@vorim/sdk 4.3.0 → 4.5.0

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Files changed (120) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +23 -0
  2. package/dist/{_commerce-core-BQbISpWe.d.cts → _commerce-core-QF7IKCKQ.d.cts} +1 -1
  3. package/dist/{_commerce-core-BIqTJ7Om.d.ts → _commerce-core-jih7k4hQ.d.ts} +1 -1
  4. package/dist/index.cjs +218 -3
  5. package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
  6. package/dist/index.d.cts +162 -3
  7. package/dist/index.d.ts +162 -3
  8. package/dist/index.js +217 -3
  9. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/integrations/amazon.d.cts +2 -2
  11. package/dist/integrations/amazon.d.ts +2 -2
  12. package/dist/integrations/anthropic.d.cts +1 -1
  13. package/dist/integrations/anthropic.d.ts +1 -1
  14. package/dist/integrations/ap2.d.cts +1 -1
  15. package/dist/integrations/ap2.d.ts +1 -1
  16. package/dist/integrations/aws-iam.d.cts +1 -1
  17. package/dist/integrations/aws-iam.d.ts +1 -1
  18. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.d.cts +1 -1
  19. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.d.ts +1 -1
  20. package/dist/integrations/circle.d.cts +1 -1
  21. package/dist/integrations/circle.d.ts +1 -1
  22. package/dist/integrations/cloudflare.d.cts +1 -1
  23. package/dist/integrations/cloudflare.d.ts +1 -1
  24. package/dist/integrations/coinbase-cdp.d.cts +1 -1
  25. package/dist/integrations/coinbase-cdp.d.ts +1 -1
  26. package/dist/integrations/commerce-agents.d.cts +1 -1
  27. package/dist/integrations/commerce-agents.d.ts +1 -1
  28. package/dist/integrations/crewai.d.cts +1 -1
  29. package/dist/integrations/crewai.d.ts +1 -1
  30. package/dist/integrations/delivery.d.cts +2 -2
  31. package/dist/integrations/delivery.d.ts +2 -2
  32. package/dist/integrations/ebay.d.cts +2 -2
  33. package/dist/integrations/ebay.d.ts +2 -2
  34. package/dist/integrations/entra.d.cts +1 -1
  35. package/dist/integrations/entra.d.ts +1 -1
  36. package/dist/integrations/etsy.d.cts +2 -2
  37. package/dist/integrations/etsy.d.ts +2 -2
  38. package/dist/integrations/eu-providers.d.cts +1 -1
  39. package/dist/integrations/eu-providers.d.ts +1 -1
  40. package/dist/integrations/fhir.d.cts +1 -1
  41. package/dist/integrations/fhir.d.ts +1 -1
  42. package/dist/integrations/google-merchant.d.cts +2 -2
  43. package/dist/integrations/google-merchant.d.ts +2 -2
  44. package/dist/integrations/grok.d.cts +1 -1
  45. package/dist/integrations/grok.d.ts +1 -1
  46. package/dist/integrations/guidewire.d.cts +1 -1
  47. package/dist/integrations/guidewire.d.ts +1 -1
  48. package/dist/integrations/hermes.d.cts +1 -1
  49. package/dist/integrations/hermes.d.ts +1 -1
  50. package/dist/integrations/jira.d.cts +1 -1
  51. package/dist/integrations/jira.d.ts +1 -1
  52. package/dist/integrations/langchain.d.cts +1 -1
  53. package/dist/integrations/langchain.d.ts +1 -1
  54. package/dist/integrations/langgraph.d.cts +1 -1
  55. package/dist/integrations/langgraph.d.ts +1 -1
  56. package/dist/integrations/legal.d.cts +1 -1
  57. package/dist/integrations/legal.d.ts +1 -1
  58. package/dist/integrations/life-sciences.d.cts +1 -1
  59. package/dist/integrations/life-sciences.d.ts +1 -1
  60. package/dist/integrations/linear.d.cts +1 -1
  61. package/dist/integrations/linear.d.ts +1 -1
  62. package/dist/integrations/lithic.d.cts +1 -1
  63. package/dist/integrations/lithic.d.ts +1 -1
  64. package/dist/integrations/llamaindex.d.cts +1 -1
  65. package/dist/integrations/llamaindex.d.ts +1 -1
  66. package/dist/integrations/marqeta.d.cts +1 -1
  67. package/dist/integrations/marqeta.d.ts +1 -1
  68. package/dist/integrations/meta.d.cts +2 -2
  69. package/dist/integrations/meta.d.ts +2 -2
  70. package/dist/integrations/mistral.d.cts +1 -1
  71. package/dist/integrations/mistral.d.ts +1 -1
  72. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.d.cts +1 -1
  73. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.d.ts +1 -1
  74. package/dist/integrations/muse.d.cts +1 -1
  75. package/dist/integrations/muse.d.ts +1 -1
  76. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.d.cts +1 -1
  77. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.d.ts +1 -1
  78. package/dist/integrations/okta.d.cts +1 -1
  79. package/dist/integrations/okta.d.ts +1 -1
  80. package/dist/integrations/openai.d.cts +1 -1
  81. package/dist/integrations/openai.d.ts +1 -1
  82. package/dist/integrations/openrouter.d.cts +1 -1
  83. package/dist/integrations/openrouter.d.ts +1 -1
  84. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.d.cts +1 -1
  85. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.d.ts +1 -1
  86. package/dist/integrations/perplexity.d.cts +1 -1
  87. package/dist/integrations/perplexity.d.ts +1 -1
  88. package/dist/integrations/plaid.d.cts +1 -1
  89. package/dist/integrations/plaid.d.ts +1 -1
  90. package/dist/integrations/ramp.d.cts +1 -1
  91. package/dist/integrations/ramp.d.ts +1 -1
  92. package/dist/integrations/shopify.d.cts +1 -1
  93. package/dist/integrations/shopify.d.ts +1 -1
  94. package/dist/integrations/siem.d.cts +1 -1
  95. package/dist/integrations/siem.d.ts +1 -1
  96. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.d.cts +1 -1
  97. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.d.ts +1 -1
  98. package/dist/integrations/social-ads.d.cts +2 -2
  99. package/dist/integrations/social-ads.d.ts +2 -2
  100. package/dist/integrations/stripe-acp.d.cts +1 -1
  101. package/dist/integrations/stripe-acp.d.ts +1 -1
