@vzn/vx 0.0.0 → 0.0.14

package/src/exec/sandbox-runtime.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+// Thin wrapper around `@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` (SRT) for enforcing
+// per-task filesystem + network isolation.
+//
+// Design contract:
+//   The caller (executeCachedTask) computes the exact allowRead /
+//   allowWrite paths from the task's declared inputs + outputs + sandbox
+//   block. This module adds nothing implicit — no /tmp, no node_modules,
+//   no project dir. If a task needs them, the user declares them in
+//   their sandbox config. That gives users a complete view of what each
+//   task can touch from a single vx.config.ts file.
+//
+// Network is opt-in per task. By default the sandbox blocks all outbound
+// traffic; tasks that need it set `sandbox.network: true`.
+//
+// Platform reality:
+//   macOS — `SandboxViolationStore` is populated from the system log
+//   monitor in real time; violations carry the offending command +
+//   syscall line, so we get structured detection.
+//   Linux  — bwrap denies the read at the kernel boundary; the child
+//   sees ENOENT (or EPERM for some operations). SRT doesn't surface
+//   structured events for Linux, so detection is enforcement-only.
+
+import path from 'node:path'
+import os from 'node:os'
+import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { unlink } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import type { SandboxConfig, SandboxNetworkConfig } from '../config.js'
+import {
+  armTimeout,
+  shellQuote,
+  signalExitCode,
+  streamToString,
+  resourceUsageToCpuRss,
+  type RunResult,
+} from './runner.js'
+import { xxh3hex } from '../util/index.js'
+
+type SrtModule = typeof import('@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime')
+let srtPromise: Promise<SrtModule> | undefined
+
+async function loadSrt(): Promise<SrtModule> {
+  if (!srtPromise) srtPromise = import('@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime')
+  return srtPromise
+}
+
+export interface SandboxAvailability {
+  available: boolean
+  /** Reason it isn't available (platform / missing deps). Empty when available. */
+  reason: string
+}
+
+let availabilityCache: SandboxAvailability | undefined
+
+/**
+ * Probe whether SRT can sandbox on this host. Memoized — the binary
+ * presence + platform check doesn't change within a process.
+ *
+ * In addition to SRT's own `checkDependencies` (which only verifies
+ * binary presence on PATH), this runs a minimal bwrap invocation on
+ * Linux to catch the "bwrap installed but unprivileged user namespaces
+ * blocked by AppArmor / sysctl" case that's the default on stock
+ * Ubuntu 24.04. Without this real-execution probe, the unavailability
+ * surfaces only at the first task spawn, deep inside the orchestrator.
+ */
+export async function probeSandbox(): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
+  if (availabilityCache) return availabilityCache
+  const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
+  if (!SandboxManager.isSupportedPlatform()) {
+    availabilityCache = { available: false, reason: `platform ${process.platform} not supported` }
+    return availabilityCache
+  }
+  const deps = SandboxManager.checkDependencies()
+  if (deps.errors.length > 0) {
+    availabilityCache = { available: false, reason: deps.errors.join('; ') }
+    return availabilityCache
+  }
+  // Linux only: real-execution probe. Run `bwrap` with the minimal
+  // user-namespace invocation it'd attempt for a sandboxed task; if
+  // the kernel rejects (AppArmor / sysctl), surface that here.
+  if (process.platform === 'linux') {
+    const ok = await tryBwrapOnce()
+    if (!ok.available) {
+      availabilityCache = ok
+      return availabilityCache
+    }
+  }
+  availabilityCache = { available: true, reason: '' }
+  return availabilityCache
+}
+
+async function tryBwrapOnce(): Promise<SandboxAvailability> {
+  try {
+    const proc = Bun.spawn(
+      ['bwrap', '--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--proc', '/proc', '--dev', '/dev', '/bin/true'],
+      { stdout: 'pipe', stderr: 'pipe', stdin: 'ignore' },
+    )
+    const stderr = await new Response(proc.stderr).text()
+    await proc.exited
+    if (proc.exitCode !== 0) {
+      return {
+        available: false,
+        reason: `bwrap probe failed (exit ${proc.exitCode}): ${stderr.trim().slice(0, 200)}`,
+      }
+    }
+    return { available: true, reason: '' }
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { available: false, reason: `bwrap probe threw: ${(err as Error).message}` }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Default `ignoreViolations` we install in the SRT global config.
