@vorim/sdk 4.0.0 → 4.1.1

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Files changed (64) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +13 -0
  2. package/dist/_commerce-core-Dyr_dHVP.d.ts +156 -0
  3. package/dist/_commerce-core-wY2jC6rC.d.cts +156 -0
  4. package/dist/index.cjs +6 -1
  5. package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
  6. package/dist/index.d.cts +5 -0
  7. package/dist/index.d.ts +5 -0
  8. package/dist/index.js +6 -1
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  10. package/dist/integrations/amazon.cjs +358 -0
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  22. package/dist/integrations/ebay.cjs +351 -0
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  28. package/dist/integrations/etsy.cjs +331 -0
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  34. package/dist/integrations/google-merchant.cjs +333 -0
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  36. package/dist/integrations/google-merchant.d.cts +43 -0
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  40. package/dist/integrations/meta.cjs +376 -0
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  46. package/dist/integrations/social-ads.cjs +329 -0
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  52. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.cjs +335 -0
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  54. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.d.cts +44 -0
  55. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.d.ts +44 -0
  56. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.js +306 -0
  57. package/dist/integrations/tiktok-shop.js.map +1 -0
  58. package/dist/integrations/walmart.cjs +345 -0
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  61. package/dist/integrations/walmart.d.ts +60 -0
  62. package/dist/integrations/walmart.js +316 -0
  63. package/dist/integrations/walmart.js.map +1 -0
  64. package/package.json +92 -2
package/dist/index.js.map CHANGED
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- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/replay.ts","../../shared-types/src/index.ts","../src/commit.ts","../src/httpSignatures.ts","../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Replayable agent decision evidence helpers.\n *\n * Canonical-form hashing for the VAIP -02 schema fields that the SDK\n * attaches to audit events. The hashes recorded in audit_events.tool_catalogue_hash\n * and audit_events.system_prompt_hash use these functions, so the bytes\n * an auditor or counterparty reconstructs must match what the SDK produced.\n *\n * These helpers are intentionally separate from the signing path. The\n * v0 canonical signature form (event_type|action|resource|input_hash|\n * output_hash|result) does NOT cover model_version, tool_catalogue_hash,\n * or system_prompt_hash. They will enter the canonical bytes in v1\n * (RFC 8785 JCS) in a follow-up release.\n *\n * Stable across SDK versions: the canonical-form version is documented\n * in CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION. Future changes get a v2 etc;\n * never edit the existing v1 logic, or already-recorded hashes lose\n * their meaning.\n */\n\n// ─── Versioning ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Canonical-form version for tool catalogue hashes produced by this SDK.\n * Recorded in tool_catalogue_canon_version on the event metadata (when\n * the metadata field is used) so verifiers know which hash recipe to\n * reproduce. Increment ONLY if the algorithm changes in a way that\n * would change the hash for the same logical catalogue.\n */\nexport const CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION = 'v1' as const;\n\n// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Minimum shape a tool needs for catalogue hashing. The framework\n * integrations adapt their native tool objects to this shape before\n * calling hashToolCatalogue.\n */\nexport interface CatalogueTool {\n /** The name the model sees and calls. Required. */\n name: string;\n /** Human-readable description shown to the model. Optional; absent ↔ empty string. */\n description?: string;\n /**\n * JSON Schema describing the tool's input parameters. Optional;\n * absent ↔ empty object `{}`. The schema gets RFC 8785 JCS-canonicalised\n * before hashing so semantically-equivalent variations (key order,\n * whitespace) produce the same hash.\n */\n schema?: Record<string, unknown> | null;\n}\n\n// ─── RFC 8785 JCS subset ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme, sufficient subset for tool\n * catalogue values.\n *\n * Rules:\n * - Object keys sorted lexicographically by UTF-16 code units (which\n * is what JS string comparison does naturally).\n * - No whitespace between tokens.\n * - Numbers: integers as integers, finite floats per ECMAScript\n * Number.prototype.toString. JCS forbids NaN and Infinity.\n * - Strings: JSON-escape using minimal set per RFC 8259 § 7.\n * - null, true, false, arrays: as JSON.stringify produces them, since\n * JSON.stringify already produces the canonical form for these.\n *\n * Not vendoring a full library because tool schemas don't carry\n * non-integer numbers in practice and the JS spec for Number.toString\n * happens to coincide with JCS § 3.2.2.2 for the integer case.\n */\nexport function jcsCanonicalise(value: unknown): string {\n if (value === null) return 'null';\n if (value === true) return 'true';\n if (value === false) return 'false';\n\n if (typeof value === 'number') {\n if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n throw new Error('jcsCanonicalise: NaN and Infinity are not JCS-valid');\n }\n // Fail closed on magnitudes where JS .toString() and CPython diverge, so TS\n // and Python sign byte-identical bytes (or both reject). JS switches\n // integer-valued floats to exponent form at |x| >= 1e21 (Python expands to\n // full digits); in [1e-7, 1e-4) JS keeps decimals while Python repr() uses\n // exponent form. Keeping both engines in lockstep preserves cross-SDK\n // signature verifiability.\n const abs = Math.abs(value);\n // Reject ranges where JS Number.toString() and CPython diverge: |x| >= 1e21,\n // |x| < 1e-4, and integer-valued |x| > 2^53 (JS shortest-round-trip vs\n // Python exact int expansion — they only coincide for \"round\" values there).\n if (value !== 0 && (abs >= 1e21 || abs < 1e-4 || (Number.isInteger(value) && abs > 2 ** 53))) {\n throw new Error(\n `jcsCanonicalise: numbers in the ranges where JS and Python formatting ` +\n `diverge (|x| >= 1e21, |x| < 1e-4, or integer |x| > 2^53) are not ` +\n `supported in signed metadata. Use a string instead of ${value}.`,\n );\n }\n // For integers in safe range and ordinary decimals, .toString() matches JCS\n // (modern JS engines use the shortest round-trip representation).\n return value.toString();\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'string') {\n return JSON.stringify(value);\n }\n\n if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n return '[' + value.map(jcsCanonicalise).join(',') + ']';\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'object') {\n const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n // Filter undefined-valued fields, matching @vorim/verify and\n // @vorim/shared-types. Without this the SDK throws on { a: 1, b: undefined }\n // while the verifier silently drops b — a cross-module canonical-form\n // divergence that would break signature verification on such events.\n const keys = Object.keys(obj).filter(k => obj[k] !== undefined).sort();\n const parts = keys.map(k => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + jcsCanonicalise(obj[k]));\n return '{' + parts.join(',') + '}';\n }\n\n // undefined, function, symbol, bigint — not JSON-representable\n throw new Error(`jcsCanonicalise: unsupported value type: ${typeof value}`);\n}\n\n// ─── SHA-256 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nasync function sha256Hex(input: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n const bytes = typeof input === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(input) : input;\n\n // Node.js Web Crypto (Node 18+) supports digest. Browser Web Crypto does too.\n // Fall back to node:crypto if Web Crypto is unavailable.\n const subtle = (globalThis as any).crypto?.subtle;\n if (subtle) {\n const buf = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes);\n return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf))\n .map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n .join('');\n }\n\n // Node fallback\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return nodeCrypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex');\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Hash a single tool definition. Returns `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * Canonical form (v1):\n * JCS-canonicalised JSON of `{name, description, schema}` where\n * absent fields substitute `description: \"\"` and `schema: {}`.\n */\nexport async function hashTool(tool: CatalogueTool): Promise<string> {\n const normalised = {\n name: tool.name,\n description: tool.description ?? '',\n schema: tool.schema ?? {},\n };\n const hex = await sha256Hex(jcsCanonicalise(normalised));\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hash an entire tool catalogue. Returns `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * Reordering tools does NOT change the hash (tool hashes sorted\n * lexicographically before concatenation). Adding, removing, or\n * modifying a tool DOES change the hash.\n *\n * Per-tool hashing first means a verifier comparing two catalogue\n * hashes that differ can also be given the per-tool hashes to\n * identify which specific tool changed.\n */\nexport async function hashToolCatalogue(tools: CatalogueTool[]): Promise<string> {\n if (tools.length === 0) {\n // Empty catalogue has a deterministic, stable hash distinct from \"no field\"\n return `sha256:${await sha256Hex('[]')}`;\n }\n const perTool = await Promise.all(tools.map(hashTool));\n perTool.sort();\n const hex = await sha256Hex(perTool.join(''));\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hash a system prompt. Returns `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * The prompt is UTF-8 encoded and hashed verbatim — no normalisation.\n * If a caller wants to ignore whitespace or comment differences, they\n * should normalise before calling. The intent here is deterministic\n * reproducibility, not semantic equivalence.\n */\nexport async function hashSystemPrompt(prompt: string): Promise<string> {\n const hex = await sha256Hex(prompt);\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: hash the previous event's canonical bytes for use in\n * the prev_event_hash field of hash-chained ingest. Caller provides\n * the canonical bytes (use canonicalPayloadV0 from the main module).\n */\nexport async function hashPreviousEvent(canonicalBytes: string): Promise<string> {\n const hex = await sha256Hex(canonicalBytes);\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n// ─── Replay context — framework integration helper ────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Raw inputs the integration captures from the framework. Set by the\n * integration's config; turned into hashes by {@link prepareReplayContext}.\n */\nexport interface ReplayInputs {\n /** Stable identifier for the model. E.g. `\"anthropic:claude-opus-4-8\"`. */\n modelVersion?: string;\n /** Tools available to the agent at call time. Hashed via {@link hashToolCatalogue}. */\n tools?: CatalogueTool[];\n /** System prompt active at call time. Hashed via {@link hashSystemPrompt}. */\n systemPrompt?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pre-computed hashes ready to attach to audit events. The three keys\n * match the audit_events column names.\n */\nexport interface ReplayContext {\n model_version?: string;\n tool_catalogue_hash?: string;\n system_prompt_hash?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute replay context once from raw inputs. Use at integration\n * setup time so each emit can attach the hashes without re-hashing.\n *\n * Returns an object suitable for spreading into an AuditEventInput:\n * `await vorim.emit({ ...event, ...replayContext })`\n *\n * If a field is absent in the inputs, it is absent in the result\n * (not the empty string). That keeps the event lean.\n */\nexport async function prepareReplayContext(\n inputs: ReplayInputs,\n): Promise<ReplayContext> {\n const ctx: ReplayContext = {};\n if (inputs.modelVersion) ctx.model_version = inputs.modelVersion;\n if (inputs.tools) ctx.tool_catalogue_hash = await hashToolCatalogue(inputs.tools);\n if (inputs.systemPrompt) ctx.system_prompt_hash = await hashSystemPrompt(inputs.systemPrompt);\n return ctx;\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// VORIM — Shared Types\n// Core domain types used across API, SDK, and Web Dashboard\n// ============================================================================\n\n// ─── Agent Identity ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentStatus = 'pending' | 'active' | 'suspended' | 'revoked' | 'expired';\n\nexport interface Agent {\n id: string;\n agent_id: string; // agid_{org_id}_{uuid4}\n org_id: string;\n owner_user_id: string;\n name: string;\n description?: string;\n status: AgentStatus;\n public_key: string;\n key_fingerprint: string;\n trust_score: number; // 0–100\n capabilities: string[];\n metadata: Record<string, unknown>;\n expires_at?: string;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n revoked_at?: string;\n revoked_by?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentRegistrationInput {\n name: string;\n description?: string;\n capabilities: string[];\n scopes: PermissionScope[];\n}\n\nexport interface AgentRegistrationResult {\n agent: Agent;\n private_key: string; // returned exactly once\n public_key: string;\n key_fingerprint: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Permission Scopes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type PermissionScope =\n | 'agent:read'\n | 'agent:write'\n | 'agent:execute'\n | 'agent:transact'\n | 'agent:communicate'\n | 'agent:delegate'\n | 'agent:elevate';\n\nexport const PERMISSION_SCOPES: readonly PermissionScope[] = [\n 'agent:read',\n 'agent:write',\n 'agent:execute',\n 'agent:transact',\n 'agent:communicate',\n 'agent:delegate',\n 'agent:elevate',\n] as const;\n\nexport interface Permission {\n id: string;\n agent_id: string;\n scope: PermissionScope;\n granted_by: string;\n valid_from: string;\n valid_until?: string;\n rate_limit?: RateLimit;\n conditions?: PermissionConditions;\n created_at: string;\n revoked_at?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RateLimit {\n max: number;\n window: string; // '1h' | '1d' | '1m'\n}\n\nexport interface PermissionConditions {\n ip_allowlist?: string[];\n [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface PermissionCheckResult {\n allowed: boolean;\n scope: PermissionScope;\n agent_id: string;\n reason?: string;\n remaining_quota?: number;\n}\n\n// ─── Audit Events ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AuditEventType =\n | 'tool_call'\n | 'api_request'\n | 'message_sent'\n | 'permission_change'\n | 'status_change'\n | 'key_rotation'\n | 'login'\n | 'export';\n\nexport type AuditResult = 'success' | 'denied' | 'error';\n\nexport interface AuditEvent {\n event_id: string; // ULID\n agent_id: string;\n org_id: string;\n event_type: AuditEventType;\n action: string;\n resource?: string;\n input_hash?: string; // sha256:...\n output_hash?: string;\n permission?: PermissionScope;\n result: AuditResult;\n latency_ms?: number;\n error_code?: string;\n signature?: string; // ed25519 signature\n metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n timestamp: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AuditEventInput {\n agent_id: string;\n event_type: AuditEventType;\n action: string;\n resource?: string;\n input_hash?: string;\n output_hash?: string;\n permission?: PermissionScope;\n result: AuditResult;\n latency_ms?: number;\n error_code?: string;\n signature?: string;\n metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n /**\n * Replayable agent decision evidence (VAIP -02 schema fields).\n *\n * These are stored and exported but NOT covered by the v0 canonical\n * signature form. They will enter the canonical bytes when v1\n * (RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme) lands in a follow-up\n * release. Until then, they are advisory.\n *\n * - `model_version`: stable identifier for the model artefact that\n * produced the event (e.g. `anthropic:claude-opus-4-8`).\n * - `tool_catalogue_hash`: SHA-256 (`sha256:<hex>`) of the canonicalised\n * tool catalogue available to the agent at call time.\n * - `system_prompt_hash`: SHA-256 (`sha256:<hex>`) of the system prompt\n * active at call time.\n * - `prev_event_hash`: SHA-256 (`sha256:<hex>`) of the previous event\n * for this agent in this org. Enables hash-chained ingest so a\n * verifier can detect deletion of a single event.\n */\n model_version?: string;\n tool_catalogue_hash?: string;\n system_prompt_hash?: string;\n prev_event_hash?: string;\n /**\n * The caller's OpenTelemetry trace context, correlation only: joins this\n * signed event to the span that asked for the action. `trace_id` (32 hex)\n * and `span_id` (16 hex) are stored and returned with the event (a v1\n * signature covers them when set). `traceparent` (W3C header value) is a\n * convenience: the SDK turns it into the two ids before signing, and the\n * server never stores it.\n */\n trace_id?: string;\n span_id?: string;\n traceparent?: string;\n /**\n * Which canonical-form recipe this event's `signature` was computed\n * over. Defaults to `\"v0\"` when absent. New SDK versions emitting\n * v1 signatures MUST set this field so the server (and verifiers)\n * use the right recipe.\n *\n * v0: pipe-joined `event_type|action|resource|input_hash|output_hash|result`.\n * Defined by {@link canonicalPayloadV0}.\n * v1: RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme over the full event\n * object excluding `signature` and `canonical_form` themselves.\n * Covers all replayable-evidence fields. Defined by\n * {@link canonicalPayloadV1}.\n *\n * Why versioned: existing v0-signed events must continue to verify\n * forever. Server reads this field and dispatches verification to\n * the matching helper. Never edit v0 or v1 — bump the version instead.\n */\n canonical_form?: CanonicalForm;\n /**\n * Per-event delegation context (VAIP -02 § 6).\n *\n * Populated when the emitting agent is acting via a delegation chain.\n * NULL otherwise. A regulator or counterparty walking the audit\n * bundle can reconstruct who authorised the action and at which\n * depth in the chain.\n *\n * - `on_behalf_of`: root principal's agent_id (or user identifier\n * for human-rooted delegations).\n * - `delegator_agent_id`: direct parent in the chain. NULL for the\n * root delegation step.\n * - `delegation_chain_id`: shared across every event in one chain\n * (regardless of which agent in the chain emitted it).\n * - `delegation_depth`: 0 = no delegation, N = N hops from root.\n *\n * v1 signatures cover these fields. v0 signatures do not.\n */\n on_behalf_of?: string;\n delegator_agent_id?: string;\n delegation_chain_id?: string;\n delegation_depth?: number;\n /**\n * Runtime-control linkage (Strategy A). When the SDK gated this action\n * through `POST /v1/runtime/decisions` before performing it, the\n * returned `decision_id` is carried here so the post-action audit\n * event links back to the runtime decision that authorised it.\n *\n * Not covered by the v0 canonical signature form; enters the canonical\n * bytes when v1 (RFC 8785 JCS) signs the full event. Advisory until then.\n */\n decision_id?: string;\n}\n\n/** The set of canonical-form versions a Vorim signer may emit. */\nexport type CanonicalForm = 'v0' | 'v1';\n\n/**\n * VAIP v0 canonical bytes for audit-event signing.\n *\n * Pipe-joined content fields with empty-string substitution for missing values.\n * Single source of truth for both the SDK (sign-side) and the server\n * (verify-side). To upgrade the format, version the function (`canonicalPayloadV1`),\n * do not edit this one — old signatures must remain verifiable.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV0(event: {\n event_type: string;\n action: string;\n resource?: string;\n input_hash?: string;\n output_hash?: string;\n result: string;\n}): string {\n return [\n event.event_type,\n event.action,\n event.resource ?? '',\n event.input_hash ?? '',\n event.output_hash ?? '',\n event.result,\n ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * VAIP v1 canonical bytes for audit-event signing.\n *\n * RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme over the event object excluding\n * `signature` (the field being computed) and `canonical_form` (which is\n * metadata about the recipe, not part of the recipe).\n *\n * Unlike v0, v1 covers ALL event fields — including replayable-evidence\n * fields (model_version, tool_catalogue_hash, system_prompt_hash,\n * prev_event_hash) and free-form metadata. Tampering with any of them\n * invalidates the signature.\n *\n * Cost vs v0: ~10-50µs per event for typical sizes. Worth it for the\n * stronger property.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV1(event: Record<string, unknown>): string {\n const { signature: _sig, canonical_form: _cf, ...rest } = event;\n return jcsCanonicalise(rest);\n}\n\n// ─── Delegation chain (VAIP -02 § 5) ───────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * One link in an agent-to-agent identity delegation chain.\n *\n * The link is JCS-canonicalised and Ed25519-signed by the delegator's\n * private key, producing a self-contained capability token a verifier\n * can walk offline. Signed bytes are produced by\n * {@link delegationLinkCanonicalBytes}.\n */\nexport interface DelegationLinkClaims {\n /** Format version. Currently `0`. Bump when the canonical form changes. */\n v: 0;\n /** Type discriminator. */\n type: 'vaip-delegation-link';\n /** Public chain id (format `chain_<32hex>`). Same across every link in a chain. */\n chain_id: string;\n /** Depth from root. Root step = 1; each subsequent link increments. */\n depth: number;\n /** Public agent_id of the delegator (signer of this link). */\n delegator: string;\n /** Public agent_id of the delegate (recipient of this link's authority). */\n delegate: string;\n /** Scopes granted to the delegate. Sorted lexicographically. */\n scopes: string[];\n /** Further hops the delegate may make. */\n max_chain_depth: number;\n /** ISO8601 valid-from timestamp. */\n valid_from: string;\n /** ISO8601 expiry, or null for no expiry. */\n valid_until: string | null;\n /**\n * SHA-256 (sha256:<hex>) of the JCS-canonical bytes of the parent\n * link's claims. NULL for root links — i.e. the first link in a\n * chain, where the delegator is the user or org-root principal.\n */\n parent_link_hash: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * A signed link as transmitted on the wire and stored in the database.\n */\nexport interface SignedDelegationLink {\n claims: DelegationLinkClaims;\n /** `ed25519:<base64>` signature over {@link delegationLinkCanonicalBytes}. */\n signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A full delegation chain token: every link from root to leaf.\n *\n * Emitted into bundle exports as `delegation_tokens[]` and walkable\n * offline by `@vorim/verify`.\n */\nexport interface DelegationChainToken {\n v: 0;\n /** All links from root (depth=1) to leaf, in depth order. */\n links: SignedDelegationLink[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical bytes for an Ed25519 signature over a delegation link.\n *\n * Uses RFC 8785 JCS — the same canonicalisation as v1 audit signatures\n * — to ensure cross-language byte-equivalence.\n */\nexport function delegationLinkCanonicalBytes(claims: DelegationLinkClaims): string {\n return jcsCanonicalise(claims);\n}\n\n// ─── Governed Shared Memory (multi-agent fabric, Phase 2) ───────────────\n\n/**\n * One governed shared-memory entry as returned by the API.\n *\n * Every entry is attributed to the agent that wrote it and carries that\n * agent's Ed25519 signature over {@link sharedMemoryCanonicalBytes}, so a\n * poisoned entry is always traceable to its source (OWASP ASI06).\n */\nexport interface SharedMemoryEntry {\n namespace: string;\n key: string;\n value: unknown;\n /** Public agent_id (`agid_*`) of the agent that authored the current value. */\n written_by: string;\n /** `sha256:<hex>` of the canonical value. */\n content_hash: string | null;\n /** True iff a signature is stored (and, when present, was verified). */\n signed: boolean;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical bytes an agent signs when writing a shared-memory entry.\n *\n * Uses RFC 8785 JCS — the same canonicalisation as v1 audit signatures and\n * delegation links — over the entry's identity + payload, so the server, the\n * TypeScript SDK, and the Python SDK all produce byte-identical bytes (or all\n * reject). The signed object is exactly:\n *\n * { agent_id, key, namespace, value }\n *\n * (JCS sorts keys lexicographically, so field order here is irrelevant.)