@vzn/vx 0.0.16 → 0.0.21

package/src/exec/sandbox-runtime.ts

@@ -17,23 +17,30 @@
 //   monitor in real time; violations carry the offending command +
 //   syscall line, so we get structured detection.
 //   Linux  — bwrap denies the read at the kernel boundary; the child
-//   sees ENOENT (or EPERM for some operations). SRT doesn't surface
-//   structured events for Linux, so detection is enforcement-only.
+//   sees ENOENT (or EPERM for some operations). SRT surfaces no
+//   structured events there, so we wrap the spawn in strace and parse
+//   the trace ourselves (`deniedCalls`) — detection is NOT
+//   enforcement-only on Linux, and the fail-on-violation branch in
+//   execute-task is live on both platforms.
 
 import path from 'node:path'
 import os from 'node:os'
-import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs'
-import { unlink } from 'node:fs/promises'
-import type { SandboxConfig, SandboxNetworkConfig } from '../config.js'
+import { mkdir, unlink } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import type { SandboxConfig } from '../config.js'
 import {
   armTimeout,
+  drainOrAbort,
   shellQuote,
   signalExitCode,
   streamToString,
   resourceUsageToCpuRss,
+  type CaptureConfig,
   type RunResult,
 } from './runner.js'
-import { xxh3hex } from '../util/index.js'
+import { UserError, xxh3hex } from '../util/index.js'
+import { buildCustomConfig } from './sandbox-binds.js'
+import { localBindingOn, toRealPath, unique } from './sandbox-paths.js'
+import { parseStraceViolations, reportableViolations } from './sandbox-violations.js'
 
 type SrtModule = typeof import('@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime')
 let srtPromise: Promise<SrtModule> | undefined
@@ -49,62 +56,127 @@ export interface SandboxAvailability {
   reason: string
 }
 
-let availabilityCache: SandboxAvailability | undefined
+/** One verdict per mode: the wrapper the probe runs differs by mode. */
+const availabilityCache = new Map<'secure' | 'weaker', SandboxAvailability>()
 
 /**
- * Probe whether SRT can sandbox on this host. Memoized — the binary
- * presence + platform check doesn't change within a process.
+ * Probe whether SRT can sandbox on this host. Memoized per mode — the
+ * binary presence + platform check doesn't change within a process.
  *
  * In addition to SRT's own `checkDependencies` (which only verifies
- * binary presence on PATH), this runs a minimal bwrap invocation on
- * Linux to catch the "bwrap installed but unprivileged user namespaces
- * blocked by AppArmor / sysctl" case that's the default on stock
- * Ubuntu 24.04. Without this real-execution probe, the unavailability
- * surfaces only at the first task spawn, deep inside the orchestrator.
+ * binary presence on PATH), this runs ONE sandboxed `true` on Linux
+ * through SRT's own wrapper: bwrap with the runtime's namespace flags
+ * plus its vendored seccomp helper, which creates a NESTED user
+ * namespace. A bare `bwrap … /bin/true` (the probe until 2026-09-04)
+ * passed on hosts where every task then failed — as root inside a
+ * container, the helper's `write /proc/self/uid_map` is EPERM under
+ * `--cap-drop ALL`. Without this real-execution probe the
+ * unavailability surfaces only at the first task spawn, deep inside the
+ * orchestrator, as exit 1 with the helper's line in the task's stderr.
+ *
+ * `weakerNested` probes with `enableWeakerNestedSandbox`; the caller
+ * passes it only when EVERY sandboxed task opts in, since the secure
+ * wrapper is what any other task will run under.
+ *
+ * On Linux the probe INITIALIZES SRT (idempotent — `run()` initializes
+ * right after anyway), and SRT's proxy sockets then keep the event loop
+ * alive: a standalone caller must `resetSandbox()` or exit. CI's
+ * diagnostic `bun -e` step sat on this for its whole 10-minute timeout
+ * (2026-09-04).
  */
-export async function probeSandbox(): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
-  if (availabilityCache) return availabilityCache
+export async function probeSandbox(opts?: {
+  weakerNested?: boolean
+}): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
+  const mode = opts?.weakerNested === true ? 'weaker' : 'secure'
+  const cached = availabilityCache.get(mode)
+  if (cached) return cached
+  const verdict = await probeUncached(mode === 'weaker')
+  availabilityCache.set(mode, verdict)
+  return verdict
+}
+
+async function probeUncached(weakerNested: boolean): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
   const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
   if (!SandboxManager.isSupportedPlatform()) {
-    availabilityCache = { available: false, reason: `platform ${process.platform} not supported` }
-    return availabilityCache
+    return { available: false, reason: `platform ${process.platform} not supported` }
   }
   const deps = SandboxManager.checkDependencies()
-  if (deps.errors.length > 0) {
-    availabilityCache = { available: false, reason: deps.errors.join('; ') }
-    return availabilityCache
-  }
-  // Linux only: real-execution probe. Run `bwrap` with the minimal
-  // user-namespace invocation it'd attempt for a sandboxed task; if
-  // the kernel rejects (AppArmor / sysctl), surface that here.
+  if (deps.errors.length > 0) return { available: false, reason: deps.errors.join('; ') }
   if (process.platform === 'linux') {
-    const ok = await tryBwrapOnce()
-    if (!ok.available) {
-      availabilityCache = ok
-      return availabilityCache
+    await initSandbox()
+    return trySandboxedTrue(SandboxManager, weakerNested)
+  }
+  return applyPolicyHere()
+}
+
+/**
+ * Can a seatbelt policy be applied in THIS process at all?
+ *
+ * Not if one already is: macOS refuses `sandbox_apply` inside a sandbox,
+ * at any permission level — an inner profile of `(allow default)` still
+ * dies `sandbox_apply: Operation not permitted` (exit 71, measured
+ * 2026-09-05). No grant fixes it, so the honest verdict is "unavailable",
+ * which is what stops a sandboxed task from spawning tasks that report
+ * a sandbox they never got. Answering `available: true` here is how a
+ * suite that exercises the sandbox came to fail sixteen ways at once.
+ *
+ * The probe costs one `/usr/bin/true` and is memoized with the rest.
+ */
+function applyPolicyHere(): SandboxAvailability {
+  const proc = Bun.spawnSync({
+    cmd: ['sandbox-exec', '-p', '(version 1)(allow default)', '/usr/bin/true'],
+    stdout: 'ignore',
+    stderr: 'pipe',
+  })
+  if (proc.exitCode === 0) return { available: true, reason: '' }
+  const stderr = proc.stderr.toString().trim()
+  if (stderr.includes('sandbox_apply')) {
+    return {
+      available: false,
+      reason:
+        'this process is already sandboxed and macOS cannot nest one — a task that ' +
+        'itself sandboxes has to run without `exec.sandbox` of its own',
     }
   }
-  availabilityCache = { available: true, reason: '' }
-  return availabilityCache
+  return { available: false, reason: `sandbox-exec failed: ${stderr || `exit ${proc.exitCode}`}` }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why the probe's sandboxed `true` failed, in the user's terms. The hint
+ * names the CONFIG field (`exec.sandbox.weakerWhenNested`), not the
+ * runtime option it maps to — a user who followed the runtime's name into
+ * their config met the loader's unknown-field refusal instead of a fix
+ * (`tests/sandbox-hint.test.ts` pins every field the hint names against
+ * the loader).
+ */
+export function unavailableReason(exitCode: number | null, stderr: string): string {
+  const hint = stderr.includes('uid_map')
+    ? " — the runtime's seccomp helper cannot create its nested user namespace here (root inside a container, or a kernel that forbids nested user namespaces): run as a non-root user, or set `sandbox.weakerWhenNested: true` on every sandboxed task"
+    : ''
+  return `a sandboxed \`true\` failed (exit ${exitCode}): ${stderr.slice(0, 200)}${hint}`
 }
 