  102. package/dist/integrations/stripe-issuing.d.cts +1 -1
  103. package/dist/integrations/stripe-issuing.d.ts +1 -1
  104. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.d.cts +2 -2
  105. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.d.ts +2 -2
  106. package/dist/integrations/truanon.d.cts +1 -1
  107. package/dist/integrations/truanon.d.ts +1 -1
  108. package/dist/integrations/typesafe.d.cts +1 -1
  109. package/dist/integrations/typesafe.d.ts +1 -1
  110. package/dist/integrations/ucp.d.cts +1 -1
  111. package/dist/integrations/ucp.d.ts +1 -1
  112. package/dist/integrations/vercel-ai.d.cts +1 -1
  113. package/dist/integrations/vercel-ai.d.ts +1 -1
  114. package/dist/integrations/walmart.d.cts +2 -2
  115. package/dist/integrations/walmart.d.ts +2 -2
  116. package/dist/integrations/x402.d.cts +1 -1
  117. package/dist/integrations/x402.d.ts +1 -1
  118. package/dist/{types-DwPEBj7p.d.cts → types-3hhqtL0W.d.cts} +110 -2
  119. package/dist/{types-DwPEBj7p.d.ts → types-3hhqtL0W.d.ts} +110 -2
  120. package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
- import { A as AgentRegistrationResult, R as RuntimeDecision, a as AgentRegistrationInput, T as TrustRecord, b as Agent, S as SuspendPreview, P as PermissionScope, c as PermissionCheckResult, D as DelegationLinkClaims, d as AgentDelegationRecord, W as WorkflowProvenanceGraph, C as CapabilityProfile, e as SharedMemoryWriteInput, f as SharedMemoryEntry, g as SharedMemoryListResult, B as BeforeActionInput, h as TokenBudgetInput, i as TokenBudget, j as BudgetSpend, k as AuditEventInput, l as SwarmView, m as DeclareIntentInput, I as Intent } from './types-DwPEBj7p.cjs';
2
- export { n as AgentStatus, o as ApprovalAttestation, p as AuditEventType, q as AuditResult, r as BudgetEnforcement, s as BudgetScope, t as DecisionVerdict, u as WorkflowGraphEdge, v as WorkflowGraphEvent, w as WorkflowGraphNode } from './types-DwPEBj7p.cjs';
1
+ import { A as AgentRegistrationResult, R as RuntimeDecision, a as AgentRegistrationInput, T as TrustRecord, b as Agent, S as SuspendPreview, P as PermissionScope, c as PermissionCheckResult, D as DelegationLinkClaims, d as AgentDelegationRecord, W as WorkflowProvenanceGraph, C as CapabilityProfile, e as SharedMemoryWriteInput, f as SharedMemoryEntry, g as SharedMemoryListResult, B as BeforeActionInput, h as TokenBudgetInput, i as TokenBudget, j as BudgetSpend, k as AuditEventInput, l as SwarmView, m as DeclareIntentInput, I as Intent, n as CreateMandateInput, o as CustomerSignature, G as GatewayCheckInput } from './types-3hhqtL0W.cjs';
2
+ export { p as AgentStatus, q as ApprovalAttestation, r as AuditEventType, s as AuditResult, t as BudgetEnforcement, u as BudgetScope, v as DecisionVerdict, M as MandateTerms, w as WorkflowGraphEdge, x as WorkflowGraphEvent, y as WorkflowGraphNode } from './types-3hhqtL0W.cjs';
3
3
  import { PortableSignedReceipt } from '@vorim/shared-types';
4
4
  export { PortableSignedReceipt, portableReceiptCanonicalBytes } from '@vorim/shared-types';
5
5
  import { HttpRequestLike, SignHttpRequestOptions, SignHttpRequestResult } from './httpSignatures.cjs';
@@ -1068,11 +1068,167 @@ declare class VorimSDK {
1068
1068
  * await vorim.completeIntent(intent.intent_id, 'completed', 'Refunded 79.00');
1069
1069
  */
1070
1070
  declareIntent(input: DeclareIntentInput): Promise<Intent>;
1071
+ /**
1072
+ * Record whether an intent achieved what it set out to do. Once only: a
1073
+ * second call is refused with 409 OUTCOME_RECORDED. With an API key it is
1074
+ * recorded as the agent's own assessment; a person reviewing in the
1075
+ * dashboard is recorded as the operator.
1076
+ */
1077
+ recordIntentOutcome(intentId: string, result: 'met' | 'partly_met' | 'not_met', note?: string): Promise<any>;
1078
+ /** Outcome summary for the last `days` (default 30) plus the reviews that are due. */
1079
+ getIntentOutcomes(params?: {
1080
+ days?: number;
1081
+ }): Promise<any>;
1071
1082
  /** A platform-signed ledger of intents over a period, for a counterparty to verify offline. */
1072
1083
  getIntentLedger(params?: {
1073
1084
  agentId?: string;
1074
1085
  days?: number;
1075
1086
  }): Promise<any>;
1087
+ /**
1088
+ * Create a pending customer mandate. Returns `signing_input`: the exact text
1089
+ * the customer's device must sign (ES256 raw r||s or DER, base64url) before
1090
+ * `activateMandate`. The private key stays on the customer's device.
1091
+ *
1092
+ * @example
1093
+ * const { mandate, signing_input } = await vorim.createMandate({
1094
+ * agentId, customerRef: 'cust_7731', alg: 'ES256', publicKeyJwk: phoneJwk,
1095
+ * terms: { actionTypes: ['initiate_payment'], maxAmount: 5000, currency: 'GBP', maxTotal: 20000 },
1096
+ * expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 86400e3).toISOString(),
1097
+ * });
1098
+ * // ... the customer's app signs signing_input ...
1099
+ * await vorim.activateMandate(mandate.mandate_id, signatureFromPhone);
1100
+ * await vorim.beforeAction({ agentId, actionType: 'initiate_payment', payload: { amount: 4000, currency: 'GBP' }, mandateId: mandate.mandate_id });
1101
+ */
1102
+ createMandate(input: CreateMandateInput): Promise<{
1103
+ mandate: any;
1104
+ signing_input: string;
1105
+ }>;
1106
+ /**
1107
+ * The mandate as an AP2 (Agent Payments Protocol v0.2) open Payment Mandate:
1108
+ * an SD-JWT signed by Vorim, `vct: "mandate.payment.open.1"`, with the
1109
+ * limits as AP2 constraints. `not_expressed_in_ap2` lists anything AP2
1110
+ * cannot carry.
