@voxgig/sdkgen 4.9.0 → 4.11.0

package/project/.sdk/tm/lua/feature/secrets/native/sekretonet.c

@@ -0,0 +1,806 @@
+-- VENDORED: @voxgig/sekreto sdk-20260908-1556-0 (lua/native/sekretonet.c)
+-- Source: https://github.com/voxgig/sekreto @ 1267ee2e5f49566bc92695bc9eb3a60ef4924998  [tag: sdk-20260908-1556-0]
+-- License: MIT (c) voxgig - see repository LICENSE. Do not edit: resync from upstream.
+/*
+ * sekreto-net: the transport this port does not have.
+ *
+ * Lua 5.4's whole standard library is basic, coroutine, package, string,
+ * utf8, table, math, io, os and debug. There are no sockets of any kind,
+ * no TLS, and `io.popen` is unidirectional and goes through a shell. So
+ * the two things a Lua program cannot do for itself are done here, in one
+ * file, compiled by lua/Makefile:
+ *
+ *   fetch  connect a TCP socket (optionally TLS), write the bytes the
+ *          caller framed, read the bytes back
+ *   exec   run a child with an argv ARRAY (never a shell), stdin closed,
+ *          stdout and stderr drained concurrently
+ *
+ * What is NOT here, deliberately: HTTP. The request line, the headers,
+ * chunked decoding and the 8 MiB cap are all framed in Lua
+ * (src/sekreto/http.lua). This program moves bytes. That keeps the
+ * dependency exactly as narrow as AGENTS.md rule 3 allows -
+ * cryptographic transport, and nothing else. In particular SHA-256 and
+ * HMAC are NOT taken from libcrypto: they are hand-rolled in
+ * src/sekreto/crypto.lua, the same decision the rust port took with
+ * `ring` already inside rustls's closure.
+ *
+ * Audit surface: `-lssl -lcrypto`, and the distribution's OpenSSL is the
+ * audit surface. Nothing else is linked beyond libc.
+ *
+ * The four obligations of a TLS binding, all of them met below, because a
+ * binding that connects without verifying is worse than no TLS:
+ *
+ *   1. chain     SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths + SSL_VERIFY_PEER, and
+ *                SSL_get_verify_result checked afterwards
+ *   2. hostname  SSL_set1_host for a DNS name, and
+ *                X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc for an IP literal - which
+ *                is a different call, and the half people forget
+ *   3. SNI       SSL_set_tlsext_host_name, and NOT for an IP literal
+ *                (RFC 6066 forbids it)
+ *   4. roots     SEKRETO_CA_BUNDLE, loaded IN ADDITION to the system
+ *                store, failing open and silently
+ *
+ * Invocation: sekreto-net <requestfile>
+ *
+ * The request arrives in a file rather than on the command line because
+ * a vault token rides in the headers and the process table is world
+ * readable. The caller creates it 0600; this program unlinks it before
+ * reading a byte of it.
+ *
+ * Wire format, in and out, is length-prefixed and binary safe:
+ *
+ *   request   <name> <len>\n<len bytes>\n   repeated
+ *   answer    OK <len>\n<len bytes>
+ *             ERR <len>\n<len bytes>
+ *             EXEC <status> <outlen> <errlen>\n<out><err>
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+
+#define MAXFIELD (16 * 1024 * 1024)
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ buffers */
+
+typedef struct {
+  char *data;
+  size_t len;
+  size_t cap;
+} buf;
+
+static void bufinit(buf *b) {
+  b->data = NULL;
+  b->len = 0;
+  b->cap = 0;
+}
+
+static int bufput(buf *b, const char *bytes, size_t n) {
+  if (b->len + n > b->cap) {
+    size_t want = b->cap ? b->cap : 4096;
+    char *grown;
+    while (want < b->len + n) {
+      want *= 2;
+    }
+    grown = realloc(b->data, want);
+    if (NULL == grown) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    b->data = grown;
+    b->cap = want;
+  }
+  memcpy(b->data + b->len, bytes, n);
+  b->len += n;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void buffree(buf *b) {
+  free(b->data);
+  bufinit(b);
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ answers */
+
+static void writeall(int fd, const char *bytes, size_t n) {
+  size_t at = 0;
+  while (at < n) {
+    ssize_t wrote = write(fd, bytes + at, n - at);
+    if (0 >= wrote) {
+      if (EINTR == errno) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    at += (size_t)wrote;
+  }
+}
+
+/* A transport failure. The caller turns this into
+ * `sekreto: cannot reach <url>: <message>`. */
+static void answererr(const char *message) {
+  char head[64];