-async function tryBwrapOnce(): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
+async function trySandboxedTrue(
+  SandboxManager: SrtModule['SandboxManager'],
+  weakerNested: boolean,
+): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
   try {
-    const proc = Bun.spawn(
-      ['bwrap', '--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--proc', '/proc', '--dev', '/dev', '/bin/true'],
-      { stdout: 'pipe', stderr: 'pipe', stdin: 'ignore' },
+    const wrapped = await SandboxManager.wrapWithSandbox(
+      'true',
+      undefined,
+      weakerNested ? { enableWeakerNestedSandbox: true } : undefined,
     )
-    const stderr = await new Response(proc.stderr).text()
+    const proc = Bun.spawn(['sh', '-c', wrapped], {
+      stdout: 'ignore',
+      stderr: 'pipe',
+      stdin: 'ignore',
+    })
+    const stderr = (await new Response(proc.stderr).text()).trim()
     await proc.exited
-    if (proc.exitCode !== 0) {
-      return {
-        available: false,
-        reason: `bwrap probe failed (exit ${proc.exitCode}): ${stderr.trim().slice(0, 200)}`,
-      }
-    }
-    return { available: true, reason: '' }
+    if (proc.exitCode === 0) return { available: true, reason: '' }
+    return { available: false, reason: unavailableReason(proc.exitCode, stderr) }
   } catch (err) {
-    return { available: false, reason: `bwrap probe threw: ${(err as Error).message}` }
+    return { available: false, reason: `sandbox probe threw: ${(err as Error).message}` }
   }
 }
 
@@ -118,7 +190,7 @@ async function tryBwrapOnce(): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
  *
  * Format mirrors SRT's: `'*'` is a wildcard pattern; entries in the
  * array are substring-matched against the violation details line.
- * Users can ADD to this via per-task `sandbox.ignoreViolations`;
+ * Users can ADD to this via per-task `sandbox.ignore`;
  * those are applied at violation read-back time, on top of the
  * defaults installed here.
  */
@@ -137,24 +209,76 @@ const DEFAULT_IGNORE_VIOLATIONS: Record<string, string[]> = {
  * Per-task wrapping passes a customConfig that re-enables network for
  * tasks with `sandbox.network: true`.
  */
-export async function initSandbox(): Promise<void> {
+/**
+ * The temp directory SRT hands every sandboxed task. It overrides `TMPDIR`
+ * so temp-file writers land somewhere its filesystem policy already allows,
+ * and it deliberately does NOT create the directory — its own comment says
+ * "/tmp/claude may not exist". Nobody else does either, so on any machine
+ * that is not Claude Code's own, every sandboxed task that writes a temp
+ * file died with ENOENT: this repo's `bun build --compile` under
+ * a sandboxed `bun build --compile` reported only `error: An unknown error occurred
+ * (Unexpected)` (2026-09-04). Resolution mirrors SRT's exactly.
+ */
+function sandboxTmpdir(): string {
+  // `process.env`, not `Bun.env`: a caller that REPLACES the env object
+  // (two tests here do, and an embedder may) leaves `Bun.env` pointing at
+  // the original, so a late assignment would be invisible.
+  const named = process.env['CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR'] ?? process.env['CLAUDE_TMPDIR']
+  return named !== undefined && named !== '' ? named : '/tmp/claude'
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param opts.allowedDomains every domain any sandboxed task in this run
+ * declared. SRT's filtering proxy is per-RUN and reads its allowlist from
+ * this call, never from the per-task config, so the union is the only
+ * place a domain list can take effect. Per-task precision survives where
+ * it matters: a task that declared none is never handed the proxy port.
+ */
+export async function initSandbox(opts?: {
+  allowedDomains?: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * Lift SRT's seccomp block on `socket(AF_UNIX)` for every sandboxed
+   * task of the run (Linux; per-run like the proxy allowlist, since SRT
+   * reads it at `initialize()` only). Armed when any task declares
+   * `unixSockets` or a `localBinding` port list — the port bridge is a
+   * unix socket the task's side has to create.
+   */
+  allowAllUnixSockets?: boolean
+}): Promise<void> {
+  // Before SRT starts, so the very first task already has one.
+  await mkdir(sandboxTmpdir(), { recursive: true })
   const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
-  await SandboxManager.initialize(
-    {
-      network: { allowedDomains: [], deniedDomains: [] },
-      filesystem: { denyRead: [], allowWrite: [], denyWrite: [] },
-      ignoreViolations: DEFAULT_IGNORE_VIOLATIONS,
+  const config: Parameters<typeof SandboxManager.initialize>[0] = {
+    network: {
+      allowedDomains: [...(opts?.allowedDomains ?? [])],
+      deniedDomains: [],
+      ...(opts?.allowAllUnixSockets === true ? { allowAllUnixSockets: true } : {}),
     },
+    filesystem: { denyRead: [], allowWrite: [], denyWrite: [] },
+    ignoreViolations: DEFAULT_IGNORE_VIOLATIONS,
+  }
+  await SandboxManager.initialize(
+    config,
     undefined,
     // enableLogMonitor — macOS-only; populates the SandboxViolationStore.
     true,
   )
+  // `initialize()` returns early once SRT is up, and on Linux the
+  // availability probe brought it up with an EMPTY config before the run's
+  // own call — so the run's allowlist and unix-socket allowance never
+  // reached it (found 2026-09-10 by the port bridge: the task's side died
+  // on `socket(AF_UNIX)` with the flag set). `updateConfig` is SRT's hot
+  // reload of exactly these fields; the proxy and the wrapper read them
+  // through getters, so the run's config is what every task sees.
+  SandboxManager.updateConfig(config)
 }
 