1111
+ */
1112
+ exportMandateAp2(mandateId: string): Promise<{
1113
+ sd_jwt: string;
1114
+ payload: any;
1115
+ not_expressed_in_ap2: string[];
1116
+ verify_with: any;
1117
+ }>;
1118
+ /**
1119
+ * Import an AP2 open Payment Mandate (SD-JWT, disclosures applied) as a
1120
+ * pending Vorim mandate. The issuer signature must verify against
1121
+ * `issuerJwk`; constraints Vorim cannot enforce are refused. The
1122
+ * customer's key (`cnf.jwk`) still signs `signing_input` to activate it.
1123
+ */
1124
+ importAp2Mandate(input: {
1125
+ sdJwt: string;
1126
+ issuerJwk: Record<string, unknown>;
1127
+ agentId: string;
1128
+ customerRef: string;
1129
+ actionTypes?: string[];
1130
+ }): Promise<any>;
1131
+ /** A one-time challenge (10 minutes) for a hardware key attestation on `createMandate`. */
1132
+ getAttestationChallenge(): Promise<{
1133
+ challenge: string;
1134
+ expires_at: string;
1135
+ }>;
1136
+ /** Activate a mandate with the customer's signature over its `signing_input`. Returns the countersigned record. */
1137
+ activateMandate(mandateId: string, signature: CustomerSignature): Promise<any>;
1138
+ /** The firm revokes a mandate; every later action under it is refused. */
1139
+ revokeMandate(mandateId: string, reason?: string): Promise<any>;
1140
+ getMandate(mandateId: string): Promise<any>;
1141
+ listMandates(params?: {
1142
+ agentId?: string;
1143
+ customerRef?: string;
1144
+ limit?: number;
1145
+ }): Promise<any[]>;
1146
+ /** The countersigned record, every decision taken under the mandate, and a verification result. */
1147
+ getMandateEvidence(mandateId: string): Promise<any>;
1148
+ /**
1149
+ * The customer withdraws a mandate with their own key; no Vorim account
1150
+ * is involved. Sign `mandateWithdrawalLine(mandateId, signedAt)` on the
1151
+ * device (signedAt within 5 minutes of now) and pass the signature here.
1152
+ */
1153
+ withdrawMandate(mandateId: string, signedAt: string, signature: CustomerSignature): Promise<any>;
1154
+ /** Case references seen in the last `days` (default 90). */
1155
+ listCases(params?: {
1156
+ days?: number;
1157
+ }): Promise<any[]>;
1158
+ /** A platform-signed case pack for one case reference: decisions, approvals, intents, outcomes, mandates. */
1159
+ getCasePack(caseRef: string): Promise<any>;
1160
+ /**
1161
+ * Keep a case pack, stamped by an RFC 3161 Time Stamping Authority unless
1162
+ * `timestamp: false`. If the TSA cannot be reached the pack is still kept
1163
+ * and `timestamp.ok` is false with the error.
1164
+ */
1165
+ storeCasePack(caseRef: string, input?: {
1166
+ timestamp?: boolean;
1167
+ }): Promise<any>;
1168
+ listStoredCasePacks(caseRef: string): Promise<any[]>;
1169
+ /** A kept case pack with its timestamp token and the openssl command to verify it. */
1170
+ getStoredCasePack(id: string): Promise<any>;
1171
+ /**
1172
+ * Record what later happened to an action: `complaint`, `chargeback`,
1173
+ * `fraud_confirmed`, `refund_reversed` or `no_issue`. The savings report
1174
+ * uses these to show which bad outcomes a shadow rule would have caught.
1175
+ */
1176
+ recordActionOutcome(input: {
1177
+ decisionId: string;
1178
+ kind: 'complaint' | 'chargeback' | 'fraud_confirmed' | 'refund_reversed' | 'no_issue';
1179
+ amount?: number;
1180
+ currency?: string;
1181
+ occurredAt?: string;
1182
+ note?: string;
1183
+ }): Promise<any>;
1184
+ /** What rules did and shadow rules would have done, costed at your own review assumptions. */
1185
+ getSavingsReport(params?: {
1186
+ days?: number;
1187
+ reviewMinutes?: number;
1188
+ hourlyCost?: number;
1189
+ currency?: string;
1190
+ agentId?: string;
1191
+ }): Promise<any>;
1192
+ /** Consumer Duty outcomes by product, vulnerability and FG21/1 driver. */
1193
+ getConsumerDutyReport(params?: {
1194
+ days?: number;
1195
+ }): Promise<any>;
1196
+ /** Record what a good (and poor) outcome looks like for a product. */
1197
+ setOutcomeDefinition(input: {
1198
+ product: string;
1199
+ good: string;
1200
+ poor?: string;
1201
+ measure?: string;
1202
+ }): Promise<any>;
1203
+ /**
1204
+ * Run a sign-off pack for one agent: scenarios through the real gate in
1205
+ * shadow, answers to the risk committee's questions, signed and stored.
1206
+ */
1207
+ runSignoff(agentId: string, input?: {
1208
+ preset?: 'hazards' | 'fintech' | 'refunds' | 'collections' | 'credit' | 'aml';
1209
+ scenarios?: any[];
1210
+ label?: string;
1211
+ }): Promise<any>;
1212
+ listSignoffs(agentId: string): Promise<any[]>;
1213
+ getSignoff(id: string): Promise<any>;
1214
+ /** What changed between a sign-off pack and the one before it (or `againstId`): verdict, settings, scenarios, answers, permissions. */
1215
+ getSignoffDiff(id: string, againstId?: string): Promise<any>;
1216
+ /**
1217
+ * For a bank's API edge: is this request signed by the agent, is the agent
1218
+ * still allowed to act, and is it inside a mandate for this customer?
1219
+ * Returns a platform-sealed verdict to keep.
