@vultisig/core-chain 2.35.1 → 2.36.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,26 @@
 # @vultisig/core-chain
 
+## 2.36.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- [#1830](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/pull/1830) [`1fd27b9`](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/commit/1fd27b9103b75a13191f173ebeed98288d8c16b0) Thanks [@rcoderdev](https://github.com/rcoderdev)! - Fail closed when LI.FI returns a destination outside its official chain-scoped Diamond deployments. Accept that Diamond as LI.FI's deterministic approval-spender fast path, while requiring an independent benign Blockaid verdict for any route-dependent spender that differs from it. Require the same independent verdicts for SwapKit EVM transaction destinations and approval spenders, while retaining response-local target-address binding as defense in depth.
+
+  **Consumer-visible behavior changes:**
+
+  - **New runtime throws on the signing path.** A LI.FI destination outside the official Diamond, a distinct LI.FI approval spender that doesn't clear an independent Blockaid check, or a SwapKit destination/approval-spender that doesn't clear the same check now throws during quote construction and co-signer signing-input construction. A consumer on a caret range picks this up automatically.
+  - **Dynamic LI.FI approval spenders and SwapKit addresses add a live third-party network call (Blockaid) during MPC signing**, per co-signer. The official LI.FI Diamond remains an offline fast path. A slow or unreachable Blockaid response can stall a signing ceremony for up to the shared `queryUrl` timeout (20s default) before throwing.
+
+- [#1811](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/pull/1811) [`003ee98`](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/commit/003ee98728f3318eb2de661209f164b449150810) Thanks [@rcoderdev](https://github.com/rcoderdev)! - Bind raw swap quotes to their exact coin identities, requested source amount, absolute expiry, and returned transaction, then reject missing, stale, mismatched, or mutated quotes in the vault-free swap preparation path before any payload construction. General quotes remain preparation-valid for five minutes while SDK presentation continues to recommend refreshing after 60 seconds, and vault-free callers can catch `SwapQuoteExpiredError` to requote.
+
+  Consumers must pass the live bound quote returned by `findSwapQuote` or `getSwapQuote` into preparation instead of constructing or persisting an unbound raw quote. Structured cloning is supported; JSON round-tripping is not because it loses required runtime value types such as `bigint`.
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- [#1883](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/pull/1883) [`44f0ecb`](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/commit/44f0ecbdf10b07789341c0279041d3a1e37d46a0) Thanks [@rcoderdev](https://github.com/rcoderdev)! - Share LI.FI fee-chain fallback logic between the core and React Native quote paths.
+
+- [#1886](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/pull/1886) [`eb25508`](https://github.com/vultisig/vultisig-sdk/commit/eb25508eadfde14ee62470e64d8c2b590627fd76) Thanks [@rcoderdev](https://github.com/rcoderdev)! - Fail closed when Sui pagination reports more data without a usable cursor, preventing partial coin sets or portfolios from being returned as complete.
+
 ## 2.35.1
 
 ### Patch Changes

package/dist/chains/sui/listAllCoins.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"listAllCoins.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../packages/core/chain/chains/sui/listAllCoins.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAA;AAEzC;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;IAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAChB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACpB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACd,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAChB,CAAA;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,MAAM,CAAA;AAIlC,2DAA2D;AAC3D,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAI,YAAY,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU,MAAM,KAAG,MAChC,CAAA;AAErD,KAAK,oBAAoB,GAAG;IAC1B,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,CAAA;IACpC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACb,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACjB,CAAA;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,GAAU,6BAA6B,oBAAoB,KAAG,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAuChH,CAAA"}

package/dist/chains/sui/listAllCoins.js

@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ export const listAllSuiCoins = async ({ client, owner, coinType }) => {
                 balance: object.balance,
             });
         }
+        // `hasNextPage: true` without a cursor cannot be followed. Treat every
+        // falsy cursor as malformed because the gRPC adapter can turn an empty page
+        // token into `cursor: ''`, while GraphQL can return a null end cursor.
+        // Returning the coins collected so far would make a truncated set look
+        // complete and can surface later as a false insufficient-balance error.