 export async function resetSandbox(): Promise<void> {
+  for (const tag of [...hostBridges.keys()]) releaseBridges(tag)
   const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
   await SandboxManager.reset()
-  availabilityCache = undefined
+  availabilityCache.clear()
+  straceAvailableCache = undefined
 }
 
 export interface SandboxedRunArgs {
@@ -168,6 +292,8 @@ export interface SandboxedRunArgs {
   liveChildren?: Set<ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>>
   /** See `RunOptions.timeoutMs` — SIGTERM the child after this many ms. */
   timeoutMs?: number
+  /** See `CaptureConfig` — which streams are retained on the result. */
+  capture?: CaptureConfig
   /**
    * Baseline reads — paths the sandbox unconditionally allows. The
    * caller builds this from resolved `cache.inputs.files`.
@@ -184,6 +310,12 @@ export interface SandboxedRunArgs {
    * is forbidden. Pass `[workspaceRoot]` to enforce project boundaries.
    */
   baseDenyRead: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * Only denials on a path under this directory are reported. A denial
+   * outside it is still ENFORCED — the task cannot leave its project — but
+   * that is the wall doing its job, not a finding to fail a run over.
+   */
+  readonly reportWithin: string
   /**
    * User-declared sandbox block (after path-resolution). Path lists are
    * unioned with the baselines; bool/object fields fall through to SRT.
@@ -197,33 +329,55 @@ export interface SandboxedRunArgs {
  * but every string in a path list is guaranteed absolute.
  */
 export interface ResolvedSandboxConfig {
+  /** Readable path prefixes, absolute. */
   allowRead: readonly string[]
+  /** Writable path prefixes, absolute. */
   allowWrite: readonly string[]
-  allowGitConfig?: boolean
-  network?: boolean | SandboxNetworkConfig
-  allowPty?: boolean
-  enableWeakerNestedSandbox?: boolean
-  enableWeakerNetworkIsolation?: boolean
-  ignoreViolations?: Record<string, string[]>
+  network?: true | readonly string[]
+  denyNetwork?: readonly string[]
+  systemInfo?: readonly string[]
+  unixSockets?: true | readonly string[]
+  localBinding?: boolean | readonly number[]
+  machLookup?: readonly string[]
+  pty?: boolean
+  gitConfig?: boolean
+  weakerWhenNested?: boolean
+  weakerNetworkIsolation?: boolean
+  ignore?: {
+    read?: readonly string[]
+    write?: readonly string[]
+    systemInfo?: readonly string[]
+    network?: readonly string[]
+  }
 }
 
 /**
- * Canonicalize a path with realpath, tolerating paths that don't exist
- * yet: resolve the longest existing ancestor and re-append the rest.
+ * Canonical form of every path the sandbox policy is expressed in.
  *
- * Why: the sandbox policy matches on canonical paths (macOS seatbelt
- * evaluates real vnode paths), and SRT's own normalization refuses to
- * canonicalize bare symlinked roots like `/tmp` → `/private/tmp` (its
- * boundary check only whitelists `/tmp/<child>` forms). Without this,
- * `allowWrite: ['/tmp']` silently never matches on macOS.
+ * `resolveSandboxConfig` already canonicalizes the USER's paths; the
+ * orchestrator-supplied baselines (resolved inputs, output prefixes, the
+ * workspace-root deny anchor) arrived raw, so a workspace reached through a
+ * symlink expressed HALF its policy in real paths and half in link paths.
+ * bwrap then died mounting the link path inside its new root
+ * (`Can't mount tmpfs on /newroot/<link>`) and EVERY sandboxed task failed —
+ * whatever the config, with an error naming an internal path the user has no
+ * way to act on. Canonicalizing here is what makes the two halves agree.
  */
-function toRealPath(p: string): string {
-  try {
-    return realpathSync(p)
-  } catch {
-    const parent = path.dirname(p)
-    if (parent === p) return p
-    return path.join(toRealPath(parent), path.basename(p))
+interface CanonicalBaselines {
+  allowRead: string[]
+  allowWrite: string[]
+  denyRead: string[]
+  cwd: string
+}
+
+function canonicalBaselines(
+  args: Pick<SandboxedRunArgs, 'baseAllowRead' | 'baseAllowWrite' | 'baseDenyRead' | 'cwd'>,
+): CanonicalBaselines {
+  return {
+    allowRead: args.baseAllowRead.map(toRealPath),
+    allowWrite: args.baseAllowWrite.map(toRealPath),
+    denyRead: args.baseDenyRead.map(toRealPath),
+    cwd: toRealPath(args.cwd),
   }
 }
 