1220
+ */
1221
+ gatewayCheck(input: GatewayCheckInput): Promise<any>;
1222
+ /** Check any sealed Vorim document (case pack, sign-off, gateway verdict, mandate record). Public endpoint. */
1223
+ verifyEvidence(doc: {
1224
+ payload: unknown;
1225
+ hash: string;
1226
+ signature: string;
1227
+ }): Promise<{
1228
+ type: string;
1229
+ ok: boolean;
1230
+ reason: string | null;
1231
+ }>;
1076
1232
  /** Close an intent when the job ends. Further actions under it are off intent. */
1077
1233
  completeIntent(intentId: string, status?: 'completed' | 'abandoned', outcome?: string): Promise<any>;
1078
1234
  /** Intents for the org, newest first; filter by agent or status. */
@@ -1340,4 +1496,7 @@ interface DeviceLoginResult {
1340
1496
  */
1341
1497
  declare function deviceLogin(opts: DeviceLoginOptions): Promise<DeviceLoginResult>;
1342
1498
 
1343
- export { Agent, AgentDelegationRecord, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult, AuditEventInput, BeforeActionInput, BudgetSpend, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION, type CatalogueTool, type CommitmentKey, DeclareIntentInput, DelegationLinkClaims, type DeviceLoginOptions, type DeviceLoginResult, HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX, HttpRequestLike, type HttpSignatureVerification, Intent, PermissionCheckResult, PermissionScope, type ReplayContext, type ReplayInputs, RuntimeDecision, SHA256_PREFIX, SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryListResult, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SignHttpRequestOptions, SignHttpRequestResult, SuspendPreview, SwarmView, TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, TrustRecord, type VorimConfig, VorimDeniedError, VorimError, VorimSDK, WorkflowProvenanceGraph, canonicalIntent, canonicalPayloadV0, canonicalPayloadV1, commitPayload, createVorim as default, deviceLogin, eventDigest, foldTraceparent, hashPayload, hashPreviousEvent, hashSystemPrompt, hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, isDigest, isKeyedCommitment, jcsCanonicalise, prepareReplayContext };
1499
+ /** The exact line a customer signs to withdraw a mandate (signedAt: ISO, within 5 minutes of sending). */
1500
+ declare function mandateWithdrawalLine(mandateId: string, signedAt: string): string;
1501
+
1502
+ export { Agent, AgentDelegationRecord, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult, AuditEventInput, BeforeActionInput, BudgetSpend, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION, type CatalogueTool, type CommitmentKey, CreateMandateInput, CustomerSignature, DeclareIntentInput, DelegationLinkClaims, type DeviceLoginOptions, type DeviceLoginResult, GatewayCheckInput, HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX, HttpRequestLike, type HttpSignatureVerification, Intent, PermissionCheckResult, PermissionScope, type ReplayContext, type ReplayInputs, RuntimeDecision, SHA256_PREFIX, SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryListResult, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SignHttpRequestOptions, SignHttpRequestResult, SuspendPreview, SwarmView, TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, TrustRecord, type VorimConfig, VorimDeniedError, VorimError, VorimSDK, WorkflowProvenanceGraph, canonicalIntent, canonicalPayloadV0, canonicalPayloadV1, commitPayload, createVorim as default, deviceLogin, eventDigest, foldTraceparent, hashPayload, hashPreviousEvent, hashSystemPrompt, hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, isDigest, isKeyedCommitment, jcsCanonicalise, mandateWithdrawalLine, prepareReplayContext };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
- import { A as AgentRegistrationResult, R as RuntimeDecision, a as AgentRegistrationInput, T as TrustRecord, b as Agent, S as SuspendPreview, P as PermissionScope, c as PermissionCheckResult, D as DelegationLinkClaims, d as AgentDelegationRecord, W as WorkflowProvenanceGraph, C as CapabilityProfile, e as SharedMemoryWriteInput, f as SharedMemoryEntry, g as SharedMemoryListResult, B as BeforeActionInput, h as TokenBudgetInput, i as TokenBudget, j as BudgetSpend, k as AuditEventInput, l as SwarmView, m as DeclareIntentInput, I as Intent } from './types-DwPEBj7p.js';
2
- export { n as AgentStatus, o as ApprovalAttestation, p as AuditEventType, q as AuditResult, r as BudgetEnforcement, s as BudgetScope, t as DecisionVerdict, u as WorkflowGraphEdge, v as WorkflowGraphEvent, w as WorkflowGraphNode } from './types-DwPEBj7p.js';
1
+ import { A as AgentRegistrationResult, R as RuntimeDecision, a as AgentRegistrationInput, T as TrustRecord, b as Agent, S as SuspendPreview, P as PermissionScope, c as PermissionCheckResult, D as DelegationLinkClaims, d as AgentDelegationRecord, W as WorkflowProvenanceGraph, C as CapabilityProfile, e as SharedMemoryWriteInput, f as SharedMemoryEntry, g as SharedMemoryListResult, B as BeforeActionInput, h as TokenBudgetInput, i as TokenBudget, j as BudgetSpend, k as AuditEventInput, l as SwarmView, m as DeclareIntentInput, I as Intent, n as CreateMandateInput, o as CustomerSignature, G as GatewayCheckInput } from './types-3hhqtL0W.js';
2
+ export { p as AgentStatus, q as ApprovalAttestation, r as AuditEventType, s as AuditResult, t as BudgetEnforcement, u as BudgetScope, v as DecisionVerdict, M as MandateTerms, w as WorkflowGraphEdge, x as WorkflowGraphEvent, y as WorkflowGraphNode } from './types-3hhqtL0W.js';
3
3
  import { PortableSignedReceipt } from '@vorim/shared-types';
4
4
  export { PortableSignedReceipt, portableReceiptCanonicalBytes } from '@vorim/shared-types';
5
5
  import { HttpRequestLike, SignHttpRequestOptions, SignHttpRequestResult } from './httpSignatures.js';
@@ -1068,11 +1068,167 @@ declare class VorimSDK {
1068
1068
  * await vorim.completeIntent(intent.intent_id, 'completed', 'Refunded 79.00');
1069
1069
  */
1070
1070
  declareIntent(input: DeclareIntentInput): Promise<Intent>;
1071
+ /**
1072
+ * Record whether an intent achieved what it set out to do. Once only: a
1073
+ * second call is refused with 409 OUTCOME_RECORDED. With an API key it is
1074
+ * recorded as the agent's own assessment; a person reviewing in the
1075
+ * dashboard is recorded as the operator.
1076
+ */
1077
+ recordIntentOutcome(intentId: string, result: 'met' | 'partly_met' | 'not_met', note?: string): Promise<any>;
1078
+ /** Outcome summary for the last `days` (default 30) plus the reviews that are due. */
1079
+ getIntentOutcomes(params?: {
1080
+ days?: number;
1081
+ }): Promise<any>;
1071
1082
  /** A platform-signed ledger of intents over a period, for a counterparty to verify offline. */
1072
1083
  getIntentLedger(params?: {
1073
1084
  agentId?: string;
1074
1085
  days?: number;
1075
1086
  }): Promise<any>;
1087
+ /**
1088
+ * Create a pending customer mandate. Returns `signing_input`: the exact text
1089
+ * the customer's device must sign (ES256 raw r||s or DER, base64url) before
1090
+ * `activateMandate`. The private key stays on the customer's device.