+  int n = snprintf(head, sizeof head, "ERR %zu\n", strlen(message));
+  writeall(1, head, (size_t)n);
+  writeall(1, message, strlen(message));
+  exit(0);
+}
+
+static void answerok(const char *bytes, size_t n) {
+  char head[64];
+  int head_n = snprintf(head, sizeof head, "OK %zu\n", n);
+  writeall(1, head, (size_t)head_n);
+  writeall(1, bytes, n);
+  exit(0);
+}
+
+/* The newest OpenSSL diagnostic, so a verification failure says which. */
+static void answersslerr(const char *what) {
+  char message[512];
+  unsigned long code = ERR_peek_last_error();
+
+  if (0 == code) {
+    snprintf(message, sizeof message, "%s", what);
+  } else {
+    char detail[256];
+    ERR_error_string_n(code, detail, sizeof detail);
+    snprintf(message, sizeof message, "%s: %s", what, detail);
+  }
+
+  answererr(message);
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------ request fields */
+
+typedef struct {
+  char *name;
+  char *value;
+  size_t len;
+} field;
+
+static field *FIELDS = NULL;
+static size_t NFIELDS = 0;
+
+static const char *fieldof(const char *name, const char *fallback) {
+  size_t index;
+  for (index = 0; index < NFIELDS; index++) {
+    if (0 == strcmp(FIELDS[index].name, name)) {
+      return FIELDS[index].value;
+    }
+  }
+  return fallback;
+}
+
+static long numberof(const char *name, long fallback) {
+  const char *text = fieldof(name, NULL);
+  if (NULL == text) {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+  return strtol(text, NULL, 10);
+}
+
+/* Read the whole request file, then unlink it. */
+static void readrequest(const char *path) {
+  FILE *handle = fopen(path, "rb");
+  buf whole;
+  size_t at;
+
+  if (NULL == handle) {
+    answererr("cannot read the transport request");
+  }
+
+  /* Unlinked immediately: the file carries the vault token. */
+  unlink(path);
+
+  bufinit(&whole);
+
+  for (;;) {
+    char chunk[65536];
+    size_t got = fread(chunk, 1, sizeof chunk, handle);
+    if (0 == got) {
+      break;
+    }
+    if (!bufput(&whole, chunk, got)) {
+      answererr("out of memory reading the transport request");
+    }
+  }
+  fclose(handle);
+
+  /* Two NUL bytes past the end, not counted, so that the terminator
+   * written over each payload's trailing newline is always in bounds. */
+  if (!bufput(&whole, "\0\0", 2)) {
+    answererr("out of memory reading the transport request");
+  }
+  whole.len -= 2;
+
+  at = 0;
+  while (at < whole.len) {
+    char *head = whole.data + at;
+    char *nl = memchr(head, '\n', whole.len - at);
+    char *space;
+    long len;
+    field *grown;
+
+    if (NULL == nl) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    *nl = '\0';
+    space = strchr(head, ' ');
+    if (NULL == space) {
+      answererr("malformed transport request");
+    }
+    *space = '\0';
+
+    len = strtol(space + 1, NULL, 10);
+    if (0 > len || MAXFIELD < len) {
+      answererr("malformed transport request");
+    }
+
+    at = (size_t)(nl - whole.data) + 1;
+    if (at + (size_t)len > whole.len) {
+      answererr("truncated transport request");
+    }
+
+    grown = realloc(FIELDS, (NFIELDS + 1) * sizeof(field));
+    if (NULL == grown) {
+      answererr("out of memory reading the transport request");
+    }
+    FIELDS = grown;
+    FIELDS[NFIELDS].name = head;
+    FIELDS[NFIELDS].value = whole.data + at;
+    FIELDS[NFIELDS].len = (size_t)len;
+    NFIELDS++;
+
+    at += (size_t)len;
+    /* Skip the newline that terminates the payload. */
+    if (at < whole.len && '\n' == whole.data[at]) {
+      at++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Every value is NUL-terminated for the string fields; the payload
+   * fields are used with their explicit length. */
+  for (at = 0; at < NFIELDS; at++) {
+    FIELDS[at].value[FIELDS[at].len] = '\0';
+  }
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------- the clock */
+
+static long nowms(void) {
+  struct timeval tv;
+  gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+  return (long)tv.tv_sec * 1000L + (long)(tv.tv_usec / 1000);
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ connect */
+
+/*
+ * One deadline across ALL resolved addresses, not one per address.
+ * Giving each the full ten seconds makes the real bound ten seconds
+ * times however many addresses the name cares to return - which is not a
+ * bound at all when the name is the attacker's.