@@ -242,20 +396,35 @@ export function resolveSandboxConfig(
     if (path.isAbsolute(p)) return toRealPath(p)
     return toRealPath(path.resolve(projectDir, p))
   }
+  const a = cfg.allow ?? {}
   const r: ResolvedSandboxConfig = {
-    allowRead: (cfg.allowRead ?? []).map(resolve),
-    allowWrite: (cfg.allowWrite ?? []).map(resolve),
+    allowRead: expandGrants((a.read ?? []).map(resolve)),
+    allowWrite: expandGrants((a.write ?? []).map(resolve)),
   }
-  if (cfg.allowGitConfig !== undefined) r.allowGitConfig = cfg.allowGitConfig
-  if (cfg.network !== undefined) r.network = cfg.network
-  if (cfg.allowPty !== undefined) r.allowPty = cfg.allowPty
-  if (cfg.enableWeakerNestedSandbox !== undefined) {
-    r.enableWeakerNestedSandbox = cfg.enableWeakerNestedSandbox
+  if (a.network !== undefined) r.network = a.network
+  if (cfg.deny?.network !== undefined) r.denyNetwork = cfg.deny.network
+  if (a.systemInfo !== undefined) r.systemInfo = a.systemInfo
+  if (a.unixSockets !== undefined) r.unixSockets = a.unixSockets
+  if (a.localBinding !== undefined) r.localBinding = a.localBinding
+  if (a.machLookup !== undefined) r.machLookup = a.machLookup
+  if (a.pty !== undefined) r.pty = a.pty
+  if (a.gitConfig !== undefined) r.gitConfig = a.gitConfig
+  if (cfg.weakerWhenNested !== undefined) r.weakerWhenNested = cfg.weakerWhenNested
+  if (cfg.weakerNetworkIsolation !== undefined) {
+    r.weakerNetworkIsolation = cfg.weakerNetworkIsolation
   }
-  if (cfg.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation !== undefined) {
-    r.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation = cfg.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation
+  if (cfg.ignore !== undefined) {
+    // Relative patterns anchor at the project dir; absolute and `~` ones
+    // are taken as written. NOT realpath'd — a pattern is not a path.
+    const anchor = (pat: string): string =>
+      pat.startsWith('~') || path.isAbsolute(pat) ? pat : path.join(projectDir, pat)
+    r.ignore = {
+      ...(cfg.ignore.read ? { read: cfg.ignore.read.map(anchor) } : {}),
+      ...(cfg.ignore.write ? { write: cfg.ignore.write.map(anchor) } : {}),
+      ...(cfg.ignore.systemInfo ? { systemInfo: [...cfg.ignore.systemInfo] } : {}),
+      ...(cfg.ignore.network ? { network: [...(cfg.ignore.network as string[])] } : {}),
+    }
   }
-  if (cfg.ignoreViolations !== undefined) r.ignoreViolations = cfg.ignoreViolations
   return r
 }
 
@@ -263,6 +432,17 @@ export interface SandboxViolation {
   /** Raw log line from SRT. Format differs between macOS / Linux. */
   line: string
   timestamp: Date
+  /**
+   * What the denial named, and which `ignore` lists could silence it —
+   * filled in by whichever platform produced the record. The filters read
+   * these instead of re-parsing a line whose shape depends on the OS: a
+   * seatbelt `deny(1) file-read-data /x` and a strace
+   * `openat(../x) = -1 ENOENT  [/x]` say the same thing.
+   */
+  target?: string
+  /** Absolute, when `target` is a path at all. */
+  path?: string
+  ignorable?: readonly ('read' | 'write' | 'network' | 'systemInfo')[]
 }
 
 export interface SandboxedRunResult extends RunResult {
@@ -280,9 +460,24 @@ export interface SandboxedRunResult extends RunResult {
  * across packages) would otherwise collide. We prepend `: '<tag>';`
  * (shell no-op) to make every command's first 100 chars unique.
  */
-export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRunResult> {
+/**
+ * The sandboxed form of a command: SRT's wrapper over the tagged command,
+ * with vx's own seatbelt rules appended on macOS. This is the ENFORCEMENT
+ * half of `runSandboxed`, shared with persistent tasks — a dev server is
+ * spawned through it and never exits while the run watches, so it gets
+ * the same walls and no violation report (reporting reads the trace after
+ * exit). Returns the wrapped command and the tag the store keys by.
+ */
+export async function wrapSandboxedCommand(
+  args: Pick<SandboxedRunArgs, 'command' | 'cwd' | 'forwardArgs' | 'config'> &
+    Pick<SandboxedRunArgs, 'baseAllowRead' | 'baseAllowWrite' | 'baseDenyRead'>,
+): Promise<{
+  wrapped: string
+  tag: string
+  taggedCommand: string
+  baselines: CanonicalBaselines
+}> {
   const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
-  const start = Date.now()
   const userCommand =
     args.forwardArgs && args.forwardArgs.length > 0
       ? args.command + ' ' + args.forwardArgs.map(shellQuote).join(' ')
@@ -291,8 +486,102 @@ export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRun
   const tag = xxh3hex(`${args.cwd}|${userCommand}|${process.hrtime.bigint()}`).slice(0, 16)
   const taggedCommand = `: 'vx-${tag}'; ${userCommand}`
 
-  const customConfig = buildCustomConfig(args)
-  const wrapped = await SandboxManager.wrapWithSandbox(taggedCommand, undefined, customConfig)
+  const baselines = canonicalBaselines(args)
+  const customConfig = buildCustomConfig(args, baselines)
+  // Linux: the ports a list grants are bridged out of the task's network
+  // namespace. The task's side of each bridge is a socat in front of the
+  // user command, so it goes INTO the sandboxed command; the host side is
+  // spawned here and released when the task's process ends.
+  const ports = process.platform === 'linux' ? bridgedPorts(args.config) : []
+  const inner = ports.length > 0 ? `${portBridgeInner(ports, tag)} ${taggedCommand}` : taggedCommand
+  let wrapped = await SandboxManager.wrapWithSandbox(inner, undefined, customConfig)
+  if (process.platform === 'darwin') {
+    const rules = macProfileRules(args.config)
+    if (rules.length > 0) wrapped = injectProfileRules(wrapped, rules)
+  }
+  if (ports.length > 0) spawnHostBridges(ports, tag)
+  return { wrapped, tag, taggedCommand, baselines }
+}
+
+/** The ports a list grants, deduped; `true` bridges nothing (the host sees no port on Linux). */
+export function bridgedPorts(c: Pick<ResolvedSandboxConfig, 'localBinding'>): number[] {
+  return Array.isArray(c.localBinding) ? [...new Set(c.localBinding)] : []
+}
+
+/** Where a bridge's unix socket lives: the sandbox tmpdir, bound read-write on both sides. */
+export function portBridgeSocket(tag: string, port: number): string {
+  return path.join(sandboxTmpdir(), `vx-port-${tag}-${port}.sock`)
+}
+
+/**
+ * The task's side of the bridge, in front of the user command inside the
+ * sandbox: one socat per port, listening on the unix socket and relaying
+ * into the namespace's loopback. Backgrounded and reaped with the shell,
+ * exactly as SRT starts its own proxy bridges. `unlink-early` clears a
+ * socket a killed task left behind; `>/dev/null` keeps its chatter out
+ * of the task's frame.
+ */
+export function portBridgeInner(ports: readonly number[], tag: string): string {
+  const cmds = ports.map(
+    (p) =>
+      `socat UNIX-LISTEN:${shellQuote(portBridgeSocket(tag, p))},fork,unlink-early TCP:127.0.0.1:${p} >/dev/null 2>&1 &`,
+  )
+  return `${cmds.join(' ')} trap 'kill $(jobs -p) 2>/dev/null' EXIT;`
+}
+
+/**
+ * The host's side: one socat per port, listening on the host's loopback
+ * and connecting into the unix socket per client — with a retry, since a
+ * client can arrive before the task's side has bound the socket.
+ */
+export function portBridgeHostArgv(tag: string, port: number): string[] {
+  return [
+    'socat',
+    `TCP-LISTEN:${port},bind=127.0.0.1,fork,reuseaddr`,
+    `UNIX-CONNECT:${portBridgeSocket(tag, port)},retry=40,interval=0.25`,
+  ]
+}
+
+const hostBridges = new Map<string, Array<ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>>>()
+
+function spawnHostBridges(ports: readonly number[], tag: string): void {
+  const procs: Array<ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>> = []
+  for (const p of ports) {
+    // A spawn failure (no socat on the host) is the task's to report:
+    // its own side dies the same way, in its frame.
+    try {
+      procs.push(
+        Bun.spawn(portBridgeHostArgv(tag, p), {
+          stdin: 'ignore',
+          stdout: 'ignore',
+          stderr: 'ignore',
+        }),
+      )
+    } catch {
+      // see above
+    }
+  }
+  if (procs.length > 0) hostBridges.set(tag, procs)
+}
+
+/** Stop the host side of a task's port bridges; idempotent. */
+export function releaseBridges(tag: string): void {
+  const procs = hostBridges.get(tag)
+  if (procs === undefined) return
+  hostBridges.delete(tag)
+  for (const p of procs) {
+    try {
+      p.kill('SIGTERM')
+    } catch {
+      // already gone
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRunResult> {
+  const start = Date.now()
+  const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
+  const { wrapped, tag, taggedCommand, baselines } = await wrapSandboxedCommand(args)
 