1091
+ *
1092
+ * @example
1093
+ * const { mandate, signing_input } = await vorim.createMandate({
1094
+ * agentId, customerRef: 'cust_7731', alg: 'ES256', publicKeyJwk: phoneJwk,
1095
+ * terms: { actionTypes: ['initiate_payment'], maxAmount: 5000, currency: 'GBP', maxTotal: 20000 },
1096
+ * expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 86400e3).toISOString(),
1097
+ * });
1098
+ * // ... the customer's app signs signing_input ...
1099
+ * await vorim.activateMandate(mandate.mandate_id, signatureFromPhone);
1100
+ * await vorim.beforeAction({ agentId, actionType: 'initiate_payment', payload: { amount: 4000, currency: 'GBP' }, mandateId: mandate.mandate_id });
1101
+ */
1102
+ createMandate(input: CreateMandateInput): Promise<{
1103
+ mandate: any;
1104
+ signing_input: string;
1105
+ }>;
1106
+ /**
1107
+ * The mandate as an AP2 (Agent Payments Protocol v0.2) open Payment Mandate:
1108
+ * an SD-JWT signed by Vorim, `vct: "mandate.payment.open.1"`, with the
1109
+ * limits as AP2 constraints. `not_expressed_in_ap2` lists anything AP2
1110
+ * cannot carry.
1111
+ */
1112
+ exportMandateAp2(mandateId: string): Promise<{
1113
+ sd_jwt: string;
1114
+ payload: any;
1115
+ not_expressed_in_ap2: string[];
1116
+ verify_with: any;
1117
+ }>;
1118
+ /**
1119
+ * Import an AP2 open Payment Mandate (SD-JWT, disclosures applied) as a
1120
+ * pending Vorim mandate. The issuer signature must verify against
1121
+ * `issuerJwk`; constraints Vorim cannot enforce are refused. The
1122
+ * customer's key (`cnf.jwk`) still signs `signing_input` to activate it.
1123
+ */
1124
+ importAp2Mandate(input: {
1125
+ sdJwt: string;
1126
+ issuerJwk: Record<string, unknown>;
1127
+ agentId: string;
1128
+ customerRef: string;
1129
+ actionTypes?: string[];
1130
+ }): Promise<any>;
1131
+ /** A one-time challenge (10 minutes) for a hardware key attestation on `createMandate`. */
1132
+ getAttestationChallenge(): Promise<{
1133
+ challenge: string;
1134
+ expires_at: string;
1135
+ }>;
1136
+ /** Activate a mandate with the customer's signature over its `signing_input`. Returns the countersigned record. */
1137
+ activateMandate(mandateId: string, signature: CustomerSignature): Promise<any>;
1138
+ /** The firm revokes a mandate; every later action under it is refused. */
1139
+ revokeMandate(mandateId: string, reason?: string): Promise<any>;
1140
+ getMandate(mandateId: string): Promise<any>;
1141
+ listMandates(params?: {
1142
+ agentId?: string;
1143
+ customerRef?: string;
1144
+ limit?: number;
1145
+ }): Promise<any[]>;
1146
+ /** The countersigned record, every decision taken under the mandate, and a verification result. */
1147
+ getMandateEvidence(mandateId: string): Promise<any>;
1148
+ /**
1149
+ * The customer withdraws a mandate with their own key; no Vorim account
1150
+ * is involved. Sign `mandateWithdrawalLine(mandateId, signedAt)` on the
1151
+ * device (signedAt within 5 minutes of now) and pass the signature here.
1152
+ */
1153
+ withdrawMandate(mandateId: string, signedAt: string, signature: CustomerSignature): Promise<any>;
1154
+ /** Case references seen in the last `days` (default 90). */
1155
+ listCases(params?: {
1156
+ days?: number;
1157
+ }): Promise<any[]>;
1158
+ /** A platform-signed case pack for one case reference: decisions, approvals, intents, outcomes, mandates. */
1159
+ getCasePack(caseRef: string): Promise<any>;
1160
+ /**
1161
+ * Keep a case pack, stamped by an RFC 3161 Time Stamping Authority unless
1162
+ * `timestamp: false`. If the TSA cannot be reached the pack is still kept
1163
+ * and `timestamp.ok` is false with the error.
1164
+ */
1165
+ storeCasePack(caseRef: string, input?: {
1166
+ timestamp?: boolean;
1167
+ }): Promise<any>;
1168
+ listStoredCasePacks(caseRef: string): Promise<any[]>;
1169
+ /** A kept case pack with its timestamp token and the openssl command to verify it. */
1170
+ getStoredCasePack(id: string): Promise<any>;
1171
+ /**
1172
+ * Record what later happened to an action: `complaint`, `chargeback`,
1173
+ * `fraud_confirmed`, `refund_reversed` or `no_issue`. The savings report
1174
+ * uses these to show which bad outcomes a shadow rule would have caught.
1175
+ */
1176
+ recordActionOutcome(input: {
1177
+ decisionId: string;
1178
+ kind: 'complaint' | 'chargeback' | 'fraud_confirmed' | 'refund_reversed' | 'no_issue';
1179
+ amount?: number;
1180
+ currency?: string;
1181
+ occurredAt?: string;
1182
+ note?: string;
1183
+ }): Promise<any>;
1184
+ /** What rules did and shadow rules would have done, costed at your own review assumptions. */
1185
+ getSavingsReport(params?: {
1186
+ days?: number;
1187
+ reviewMinutes?: number;
1188
+ hourlyCost?: number;
1189
+ currency?: string;
1190
+ agentId?: string;
1191
+ }): Promise<any>;
1192
+ /** Consumer Duty outcomes by product, vulnerability and FG21/1 driver. */
1193
+ getConsumerDutyReport(params?: {
1194
+ days?: number;
1195
+ }): Promise<any>;
1196
+ /** Record what a good (and poor) outcome looks like for a product. */
1197
+ setOutcomeDefinition(input: {
1198
+ product: string;
1199
+ good: string;
1200
+ poor?: string;
1201
+ measure?: string;
1202
+ }): Promise<any>;
1203
+ /**
1204
+ * Run a sign-off pack for one agent: scenarios through the real gate in
1205
+ * shadow, answers to the risk committee's questions, signed and stored.
