@vorim/sdk 4.5.0 → 4.6.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -1219,6 +1219,74 @@ declare class VorimSDK {
1219
1219
  * Returns a platform-sealed verdict to keep.
1220
1220
  */
1221
1221
  gatewayCheck(input: GatewayCheckInput): Promise<any>;
1222
+ /**
1223
+ * AI incidents and near misses (4.6): kill-switch stops, tripwires that
1224
+ * refused, and sign-off packs that got worse, each with Vorim's suggested
1225
+ * classification and the firm's own assessment where recorded.
1226
+ */
1227
+ listIncidents(params?: {
1228
+ days?: number;
1229
+ }): Promise<any[]>;
1230
+ /** One signed incident record, laid out as the FCA's PS26/2 standard template (`payload.ps26_2`). */
1231
+ getIncident(ref: string): Promise<any>;
1232
+ /**
1233
+ * Record the firm's assessment of an incident. `causeType` must be one of
1234
+ * the PS26/2 template's cause types; closing it stamps the resolution time.
1235
+ * Whether it is reportable is the firm's decision.
1236
+ */
1237
+ updateIncident(ref: string, input: {
1238
+ status?: 'open' | 'resolved' | 'closed';
1239
+ classification?: 'incident' | 'near_miss' | 'not_an_incident' | null;
1240
+ reportable?: boolean | null;
1241
+ triggers?: Array<'consumer_harm' | 'market_integrity' | 'safety_soundness'>;
1242
+ incidentType?: 'disruption' | 'data_loss' | 'none' | null;
1243
+ severity?: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | null;
1244
+ title?: string | null;
1245
+ description?: string | null;
1246
+ actionsPlanned?: string | null;
1247
+ actionsTaken?: string | null;
1248
+ resolvedAt?: string | null;
1249
+ causeType?: string | null;
1250
+ origin?: 'internal' | 'external' | 'third_party' | 'unknown' | 'other' | null;
1251
+ thirdPartyName?: string | null;
1252
+ }): Promise<any>;
1253
+ /** A signed statement of delegated authority for one agent: identity, authority, accountability, execution, and the gaps a reviewer will ask about. */
1254
+ getAuthorityStatement(agentId: string): Promise<any>;
1255
+ /**
1256
+ * Import a Mastercard Verifiable Intent autonomous mandate (L1 issuer
1257
+ * credential + L2 customer mandate, payment side) as a pending Vorim
1258
+ * mandate. The customer key in L1 still signs `signing_input` to activate it.
1259
+ * Limits Vorim cannot enforce are refused by name (422).
1260
+ */
1261
+ importVerifiableIntent(input: {
1262
+ l1: string;
1263
+ l2: string;
1264
+ issuerJwk: Record<string, unknown>;
1265
+ agentId: string;
1266
+ customerRef: string;
1267
+ actionTypes?: string[];
1268
+ expectedAud?: string;
1269
+ }): Promise<any>;
1270
+ /**
1271
+ * Verify a Visa Trusted Agent Protocol message signature on a request your
1272
+ * site received: the signature over "@authority" and "@path", the 8-minute
1273
+ * window, the tag (`agent-browser-auth` or `agent-payer-auth`) and a nonce
1274
+ * used once. Keys come from the key directory configured on the server, or
1275
+ * pass `keys`. Needs an API key with runtime:decide.
1276
+ */
1277
+ verifyTap(input: {
1278
+ url: string;
1279
+ headers: Record<string, string>;
1280
+ keys?: Record<string, unknown>[];
1281
+ requireTag?: 'agent-browser-auth' | 'agent-payer-auth';
1282
+ }): Promise<{
1283
+ ok: boolean;
1284
+ reasons: string[];
1285
+ tag: string | null;
1286
+ keyid: string | null;
1287
+ alg: string | null;
1288
+ nonce: string | null;
1289
+ }>;
1222
1290
  /** Check any sealed Vorim document (case pack, sign-off, gateway verdict, mandate record). Public endpoint. */
1223
1291
  verifyEvidence(doc: {
1224
1292
  payload: unknown;
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -1219,6 +1219,74 @@ declare class VorimSDK {
1219
1219
  * Returns a platform-sealed verdict to keep.
