a positive `ms` duration. See {@link parseDuration}.\r\n     */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"accessToken.expiresIn\",\r\n        authConfig.accessToken.expiresIn() ?? DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,\r\n      ),\r\n  },\r\n  pageAuth: {\r\n    /**\r\n     * Login path a guarded PAGE route redirects a logged-out browser to.\r\n     *\r\n     * Unset (the default) ⇒ page-route auth failures keep the JSON 401 API\r\n     * contract, so existing apps see NO behavior change. Set it (e.g. \"/login\")\r\n     * to opt a browser-facing app into login-redirect UX: a logged-out human\r\n     * navigating to a guarded page lands on the login screen instead of reading\r\n     * a raw JSON error blob. Finding b9ab9804.\r\n     */\r\n    loginPath: (): string | undefined => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.loginPath\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Query parameter the redirect carries the originally-requested path in, so\r\n     * the login flow can send the user back where they were headed. Defaults to\r\n     * `\"returnUrl\"`.\r\n     */\r\n    returnUrlParam: (): string => config.key(\"auth.pageAuth.returnUrlParam\", \"returnUrl\"),\r\n  },\r\n  cookie: {\r\n    /** Cookie name `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"access_token\" */\r\n    name: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.name\", \"access_token\"),\r\n    /** Cookie `Path` attribute `setAuthCookie`/`clearAuthCookie` use. @default \"/\" */\r\n    path: (): string => config.key(\"auth.cookie.path\", \"/\"),\r\n  },\r\n  csrf: {\r\n    /**\r\n     * Extra origins allowed on a cookie-authenticated unsafe-method request,\r\n     * beyond the request's own origin. @default []\r\n     */\r\n    allowedOrigins: (): string[] => config.key(\"auth.csrf.allowedOrigins\", []),\r\n  },\r\n  verification: {\r\n    /** Lifetime in ms of an email-verification token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"24h\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"verification.expiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.verification.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_VERIFICATION_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n    /** User attribute stamped with the verification date. @default \"emailVerifiedAt\" */\r\n    field: (): string => config.key(\"auth.verification.field\", \"emailVerifiedAt\"),\r\n    /** App notification replacing the default verification email. */\r\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.notification\"),\r\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\r\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.verification.url\"),\r\n  },\r\n  passwordReset: {\r\n    /** Lifetime in ms of a password-reset token; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"60m\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"passwordReset.expiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSWORD_RESET_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n    /** User attribute `requestPasswordReset` looks the account up by. @default \"email\" */\r\n    identifierField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.identifierField\", \"email\"),\r\n    /** App notification replacing the default reset email. */\r\n    notification: (): AuthNotification | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.notification\"),\r\n    /** Link builder whose result is handed to the notification as `url`. */\r\n    url: (): OneTimeTokenUrlBuilder | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.url\"),\r\n    /** App-owned password writer replacing the default. */\r\n    setPassword: (): PasswordSetter | undefined => config.key(\"auth.passwordReset.setPassword\"),\r\n  },\r\n  providers: {\r\n    /** `auth.providers.google`, when configured. */\r\n    google: (): GoogleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.google\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.github`, when configured. */\r\n    github: (): GitHubProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.github\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.discord`, when configured. */\r\n    discord: (): DiscordProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.discord\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.linkedin`, when configured. */\r\n    linkedin: (): LinkedInProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.linkedin\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.apple`, when configured. */\r\n    apple: (): AppleProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.apple\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.facebook`, when configured. */\r\n    facebook: (): FacebookProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.facebook\"),\r\n    /** `auth.providers.x`, when configured. */\r\n    x: (): XProviderConfig | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.x\"),\r\n    /** An app-registered provider under `auth.providers.custom.