+        if (page.hasNextPage && !page.cursor) {
+            throw new Error(`listAllSuiCoins: page ${pages + 1} for ${owner} (${coinType}) reports hasNextPage with no cursor — refusing to build a send from a truncated coin set`);
+        }
         cursor = page.hasNextPage ? page.cursor : null;
         if (++pages >= maxSuiCoinPages && cursor) {
             throw new Error(`listAllSuiCoins: exceeded ${maxSuiCoinPages} pages for ${owner} (${coinType}) — refusing to build a send from a possibly-truncated or looping coin set`);

package/dist/chains/sui/listAllCoins.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"listAllCoins.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../packages/core/chain/chains/sui/listAllCoins.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAmBA;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,GAAG,CAAA;AAElC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAE7C,2DAA2D;AAC3D,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,CAAC,UAA8B,EAAE,QAAgB,EAAU,EAAE,CAC5F,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAA;AAQrD;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAwB,EAA4B,EAAE;IACnH,MAAM,KAAK,GAAoB,EAAE,CAAA;IACjC,IAAI,MAAM,GAA8B,SAAS,CAAA;IACjD,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;IAEb,GAAG,CAAC;QACF,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;QAEhE,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAClC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;gBACT,QAAQ,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;gBAClD,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ;gBAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;gBACvB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM;gBACrB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;aACxB,CAAC,CAAA;QACJ,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAA;QAE9C,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,6BAA6B,eAAe,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,4EAA4E,CACzJ,CAAA;QACH,CAAC;IACH,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAC;IAEhB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AACd,CAAC,CAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"listAllCoins.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../packages/core/chain/chains/sui/listAllCoins.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAmBA;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,GAAG,CAAA;AAElC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAE7C,2DAA2D;AAC3D,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,CAAC,UAA8B,EAAE,QAAgB,EAAU,EAAE,CAC5F,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAA;AAQrD;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAwB,EAA4B,EAAE;IACnH,MAAM,KAAK,GAAoB,EAAE,CAAA;IACjC,IAAI,MAAM,GAA8B,SAAS,CAAA;IACjD,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;IAEb,GAAG,CAAC;QACF,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;QAEhE,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;YAClC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;gBACT,QAAQ,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;gBAClD,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ;gBAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;gBACvB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM;gBACrB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;aACxB,CAAC,CAAA;QACJ,CAAC;QAED,uEAAuE;QACvE,4EAA4E;QAC5E,uEAAuE;QACvE,uEAAuE;QACvE,wEAAwE;QACxE,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACrC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,yBAAyB,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,2FAA2F,CACxJ,CAAA;QACH,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAA;QAE9C,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,6BAA6B,eAAe,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,4EAA4E,CACzJ,CAAA;QACH,CAAC;IACH,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAC;IAEhB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AACd,CAAC,CAAA"}

package/dist/swap/general/knownAggregatorRouters.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
 import { Chain } from '../../Chain.js';
-export type EnforcedRouterProvider = '1inch' | 'kyber' | 'cowswap';
+export type EnforcedRouterProvider = '1inch' | 'kyber' | 'cowswap' | 'li.fi';
 /**
  * Signing-path re-assert (sdk#1358): the same allow-list check as {@link assertKnownAggregatorRouter},
  * but keyed off an arbitrary provider STRING (the value carried in KeysignSwapPayload.general.provider,
- * which is a plain `string`). Enforced providers (1inch/kyber/cowswap) fail closed; the small closed set
- * of genuinely unenforceable providers (li.fi/swapkit, plus the legacy `''` unattributed provider - see
- * RECOGNIZED_UNENFORCED_PROVIDERS) fall through to the same log-only path they take at quote construction;
- * anything else is rejected outright (sdk#1457, see below).
+ * which is a plain `string`). Fixed-router providers fail closed against their allowlists, SwapKit
+ * fails closed against an independent Blockaid reputation verdict, and only the legacy `''`
+ * unattributed provider remains log-only. Anything else is rejected outright (sdk#1457, see below).
  *
  * WHY THIS EXISTS SEPARATELY FROM quote construction: a compromised initiator (or server composing the
  * intent) can hand a co-signer a KeysignPayload whose swapPayload.quote.tx.to was NEVER run through the
@@ -23,23 +22,35 @@ export type EnforcedRouterProvider = '1inch' | 'kyber' | 'cowswap';
  * enforcement) is a real, closable gap - not just a theoretical one.
  *
  * sdk#1457 FIX: two structural improvements that need no proto change. (1) CowSwap is now enforced -
- * unlike li.fi/swapkit it settles through ONE fixed, deterministic contract (the GPv2VaultRelayer, see
+ * unlike swapkit it settles through ONE fixed, deterministic contract (the GPv2VaultRelayer, see
  * assertKnownAggregatorRouter), so its destination is exactly as allow-listable as 1inch/Kyber's; a
  * payload can no longer relabel itself 'cowswap' to dodge a router check the way it previously could. (2)
  * the log-only fallback is now a CLOSED list of the provider values the codebase legitimately produces
- * (li.fi/swapkit, plus the legacy `''` unattributed provider) - a `provider` string outside every known
+ * (at that time li.fi/swapkit, plus the legacy `''` unattributed provider) - a `provider` string outside every known
  * value (enforced or unenforced) is unrecognized and REJECTED, not silently passed through. Together
- * these shrink "relabel to escape enforcement" from "any string at all" down to exactly li.fi, swapkit,
- * and the legacy `''`, which remain unenforceable by address because they legitimately route through
- * many different contracts by design (see the file doc comment) - closing that residual gap needs the
- * provider identity to be a trusted wire discriminant instead of a free string, i.e. a proto oneof case
- * per provider (tracked in sdk#1457, not attempted here: a schema change on the shared commondata proto
- * is a cross-repo, cross-consumer change every native client (iOS/Android/Windows) also builds against).
+ * these originally shrank "relabel to escape enforcement" from "any string at all" to that closed set.
+ * sdk#1458 subsequently removes li.fi from the residual gap using its official Diamond deployments
+ * and applies an independent Blockaid reputation check to SwapKit destinations on both quote and
+ * co-signer paths. The legacy unattributed value remains the only log-only compatibility case.