\n * The server recomputes these bytes from the resolved public agent_id and the\n * submitted value and verifies against the agent's stored public key; a\n * present-but-invalid signature is rejected (fail closed).\n */\nexport function sharedMemoryCanonicalBytes(entry: {\n namespace: string;\n key: string;\n value: unknown;\n agent_id: string;\n}): string {\n return jcsCanonicalise({\n agent_id: entry.agent_id,\n key: entry.key,\n namespace: entry.namespace,\n value: entry.value,\n });\n}\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme, sufficient subset for audit\n * event values. Must match the SDK implementations byte-for-byte; the\n * cross-language parity script in /scripts/check-replay-parity.sh\n * verifies this.\n *\n * Rules:\n * - Object keys sorted lexicographically by UTF-16 code units.\n * - No whitespace between tokens.\n * - Numbers: integers via .toString(); finite floats per ECMAScript\n * Number.prototype.toString shortest-round-trip. Rejects NaN/Infinity.\n * - Strings: JSON-escape per RFC 8259 § 7.\n * - Arrays preserve order. null/true/false/undefined-as-error.\n */\nexport function jcsCanonicalise(value: unknown): string {\n if (value === null) return 'null';\n if (value === true) return 'true';\n if (value === false) return 'false';\n\n if (typeof value === 'number') {\n if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n throw new Error('jcsCanonicalise: NaN and Infinity are not JCS-valid');\n }\n // Fail closed on the magnitudes where JS Number.toString() and CPython's\n // formatting diverge, so TS and Python sign byte-identical bytes (or both\n // reject). JS switches integer-valued floats to exponent form at |x| >= 1e21\n // (Python expands to full digits); and in [1e-7, 1e-4) JS keeps decimals\n // while Python repr() uses exponent form. Keep both engines in lockstep.\n const abs = Math.abs(value);\n // Reject the ranges where JS Number.toString() and CPython diverge:\n // - |x| >= 1e21 (JS exponent form vs Python full digits)\n // - |x| < 1e-4 (Python repr exponent vs JS decimal)\n // - integer-valued |x| > 2^53 (JS shortest-round-trip vs Python exact\n // int expansion, e.g. 9.999999e20 -> JS '...900000000000000000000'\n // vs Python '...900000000016384'). Above MAX_SAFE_INTEGER the two\n // only coincide for \"round\" values, so fail closed on all of them.\n if (value !== 0 && (abs >= 1e21 || abs < 1e-4 || (Number.isInteger(value) && abs > 2 ** 53))) {\n throw new Error(\n `jcsCanonicalise: numbers in the ranges where JS and Python formatting ` +\n `diverge (|x| >= 1e21, |x| < 1e-4, or integer |x| > 2^53) are not ` +\n `supported in signed metadata. Use a string instead of ${value}.`,\n );\n }\n return value.toString();\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'string') {\n return JSON.stringify(value);\n }\n\n if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n return '[' + value.map(jcsCanonicalise).join(',') + ']';\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'object') {\n const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n // Skip undefined values entirely (JSON.stringify behaviour). This\n // means `{a: 1, b: undefined}` and `{a: 1}` produce identical bytes,\n // which matches what callers expect from optional fields.\n const keys = Object.keys(obj).filter(k => obj[k] !== undefined).sort();\n const parts = keys.map(k => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + jcsCanonicalise(obj[k]));\n return '{' + parts.join(',') + '}';\n }\n\n throw new Error(`jcsCanonicalise: unsupported value type: ${typeof value}`);\n}\n\n// ─── Trust ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface TrustRecord {\n agent_id: string;\n owner: {\n org_name: string;\n verified: boolean;\n };\n trust_score: number;\n status: AgentStatus;\n created_at: string;\n active_scopes: PermissionScope[];\n key_fingerprint: string;\n revocation_status: boolean;\n last_active?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Organisation & Users ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type UserRole = 'owner' | 'admin' | 'developer' | 'member' | 'viewer';\nexport type OrgPlan = 'free' | 'starter' | 'growth' | 'enterprise';\nexport type SubscriptionStatus = 'none' | 'trialing' | 'active' | 'past_due' | 'canceled' | 'unpaid';\n\nexport interface Organisation {\n id: string;\n slug: string;\n name: string;\n plan: OrgPlan;\n subscription_status: SubscriptionStatus;\n trial_ends_at?: string;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n}\n\n// Plan limits. -1 means unlimited. Free = 10 agents; all paid plans are\n// unlimited agents (billed on events). Authoritative enforcement lives in\n// services/api/src/services/billing.ts (PLAN_AGENT_LIMITS + event caps); keep\n// this in sync with that and the pricing page.\nexport const PLAN_LIMITS: Record<OrgPlan, { agents: number; events_per_month: number; retention_days: number }> = {\n free: { agents: 10, events_per_month: 10000, retention_days: 30 },\n starter: { agents: -1, events_per_month: 100000, retention_days: 90 },\n growth: { agents: -1, events_per_month: 1000000, retention_days: -1 },\n enterprise: { agents: -1, events_per_month: -1, retention_days: -1 },\n};\n\nexport interface User {\n id: string;\n org_id: string;\n email: string;\n name?: string;\n role: UserRole;\n created_at: string;\n last_login_at?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── API Keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ApiKey {\n id: string;\n org_id: string;\n key_prefix: string; // agid_sk_live_aBcD\n name: string;\n scopes: string[];\n last_used_at?: string;\n expires_at?: string;\n created_at: string;\n revoked_at?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ApiKeyCreateResult {\n api_key: ApiKey;\n raw_key: string; // shown exactly once\n}\n\n// ─── Auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface AuthTokens {\n access_token: string;\n refresh_token: string;\n expires_in: number;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginInput {\n email: string;\n password: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RegisterInput {\n org_name: string;\n email: string;\n password: string;\n name?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── API Response Envelope ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ApiResponse<T> {\n data: T;\n meta?: {\n page?: number;\n per_page?: number;\n total?: number;\n total_pages?: number;\n };\n}\n\nexport interface ApiError {\n error: {\n code: string;\n message: string;\n details?: Record<string, unknown>;\n request_id: string;\n };\n}\n\n// ─── Pagination ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface PaginationParams {\n page?: number;\n per_page?: number;\n sort_by?: string;\n sort_order?: 'asc' | 'desc';\n}\n\n// ─── Alert Rules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface AlertRule {\n id: string;\n org_id: string;\n name: string;\n event_type?: AuditEventType;\n condition: Record<string, unknown>;\n channels: AlertChannel[];\n enabled: boolean;\n created_by: string;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n}\n\nexport type AlertChannelType = 'email' | 'slack' | 'pagerduty' | 'in_app';\n\nexport interface AlertChannel {\n type: AlertChannelType;\n config: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n// ─── Portable signed receipt (VAIP portable-receipt-v1) ────────────────\n\n/**\n * A self-contained, offline-verifiable statement that Vorim authorised one\n * specific agent action.\n *\n * The problem it solves: an integration that needs to prove an action was\n * authorised previously had to assemble that proof client-side from a\n * decision row, then hope its reconstruction matched whatever Vorim would\n * have signed. Two implementations of \"the same\" object drift, and the drift\n * only shows up as a signature that will not verify — usually in production,\n * usually months later.\n *\n * So the receipt is built and signed in ONE place, and the exact bytes that\n * were signed are reproducible by any verifier via\n * {@link portableReceiptCanonicalBytes}.\n *\n * Verification needs only the receipt and the public key from\n * `GET /trust/keys`: no Vorim, no chain, no network.\n */\nexport interface PortableSignedReceipt {\n version: 'vorim-portable-receipt-v1';\n decision: PortableReceiptDecision;\n binding: PortableReceiptBinding;\n /**\n * The platform-signed human approval, when this action was escalated and a\n * human approved it. `null` for an action that never needed one.\n *\n * Carried in full rather than by reference, so a holder of the receipt can\n * verify the human approval without a second lookup.\n */\n approval: PortableReceiptApproval | null;\n /** Issuing org. Scopes the receipt; also what `kid` belongs to. */\n org_id: string;\n issued_at: string;\n canonical_form: 'v1';\n /** `sha256:<hex>` over {@link portableReceiptCanonicalBytes}. */\n digest: string;\n /** `ed25519:<base64>` over those same bytes. */\n signature: string;\n /** Key id, resolvable via `GET /trust/keys`. */\n kid: string;\n alg: 'Ed25519';\n}\n\n/** The authorisation itself: what was allowed, for whom, under which policy. */\nexport interface PortableReceiptDecision {\n decision_id: string;\n /**\n * Only ever `allow` or `modify`.\n *\n * A receipt asserts \"this was authorised\". There is no honest receipt for a\n * denial, a fallback, or an unresolved escalation, so those are refused at\n * mint time rather than represented here.\n */\n verdict: 'allow' | 'modify';\n agent_id: string;\n required_scope: string | null;\n action_type: string;\n action_target: string | null;\n policy_version: number;\n /** The rule that fired, or null for a default decision. */\n decision_rule_id: string | null;\n requested_at: string;\n /** After this the decision is stale; a verifier should treat it as expired. */\n expires_at: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Binds the receipt to the exact action, so it cannot be replayed against a\n * different one.\n *\n * Hashes rather than payloads: the regulated record stays in the customer's\n * systems and in Vorim. A verifier who holds the payload can recompute the\n * hash and confirm the match; one who does not learns nothing from it.\n */\nexport interface PortableReceiptBinding {\n /** `sha256:<hex>` over the JCS bytes of the payload as proposed. */\n original_intent_hash: string | null;\n /**\n * `sha256:<hex>` over the payload as APPROVED. Differs from the original\n * exactly when policy modified it — which is the case that matters, since\n * settling the original amount after a policy reduction is the failure this\n * field exists to make detectable.\n */\n effective_intent_hash: string | null;\n policy_modified: boolean;\n}\n\n/** @see the `approval` field on a runtime decision — same shape, snake_case. */\nexport interface PortableReceiptApproval {\n resolution: 'approved';\n resolved_at: string;\n /** Opaque: a role name or a per-org commitment. Never a raw user id. */\n approver_ref: string | null;\n alg: 'Ed25519';\n kid: string;\n signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The exact bytes a portable receipt's `digest` and `signature` cover.\n *\n * RFC 8785 JCS over an EXPLICITLY ENUMERATED body. This is the whole point of\n * the function, so it is worth being blunt about why: Vorim's v1 signed\n * bundles failed verification for three months in 2026 because a\n * server-stamped column leaked into a signed body that was built by\n * spreading a database row. Every field below is listed by hand. Adding one\n * means bumping `version` — never widening this object in place, and never\n * signing \"the row minus a few keys\".\n *\n * `digest`, `signature`, `kid` and `alg` are excluded: they are the output of\n * this computation, not inputs to it.\n */\nexport function portableReceiptCanonicalBytes(receipt: PortableSignedReceipt): string {\n return jcsCanonicalise({\n version: receipt.version,\n org_id: receipt.org_id,\n issued_at: receipt.issued_at,\n canonical_form: receipt.canonical_form,\n decision: {\n decision_id: receipt.decision.decision_id,\n verdict: receipt.decision.verdict,\n agent_id: receipt.decision.agent_id,\n required_scope: receipt.decision.required_scope,\n action_type: receipt.decision.action_type,\n action_target: receipt.decision.action_target,\n policy_version: receipt.decision.policy_version,\n decision_rule_id: receipt.decision.decision_rule_id,\n requested_at: receipt.decision.requested_at,\n expires_at: receipt.decision.expires_at,\n },\n binding: {\n original_intent_hash: receipt.binding.original_intent_hash,\n effective_intent_hash: receipt.binding.effective_intent_hash,\n policy_modified: receipt.binding.policy_modified,\n },\n approval: receipt.approval === null ? null : {\n resolution: receipt.approval.resolution,\n resolved_at: receipt.approval.resolved_at,\n approver_ref: receipt.approval.approver_ref,\n alg: receipt.approval.alg,\n kid: receipt.approval.kid,\n signature: receipt.approval.signature,\n },\n });\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// VORIM — Payload commitments\n//\n// WHY THIS EXISTS. `input_hash` and `output_hash` have always let a caller\n// send a digest instead of a prompt, so agent content never had to reach\n// Vorim. The digest format was a bare `sha256:<hex>`, and a bare SHA-256 of a\n// prompt is not a commitment — it is a lookup key. Prompts are low-entropy\n// and usually templated: given the digest and the template, an attacker (or\n// Vorim, or anyone who obtains an export) recovers the content by trying\n// candidates until a hash matches. Nothing about that is exotic; it is the\n// same reason unsalted password hashes fail.\n//\n// So \"we never see your prompts\" was true of the wire and false of the maths.\n// These helpers close that gap.\n//\n// WHAT TO USE. `commitPayload(content, key)` produces `hmac-sha256:<hex>`\n// under a key you hold and never send us. Without the key the digest is\n// unlinkable to any candidate content, so an exported bundle discloses that\n// an action happened and nothing about what was in it. You can still prove\n// the link later, to an auditor or a counterparty, by revealing the content\n// and the key and letting them recompute.\n//\n// `hashPayload` remains available and remains a bare SHA-256. It is correct\n// for content that is already high-entropy (a file digest, a random id) and\n// wrong for anything a person wrote. It is not deprecated, it is narrower\n// than it looks.\n//\n// FORMAT. Digests are `<alg>:<hex>` and the algorithm label travels with the\n// value, so a verifier reading a bundle years from now can tell a keyed\n// commitment from a bare hash without being told out of band, and a future\n// algorithm can be added without a migration.\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Prefix used for keyed commitments. */\nexport const HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX = 'hmac-sha256:';\n/** Prefix used for bare digests. */\nexport const SHA256_PREFIX = 'sha256:';\n\n/**\n * Key material for a payload commitment. Never transmitted by the SDK.\n *\n * A string is UTF-8 encoded. Prefer at least 32 bytes from a CSPRNG, held\n * wherever you already hold secrets. One key per org is fine; one per agent\n * or per tenant narrows what a single leaked key exposes.\n */\nexport type CommitmentKey = string | Uint8Array;\n\nfunction toBytes(v: string | Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n return typeof v === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(v) : v;\n}\n\nfunction toHex(buf: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n return Array.from(buf instanceof Uint8Array ? buf : new Uint8Array(buf))\n .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n .join('');\n}\n\n/**\n * Bare SHA-256 digest of `content`, as `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * Correct only when `content` has enough entropy that guessing it is\n * infeasible. For prompts, responses, tool arguments or anything else a\n * human or a model wrote, use {@link commitPayload} instead.\n */\nexport async function hashPayload(content: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n const bytes = toBytes(content);\n const subtle = (globalThis as any).crypto?.subtle;\n if (subtle) {\n return SHA256_PREFIX + toHex(await subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes));\n }\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return SHA256_PREFIX + nodeCrypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex');\n}\n\n/**\n * Keyed commitment to `content`, as `hmac-sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * `key` never leaves this process. Vorim stores and signs over the digest\n * with no way to test a candidate plaintext against it.\n *\n * To disclose later, hand the verifier the content and the key; they\n * recompute and compare. Disclosure is per-key, so a key scoped to one agent\n * or one tenant lets you open that subset without opening the rest.\n *\n * Rotating the key does not invalidate past events. Old digests stay\n * verifiable under the old key, which is why the key you used has to be\n * retained for as long as you might need to prove the events it covers.\n */\nexport async function commitPayload(\n content: string | Uint8Array,\n key: CommitmentKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n const keyBytes = toBytes(key);\n if (keyBytes.length === 0) {\n // An empty key is an HMAC with a known key, which is a bare hash wearing\n // a different prefix. Fail rather than emit something that looks keyed.\n throw new Error(\n 'commitPayload: key must not be empty. An empty key makes the commitment ' +\n 'no stronger than hashPayload while labelling it as keyed.',\n );\n }\n const bytes = toBytes(content);\n\n const subtle = (globalThis as any).crypto?.subtle;\n if (subtle) {\n const cryptoKey = await subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n keyBytes,\n { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n false,\n ['sign'],\n );\n const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', cryptoKey, bytes);\n return HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX + toHex(sig);\n }\n\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX + nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', keyBytes).update(bytes).digest('hex');\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `digest` is a keyed commitment rather than a bare hash.\n *\n * Useful in a review or an export check: a bundle whose `input_hash` values\n * are all `sha256:` carries content that a determined reader may be able to\n * recover, and that is worth knowing before the bundle leaves the building.\n */\nexport function isKeyedCommitment(digest: unknown): boolean {\n return typeof digest === 'string' && digest.startsWith(HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX);\n}\n\n/** Shape of any digest this SDK will put in a hash field. */\nconst DIGEST_RE = /^(?:sha256|hmac-sha256):[0-9a-f]{64}$/;\n\n/**\n * True when `digest` is a well-formed `<alg>:<64 hex>` value in a form the\n * server and `@vorim/verify` both understand.\n */\nexport function isDigest(digest: unknown): boolean {\n return typeof digest === 'string' && DIGEST_RE.test(digest);\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// Vorim AI — HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) + Content-Digest (RFC 9530)\n//\n// A general RFC 9421 signer and verifier. Any HTTP request can be signed over a\n// chosen set of components (derived components such as @method, @target-uri,\n// @authority, @path, @query, @query-param, and any header field), and verified\n// against a public key or a key resolver.\n//\n// Algorithms: `ed25519` (RFC 8032) and `ecdsa-p256-sha256` (FIPS 186-5, raw\n// r||s). The algorithm is never hard-coded: it is read from the key material,\n// and when an `alg` parameter is present it must agree with the key. P-256 is\n// here because hardware key stores (iOS Secure Enclave, Android StrongBox) hold\n// P-256, not Ed25519.\n//\n// Runtime: uses Web Crypto when present (browsers, Workers, Deno, Bun, Node 20+)\n// and falls back to node:crypto otherwise. No dependencies.\n//\n// Usage:\n// import { signHttpRequest, verifyHttpRequest } from '@vorim/sdk/http-signatures';\n//\n// const { headers } = await signHttpRequest(\n// { method: 'POST', url: 'https://api.example.com/orders',\n// headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body },\n// { privateKey: pem, keyid: 'agid_abc123' },\n// );\n// await fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers }, body });\n//\n// const result = await verifyHttpRequest(incoming, { publicKey: spkiPem });\n// ============================================================================\n\nexport type HttpSignatureAlgorithm = 'ed25519' | 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\nexport type ContentDigestAlgorithm = 'sha-256' | 'sha-512';\n\n/** A request as seen by the signer or verifier. */\nexport interface HttpRequestLike {\n method: string;\n /** Absolute URL, e.g. https://api.example.com/path?x=1 */\n url: string;\n /** Header fields. Names are matched case-insensitively. Repeated fields may be given as an array. */\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n /** Message content. Used for Content-Digest. */\n body?: string | Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * A message for {@link createSignatureBase}. A request, or a response when\n * `status` is set (then `request` supplies the context for `;req` components).\n */\nexport interface HttpMessageLike {\n method?: string;\n url?: string;\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n body?: string | Uint8Array;\n status?: number;\n request?: HttpRequestLike;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signature parameters. Serialized in the object's own key order, which the\n * signer chooses and the verifier must keep.\n */\nexport interface SignatureParams {\n created?: number;\n expires?: number;\n nonce?: string;\n alg?: string;\n keyid?: string;\n tag?: string;\n [extra: string]: string | number | boolean | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface SignHttpRequestOptions {\n /** PKCS#8 PEM private key (Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256). */\n privateKey: string;\n /** Default: inferred from the key. Throws if it conflicts with the key. */\n alg?: HttpSignatureAlgorithm;\n keyid?: string;\n /** Dictionary label for Signature-Input / Signature. Default 'sig1'. */\n label?: string;\n /**\n * Covered components, e.g. ['@method', '@target-uri', 'content-type',\n * '@query-param;name=\"id\"']. Default: @method, @target-uri, @authority,\n * plus content-type when that header is present. When a body is given,\n * content-digest is always added.\n */\n components?: string[];\n /** Unix seconds. Default: now. */\n created?: number;\n /** Unix seconds. Default created + 300. Pass null to omit. */\n expires?: number | null;\n nonce?: string;\n tag?: string;\n /** Include the alg parameter. Default true. */\n includeAlg?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface SignHttpRequestResult {\n headers: {\n 'Signature-Input': string;\n 'Signature': string;\n 'Content-Digest'?: string;\n };\n signatureBase: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n /** SPKI PEM public key. */\n publicKey: string;\n alg?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyHttpRequestOptions {\n /** SPKI PEM public key. Either this or resolveKey is required. */\n publicKey?: string;\n /** Look up the key by the signature's keyid. */\n resolveKey?: (keyid: string | undefined) => Promise<ResolvedKey | null | undefined> | ResolvedKey | null | undefined;\n /** Which signature to check. Default: the first label in Signature-Input. */\n label?: string;\n /** Reject when now - created exceeds this. Requires a created parameter. */\n maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n /** Unix seconds, for tests. Default: now. */\n now?: number;\n /** Component identifiers that must be covered, e.g. ['@method', 'content-digest']. */\n requiredComponents?