+ */
+static int dial(const char *host, const char *port, long deadline) {
+  struct addrinfo hints;
+  struct addrinfo *list = NULL;
+  struct addrinfo *entry;
+  int sock = -1;
+
+  memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+  hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+  hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+
+  if (0 != getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &list)) {
+    answererr("cannot resolve host");
+  }
+
+  for (entry = list; NULL != entry; entry = entry->ai_next) {
+    int flags;
+    int result;
+
+    if (0 >= deadline - nowms()) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    sock = socket(entry->ai_family, entry->ai_socktype, entry->ai_protocol);
+    if (0 > sock) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    flags = fcntl(sock, F_GETFL, 0);
+    fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK);
+
+    result = connect(sock, entry->ai_addr, entry->ai_addrlen);
+
+    if (0 != result && EINPROGRESS == errno) {
+      struct pollfd waiting;
+      long left = deadline - nowms();
+
+      waiting.fd = sock;
+      waiting.events = POLLOUT;
+      waiting.revents = 0;
+
+      if (0 < left && 0 < poll(&waiting, 1, (int)left)) {
+        int soerr = 0;
+        socklen_t soerrlen = sizeof soerr;
+        if (0 == getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &soerr, &soerrlen) &&
+            0 == soerr) {
+          result = 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (0 == result) {
+      fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, flags);
+      freeaddrinfo(list);
+      return sock;
+    }
+
+    close(sock);
+    sock = -1;
+  }
+
+  freeaddrinfo(list);
+  answererr("connection refused or timed out");
+  return -1;
+}
+
+/* Is this host an IP literal rather than a DNS name? Hostname
+ * verification and SNI both branch on the answer. */
+static int isipliteral(const char *host) {
+  unsigned char scratch[16];
+
+  if (1 == inet_pton(AF_INET, host, scratch)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (1 == inet_pton(AF_INET6, host, scratch)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------- fetch */
+
+static void dofetch(void) {
+  const char *host = fieldof("host", "");
+  const char *port = fieldof("port", "443");
+  const char *body = fieldof("data", "");
+  size_t bodylen = 0;
+  long usetls = numberof("tls", 0);
+  long timeout = numberof("timeout", 10000);
+  long maxbody = numberof("maxbody", 8 * 1024 * 1024);
+  long deadline = nowms() + timeout;
+  int sock;
+  buf answer;
+  size_t at;
+  SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  SSL *ssl = NULL;
+
+  {
+    size_t index;
+    for (index = 0; index < NFIELDS; index++) {
+      if (0 == strcmp(FIELDS[index].name, "data")) {
+        bodylen = FIELDS[index].len;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  sock = dial(host, port, deadline);
+
+  if (usetls) {
+    const char *bundle = getenv("SEKRETO_CA_BUNDLE");
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+    X509 *peer;
+
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
+    if (NULL == ctx) {
+      answererr("cannot create a TLS context");
+    }
+
+    /* (1) Chain verification against the system trust store. The NULL
+     * callback is what makes a verification error abort the handshake
+     * rather than be reported and ignored. */
+    if (1 != SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+      answersslerr("cannot load the system trust store");
+    }
+    SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
+    SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, TLS1_2_VERSION);
+
+    /* (4) SEKRETO_CA_BUNDLE, ADDITIVE: the default roots are already
+     * loaded above and stay loaded. A private CA is how most internal
+     * Vault deployments are set up, so a wrong path weakens nothing - it
+     * adds no roots and raises nothing. */
+    if (NULL != bundle && '\0' != bundle[0]) {
+      if (1 != SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, bundle, NULL)) {
+        ERR_clear_error();
+      }
+    }
+
+    ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+    if (NULL == ssl) {
+      answererr("cannot create a TLS connection");
+    }
+
+    param = SSL_get0_param(ssl);
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS);
+
+    /* (2) Hostname verification - a SEPARATE step from the chain, and a
+     * different call for an IP literal. SSL_set1_host does DNS-name
+     * matching and will NOT match an iPAddress SAN, so an address like
+     * https://127.0.0.1:8304 needs set1_ip_asc or it is not checked at
+     * all. */
+    if (isipliteral(host)) {
+      if (1 != X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(param, host)) {
+        answererr("cannot pin the peer address");
+      }
+    } else {