  *
  * This guard remains MONOTONIC beyond that residual gap: it only ever THROWS (rejects) or no-ops - it
  * never makes anything signable that wasn't already.
  */
 export declare function assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath(provider: string, address: string, chain: Chain): void;
+/**
+ * Independent trust boundary for dynamic SwapKit EVM addresses. SwapKit's `tx.to`,
+ * `targetAddress`, and optional approval transaction all come from the same `/v3/swap`
+ * response, so equality between them cannot establish destination safety when that response
+ * is compromised.
+ */
+export declare function assertSwapKitAddressReputation(address: string, chain: Chain, role?: string): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * LI.FI documents `estimate.approvalAddress` as route-dependent and explicitly warns consumers
+ * not to hardcode it. The official Diamond is safe without a network dependency; a distinct
+ * spender is accepted only after an independent benign Blockaid verdict. This preserves valid
+ * inner-executor routes without trusting the quote response to authorize its own spender.
+ */
+export declare function assertLifiApprovalAddress(address: string, chain: Chain): Promise<void>;
 /**
  * Signing-path approval-spender bind (sdk#1358 review follow-up, requested by neavra). The
  * follow-on to {@link assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath}: that guard validates the swap-leg
@@ -49,12 +60,14 @@ export declare function assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath(provider: strin
  * genuine 1inch/kyber `tx.to` yet still carry an approve granting an ATTACKER an allowance over the
  * user's token (a classic approval-drain the co-signer would otherwise sign blind).
  *
- * On the initiator these coincide by construction (build.ts sets the approve spender to
- * `getSwapDestinationAddress` === `tx.to`), so this only ever fires on a hand-built/tampered payload.
- * Enforced providers (1inch/kyber/cowswap) MUST have `spender === routerDestination`; unenforced
- * providers (li.fi/swapkit) are NOT bound. CowSwap's spender IS its `tx.to` (both are the fixed
- * GPv2VaultRelayer - see getSwapDestinationAddress.ts), so it binds the same way 1inch/kyber do. Like
- * its sibling this is a MONOTONIC gate: it only throws or no-ops, never changes the signed bytes.
+ * On the initiator the fixed-spender providers coincide by construction. LI.FI and SwapKit can
+ * instead set an explicit `approvalAddress`, which is why their spender checks are separate.
+ * Approval-bound providers (1inch/kyber/cowswap) MUST have `spender === routerDestination`.
+ * LI.FI approval spenders can vary by route and are instead checked by
+ * {@link assertLifiApprovalAddress}; SwapKit spenders use its corresponding reputation guard.
+ * CowSwap's spender IS its `tx.to` (both are the fixed GPv2VaultRelayer - see
+ * getSwapDestinationAddress.ts), so it binds the same way 1inch/kyber do. Like its sibling this is
+ * a MONOTONIC gate: it only throws or no-ops, never changes the signed bytes.
  */
 export declare function assertEnforcedSwapApprovalSpenderBound(provider: string, spender: string, routerDestination: string, chain: Chain): void;
 /**
@@ -63,9 +76,14 @@ export declare function assertEnforcedSwapApprovalSpenderBound(provider: string,
  */
 export declare function assertKnownAggregatorRouter(provider: EnforcedRouterProvider, address: string, chain: Chain): void;
 /**
- * Log-only (never throws) — for LiFi/SwapKit, whose legitimate routes span many different
- * contracts. Structured so the data is queryable (provider + address) and a future allowlist
- * is easy to build if a stable pattern emerges from real usage.
+ * SwapKit v3 returns `targetAddress` independently from the ready-to-sign EVM
+ * transaction and defines it as the address the transaction must call or transfer to.
+ * Bind those fields before constructing a GeneralSwapQuote so a substituted `tx.to`
+ * cannot silently become the signed destination (or the approval fallback).
+ */
+export declare function assertSwapKitDestinationMatchesTarget(address: string, targetAddress: string | undefined, chain: Chain): void;
+/**
+ * Log-only (never throws) — retained only for legacy unattributed signing payloads.
  */
 export declare function logUnenforcedAggregatorDestination(provider: string, address: string): void;
 //# sourceMappingURL=knownAggregatorRouters.d.ts.map

package/dist/swap/general/knownAggregatorRouters.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"knownAggregatorRouters.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../packages/core/chain/swap/general/knownAggregatorRouters.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAY,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AA+F7C,MAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;AAuB5E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmCG;AACH,wBAAgB,wCAAwC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAuB9G;AAsCD;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,8BAA8B,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,SAAgB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAEjH;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAMtF;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AACH,wBAAgB,sCAAsC,CACpD,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,EACzB,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,GACX,IAAI,CASN;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,2BAA2B,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CA4BjH;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,qCAAqC,CACnD,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,EACjC,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,GACX,IAAI,CAYN;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,kCAAkC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAK1F"}

package/dist/swap/general/knownAggregatorRouters.js

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 import { isOneOf } from '@vultisig/lib-utils/array/isOneOf';
 import { Chain } from '../../Chain.js';
+import { scanAddressWithBlockaid } from '../../security/blockaid/address/index.js';
+import { blockaidEvmChain } from '../../security/blockaid/evmChains.js';
 import { COW_VAULT_RELAYER_ADDRESS, cowSwapSupportedChains } from './cowswap/config.js';
 /**
  * Fund-safety allowlist for the general-purpose EVM swap aggregators (AGG-02, round-2
@@ -34,14 +36,15 @@ import { COW_VAULT_RELAYER_ADDRESS, cowSwapSupportedChains } from './cowswap/con
  * zkSync 1inch swap. Kyber showed no such variance on every chain that returned a live
  * response (see the per-chain notes below) — its allowlist stays flat.