   // Linux: SRT's SandboxViolationStore is macOS-only, so structured
   // detection on Linux requires us to wrap the spawn with strace and
@@ -307,8 +596,31 @@ export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRun
   // are mostly shell PATH-walking and stat probes that aren't
   // actionable (we'd report every node_modules/.bin entry the shell
   // checks before resolving a command).
+  //
+  // `--seccomp-bpf` is what makes that filter cheap: without it strace
+  // ptrace-stops the tracee on EVERY syscall and discards the untraced
+  // ones in userspace, so a stat-heavy task ran many times slower under
+  // the sandbox than outside it. That is what failed the cache perf
+  // baselines on the Linux job (reproduced 2026-09-09: plain `bun test`
+  // 24/24; under `strace -f -e trace=openat` the same four fail with
+  // medians 2.5–7× over budget; with `--seccomp-bpf` 24/24 again), and
+  // it taxed every other sandboxed task the same way. With the flag the
+  // kernel filter stops only on `openat`. strace ≥ 5.3 (2019); an older
+  // one gets the slow form rather than no detection.
   const spawnArgv = straceLog
-    ? ['strace', '-f', '-e', 'trace=openat', '-o', straceLog, '--', 'sh', '-c', wrapped]
+    ? [
+        'strace',
+        '-f',
+        ...(useStrace === 'seccomp' ? ['--seccomp-bpf'] : []),
+        '-e',
+        'trace=openat',
+        '-o',
+        straceLog,
+        '--',
+        'sh',
+        '-c',
+        wrapped,
+      ]
     : ['sh', '-c', wrapped]
 
   let proc: ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>
@@ -335,31 +647,73 @@ export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRun
   const timeout = armTimeout(proc, args.timeoutMs)
   const ac = new AbortController()
   const streams = Promise.all([
-    streamToString(proc.stdout, args.onStdout, ac.signal),
-    streamToString(proc.stderr, args.onStderr, ac.signal),
+    streamToString(proc.stdout, args.onStdout, ac.signal, args.capture?.stdout ?? true),
+    streamToString(proc.stderr, args.onStderr, ac.signal, args.capture?.stderr ?? true),
   ])
-  // See runCommand: gate on child exit, abort the readers on timeout so
-  // a lingering grandchild pipe can't hang the run.
+  // See runCommand: gate on child exit; a lingering grandchild pipe (timeout
+  // OR a clean exit that backgrounds a process) can't hang the run — timeout
+  // aborts at once, otherwise drainOrAbort bounds the post-exit drain.
   await proc.exited
   timeout.clear()
   if (timeout.timedOut()) ac.abort()
+  else await drainOrAbort(streams, ac)
   const [stdout, stderr] = await streams
   args.liveChildren?.delete(proc)
+  releaseBridges(tag)
   const exitCode = proc.exitCode ?? (proc.signalCode ? signalExitCode(proc.signalCode) : 1)
 
   // macOS: read the violation store keyed by our tagged command.
+  //
+  // The store is fed ASYNCHRONOUSLY — SRT's monitor ingests macOS unified-log
+  // records, and log delivery lags under load — so reading it immediately
+  // after child exit races the pipeline: the denial happened, the child died
+  // on it, and the store is still empty. Observed locally as the 1-in-N
+  // "denied but zero violation lines" flake (decision log 2026-08-23/24).
+  // When the exit is a FAILURE and the store is empty, give the pipeline a
+  // bounded settle window; a clean exit skips the poll entirely, so the warm
+  // path pays nothing.
+  //
+  // MEASURED (2026-08-24, ~430 runs/arm under full-suite load): the poll
+  // HALVES the loss (5.0% → 2.2%) but cannot eliminate it — the residual
+  // failures survive the whole 1 s window, meaning those records were
+  // DROPPED by the unified log under pressure, not delayed. Reporting on
+  // macOS is therefore lossy-by-OS under load; ENFORCEMENT is unaffected
+  // (every observed loss still denied the read and failed the child).
   const store = SandboxManager.getSandboxViolationStore()
-  const macViolations = store.getViolationsForCommand(taggedCommand).map((v) => ({
-    line: v.line,
-    timestamp: v.timestamp,
-  }))
-
+  // EVERY record the store holds for this command, unfiltered (owner,
+  // 2026-09-05). A sandboxed task that fails must say what it was denied;
+  // deciding on the user's behalf that a record was "just traversal" is how
+  // a failure ends up with an empty violations section and no explanation.
+  const readMacViolations = (): SandboxViolation[] =>
+    store.getViolationsForCommand(taggedCommand).map((v) => ({
+      line: v.line,
+      timestamp: v.timestamp,
+    }))
+  // Darwin only. Since SRT 0.0.75 the store is fed on Linux too, by the
+  // seccomp helper's write observer — but SRT judges those reports against
+  // the GLOBAL `filesystem.allowWrite` from `initialize` (empty here; the
+  // per-task list travels in `customConfig`, which the monitor never sees),
+  // so every write a task makes to its own declared output arrived as
+  // `deny openat <output>` and failed the task (reproduced 2026-09-04 in a
+  // Linux container: exit 1, empty stderr). Linux detection is the strace
+  // pass below, judged against the task's own baselines.
+  let macViolations = process.platform === 'darwin' ? readMacViolations() : []
+  // No settle window: the store is read once, right after the child exits
+  // (owner, 2026-09-05). It cost 300ms on EVERY clean sandboxed task — the
+  // full budget, since a task with nothing to report can only prove that by
+  // waiting — against 26ms for one that reports something and breaks out
+  // early. Measured: clean `echo` 331ms sandboxed vs 16ms plain.
+  //
+  // The price is that macOS feeds this store asynchronously, so a record
+  // that has not arrived yet is not reported. Enforcement is unaffected —
+  // the OS denied the operation either way, and a command that could not
+  // proceed still fails on its own exit code.
   // Linux: parse the strace log and emit one violation per denied
   // syscall on a path inside denyRead that wasn't unconditionally
   // allowed. Best-effort — if parsing fails we surface no Linux
   // violations rather than fail the whole task.
   const linuxViolations: SandboxViolation[] = straceLog
-    ? await parseStraceViolations(straceLog, args).catch(() => [])
+    ? await parseStraceViolations(straceLog, args, baselines).catch(() => [])
     : []
   if (straceLog) await unlink(straceLog).catch(() => undefined)
 