+ * These are well-known macOS shell-startup probes that SRT's own
+ * sysctl allowlist doesn't cover — every binary launched by sh
+ * (bash, sleep, mkdir, touch, etc.) sysctl-reads them at init, so
+ * without this filter every task floods with noise that isn't
+ * actionable security signal.
+ *
+ * Format mirrors SRT's: `'*'` is a wildcard pattern; entries in the
+ * array are substring-matched against the violation details line.
+ * Users can ADD to this via per-task `sandbox.ignoreViolations`;
+ * those are applied at violation read-back time, on top of the
+ * defaults installed here.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_IGNORE_VIOLATIONS: Record<string, string[]> = {
+  '*': [
+    'kern.iossupportversion', // newer macOS sysctl SRT's allowlist misses
+  ],
+}
+
+/**
+ * One-time SRT initialization per orchestrator run. Starts the proxy
+ * servers + (on macOS) the violation log monitor. Safe to call repeatedly
+ * — SRT itself returns early on the second call.
+ *
+ * The base config sets network to "block everything" (empty allowedDomains).
+ * Per-task wrapping passes a customConfig that re-enables network for
+ * tasks with `sandbox.network: true`.
+ */
+export async function initSandbox(): Promise<void> {
+  const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
+  await SandboxManager.initialize(
+    {
+      network: { allowedDomains: [], deniedDomains: [] },
+      filesystem: { denyRead: [], allowWrite: [], denyWrite: [] },
+      ignoreViolations: DEFAULT_IGNORE_VIOLATIONS,
+    },
+    undefined,
+    // enableLogMonitor — macOS-only; populates the SandboxViolationStore.
+    true,
+  )
+}
+
+export async function resetSandbox(): Promise<void> {
+  const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
+  await SandboxManager.reset()
+  availabilityCache = undefined
+}
+
+export interface SandboxedRunArgs {
+  command: string
+  cwd: string
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv
+  forwardArgs?: readonly string[] | undefined
+  onStdout?: (chunk: string) => void
+  onStderr?: (chunk: string) => void
+  /** See `RunOptions.liveChildren` — same contract for sandboxed spawns. */
+  liveChildren?: Set<ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>>
+  /** See `RunOptions.timeoutMs` — SIGTERM the child after this many ms. */
+  timeoutMs?: number
+  /**
+   * Baseline reads — paths the sandbox unconditionally allows. The
+   * caller builds this from resolved `cache.inputs.files`.
+   */
+  baseAllowRead: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * Baseline writes — paths the sandbox unconditionally allows for
+   * writes. Built from the static prefix of `cache.outputs.files`.
+   */
+  baseAllowWrite: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * Read-deny anchor. Combined with allowRead it produces the effective
+   * deny set: anything under one of these paths that isn't in allowRead
+   * is forbidden. Pass `[workspaceRoot]` to enforce project boundaries.
+   */
+  baseDenyRead: readonly string[]
+  /**
+   * User-declared sandbox block (after path-resolution). Path lists are
+   * unioned with the baselines; bool/object fields fall through to SRT.
+   */
+  config: ResolvedSandboxConfig
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sandbox config with all path fields resolved to absolute paths.
+ * Produced by `resolveSandboxConfig`. The shape mirrors `SandboxConfig`
+ * but every string in a path list is guaranteed absolute.
+ */
+export interface ResolvedSandboxConfig {
+  allowRead: readonly string[]
+  allowWrite: readonly string[]
+  allowGitConfig?: boolean
+  network?: boolean | SandboxNetworkConfig
+  allowPty?: boolean
+  enableWeakerNestedSandbox?: boolean
+  enableWeakerNetworkIsolation?: boolean
+  ignoreViolations?: Record<string, string[]>
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonicalize a path with realpath, tolerating paths that don't exist
+ * yet: resolve the longest existing ancestor and re-append the rest.