  *
- * LiFi and SwapKit CANNOT be enforced the same way — they route through many different
- * bridge/DEX contracts by design (diamond routing, multi-hop, chain-specific deployments),
- * so a hard allowlist would false-block legitimate routes. Those two are logged (never
- * thrown) via logUnenforcedAggregatorDestination so an anomaly is queryable, and so a future
- * allowlist has real usage data to build from if a pattern emerges. sdk#1457: because they are
- * the only genuinely unenforceable-by-address providers, they are the one residual gap
- * assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath's provider-string closed-list still can't structurally
- * close - see that function's doc comment.
+ * LI.FI is enforced too (sdk#1458). Although its Diamond dispatches to many bridge/DEX contracts,
+ * the user-facing transaction enters through one officially published, chain-scoped Diamond.
+ * Most supported chains share the CREATE2 address below; HyperEVM, Robinhood, and zkSync do not.
+ * LI.FI's approval spender can vary by route, so the Diamond remains the deterministic fast path
+ * while any distinct spender requires an independent benign Blockaid verdict.
+ * SwapKit remains dynamic because its target can be a provider router or a per-swap deposit
+ * address. Its quote and co-signer paths therefore require an independent benign Blockaid
+ * reputation verdict via {@link assertSwapKitAddressReputation}; the response-local
+ * `targetAddress` equality check remains defense in depth only.
  */
 // 1inch Aggregation Router V5 (legacy). Same address as
 // chains/evm/contract/knownContracts.ts's display-only registry; kept separate here since
@@ -64,23 +67,49 @@ const ONE_INCH_V6_ROBINHOOD_ROUTER = '0x5a705de8982235a7fa45bb83dcacf03a211389c7
 // kyberSwapEnabledChains chain through aggregator-api.kyberswap.com's /routes
 // (Ethereum, BSC, Arbitrum, Optimism, Avalanche, Base, Polygon).
 const KYBER_STANDARD_ROUTER = '0x6131b5fae19ea4f9d964eac0408e4408b66337b5';
-const ENFORCED_ROUTER_PROVIDERS = new Set(['1inch', 'kyber', 'cowswap']);
-// sdk#1457: the small, closed set of provider values the codebase legitimately produces for a
-// route that is genuinely NOT address-allow-listable. `li.fi`/`swapkit` route through many
-// different bridge/DEX contracts by design (see the file doc comment). `''` is NOT an attacker
-// label - it is the documented fallback mapSwapPayload.ts (and getKeysignSwapPayload's own
+// Official LI.FI Diamond deployment registry, read from
+// github.com/lifinance/contracts/tree/main/deployments on 2026-08-08. Keep this
+// deliberately chain-scoped: the exceptions are real deployments, not aliases.
+const LIFI_DIAMOND_BY_CHAIN = {
+    [Chain.Arbitrum]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Avalanche]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Base]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Blast]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.BSC]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.CronosChain]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Ethereum]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Hyperliquid]: '0x0a0758d937d1059c356d4714e57f5df0239bce1a',
+    [Chain.Mantle]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Optimism]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Polygon]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Robinhood]: '0xb477751b76cf82d00a686a1232f5fcd772414af3',
+    [Chain.Sei]: '0x1231deb6f5749ef6ce6943a275a1d3e7486f4eae',
+    [Chain.Zksync]: '0x341e94069f53234fe6dabef707ad424830525715',
+};
+const ENFORCED_ROUTER_PROVIDERS = new Set([
+    '1inch',
+    'kyber',
+    'cowswap',
+    'li.fi',
+]);
+// These providers use the same fixed address for the user-facing router and approval spender.
+// LI.FI is intentionally absent: its official API contract says approval spenders may vary by
+// route or bridge, so distinct spenders use assertLifiApprovalAddress instead of hard equality.
+const APPROVAL_BOUND_ROUTER_PROVIDERS = new Set(['1inch', 'kyber', 'cowswap']);
+// sdk#1457/#1458: the small, closed set of recognized providers outside the fixed-router
+// allowlists. SwapKit targets are dynamic and use Blockaid; `''` is NOT an attacker label - it is
+// the documented fallback mapSwapPayload.ts (and getKeysignSwapPayload's own
 // callers) use for pre-provider-field mobile captures, proven by real golden fixtures
 // (mobileFixtures.golden.test.ts's arb.json/lifiswap.json) that still carry an unset provider.
 // This is a CLOSED list, not "everything not enforced": a `provider` string outside BOTH this
 // set and ENFORCED_ROUTER_PROVIDERS is unrecognized and rejected below, instead of silently logged.