1206
+ */
1207
+ runSignoff(agentId: string, input?: {
1208
+ preset?: 'hazards' | 'fintech' | 'refunds' | 'collections' | 'credit' | 'aml';
1209
+ scenarios?: any[];
1210
+ label?: string;
1211
+ }): Promise<any>;
1212
+ listSignoffs(agentId: string): Promise<any[]>;
1213
+ getSignoff(id: string): Promise<any>;
1214
+ /** What changed between a sign-off pack and the one before it (or `againstId`): verdict, settings, scenarios, answers, permissions. */
1215
+ getSignoffDiff(id: string, againstId?: string): Promise<any>;
1216
+ /**
1217
+ * For a bank's API edge: is this request signed by the agent, is the agent
1218
+ * still allowed to act, and is it inside a mandate for this customer?
1219
+ * Returns a platform-sealed verdict to keep.
1220
+ */
1221
+ gatewayCheck(input: GatewayCheckInput): Promise<any>;
1222
+ /** Check any sealed Vorim document (case pack, sign-off, gateway verdict, mandate record). Public endpoint. */
1223
+ verifyEvidence(doc: {
1224
+ payload: unknown;
1225
+ hash: string;
1226
+ signature: string;
1227
+ }): Promise<{
1228
+ type: string;
1229
+ ok: boolean;
1230
+ reason: string | null;
1231
+ }>;
1076
1232
  /** Close an intent when the job ends. Further actions under it are off intent. */
1077
1233
  completeIntent(intentId: string, status?: 'completed' | 'abandoned', outcome?: string): Promise<any>;
1078
1234
  /** Intents for the org, newest first; filter by agent or status. */
@@ -1340,4 +1496,7 @@ interface DeviceLoginResult {
1340
1496
  */
1341
1497
  declare function deviceLogin(opts: DeviceLoginOptions): Promise<DeviceLoginResult>;
1342
1498
 
1343
- export { Agent, AgentDelegationRecord, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult, AuditEventInput, BeforeActionInput, BudgetSpend, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION, type CatalogueTool, type CommitmentKey, DeclareIntentInput, DelegationLinkClaims, type DeviceLoginOptions, type DeviceLoginResult, HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX, HttpRequestLike, type HttpSignatureVerification, Intent, PermissionCheckResult, PermissionScope, type ReplayContext, type ReplayInputs, RuntimeDecision, SHA256_PREFIX, SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryListResult, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SignHttpRequestOptions, SignHttpRequestResult, SuspendPreview, SwarmView, TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, TrustRecord, type VorimConfig, VorimDeniedError, VorimError, VorimSDK, WorkflowProvenanceGraph, canonicalIntent, canonicalPayloadV0, canonicalPayloadV1, commitPayload, createVorim as default, deviceLogin, eventDigest, foldTraceparent, hashPayload, hashPreviousEvent, hashSystemPrompt, hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, isDigest, isKeyedCommitment, jcsCanonicalise, prepareReplayContext };
1499
+ /** The exact line a customer signs to withdraw a mandate (signedAt: ISO, within 5 minutes of sending). */
1500
+ declare function mandateWithdrawalLine(mandateId: string, signedAt: string): string;
1501
+
1502
+ export { Agent, AgentDelegationRecord, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult, AuditEventInput, BeforeActionInput, BudgetSpend, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION, type CatalogueTool, type CommitmentKey, CreateMandateInput, CustomerSignature, DeclareIntentInput, DelegationLinkClaims, type DeviceLoginOptions, type DeviceLoginResult, GatewayCheckInput, HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX, HttpRequestLike, type HttpSignatureVerification, Intent, PermissionCheckResult, PermissionScope, type ReplayContext, type ReplayInputs, RuntimeDecision, SHA256_PREFIX, SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryListResult, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SignHttpRequestOptions, SignHttpRequestResult, SuspendPreview, SwarmView, TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, TrustRecord, type VorimConfig, VorimDeniedError, VorimError, VorimSDK, WorkflowProvenanceGraph, canonicalIntent, canonicalPayloadV0, canonicalPayloadV1, commitPayload, createVorim as default, deviceLogin, eventDigest, foldTraceparent, hashPayload, hashPreviousEvent, hashSystemPrompt, hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, isDigest, isKeyedCommitment, jcsCanonicalise, mandateWithdrawalLine, prepareReplayContext };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ function canonicalIntent(value) {
875
875
  const keys = Object.keys(obj).filter((k) => obj[k] !== void 0).sort();
876
876
  return `{${keys.map((k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${canonicalIntent(obj[k])}`).join(",")}}`;
877
877
  }
878
- var SDK_VERSION = true ? "4.3.0" : "0.0.0";
878
+ var SDK_VERSION = true ? "4.5.0" : "0.0.0";
879
879
  var USER_AGENT = `vorim-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
880
880
  function sleep(ms) {
881
881
  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
@@ -1497,7 +1497,9 @@ var VorimSDK = class _VorimSDK {
1497
1497
  trace_id: input.traceId,
1498
1498
  span_id: input.spanId,
1499
1499
  traceparent: input.traceparent,
1500
- intent_id: input.intentId
1500
+ intent_id: input.intentId,
1501
+ case_ref: input.caseRef,
1502
+ mandate_id: input.mandateId
1501
1503
  };
1502
1504
  let raw;
1503
1505
  try {
@@ -2028,7 +2030,30 @@ var VorimSDK = class _VorimSDK {
2028
2030
  const signature = await this.sign(canonicalIntent({ type: "vorim-agent-intent", v: 1, ...fields, signed_at }), key);
2029
2031
  signed = { signature, signed_at };
2030
2032
  }
2031
- return this.post("/intents", { ...fields, workflow_id: input.workflowId, ...signed });
2033
+ return this.post("/intents", {
2034
+ ...fields,
2035
+ workflow_id: input.workflowId,
2036
+ ...signed,
2037
+ expected_outcome: input.expectedOutcome,
2038
+ review_at: input.reviewAt,
2039
+ case_ref: input.caseRef,
2040
+ product: input.product,
2041
+ vulnerable_customer: input.vulnerableCustomer,
2042
+ vulnerability_drivers: input.vulnerabilityDrivers
2043
+ });
2044
+ }
2045
+ /**
2046
+ * Record whether an intent achieved what it set out to do. Once only: a
2047
+ * second call is refused with 409 OUTCOME_RECORDED. With an API key it is
2048
+ * recorded as the agent's own assessment; a person reviewing in the
2049
+ * dashboard is recorded as the operator.