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyHttpRequestResult {\n valid: boolean;\n reason?: string;\n label: string;\n keyid?: string;\n alg?: string;\n covered: string[];\n created?: number;\n expires?: number;\n /** True only when content-digest was covered, a body was supplied, and it was recomputed. */\n contentDigestChecked: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Tolerated clock skew for a `created` in the future, in seconds. */\nconst FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;\n\nexport class HttpSignatureError extends Error {\n constructor(message: string) {\n super(message);\n this.name = 'HttpSignatureError';\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Structured Fields (RFC 8941), the subset RFC 9421 needs ───────────────\n\ntype BareItem =\n | { t: 'int'; v: number }\n | { t: 'dec'; v: number }\n | { t: 'str'; v: string }\n | { t: 'tok'; v: string }\n | { t: 'bool'; v: boolean }\n | { t: 'bin'; v: Uint8Array };\n\ntype Params = Array<[string, BareItem]>;\ninterface SfItem { kind: 'item'; value: BareItem; params: Params }\ninterface SfInnerList { kind: 'list'; items: SfItem[]; params: Params }\ntype SfMember = SfItem | SfInnerList;\n\nclass SfParser {\n i = 0;\n constructor(private s: string) {}\n\n fail(msg: string): never {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`structured field parse error: ${msg} at ${this.i}`);\n }\n peek(): string { return this.s[this.i]; }\n eof(): boolean { return this.i >= this.s.length; }\n skipSP(): void { while (this.s[this.i] === ' ') this.i++; }\n skipOWS(): void { while (this.s[this.i] === ' ' || this.s[this.i] === '\\t') this.i++; }\n\n parseDictionary(): Array<[string, SfMember]> {\n const out: Array<[string, SfMember]> = [];\n this.skipSP();\n if (this.eof()) return out;\n for (;;) {\n const key = this.parseKey();\n let member: SfMember;\n if (this.peek() === '=') {\n this.i++;\n member = this.parseItemOrInnerList();\n } else {\n member = { kind: 'item', value: { t: 'bool', v: true }, params: this.parseParams() };\n }\n const existing = out.findIndex(([k]) => k === key);\n if (existing >= 0) out[existing] = [key, member];\n else out.push([key, member]);\n this.skipOWS();\n if (this.eof()) return out;\n if (this.peek() !== ',') this.fail('expected \",\"');\n this.i++;\n this.skipOWS();\n if (this.eof()) this.fail('trailing \",\"');\n }\n }\n\n parseItemOrInnerList(): SfMember {\n if (this.peek() === '(') return this.parseInnerList();\n return this.parseItem();\n }\n\n parseInnerList(): SfInnerList {\n if (this.peek() !== '(') this.fail('expected \"(\"');\n this.i++;\n const items: SfItem[] = [];\n for (;;) {\n this.skipSP();\n if (this.peek() === ')') {\n this.i++;\n return { kind: 'list', items, params: this.parseParams() };\n }\n if (this.eof()) this.fail('unterminated inner list');\n items.push(this.parseItem());\n const c = this.peek();\n if (c !== ' ' && c !== ')') this.fail('expected SP or \")\"');\n }\n }\n\n parseItem(): SfItem {\n const value = this.parseBareItem();\n return { kind: 'item', value, params: this.parseParams() };\n }\n\n parseParams(): Params {\n const out: Params = [];\n while (this.peek() === ';') {\n this.i++;\n this.skipSP();\n const key = this.parseKey();\n let value: BareItem = { t: 'bool', v: true };\n if (this.peek() === '=') {\n this.i++;\n value = this.parseBareItem();\n }\n const existing = out.findIndex(([k]) => k === key);\n if (existing >= 0) out[existing] = [key, value];\n else out.push([key, value]);\n }\n return out;\n }\n\n parseKey(): string {\n const m = /^[a-z*][a-z0-9_\\-.*]*/.exec(this.s.slice(this.i));\n if (!m) this.fail('expected key');\n this.i += m[0].length;\n return m[0];\n }\n\n parseBareItem(): BareItem {\n const c = this.peek();\n if (c === '\"') return this.parseString();\n if (c === ':') return this.parseBytes();\n if (c === '?') {\n const v = this.s[this.i + 1];\n if (v !== '0' && v !== '1') this.fail('bad boolean');\n this.i += 2;\n return { t: 'bool', v: v === '1' };\n }\n if (c === '-' || (c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {\n const m = /^-?\\d{1,15}(\\.\\d{1,3})?/.exec(this.s.slice(this.i));\n if (!m) this.fail('bad number');\n this.i += m[0].length;\n return m[1] ? { t: 'dec', v: Number(m[0]) } : { t: 'int', v: Number(m[0]) };\n }\n const tm = /^[A-Za-z*][!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z:/]*/.exec(this.s.slice(this.i));\n if (tm) {\n this.i += tm[0].length;\n return { t: 'tok', v: tm[0] };\n }\n this.fail('unexpected character');\n }\n\n parseString(): BareItem {\n this.i++;\n let out = '';\n for (;;) {\n if (this.eof()) this.fail('unterminated string');\n const c = this.s[this.i++];\n if (c === '\\\\') {\n const n = this.s[this.i++];\n if (n !== '\"' && n !== '\\\\') this.fail('bad escape');\n out += n;\n } else if (c === '\"') {\n return { t: 'str', v: out };\n } else {\n const code = c.charCodeAt(0);\n if (code < 0x20 || code > 0x7e) this.fail('non-printable in string');\n out += c;\n }\n }\n }\n\n parseBytes(): BareItem {\n this.i++;\n const end = this.s.indexOf(':', this.i);\n if (end < 0) this.fail('unterminated byte sequence');\n const b64 = this.s.slice(this.i, end);\n if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/.test(b64)) this.fail('bad base64');\n this.i = end + 1;\n return { t: 'bin', v: base64ToBytes(b64) };\n }\n}\n\nfunction serializeBareItem(b: BareItem): string {\n switch (b.t) {\n case 'int': return String(Math.trunc(b.v));\n case 'dec': {\n const r = Math.round(b.v * 1000) / 1000;\n return Number.isInteger(r) ? `${r}.0` : String(r);\n }\n case 'str': return serializeString(b.v);\n case 'tok': return b.v;\n case 'bool': return b.v ? '?1' : '?0';\n case 'bin': return `:${bytesToBase64(b.v)}:`;\n }\n}\n\nfunction serializeString(v: string): string {\n if (!/^[\\x20-\\x7e]*$/.test(v)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`string parameter must be printable ASCII: ${JSON.stringify(v)}`);\n return `\"${v.replace(/\\\\/g, '\\\\\\\\').replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`;\n}\n\nfunction serializeParams(params: Params): string {\n return params\n .map(([k, v]) => (v.t === 'bool' && v.v === true ? `;${k}` : `;${k}=${serializeBareItem(v)}`))\n .join('');\n}\n\nfunction serializeItem(item: SfItem): string {\n return serializeBareItem(item.value) + serializeParams(item.params);\n}\n\nfunction serializeInnerList(list: SfInnerList): string {\n return `(${list.items.map(serializeItem).join(' ')})${serializeParams(list.params)}`;\n}\n\n// ─── Component identifiers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ComponentId {\n name: string;\n params: Params;\n}\n\nconst DERIVED = new Set([\n '@method', '@target-uri', '@authority', '@scheme', '@request-target',\n '@path', '@query', '@query-param', '@status',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Parse a component identifier given as `name`, `name;param=...`, or the\n * serialized form `\"name\";param=...`. Field names are lowercased.\n */\nfunction parseComponent(input: string): ComponentId {\n const s = input.trim();\n let name: string;\n let params: Params;\n if (s.startsWith('\"')) {\n const p = new SfParser(s);\n const item = p.parseItem();\n if (!p.eof()) throw new HttpSignatureError(`bad component identifier: ${input}`);\n if (item.value.t !== 'str') throw new HttpSignatureError(`bad component identifier: ${input}`);\n name = item.value.v;\n params = item.params;\n } else {\n const semi = s.indexOf(';');\n name = semi < 0 ? s : s.slice(0, semi);\n const p = new SfParser(semi < 0 ? '' : s.slice(semi));\n params = p.parseParams();\n if (!p.eof()) throw new HttpSignatureError(`bad component identifier: ${input}`);\n }\n if (!name) throw new HttpSignatureError('empty component name');\n if (!name.startsWith('@')) name = name.toLowerCase();\n return { name, params };\n}\n\nfunction serializeComponent(c: ComponentId): string {\n return serializeString(c.name) + serializeParams(c.params);\n}\n\n/** Equality key: parameter order is not significant for duplicate detection. */\nfunction componentKey(c: ComponentId): string {\n const sorted = [...c.params].sort(([a], [b]) => (a < b ? -1 : a > b ? 1 : 0));\n return serializeString(c.name) + serializeParams(sorted);\n}\n\nfunction componentToItem(c: ComponentId): SfItem {\n return { kind: 'item', value: { t: 'str', v: c.name }, params: c.params };\n}\n\n// ─── Component values ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction fieldValues(headers: HttpMessageLike['headers'], name: string): string[] | null {\n const out: string[] = [];\n let found = false;\n for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers ?? {})) {\n if (k.toLowerCase() !== name || v === undefined || v === null) continue;\n found = true;\n for (const one of Array.isArray(v) ? v : [v]) out.push(String(one));\n }\n return found ? out : null;\n}\n\nfunction cleanFieldValue(v: string): string {\n return v.replace(/\\r?\\n[ \\t]+/g, ' ').trim();\n}\n\n// application/x-www-form-urlencoded percent-encode set, with space as %20\n// (RFC 9421 §2.2.8 examples). Leaves only ALPHA / DIGIT / * - . _ unencoded.\nfunction formPercentEncode(s: string): string {\n const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(s);\n let out = '';\n for (const b of bytes) {\n const ch = String.fromCharCode(b);\n if (/[A-Za-z0-9*\\-._]/.test(ch)) out += ch;\n else out += '%' + b.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(2, '0');\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction parseUrl(url: string | undefined, what: string): URL {\n if (!url) throw new HttpSignatureError(`${what} requires the message url`);\n try {\n return new URL(url);\n } catch {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`invalid url: ${url}`);\n }\n}\n\nfunction derivedValue(c: ComponentId, msg: HttpMessageLike, isResponse: boolean): string {\n const nameParam = c.params.find(([k]) => k === 'name');\n if (c.name !== '@query-param' && nameParam) throw new HttpSignatureError(`parameter \"name\" is not valid on ${c.name}`);\n switch (c.name) {\n case '@method':\n if (isResponse || !msg.method) throw new HttpSignatureError('@method requires a request');\n return msg.method;\n case '@target-uri': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@target-uri requires a request');\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@target-uri');\n u.hash = '';\n return u.href;\n }\n case '@authority':\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@authority requires a request');\n return parseUrl(msg.url, '@authority').host.toLowerCase();\n case '@scheme':\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@scheme requires a request');\n return parseUrl(msg.url, '@scheme').protocol.replace(/:$/, '').toLowerCase();\n case '@request-target': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@request-target requires a request');\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@request-target');\n return (u.pathname || '/') + u.search;\n }\n case '@path':\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@path requires a request');\n return parseUrl(msg.url, '@path').pathname || '/';\n case '@query': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@query requires a request');\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@query');\n return u.search || '?';\n }\n case '@query-param': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@query-param requires a request');\n if (!nameParam || nameParam[1].t !== 'str') throw new HttpSignatureError('@query-param requires a name parameter (String)');\n const wanted = nameParam[1].v;\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@query-param');\n const matches: string[] = [];\n for (const [n, v] of new URLSearchParams(u.search)) {\n if (formPercentEncode(n) === wanted) matches.push(v);\n }\n if (matches.length === 0) throw new HttpSignatureError(`query parameter \"${wanted}\" not found`);\n if (matches.length > 1) throw new HttpSignatureError(`query parameter \"${wanted}\" occurs more than once and cannot be signed individually`);\n return formPercentEncode(matches[0]);\n }\n case '@status':\n if (!isResponse || msg.status === undefined) throw new HttpSignatureError('@status is only valid on a response');\n return String(Math.trunc(msg.status)).padStart(3, '0');\n default:\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`unknown derived component ${c.name}`);\n }\n}\n\nconst FIELD_PARAMS = new Set(['req', 'bs']);\nconst DERIVED_PARAMS = new Set(['req', 'name']);\nconst UNSUPPORTED_FIELD_PARAMS = new Set(['sf', 'key', 'tr']);\n\nfunction componentValue(c: ComponentId, message: HttpMessageLike): string {\n const isDerived = c.name.startsWith('@');\n if (c.name === '@signature-params') throw new HttpSignatureError('@signature-params cannot be a covered component');\n if (isDerived && !DERIVED.has(c.name)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`unknown derived component ${c.name}`);\n for (const [k, v] of c.params) {\n const allowed = isDerived ? DERIVED_PARAMS : FIELD_PARAMS;\n if (!allowed.has(k)) {\n if (!isDerived && UNSUPPORTED_FIELD_PARAMS.has(k)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component parameter \"${k}\" is not supported`);\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`unknown component parameter \"${k}\" on ${c.name}`);\n }\n if ((k === 'req' || k === 'bs') && !(v.t === 'bool' && v.v === true)) {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`component parameter \"${k}\" must be a true Boolean`);\n }\n }\n\n let target = message;\n let isResponse = message.status !== undefined;\n if (c.params.some(([k]) => k === 'req')) {\n if (!isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} has the req parameter but the message is a request`);\n if (!message.request) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} has the req parameter but no related request was given`);\n target = message.request;\n isResponse = false;\n }\n\n let value: string;\n if (isDerived) {\n value = derivedValue(c, target, isResponse);\n } else {\n const raw = fieldValues(target.headers, c.name);\n if (raw === null) throw new HttpSignatureError(`header field \"${c.name}\" is missing`);\n if (c.params.some(([k]) => k === 'bs')) {\n value = raw\n .map((v) => `:${bytesToBase64(new TextEncoder().encode(cleanFieldValue(v)))}:`)\n .join(', ');\n } else {\n value = raw.map(cleanFieldValue).join(', ');\n }\n }\n if (/[\\r\\n]/.test(value)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} contains a newline`);\n if (!/^[\\x20-\\x7e\\t]*$/.test(value)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} contains non-ASCII characters`);\n return value;\n}\n\n// ─── Signature base ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction paramsFromObject(params: SignatureParams): Params {\n const out: Params = [];\n for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(params ?? {})) {\n if (v === undefined || v === null) continue;\n if (!/^[a-z*][a-z0-9_\\-.*]*$/.test(k)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`invalid signature parameter name \"${k}\"`);\n if (typeof v === 'number') {\n if (!Number.isInteger(v)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`signature parameter \"${k}\" must be an integer`);\n out.push([k, { t: 'int', v }]);\n } else if (typeof v === 'boolean') {\n out.push([k, { t: 'bool', v }]);\n } else {\n out.push([k, { t: 'str', v: String(v) }]);\n }\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction buildBase(message: HttpMessageLike, components: ComponentId[], params: Params): { base: string; signatureParams: string } {\n const seen = new Set<string>();\n const lines: string[] = [];\n for (const c of components) {\n const key = componentKey(c);\n if (seen.has(key)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`duplicate component ${serializeComponent(c)}`);\n seen.add(key);\n lines.push(`${serializeComponent(c)}: ${componentValue(c, message)}`);\n }\n const signatureParams = serializeInnerList({ kind: 'list', items: components.map(componentToItem), params });\n lines.push(`\"@signature-params\": ${signatureParams}`);\n const base = lines.join('\\n');\n if (!/^[\\x20-\\x7e\\t\\n]*$/.test(base)) throw new HttpSignatureError('signature base is not ASCII');\n return { base, signatureParams };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the RFC 9421 signature base for a message.\n *\n * `components` are identifiers such as '@method', 'content-type' or\n * '@query-param;name=\"id\"'. `params` are serialized in their key order.\n * Throws {@link HttpSignatureError} on a duplicate, missing or invalid component.\n */\nexport function createSignatureBase(\n message: HttpMessageLike,\n components: string[],\n params: SignatureParams = {},\n): string {\n return buildBase(message, components.map(parseComponent), paramsFromObject(params)).base;\n}\n\n// ─── Encoding helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n let s = '';\n for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) s += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);\n return btoa(s);\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n const raw = atob(b64);\n const out = new Uint8Array(raw.length);\n for (let i = 0; i < raw.length; i++) out[i] = raw.charCodeAt(i);\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction toBytes(body: string | Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n return typeof body === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(body) : body;\n}\n\nfunction pemToDer(pem: string): Uint8Array {\n const body = pem.replace(/-----BEGIN [^-]+-----/, '').replace(/-----END [^-]+-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '');\n if (!body) throw new HttpSignatureError('empty PEM');\n return base64ToBytes(body);\n}\n\nfunction toArrayBuffer(bytes: Uint8Array): ArrayBuffer {\n const out = new ArrayBuffer(bytes.length);\n new Uint8Array(out).set(bytes);\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n if (a.length !== b.length) return false;\n let d = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) d |= a[i] ^ b[i];\n return d === 0;\n}\n\n// ─── Crypto (Web Crypto first, node:crypto fallback) ───────────────────────\n\nconst OID_ED25519 = [0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70];\nconst OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY = [0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01];\nconst OID_P256 = [0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07];\n\nfunction hasSeq(hay: Uint8Array, needle: number[]): boolean {\n outer: for (let i = 0; i + needle.length <= hay.length; i++) {\n for (let j = 0; j < needle.length; j++) if (hay[i + j] !== needle[j]) continue outer;\n return true;\n }\n return false;\n}\n\n/** Algorithm implied by a PKCS#8 or SPKI key (DER). */\nfunction algFromKeyDer(der: Uint8Array): HttpSignatureAlgorithm {\n // Only the AlgorithmIdentifier prefix is examined, so key bytes cannot\n // accidentally match an OID.\n const head = der.slice(0, 32);\n if (hasSeq(head, OID_ED25519)) return 'ed25519';\n if (hasSeq(head, OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY)) {\n if (hasSeq(der.slice(0, 40), OID_P256)) return 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\n throw new HttpSignatureError('unsupported EC curve (only P-256 is supported)');\n }\n throw new HttpSignatureError('unsupported key type (Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256 required)');\n}\n\n/** The HTTP signature algorithm implied by a PEM key (PKCS#8 or SPKI). */\nexport function httpSignatureAlgForKey(pem: string): HttpSignatureAlgorithm {\n return algFromKeyDer(pemToDer(pem));\n}\n\n// Minimal structural type for Web Crypto's SubtleCrypto, so this module does\n// not depend on the DOM lib being in the consumer's tsconfig.\ninterface SubtleLike {\n importKey(format: 'pkcs8' | 'spki', keyData: ArrayBuffer, algorithm: any, extractable: boolean, usages: string[]): Promise<any>;\n sign(algorithm: any, key: any, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<ArrayBuffer>;\n verify(algorithm: any, key: any, signature: ArrayBuffer, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<boolean>;\n digest(algorithm: string, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<ArrayBuffer>;\n}\n\nfunction subtle(): SubtleLike | undefined {\n return (globalThis as { crypto?: { subtle?: SubtleLike } }).crypto?.subtle;\n}\n\nasync function digestBytes(alg: ContentDigestAlgorithm, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n const s = subtle();\n if (s) return new Uint8Array(await s.digest(alg === 'sha-256' ? 'SHA-256' : 'SHA-512', toArrayBuffer(data)));\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.createHash(alg === 'sha-256' ? 'sha256' : 'sha512').update(data).digest());\n}\n\nasync function signBytes(alg: HttpSignatureAlgorithm, privateKeyPem: string, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n const s = subtle();\n if (s) {\n const der = toArrayBuffer(pemToDer(privateKeyPem));\n if (alg === 'ed25519') {\n const key = await s.importKey('pkcs8', der, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['sign']);\n return new Uint8Array(await s.sign('Ed25519', key, toArrayBuffer(data)));\n }\n const key = await s.importKey('pkcs8', der, { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, false, ['sign']);\n // Web Crypto returns ECDSA signatures as raw r||s, which is what RFC 9421 wants.\n return new Uint8Array(await s.sign({ name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' }, key, toArrayBuffer(data)));\n }\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n if (alg === 'ed25519') return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.sign(null, data, privateKeyPem));\n return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.sign('sha256', data, { key: privateKeyPem, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }));\n}\n\nasync function verifyBytes(alg: HttpSignatureAlgorithm, publicKeyPem: string, data: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {\n if (sig.length !== 64) return false;\n const s = subtle();\n if (s) {\n const der = toArrayBuffer(pemToDer(publicKeyPem));\n if (alg === 'ed25519') {\n const key = await s.importKey('spki', der, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['verify']);\n return s.verify('Ed25519', key, toArrayBuffer(sig), toArrayBuffer(data));\n }\n const key = await s.importKey('spki', der, { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, false, ['verify']);\n return s.verify({ name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' }, key, toArrayBuffer(sig), toArrayBuffer(data));\n }\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n if (alg === 'ed25519') return nodeCrypto.verify(null, data, publicKeyPem, sig);\n return nodeCrypto.verify('sha256', data, { key: publicKeyPem, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, sig);\n}\n\n// ─── Content-Digest (RFC 9530) ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * RFC 9530 Content-Digest field value for a body, e.g.\n * `sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:`.\n */\nexport async function contentDigest(body: string | Uint8Array, alg: ContentDigestAlgorithm = 'sha-256'): Promise<string> {\n if (alg !== 'sha-256' && alg !== 'sha-512') throw new HttpSignatureError(`unsupported digest algorithm ${alg}`);\n return `${alg}=:${bytesToBase64(await digestBytes(alg, toBytes(body)))}:`;\n}\n\n/** Check a Content-Digest field value against a body. Returns a reason on failure. */\nasync function checkContentDigest(fieldValue: string, body: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string | null> {\n let dict: Array<[string, SfMember]>;\n try {\n dict = new SfParser(fieldValue).parseDictionary();\n } catch {\n return 'Content-Digest is not a valid structured field';\n }\n const bytes = toBytes(body);\n let checked = 0;\n for (const [alg, member] of dict) {\n if (alg !== 'sha-256' && alg !== 'sha-512') continue;\n if (member.kind !== 'item' || member.value.t !== 'bin') return `Content-Digest ${alg} is not a byte sequence`;\n const actual = await digestBytes(alg, bytes);\n if (!constantTimeEqual(actual, member.value.v)) return `Content-Digest ${alg} does not match the body`;\n checked++;\n }\n return checked > 0 ? null : 'Content-Digest has no supported algorithm (sha-256 or sha-512)';\n}\n\n// ─── Sign ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst LABEL_RE = /^[a-z*][a-z0-9_\\-.*]*$/;\n\n/**\n * Sign an HTTP request per RFC 9421. Returns the Signature-Input and Signature\n * headers (and Content-Digest when a body is given) to add to the request.\n */\nexport async function signHttpRequest(\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: SignHttpRequestOptions,\n): Promise<SignHttpRequestResult> {\n if (!options?.privateKey) throw new HttpSignatureError('signHttpRequest requires privateKey (PKCS#8 PEM)');\n const label = options.label ?? 'sig1';\n if (!LABEL_RE.test(label)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`invalid label \"${label}\"`);\n\n const keyAlg = httpSignatureAlgForKey(options.privateKey);\n if (options.alg && options.alg !== keyAlg) {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`alg \"${options.alg}\" does not match the private key (${keyAlg})`);\n }\n const alg = keyAlg;\n\n const headers: HttpRequestLike['headers'] = { ...(request.headers ?? {}) };\n const hasBody = request.body !== undefined && request.body !== null;\n let digestHeader: string | undefined;\n if (hasBody) {\n digestHeader = await contentDigest(request.body as string | Uint8Array, 'sha-256');\n for (const k of Object.keys(headers)) if (k.toLowerCase() === 'content-digest') delete headers[k];\n headers['content-digest'] = digestHeader;\n }\n\n let componentStrs: string[];\n if (options.components) {\n componentStrs = [...options.components];\n } else {\n componentStrs = ['@method', '@target-uri', '@authority'];\n if (fieldValues(headers, 'content-type') !== null) componentStrs.push('content-type');\n }\n const components = componentStrs.map(parseComponent);\n if (hasBody && !components.some((c) => c.name === 'content-digest' && c.params.length === 0)) {\n components.push({ name: 'content-digest', params: [] });\n }\n\n const created = options.created ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n const expires = options.expires === null ? undefined : (options.expires ?? created + 300);\n const params: SignatureParams = { created };\n if (expires !