1220
1220
  */
1221
1221
  gatewayCheck(input: GatewayCheckInput): Promise<any>;
1222
+ /**
1223
+ * AI incidents and near misses (4.6): kill-switch stops, tripwires that
1224
+ * refused, and sign-off packs that got worse, each with Vorim's suggested
1225
+ * classification and the firm's own assessment where recorded.
1226
+ */
1227
+ listIncidents(params?: {
1228
+ days?: number;
1229
+ }): Promise<any[]>;
1230
+ /** One signed incident record, laid out as the FCA's PS26/2 standard template (`payload.ps26_2`). */
1231
+ getIncident(ref: string): Promise<any>;
1232
+ /**
1233
+ * Record the firm's assessment of an incident. `causeType` must be one of
1234
+ * the PS26/2 template's cause types; closing it stamps the resolution time.
1235
+ * Whether it is reportable is the firm's decision.
1236
+ */
1237
+ updateIncident(ref: string, input: {
1238
+ status?: 'open' | 'resolved' | 'closed';
1239
+ classification?: 'incident' | 'near_miss' | 'not_an_incident' | null;
1240
+ reportable?: boolean | null;
1241
+ triggers?: Array<'consumer_harm' | 'market_integrity' | 'safety_soundness'>;
1242
+ incidentType?: 'disruption' | 'data_loss' | 'none' | null;
1243
+ severity?: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | null;
1244
+ title?: string | null;
1245
+ description?: string | null;
1246
+ actionsPlanned?: string | null;
1247
+ actionsTaken?: string | null;
1248
+ resolvedAt?: string | null;
1249
+ causeType?: string | null;
1250
+ origin?: 'internal' | 'external' | 'third_party' | 'unknown' | 'other' | null;
1251
+ thirdPartyName?: string | null;
1252
+ }): Promise<any>;
1253
+ /** A signed statement of delegated authority for one agent: identity, authority, accountability, execution, and the gaps a reviewer will ask about. */
1254
+ getAuthorityStatement(agentId: string): Promise<any>;
1255
+ /**
1256
+ * Import a Mastercard Verifiable Intent autonomous mandate (L1 issuer
1257
+ * credential + L2 customer mandate, payment side) as a pending Vorim
1258
+ * mandate. The customer key in L1 still signs `signing_input` to activate it.
1259
+ * Limits Vorim cannot enforce are refused by name (422).
1260
+ */
1261
+ importVerifiableIntent(input: {
1262
+ l1: string;
1263
+ l2: string;
1264
+ issuerJwk: Record<string, unknown>;
1265
+ agentId: string;
1266
+ customerRef: string;
1267
+ actionTypes?: string[];
1268
+ expectedAud?: string;
1269
+ }): Promise<any>;
1270
+ /**
1271
+ * Verify a Visa Trusted Agent Protocol message signature on a request your
1272
+ * site received: the signature over "@authority" and "@path", the 8-minute
1273
+ * window, the tag (`agent-browser-auth` or `agent-payer-auth`) and a nonce
1274
+ * used once. Keys come from the key directory configured on the server, or
1275
+ * pass `keys`. Needs an API key with runtime:decide.
1276
+ */
1277
+ verifyTap(input: {
1278
+ url: string;
1279
+ headers: Record<string, string>;
1280
+ keys?: Record<string, unknown>[];
1281
+ requireTag?: 'agent-browser-auth' | 'agent-payer-auth';
1282
+ }): Promise<{
1283
+ ok: boolean;
1284
+ reasons: string[];
1285
+ tag: string | null;
1286
+ keyid: string | null;
1287
+ alg: string | null;
1288
+ nonce: string | null;
1289
+ }>;
1222
1290
  /** Check any sealed Vorim document (case pack, sign-off, gateway verdict, mandate record). Public endpoint. */
1223
1291
  verifyEvidence(doc: {
1224
1292
  payload: unknown;
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ function canonicalIntent(value) {
875
875
  const keys = Object.keys(obj).filter((k) => obj[k] !== void 0).sort();
876
876
  return `{${keys.map((k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${canonicalIntent(obj[k])}`).join(",")}}`;
877
877
  }
878
- var SDK_VERSION = true ? "4.5.0" : "0.0.0";
878
+ var SDK_VERSION = true ? "4.6.0" : "0.0.0";
879
879
  var USER_AGENT = `vorim-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
880
880
  function sleep(ms) {
881
881
  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
@@ -2244,6 +2244,60 @@ var VorimSDK = class _VorimSDK {
2244
2244
  max_age_seconds: input.maxAgeSeconds
2245
2245
  });
2246
2246
  }
2247
+ /**
2248
+ * AI incidents and near misses (4.6): kill-switch stops, tripwires that
2249
+ * refused, and sign-off packs that got worse, each with Vorim's suggested
2250
+ * classification and the firm's own assessment where recorded.