+ *
+ * Why: the sandbox policy matches on canonical paths (macOS seatbelt
+ * evaluates real vnode paths), and SRT's own normalization refuses to
+ * canonicalize bare symlinked roots like `/tmp` → `/private/tmp` (its
+ * boundary check only whitelists `/tmp/<child>` forms). Without this,
+ * `allowWrite: ['/tmp']` silently never matches on macOS.
+ */
+function toRealPath(p: string): string {
+  try {
+    return realpathSync(p)
+  } catch {
+    const parent = path.dirname(p)
+    if (parent === p) return p
+    return path.join(toRealPath(parent), path.basename(p))
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convert a user-facing `SandboxConfig` (paths may be relative / tilde)
+ * into a `ResolvedSandboxConfig` (all paths absolute + canonical) for a
+ * given project. Relative paths resolve against `projectDir`; tilde
+ * paths expand against the user's home; symlinks resolve to real paths.
+ */
+export function resolveSandboxConfig(
+  cfg: SandboxConfig,
+  projectDir: string,
+): ResolvedSandboxConfig {
+  const resolve = (p: string): string => {
+    if (p.startsWith('~')) return toRealPath(path.join(os.homedir(), p.slice(1)))
+    if (path.isAbsolute(p)) return toRealPath(p)
+    return toRealPath(path.resolve(projectDir, p))
+  }
+  const r: ResolvedSandboxConfig = {
+    allowRead: (cfg.allowRead ?? []).map(resolve),
+    allowWrite: (cfg.allowWrite ?? []).map(resolve),
+  }
+  if (cfg.allowGitConfig !== undefined) r.allowGitConfig = cfg.allowGitConfig
+  if (cfg.network !== undefined) r.network = cfg.network
+  if (cfg.allowPty !== undefined) r.allowPty = cfg.allowPty
+  if (cfg.enableWeakerNestedSandbox !== undefined) {
+    r.enableWeakerNestedSandbox = cfg.enableWeakerNestedSandbox
+  }
+  if (cfg.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation !== undefined) {
+    r.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation = cfg.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation
+  }
+  if (cfg.ignoreViolations !== undefined) r.ignoreViolations = cfg.ignoreViolations
+  return r
+}
+
+export interface SandboxViolation {
+  /** Raw log line from SRT. Format differs between macOS / Linux. */
+  line: string
+  timestamp: Date
+}
+
+export interface SandboxedRunResult extends RunResult {
+  /** Violations captured during this task. Empty when nothing tripped. */
+  violations: SandboxViolation[]
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run a single task wrapped in the sandbox. Caller must have called
+ * `initSandbox()` first.
+ *
+ * Violations are matched by a unique per-task command prefix — SRT's
+ * `getViolationsForCommand` keys by base64 of the first 100 chars, so
+ * two tasks running the same underlying command (e.g. parallel `tsc`
+ * across packages) would otherwise collide. We prepend `: '<tag>';`
+ * (shell no-op) to make every command's first 100 chars unique.
+ */
+export async function runSandboxed(args: SandboxedRunArgs): Promise<SandboxedRunResult> {
+  const { SandboxManager } = await loadSrt()
+  const start = Date.now()
+  const userCommand =
+    args.forwardArgs && args.forwardArgs.length > 0
+      ? args.command + ' ' + args.forwardArgs.map(shellQuote).join(' ')
+      : args.command
+
+  const tag = xxh3hex(`${args.cwd}|${userCommand}|${process.hrtime.bigint()}`).slice(0, 16)
+  const taggedCommand = `: 'vx-${tag}'; ${userCommand}`
+
+  const customConfig = buildCustomConfig(args)
+  const wrapped = await SandboxManager.wrapWithSandbox(taggedCommand, undefined, customConfig)
+
+  // Linux: SRT's SandboxViolationStore is macOS-only, so structured
+  // detection on Linux requires us to wrap the spawn with strace and
+  // parse the trace for denied syscalls. The trace is per-task (unique
+  // log path keyed by the command tag) so parallel tasks don't share
+  // a stream. Skipped when strace isn't on PATH — bwrap still enforces
+  // structurally; we just lose the structured violation list.