== undefined) params.expires = expires;\n if (options.nonce !== undefined) params.nonce = options.nonce;\n if (options.includeAlg !== false) params.alg = alg;\n if (options.keyid !== undefined) params.keyid = options.keyid;\n if (options.tag !== undefined) params.tag = options.tag;\n\n const { base, signatureParams } = buildBase(\n { method: request.method, url: request.url, headers, body: request.body },\n components,\n paramsFromObject(params),\n );\n const sig = await signBytes(alg, options.privateKey, new TextEncoder().encode(base));\n\n const out: SignHttpRequestResult['headers'] = {\n 'Signature-Input': `${label}=${signatureParams}`,\n 'Signature': `${label}=:${bytesToBase64(sig)}:`,\n };\n if (digestHeader) out['Content-Digest'] = digestHeader;\n return { headers: out, signatureBase: base };\n}\n\n// ─── Verify ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst SUPPORTED_ALGS = new Set<string>(['ed25519', 'ecdsa-p256-sha256']);\n\n/**\n * Verify an RFC 9421 signature on a request. Never throws for a bad signature;\n * returns `{ valid: false, reason }`. Throws only when neither publicKey nor\n * resolveKey is given.\n */\nexport async function verifyHttpRequest(\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: VerifyHttpRequestOptions,\n): Promise<VerifyHttpRequestResult> {\n if (!options?.publicKey && !options?.resolveKey) {\n throw new HttpSignatureError('verifyHttpRequest requires publicKey or resolveKey');\n }\n const result: VerifyHttpRequestResult = {\n valid: false,\n label: options.label ?? '',\n covered: [],\n contentDigestChecked: false,\n };\n const fail = (reason: string): VerifyHttpRequestResult => ({ ...result, valid: false, reason });\n\n const inputRaw = fieldValues(request.headers, 'signature-input');\n const sigRaw = fieldValues(request.headers, 'signature');\n if (!inputRaw) return fail('missing Signature-Input header');\n if (!sigRaw) return fail('missing Signature header');\n\n let inputs: Array<[string, SfMember]>;\n let sigs: Array<[string, SfMember]>;\n try {\n inputs = new SfParser(inputRaw.map(cleanFieldValue).join(', ')).parseDictionary();\n sigs = new SfParser(sigRaw.map(cleanFieldValue).join(', ')).parseDictionary();\n } catch (e) {\n return fail(`malformed signature headers: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n }\n\n const label = options.label ?? inputs[0]?.[0];\n if (!label) return fail('Signature-Input has no signatures');\n result.label = label;\n const input = inputs.find(([k]) => k === label)?.[1];\n const sigMember = sigs.find(([k]) => k === label)?.[1];\n if (!input) return fail(`no Signature-Input for label \"${label}\"`);\n if (!sigMember) return fail(`no Signature for label \"${label}\"`);\n if (input.kind !== 'list') return fail('Signature-Input member is not an inner list');\n if (sigMember.kind !== 'item' || sigMember.value.t !== 'bin') return fail('Signature member is not a byte sequence');\n\n const components: ComponentId[] = [];\n for (const item of input.items) {\n if (item.value.t !== 'str') return fail('covered component is not a string');\n components.push({ name: item.value.v, params: item.params });\n }\n result.covered = components.map(serializeComponent);\n\n const p = new Map(input.params);\n const getInt = (k: string): number | undefined | null => {\n const v = p.get(k);\n if (v === undefined) return undefined;\n return v.t === 'int' ? v.v : null;\n };\n const getStr = (k: string): string | undefined | null => {\n const v = p.get(k);\n if (v === undefined) return undefined;\n return v.t === 'str' ? v.v : null;\n };\n const created = getInt('created');\n const expires = getInt('expires');\n const keyid = getStr('keyid');\n const algParam = getStr('alg');\n if (created === null) return fail('created must be an integer');\n if (expires === null) return fail('expires must be an integer');\n if (keyid === null) return fail('keyid must be a string');\n if (algParam === null) return fail('alg must be a string');\n result.created = created;\n result.expires = expires;\n result.keyid = keyid;\n\n // Application requirements: required components, time window.\n if (options.requiredComponents?.length) {\n const have = new Set(components.map(componentKey));\n for (const r of options.requiredComponents) {\n let rc: ComponentId;\n try {\n rc = parseComponent(r);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail((e as Error).message);\n }\n if (!have.has(componentKey(rc))) return fail(`required component ${serializeComponent(rc)} is not covered`);\n }\n }\n const now = options.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n if (expires !== undefined && now > expires) return fail('signature has expired');\n if (created !== undefined && created > now + FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS) return fail('signature created in the future');\n if (options.maxAgeSeconds !== undefined) {\n if (created === undefined) return fail('signature has no created parameter, so its age cannot be checked');\n if (now - created > options.maxAgeSeconds) return fail('signature is older than maxAgeSeconds');\n }\n\n // Key and algorithm.\n let publicKey = options.publicKey;\n let resolvedAlg: string | undefined;\n if (!publicKey) {\n let resolved: ResolvedKey | null | undefined;\n try {\n resolved = await options.resolveKey!(keyid);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail(`key resolution failed: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n }\n if (!resolved?.publicKey) return fail(`unknown key${keyid ? ` \"${keyid}\"` : ''}`);\n publicKey = resolved.publicKey;\n resolvedAlg = resolved.alg;\n }\n let keyAlg: HttpSignatureAlgorithm;\n try {\n keyAlg = httpSignatureAlgForKey(publicKey);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail((e as Error).message);\n }\n if (algParam !== undefined && !SUPPORTED_ALGS.has(algParam)) return fail(`unsupported algorithm \"${algParam}\"`);\n if (algParam !== undefined && algParam !== keyAlg) return fail(`alg \"${algParam}\" does not match the key (${keyAlg})`);\n if (resolvedAlg !== undefined && resolvedAlg !== keyAlg) return fail(`resolved key alg \"${resolvedAlg}\" does not match the key (${keyAlg})`);\n result.alg = keyAlg;\n\n // Rebuild the base from the received message and check the signature.\n let base: string;\n try {\n base = buildBase(\n { method: request.method, url: request.url, headers: request.headers, body: request.body },\n components,\n input.params,\n ).base;\n } catch (e) {\n return fail((e as Error).message);\n }\n let ok: boolean;\n try {\n ok = await verifyBytes(keyAlg, publicKey, new TextEncoder().encode(base), sigMember.value.v);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail(`signature check failed: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n }\n if (!ok) return fail('signature does not verify');\n\n // The signature covers the Content-Digest header; that only protects the\n // body if the digest is recomputed from the body we actually received.\n const coversDigest = components.some((c) => c.name === 'content-digest');\n if (coversDigest && request.body !== undefined && request.body !== null) {\n const dv = fieldValues(request.headers, 'content-digest');\n const reason = await checkContentDigest((dv ?? []).map(cleanFieldValue).join(', '), request.body);\n if (reason) return fail(reason);\n result.contentDigestChecked = true;\n }\n\n return { ...result, valid: true };\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// VORIM SDK — TypeScript\n// Thin client wrapping the Vorim AI REST API\n// ============================================================================\n\nimport type {\n Agent, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult,\n TrustRecord, AuditEventInput, PermissionScope, PermissionCheckResult,\n AgentDelegationRecord, DelegationLinkClaims,\n BeforeActionInput, RuntimeDecision, DecisionVerdict, ApprovalAttestation,\n TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, BudgetSpend,\n WorkflowProvenanceGraph, CapabilityProfile,\n SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SharedMemoryListResult,\n SuspendPreview, SwarmView,\n} from './types.js';\nimport { jcsCanonicalise, hashPreviousEvent } from './replay.js';\nimport {\n portableReceiptCanonicalBytes,\n type PortableSignedReceipt,\n} from '@vorim/shared-types';\nimport { isDigest } from './commit.js';\nimport {\n signHttpRequest as signHttpRequestWithKey,\n type HttpRequestLike,\n type SignHttpRequestOptions,\n type SignHttpRequestResult,\n} from './httpSignatures.js';\n\n// __SDK_VERSION__ is replaced at build time (tsup define) with the package.json\n// version, so the User-Agent always matches the published version. Falls back to\n// '0.0.0' when run un-bundled (e.g. ts-node / tests) where the define isn't applied.\ndeclare const __SDK_VERSION__: string | undefined;\nconst SDK_VERSION = typeof __SDK_VERSION__ !== 'undefined' ? __SDK_VERSION__ : '0.0.0';\nconst USER_AGENT = `vorim-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/** Promise-based delay. Used by the runtime escalation poller. */\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\n}\n\nexport interface VorimConfig {\n apiKey: string;\n baseUrl?: string;\n timeout?: number;\n /**\n * Auto-sign audit events with the agent's private key at emit time.\n * Default true in v3.1+. Set to false to opt out globally.\n * When enabled, the SDK signs the event using whichever private key was\n * stored via {@link VorimSDK.useAgentKey} or returned by\n * {@link VorimSDK.register}. Events for unknown agents pass through unsigned.\n */\n autoSign?: boolean;\n /**\n * Canonical form to use when signing. Default `\"v0\"` for backward-compat\n * with `@vorim/sdk` 3.1.x. Set to `\"v1\"` to sign the full event object\n * via RFC 8785 JCS, covering replayable-evidence fields (model_version,\n * tool_catalogue_hash, system_prompt_hash, prev_event_hash). v1 events\n * carry `canonical_form: \"v1\"` on the wire so the server can dispatch\n * verification correctly.\n */\n canonicalForm?: 'v0' | 'v1';\n /**\n * Hash-chain events per agent so deletion of a single audit row\n * becomes detectable. Default `false` (no chaining). When enabled,\n * the SDK sets `prev_event_hash` on each event to SHA-256 of the\n * previous event's canonical bytes for the same agent. The first\n * event after enable / process restart has `prev_event_hash = null`,\n * which the verifier reports as `chain_restart` (informational, not\n * a failure). Chain integrity is checked by `@vorim/verify`.\n */\n chainEvents?: boolean;\n /**\n * Refuse to transmit agent content. Default `false`.\n *\n * Vorim's event schema was already digest-shaped: `input_hash`,\n * `output_hash` and `system_prompt_hash` are the fields prompts and\n * responses are meant to travel as. Nothing enforced it, though. `metadata`\n * is `Record<string, unknown>`, so a caller could put a whole prompt in it\n * without noticing, and \"we never receive your content\" was a property of\n * how you happened to call the SDK rather than a guarantee.\n *\n * With `noPayload` on, {@link VorimSDK.emit} and {@link VorimSDK.emitBatch}\n * throw before anything is sent when an event would carry content:\n *\n * - any `metadata` value that is not a string, number, boolean or null\n * (objects and arrays can nest arbitrary text)\n * - any `metadata` string longer than `maxMetadataChars` (default 256)\n * - any hash field that is not a well-formed `sha256:` / `hmac-sha256:`\n * digest, which catches a raw prompt passed to `input_hash`\n *\n * This is distinct from the server-side Zero Data Retention setting. ZDR\n * drops `metadata` at persistence, so the content still crossed the network\n * and passed through our process. `noPayload` means it never left yours.\n * Enterprises asking \"can we send you nothing?\" are asking for this one.\n *\n * It does not restrict `action` or `resource`. Both are short structural\n * identifiers, both are covered by the v1 signature, and stripping them\n * would break bundle verification. Keep tool names in them, not arguments.\n */\n noPayload?: boolean | { maxMetadataChars?: number };\n /**\n * Client-side fail-open behaviour for {@link VorimSDK.beforeAction} when\n * the runtime decision API itself is unreachable (network error, DNS,\n * timeout, or 5xx). Default `false` (since 4.0.0): a transport failure\n * re-throws and the caller must decide, so an outage or a blocked path\n * to Vorim cannot be turned into an allow. Set `true` to fail open — a\n * transport failure then returns a synthetic `fallback` decision\n * (`decision: 'fallback'`, `isFallback: true`) so a momentary\n * control-plane outage does not block the agent. Choose that\n * deliberately, per deployment.\n *\n * Note: this governs only transport failures. A reachable server that\n * returns `deny` still denies regardless of this flag.\n */\n runtimeFailOpen?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * VAIP v0 canonical bytes used by Vorim's per-event signing.\n *\n * Pipe-joined content fields with empty-string substitution for missing values.\n * This is intentionally duplicated from `@vorim/shared-types` so the published\n * SDK ships with zero runtime dependencies. A parity test in this package\n * imports both definitions and asserts byte-exact equality across a fixture\n * matrix, so they cannot drift silently.\n *\n * To upgrade the format, version the function (`canonicalPayloadV1`) — never\n * edit this one. Old signatures must remain verifiable.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV0(event: AuditEventInput): string {\n return [\n event.event_type,\n event.action,\n event.resource ?? '',\n event.input_hash ?? '',\n event.output_hash ?? '',\n event.result,\n ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * VAIP v1 canonical bytes for audit-event signing (RFC 8785 JCS).\n *\n * Signs the full event object excluding `signature` (the field being\n * computed) and `canonical_form` (metadata about the recipe). Unlike v0,\n * v1 covers the replayable-evidence fields and the metadata field.\n *\n * Re-exports `jcsCanonicalise` from `./replay.js` which is the byte-exact\n * twin of `@vorim/shared-types`' implementation. The cross-language parity\n * script enforces equivalence with the Python SDK.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV1(event: AuditEventInput): string {\n // Strip the fields that are out of scope for v1 signing.\n const { signature: _sig, canonical_form: _cf, ...rest } = event as Record<string, unknown> & AuditEventInput;\n return jcsCanonicalise(rest);\n}\n\n/**\n * Stable content digest of an audit event: `sha256:<hex>` over the event's\n * canonical bytes, dispatched on `canonical_form` the same way signing is.\n *\n * Byte-identical to `eventDigest` in `@vorim/verify` and to the digest the\n * server returns from `POST /audit/events`, so a counterparty can bind to a\n * reference you computed locally without trusting either of us to compute it.\n * It is also what `prev_event_hash` references, so a hash-chained emitter is\n * already producing these whether it names them or not.\n *\n * Content digest, not an identity: two byte-identical events share one\n * digest. Pair it with the `event_id` the server returns when you need a\n * unique handle.\n */\nexport async function eventDigest(event: AuditEventInput): Promise<string> {\n const form = (event as { canonical_form?: string }).canonical_form ?? 'v0';\n const bytes = form === 'v1' ? canonicalPayloadV1(event) : canonicalPayloadV0(event);\n return hashPreviousEvent(bytes);\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the Idempotency-Key header, or nothing when no key was given.\n *\n * The unit that gets retried is the request, so the key is per-call rather than\n * per-event. Send the same key on a retry and the server replays the first\n * response, original event ids included, instead of writing the batch twice.\n *\n * Pick a key that is stable across YOUR retries and distinct between genuine\n * calls: a request id, or a uuid generated once before the first attempt and\n * reused by the retry. Do NOT derive it from event content alone. Two\n * legitimately distinct events are often byte-identical (same agent, same tool,\n * same arguments, same result), and a content-derived key would make the server\n * drop the second one as a duplicate.\n */\nfunction idempotencyHeader(key?: string): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n return key ? { 'Idempotency-Key': key } : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow a server `approval` object to {@link ApprovalAttestation}.\n *\n * Every field is checked: a downstream integration decides whether to settle\n * a consequential action on the presence of this object, so a half-formed one\n * must read as ABSENT rather than as a weaker approval. Returning `null` makes\n * the caller's \"no signed approval → refuse\" branch fire, which is the safe\n * direction; returning a partial object would let it pass a truthiness check.\n *\n * The algorithm is pinned to Ed25519 because that is what the platform signs\n * with today. When device-bound P-256 approvals land, widen the check — do not\n * let an unrecognised `alg` through, or the receipt would assert a guarantee\n * the verifier cannot actually check.\n */\nfunction toApprovalAttestation(raw: any): ApprovalAttestation | null {\n if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object') return null;\n if (raw.resolution !== 'approved') return null;\n if (raw.alg !== 'Ed25519') return null;\n if (typeof raw.kid !== 'string' || !raw.kid) return null;\n if (typeof raw.signature !== 'string' || !raw.signature.startsWith('ed25519:')) return null;\n if (typeof raw.resolved_at !== 'string' || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(raw.resolved_at))) return null;\n return {\n resolution: 'approved',\n resolvedAt: raw.resolved_at,\n approverRef: typeof raw.approver_ref === 'string' ? raw.approver_ref : null,\n alg: 'Ed25519',\n kid: raw.kid,\n signature: raw.signature,\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a W3C `traceparent` (00-<trace_id>-<span_id>-<flags>) into the\n * `trace_id` / `span_id` fields Vorim stores. Explicit ids win; a malformed\n * header is dropped rather than sent (the server would 400 on a decision and\n * ignore it on an event). Exported for the OTel helpers.\n */\nexport function foldTraceparent<T extends { trace_id?: string; span_id?: string; traceparent?: string }>(input: T): T {\n if (!input.traceparent) return input;\n const { traceparent, ...rest } = input;\n const m = /^[0-9a-f]{2}-([0-9a-f]{32})-([0-9a-f]{16})-[0-9a-f]{2}$/i.exec(traceparent.trim());\n const out = { ...rest } as T;\n if (m) {\n if (!out.trace_id) out.trace_id = m[1].toLowerCase();\n if (!out.span_id) out.span_id = m[2].toLowerCase();\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nexport class VorimSDK {\n private apiKey: string;\n private baseUrl: string;\n private timeout: number;\n private autoSign: boolean;\n private canonicalForm: 'v0' | 'v1';\n private chainEvents: boolean;\n private runtimeFailOpen: boolean;\n private noPayload: boolean;\n private maxMetadataChars: number;\n /**\n * In-memory keyring mapping agent_id -> PEM-encoded Ed25519 private key.\n * Populated automatically by register() and registerEphemeral(), or\n * explicitly via useAgentKey(). Lost on process restart by design; the\n * caller is responsible for durable key storage.\n */\n private agentKeys: Map<string, string> = new Map();\n /**\n * Per-agent hash of the last emitted event's canonical bytes. Used to\n * populate prev_event_hash on the next emit when chainEvents is on.\n * Empty string ↔ no previous event (chain restart). Reset by\n * forgetAgentKey() so reusing an agent_id after revocation doesn't\n * link to the old chain.\n */\n private lastEventHash: Map<string, string> = new Map();\n /**\n * Per-agent monotonic counter incremented by `forgetAgentKey`. An\n * emit that started before `forgetAgentKey` ran will read a stale\n * epoch and refuse to repopulate the chain tail, preventing the\n * revoked agent from inheriting a new lastEventHash from the\n * in-flight emit that the lock was holding.\n */\n private agentForgetEpoch: Map<string, number> = new Map();\n /**\n * Per-agent emit promise. Each new emit awaits the previous one so\n * the chain is constructed in order. Concurrent emits to the same\n * agent are serialised (correct); concurrent emits to different\n * agents remain parallel (fast).\n */\n private chainLocks: Map<string, Promise<void>> = new Map();\n\n constructor(config: VorimConfig) {\n this.apiKey = config.apiKey;\n this.baseUrl = (config.baseUrl || 'https://api.vorim.ai').replace(/\\/$/, '') + '/v1';\n this.timeout = config.timeout || 10000;\n this.autoSign = config.autoSign !== false;\n // Default to v1 as of 3.4.0. v0 only covers six fields and any\n // metadata, delegation context, or replayable-evidence field is\n // unsigned tail — see crypto-1 in the deep-audit findings. Callers\n // who explicitly want v0 (legacy verifier compatibility) must opt\n // in. A console.warn fires the first time an SDK instance is\n // created with v0 so the deprecation is visible in dev.\n this.canonicalForm = config.canonicalForm ?? 'v1';\n if (config.canonicalForm === 'v0') {\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n console.warn(\n '[@vorim/sdk] canonicalForm=v0 is deprecated: it leaves metadata, ' +\n 'delegation context, and replayable-evidence fields unsigned. ' +\n 'Switch to canonicalForm=v1 (the new default in 3.4.0+) for full ' +\n 'tamper coverage. Pass canonicalForm: \"v0\" explicitly only if you ' +\n 'need byte-compat with verifiers older than @vorim/verify 0.2.0.',\n );\n } catch { /* ignore logger errors */ }\n }\n this.chainEvents = config.chainEvents ?? false;\n // Fail closed unless the integrator opts in to fail-open (4.0.0).\n this.runtimeFailOpen = config.runtimeFailOpen ?? false;\n this.noPayload = config.noPayload !== undefined && config.noPayload !== false;\n this.maxMetadataChars =\n typeof config.noPayload === 'object' && typeof config.noPayload.maxMetadataChars === 'number'\n ? config.noPayload.maxMetadataChars\n : 256;\n }\n\n /**\n * Register a previously-issued agent keypair so this SDK instance can\n * auto-sign events for it on emit. Use this when restoring an agent across\n * process restarts: read the agent's private_key from durable storage,\n * call useAgentKey(agentId, privateKey), and emit() will sign automatically.\n */\n useAgentKey(agentId: string, privateKeyPem: string): void {\n this.agentKeys.set(agentId, privateKeyPem);\n }\n\n /**\n * Forget an agent's signing key (e.g. after revocation). Subsequent emit()\n * calls for that agent will pass through unsigned unless a key is provided\n * inline. Also clears the per-agent chain state — re-using the same\n * agent_id after revocation does NOT link to the old chain.\n */\n forgetAgentKey(agentId: string): void {\n this.agentKeys.delete(agentId);\n this.lastEventHash.delete(agentId);\n this.chainLocks.delete(agentId);\n // Bump the per-agent epoch so any in-flight emit that completes\n // after this call refuses to write back a chain tail. Without\n // this, an emit that holds the chain lock can repopulate\n // lastEventHash after forgetAgentKey clears it, defeating the\n // revoked-agent isolation guarantee.\n this.agentForgetEpoch.set(agentId, (this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0) + 1);\n }\n\n /**\n * Cap on how many per-agent chain entries the SDK tracks. Set\n * generously — most callers will hold ≤ 1k agent_ids in memory.\n * Long-running processes that cycle through many agent_ids without\n * calling forgetAgentKey (e.g. ephemeral test agents) would\n * otherwise grow chainLocks / agentForgetEpoch / lastEventHash\n * unbounded.\n */\n private static readonly MAX_CHAIN_STATE_ENTRIES = 10_000;\n\n /**\n * Evict the oldest chain state entries when we cross the cap. Called\n * lazily from prepareEventChained — no scheduled task, no background\n * timer; only runs when the cap is breached during a real emit.\n */\n private evictChainStateIfNeeded(): void {\n if (this.chainLocks.size <= VorimSDK.MAX_CHAIN_STATE_ENTRIES) return;\n const toRemove = Math.ceil(this.chainLocks.size * 0.1); // drop oldest 10 %\n let removed = 0;\n for (const agentId of this.chainLocks.keys()) {\n if (removed >= toRemove) break;\n // Skip agents with an active key — they're in use.\n if (this.agentKeys.has(agentId)) continue;\n this.chainLocks.delete(agentId);\n this.lastEventHash.delete(agentId);\n this.agentForgetEpoch.delete(agentId);\n removed++;\n }\n }\n\n // ─── Health Check ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Ping the Vorim API to verify connectivity and API key validity.\n * Returns { status, timestamp } on success, throws VorimError on failure.\n */\n async ping(): Promise<{ status: string; timestamp: string }> {\n const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl.replace('/v1', '')}/health`, {\n headers: { 'User-Agent': USER_AGENT },\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeout),\n });\n if (!response.ok) throw new VorimError(response.status, 'UNREACHABLE', 'Vorim API is not reachable');\n return response.json() as Promise<{ status: string; timestamp: string }>;\n }\n\n // ─── Agent Identity ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register a new agent with Vorim AI.