@@ -368,12 +722,33 @@ export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRun
   // ignoreViolations through to the log monitor — that filter is set
   // once globally at initSandbox time. So per-task user overrides have
   // to be applied here, after read-back.
-  const userIgnore = args.config.ignoreViolations
-  const violations: SandboxViolation[] = filterIgnored(
-    [...macViolations, ...linuxViolations],
-    userIgnore,
-    userCommand,
-  )
+  const violations = reportableViolations([...macViolations, ...linuxViolations], {
+    within: args.reportWithin,
+    config: args.config,
+  })
+
+  // The one denial macOS never logs. MEASURED 2026-09-05, same machine, two
+  // runs differing only in the grant: with the cwd granted a failing task
+  // reports its denials normally; WITHOUT it the store stays empty across
+  // the whole settle window (11 reads, 0 records) and the child reports
+  // whatever it likes — `bun test` says only `error: An unknown error
+  // occurred (Unexpected)`. The process dies before macOS logs anything, so
+  // no amount of un-filtering can surface it.
+  //
+  // Not a guess about the cause: the cwd lying outside every allowRead
+  // prefix is a fact of the resolved baselines. Added only when the task
+  // ALREADY failed with nothing to show, so it can never redden a pass.
+  const grantedRead = [...baselines.allowRead, ...args.config.allowRead]
+  if (exitCode !== 0 && violations.length === 0 && !readableUnder(args.cwd, grantedRead)) {
+    violations.push({
+      timestamp: new Date(),
+      line:
+        `vx: this sandbox grants no read access to the task's own working directory ` +
+        `(${args.cwd}), so a command that reads or lists it fails with whatever error it ` +
+        `reports for that — macOS logs no violation record. Add ` +
+        "`sandbox: { allow: { read: ['.'] } }`.",
+    })
+  }
 
   try {
     SandboxManager.cleanupAfterCommand()
@@ -393,186 +768,193 @@ export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRun
   }
 }
 
-/** Memoized check: is `strace` on PATH on a Linux host? */
-let straceAvailableCache: boolean | undefined
-async function wantsStraceDetection(): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (process.platform !== 'linux') return false
-  if (straceAvailableCache !== undefined) return straceAvailableCache
-  try {
-    const p = Bun.spawn(['strace', '--version'], { stdout: 'ignore', stderr: 'ignore' })
-    await p.exited
-    straceAvailableCache = p.exitCode === 0
-  } catch {
-    straceAvailableCache = false
-  }
-  return straceAvailableCache
+/**
+ * Is `dir` inside a path the sandbox granted for reading? bwrap binds and
+ * seatbelt rules are both prefix-based, so a grant covers the subtree.
+ */
+function readableUnder(dir: string, granted: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  const target = toRealPath(dir)
+  return granted.some((p) => {
+    const g = toRealPath(p)
+    return target === g || target.startsWith(g.endsWith(path.sep) ? g : g + path.sep)
+  })
 }
 
 /**
- * Parse a strace log for denied filesystem syscalls and convert each
- * one inside the workspace deny anchor (and not in allowRead) into a
- * SandboxViolation. Dedups by (syscall, abs-path) so a tool that
- * statx's the same missing path 10 times in a row produces one line.
- *
- * strace line shape (with -f):
- *   <pid> openat(AT_FDCWD, "<path>", <flags>) = -1 ENOENT (...)
- *   <pid> access("<path>", <mode>) = -1 EACCES (...)
- *   <pid> statx(AT_FDCWD, "<path>", <flags>, <mask>, ...) = -1 ENOENT (...)
- *
- * We capture the first quoted-string argument as the path. paths that
- * are relative resolve against the task's cwd (set by Bun.spawn).
+ * A token safe to interpolate into a seatbelt profile. The profile travels
+ * inside a shell-quoted `sandbox-exec -p '…'` argument, so a value carrying
+ * a quote, paren or backslash could rewrite the policy or escape the
+ * argument. Refuse rather than escape — every real info type is a plain
+ * dotted name.
  */
-const STRACE_RE =
-  /^\d+\s+(openat|access|statx|newfstatat)\([^"]*"([^"]+)"[^)]*\)\s*=\s*-1\s+(ENOENT|EACCES|EPERM)/gm
-
-async function parseStraceViolations(
-  logPath: string,
-  args: SandboxedRunArgs,
-): Promise<SandboxViolation[]> {
-  const text = await Bun.file(logPath).text()
-  if (text.length === 0) return []
-
-  // Treat every baseAllow + sandbox.allowRead path as "this was
-  // explicitly permitted; any -ENOENT here is the user's own missing
-  // file, not a sandbox-induced denial". Same for absolute denyRead
-  // checks below.
-  const allowAbs = new Set<string>(
-    [...args.baseAllowRead, ...args.config.allowRead].map((p) => absolutize(p)),
-  )
-  const denyAnchors = args.baseDenyRead.map((p) => absolutize(p))
-
-  const seen = new Set<string>()
-  const out: SandboxViolation[] = []
-  for (const m of text.matchAll(STRACE_RE)) {
-    const [, syscall, rawPath, errno] = m
-    if (!rawPath) continue
-    const abs = absolutize(rawPath, args.cwd)
-    // Only report paths under the workspace-root deny anchor — system
-    // libs / /proc / /sys / etc. probes are not interesting violations.
-    if (!denyAnchors.some((root) => abs === root || abs.startsWith(root + path.sep))) continue
-    // Skip paths the user explicitly allowed (and their descendants).
-    if (isUnderAny(abs, allowAbs)) continue
-    const key = `${syscall}|${abs}`
-    if (seen.has(key)) continue
-    seen.add(key)
-    out.push({
-      line: `${syscall}(${rawPath}) = -1 ${errno}  [${abs}]`,
-      timestamp: new Date(),
-    })
+function sbplToken(value: string, field: string): string {
+  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/.test(value)) {
+    throw new UserError(`${field}: '${value}' is not a valid name`)
   }
-  return out
+  return value
 }
 