+  const useStrace = await wantsStraceDetection()
+  const straceLog = useStrace ? path.join(os.tmpdir(), `vx-strace-${tag}.log`) : undefined
+  // We trace only `openat` — it's the actual file-read attempt, the
+  // signal the user cares about. `statx` / `newfstatat` / `access`
+  // are mostly shell PATH-walking and stat probes that aren't
+  // actionable (we'd report every node_modules/.bin entry the shell
+  // checks before resolving a command).
+  const spawnArgv = straceLog
+    ? ['strace', '-f', '-e', 'trace=openat', '-o', straceLog, '--', 'sh', '-c', wrapped]
+    : ['sh', '-c', wrapped]
+
+  let proc: ReturnType<typeof Bun.spawn>
+  try {
+    proc = Bun.spawn(spawnArgv, {
+      cwd: args.cwd,
+      env: args.env as Record<string, string>,
+      stdin: 'ignore',
+      stdout: 'pipe',
+      stderr: 'pipe',
+    })
+  } catch (err) {
+    const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+    return {
+      exitCode: 127,
+      durationMs: Date.now() - start,
+      stdout: '',
+      stderr: `\n[vx] failed to spawn sandboxed task: ${message}\n`,
+      violations: [],
+    }
+  }
+
+  args.liveChildren?.add(proc)
+  const timeout = armTimeout(proc, args.timeoutMs)
+  const ac = new AbortController()
+  const streams = Promise.all([
+    streamToString(proc.stdout, args.onStdout, ac.signal),
+    streamToString(proc.stderr, args.onStderr, ac.signal),
+  ])
+  // See runCommand: gate on child exit, abort the readers on timeout so
+  // a lingering grandchild pipe can't hang the run.
+  await proc.exited
+  timeout.clear()
+  if (timeout.timedOut()) ac.abort()
+  const [stdout, stderr] = await streams
+  args.liveChildren?.delete(proc)
+  const exitCode = proc.exitCode ?? (proc.signalCode ? signalExitCode(proc.signalCode) : 1)
+
+  // macOS: read the violation store keyed by our tagged command.
+  const store = SandboxManager.getSandboxViolationStore()
+  const macViolations = store.getViolationsForCommand(taggedCommand).map((v) => ({
+    line: v.line,
+    timestamp: v.timestamp,
+  }))
+
+  // Linux: parse the strace log and emit one violation per denied
+  // syscall on a path inside denyRead that wasn't unconditionally
+  // allowed. Best-effort — if parsing fails we surface no Linux
+  // violations rather than fail the whole task.
+  const linuxViolations: SandboxViolation[] = straceLog
+    ? await parseStraceViolations(straceLog, args).catch(() => [])
+    : []
+  if (straceLog) await unlink(straceLog).catch(() => undefined)
+
+  // Apply the task's own ignoreViolations on top of the global defaults.
+  // SRT's wrapCommandWithSandboxMacOS doesn't actually thread customConfig.
+  // ignoreViolations through to the log monitor — that filter is set
+  // once globally at initSandbox time. So per-task user overrides have
+  // to be applied here, after read-back.