\n * Returns the agent identity and a private key (shown once).\n *\n * Side effect: the returned private_key is cached in this SDK instance's\n * in-memory keyring so subsequent emit() calls for this agent auto-sign.\n * The keyring is process-local; the caller is responsible for persisting\n * the private_key to durable storage if the agent should survive restarts.\n */\n async register(input: AgentRegistrationInput): Promise<AgentRegistrationResult> {\n const result = await this.post('/agents', input) as AgentRegistrationResult;\n if (result?.agent?.agent_id && result?.private_key) {\n this.agentKeys.set(result.agent.agent_id, result.private_key);\n }\n return result;\n }\n\n /**\n * Verify an agent's identity via the public Trust API.\n */\n async verify(agentId: string): Promise<TrustRecord> {\n return this.get(`/trust/verify/${agentId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Get agent details.\n */\n async getAgent(agentId: string): Promise<Agent> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * List all agents in the organisation.\n */\n async listAgents(params?: { page?: number; per_page?: number; status?: string }): Promise<{ agents: Agent[]; meta: any }> {\n const qs = new URLSearchParams(params as any).toString();\n // The API returns { data: Agent[], meta }. The generic get() unwraps to\n // `data` only, dropping `meta`, so read the full envelope here to honour\n // the documented { agents, meta } return shape (pagination relies on meta).\n const env = await this.requestEnvelope('GET', `/agents${qs ? '?' + qs : ''}`);\n return { agents: (env.data ?? []) as Agent[], meta: env.meta ?? null };\n }\n\n /**\n * Update an agent's metadata or status.\n *\n * `status: 'suspended'` is the kill switch and, since 4.0.0, cascades to\n * every agent reachable through the agent's active identity delegations\n * unless `cascade: false`. Setting `status: 'active'` on a suspended agent\n * reverses exactly that cascade. The returned agent carries\n * `cascade.suspended` / `cascade.reactivated` with the agent ids touched.\n * See {@link suspendPreview} for the blast radius before acting.\n */\n async updateAgent(\n agentId: string,\n updates: Partial<Pick<Agent, 'name' | 'description' | 'status' | 'capabilities'>> & { cascade?: boolean },\n ): Promise<Agent & { cascade?: { suspended?: string[]; reactivated?: string[]; delegations_revoked?: number } }> {\n return this.patch(`/agents/${agentId}`, updates);\n }\n\n /**\n * What suspending (or revoking) this agent would touch: its delegation\n * subtree, how many of those agents are still active, open escalations\n * across the subtree, and live delegation links. Writes nothing.\n */\n async suspendPreview(agentId: string): Promise<SuspendPreview> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/suspend-preview`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke an agent (permanent deactivation).\n */\n async revoke(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n await this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Permissions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Check if an agent has a specific permission scope.\n * Target: < 5ms response via Redis cache.\n */\n async check(agentId: string, scope: PermissionScope): Promise<PermissionCheckResult> {\n return this.post(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions/verify`, { scope });\n }\n\n /**\n * Grant a permission scope to an agent.\n */\n async grant(agentId: string, scope: PermissionScope, options?: {\n valid_until?: string;\n rate_limit?: { max: number; window: string };\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions`, { scope, ...options });\n }\n\n /**\n * List all active permissions for an agent.\n */\n async listPermissions(agentId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke a specific permission scope from an agent.\n */\n async revokePermission(agentId: string, scope: PermissionScope): Promise<any> {\n return this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions/${scope}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Agent-to-Agent Identity Delegation (VAIP -02 § 5) ──────────────\n\n /**\n * Delegate the right to act on this agent's behalf to another agent\n * in the same org, with a strict subset of this agent's scopes.\n *\n * Multi-hop chains are supported up to depth 32. Scope subset is\n * enforced at every hop. Audit events emitted by the delegate carry\n * the chain context (`on_behalf_of`, `delegator_agent_id`,\n * `delegation_chain_id`, `delegation_depth`) so a verifier walking\n * the bundle can reconstruct the full chain.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const chain = await vorim.delegateToAgent('agid_parent_abc', {\n * delegate_agent_id: 'agid_child_xyz',\n * scopes_delegated: ['agent:read', 'agent:execute'],\n * max_chain_depth: 1, // delegate may make ONE further hop\n * valid_until: '2026-12-31T00:00:00Z',\n * });\n * console.log(chain.public_chain_id); // chain_<hex>\n * ```\n */\n async delegateToAgent(\n delegatorAgentId: string,\n input: {\n delegate_agent_id: string;\n scopes_delegated: PermissionScope[];\n max_chain_depth?: number;\n valid_until?: string;\n /**\n * The delegate's share of the swarm token budget per window, granted\n * out of the delegator's own share (conservation ledger). The server\n * refuses a share the delegator cannot cover (409 ALLOCATION_EXCEEDED\n * with the numbers). Needs the delegator to be in a swarm with a budget.\n */\n budget_tokens?: number;\n /**\n * Optional Ed25519-signed delegation link (VAIP -02 § 5). When\n * provided, the server verifies the signature against the\n * delegator's stored public key, persists alongside the chain\n * row, and exports it in bundle delegation_tokens so the chain\n * is offline-verifiable by `@vorim/verify`. Compute via\n * {@link signDelegationLink} or set manually if signing\n * elsewhere.\n */\n signed_link?: {\n claims: DelegationLinkClaims;\n signature: string;\n };\n },\n ): Promise<AgentDelegationRecord> {\n return this.post(`/agents/${delegatorAgentId}/delegations`, input);\n }\n\n /**\n * Sign a delegation link with the delegator's private key. Returns\n * the signed link in the shape accepted by `delegateToAgent`'s\n * `signed_link` field.\n *\n * The signature is Ed25519 over the RFC 8785 JCS-canonical bytes of\n * the claims object. Same algorithm the server and `@vorim/verify`\n * use for verification.\n *\n * Use this when the delegator's private key is in this SDK's\n * keyring (i.e. set via `register()` or `useAgentKey()`).\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const signed = await vorim.signDelegationLink({\n * v: 0,\n * type: 'vaip-delegation-link',\n * chain_id: 'chain_abc', // server returns this on first delegation\n * depth: 1,\n * delegator: 'agid_parent',\n * delegate: 'agid_child',\n * scopes: ['agent:read', 'agent:execute'],\n * max_chain_depth: 1,\n * valid_from: new Date().toISOString(),\n * valid_until: null,\n * parent_link_hash: null,\n * });\n * ```\n */\n async signDelegationLink(\n claims: DelegationLinkClaims,\n ): Promise<{ claims: DelegationLinkClaims; signature: string }> {\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(claims.delegator);\n if (!key) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 400,\n 'NO_AGENT_KEY',\n `SDK has no private key for delegator ${claims.delegator}`,\n );\n }\n // Sign using the SDK's local JCS. Byte-equivalent to shared-types\n // and the server (enforced by scripts/check-replay-parity.sh).\n const bytes = jcsCanonicalise(claims as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);\n const signature = await this.sign(bytes, key);\n return { claims, signature };\n }\n\n /**\n * List active identity-chain entries this agent participates in\n * (either as delegator or delegate). Useful for showing the current\n * delegation graph in an admin UI.\n */\n async listAgentDelegations(agentId: string): Promise<AgentDelegationRecord[]> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/delegations`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Walk a delegation chain by its public id. Returns the full chain\n * in depth order.\n */\n async getDelegationChain(\n agentId: string,\n chainId: string,\n ): Promise<AgentDelegationRecord[]> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/delegation-chain/${chainId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke this agent's delegation in a given chain. Cascades to all\n * descendants beneath this agent's depth in the chain.\n */\n async revokeAgentDelegation(\n agentId: string,\n chainId: string,\n ): Promise<{ revoked: number }> {\n return this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}/delegations/${chainId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Reconstruct a multi-agent workflow's provenance graph from a delegation\n * chain id — the nodes (agents), edges (who delegated what to whom), and the\n * audit events attributed to each agent within that workflow. Multi-agent\n * fabric Phase 1: the tamper-evident answer to \"which agents did what, and\n * who authorised whom?\" across a whole hand-off chain.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const graph = await vorim.getWorkflowGraph('chain_abc123');\n * for (const edge of graph.edges) {\n * console.log(`${edge.from} -> ${edge.to} [${edge.scopes.join(', ')}]`);\n * }\n * ```\n */\n async getWorkflowGraph(\n chainId: string,\n options?: { maxEvents?: number },\n ): Promise<WorkflowProvenanceGraph> {\n const qs = options?.maxEvents ? `?max_events=${options.maxEvents}` : '';\n return this.get(`/audit/workflow-graph/${chainId}${qs}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Read-only least-privilege analysis for an agent. Compares the scopes the\n * agent was granted against the scopes it actually used (from its audit\n * history) and suggests the tightest scope set that still covers its real\n * behaviour. Writes nothing — safe to call any time.\n *\n * @param agentId The agent to analyse.\n * @param options.windowDays How far back to look at audit history (default 30).\n */\n async getCapabilityProfile(\n agentId: string,\n options?: { windowDays?: number },\n ): Promise<CapabilityProfile> {\n const qs = options?.windowDays ? `?window=${options.windowDays}` : '';\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/capability-profile${qs}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Governed Shared Memory (multi-agent fabric, Phase 2) ──────────\n\n /**\n * Write (upsert) an entry into the org's governed shared-memory pool,\n * attributed to `agentId`.\n *\n * If the SDK holds the agent's private key (via {@link VorimSDK.register}\n * or {@link VorimSDK.useAgentKey}), the entry is signed at source with the\n * agent's Ed25519 key over the canonical entry (namespace + key + value +\n * agent_id) before it leaves the process, and the server verifies it against\n * the agent's stored public key — rejecting a bad signature (fail closed).\n * This is what makes a poisoned entry always traceable to its source\n * (OWASP ASI06). If no key is available, the entry is written unsigned.\n *\n * A write to an existing (namespace, key) updates it, recording the new\n * writer + signature.\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * await vorim.writeMemory('agid_researcher_abc', {\n * namespace: 'research-run-42',\n * key: 'sources',\n * value: { urls: ['https://…'], gathered_at: '2026-07-25T…' },\n * });\n * ```\n */\n async writeMemory(\n agentId: string,\n entry: SharedMemoryWriteInput,\n ): Promise<SharedMemoryEntry> {\n const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n agent_id: agentId,\n namespace: entry.namespace,\n key: entry.key,\n value: entry.value,\n };\n // Sign at source when we have the agent's key. Byte-identical canonical\n // form to the server's sharedMemoryCanonicalBytes (@vorim/shared-types)\n // and the Python SDK: JCS over { agent_id, key, namespace, value }.\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);\n if (key) {\n try {\n const canonical = jcsCanonicalise({\n agent_id: agentId,\n key: entry.key,\n namespace: entry.namespace,\n value: entry.value,\n });\n body.signature = await this.sign(canonical, key);\n } catch {\n // Signing failure is non-fatal: the entry still writes unsigned\n // rather than blocking the caller on a single bad key.\n }\n }\n return this.post('/memory', body);\n }\n\n /**\n * Read one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key). Throws a 404\n * {@link VorimError} if it does not exist. Returns the value plus\n * provenance (which agent wrote it, content hash, whether it is signed).\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.\n */\n async readMemory(input: { namespace: string; key: string }): Promise<SharedMemoryEntry> {\n return this.get(`/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(input.key)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * List entries in a namespace (paginated). Returns `{ entries, meta }`.\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.\n */\n async listMemory(input: {\n namespace: string;\n page?: number;\n perPage?: number;\n }): Promise<SharedMemoryListResult> {\n const params = new URLSearchParams();\n if (input.page) params.set('page', String(input.page));\n if (input.perPage) params.set('per_page', String(input.perPage));\n const qs = params.toString();\n const envelope = await this.requestEnvelope(\n 'GET',\n `/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ''}`,\n );\n return {\n entries: (envelope.data ?? []) as SharedMemoryEntry[],\n meta: envelope.meta,\n };\n }\n\n /**\n * Delete one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key).\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.\n */\n async deleteMemory(input: { namespace: string; key: string }): Promise<{ deleted: true; namespace: string; key: string }> {\n return this.delete(`/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(input.key)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Verified hand-off — the multi-agent-fabric primitive.\n *\n * Hands a task from one agent to another as ONE auditable operation that\n * composes the three trust primitives:\n * 1. (optional) VERIFY the receiving agent is trusted + active before\n * handing it anything — fails closed if it is not (unless you opt out).\n * 2. DELEGATE a strictly-attenuated subset of the sender's scopes to the\n * receiver (the server enforces child ⊆ parent + depth; a scope the\n * sender doesn't hold is rejected). Optionally as a signed capability\n * link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable by `@vorim/verify`.\n * 3. EMIT a signed audit event recording the hand-off, stamped with the\n * delegation-chain provenance so the whole multi-agent workflow is\n * reconstructable later.\n *\n * Returns the delegation record (with `public_chain_id`) plus the verification\n * result. Throws before delegating if verification fails.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const { chain } = await vorim.handOff('agid_planner', {\n * to: 'agid_researcher',\n * scopes: ['agent:read'], // researcher gets read-only, nothing more\n * task: 'gather sources for Q3 report',\n * maxChainDepth: 0, // researcher cannot re-delegate\n * minTrustScore: 60,\n * });\n * console.log(chain.publicChainId);\n * ```\n */\n async handOff(\n fromAgentId: string,\n input: {\n /** The receiving agent's id. */\n to: string;\n /** Scopes to delegate — must be a subset of what `fromAgentId` holds. */\n scopes: PermissionScope[];\n /** Human-readable description of the handed-off task (recorded in audit). */\n task?: string;\n /** How many further hops the receiver may make (default 0 — no re-delegation). */\n maxChainDepth?: number;\n /** Delegation expiry (ISO 8601). */\n validUntil?: string;\n /** Minimum trust score the receiver must have to accept the hand-off (default 50). */\n minTrustScore?: number;\n /** Skip the pre-delegation trust verification (NOT recommended). @default false */\n skipVerify?: boolean;\n /** Sign the delegation link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable. @default false */\n signed?: boolean;\n },\n ): Promise<{ chain: AgentDelegationRecord; verification?: TrustRecord }> {\n let verification: TrustRecord | undefined;\n\n // 1. Verify the receiver is trusted + active before delegating to it.\n if (!input.skipVerify) {\n try {\n verification = await this.verify(input.to);\n } catch {\n throw new VorimError(400, 'HANDOFF_VERIFY_FAILED',\n `Could not verify receiving agent ${input.to} — refusing hand-off (fail closed).`);\n }\n const minScore = input.minTrustScore ?? 50;\n if (verification.status !== 'active') {\n throw new VorimError(403, 'HANDOFF_RECEIVER_INACTIVE',\n `Receiving agent ${input.to} is ${verification.status}, not active — refusing hand-off.`);\n }\n if ((verification.trust_score ?? 0) < minScore) {\n throw new VorimError(403, 'HANDOFF_RECEIVER_UNTRUSTED',\n `Receiving agent ${input.to} trust score ${verification.trust_score} is below minimum ${minScore}.`);\n }\n }\n\n // 2. Delegate the attenuated scope subset (server enforces child ⊆ parent).\n const delegationInput: Parameters<VorimSDK['delegateToAgent']>[1] = {\n delegate_agent_id: input.to,\n scopes_delegated: input.scopes,\n max_chain_depth: input.maxChainDepth ?? 0,\n ...(input.validUntil ? { valid_until: input.validUntil } : {}),\n };\n if (input.signed) {\n // Sign the link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable end to end.\n const chainId = `chain_pending_${input.to}`; // server assigns the real id on root\n const signed = await this.signDelegationLink({\n v: 0,\n type: 'vaip-delegation-link',\n chain_id: chainId,\n depth: 1,\n delegator: fromAgentId,\n delegate: input.to,\n scopes: input.scopes,\n max_chain_depth: input.maxChainDepth ?? 0,\n valid_from: new Date().toISOString(),\n valid_until: input.validUntil ?? null,\n parent_link_hash: null,\n });\n delegationInput.signed_link = signed;\n }\n const chain = await this.delegateToAgent(fromAgentId, delegationInput);\n\n // 3. Emit a signed audit event recording the hand-off, carrying the\n // delegation-chain provenance so the whole workflow is reconstructable.\n try {\n await this.emit({\n agent_id: fromAgentId,\n event_type: 'permission_change',\n action: 'agent.handoff',\n resource: input.to,\n result: 'success',\n delegation_chain_id: chain.publicChainId,\n metadata: {\n framework: 'fabric',\n to: input.to,\n scopes: input.scopes,\n task: input.task,\n receiver_trust_score: verification?.trust_score,\n },\n }, { sign: true });\n } catch {\n // Audit failure never rolls back a completed delegation; it is logged\n // server-side. The hand-off itself succeeded.\n }\n\n return { chain, verification };\n }\n\n // ─── Runtime Control (Strategy A) ──────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Gate an agent action BEFORE it is performed. Calls\n * `POST /v1/runtime/decisions` and returns a typed {@link RuntimeDecision}.\n *\n * By default (`throwOnDeny: true`) a `deny` verdict throws\n * {@link VorimDeniedError} — deny is carried in the response body, not\n * the HTTP status, so without this the caller would treat a denial as\n * success. Pass `{ throwOnDeny: false }` to handle deny yourself.\n *\n * On a `modify` verdict, use `decision.modifiedPayload` in place of your\n * original payload (e.g. a policy rule masked PII). This is\n * client-cooperative: Vorim returns the sanitised payload but does not sit\n * inline and does not enforce that you send it — carry `decisionId` into\n * the matching {@link emit} so the action stays auditable. On `escalate`,\n * poll {@link waitForDecisionResolution} for the human decision.\n *\n * Transport failures (network/DNS/timeout/5xx) respect the constructor's\n * `runtimeFailOpen` flag: when false (default) the underlying error is\n * re-thrown; when true a synthetic `fallback` decision is returned so a\n * control-plane blip does not block the agent.\n *\n * Always pass the public `agid_*` id as `agentId`.\n *\n * @example\n * const d = await vorim.beforeAction({\n * agentId: 'agid_acme_evilbot',\n * actionType: 'tool_call',\n * actionTarget: 'sendEmail',\n * requiredScope: 'agent:communicate',\n * payload: { to: 'customer@example.com' },\n * });\n * if (d.decision === 'allow') await sendEmail(d.modifiedPayload ?? payload);\n */\n async beforeAction(\n input: BeforeActionInput,\n options: { throwOnDeny?: boolean } = {},\n ): Promise<RuntimeDecision> {\n const throwOnDeny = options.throwOnDeny ?? true;\n const body = {\n agent_id: input.agentId,\n action_type: input.actionType,\n action_target: input.actionTarget,\n payload: input.payload,\n context: input.context,\n required_scope: input.requiredScope,\n idempotency_key: input.idempotencyKey,\n workflow_id: input.workflowId,\n estimated_tokens: input.estimatedTokens,\n trace_id: input.traceId,\n span_id: input.spanId,\n traceparent: input.traceparent,\n };\n\n let raw: any;\n try {\n raw = await this.post('/runtime/decisions', body);\n } catch (err) {\n // Transport-level failure. A VorimError carrying a real HTTP status\n // < 500 (e.g. 400/403/404) is a genuine server verdict/validation\n // error and must propagate. Only network errors and 5xx are\n // candidates for client-side fail-open.\n const status = err instanceof VorimError ? err.status : 0;\n const code = err instanceof VorimError ? err.code : undefined;\n // A malformed (non-JSON) control-plane response is NOT eligible for\n // fail-open: we can't trust a policy plane we can't parse, so it must\n // fail closed (the error propagates and the gate denies). Everything\n // else with status 0 or >= 500 is a genuine transport failure.\n const isTransport = (status === 0 || status >= 500) && code !== 'MALFORMED_RESPONSE';\n if (isTransport && this.runtimeFailOpen) {\n return {\n decisionId: '',\n decision: 'fallback',\n reason: 'Runtime decision API unreachable; client fail-open applied',\n decisionRuleId: null,\n modifiedPayload: null,\n expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000).toISOString(),\n latencyMs: 0,\n isFallback: true,\n policyVersion: 0,\n swarmId: null,\n escalationResolution: null,\n approval: null,\n };\n }\n throw err;\n }\n\n const decision = this.toRuntimeDecision(raw);\n if (decision.decision === 'deny' && throwOnDeny) {\n throw new VorimDeniedError(decision);\n }\n return decision;\n }\n\n // ─── Token Budgets (AI Cost Management) ──────────────────────────────\n //\n // A budget is a rolling token ceiling for one agent or one workflow.\n // Enforcement runs inside beforeAction(): pass `workflowId` + `estimatedTokens`\n // on the action, and a `token_budget_gt` policy rule denies the action before\n // the spend if it would breach the budget. These methods manage the budgets\n // and read live spend. They need an API key holding the `runtime:manage`\n // scope (deliberately separate from `runtime:decide`, so an agent's own key\n // cannot raise its ceiling).\n\n /**\n * Create or update a token budget for an agent or workflow. One budget per\n * (scope, scope_ref) — calling this again for the same target updates it.\n *\n * @example\n * await vorim.setBudget({\n * scope: 'workflow', scope_ref: 'nightly-summariser',\n * max_tokens: 2_000_000, window_seconds: 86400, enforcement: 'hard',\n * });\n */\n async setBudget(input: TokenBudgetInput): Promise<TokenBudget> {\n return this.put('/runtime/budgets', input);\n }\n\n /** List the org's configured token budgets. */\n async listBudgets(): Promise<TokenBudget[]> {\n return this.get('/runtime/budgets');\n }\n\n /** Live rolling spend, remaining allowance, and monthly total per budget. */\n async getBudgetSpend(): Promise<BudgetSpend[]> {\n return this.get('/runtime/budgets/spend');\n }\n\n /** Remove a token budget by id. */\n async deleteBudget(budgetId: string): Promise<void> {\n await this.delete(`/runtime/budgets/${encodeURIComponent(budgetId)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Poll a decision until it leaves the `escalate` state (a human\n * approved or denied it) or the timeout elapses. Returns the resolved\n * decision; throws {@link VorimError} `ESCALATION_TIMEOUT` (408) if the\n * decision is still pending when the timeout is reached.\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `runtime:decide` scope (the same scope\n * `beforeAction` uses).\n */\n async waitForDecisionResolution(\n decisionId: string,\n options: { timeoutMs?: number; pollIntervalMs?: number } = {},\n ): Promise<RuntimeDecision> {\n const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 300_000;\n const pollIntervalMs = options.pollIntervalMs ?? 1000;\n const start = Date.now();\n // Always poll at least once even if timeoutMs is 0.\n do {\n const raw = await this.get(`/runtime/decisions/${decisionId}`);\n // The GET projection carries escalation_resolution; once set (or\n // once the verdict is no longer 'escalate') the escalation is done.\n if (raw?.decision !