<name>`. */\r\n    custom: (name: string): AuthProvider | undefined => {\r\n      const providers = config.key<Record<string, AuthProvider>>(\"auth.providers.custom\", {});\r\n\r\n      // Own keys only: `name` arrives from a URL, and \"constructor\" must not resolve to Object.\r\n      return Object.hasOwn(providers, name) ? providers[name] : undefined;\r\n    },\r\n    /** User attribute a verified provider email is matched against. @default \"email\" */\r\n    emailField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.providers.emailField\", \"email\"),\r\n    /** App-owned user creation for a first provider login. */\r\n    createUser: (): ProviderUserCreator | undefined => config.key(\"auth.providers.createUser\"),\r\n  },\r\n  passkeys: {\r\n    /** `auth.passkeys`; throws naming the keys when `rpID`, `rpName` or `origin` is missing. */\r\n    settings: (): PasskeysConfig => {\r\n      const settings = config.key<PasskeysConfig | undefined>(\"auth.passkeys\");\r\n\r\n      if (!settings?.rpID || !settings.rpName || !settings.origin) {\r\n        throw new Error(\r\n          \"@warlock.js/auth: passkeys need `auth.passkeys.rpID`, `auth.passkeys.rpName` and `auth.passkeys.origin`.\",\r\n        );\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return settings;\r\n    },\r\n    /** Allowed ceremony origins, as a list. */\r\n    origins: (): string[] => {\r\n      const { origin } = authConfig.passkeys.settings();\r\n\r\n      return Array.isArray(origin) ? origin : [origin];\r\n    },\r\n    /** Challenge lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\r\n    challengeExpiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\r\n        \"passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\",\r\n        config.key(\"auth.passkeys.challengeExpiresIn\", DEFAULT_PASSKEY_CHALLENGE_EXPIRES_IN),\r\n      ),\r\n  },\r\n  otp: {\r\n    /** Notifications channel the code is sent through. @default \"sms\" */\r\n    channel: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.channel\", \"sms\"),\r\n    /** User attribute holding the phone number. @default \"phone\" */\r\n    phoneField: (): string => config.key(\"auth.otp.phoneField\", \"phone\"),\r\n    /** Code lifetime in ms; throws naming the key when unusable. @default \"5m\" */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\"otp.expiresIn\", config.key(\"auth.otp.expiresIn\", DEFAULT_OTP_EXPIRES_IN)),\r\n    /** Verify attempts before the code is invalidated. @default 5 */\r\n    maxAttempts: (): number => config.key(\"auth.otp.maxAttempts\", 5),\r\n    /** The message text for a code. */\r\n    message: (code: string): string => {\r\n      const build = config.key<((code: string) => string) | undefined>(\"auth.otp.message\");\r\n\r\n      return build ? build(code) : `Your verification code is ${code}`;\r\n    },\r\n    /** App-owned delivery replacing the notifications channel send. */\r\n    send: (): OtpSender | undefined => config.key(\"auth.otp.send\"),\r\n  },\r\n  refreshToken: {\r\n    /** Separate refresh secret (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.secret`); empty ⇒ fall back to the access secret. */\r\n    secret: (): string | undefined => resolve(\"refreshToken.secret\", \"jwt.refresh.secret\"),\r\n    /** Whether refresh tokens are enabled (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.enabled`). */\r\n    enabled: (): boolean => resolve(\"refreshToken.enabled\", \"jwt.refresh.enabled\", true),\r\n    /** Lifetime as an `ms`-string (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.expiresIn`). */\r\n    expiresIn: (): string => resolve(\"refreshToken.expiresIn\", \"jwt.refresh.expiresIn\", \"7d\"),\r\n    /**\r\n     * Lifetime in milliseconds — the only form a token issuer may use. Throws\r\n     * naming the key when the configured value is not a positive `ms` duration.