2050
+ */
2051
+ async recordIntentOutcome(intentId, result, note) {
2052
+ return this.post(`/intents/${encodeURIComponent(intentId)}/outcome`, { result, note });
2053
+ }
2054
+ /** Outcome summary for the last `days` (default 30) plus the reviews that are due. */
2055
+ async getIntentOutcomes(params = {}) {
2056
+ return this.get(`/intents/outcomes${params.days ? `?days=${encodeURIComponent(String(params.days))}` : ""}`);
2032
2057
  }
2033
2058
  /** A platform-signed ledger of intents over a period, for a counterparty to verify offline. */
2034
2059
  async getIntentLedger(params = {}) {
@@ -2038,6 +2063,191 @@ var VorimSDK = class _VorimSDK {
2038
2063
  const s = q.toString();
2039
2064
  return this.get(`/intents/ledger${s ? `?${s}` : ""}`);
2040
2065
  }
2066
+ // ─── Customer mandates ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
2067
+ /**
2068
+ * Create a pending customer mandate. Returns `signing_input`: the exact text
2069
+ * the customer's device must sign (ES256 raw r||s or DER, base64url) before
2070
+ * `activateMandate`. The private key stays on the customer's device.
2071
+ *
2072
+ * @example
2073
+ * const { mandate, signing_input } = await vorim.createMandate({
2074
+ * agentId, customerRef: 'cust_7731', alg: 'ES256', publicKeyJwk: phoneJwk,
2075
+ * terms: { actionTypes: ['initiate_payment'], maxAmount: 5000, currency: 'GBP', maxTotal: 20000 },
2076
+ * expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 86400e3).toISOString(),
2077
+ * });
2078
+ * // ... the customer's app signs signing_input ...
2079
+ * await vorim.activateMandate(mandate.mandate_id, signatureFromPhone);
2080
+ * await vorim.beforeAction({ agentId, actionType: 'initiate_payment', payload: { amount: 4000, currency: 'GBP' }, mandateId: mandate.mandate_id });
2081
+ */
2082
+ async createMandate(input) {
2083
+ const t = input.terms;
2084
+ return this.post("/mandates", {
2085
+ agent_id: input.agentId,
2086
+ customer_ref: input.customerRef,
2087
+ alg: input.alg,
2088
+ public_key_jwk: input.publicKeyJwk,
2089
+ terms: {
2090
+ action_types: t.actionTypes,
2091
+ targets: t.targets,
2092
+ max_amount: t.maxAmount,
2093
+ currency: t.currency,
2094
+ max_total: t.maxTotal,
2095
+ max_uses: t.maxUses,
2096
+ read_only: t.readOnly,
2097
+ amount_field: t.amountField
2098
+ },
2099
+ expires_at: input.expiresAt,
2100
+ key_attestation: !input.keyAttestation ? void 0 : input.keyAttestation.format === "android-key" ? { format: "android-key", certificate_chain: input.keyAttestation.certificateChain, challenge: input.keyAttestation.challenge } : {
2101
+ format: "apple-app-attest",
2102
+ attestation_object: input.keyAttestation.attestationObject,
2103
+ key_id: input.keyAttestation.keyId,
2104
+ app_id: input.keyAttestation.appId,
2105
+ environment: input.keyAttestation.environment,
2106
+ challenge: input.keyAttestation.challenge
2107
+ },
2108
+ webauthn: input.webauthn ? { rp_id: input.webauthn.rpId, origin: input.webauthn.origin } : void 0
2109
+ });
2110
+ }
2111
+ /**
2112
+ * The mandate as an AP2 (Agent Payments Protocol v0.2) open Payment Mandate:
2113
+ * an SD-JWT signed by Vorim, `vct: "mandate.payment.open.1"`, with the
2114
+ * limits as AP2 constraints. `not_expressed_in_ap2` lists anything AP2
2115
+ * cannot carry.
2116
+ */
2117
+ async exportMandateAp2(mandateId) {
2118
+ return this.get(`/mandates/${encodeURIComponent(mandateId)}/ap2`);
2119
+ }
2120
+ /**
2121
+ * Import an AP2 open Payment Mandate (SD-JWT, disclosures applied) as a
2122
+ * pending Vorim mandate. The issuer signature must verify against
2123
+ * `issuerJwk`; constraints Vorim cannot enforce are refused. The
2124
+ * customer's key (`cnf.jwk`) still signs `signing_input` to activate it.
2125
+ */
2126
+ async importAp2Mandate(input) {
2127
+ return this.post("/mandates/import-ap2", { sd_jwt: input.sdJwt, issuer_jwk: input.issuerJwk, agent_id: input.agentId, customer_ref: input.customerRef, action_types: input.actionTypes });
2128
+ }
2129
+ /** A one-time challenge (10 minutes) for a hardware key attestation on `createMandate`. */
2130
+ async getAttestationChallenge() {
2131
+ return this.post("/mandates/attestation-challenge", {});
2132
+ }
2133
+ /** Activate a mandate with the customer's signature over its `signing_input`. Returns the countersigned record. */
2134
+ async activateMandate(mandateId, signature) {
2135
+ return this.post(`/mandates/${encodeURIComponent(mandateId)}/activate`, { signature });
2136
+ }
2137
+ /** The firm revokes a mandate; every later action under it is refused. */
2138
+ async revokeMandate(mandateId, reason) {
2139
+ return this.post(`/mandates/${encodeURIComponent(mandateId)}/revoke`, { reason });
2140
+ }
2141
+ async getMandate(mandateId) {
2142
+ return this.get(`/mandates/${encodeURIComponent(mandateId)}`);
2143
+ }
2144
+ async listMandates(params = {}) {
2145
+ const q = new URLSearchParams();
2146
+ if (params.agentId) q.set("agent_id", params.agentId);
2147
+ if (params.customerRef) q.set("customer_ref", params.customerRef);
2148
+ if (params.limit) q.set("limit", String(params.limit));
2149
+ const s = q.toString();
2150
+ return this.get(`/mandates${s ? `?${s}` : ""}`);
2151
+ }
2152
+ /** The countersigned record, every decision taken under the mandate, and a verification result. */
2153
+ async getMandateEvidence(mandateId) {
2154
+ return this.get(`/mandates/${encodeURIComponent(mandateId)}/evidence`);
2155
+ }
2156
+ /**
2157
+ * The customer withdraws a mandate with their own key; no Vorim account
2158
+ * is involved. Sign `mandateWithdrawalLine(mandateId, signedAt)` on the
2159
+ * device (signedAt within 5 minutes of now) and pass the signature here.