== 'escalate' || raw?.escalation_resolution) {\n return this.toRuntimeDecision(raw);\n }\n // Sleep only as long as the deadline allows, so the final throw\n // fires at ~timeoutMs rather than up to one pollIntervalMs late.\n const remaining = timeoutMs - (Date.now() - start);\n if (remaining <= 0) break;\n await sleep(Math.min(pollIntervalMs, remaining));\n } while (Date.now() - start < timeoutMs);\n throw new VorimError(\n 408,\n 'ESCALATION_TIMEOUT',\n `Decision ${decisionId} still pending after ${timeoutMs}ms`,\n { decisionId },\n );\n }\n\n /**\n * Mint a portable signed receipt for a decision: a self-contained,\n * offline-verifiable statement that Vorim authorised this action.\n *\n * Use it when something OUTSIDE Vorim has to be convinced — a settlement\n * layer, a downstream anchor, a counterparty's auditor. Verification needs\n * the receipt and the public key from `GET /trust/keys`: no call back to\n * Vorim, no chain, no network.\n *\n * Reproduce the signed bytes with `portableReceiptCanonicalBytes` from\n * `@vorim/shared-types` (also re-exported here), then check `signature`\n * against the key matching `kid`. Never re-derive those bytes by hand: the\n * canonical form is defined once precisely so two implementations cannot\n * drift into signatures that do not verify.\n *\n * Throws 409 when the decision is not an authorisation — a denial, a\n * fail-open fallback, an unresolved escalation, or one a human refused.\n * A receipt only ever means yes, so there is nothing to return for a no.\n *\n * @example\n * const d = await vorim.beforeAction({ ... });\n * if (d.decision === 'allow') {\n * const receipt = await vorim.mintPortableSignedReceipt(d.decisionId);\n * await settleWith(receipt); // the counterparty verifies it alone\n * }\n */\n async mintPortableSignedReceipt(decisionId: string): Promise<PortableSignedReceipt> {\n return this.get(`/runtime/decisions/${decisionId}/receipt`) as Promise<PortableSignedReceipt>;\n }\n\n /**\n * Map a snake_case decision row (from POST or GET) to the camelCase\n * {@link RuntimeDecision}. The SDK has no generic camelizer, so the\n * mapping is explicit — and tolerant of either the POST shape\n * (`decision_rule_id`, `latency_ms`) or absent fields on a GET row.\n *\n * Escalation-resolution translation (load-bearing): the server resolves\n * an escalation by setting `escalation_resolution` but does NOT flip the\n * row's `decision` column off `'escalate'`. If we returned that verbatim,\n * a caller's obvious `if (d.decision === 'deny')` check would never fire\n * on a human DENIAL — a silent fail-open. So when a resolution is present\n * we translate the verdict: approved → 'allow', denied → 'deny', and\n * timed_out (nobody answered within the org's escalation window) → 'deny'.\n * The raw resolution is also surfaced as `escalationResolution` for\n * callers that want it explicitly.\n *\n * A missing verdict (malformed/truncated response) fails CLOSED to 'deny'\n * rather than 'fallback', so the deny check fires on garbled input.\n */\n private toRuntimeDecision(raw: any): RuntimeDecision {\n // Runtime-narrow to the enum: a surprise server value (e.g. 'pending')\n // collapses to null rather than leaking through the typed field, and\n // never drives a translation.\n const resolution: 'approved' | 'denied' | 'timed_out' | null =\n raw?.escalation_resolution === 'approved' ? 'approved'\n : raw?.escalation_resolution === 'denied' ? 'denied'\n : raw?.escalation_resolution === 'timed_out' ? 'timed_out'\n : null;\n const hasVerdict = typeof raw?.decision === 'string';\n let decision: DecisionVerdict;\n // Only translate the resolution when the row is actually an escalation.\n // Gating on raw.decision==='escalate' means a resolution that somehow\n // appears on a payload-bearing 'modify' row can never override it and\n // drop modifiedPayload (defensive — the server only sets resolution on\n // escalate rows today).\n if (raw?.decision === 'escalate' && resolution === 'approved') decision = 'allow';\n else if (raw?.decision === 'escalate' && (resolution === 'denied' || resolution === 'timed_out')) decision = 'deny';\n else if (hasVerdict) decision = raw.decision as DecisionVerdict;\n else decision = 'deny'; // fail closed on a verdict-less response\n\n return {\n decisionId: raw?.decision_id ?? '',\n decision,\n reason: raw?.reason ?? (hasVerdict ? '' : 'Malformed decision response (no verdict); failing closed'),\n decisionRuleId: raw?.decision_rule_id ?? null,\n modifiedPayload: raw?.modified_payload ?? null,\n // Avoid '' (Date.parse('') === NaN). A verdict-less row gets an epoch\n // timestamp so any staleness check treats it as already expired.\n expiresAt: raw?.expires_at ?? (hasVerdict ? '' : new Date(0).toISOString()),\n latencyMs: raw?.latency_ms ?? 0,\n isFallback: raw?.is_fallback ?? !hasVerdict,\n policyVersion: raw?.policy_version ?? 0,\n swarmId: typeof raw?.swarm_id === 'string' ? raw.swarm_id : null,\n escalationResolution: resolution,\n approval: toApprovalAttestation(raw?.approval),\n };\n }\n\n // ─── Audit ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Emit an audit event for an agent action.\n *\n * By default (autoSign=true on the SDK), the event is signed with the\n * agent's private key before it leaves the process. Set options.sign=false\n * to skip signing (e.g. for testing). If the SDK has no private key for the\n * event's agent_id, the event is sent unsigned and a warning is not\n * raised — callers that require signing should check event.signature on\n * the returned event after a round-trip, or use a server-side enforcement\n * flag (VORIM_VERIFY_AUDIT_SIGNATURES).\n */\n async emit(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n options?: { sign?: boolean; idempotencyKey?: string },\n ): Promise<{ ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean }> {\n const prepared = await this.prepareEvent(event, options?.sign);\n const result = await this.post(\n '/audit/events',\n { events: [prepared] },\n idempotencyHeader(options?.idempotencyKey),\n ) as { ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean };\n this.warnOnPartialIngest(1, result?.ingested ?? 0);\n return result;\n }\n\n /**\n * Emit a batch of audit events (up to 1,000). Each event is signed\n * independently using its agent_id to look up the signing key. See\n * {@link VorimSDK.emit} for signing behaviour and opt-out.\n *\n * When the server returns `ingested < events.length` (e.g. one event\n * referenced an unknown agent_id), a `console.warn` is emitted so\n * operators don't silently lose audit rows. The result is returned\n * unchanged so callers can inspect / act on it.\n */\n async emitBatch(\n events: AuditEventInput[],\n options?: { sign?: boolean; idempotencyKey?: string },\n ): Promise<{ ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean }> {\n const prepared = await Promise.all(events.map(e => this.prepareEvent(e, options?.sign)));\n const result = await this.post(\n '/audit/events',\n { events: prepared },\n idempotencyHeader(options?.idempotencyKey),\n ) as { ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean };\n this.warnOnPartialIngest(events.length, result?.ingested ?? 0);\n return result;\n }\n\n private warnOnPartialIngest(submitted: number, ingested: number): void {\n if (ingested < submitted) {\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n console.warn(\n `[@vorim/sdk] partial ingest: server stored ${ingested}/${submitted} events. ` +\n `Common causes: unknown agent_id (cross-org or typo), invalid signature when strict ` +\n `verification is enabled.`,\n );\n } catch {\n /* ignore logger errors */\n }\n }\n }\n\n /**\n * Internal: prepare an event for transmission. Auto-signs if the SDK has a\n * key for this agent and signing isn't explicitly opted out. Pre-existing\n * signatures on the event are respected (caller-signed events are not\n * re-signed). Per-agent failure is non-fatal: if signing throws, the event\n * still sends unsigned so a single bad key doesn't break a batch.\n *\n * Canonical-form dispatch:\n * - If the event already carries `canonical_form`, that wins (caller\n * opted in/out for this specific event).\n * - Otherwise the SDK-level `canonicalForm` (config) applies.\n * - v0 signs the pipe-joined 6 fields. v1 signs the RFC 8785 JCS\n * bytes over the full event minus signature and canonical_form,\n * and the event goes on the wire with `canonical_form: \"v1\"`.\n *\n * Chain construction:\n * - When chainEvents is on, the event gets `prev_event_hash` set to\n * the SHA-256 of the previous event's canonical bytes for the\n * same agent, set BEFORE the signature is computed (so v1\n * signatures cover the chain link).\n * - Chain ops are serialised per-agent via `chainLocks` so\n * concurrent emits to the same agent build a deterministic chain.\n */\n /**\n * Fail closed when `noPayload` is on and an event would carry content.\n *\n * Runs before signing and before any network call, so a rejected event is\n * one Vorim never saw. Throwing rather than stripping is deliberate: a\n * silent strip would leave the caller believing they had logged something\n * they had not, and would change the bytes after they were signed.\n */\n private assertNoPayload(event: AuditEventInput): void {\n if (!this.noPayload) return;\n\n for (const field of ['input_hash', 'output_hash', 'system_prompt_hash', 'tool_catalogue_hash'] as const) {\n const value = (event as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[field];\n if (value === undefined || value === null) continue;\n if (!isDigest(value)) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: ${field} must be a sha256: or hmac-sha256: digest, got ` +\n `${typeof value === 'string' ? `${value.length} chars` : typeof value}. ` +\n `Hash it locally first — commitPayload() for anything a human or a model wrote, ` +\n `hashPayload() only for content that is already high-entropy.`,\n { field },\n );\n }\n }\n\n const metadata = event.metadata;\n if (metadata === undefined || metadata === null) return;\n for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(metadata)) {\n if (value === null) continue;\n const t = typeof value;\n if (t === 'object') {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: metadata.${key} is ${Array.isArray(value) ? 'an array' : 'an object'}. ` +\n `Nested values can carry arbitrary content, so only string, number, boolean and null ` +\n `are allowed. Summarise it, or commit to it with commitPayload() and send the digest.`,\n { field: `metadata.${key}` },\n );\n }\n if (t !== 'string' && t !== 'number' && t !== 'boolean') {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: metadata.${key} is ${t}, which is not a permitted metadata type.`,\n { field: `metadata.${key}` },\n );\n }\n if (t === 'string' && (value as string).length > this.maxMetadataChars) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: metadata.${key} is ${(value as string).length} chars, over the ` +\n `${this.maxMetadataChars} limit. A value this long is content, not a label. ` +\n `Raise the limit with noPayload: { maxMetadataChars } if this really is a label.`,\n { field: `metadata.${key}`, length: (value as string).length },\n );\n }\n }\n }\n\n private async prepareEvent(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n signOverride?: boolean\n ): Promise<AuditEventInput> {\n this.assertNoPayload(event);\n // A W3C traceparent becomes trace_id + span_id BEFORE signing, so the\n // signature covers the stored columns and never a field the server drops.\n event = foldTraceparent(event);\n const shouldSign = signOverride ?? this.autoSign;\n if (!shouldSign && !this.chainEvents) return event;\n // Even unsigned events participate in the chain if chaining is on.\n if (this.chainEvents) {\n return this.prepareEventChained(event, shouldSign);\n }\n if (!shouldSign) return event;\n if (event.signature) return event;\n return this.signEventNow(event, shouldSign);\n }\n\n /** Serialise per-agent and apply chain hash + sign. */\n private async prepareEventChained(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n shouldSign: boolean,\n ): Promise<AuditEventInput> {\n const agentId = event.agent_id;\n this.evictChainStateIfNeeded();\n const prior = this.chainLocks.get(agentId) ?? Promise.resolve();\n let release!: () => void;\n const next = new Promise<void>(r => { release = r; });\n this.chainLocks.set(agentId, prior.then(() => next));\n await prior;\n // Snapshot the forget-epoch BEFORE doing any chain work. If the\n // epoch advances while we're in flight, forgetAgentKey() ran and\n // we must not write back the chain tail.\n const startEpoch = this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0;\n try {\n // Insert prev_event_hash if we have a previous bytes-hash for this\n // agent. First event after enable / process restart has none.\n const prev = this.lastEventHash.get(agentId);\n const eventWithPrev: AuditEventInput = prev\n ? { ...event, prev_event_hash: prev }\n : event;\n\n // Sign (or pass through unsigned if signing not requested / no\n // key). If forgetAgentKey runs between the lock acquisition and\n // the sign call, skip signing — the key has been revoked and\n // we must not use it. The event still ships unsigned, which the\n // caller can detect via the missing `signature` field.\n const epochBeforeSign = this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0;\n const keyStillPresent = this.agentKeys.has(agentId);\n const prepared = shouldSign && !eventWithPrev.signature && keyStillPresent && epochBeforeSign === startEpoch\n ? await this.signEventNow(eventWithPrev, shouldSign)\n : eventWithPrev;\n\n // Record this event's canonical bytes hash as the chain's new tail.\n // Use the v1 form for v1 events (matches what the signature covered);\n // v0 form for v0 events.\n const wireForm = (prepared.canonical_form as 'v0' | 'v1' | undefined) ?? 'v0';\n const bytes = wireForm === 'v1' ? canonicalPayloadV1(prepared) : canonicalPayloadV0(prepared);\n try {\n const tail = await hashPreviousEvent(bytes);\n // Only commit the tail if forgetAgentKey didn't run while we\n // were in flight. Without this guard the revoked agent\n // silently inherits a new chain tail from the in-flight emit.\n if ((this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0) === startEpoch) {\n this.lastEventHash.set(agentId, tail);\n }\n } catch {\n // hashing failure (extreme edge) is non-fatal; chain restarts next time\n this.lastEventHash.delete(agentId);\n }\n return prepared;\n } finally {\n release();\n }\n }\n\n /** Sign an event right now, no chain handling.\n *\n * On signing failure (malformed key, Web Crypto unavailable, etc.)\n * the event ships with its requested `canonical_form` preserved and\n * a one-line warning is logged via `console.warn`. The previous\n * behaviour silently dropped both the signature AND the\n * canonical_form marker, which caused the event to be classified\n * server-side as a v0 `signature_missing` instead of a v1 attempt\n * that failed — making the breakage invisible to operators. */\n private async signEventNow(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n _shouldSign: boolean,\n ): Promise<AuditEventInput> {\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(event.agent_id);\n if (!key) return event;\n const form: 'v0' | 'v1' = (event.canonical_form as 'v0' | 'v1' | undefined) ?? this.canonicalForm;\n const withForm: AuditEventInput = form === 'v0'\n ? event\n : { ...event, canonical_form: 'v1' };\n try {\n const payload = form === 'v1' ? canonicalPayloadV1(withForm) : canonicalPayloadV0(withForm);\n const signature = await this.sign(payload, key);\n return { ...withForm, signature };\n } catch (err) {\n // Surface the failure rather than silently dropping the signature.\n // Operators need a signal to detect broken signing at the SDK\n // boundary; verifiers will otherwise misattribute the cause.\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n console.warn(\n // Don't echo agent_id verbatim — emit a short prefix for\n // correlation while keeping log-sink content lower-cardinality\n // and avoiding accidental leakage of org-identifiable ids.\n `[@vorim/sdk] signing failed for agent_id=${(event.agent_id ?? '').slice(0, 12)}... form=${form}: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? err}. ` +\n `Event will be emitted unsigned with canonical_form retained.`,\n );\n } catch {\n /* ignore logger errors */\n }\n // Preserve canonical_form so the event is still classified as a\n // v1 attempt server-side, just without a signature. This makes\n // the breakage detectable via the signature_missing + v1 form\n // pair instead of looking like a legacy v0 unsigned event.\n return withForm;\n }\n }\n\n /**\n * Export a signed audit bundle for a date range.\n * The server only supports 'json' (the sole allowed export format).\n */\n async exportAudit(from: string, to: string, format: 'json' = 'json'): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/audit/export', { from, to, format });\n }\n\n // ─── API Keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * List all API keys for the organisation.\n * Requires an API key with the apikeys:read scope (or a dashboard JWT).\n */\n async listApiKeys(): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get('/api-keys');\n }\n\n /**\n * Create a new API key.\n * Requires an API key with the apikeys:write scope (or a dashboard JWT).\n */\n async createApiKey(name: string, options?: { scopes?: string[]; expires_at?: string }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/api-keys', { name, ...options });\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke an API key. Returns the revoked key object (server returns the\n * formatted api_key record, not a { revoked } flag).\n * Requires an API key with the apikeys:write scope (or a dashboard JWT).\n */\n async deleteApiKey(keyId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.delete(`/api-keys/${keyId}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Ephemeral Agents ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register an ephemeral agent with W3C did:key identity.\n * The agent auto-expires after the specified TTL.\n *\n * Side effect: the returned private_key is cached in this SDK instance's\n * in-memory keyring (matching register()).\n */\n async registerEphemeral(input: {\n capabilities: string[];\n scopes: string[];\n ttl_seconds?: number;\n /**\n * The agent this worker is spawned for. The worker joins the parent's\n * swarm (minted on the parent if it has none), so swarm budgets,\n * behaviour windows and cascading suspend cover it.\n */\n parent_agent_id?: string;\n /**\n * The worker's share of the swarm token budget per window, granted out\n * of the parent's own share (conservation ledger). Needs parent_agent_id\n * and a swarm budget; refused when the parent cannot cover it.\n */\n budget_tokens?: number;\n }): Promise<any> {\n const result = await this.post('/agents/ephemeral', input);\n const agentId: string | undefined = result?.agent?.agent_id ?? result?.did_key;\n if (agentId && result?.private_key) {\n this.agentKeys.set(agentId, result.private_key);\n }\n return result;\n }\n\n /**\n * The server-minted swarm an agent belongs to and every member of it.\n * `{ swarm_id: null, members: [] }` for a standalone agent.\n */\n async getSwarm(agentId: string): Promise<SwarmView> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/swarm`);\n }\n\n // ─── Many agents at once ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register up to 50 agents in one call: an explicit list, or a template\n * repeated `count` times (names `<prefix>-1` .. `<prefix>-N`), optionally\n * grouped into a new swarm (`swarm: { name?, root? }`; the first created\n * agent roots it when `root` is absent). Each created agent's private key\n * is cached, like `register()`, so the SDK can sign for it at once. The\n * plan allowance is checked for the whole batch first; a single failure is\n * listed in `failed`, not thrown.\n */\n async registerMany(input: {\n agents?: Array<{ name: string; description?: string; capabilities?: string[]; scopes: string[] }>;\n template?: { name_prefix: string; description?: string; capabilities?: string[]; scopes: string[] };\n count?: number;\n swarm?: { name?: string; root?: string };\n }): Promise<{ created: any[]; failed: Array<{ name: string; error: string }>; swarm: { swarm_id: string; name: string | null; root_agent_id: string } | null }> {\n const result = await this.post('/agents/bulk', input);\n for (const c of result?.created ?? []) {\n const id: string | undefined = c?.agent?.agent_id;\n if (id && c?.private_key) this.agentKeys.set(id, c.private_key);\n }\n return result;\n }\n\n // ─── Declarative swarm spec (vorim.swarm/v1) ─────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Create or update a swarm from a spec: root, members and who they report\n * to, guardians, charter, budget and shares, breakers, tripwires. Pass the\n * YAML or JSON text, or the parsed object. `dryRun` returns the plan\n * without writing. Needs an org key with `runtime:manage`.\n */\n async applySwarmSpec(spec: string | Record<string, unknown>, opts: { dryRun?: boolean } = {}): Promise<any> {\n const body = typeof spec === 'string' ? { spec } : spec;\n return this.post(`/swarms/apply?dry_run=${opts.dryRun ? 'true' : 'false'}`, body);\n }\n\n /**\n * Rehearse a swarm: every active member against a scenario set, through\n * the real decision pipeline with nothing written, signed with the roster,\n * charter, budget and policy version it ran under. `preset: 'hazards'`\n * (default) runs generic side tasks plus one main task; `'replay'` re-judges\n * the swarm's last 100 decisions; `scenarios` runs your own (each with\n * `expect: 'allow' | 'not_allow' | 'deny' | 'escalate'`). Verdict is pass,\n * pass_with_findings or fail. Needs `runtime:manage`.\n */\n async rehearseSwarm(swarmId: string, input: { preset?: 'hazards' | 'replay'; scenarios?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>; label?: string } = {}): Promise<any> {\n return this.post(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/rehearse`, input);\n }\n\n /** Past rehearsals, newest first (summary only; fetch `/swarms/:id/rehearsals/:rid` for the signed payload). */\n async listSwarmRehearsals(swarmId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/rehearsals`);\n }\n\n /**\n * A swarm's trust: `min` (gate on it: the least trusted active member),\n * `weighted_mean` (display, weighted by recent activity), `trimmed_mean`\n * (for anything derived from peer reports), per member.\n */\n async getSwarmScore(swarmId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/score`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Issue a platform-signed attestation of the swarm as it is now: roster\n * and its hash, policy version and rules hash, charter, budget, kills,\n * latest rehearsal, receipt chain head and the three scores. Valid 24 h.\n * Hand it to a counterparty; they verify it against GET /trust/keys.\n */\n async attestSwarm(swarmId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.post(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/attest`, {});\n }\n\n /** Past attestations, newest first (fetch one by id for the signed payload). */\n async listSwarmAttestations(swarmId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/attestations`);\n }\n\n /** A swarm as it is now, as a spec: `{ spec, yaml }`. Keep the YAML in git and apply it again. */\n async getSwarmSpec(swarmId: string): Promise<{ spec: Record<string, unknown>; yaml: string }> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/spec`);\n }\n\n /**\n * A swarm's attention picture: escalations in the last hour against its\n * budget, the rate to expect, median time to resolve, mean time between\n * interventions, and the fan-out estimate after Olsen and Goodrich (how\n * many swarms like this one person could supervise).\n */\n async getSwarmAttention(swarmId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/attention`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Set the swarm's attention budget: `perHour` escalations per rolling hour\n * a person may be asked to read (null = no budget). Past it `onExceed`\n * decides: 'deny' (the escalation is denied unread, the default) or\n * 'suspend' (the whole swarm stops). Returns the swarm detail.\n */\n async setSwarmAttention(swarmId: string, input: { perHour?: number | null; onExceed?: 'deny' | 'suspend' }): Promise<any> {\n const body: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n if (input.perHour !== undefined) body.attention_budget_per_hour = input.perHour;\n if (input.onExceed !== undefined) body.attention_exceeded_action = input.onExceed;\n return this.patch(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}`, body);\n }\n\n // ─── OpenTelemetry ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Attributes for the agent's own spans: the OTel GenAI `gen_ai.agent.id`\n * plus Vorim's swarm and parent-agent ids (the conventions have no field\n * for either), so any OTel backend can group a swarm's spans. Cached for\n * 60 seconds per agent. Pass the active span's trace/span id back to\n * `beforeAction` / `emit` and Vorim's OTLP connector parents its spans\n * under yours.