-const RECOGNIZED_UNENFORCED_PROVIDERS = new Set(['li.fi', 'swapkit', '']);
+const RECOGNIZED_DYNAMIC_OR_LEGACY_PROVIDERS = new Set(['swapkit', '']);
 /**
  * Signing-path re-assert (sdk#1358): the same allow-list check as {@link assertKnownAggregatorRouter},
  * but keyed off an arbitrary provider STRING (the value carried in KeysignSwapPayload.general.provider,
- * which is a plain `string`). Enforced providers (1inch/kyber/cowswap) fail closed; the small closed set
- * of genuinely unenforceable providers (li.fi/swapkit, plus the legacy `''` unattributed provider - see
- * RECOGNIZED_UNENFORCED_PROVIDERS) fall through to the same log-only path they take at quote construction;
- * anything else is rejected outright (sdk#1457, see below).
+ * which is a plain `string`). Fixed-router providers fail closed against their allowlists, SwapKit
+ * fails closed against an independent Blockaid reputation verdict, and only the legacy `''`
+ * unattributed provider remains log-only. Anything else is rejected outright (sdk#1457, see below).
  *
  * WHY THIS EXISTS SEPARATELY FROM quote construction: a compromised initiator (or server composing the
  * intent) can hand a co-signer a KeysignPayload whose swapPayload.quote.tx.to was NEVER run through the
@@ -97,18 +126,16 @@ const RECOGNIZED_UNENFORCED_PROVIDERS = new Set(['li.fi', 'swapkit', '']);
  * enforcement) is a real, closable gap - not just a theoretical one.
  *
  * sdk#1457 FIX: two structural improvements that need no proto change. (1) CowSwap is now enforced -
- * unlike li.fi/swapkit it settles through ONE fixed, deterministic contract (the GPv2VaultRelayer, see
+ * unlike swapkit it settles through ONE fixed, deterministic contract (the GPv2VaultRelayer, see
  * assertKnownAggregatorRouter), so its destination is exactly as allow-listable as 1inch/Kyber's; a
  * payload can no longer relabel itself 'cowswap' to dodge a router check the way it previously could. (2)
  * the log-only fallback is now a CLOSED list of the provider values the codebase legitimately produces
- * (li.fi/swapkit, plus the legacy `''` unattributed provider) - a `provider` string outside every known
+ * (at that time li.fi/swapkit, plus the legacy `''` unattributed provider) - a `provider` string outside every known
  * value (enforced or unenforced) is unrecognized and REJECTED, not silently passed through. Together
- * these shrink "relabel to escape enforcement" from "any string at all" down to exactly li.fi, swapkit,
- * and the legacy `''`, which remain unenforceable by address because they legitimately route through
- * many different contracts by design (see the file doc comment) - closing that residual gap needs the
- * provider identity to be a trusted wire discriminant instead of a free string, i.e. a proto oneof case
- * per provider (tracked in sdk#1457, not attempted here: a schema change on the shared commondata proto
- * is a cross-repo, cross-consumer change every native client (iOS/Android/Windows) also builds against).
+ * these originally shrank "relabel to escape enforcement" from "any string at all" to that closed set.
+ * sdk#1458 subsequently removes li.fi from the residual gap using its official Diamond deployments
+ * and applies an independent Blockaid reputation check to SwapKit destinations on both quote and
+ * co-signer paths. The legacy unattributed value remains the only log-only compatibility case.
  *
  * This guard remains MONOTONIC beyond that residual gap: it only ever THROWS (rejects) or no-ops - it
  * never makes anything signable that wasn't already.
@@ -120,16 +147,66 @@ export function assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath(provider, address, chai
         assertKnownAggregatorRouter(provider, address, chain);
         return;
     }
-    if (!RECOGNIZED_UNENFORCED_PROVIDERS.has(provider)) {
+    if (provider === 'swapkit') {
+        throw new Error('SwapKit destinations require the asynchronous independent reputation guard — refusing a synchronous log-only check.');
+    }
+    if (!RECOGNIZED_DYNAMIC_OR_LEGACY_PROVIDERS.has(provider)) {
         throw new Error(`Unrecognized swap provider "${provider}" on the co-signer signing path - refusing to sign a swap ` +
             'whose provider label does not match any known aggregator (enforced or unenforced).');
     }
-    // Unenforced (li.fi/swapkit): log-only, and log the ACTUAL provider so the usage dataset the future
-    // allow-list is built from isn't poisoned by a coerced label. Skip a genuinely empty address.
+    // Legacy unattributed payloads remain log-only for compatibility with historical mobile captures.
+    // Log the actual provider so the usage dataset isn't poisoned by a coerced label. Skip a genuinely empty address.
     if (address) {
         logUnenforcedAggregatorDestination(provider, address);
     }
 }
+/**
+ * Independent reputation boundary shared by dynamic aggregator addresses. Only an explicit
+ * Benign Blockaid verdict is accepted; unsupported chains, scan failures, Warning, and Malicious
+ * verdicts all fail closed.