\r\n     */\r\n    expiresInMs: (): number =>\r\n      parseDuration(\"refreshToken.expiresIn\", authConfig.refreshToken.expiresIn()),\r\n    /** Rotate-on-use (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.rotation`). */\r\n    rotation: (): boolean => resolve(\"refreshToken.rotation\", \"jwt.refresh.rotation\", true),\r\n    /** Max active tokens per user (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.maxPerUser`). */\r\n    maxPerUser: (): number => resolve(\"refreshToken.maxPerUser\", \"jwt.refresh.maxPerUser\", 5),\r\n    /** Logout-without-token behavior (legacy: `auth.jwt.refresh.logoutWithoutToken`). */\r\n    logoutWithoutToken: (): LogoutWithoutTokenBehavior =>\r\n      resolve(\"refreshToken.logoutWithoutToken\", \"jwt.refresh.logoutWithoutToken\", \"revoke-all\"),\r\n  },\r\n};\r\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AA0BA,MAAM,mCAAmB,IAAI,IAAY;AAEzC,MAAM,6BAAuD;;;;;;;;;;AAW7D,MAAM,UAAU;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmBhB,SAAS,cAAc,KAAa,KAAsB;CACxD,IAAI;CAEJ,IAAI;EACF,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;CACtB,QAAQ;EAEN,SAAS;CACX;CAEA,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,GACtE,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG,EAAE,mGAEtC;CAGF,OAAO;AACT;;AAGA,MAAM,kCAAkC;;AAGxC,MAAM,oCAAoC;;AAG1C,MAAM,uCAAuC;;AAG7C,MAAM,yBAAyB;;AAG/B,MAAM,kCAAkC;;;;;;;;;AAUxC,SAAS,QAAW,QAAgB,WAAmB,UAAiB;CACtE,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;CAE3C,IAAI,YAAY,UAAa,YAAY,MACvC,OAAO;CAGT,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;CAEjD,IAAI,eAAe,UAAa,eAAe,MAAM;EACnD,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG;GACpC,iBAAiB,IAAI,SAAS;GAC9B,IAAI,KACF,QACA,sBACA,QAAQ,UAAU,4BAA4B,QAChD;EACF;EAEA,OAAO;CACT;CAEA,OAAO;AACT;;;;;;AAOA,MAAa,aAAa;CACxB,iBAAiB,OAAO,SAAiC;EAMvD,OALwB,OAAO,IAC7B,wBACA,oBAGmB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI;CAC7B;CACA,aAAa;;EAEX,cAAsB;GACpB,MAAM,SAAS,QAA4B,sBAAsB,YAAY;GAE7E,IAAI,CAAC,QACH,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iEAAiE;GAGnF,OAAO;EACT;;EAEA,iBAA4B,QAAQ,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,OAAO;;EAErF,iBAAqC,QAAQ,yBAAyB,eAAe;;;;;;EAMrF,mBACE,cACE,yBACA,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU,KAAK,+BACxC;CACJ;CACA,UAAU;;;;;;;;;;EAUR,iBAAqC,OAAO,IAAI,yBAAyB;;;;;;EAMzE,sBAA8B,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC,WAAW;CACtF;CACA,QAAQ;;EAEN,YAAoB,OAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,cAAc;;EAEjE,YAAoB,OAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,GAAG;CACxD;CACA,MAAM;;;;;AAKJ,sBAAgC,OAAO,IAAI,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,EAC3E;CACA,cAAc;;EAEZ,mBACE,cACE,0BACA,OAAO,IAAI,+BAA+B,+BAA+B,CAC3E;;EAEF,aAAqB,OAAO,IAAI,2BAA2B,iBAAiB;;EAE5E,oBAAkD,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC;;EAE7F,WAA+C,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB;CACnF;CACA,eAAe;;EAEb,mBACE,cACE,2BACA,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC,iCAAiC,CAC9E;;EAEF,uBAA+B,OAAO,IAAI,sCAAsC,OAAO;;EAEvF,oBAAkD,OAAO,IAAI,iCAAiC;;EAE9F,WAA+C,OAAO,IAAI,wBAAwB;;EAElF,mBAA+C,OAAO,IAAI,gCAAgC;CAC5F;CACA,WAAW;;EAET,cAAgD,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB;;EAElF,cAAgD,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB;;EAElF,eAAkD,OAAO,IAAI,wBAAwB;;EAErF,gBAAoD,OAAO,IAAI,yBAAyB;;EAExF,aAA8C,OAAO,IAAI,sBAAsB;;EAE/E,gBAAoD,OAAO,IAAI,yBAAyB;;EAExF,SAAsC,OAAO,IAAI,kBAAkB;;EAEnE,SAAS,SAA2C;GAClD,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,IAAkC,yBAAyB,CAAC,CAAC;GAGtF,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,QAAQ;EAC5D;;EAEA,kBAA0B,OAAO,IAAI,6BAA6B,OAAO;;EAEzE,kBAAmD,OAAO,IAAI,2BAA2B;CAC3F;CACA,UAAU;;EAER,gBAAgC;GAC9B,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,IAAgC,eAAe;GAEvE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,QACnD,MAAM,IAAI,MACR,0GACF;GAGF,OAAO;EACT;;EAEA,eAAyB;GACvB,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS;GAEhD,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;EACjD;;EAEA,4BACE,cACE,+BACA,OAAO,IAAI,oCAAoC,oCAAoC,CACrF;CACJ;CACA,KAAK;;EAEH,eAAuB,OAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,KAAK;;EAE3D,kBAA0B,OAAO,IAAI,uBAAuB,OAAO;;EAEnE,mBACE,cAAc,iBAAiB,OAAO,IAAI,sBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC;;EAEzF,mBAA2B,OAAO,IAAI,wBAAwB,CAAC;;EAE/D,UAAU,SAAyB;GACjC,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,IAA4C,kBAAkB;GAEnF,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,6BAA6B;EAC5D;;EAEA,YAAmC,OAAO,IAAI,eAAe;CAC/D;CACA,cAAc;;EAEZ,cAAkC,QAAQ,uBAAuB,oBAAoB;;EAErF,eAAwB,QAAQ,wBAAwB,uBAAuB,IAAI;;EAEnF,iBAAyB,QAAQ,0BAA0B,yBAAyB,IAAI;;;;;EAKxF,mBACE,cAAc,0BAA0B,WAAW,aAAa,UAAU,CAAC;;EAE7E,gBAAyB,QAAQ,yBAAyB,wBAAwB,IAAI;;EAEtF,kBAA0B,QAAQ,2BAA2B,0BAA0B,CAAC;;EAExF,0BACE,QAAQ,mCAAmC,kCAAkC,YAAY;CAC7F;AACF"}