+      if (1 != SSL_set1_host(ssl, host)) {
+        answererr("cannot pin the peer hostname");
+      }
+      /* (3) SNI, for a name only: RFC 6066 forbids an IP literal here,
+       * and OpenSSL will send whatever it is handed. */
+      SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, host);
+    }
+
+    SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock);
+
+    if (1 != SSL_connect(ssl)) {
+      answersslerr("TLS handshake failed");
+    }
+
+    /* Belt and braces. SSL_VERIFY_PEER already aborts on a bad chain, but
+     * a build or a callback that did not is worse than no TLS, so the
+     * result is read back explicitly. */
+    if (X509_V_OK != SSL_get_verify_result(ssl)) {
+      answererr("TLS certificate verification failed");
+    }
+
+    peer = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(ssl);
+    if (NULL == peer) {
+      answererr("TLS peer sent no certificate");
+    }
+    X509_free(peer);
+  }
+
+  /* Write the framed request. */
+  at = 0;
+  while (at < bodylen) {
+    int wrote;
+    if (0 >= deadline - nowms()) {
+      answererr("timed out sending the request");
+    }
+    if (usetls) {
+      wrote = SSL_write(ssl, body + at, (int)(bodylen - at));
+    } else {
+      wrote = (int)write(sock, body + at, bodylen - at);
+    }
+    if (0 >= wrote) {
+      if (!usetls && EINTR == errno) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      answererr("connection lost while sending the request");
+    }
+    at += (size_t)wrote;
+  }
+
+  if (!usetls) {
+    shutdown(sock, SHUT_WR);
+  }
+
+  /* Read to EOF. The request always carries `Connection: close`, so the
+   * server closing is the end of the body. One byte over the cap is
+   * enough to know it was exceeded; the Lua side decides what that
+   * means. */
+  bufinit(&answer);
+
+  for (;;) {
+    char chunk[65536];
+    int got;
+    long left = deadline - nowms();
+    struct pollfd waiting;
+
+    if (0 >= left) {
+      answererr("timed out reading the response");
+    }
+
+    if (!usetls || 0 == SSL_pending(ssl)) {
+      waiting.fd = sock;
+      waiting.events = POLLIN;
+      waiting.revents = 0;
+      if (0 >= poll(&waiting, 1, (int)left)) {
+        answererr("timed out reading the response");
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (usetls) {
+      got = SSL_read(ssl, chunk, sizeof chunk);
+      if (0 >= got) {
+        int why = SSL_get_error(ssl, got);
+        if (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == why || SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == why) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+    } else {
+      got = (int)read(sock, chunk, sizeof chunk);
+      if (0 > got && EINTR == errno) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (0 >= got) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!bufput(&answer, chunk, (size_t)got)) {
+      answererr("out of memory reading the response");
+    }
+
+    if ((long)answer.len > maxbody) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (usetls) {
+    SSL_free(ssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  close(sock);
+
+  answerok(answer.data ? answer.data : "", answer.len);
+  buffree(&answer);
+}
+
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------- exec */
+
+/*
+ * A child, with an argv ARRAY and no shell anywhere. The two streams are
+ * drained CONCURRENTLY through one poll: reading stdout to EOF and only
+ * then reading stderr deadlocks permanently the moment the child writes
+ * more than one pipe buffer (64 KiB) to stderr, and secretspec's
+ * box-drawn diagnostics reach that size easily.
+ *
+ * The child's stdin is /dev/null rather than a pipe nobody writes to, so
+ * a CLI that reads it - one prompting for a passphrase when its
+ * environment variable is absent - sees EOF and gives up instead of
+ * waiting forever.
+ */
+static void doexec(void) {
+  char **argv;
+  size_t argc = 0;
+  size_t index;
+  int outpipe[2];
+  int errpipe[2];
+  int failpipe[2];
+  char failure[256];
+  ssize_t failed;
+  pid_t child;
+  buf out;
+  buf why;
+  int status = 0;
+  int alive = 2;
+  char head[128];
+  int head_n;
+
+  for (index = 0; index < NFIELDS; index++) {
+    if (0 == strcmp(FIELDS[index].name, "arg")) {
+      argc++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (0 == argc) {
+    answererr("no command given");
+  }
+
+  argv = calloc(argc + 1, sizeof(char *));
+  if (NULL == argv) {
+    answererr("out of memory");
+  }
+
+  argc = 0;
+  for (index = 0; index < NFIELDS; index++) {
+    if (0 == strcmp(FIELDS[index].name, "arg")) {
+      argv[argc++] = FIELDS[index].value;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* The child inherits THIS process's environment, which is the Lua
+   * process's environment, plus whatever `setenv` fields the caller sent.