+  const userIgnore = args.config.ignoreViolations
+  const violations: SandboxViolation[] = filterIgnored(
+    [...macViolations, ...linuxViolations],
+    userIgnore,
+    userCommand,
+  )
+
+  try {
+    SandboxManager.cleanupAfterCommand()
+  } catch {
+    // ignore; bwrap mount-point cleanup is best-effort
+  }
+
+  return {
+    exitCode,
+    durationMs: Date.now() - start,
+    stdout,
+    stderr,
+    violations,
+    ...(proc.signalCode ? { signal: proc.signalCode } : {}),
+    ...(timeout.timedOut() ? { timedOut: true } : {}),
+    ...resourceUsageToCpuRss(proc.resourceUsage()),
+  }
+}
+
+/** Memoized check: is `strace` on PATH on a Linux host? */
+let straceAvailableCache: boolean | undefined
+async function wantsStraceDetection(): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (process.platform !== 'linux') return false
+  if (straceAvailableCache !== undefined) return straceAvailableCache
+  try {
+    const p = Bun.spawn(['strace', '--version'], { stdout: 'ignore', stderr: 'ignore' })
+    await p.exited
+    straceAvailableCache = p.exitCode === 0
+  } catch {
+    straceAvailableCache = false
+  }
+  return straceAvailableCache
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a strace log for denied filesystem syscalls and convert each
+ * one inside the workspace deny anchor (and not in allowRead) into a
+ * SandboxViolation. Dedups by (syscall, abs-path) so a tool that
+ * statx's the same missing path 10 times in a row produces one line.
+ *
+ * strace line shape (with -f):
+ *   <pid> openat(AT_FDCWD, "<path>", <flags>) = -1 ENOENT (...)
+ *   <pid> access("<path>", <mode>) = -1 EACCES (...)
+ *   <pid> statx(AT_FDCWD, "<path>", <flags>, <mask>, ...) = -1 ENOENT (...)
+ *
+ * We capture the first quoted-string argument as the path. paths that
+ * are relative resolve against the task's cwd (set by Bun.spawn).
+ */
+const STRACE_RE =
+  /^\d+\s+(openat|access|statx|newfstatat)\([^"]*"([^"]+)"[^)]*\)\s*=\s*-1\s+(ENOENT|EACCES|EPERM)/gm
+
+async function parseStraceViolations(
+  logPath: string,
+  args: SandboxedRunArgs,
+): Promise<SandboxViolation[]> {
+  const text = await Bun.file(logPath).text()
+  if (text.length === 0) return []
+
+  // Treat every baseAllow + sandbox.allowRead path as "this was
+  // explicitly permitted; any -ENOENT here is the user's own missing
+  // file, not a sandbox-induced denial". Same for absolute denyRead
+  // checks below.
+  const allowAbs = new Set<string>(
+    [...args.baseAllowRead, ...args.config.allowRead].map((p) => absolutize(p)),
+  )
+  const denyAnchors = args.baseDenyRead.map((p) => absolutize(p))
+
+  const seen = new Set<string>()
+  const out: SandboxViolation[] = []
+  for (const m of text.matchAll(STRACE_RE)) {
+    const [, syscall, rawPath, errno] = m
+    if (!rawPath) continue
+    const abs = absolutize(rawPath, args.cwd)
+    // Only report paths under the workspace-root deny anchor — system
+    // libs / /proc / /sys / etc. probes are not interesting violations.
+    if (!denyAnchors.some((root) => abs === root || abs.startsWith(root + path.sep))) continue
+    // Skip paths the user explicitly allowed (and their descendants).
+    if (isUnderAny(abs, allowAbs)) continue
+    const key = `${syscall}|${abs}`
+    if (seen.has(key)) continue
+    seen.add(key)
+    out.push({
+      line: `${syscall}(${rawPath}) = -1 ${errno}  [${abs}]`,
+      timestamp: new Date(),
+    })
+  }
+  return out
+}
+
+function absolutize(p: string, cwd?: string): string {
+  if (p.startsWith('~')) return path.join(os.homedir(), p.slice(1))
+  if (path.isAbsolute(p)) return p
+  return path.resolve(cwd ?? process.cwd(), p)
+}
+
+function isUnderAny(abs: string, allow: Set<string>): boolean {
+  if (allow.has(abs)) return true
+  for (const a of allow) {
+    if (abs === a || abs.startsWith(a + path.sep)) return true
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+/**
+ * Apply the task's user-provided `sandbox.ignoreViolations` map on top
+ * of whatever the macOS log monitor + Linux strace pass produced.