\n */\n async otelAttributes(agentId: string): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n const cached = this.otelCache.get(agentId);\n if (cached && cached.expires > Date.now()) return cached.attrs;\n const attrs: Record<string, string> = { 'gen_ai.agent.id': agentId, 'vorim.agent.id': agentId };\n try {\n const swarm = await this.getSwarm(agentId);\n if (swarm?.swarm_id) {\n attrs['vorim.swarm.id'] = swarm.swarm_id;\n const me = swarm.members?.find((m) => m.agent_id === agentId);\n if (me?.parent_agent_id) attrs['vorim.parent_agent.id'] = me.parent_agent_id;\n }\n } catch {\n // The agent's own id is still worth stamping when the lookup fails.\n }\n this.otelCache.set(agentId, { attrs, expires: Date.now() + 60_000 });\n return attrs;\n }\n private otelCache = new Map<string, { attrs: Record<string, string>; expires: number }>();\n\n // ─── Guardian agents ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n //\n // An agent with metadata.class = 'guardian' judges escalations that a rule\n // with approver_role 'guardian' assigned to its swarm. It reads the queue\n // from the server (never from a peer) and answers with a verdict signed by\n // its own key over one canonical line, so the approval is verifiable\n // offline against the agent's registered public key. An unanswered\n // escalation times out as denied: an absent guardian fails closed.\n\n /** Pending escalations this guardian may judge (empty for a non-guardian). */\n async listGuardianEscalations(agentId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/runtime/guardian/escalations?agent_id=${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Approve or veto an escalation as a guardian. Needs the agent's private\n * key (loaded by register(), registerEphemeral() or useAgentKey()). A\n * quorum rule returns `{ status: 'partial', approvals, required_approvals }`\n * until enough distinct approvals arrive; one veto denies at once.\n */\n async guardianResolve(agentId: string, decisionId: string, resolution: 'approved' | 'denied'): Promise<any> {\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);\n if (!key) {\n throw new VorimError(400, 'AGENT_KEY_NOT_LOADED',\n `No private key is cached for agent ${agentId}. Call register() or useAgentKey(agentId, privateKeyPem) first.`);\n }\n const signedAt = new Date().toISOString();\n // Byte-identical to the server's approvalSigningLine().\n const line = `vorim-escalation-approval|v1|${decisionId}|${resolution}|agent:${agentId}|${signedAt}`;\n const signature = await this.sign(line, key);\n return this.post('/runtime/guardian/resolve', {\n agent_id: agentId, decision_id: decisionId, resolution, signed_at: signedAt, signature,\n });\n }\n\n // ─── Credential Delegation ──────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register an OAuth provider for credential delegation.\n */\n async registerProvider(input: {\n provider_key: string;\n display_name?: string;\n client_id: string;\n client_secret: string;\n auth_url: string;\n token_url: string;\n revoke_url?: string;\n scopes_available?: string[];\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/credentials/providers', input);\n }\n\n /**\n * List registered OAuth providers.\n */\n async listProviders(): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get('/credentials/providers');\n }\n\n /**\n * Store an OAuth connection (user's authorized tokens).\n */\n async storeConnection(input: {\n provider_id: string;\n refresh_token: string;\n scopes_granted: string[];\n external_account_id?: string;\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/credentials/connections', input);\n }\n\n /**\n * List OAuth connections.\n */\n async listConnections(): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get('/credentials/connections');\n }\n\n /**\n * Delegate a credential to an agent.\n * The agent will be able to request short-lived access tokens\n * for the delegated scopes without ever seeing the refresh token.\n */\n async delegateCredential(input: {\n connection_id: string;\n agent_id: string;\n scopes_delegated: string[];\n max_requests_per_hr?: number;\n valid_until?: string;\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/credentials/delegations', input);\n }\n\n /**\n * List credential delegations for the organisation or a specific agent.\n */\n async listDelegations(agentId?: string): Promise<any[]> {\n const params = agentId ? `?agent_id=${agentId}` : '';\n return this.get(`/credentials/delegations${params}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke a credential delegation (cascades to delegation chains).\n */\n async revokeDelegation(delegationId: string): Promise<{ revoked: boolean }> {\n return this.delete(`/credentials/delegations/${delegationId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Request a short-lived access token for an agent.\n * The agent must have an active credential delegation.\n * The refresh token is never exposed — the platform proxies the request.\n */\n async requestToken(input: {\n agent_id: string;\n scope: string;\n provider_id?: string;\n }): Promise<{\n access_token: string;\n token_type: string;\n expires_in: number;\n scope: string;\n delegation_id: string;\n }> {\n return this.post('/credentials/token', input);\n }\n\n // ─── HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) ─────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Sign an outbound HTTP request (RFC 9421) with an agent's cached Ed25519\n * key, so the receiver can tell which Vorim agent sent it. `keyid` is the\n * agent_id, `alg` is `ed25519`, and `tag` defaults to `vorim`. When the\n * request has a body, a Content-Digest header is added and covered.\n *\n * The key must already be in this instance's keyring (from `register()`,\n * `registerEphemeral()` or `useAgentKey()`). Returns the headers to add.\n *\n * ```ts\n * const { headers } = await vorim.signHttpRequest(agentId, {\n * method: 'POST', url: 'https://agent-b.example/tasks',\n * headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body,\n * });\n * await fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers }, body });\n * ```\n */\n async signHttpRequest(\n agentId: string,\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: Omit<SignHttpRequestOptions, 'privateKey' | 'keyid' | 'alg'> = {},\n ): Promise<SignHttpRequestResult> {\n const privateKey = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);\n if (!privateKey) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 400,\n 'AGENT_KEY_NOT_LOADED',\n `No private key is cached for agent ${agentId}. Call register() or useAgentKey(agentId, privateKeyPem) first.`,\n );\n }\n return signHttpRequestWithKey(request, {\n ...options,\n tag: options.tag ?? 'vorim',\n privateKey,\n keyid: agentId,\n alg: 'ed25519',\n });\n }\n\n /**\n * Verify an RFC 9421 signed request through Vorim. The server resolves the\n * signature's keyid (an agent_id) to that agent's registered public key,\n * rejects suspended or revoked agents, and checks Content-Digest when the\n * body is passed. Public endpoint: no API key scope is needed.\n *\n * Pass the request exactly as received: method, full URL, headers, and the\n * raw body if `content-digest` is covered.\n */\n async verifyHttpRequest(\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: { label?: string; maxAgeSeconds?: number } = {},\n ): Promise<HttpSignatureVerification> {\n const payload: Record<string, unknown> = {\n method: request.method,\n url: request.url,\n headers: request.headers,\n };\n if (typeof request.body === 'string') {\n payload.body = request.body;\n } else if (request.body instanceof Uint8Array) {\n let bin = '';\n for (let i = 0; i < request.body.length; i++) bin += String.fromCharCode(request.body[i]);\n payload.body_base64 = btoa(bin);\n }\n if (options.label !== undefined) payload.label = options.label;\n if (options.maxAgeSeconds !== undefined) payload.max_age_seconds = options.maxAgeSeconds;\n return this.post('/http-signatures/verify', payload);\n }\n\n // ─── Signing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Sign a payload with an Ed25519 private key (client-side).\n * Uses the Web Crypto API or Node.js crypto.\n */\n async sign(payload: string, privateKeyPem: string): Promise<string> {\n if (typeof globalThis.crypto?.subtle !== 'undefined') {\n // Web Crypto API\n const keyData = this.pemToArrayBuffer(privateKeyPem);\n const key = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'pkcs8', keyData, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['sign']\n );\n const signature = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign(\n 'Ed25519', key, new TextEncoder().encode(payload)\n );\n return `ed25519:${this.arrayBufferToBase64(signature)}`;\n } else {\n // Node.js crypto fallback\n const crypto = await import('node:crypto');\n const sign = crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(payload), privateKeyPem);\n return `ed25519:${sign.toString('base64')}`;\n }\n }\n\n // ─── HTTP Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n private async get(path: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('GET', path);\n }\n\n private async post(path: string, body: any, headers?: Record<string, string>): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('POST', path, body, true, headers);\n }\n\n private async patch(path: string, body: any): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('PATCH', path, body);\n }\n\n private async put(path: string, body: any): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('PUT', path, body);\n }\n\n private async delete(path: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('DELETE', path);\n }\n\n /** Like request() but returns the FULL { data, meta, ... } envelope\n * instead of unwrapping to `data`. Used where meta (pagination) matters. */\n private async requestEnvelope(method: string, path: string, body?: any): Promise<Record<string, any>> {\n return this.request(method, path, body, false);\n }\n\n private async request(\n method: string,\n path: string,\n body?: any,\n unwrap = true,\n extraHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n ): Promise<any> {\n const controller = new AbortController();\n const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeout);\n\n try {\n const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n method,\n headers: {\n 'Authorization': `Bearer ${this.apiKey}`,\n 'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n 'User-Agent': USER_AGENT,\n ...extraHeaders,\n },\n body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n signal: controller.signal,\n });\n\n if (!response.ok) {\n const errBody = await response.json().catch(() => ({})) as Record<string, any>;\n throw new VorimError(\n response.status,\n errBody.error?.code || 'UNKNOWN_ERROR',\n errBody.error?.message || `HTTP ${response.status}`,\n errBody.error?.details\n );\n }\n\n // A 204 No Content (e.g. DELETE endpoints) is a legitimate success with\n // an empty body — there is nothing to parse. Return early so the JSON\n // guard below doesn't misclassify the empty body as MALFORMED_RESPONSE.\n if (response.status === 204) {\n return unwrap ? undefined : {};\n }\n\n // Guard the success-body parse: a 2xx whose body is not valid JSON\n // (e.g. a proxy/CDN/captive-portal \"200 OK\" HTML interstitial) would\n // otherwise throw a bare SyntaxError that beforeAction's catch\n // misclassifies as a status-0 transport failure and, under\n // runtimeFailOpen, silently ALLOWS the gated action. We throw a\n // VorimError with a distinct MALFORMED_RESPONSE code so the gate\n // fails closed (see the isTransport check in beforeAction). Python's\n // before_action catches json.JSONDecodeError the same way.\n let json: Record<string, any>;\n try {\n json = await response.json() as Record<string, any>;\n } catch {\n throw new VorimError(502, 'MALFORMED_RESPONSE', 'Control plane returned a non-JSON success response');\n }\n return unwrap ? json.data : json;\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timeoutId);\n }\n }\n\n private pemToArrayBuffer(pem: string): ArrayBuffer {\n const b64 = pem.replace(/-----[^-]+-----/g, '').replace(/\\s/g, '');\n const binary = atob(b64);\n const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n }\n return bytes.buffer;\n }\n\n private arrayBufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer): string {\n const bytes = new Uint8Array(buffer);\n let binary = '';\n for (const byte of bytes) {\n binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n }\n return btoa(binary);\n }\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link VorimSDK.verifyHttpRequest}, from POST /v1/http-signatures/verify. */\nexport interface HttpSignatureVerification {\n valid: boolean;\n reason?: string;\n label: string;\n keyid: string | null;\n agent_id: string | null;\n org_name: string | null;\n agent_status: string | null;\n trust_score: number | null;\n covered: string[];\n created: number | null;\n expires: number | null;\n content_digest_checked: boolean;\n}\n\nexport class VorimError extends Error {\n constructor(\n public status: number,\n public code: string,\n message: string,\n public details?: Record<string, unknown>\n ) {\n super(message);\n this.name = 'VorimError';\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown by {@link VorimSDK.beforeAction} when the runtime decision is\n * `deny` and `throwOnDeny` is left at its default (`true`). Carries the\n * full {@link RuntimeDecision} so the caller can inspect the reason and\n * the decision id. Status is 403 with code `DECISION_DENIED`.\n */\nexport class VorimDeniedError extends VorimError {\n constructor(public decision: RuntimeDecision) {\n super(403, 'DECISION_DENIED', decision.reason, { decisionId: decision.decisionId });\n this.name = 'VorimDeniedError';\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Convenience export ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport default function createVorim(config: VorimConfig): VorimSDK {\n return new VorimSDK(config);\n}\n\n// ─── Device-flow onboarding (RFC 8628) ──────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DeviceLoginOptions {\n baseUrl?: string;\n /** Shown to the human on the consent screen, e.g. \"Cursor\" or \"my-app\". */\n clientName?: string;\n /** Scopes to request; the server clamps to its ceiling regardless. */\n requestedScopes?: string[];\n /**\n * Requested lifetime for the minted key, in days (1..90). Omit for the\n * 90-day default. A short-lived task agent can ask for 1; the server clamps\n * to 1..90, so a shorter key is honoured and an out-of-range value can never\n * mint a longer-lived key than policy allows.\n */\n keyTtlDays?: number;\n /**\n * Called once with the code + URL to show the human. The agent MUST surface\n * `user_code` and `verification_uri` verbatim — do not summarise or truncate.\n */\n onUserCode: (info: { user_code: string; verification_uri: string; verification_uri_complete: string; expires_in: number }) => void;\n /** Stop polling after this many ms (default: the server's expires_in). */\n timeoutMs?: number;\n /**\n * After the key is minted, also register a first agent identity with it, so\n * the agent is fully set up in one call. Pass `true` for a sensible default,\n * or an object to customise. The agent's one-time private key is returned in\n * `result.agent.private_key` — store it; it cannot be retrieved again.\n */\n registerAgent?: boolean | { name?: string; capabilities?: string[]; scopes?: string[] };\n}\n\nexport interface DeviceLoginResult {\n api_key: string;\n key_prefix: string;\n scopes: string[];\n org_id: string;\n /** Present only when `registerAgent` was set — the auto-registered identity. */\n agent?: AgentRegistrationResult;\n}\n\n/**\n * Onboard via the device-authorization flow: obtain a scoped Vorim API key by\n * polling, after a human approves in the browser. No existing key needed — this\n * is the pre-auth bootstrap. Resolves with the key once the human approves;\n * rejects on denial, expiry, or timeout (fail-closed — never returns a partial\n * or unverified credential).\n *\n * @example\n * const { api_key } = await deviceLogin({\n * clientName: 'my-app',\n * onUserCode: ({ user_code, verification_uri }) =>\n * console.log(`Approve at ${verification_uri} — code: ${user_code}`),\n * });\n */\nexport async function deviceLogin(opts: DeviceLoginOptions): Promise<DeviceLoginResult> {\n const base = (opts.baseUrl || 'https://api.vorim.ai').replace(/\\/$/, '') + '/v1';\n\n const startRes = await fetch(`${base}/auth/device`, {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ client_name: opts.clientName, requested_scopes: opts.requestedScopes, key_ttl_days: opts.keyTtlDays }),\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),\n });\n if (!startRes.ok) throw new VorimError(startRes.status, 'DEVICE_START_FAILED', `Could not start device authorization (HTTP ${startRes.status})`);\n const start = ((await startRes.json()) as { data: any }).data;\n\n opts.onUserCode({\n user_code: start.user_code,\n verification_uri: start.verification_uri,\n verification_uri_complete: start.verification_uri_complete,\n expires_in: start.expires_in,\n });\n\n const intervalMs = Math.max(1, start.interval || 5) * 1000;\n const deadline = Date.now() + (opts.timeoutMs ?? start.expires_in * 1000);\n let wait = intervalMs;\n\n // Poll until approved, denied, expired, or our deadline.\n for (;;) {\n if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new VorimError(408, 'DEVICE_TIMEOUT', 'Device authorization timed out before approval');\n await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, wait));\n\n const pollRes = await fetch(`${base}/auth/device/token`, {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ device_code: start.device_code }),\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),\n });\n const json = (await pollRes.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { data?: any; error?: { code?: string } };\n\n if (pollRes.ok && json.data?.api_key) {\n const result: DeviceLoginResult = {\n api_key: json.data.api_key, key_prefix: json.data.key_prefix, scopes: json.data.scopes, org_id: json.data.org_id,\n };\n // Optionally finish setup: register a first agent identity with the\n // freshly-minted key so the caller gets back a fully-wired agent. Done\n // SDK-side (a normal authenticated POST /agents) — the device endpoints\n // themselves never create agents, keeping that audited surface unchanged.\n if (opts.registerAgent) {\n const cfg = typeof opts.registerAgent === 'object' ? opts.registerAgent : {};\n const sdk = new VorimSDK({ apiKey: result.api_key, baseUrl: opts.baseUrl });\n result.agent = await sdk.register({\n name: cfg.name || opts.clientName || 'my-agent',\n capabilities: cfg.capabilities || [],\n scopes: (cfg.scopes as any) || ['agent:read', 'agent:execute'],\n });\n }\n return result;\n }\n const code = json.error?.code;\n if (code === 'access_denied') throw new VorimError(403, 'DEVICE_DENIED', 'The human denied the authorization request');\n if (code === 'expired_token') throw new VorimError(410, 'DEVICE_EXPIRED', 'The device code expired before approval');\n if (code === 'slow_down') { wait += intervalMs; continue; } // back off per RFC 8628\n // authorization_pending (or any transient): keep polling at the base interval.\n wait = intervalMs;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The exact bytes a {@link PortableSignedReceipt}'s signature covers.\n *\n * Re-exported so a verifier holding only this SDK has ONE source for the\n * canonical form. Reimplementing it is the failure mode the shared definition\n * exists to prevent.\n */\nexport { portableReceiptCanonicalBytes };\nexport type { PortableSignedReceipt } from '@vorim/shared-types';\n\n// Re-export types for consumers\nexport type {\n Agent, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult,\n TrustRecord, AuditEventInput, AuditEventType, AuditResult,\n PermissionScope, PermissionCheckResult, AgentStatus,\n AgentDelegationRecord, DelegationLinkClaims,\n BeforeActionInput, RuntimeDecision, DecisionVerdict, ApprovalAttestation,\n TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, BudgetSpend, BudgetScope, BudgetEnforcement,\n WorkflowProvenanceGraph, WorkflowGraphNode, WorkflowGraphEdge, WorkflowGraphEvent,\n SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SharedMemoryListResult,\n SuspendPreview, SwarmView,\n} from './types.js';\n\n// Re-export replayable evidence helpers (VAIP -02 schema field hashing)\nexport {\n hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, hashSystemPrompt, hashPreviousEvent,\n jcsCanonicalise, prepareReplayContext, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION,\n} from './replay.js';\nexport type { CatalogueTool, ReplayInputs, ReplayContext } from './replay.js';\nexport {\n commitPayload, hashPayload, isKeyedCommitment, isDigest,\n HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX, SHA256_PREFIX,\n} from './commit.js';\nexport type { CommitmentKey } from './commit.js';\n\n// RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures + RFC 9530 Content-Digest (also available\n// as the '@vorim/sdk/http-signatures' subpath).\nexport {\n createSignatureBase, signHttpRequest, verifyHttpRequest, contentDigest,\n httpSignatureAlgForKey, HttpSignatureError,\n} from './httpSignatures.js';\nexport type {\n HttpRequestLike, HttpMessageLike, SignatureParams, SignHttpRequestOptions,\n SignHttpRequestResult, VerifyHttpRequestOptions, VerifyHttpRequestResult,\n ResolvedKey, HttpSignatureAlgorithm, ContentDigestAlgorithm,\n} from 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+ {"version":3,"sources":["../src/replay.ts","../../shared-types/src/index.ts","../src/commit.ts","../src/httpSignatures.ts","../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Replayable agent decision evidence helpers.\n *\n * Canonical-form hashing for the VAIP -02 schema fields that the SDK\n * attaches to audit events. The hashes recorded in audit_events.tool_catalogue_hash\n * and audit_events.system_prompt_hash use these functions, so the bytes\n * an auditor or counterparty reconstructs must match what the SDK produced.\n *\n * These helpers are intentionally separate from the signing path. The\n * v0 canonical signature form (event_type|action|resource|input_hash|\n * output_hash|result) does NOT cover model_version, tool_catalogue_hash,\n * or system_prompt_hash. They will enter the canonical bytes in v1\n * (RFC 8785 JCS) in a follow-up release.\n *\n * Stable across SDK versions: the canonical-form version is documented\n * in CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION. Future changes get a v2 etc;\n * never edit the existing v1 logic, or already-recorded hashes lose\n * their meaning.\n */\n\n// ─── Versioning ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Canonical-form version for tool catalogue hashes produced by this SDK.\n * Recorded in tool_catalogue_canon_version on the event metadata (when\n * the metadata field is used) so verifiers know which hash recipe to\n * reproduce. Increment ONLY if the algorithm changes in a way that\n * would change the hash for the same logical catalogue.\n */\nexport const CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION = 'v1' as const;\n\n// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Minimum shape a tool needs for catalogue hashing. The framework\n * integrations adapt their native tool objects to this shape before\n * calling hashToolCatalogue.\n */\nexport interface CatalogueTool {\n /** The name the model sees and calls. Required. */\n name: string;\n /** Human-readable description shown to the model. Optional; absent ↔ empty string. */\n description?: string;\n /**\n * JSON Schema describing the tool's input parameters. Optional;\n * absent ↔ empty object `{}`. The schema gets RFC 8785 JCS-canonicalised\n * before hashing so semantically-equivalent variations (key order,\n * whitespace) produce the same hash.\n */\n schema?: Record<string, unknown> | null;\n}\n\n// ─── RFC 8785 JCS subset ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme, sufficient subset for tool\n * catalogue values.\n *\n * Rules:\n * - Object keys sorted lexicographically by UTF-16 code units (which\n * is what JS string comparison does naturally).\n * - No whitespace between tokens.\n * - Numbers: integers as integers, finite floats per ECMAScript\n * Number.prototype.toString. JCS forbids NaN and Infinity.\n * - Strings: JSON-escape using minimal set per RFC 8259 § 7.\n * - null, true, false, arrays: as JSON.stringify produces them, since\n * JSON.stringify already produces the canonical form for these.\n *\n * Not vendoring a full library because tool schemas don't carry\n * non-integer numbers in practice and the JS spec for Number.toString\n * happens to coincide with JCS § 3.2.2.2 for the integer case.