-function absolutize(p: string, cwd?: string): string {
-  if (p.startsWith('~')) return path.join(os.homedir(), p.slice(1))
-  if (path.isAbsolute(p)) return p
-  return path.resolve(cwd ?? process.cwd(), p)
+/**
+ * The capabilities that reach the macOS profile as rules rather than
+ * through SRT's config.
+ *
+ * `systemInfo` has no SRT field at any level. The rest DO have fields,
+ * but SRT reads `network.allowLocalBinding` / `allowUnixSockets` /
+ * `allowMachLookup` off the config given to `initialize()` and never off
+ * the per-call one (`sandbox-manager.js` getters, 0.0.75) — so a per-task
+ * grant passed there is silently dropped. vx is per-task by definition,
+ * so it emits them itself. The rule text mirrors SRT's own.
+ */
+function macProfileRules(c: ResolvedSandboxConfig): string[] {
+  const rules: string[] = []
+  for (const t of c.systemInfo ?? []) {
+    rules.push(`(allow system-info (info-type "${sbplToken(t, 'allow.systemInfo')}"))`)
+  }
+  if (localBindingOn(c)) {
+    // `*:*`, not `localhost:*`: a dual-stack socket bound to 127.0.0.1 is
+    // ::ffff:127.0.0.1 in the kernel, which seatbelt's `localhost` does
+    // not match. bind and inbound carry no remote endpoint, so this is
+    // not egress. Egress stays pinned to loopback.
+    rules.push('(allow network-bind (local ip "*:*"))')
+    rules.push('(allow network-inbound (local ip "*:*"))')
+    rules.push('(allow network-outbound (remote ip "localhost:*"))')
+  }
+  if (c.unixSockets === true) {
+    rules.push('(allow system-socket (socket-domain AF_UNIX))')
+    rules.push('(allow network-bind (local unix-socket (path-regex #"^/")))')
+    rules.push('(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (path-regex #"^/")))')
+  } else if (c.unixSockets !== undefined && c.unixSockets.length > 0) {
+    rules.push('(allow system-socket (socket-domain AF_UNIX))')
+    for (const sock of c.unixSockets) {
+      // Both the declared path and what it resolves to: seatbelt matches the
+      // path the kernel sees, and on macOS `/tmp` is a symlink to
+      // `/private/tmp` — a grant on the former alone never matches.
+      for (const p of unique([sbplPath(sock, 'allow.unixSockets'), toRealPath(sock)])) {
+        rules.push(`(allow network-bind (local unix-socket (subpath "${p}")))`)
+        rules.push(`(allow network-outbound (remote unix-socket (subpath "${p}")))`)
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  for (const name of c.machLookup ?? []) {
+    rules.push(`(allow mach-lookup (global-name "${sbplToken(name, 'allow.machLookup')}"))`)
+  }
+  return rules
 }
 
-function isUnderAny(abs: string, allow: Set<string>): boolean {
-  if (allow.has(abs)) return true
-  for (const a of allow) {
-    if (abs === a || abs.startsWith(a + path.sep)) return true
+/**
+ * A path safe to interpolate into a seatbelt profile. Same reasoning as
+ * {@link sbplToken}, with the separators a path needs.
+ */
+function sbplPath(value: string, field: string): string {
+  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9._\-/@+]+$/.test(value) || value.includes('..')) {
+    throw new UserError(`${field}: '${value}' is not a valid path`)
   }
-  return false
+  return value
 }
 
 /**
- * Apply the task's user-provided `sandbox.ignoreViolations` map on top
- * of whatever the macOS log monitor + Linux strace pass produced.
- * Mirrors SRT's own substring-match semantics:
- *   - `'*'` entries match every command
- *   - other keys match commands whose userCommand string CONTAINS the key
- *   - the array of strings under each key is substring-matched against
- *     the violation line
+ * Add rules to the END of the seatbelt profile SRT generated.
  *
- * The defaults installed in `initSandbox` already filter on the macOS
- * side; this pass catches per-task additions + Linux strace results.
+ * SBPL is last-match-wins, so the tail is the only place a rule of ours
+ * outranks one of SRT's. Measured 2026-09-05: the same rules injected
+ * after the `(deny default …)` header were inert in both directions —
+ * SRT's own later clauses won. Filesystem capabilities still go through
+ * SRT's config, where they also work on Linux; what arrives here is what
+ * SRT's per-call config CANNOT carry.
+ *
+ * A profile that does not have the expected shape THROWS. Silently
+ * running a task without a capability it asked for is worse than not
+ * offering the capability.
  */
-function filterIgnored(
-  violations: SandboxViolation[],
-  ignore: Record<string, string[]> | undefined,
-  userCommand: string,
-): SandboxViolation[] {
-  if (!ignore) return violations
-  const wildcard = ignore['*'] ?? []
-  const cmdEntries = Object.entries(ignore).filter(([k]) => k !== '*')
-  return violations.filter((v) => {
-    if (wildcard.some((s) => v.line.includes(s))) return false
-    for (const [pattern, needles] of cmdEntries) {
-      if (userCommand.includes(pattern) && needles.some((s) => v.line.includes(s))) {
-        return false
-      }
+function injectProfileRules(wrapped: string, rules: readonly string[]): string {
+  const anchor = /sandbox-exec -p '\(version 1\)\n\(deny default[^\n]*\n/.exec(wrapped)
+  if (anchor === null) {
+    throw new UserError(
+      'sandbox: the OS sandbox policy did not have the expected shape, so the ' +
+        'capabilities this task declared could not be applied',
+    )
+  }
+  // The profile is a single-quoted shell argument; SRT escapes a literal
+  // quote inside it as `'"'"'` (5 chars). The first bare `'` after the
+  // header therefore closes the profile.
+  let i = anchor.index + anchor[0].length
+  for (;;) {
+    const q = wrapped.indexOf("'", i)
+    if (q === -1) {
+      throw new UserError(
+        'sandbox: the OS sandbox policy was not quoted as expected, so the ' +
+          'capabilities this task declared could not be applied',
+      )
     }
-    return true
-  })
+    if (wrapped.startsWith(`'"'"'`, q)) {
+      i = q + 5
+      continue
+    }
+    return `${wrapped.slice(0, q)}\n${rules.join('\n')}\n${wrapped.slice(q)}`
+  }
 }
 