+ * Mirrors SRT's own substring-match semantics:
+ *   - `'*'` entries match every command
+ *   - other keys match commands whose userCommand string CONTAINS the key
+ *   - the array of strings under each key is substring-matched against
+ *     the violation line
+ *
+ * The defaults installed in `initSandbox` already filter on the macOS
+ * side; this pass catches per-task additions + Linux strace results.
+ */
+function filterIgnored(
+  violations: SandboxViolation[],
+  ignore: Record<string, string[]> | undefined,
+  userCommand: string,
+): SandboxViolation[] {
+  if (!ignore) return violations
+  const wildcard = ignore['*'] ?? []
+  const cmdEntries = Object.entries(ignore).filter(([k]) => k !== '*')
+  return violations.filter((v) => {
+    if (wildcard.some((s) => v.line.includes(s))) return false
+    for (const [pattern, needles] of cmdEntries) {
+      if (userCommand.includes(pattern) && needles.some((s) => v.line.includes(s))) {
+        return false
+      }
+    }
+    return true
+  })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Merge the orchestrator-provided baseline (declared inputs / outputs /
+ * workspace-root anchor) with the user's resolved sandbox block to
+ * produce the SRT customConfig. Path arrays are unioned and deduped.
+ *
+ * Network coercion:
+ *   - missing / undefined / false  → block all (allowedDomains: [])
+ *   - true                          → allow all (allowedDomains: ['*'])
+ *   - object                        → use as-is (no merge with shortcuts)
+ */
+function buildCustomConfig(
+  args: SandboxedRunArgs,
+): Parameters<SrtModule['SandboxManager']['wrapWithSandbox']>[2] {
+  const c = args.config
+  const allowRead = unique([...args.baseAllowRead, ...c.allowRead])
+  const denyRead = unique([...args.baseDenyRead])
+  const allowWrite = unique([...args.baseAllowWrite, ...c.allowWrite])
+
+  const custom: Parameters<SrtModule['SandboxManager']['wrapWithSandbox']>[2] = {
+    filesystem: {
+      denyRead,
+      allowRead,
+      allowWrite,
+      denyWrite: [],
+      ...(c.allowGitConfig !== undefined ? { allowGitConfig: c.allowGitConfig } : {}),
+    },
+  }
+
+  // Network coercion. SRT requires allowedDomains + deniedDomains to be
+  // present on any network config; we always supply both.
+  if (c.network === true) {
+    custom.network = { allowedDomains: ['*'], deniedDomains: [] }
+  } else if (c.network && typeof c.network === 'object') {
+    custom.network = {
+      allowedDomains: c.network.allowedDomains ?? [],
+      deniedDomains: c.network.deniedDomains ?? [],
+      ...(c.network.allowUnixSockets !== undefined
+        ? { allowUnixSockets: c.network.allowUnixSockets }
+        : {}),
+      ...(c.network.allowAllUnixSockets !== undefined
+        ? { allowAllUnixSockets: c.network.allowAllUnixSockets }
+        : {}),
+      ...(c.network.allowLocalBinding !== undefined
+        ? { allowLocalBinding: c.network.allowLocalBinding }
+        : {}),
+      ...(c.network.allowMachLookup !== undefined
+        ? { allowMachLookup: c.network.allowMachLookup }
+        : {}),
+    }
+  } else {
+    // false / undefined → block all
+    custom.network = { allowedDomains: [], deniedDomains: [] }
+  }
+
+  if (c.allowPty !== undefined) custom.allowPty = c.allowPty
+  if (c.enableWeakerNestedSandbox !== undefined) {
+    custom.enableWeakerNestedSandbox = c.enableWeakerNestedSandbox
+  }
+  if (c.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation !== undefined) {
+    custom.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation = c.enableWeakerNetworkIsolation
+  }
+  if (c.ignoreViolations !== undefined) custom.ignoreViolations = c.ignoreViolations
+  return custom
+}
+
+function unique(arr: readonly string[]): string[] {
+  return [...new Set(arr)]
+}

package/src/graph/dependency-spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// Parser for the Turbo/Nx-style task-edge micro-syntax used in
+// `dependsOn` and `cache.inputs.tasks`. Returns a small discriminated
+// union the graph builder + cache filter both consume.