+ */
+async function assertAggregatorAddressReputation(provider, address, chain, role = 'destination') {
+    if (!/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(address)) {
+        throw new Error(`${provider} ${role} (${address}) is not a valid EVM address on ${chain}.`);
+    }
+    const blockaidChain = blockaidEvmChain[chain];
+    if (!blockaidChain) {
+        throw new Error(`${provider} ${role} reputation cannot be verified on unsupported Blockaid chain ${chain}.`);
+    }
+    let result;
+    try {
+        result = await scanAddressWithBlockaid(address, blockaidChain);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        const reason = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        throw new Error(`${provider} ${role} reputation check failed on ${chain}: ${reason}`);
+    }
+    if (result.resultType !== 'Benign') {
+        const features = result.features.length ? ` (${result.features.join(', ')})` : '';
+        throw new Error(`${provider} ${role} (${address}) received a ${result.resultType} Blockaid verdict on ${chain}${features} — refusing to sign or return the transaction.`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Independent trust boundary for dynamic SwapKit EVM addresses. SwapKit's `tx.to`,
+ * `targetAddress`, and optional approval transaction all come from the same `/v3/swap`
+ * response, so equality between them cannot establish destination safety when that response
+ * is compromised.
+ */
+export function assertSwapKitAddressReputation(address, chain, role = 'destination') {
+    return assertAggregatorAddressReputation('SwapKit', address, chain, role);
+}
+/**
+ * LI.FI documents `estimate.approvalAddress` as route-dependent and explicitly warns consumers
+ * not to hardcode it. The official Diamond is safe without a network dependency; a distinct
+ * spender is accepted only after an independent benign Blockaid verdict. This preserves valid
+ * inner-executor routes without trusting the quote response to authorize its own spender.
+ */
+export function assertLifiApprovalAddress(address, chain) {
+    if (address.toLowerCase() === LIFI_DIAMOND_BY_CHAIN[chain]) {
+        return Promise.resolve();
+    }
+    return assertAggregatorAddressReputation('LI.FI', address, chain, 'approval spender');
+}
 /**
  * Signing-path approval-spender bind (sdk#1358 review follow-up, requested by neavra). The
  * follow-on to {@link assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath}: that guard validates the swap-leg
@@ -139,15 +216,17 @@ export function assertKnownAggregatorRouterOnSigningPath(provider, address, chai
  * genuine 1inch/kyber `tx.to` yet still carry an approve granting an ATTACKER an allowance over the
  * user's token (a classic approval-drain the co-signer would otherwise sign blind).
  *
- * On the initiator these coincide by construction (build.ts sets the approve spender to
- * `getSwapDestinationAddress` === `tx.to`), so this only ever fires on a hand-built/tampered payload.
- * Enforced providers (1inch/kyber/cowswap) MUST have `spender === routerDestination`; unenforced
- * providers (li.fi/swapkit) are NOT bound. CowSwap's spender IS its `tx.to` (both are the fixed
- * GPv2VaultRelayer - see getSwapDestinationAddress.ts), so it binds the same way 1inch/kyber do. Like
- * its sibling this is a MONOTONIC gate: it only throws or no-ops, never changes the signed bytes.
+ * On the initiator the fixed-spender providers coincide by construction. LI.FI and SwapKit can
+ * instead set an explicit `approvalAddress`, which is why their spender checks are separate.
+ * Approval-bound providers (1inch/kyber/cowswap) MUST have `spender === routerDestination`.
+ * LI.FI approval spenders can vary by route and are instead checked by
+ * {@link assertLifiApprovalAddress}; SwapKit spenders use its corresponding reputation guard.
+ * CowSwap's spender IS its `tx.to` (both are the fixed GPv2VaultRelayer - see
+ * getSwapDestinationAddress.ts), so it binds the same way 1inch/kyber do. Like its sibling this is
+ * a MONOTONIC gate: it only throws or no-ops, never changes the signed bytes.
  */
 export function assertEnforcedSwapApprovalSpenderBound(provider, spender, routerDestination, chain) {
-    if (!ENFORCED_ROUTER_PROVIDERS.has(provider)) {
+    if (!APPROVAL_BOUND_ROUTER_PROVIDERS.has(provider)) {
         return;
     }
     if (spender.toLowerCase() !== routerDestination.toLowerCase()) {
@@ -162,29 +241,43 @@ export function assertKnownAggregatorRouter(provider, address, chain) {
     const normalized = address.toLowerCase();
     const isKnown = provider === 'kyber'
         ? normalized === KYBER_STANDARD_ROUTER
-        : provider === 'cowswap'
-            ? // CHAIN-SCOPED, same reason the 1inch arm is: the relayer is a deterministic address, so it
-                // resolves on EVERY EVM chain, but CoW has only deployed the GPv2 stack on
-                // cowSwapSupportedChains (findSwapQuote gates quotes to exactly those). Accepting it
-                // chain-agnostically would let a tampered payload relabelled 'cowswap' on e.g. CronosChain /
-                // Zksync / Blast — where eth_getCode at this address is literally `0x`, verified 2026-07-21 —
-                // pass BOTH this guard and assertEnforcedSwapApprovalSpenderBound, so the co-signer would
-                // sign an ERC-20 approve to a codeless address anyone can later claim via the deterministic
-                // deployment proxy. Fail closed off the supported set.