+   * Lua cannot enumerate its own environment - `os.getenv` reads one name
+   * - so a caller-built environment would silently drop every variable
+   * the port did not think to name, and a child like boru reads several
+   * of its own. Inheriting and overriding is the only correct shape. */
+  for (index = 0; index < NFIELDS; index++) {
+    if (0 == strcmp(FIELDS[index].name, "setenv")) {
+      putenv(FIELDS[index].value);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (0 != pipe(outpipe) || 0 != pipe(errpipe) || 0 != pipe(failpipe)) {
+    answererr("cannot create a pipe");
+  }
+
+  /* The exec status pipe: close-on-exec, so a SUCCESSFUL exec closes it
+   * with nothing written and the parent reads EOF. Anything that does
+   * arrive is the reason exec failed. Guessing from an exit code cannot
+   * do this - a real child is free to exit 127 too. */
+  if (0 != fcntl(failpipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) {
+    answererr("cannot create a pipe");
+  }
+
+  child = fork();
+  if (0 > child) {
+    answererr("cannot fork");
+  }
+
+  if (0 == child) {
+    int devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+    if (0 <= devnull) {
+      dup2(devnull, 0);
+      close(devnull);
+    } else {
+      close(0);
+    }
+    dup2(outpipe[1], 1);
+    dup2(errpipe[1], 2);
+    close(outpipe[0]);
+    close(outpipe[1]);
+    close(errpipe[0]);
+    close(errpipe[1]);
+    close(failpipe[0]);
+    execvp(argv[0], argv);
+    {
+      /* execvpe only returns on failure. */
+      const char *reason = strerror(errno);
+      ssize_t ignored = write(failpipe[1], reason, strlen(reason));
+      (void)ignored;
+    }
+    _exit(127);
+  }
+
+  close(outpipe[1]);
+  close(errpipe[1]);
+  close(failpipe[1]);
+
+  failed = read(failpipe[0], failure, sizeof failure - 1);
+  close(failpipe[0]);
+
+  if (0 < failed) {
+    failure[failed] = '\0';
+    close(outpipe[0]);
+    close(errpipe[0]);
+    while (0 > waitpid(child, &status, 0)) {
+      if (EINTR != errno) {
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    {
+      char message[512];
+      snprintf(message, sizeof message, "EXECFAIL %s", failure);
+      answererr(message);
+    }
+  }
+
+  bufinit(&out);
+  bufinit(&why);
+
+  while (0 < alive) {
+    struct pollfd waiting[2];
+    int count = 0;
+    int at;
+
+    if (0 <= outpipe[0]) {
+      waiting[count].fd = outpipe[0];
+      waiting[count].events = POLLIN;
+      waiting[count].revents = 0;
+      count++;
+    }
+    if (0 <= errpipe[0]) {
+      waiting[count].fd = errpipe[0];
+      waiting[count].events = POLLIN;
+      waiting[count].revents = 0;
+      count++;
+    }
+
+    if (0 >= poll(waiting, (nfds_t)count, -1)) {
+      if (EINTR == errno) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    for (at = 0; at < count; at++) {
+      char chunk[65536];
+      ssize_t got;
+
+      if (0 == waiting[at].revents) {
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      got = read(waiting[at].fd, chunk, sizeof chunk);
+      if (0 < got) {
+        if (!bufput(waiting[at].fd == outpipe[0] ? &out : &why, chunk, (size_t)got)) {
+          answererr("out of memory reading the child");
+        }
+      } else if (0 > got && EINTR == errno) {
+        continue;
+      } else {
+        close(waiting[at].fd);
+        if (waiting[at].fd == outpipe[0]) {
+          outpipe[0] = -1;
+        } else {
+          errpipe[0] = -1;
+        }
+        alive--;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  while (0 > waitpid(child, &status, 0)) {
+    if (EINTR != errno) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  {
+    int code = 0;
+    if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+      code = WEXITSTATUS(status);
+    } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+      code = 128 + WTERMSIG(status);
+    }
+
+    /* 127 is "could not be executed": the caller turns it into
+     * `sekreto: cannot run <command>: ...` rather than a store error. */
+    head_n = snprintf(head, sizeof head, "EXEC %d %zu %zu\n", code, out.len, why.len);
+  }
+
+  writeall(1, head, (size_t)head_n);
+  writeall(1, out.data ? out.data : "", out.len);
+  writeall(1, why.data ? why.data : "", why.len);
+
+  buffree(&out);
+  buffree(&why);
+  exit(0);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+  const char *mode;
+
+  /* A child that exits while its pipe is still being written must not
+   * take this process down with it. */
+  signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+  if (2 > argc) {
+    answererr("no transport request given");
+  }
+
+  readrequest(argv[1]);
+
+  mode = fieldof("mode", "fetch");
+
+  if (0 == strcmp(mode, "exec")) {
+    doexec();
+  } else {
+    dofetch();
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}