2251
+ */
2252
+ async listIncidents(params = {}) {
2253
+ return this.get(`/evidence/incidents${params.days ? `?days=${encodeURIComponent(String(params.days))}` : ""}`);
2254
+ }
2255
+ /** One signed incident record, laid out as the FCA's PS26/2 standard template (`payload.ps26_2`). */
2256
+ async getIncident(ref) {
2257
+ return this.get(`/evidence/incidents/${encodeURIComponent(ref)}`);
2258
+ }
2259
+ /**
2260
+ * Record the firm's assessment of an incident. `causeType` must be one of
2261
+ * the PS26/2 template's cause types; closing it stamps the resolution time.
2262
+ * Whether it is reportable is the firm's decision.
2263
+ */
2264
+ async updateIncident(ref, input) {
2265
+ const map = { incidentType: "incident_type", actionsPlanned: "actions_planned", actionsTaken: "actions_taken", resolvedAt: "resolved_at", causeType: "cause_type", thirdPartyName: "third_party_name" };
2266
+ const body = {};
2267
+ for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(input)) if (v !== void 0) body[map[k] ?? k] = v;
2268
+ return this.patch(`/evidence/incidents/${encodeURIComponent(ref)}`, body);
2269
+ }
2270
+ /** A signed statement of delegated authority for one agent: identity, authority, accountability, execution, and the gaps a reviewer will ask about. */
2271
+ async getAuthorityStatement(agentId) {
2272
+ return this.get(`/evidence/authority/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}`);
2273
+ }
2274
+ /**
2275
+ * Import a Mastercard Verifiable Intent autonomous mandate (L1 issuer
2276
+ * credential + L2 customer mandate, payment side) as a pending Vorim
2277
+ * mandate. The customer key in L1 still signs `signing_input` to activate it.
2278
+ * Limits Vorim cannot enforce are refused by name (422).
2279
+ */
2280
+ async importVerifiableIntent(input) {
2281
+ return this.post("/mandates/import-verifiable-intent", {
2282
+ l1: input.l1,
2283
+ l2: input.l2,
2284
+ issuer_jwk: input.issuerJwk,
2285
+ agent_id: input.agentId,
2286
+ customer_ref: input.customerRef,
2287
+ action_types: input.actionTypes,
2288
+ expected_aud: input.expectedAud
2289
+ });
2290
+ }
2291
+ /**
2292
+ * Verify a Visa Trusted Agent Protocol message signature on a request your
2293
+ * site received: the signature over "@authority" and "@path", the 8-minute
2294
+ * window, the tag (`agent-browser-auth` or `agent-payer-auth`) and a nonce
2295
+ * used once. Keys come from the key directory configured on the server, or
2296
+ * pass `keys`. Needs an API key with runtime:decide.
2297
+ */
2298
+ async verifyTap(input) {
2299
+ return this.post("/gateway/tap/verify", { url: input.url, headers: input.headers, keys: input.keys, require_tag: input.requireTag });
2300
+ }
2247
2301
  /** Check any sealed Vorim document (case pack, sign-off, gateway verdict, mandate record). Public endpoint. */
2248
2302
  async verifyEvidence(doc) {
2249
2303
  return this.post("/evidence/verify", { payload: doc.payload, hash: doc.hash, signature: doc.signature });