-                isOneOf(chain, cowSwapSupportedChains) && normalized === COW_VAULT_RELAYER_ADDRESS.toLowerCase()
-            : chain === Chain.Zksync
-                ? normalized === ONE_INCH_V6_ZKSYNC_ROUTER
-                : chain === Chain.Robinhood
-                    ? normalized === ONE_INCH_V6_ROBINHOOD_ROUTER
-                    : normalized === ONE_INCH_V5_ROUTER || normalized === ONE_INCH_V6_STANDARD_ROUTER;
+        : provider === 'li.fi'
+            ? normalized === LIFI_DIAMOND_BY_CHAIN[chain]
+            : provider === 'cowswap'
+                ? // CHAIN-SCOPED, same reason the 1inch arm is: the relayer is a deterministic address, so it
+                    // resolves on EVERY EVM chain, but CoW has only deployed the GPv2 stack on
+                    // cowSwapSupportedChains (findSwapQuote gates quotes to exactly those). Accepting it
+                    // chain-agnostically would let a tampered payload relabelled 'cowswap' on e.g. CronosChain /
+                    // Zksync / Blast — where eth_getCode at this address is literally `0x`, verified 2026-07-21 —
+                    // pass BOTH this guard and assertEnforcedSwapApprovalSpenderBound, so the co-signer would
+                    // sign an ERC-20 approve to a codeless address anyone can later claim via the deterministic
+                    // deployment proxy. Fail closed off the supported set.
+                    isOneOf(chain, cowSwapSupportedChains) && normalized === COW_VAULT_RELAYER_ADDRESS.toLowerCase()
+                : chain === Chain.Zksync
+                    ? normalized === ONE_INCH_V6_ZKSYNC_ROUTER
+                    : chain === Chain.Robinhood
+                        ? normalized === ONE_INCH_V6_ROBINHOOD_ROUTER
+                        : normalized === ONE_INCH_V5_ROUTER || normalized === ONE_INCH_V6_STANDARD_ROUTER;
     if (!isKnown) {
         throw new Error(`${provider} swap quote returned an unrecognized router address (${address}) on ${chain} — refusing to build a signable transaction against it.`);
     }
 }
 /**
- * Log-only (never throws) — for LiFi/SwapKit, whose legitimate routes span many different
- * contracts. Structured so the data is queryable (provider + address) and a future allowlist
- * is easy to build if a stable pattern emerges from real usage.
+ * SwapKit v3 returns `targetAddress` independently from the ready-to-sign EVM
+ * transaction and defines it as the address the transaction must call or transfer to.
+ * Bind those fields before constructing a GeneralSwapQuote so a substituted `tx.to`
+ * cannot silently become the signed destination (or the approval fallback).
+ */
+export function assertSwapKitDestinationMatchesTarget(address, targetAddress, chain) {
+    if (!targetAddress || !/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(targetAddress)) {
+        throw new Error(`SwapKit swap response did not include a valid targetAddress on ${chain} — refusing to trust tx.to.`);
+    }
+    if (address.toLowerCase() !== targetAddress.toLowerCase()) {
+        throw new Error(`SwapKit swap transaction destination (${address}) does not match the screened targetAddress (${targetAddress}) on ${chain} — refusing to build a signable transaction.`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Log-only (never throws) — retained only for legacy unattributed signing payloads.
  */
 export function logUnenforcedAggregatorDestination(provider, address) {
     console.info('[swap-router-telemetry] general-swap destination (not enforced, logged for future analysis):', {

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package/dist/swap/general/lifi/api/getLifiSwapQuote.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"getLifiSwapQuote.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../../../packages/core/chain/swap/general/lifi/api/getLifiSwapQuote.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,OAAO,EAEL,mBAAmB,EAGpB,MAAM,+CAA+C,CAAA;AACtD,OAAO,EAAmB,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,8DAA8D,CAAA;AAIpH,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAA;AAEzE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,8BAA8B,CAAA;AAC7D,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAA;AAMzD,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,GAAG;IAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC,GAAG;IACnG,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACd,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACrB;4EACwE;IACxE,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAA;IACzC;qDACiD;IACjD,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAClB,CAAA;AAED,qFAAqF;AACrF,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAA;AAgB7D,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAU,wFAMpC,KAAK,KAAG,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAoMlC,CAAA"}

package/dist/swap/general/lifi/api/getLifiSwapQuote.js

@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ import { lifiSwapChainId } from '@vultisig/core-chain/swap/general/lifi/LifiSwap
 import { shouldBePresent } from '@vultisig/lib-utils/assert/shouldBePresent';
 import { match } from '@vultisig/lib-utils/match';
 import { memoize } from '@vultisig/lib-utils/memoize';
-import { mirrorRecord } from '@vultisig/lib-utils/record/mirrorRecord';
-import { logUnenforcedAggregatorDestination } from '../../knownAggregatorRouters.js';
+import { assertKnownAggregatorRouter, assertLifiApprovalAddress } from '../../knownAggregatorRouters.js';
 import { injectSolanaAtaIfMissing } from './injectSolanaAtaIfMissing.js';
 import { MAX_COMBINED_COST_BPS, resolveLifiSlippage } from './lifiSlippage.js';
+import { resolveSwapFeeChain } from './lifiSwapFeeChain.js';
 /** @internal re-exported for unit tests only — source of truth is ./lifiSlippage. */
 export { isStablePair, STABLE_TICKERS } from './lifiSlippage.js';
 /** Lazy bootstrap for callers that never invoked the public `setupLifi`
@@ -25,32 +25,6 @@ const ensureLifiConfigured = memoize(() => {
 // ./lifiSlippage — the shared source of truth for the two tiers + combined-cost ceiling, so the RN
 // override resolves it identically. See that module for the full rationale (MPC ceremony drift, the
 // stable/volatile split, and the cross-chain bridge-slippage caveat).