 /**
- * Merge the orchestrator-provided baseline (declared inputs / outputs /
- * workspace-root anchor) with the user's resolved sandbox block to
- * produce the SRT customConfig. Path arrays are unioned and deduped.
+ * Grant paths, with globs handled per platform.
  *
- * Network coercion:
- *   - missing / undefined / false  → block all (allowedDomains: [])
- *   - true                          → allow all (allowedDomains: ['*'])
- *   - object                        → use as-is (no merge with shortcuts)
+ * macOS: SRT's own `pathFilter` turns a glob into `(regex …)` and a literal
+ * into `(subpath …)`, so a pattern is passed through and seatbelt matches
+ * it — including files created DURING the run.
+ *
+ * Linux: a grant is a bwrap bind mount, and you cannot mount a pattern.
+ * The glob is expanded against the filesystem here, which means it covers
+ * what exists when the task STARTS. A pattern matching a file the task
+ * creates later grants nothing there — declare its directory instead.
  */
-function buildCustomConfig(
-  args: SandboxedRunArgs,
-): Parameters<SrtModule['SandboxManager']['wrapWithSandbox']>[2] {
-  const c = args.config
-  const allowRead = unique([...args.baseAllowRead, ...c.allowRead])
-  const denyRead = unique([...args.baseDenyRead])
-  const allowWrite = unique([...args.baseAllowWrite, ...c.allowWrite])
-
-  const custom: Parameters<SrtModule['SandboxManager']['wrapWithSandbox']>[2] = {
-    filesystem: {
-      denyRead,
-      allowRead,
-      allowWrite,
-      denyWrite: [],
-      ...(c.allowGitConfig !== undefined ? { allowGitConfig: c.allowGitConfig } : {}),
-    },
-  }
-
-  // Network coercion. SRT requires allowedDomains + deniedDomains to be
-  // present on any network config; we always supply both.
-  if (c.network === true) {
-    custom.network = { allowedDomains: ['*'], deniedDomains: [] }
-  } else if (c.network && typeof c.network === 'object') {
-    custom.network = {
-      allowedDomains: c.network.allowedDomains ?? [],
-      deniedDomains: c.network.deniedDomains ?? [],
-      ...(c.network.allowUnixSockets !== undefined
-        ? { allowUnixSockets: c.network.allowUnixSockets }
-        : {}),
-      ...(c.network.allowAllUnixSockets !== undefined
-        ? { allowAllUnixSockets: c.network.allowAllUnixSockets }
-        : {}),
-      ...(c.network.allowLocalBinding !== undefined
-        ? { allowLocalBinding: c.network.allowLocalBinding }
-        : {}),
-      ...(c.network.allowMachLookup !== undefined
-        ? { allowMachLookup: c.network.allowMachLookup }
-        : {}),
+function expandGrants(paths: readonly string[]): string[] {
+  // A pattern covering a directory WHOLE is that directory. `<d>/**/*` and
+  // `<d>/**` match everything UNDER `<d>` and never `<d>` itself, so a task
+  // granted `read: ['**/*']` still could not list its own cwd — the exact
+  // shape `bun test` and `oxlint` need. Collapsing is not a widening: the
+  // pattern already covered every file there; it adds the directory entry.
+  const collapsed = paths.map((p) => {
+    const m = /^(.*?)\/\*\*(?:\/\*)?$/.exec(p)
+    return m === null ? p : m[1]!
+  })
+  if (process.platform !== 'linux') return collapsed
+  const out: string[] = []
+  for (const p of collapsed) {
+    if (!/[*?[\]]/.test(p)) {
+      out.push(p)
+      continue
+    }
+    // Anchor the scan at the longest literal prefix so a pattern does not
+    // walk the whole filesystem to find its matches.
+    const base = path.dirname(p.slice(0, p.search(/[*?[\]]/)))
+    const pattern = path.relative(base, p)
+    for (const hit of new Bun.Glob(pattern).scanSync({ cwd: base, onlyFiles: false, dot: true })) {
+      out.push(path.join(base, hit))
     }
-  } else {
-    // false / undefined → block all
-    custom.network = { allowedDomains: [], deniedDomains: [] }
-  }
-
-  if (c.allowPty !== undefined) custom.allowPty = c.allowPty
-  if (c.enableWeakerNestedSandbox !== undefined) {
-    custom.enableWeakerNestedSandbox = c.enableWeakerNestedSandbox
-  }
-  if (c.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation !== undefined) {
-    custom.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation = c.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation
   }
-  if (c.ignoreViolations !== undefined) custom.ignoreViolations = c.ignoreViolations
-  return custom
+  return out
 }
 
-function unique(arr: readonly string[]): string[] {
-  return [...new Set(arr)]
+/**
+ * Memoized check: is `strace` on PATH on a Linux host, and does it know
+ * `--seccomp-bpf` (5.3+)? `'seccomp'` is the fast form; `'plain'` traces
+ * every syscall through ptrace and is kept only for an old strace.
+ */
+let straceAvailableCache: false | 'plain' | 'seccomp' | undefined
+async function wantsStraceDetection(): Promise<false | 'plain' | 'seccomp'> {
+  if (process.platform !== 'linux') return false
+  if (straceAvailableCache !== undefined) return straceAvailableCache
+  try {
+    const p = Bun.spawn(['strace', '--version'], { stdout: 'pipe', stderr: 'ignore' })
+    const out = await new Response(p.stdout).text()
+    await p.exited
+    if (p.exitCode !== 0) straceAvailableCache = false
+    else {
+      const m = /version (\d+)\.(\d+)/.exec(out)
+      const [major, minor] = m ? [Number(m[1]), Number(m[2])] : [0, 0]
+      straceAvailableCache = major > 5 || (major === 5 && minor >= 3) ? 'seccomp' : 'plain'
+    }
+  } catch {
+    straceAvailableCache = false
+  }
+  return straceAvailableCache
 }