+
+export type DependencySpec =
+  | { kind: 'self'; task: string; negated: boolean }
+  | { kind: 'deps'; task: string; negated: boolean }
+  | { kind: 'cross'; project: string; task: string; negated: boolean }
+  | { kind: 'wildcardSelf'; negated: boolean }
+  | { kind: 'wildcardDeps'; negated: boolean }
+
+export class DependencySpecError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    public readonly raw: string,
+    message: string,
+  ) {
+    super(`Invalid dependency spec "${raw}": ${message}`)
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse one `dependsOn` / `cache.inputs.tasks` entry.
+ *
+ *   `name`       → self.name
+ *   `^name`      → every dep workspace's `name` task
+ *   `pkg#name`   → specific package's `name` task (cross-edge)
+ *   `*`          → all same-project upstream (filter-only)
+ *   `^*`         → all dep upstream (filter-only)
+ *   `!<form>`    → negation of any of the above (filter-only)
+ *
+ * Wildcards and negation are accepted everywhere — callers (the graph
+ * builder vs the filter) decide which ones make semantic sense and
+ * surface their own validation errors. This keeps the parser pure.
+ */
+/** True when a task form is a `*` pattern (`build.*`) rather than an exact name. */
+export function isTaskPattern(task: string): boolean {
+  return task.includes('*')
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compile a `*`-only glob over task names: `build.*` → /^build\..*$/.
+ * `*` is the sole metacharacter — everything else matches literally, so the
+ * dotted-namespace convention (`build.bun.linux-x64`) needs no escaping by
+ * the user.
+ */
+export function compileTaskPattern(pattern: string): RegExp {
+  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&').replace(/\*/g, '.*')
+  return new RegExp(`^${escaped}$`)
+}
+
+export function parseDependencySpec(raw: string): DependencySpec {
+  if (raw.length === 0) throw new DependencySpecError(raw, 'empty spec')
+
+  let negated = false
+  let s = raw
+  if (s.startsWith('!')) {
+    negated = true
+    s = s.slice(1)
+    if (s.length === 0) throw new DependencySpecError(raw, 'negation with no body')
+  }
+
+  if (s.startsWith('^')) {
+    const rest = s.slice(1)
+    if (rest.length === 0) throw new DependencySpecError(raw, '"^" with no task name')
+    if (rest === '*') return { kind: 'wildcardDeps', negated }
+    if (rest.includes('#')) {
+      throw new DependencySpecError(raw, '"^" cannot combine with "pkg#task" — pick one')
+    }
+    return { kind: 'deps', task: rest, negated }
+  }
+
+  if (s === '*') return { kind: 'wildcardSelf', negated }
+
+  const hashIdx = s.indexOf('#')
+  if (hashIdx >= 0) {
+    const project = s.slice(0, hashIdx)
+    const task = s.slice(hashIdx + 1)
+    if (!project || !task) {
+      throw new DependencySpecError(raw, 'pkg#task requires a non-empty project AND task')
+    }
+    return { kind: 'cross', project, task, negated }
+  }
+
+  return { kind: 'self', task: s, negated }
+}

package/src/graph/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// Module contract. Cross-module imports must come through here; see
+// docs/design/module-isolation-2026-06.md and tests/module-boundaries.test.ts.
+
+export {
+  DependencySpecError,
+  compileTaskPattern,
+  isTaskPattern,
+  parseDependencySpec,
+  type DependencySpec,
+} from './dependency-spec.js'
+export {
+  type ContinueMode,
+  type OutputFingerprint,
+  type ResourceCost,
+  runGraph,
+  type TaskOutcome,
+  type TaskStatus,
+  type VerifyVerdict,
+  ZERO_COST,
+} from './scheduler.js'
+export {
+  buildTaskGraph,
+  expandRequested,
+  isGroupTask,
+  markSurfacedDeps,
+  type TaskNode,
+} from './task-graph.js'