-// Resolve a LiFi fee-token `chainId` back to a Vultisig `LifiSwapEnabledChain`.
-//
-// `mirrorRecord(lifiSwapChainId)` is a closed, build-time map of LI.FI source
-// chains (EVM chains Vultisig exposes + Solana). LI.FI's `feeCosts[].token`
-// is *not* guaranteed by the API contract to live on the source chain — for
-// cross-chain routes (e.g. EVM → Cosmos via Stargate, EVM → BTC via THORChain
-// relay) the fee can be denominated on an intermediate chain whose ID is not
-// a key in this map. `mirrorRecord(...)[unknownChainId]` then silently yields
-// `undefined`, producing `affiliateFee.chain = undefined`, which serializes
-// as an absent `swap_fee_chain` field alongside a non-empty `swap_fee` —
-// exactly the ambiguous state this PR set out to eliminate.
-//
-// Fall back to `transfer.from.chain` because LiFi's fixed fee is collected
-// from the user's source-chain wallet regardless of which bridge leg
-// denominates it internally, and the source chain is always a
-// `LifiSwapEnabledChain` (guaranteed by the `Input` type). Warn so any
-// future LiFi behavioural drift is visible in ops telemetry rather than
-// silently misattributed. (NeOMakinG #540 review blocking #1.)
-const resolveSwapFeeChain = (chainId, fallback) => {
-    const resolved = mirrorRecord(lifiSwapChainId)[chainId];
-    if (resolved === undefined) {
-        console.warn(`[getLifiSwapQuote] fee token chainId ${chainId} not in lifiSwapChainId; falling back to ${fallback}`);
-        return fallback;
-    }
-    return resolved;
-};
 export const getLifiSwapQuote = async ({ amount, affiliateBps, lifiAffiliateConfig, slippage: slippageOverride, ...transfer }) => {
     ensureLifiConfigured();
     const [fromChain, toChain] = [transfer.from, transfer.to].map(({ chain }) => lifiSwapChainId[chain]);
@@ -140,6 +114,13 @@ export const getLifiSwapQuote = async ({ amount, affiliateBps, lifiAffiliateConf
             },
         };
     }
+    const approvalAddr = estimate.approvalAddress;
+    if (chainKind === 'evm') {
+        assertKnownAggregatorRouter('li.fi', shouldBePresent(to), transfer.from.chain);
+        if (approvalAddr && approvalAddr !== '0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000') {
+            await assertLifiApprovalAddress(approvalAddr, transfer.from.chain);
+        }
+    }
     return {
         dstAmount: estimate.toAmount,
         provider: 'li.fi',
@@ -181,27 +162,13 @@ export const getLifiSwapQuote = async ({ amount, affiliateBps, lifiAffiliateConf
                 const swapFeeAssetId = swapFee &&
                     ([fromToken, toToken].find(token => token.toLowerCase() === swapFeeAddress) ||
                         chainFeeCoin[transfer.from.chain].id);
-                // LI.FI `estimate.approvalAddress` is the address that will call
-                // `transferFrom` on the input ERC-20. It can differ from `to` (the
-                // Diamond / router) when an inner executor (e.g. 1inch
-                // AggregationExecutor) pulls the token directly. The field is always
-                // present in the LiFi API response (`Estimate.approvalAddress: string`)
-                // but may be the zero address or equal to `to` for native-token routes.
-                // Pass it through so mcp-ts (and other consumers) can approve the
-                // correct spender instead of the Diamond.
-                //
-                // On-chain proof: tx 0xa3aadf17 (Ethereum, block 25415989) reverted
-                // with "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance". Vault had 9.41 USDC
-                // approved to Diamond (0x9025B8ff…, = `to`) — sufficient. Inner 1inch
-                // executor (0x7f51c134…, = `approvalAddress`) had zero allowance — the
-                // actual transferFrom caller → revert.
-                const approvalAddr = estimate.approvalAddress;
+                // LI.FI `estimate.approvalAddress` is the spender that will pull the
+                // user's input ERC-20. LI.FI documents it as route-dependent, so it can
+                // differ from the Diamond destination. Treat it as independently
+                // attacker-controlled: the official Diamond is the deterministic fast
+                // path, while a distinct spender must receive an independent benign
+                // Blockaid verdict before it is exposed to consumers.
                 const evmTo = shouldBePresent(to);
-                // AGG-02: LiFi routes through many different bridge/DEX contracts by design
-                // (diamond routing, multi-hop, chain-specific deployments) — a hard allowlist
-                // would false-block legitimate routes, so log (never throw). See
-                // knownAggregatorRouters.ts.
-                logUnenforcedAggregatorDestination('li.fi', evmTo);
                 return {
                     evm: {
                         from: shouldBePresent(from),