@wardby/cli 0.1.0

package/dist/providers/vcs/git.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+import { type GitHubRepositoryAccess } from "./github.js";
+import type { FinalizeChangesDetails, FinalizeChangesResult, PreparedWorkspace, VcsPrepareInput, VcsProvider } from "./types.js";
+export declare const DEFAULT_MAX_CHANGED_FILES = 1000;
+export declare const DEFAULT_MAX_DIFF_BYTES: number;
+export interface GitCommandOptions {
+    cwd?: string;
+    authToken?: string;
+    maxOutputBytes?: number;
+}
+export interface GitCommandResult {
+    stdout: string;
+    stderr: string;
+}
+export interface GitCommandRunner {
+    run(args: readonly string[], options?: GitCommandOptions): Promise<GitCommandResult>;
+}
+export declare class GitCommandError extends Error {
+    readonly exitCode: number | null;
+    constructor(exitCode: number | null, detail: string);
+}
+export declare function redactGitOutput(value: string, secrets?: readonly string[]): string;
+export interface NodeGitCommandRunnerOptions {
+    gitBinary?: string;
+    path?: string;
+    homeDir: string;
+    askPassPath?: string;
+}
+/** Runs Git without a shell or inherited application secrets. */
+export declare class NodeGitCommandRunner implements GitCommandRunner {
+    private readonly options;
+    private readonly gitBinary;
+    private readonly path;
+    private readonly askPassPath;
+    constructor(options: NodeGitCommandRunnerOptions);
+    run(args: readonly string[], options?: GitCommandOptions): Promise<GitCommandResult>;
+}
+export interface GitVcsProviderOptions {
+    rootDir: string;
+    github: GitHubRepositoryAccess;
+    git?: GitCommandRunner;
+    maxChangedFiles?: number;
+    maxDiffBytes?: number;
+    /** Test-only transport override; production composition always uses github.com. */
+    cloneUrlForRepository?: (repository: string) => string;
+}
+export declare class GitVcsProvider implements VcsProvider {
+    private readonly options;
+    private readonly rootDir;
+    private readonly git;
+    private readonly maxChangedFiles;
+    private readonly maxDiffBytes;
+    private readonly cloneUrlForRepository;
+    constructor(options: GitVcsProviderOptions);
+    prepareWorkspace(input: VcsPrepareInput): Promise<PreparedWorkspace>;
+    recoverWorkspace(input: VcsPrepareInput): Promise<PreparedWorkspace | null>;
+    finalizeChanges(workspace: PreparedWorkspace, details?: FinalizeChangesDetails): Promise<FinalizeChangesResult>;
+    cleanup(workspace: PreparedWorkspace): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Best-effort "wardby is working on this PR" signal (see VcsProvider) --
+     * whole body wrapped so this can NEVER throw or otherwise affect the
+     * real coding run, mirroring docker.ts's readWorkerFailureDiagnostic
+     * ("diagnostics are optional and must never affect terminal cleanup").
+     * No-op for a fresh (non-continuation) workspace: there's no PR to
+     * attach anything to until its one commit lands.
+     */
+    notifyContinuationStarted(workspace: PreparedWorkspace, details?: {
+        agentName?: string;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Companion to notifyContinuationStarted -- finds and updates whatever
+     * that call created, never creates fresh state itself (see
+     * upsertContinuationStatusComment vs updateContinuationStatusComment,
+     * and createContinuationCheckRun vs completeContinuationCheckRun in
+     * github.ts). Safe to call more than once for the same run. Same
+     * never-throw contract as notifyContinuationStarted.
+     */
+    notifyContinuationFinished(workspace: PreparedWorkspace, outcome: "succeeded" | "failed", details?: {
+        summary?: string;
+        agentName?: string;
+    }): Promise<void>;
+    private validateInput;
+    private expectedPaths;
+    private validatePrepared;
+    private inspectWorkspace;
+    private assertRemote;
+    /**
+     * Deliberately NOT windowed, unlike every other redaction caller: here
+     * `redactTokenShapedValues` is a DETECTOR, not a formatter — nothing from the
+     * config is ever emitted, only the fixed `vcs_git_config_unsafe` — so
+     * redacting a prefix would narrow a security predicate over an
+     * attacker-controlled file (a cloned repo's `.git/config`) to buy speed. The
+     * input is already bounded: the size check short-circuits above it, so
+     * redaction never sees more than 64 KiB, and with every pattern linear the
+     * worst adversarial 64 KiB shape measures 22 ms (it was 1.5 s while the JWT
+     * pattern was quadratic — that bug, not the breadth of this scan, was the
+     * problem).
+     */
+    private assertSafeLocalConfig;
+    private pushOnce;
+    private remoteHead;
+    private revParse;
+    private revParseRaw;
+    private gitFor;
+    private gitForPaths;
+}