2160
+ */
2161
+ async withdrawMandate(mandateId, signedAt, signature) {
2162
+ return this.post(`/mandates/${encodeURIComponent(mandateId)}/withdraw`, { signed_at: signedAt, signature });
2163
+ }
2164
+ // ─── Evidence ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
2165
+ /** Case references seen in the last `days` (default 90). */
2166
+ async listCases(params = {}) {
2167
+ return this.get(`/evidence/cases${params.days ? `?days=${encodeURIComponent(String(params.days))}` : ""}`);
2168
+ }
2169
+ /** A platform-signed case pack for one case reference: decisions, approvals, intents, outcomes, mandates. */
2170
+ async getCasePack(caseRef) {
2171
+ return this.get(`/evidence/cases/${encodeURIComponent(caseRef)}/pack`);
2172
+ }
2173
+ /**
2174
+ * Keep a case pack, stamped by an RFC 3161 Time Stamping Authority unless
2175
+ * `timestamp: false`. If the TSA cannot be reached the pack is still kept
2176
+ * and `timestamp.ok` is false with the error.
2177
+ */
2178
+ async storeCasePack(caseRef, input = {}) {
2179
+ return this.post(`/evidence/cases/${encodeURIComponent(caseRef)}/packs`, input);
2180
+ }
2181
+ async listStoredCasePacks(caseRef) {
2182
+ return this.get(`/evidence/cases/${encodeURIComponent(caseRef)}/packs`);
2183
+ }
2184
+ /** A kept case pack with its timestamp token and the openssl command to verify it. */
2185
+ async getStoredCasePack(id) {
2186
+ return this.get(`/evidence/case-pack/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`);
2187
+ }
2188
+ /**
2189
+ * Record what later happened to an action: `complaint`, `chargeback`,
2190
+ * `fraud_confirmed`, `refund_reversed` or `no_issue`. The savings report
2191
+ * uses these to show which bad outcomes a shadow rule would have caught.
2192
+ */
2193
+ async recordActionOutcome(input) {
2194
+ return this.post("/evidence/outcomes", { decision_id: input.decisionId, kind: input.kind, amount: input.amount, currency: input.currency, occurred_at: input.occurredAt, note: input.note });
2195
+ }
2196
+ /** What rules did and shadow rules would have done, costed at your own review assumptions. */
2197
+ async getSavingsReport(params = {}) {
2198
+ const q = new URLSearchParams();
2199
+ if (params.days) q.set("days", String(params.days));
2200
+ if (params.reviewMinutes) q.set("review_minutes", String(params.reviewMinutes));
2201
+ if (params.hourlyCost !== void 0) q.set("hourly_cost", String(params.hourlyCost));
2202
+ if (params.currency) q.set("currency", params.currency);
2203
+ if (params.agentId) q.set("agent_id", params.agentId);
2204
+ return this.get(`/evidence/savings?${q.toString()}`);
2205
+ }
2206
+ /** Consumer Duty outcomes by product, vulnerability and FG21/1 driver. */
2207
+ async getConsumerDutyReport(params = {}) {
2208
+ return this.get(`/evidence/consumer-duty${params.days ? `?days=${encodeURIComponent(String(params.days))}` : ""}`);
2209
+ }
2210
+ /** Record what a good (and poor) outcome looks like for a product. */
2211
+ async setOutcomeDefinition(input) {
2212
+ return this.put("/evidence/outcome-definitions", input);
2213
+ }
2214
+ /**
2215
+ * Run a sign-off pack for one agent: scenarios through the real gate in
2216
+ * shadow, answers to the risk committee's questions, signed and stored.
2217
+ */
2218
+ async runSignoff(agentId, input = {}) {
2219
+ return this.post(`/evidence/signoffs/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}`, input);
2220
+ }
2221
+ async listSignoffs(agentId) {
2222
+ return this.get(`/evidence/signoffs/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}`);
2223
+ }
2224
+ async getSignoff(id) {
2225
+ return this.get(`/evidence/signoff/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`);
2226
+ }
2227
+ /** What changed between a sign-off pack and the one before it (or `againstId`): verdict, settings, scenarios, answers, permissions. */
2228
+ async getSignoffDiff(id, againstId) {
2229
+ return this.get(`/evidence/signoff/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/diff${againstId ? `?against=${encodeURIComponent(againstId)}` : ""}`);
2230
+ }
2231
+ /**
2232
+ * For a bank's API edge: is this request signed by the agent, is the agent
2233
+ * still allowed to act, and is it inside a mandate for this customer?
2234
+ * Returns a platform-sealed verdict to keep.
2235
+ */
2236
+ async gatewayCheck(input) {
2237
+ return this.post("/gateway/check", {
2238
+ request: input.request,
2239
+ mandate_id: input.mandateId,
2240
+ customer_ref: input.customerRef,
2241
+ action_type: input.actionType,
2242
+ amount: input.amount,
2243
+ currency: input.currency,
2244
+ max_age_seconds: input.maxAgeSeconds
2245
+ });
2246
+ }
2247
+ /** Check any sealed Vorim document (case pack, sign-off, gateway verdict, mandate record). Public endpoint. */
2248
+ async verifyEvidence(doc) {
2249
+ return this.post("/evidence/verify", { payload: doc.payload, hash: doc.hash, signature: doc.signature });
2250
+ }
2041
2251
  /** Close an intent when the job ends. Further actions under it are off intent. */
2042
2252
  async completeIntent(intentId, status = "completed", outcome) {
2043
2253
  return this.post(`/intents/${encodeURIComponent(intentId)}/complete`, { status, outcome });
@@ -2452,6 +2662,9 @@ async function deviceLogin(opts) {
2452
2662
  wait = intervalMs;
2453
2663
  }
2454
2664
  }
2665
+ function mandateWithdrawalLine(mandateId, signedAt) {
2666
+ return `vorim-mandate-withdraw|v1|${mandateId}|${signedAt}`;
2667
+ }
2455
2668
  export {
2456
2669
  CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION,
2457
2670
  HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX,
@@ -2479,6 +2692,7 @@ export {
2479
2692
  isDigest,
2480
2693
  isKeyedCommitment,
2481
2694
  jcsCanonicalise,
2695
+ mandateWithdrawalLine,
2482
2696
  portableReceiptCanonicalBytes,
2483
2697
  prepareReplayContext,
2484
2698
  signHttpRequest,