\n */\nexport function jcsCanonicalise(value: unknown): string {\n if (value === null) return 'null';\n if (value === true) return 'true';\n if (value === false) return 'false';\n\n if (typeof value === 'number') {\n if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n throw new Error('jcsCanonicalise: NaN and Infinity are not JCS-valid');\n }\n // Fail closed on magnitudes where JS .toString() and CPython diverge, so TS\n // and Python sign byte-identical bytes (or both reject). JS switches\n // integer-valued floats to exponent form at |x| >= 1e21 (Python expands to\n // full digits); in [1e-7, 1e-4) JS keeps decimals while Python repr() uses\n // exponent form. Keeping both engines in lockstep preserves cross-SDK\n // signature verifiability.\n const abs = Math.abs(value);\n // Reject ranges where JS Number.toString() and CPython diverge: |x| >= 1e21,\n // |x| < 1e-4, and integer-valued |x| > 2^53 (JS shortest-round-trip vs\n // Python exact int expansion — they only coincide for \"round\" values there).\n if (value !== 0 && (abs >= 1e21 || abs < 1e-4 || (Number.isInteger(value) && abs > 2 ** 53))) {\n throw new Error(\n `jcsCanonicalise: numbers in the ranges where JS and Python formatting ` +\n `diverge (|x| >= 1e21, |x| < 1e-4, or integer |x| > 2^53) are not ` +\n `supported in signed metadata. Use a string instead of ${value}.`,\n );\n }\n // For integers in safe range and ordinary decimals, .toString() matches JCS\n // (modern JS engines use the shortest round-trip representation).\n return value.toString();\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'string') {\n return JSON.stringify(value);\n }\n\n if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n return '[' + value.map(jcsCanonicalise).join(',') + ']';\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'object') {\n const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n // Filter undefined-valued fields, matching @vorim/verify and\n // @vorim/shared-types. Without this the SDK throws on { a: 1, b: undefined }\n // while the verifier silently drops b — a cross-module canonical-form\n // divergence that would break signature verification on such events.\n const keys = Object.keys(obj).filter(k => obj[k] !== undefined).sort();\n const parts = keys.map(k => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + jcsCanonicalise(obj[k]));\n return '{' + parts.join(',') + '}';\n }\n\n // undefined, function, symbol, bigint — not JSON-representable\n throw new Error(`jcsCanonicalise: unsupported value type: ${typeof value}`);\n}\n\n// ─── SHA-256 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nasync function sha256Hex(input: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n const bytes = typeof input === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(input) : input;\n\n // Node.js Web Crypto (Node 18+) supports digest. Browser Web Crypto does too.\n // Fall back to node:crypto if Web Crypto is unavailable.\n const subtle = (globalThis as any).crypto?.subtle;\n if (subtle) {\n const buf = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes);\n return Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf))\n .map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n .join('');\n }\n\n // Node fallback\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return nodeCrypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex');\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Hash a single tool definition. Returns `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * Canonical form (v1):\n * JCS-canonicalised JSON of `{name, description, schema}` where\n * absent fields substitute `description: \"\"` and `schema: {}`.\n */\nexport async function hashTool(tool: CatalogueTool): Promise<string> {\n const normalised = {\n name: tool.name,\n description: tool.description ?? '',\n schema: tool.schema ?? {},\n };\n const hex = await sha256Hex(jcsCanonicalise(normalised));\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hash an entire tool catalogue. Returns `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * Reordering tools does NOT change the hash (tool hashes sorted\n * lexicographically before concatenation). Adding, removing, or\n * modifying a tool DOES change the hash.\n *\n * Per-tool hashing first means a verifier comparing two catalogue\n * hashes that differ can also be given the per-tool hashes to\n * identify which specific tool changed.\n */\nexport async function hashToolCatalogue(tools: CatalogueTool[]): Promise<string> {\n if (tools.length === 0) {\n // Empty catalogue has a deterministic, stable hash distinct from \"no field\"\n return `sha256:${await sha256Hex('[]')}`;\n }\n const perTool = await Promise.all(tools.map(hashTool));\n perTool.sort();\n const hex = await sha256Hex(perTool.join(''));\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Hash a system prompt. Returns `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * The prompt is UTF-8 encoded and hashed verbatim — no normalisation.\n * If a caller wants to ignore whitespace or comment differences, they\n * should normalise before calling. The intent here is deterministic\n * reproducibility, not semantic equivalence.\n */\nexport async function hashSystemPrompt(prompt: string): Promise<string> {\n const hex = await sha256Hex(prompt);\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: hash the previous event's canonical bytes for use in\n * the prev_event_hash field of hash-chained ingest. Caller provides\n * the canonical bytes (use canonicalPayloadV0 from the main module).\n */\nexport async function hashPreviousEvent(canonicalBytes: string): Promise<string> {\n const hex = await sha256Hex(canonicalBytes);\n return `sha256:${hex}`;\n}\n\n// ─── Replay context — framework integration helper ────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Raw inputs the integration captures from the framework. Set by the\n * integration's config; turned into hashes by {@link prepareReplayContext}.\n */\nexport interface ReplayInputs {\n /** Stable identifier for the model. E.g. `\"anthropic:claude-opus-4-8\"`. */\n modelVersion?: string;\n /** Tools available to the agent at call time. Hashed via {@link hashToolCatalogue}. */\n tools?: CatalogueTool[];\n /** System prompt active at call time. Hashed via {@link hashSystemPrompt}. */\n systemPrompt?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pre-computed hashes ready to attach to audit events. The three keys\n * match the audit_events column names.\n */\nexport interface ReplayContext {\n model_version?: string;\n tool_catalogue_hash?: string;\n system_prompt_hash?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute replay context once from raw inputs. Use at integration\n * setup time so each emit can attach the hashes without re-hashing.\n *\n * Returns an object suitable for spreading into an AuditEventInput:\n * `await vorim.emit({ ...event, ...replayContext })`\n *\n * If a field is absent in the inputs, it is absent in the result\n * (not the empty string). That keeps the event lean.\n */\nexport async function prepareReplayContext(\n inputs: ReplayInputs,\n): Promise<ReplayContext> {\n const ctx: ReplayContext = {};\n if (inputs.modelVersion) ctx.model_version = inputs.modelVersion;\n if (inputs.tools) ctx.tool_catalogue_hash = await hashToolCatalogue(inputs.tools);\n if (inputs.systemPrompt) ctx.system_prompt_hash = await hashSystemPrompt(inputs.systemPrompt);\n return ctx;\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// VORIM — Shared Types\n// Core domain types used across API, SDK, and Web Dashboard\n// ============================================================================\n\n// ─── Agent Identity ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentStatus = 'pending' | 'active' | 'suspended' | 'revoked' | 'expired';\n\nexport interface Agent {\n id: string;\n agent_id: string; // agid_{org_id}_{uuid4}\n org_id: string;\n owner_user_id: string;\n name: string;\n description?: string;\n status: AgentStatus;\n public_key: string;\n key_fingerprint: string;\n trust_score: number; // 0–100\n capabilities: string[];\n metadata: Record<string, unknown>;\n expires_at?: string;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n revoked_at?: string;\n revoked_by?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentRegistrationInput {\n name: string;\n description?: string;\n capabilities: string[];\n scopes: PermissionScope[];\n}\n\nexport interface AgentRegistrationResult {\n agent: Agent;\n private_key: string; // returned exactly once\n public_key: string;\n key_fingerprint: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Permission Scopes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type PermissionScope =\n | 'agent:read'\n | 'agent:write'\n | 'agent:execute'\n | 'agent:transact'\n | 'agent:communicate'\n | 'agent:delegate'\n | 'agent:elevate';\n\nexport const PERMISSION_SCOPES: readonly PermissionScope[] = [\n 'agent:read',\n 'agent:write',\n 'agent:execute',\n 'agent:transact',\n 'agent:communicate',\n 'agent:delegate',\n 'agent:elevate',\n] as const;\n\nexport interface Permission {\n id: string;\n agent_id: string;\n scope: PermissionScope;\n granted_by: string;\n valid_from: string;\n valid_until?: string;\n rate_limit?: RateLimit;\n conditions?: PermissionConditions;\n created_at: string;\n revoked_at?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RateLimit {\n max: number;\n window: string; // '1h' | '1d' | '1m'\n}\n\nexport interface PermissionConditions {\n ip_allowlist?: string[];\n [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface PermissionCheckResult {\n allowed: boolean;\n scope: PermissionScope;\n agent_id: string;\n reason?: string;\n remaining_quota?: number;\n}\n\n// ─── Audit Events ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AuditEventType =\n | 'tool_call'\n | 'api_request'\n | 'message_sent'\n | 'permission_change'\n | 'status_change'\n | 'key_rotation'\n | 'login'\n | 'export';\n\nexport type AuditResult = 'success' | 'denied' | 'error';\n\nexport interface AuditEvent {\n event_id: string; // ULID\n agent_id: string;\n org_id: string;\n event_type: AuditEventType;\n action: string;\n resource?: string;\n input_hash?: string; // sha256:...\n output_hash?: string;\n permission?: PermissionScope;\n result: AuditResult;\n latency_ms?: number;\n error_code?: string;\n signature?: string; // ed25519 signature\n metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n timestamp: string;\n}\n\nexport interface AuditEventInput {\n agent_id: string;\n event_type: AuditEventType;\n action: string;\n resource?: string;\n input_hash?: string;\n output_hash?: string;\n permission?: PermissionScope;\n result: AuditResult;\n latency_ms?: number;\n error_code?: string;\n signature?: string;\n metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n /**\n * Replayable agent decision evidence (VAIP -02 schema fields).\n *\n * These are stored and exported but NOT covered by the v0 canonical\n * signature form. They will enter the canonical bytes when v1\n * (RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme) lands in a follow-up\n * release. Until then, they are advisory.\n *\n * - `model_version`: stable identifier for the model artefact that\n * produced the event (e.g. `anthropic:claude-opus-4-8`).\n * - `tool_catalogue_hash`: SHA-256 (`sha256:<hex>`) of the canonicalised\n * tool catalogue available to the agent at call time.\n * - `system_prompt_hash`: SHA-256 (`sha256:<hex>`) of the system prompt\n * active at call time.\n * - `prev_event_hash`: SHA-256 (`sha256:<hex>`) of the previous event\n * for this agent in this org. Enables hash-chained ingest so a\n * verifier can detect deletion of a single event.\n */\n model_version?: string;\n tool_catalogue_hash?: string;\n system_prompt_hash?: string;\n prev_event_hash?: string;\n /**\n * The caller's OpenTelemetry trace context, correlation only: joins this\n * signed event to the span that asked for the action. `trace_id` (32 hex)\n * and `span_id` (16 hex) are stored and returned with the event (a v1\n * signature covers them when set). `traceparent` (W3C header value) is a\n * convenience: the SDK turns it into the two ids before signing, and the\n * server never stores it.\n */\n trace_id?: string;\n span_id?: string;\n traceparent?: string;\n /**\n * Which canonical-form recipe this event's `signature` was computed\n * over. Defaults to `\"v0\"` when absent. New SDK versions emitting\n * v1 signatures MUST set this field so the server (and verifiers)\n * use the right recipe.\n *\n * v0: pipe-joined `event_type|action|resource|input_hash|output_hash|result`.\n * Defined by {@link canonicalPayloadV0}.\n * v1: RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme over the full event\n * object excluding `signature` and `canonical_form` themselves.\n * Covers all replayable-evidence fields. Defined by\n * {@link canonicalPayloadV1}.\n *\n * Why versioned: existing v0-signed events must continue to verify\n * forever. Server reads this field and dispatches verification to\n * the matching helper. Never edit v0 or v1 — bump the version instead.\n */\n canonical_form?: CanonicalForm;\n /**\n * Per-event delegation context (VAIP -02 § 6).\n *\n * Populated when the emitting agent is acting via a delegation chain.\n * NULL otherwise. A regulator or counterparty walking the audit\n * bundle can reconstruct who authorised the action and at which\n * depth in the chain.\n *\n * - `on_behalf_of`: root principal's agent_id (or user identifier\n * for human-rooted delegations).\n * - `delegator_agent_id`: direct parent in the chain. NULL for the\n * root delegation step.\n * - `delegation_chain_id`: shared across every event in one chain\n * (regardless of which agent in the chain emitted it).\n * - `delegation_depth`: 0 = no delegation, N = N hops from root.\n *\n * v1 signatures cover these fields. v0 signatures do not.\n */\n on_behalf_of?: string;\n delegator_agent_id?: string;\n delegation_chain_id?: string;\n delegation_depth?: number;\n /**\n * Runtime-control linkage (Strategy A). When the SDK gated this action\n * through `POST /v1/runtime/decisions` before performing it, the\n * returned `decision_id` is carried here so the post-action audit\n * event links back to the runtime decision that authorised it.\n *\n * Not covered by the v0 canonical signature form; enters the canonical\n * bytes when v1 (RFC 8785 JCS) signs the full event. Advisory until then.\n */\n decision_id?: string;\n}\n\n/** The set of canonical-form versions a Vorim signer may emit. */\nexport type CanonicalForm = 'v0' | 'v1';\n\n/**\n * VAIP v0 canonical bytes for audit-event signing.\n *\n * Pipe-joined content fields with empty-string substitution for missing values.\n * Single source of truth for both the SDK (sign-side) and the server\n * (verify-side). To upgrade the format, version the function (`canonicalPayloadV1`),\n * do not edit this one — old signatures must remain verifiable.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV0(event: {\n event_type: string;\n action: string;\n resource?: string;\n input_hash?: string;\n output_hash?: string;\n result: string;\n}): string {\n return [\n event.event_type,\n event.action,\n event.resource ?? '',\n event.input_hash ?? '',\n event.output_hash ?? '',\n event.result,\n ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * VAIP v1 canonical bytes for audit-event signing.\n *\n * RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme over the event object excluding\n * `signature` (the field being computed) and `canonical_form` (which is\n * metadata about the recipe, not part of the recipe).\n *\n * Unlike v0, v1 covers ALL event fields — including replayable-evidence\n * fields (model_version, tool_catalogue_hash, system_prompt_hash,\n * prev_event_hash) and free-form metadata. Tampering with any of them\n * invalidates the signature.\n *\n * Cost vs v0: ~10-50µs per event for typical sizes. Worth it for the\n * stronger property.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV1(event: Record<string, unknown>): string {\n const { signature: _sig, canonical_form: _cf, ...rest } = event;\n return jcsCanonicalise(rest);\n}\n\n// ─── Delegation chain (VAIP -02 § 5) ───────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * One link in an agent-to-agent identity delegation chain.\n *\n * The link is JCS-canonicalised and Ed25519-signed by the delegator's\n * private key, producing a self-contained capability token a verifier\n * can walk offline. Signed bytes are produced by\n * {@link delegationLinkCanonicalBytes}.\n */\nexport interface DelegationLinkClaims {\n /** Format version. Currently `0`. Bump when the canonical form changes. */\n v: 0;\n /** Type discriminator. */\n type: 'vaip-delegation-link';\n /** Public chain id (format `chain_<32hex>`). Same across every link in a chain. */\n chain_id: string;\n /** Depth from root. Root step = 1; each subsequent link increments. */\n depth: number;\n /** Public agent_id of the delegator (signer of this link). */\n delegator: string;\n /** Public agent_id of the delegate (recipient of this link's authority). */\n delegate: string;\n /** Scopes granted to the delegate. Sorted lexicographically. */\n scopes: string[];\n /** Further hops the delegate may make. */\n max_chain_depth: number;\n /** ISO8601 valid-from timestamp. */\n valid_from: string;\n /** ISO8601 expiry, or null for no expiry. */\n valid_until: string | null;\n /**\n * SHA-256 (sha256:<hex>) of the JCS-canonical bytes of the parent\n * link's claims. NULL for root links — i.e. the first link in a\n * chain, where the delegator is the user or org-root principal.\n */\n parent_link_hash: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * A signed link as transmitted on the wire and stored in the database.\n */\nexport interface SignedDelegationLink {\n claims: DelegationLinkClaims;\n /** `ed25519:<base64>` signature over {@link delegationLinkCanonicalBytes}. */\n signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A full delegation chain token: every link from root to leaf.\n *\n * Emitted into bundle exports as `delegation_tokens[]` and walkable\n * offline by `@vorim/verify`.\n */\nexport interface DelegationChainToken {\n v: 0;\n /** All links from root (depth=1) to leaf, in depth order. */\n links: SignedDelegationLink[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical bytes for an Ed25519 signature over a delegation link.\n *\n * Uses RFC 8785 JCS — the same canonicalisation as v1 audit signatures\n * — to ensure cross-language byte-equivalence.\n */\nexport function delegationLinkCanonicalBytes(claims: DelegationLinkClaims): string {\n return jcsCanonicalise(claims);\n}\n\n// ─── Governed Shared Memory (multi-agent fabric, Phase 2) ───────────────\n\n/**\n * One governed shared-memory entry as returned by the API.\n *\n * Every entry is attributed to the agent that wrote it and carries that\n * agent's Ed25519 signature over {@link sharedMemoryCanonicalBytes}, so a\n * poisoned entry is always traceable to its source (OWASP ASI06).\n */\nexport interface SharedMemoryEntry {\n namespace: string;\n key: string;\n value: unknown;\n /** Public agent_id (`agid_*`) of the agent that authored the current value. */\n written_by: string;\n /** `sha256:<hex>` of the canonical value. */\n content_hash: string | null;\n /** True iff a signature is stored (and, when present, was verified). */\n signed: boolean;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical bytes an agent signs when writing a shared-memory entry.\n *\n * Uses RFC 8785 JCS — the same canonicalisation as v1 audit signatures and\n * delegation links — over the entry's identity + payload, so the server, the\n * TypeScript SDK, and the Python SDK all produce byte-identical bytes (or all\n * reject). The signed object is exactly:\n *\n * { agent_id, key, namespace, value }\n *\n * (JCS sorts keys lexicographically, so field order here is irrelevant.)\n * The server recomputes these bytes from the resolved public agent_id and the\n * submitted value and verifies against the agent's stored public key; a\n * present-but-invalid signature is rejected (fail closed).\n */\nexport function sharedMemoryCanonicalBytes(entry: {\n namespace: string;\n key: string;\n value: unknown;\n agent_id: string;\n}): string {\n return jcsCanonicalise({\n agent_id: entry.agent_id,\n key: entry.key,\n namespace: entry.namespace,\n value: entry.value,\n });\n}\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme, sufficient subset for audit\n * event values. Must match the SDK implementations byte-for-byte; the\n * cross-language parity script in /scripts/check-replay-parity.sh\n * verifies this.\n *\n * Rules:\n * - Object keys sorted lexicographically by UTF-16 code units.\n * - No whitespace between tokens.\n * - Numbers: integers via .toString(); finite floats per ECMAScript\n * Number.prototype.toString shortest-round-trip. Rejects NaN/Infinity.\n * - Strings: JSON-escape per RFC 8259 § 7.\n * - Arrays preserve order. null/true/false/undefined-as-error.\n */\nexport function jcsCanonicalise(value: unknown): string {\n if (value === null) return 'null';\n if (value === true) return 'true';\n if (value === false) return 'false';\n\n if (typeof value === 'number') {\n if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n throw new Error('jcsCanonicalise: NaN and Infinity are not JCS-valid');\n }\n // Fail closed on the magnitudes where JS Number.toString() and CPython's\n // formatting diverge, so TS and Python sign byte-identical bytes (or both\n // reject). JS switches integer-valued floats to exponent form at |x| >= 1e21\n // (Python expands to full digits); and in [1e-7, 1e-4) JS keeps decimals\n // while Python repr() uses exponent form. Keep both engines in lockstep.\n const abs = Math.abs(value);\n // Reject the ranges where JS Number.toString() and CPython diverge:\n // - |x| >= 1e21 (JS exponent form vs Python full digits)\n // - |x| < 1e-4 (Python repr exponent vs JS decimal)\n // - integer-valued |x| > 2^53 (JS shortest-round-trip vs Python exact\n // int expansion, e.g. 9.999999e20 -> JS '...900000000000000000000'\n // vs Python '...900000000016384'). Above MAX_SAFE_INTEGER the two\n // only coincide for \"round\" values, so fail closed on all of them.\n if (value !== 0 && (abs >= 1e21 || abs < 1e-4 || (Number.isInteger(value) && abs > 2 ** 53))) {\n throw new Error(\n `jcsCanonicalise: numbers in the ranges where JS and Python formatting ` +\n `diverge (|x| >= 1e21, |x| < 1e-4, or integer |x| > 2^53) are not ` +\n `supported in signed metadata. Use a string instead of ${value}.`,\n );\n }\n return value.toString();\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'string') {\n return JSON.stringify(value);\n }\n\n if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n return '[' + value.map(jcsCanonicalise).join(',') + ']';\n }\n\n if (typeof value === 'object') {\n const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n // Skip undefined values entirely (JSON.stringify behaviour). This\n // means `{a: 1, b: undefined}` and `{a: 1}` produce identical bytes,\n // which matches what callers expect from optional fields.\n const keys = Object.keys(obj).filter(k => obj[k] !== undefined).sort();\n const parts = keys.map(k => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + jcsCanonicalise(obj[k]));\n return '{' + parts.join(',') + '}';\n }\n\n throw new Error(`jcsCanonicalise: unsupported value type: ${typeof value}`);\n}\n\n// ─── Trust ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface TrustRecord {\n agent_id: string;\n owner: {\n org_name: string;\n verified: boolean;\n };\n trust_score: number;\n status: AgentStatus;\n created_at: string;\n active_scopes: PermissionScope[];\n key_fingerprint: string;\n revocation_status: boolean;\n last_active?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── Organisation & Users ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type UserRole = 'owner' | 'admin' | 'developer' | 'member' | 'viewer';\nexport type OrgPlan = 'free' | 'starter' | 'growth' | 'enterprise';\nexport type SubscriptionStatus = 'none' | 'trialing' | 'active' | 'past_due' | 'canceled' | 'unpaid';\n\nexport interface Organisation {\n id: string;\n slug: string;\n name: string;\n plan: OrgPlan;\n subscription_status: SubscriptionStatus;\n trial_ends_at?: string;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n}\n\n// Plan limits. -1 means unlimited. Free = 10 agents; all paid plans are\n// unlimited agents (billed on events). Authoritative enforcement lives in\n// services/api/src/services/billing.ts (PLAN_AGENT_LIMITS + event caps); keep\n// this in sync with that and the pricing page.\nexport const PLAN_LIMITS: Record<OrgPlan, { agents: number; events_per_month: number; retention_days: number }> = {\n free: { agents: 10, events_per_month: 10000, retention_days: 30 },\n starter: { agents: -1, events_per_month: 100000, retention_days: 90 },\n growth: { agents: -1, events_per_month: 1000000, retention_days: -1 },\n enterprise: { agents: -1, events_per_month: -1, retention_days: -1 },\n};\n\nexport interface User {\n id: string;\n org_id: string;\n email: string;\n name?: string;\n role: UserRole;\n created_at: string;\n last_login_at?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── API Keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ApiKey {\n id: string;\n org_id: string;\n key_prefix: string; // agid_sk_live_aBcD\n name: string;\n scopes: string[];\n last_used_at?: string;\n expires_at?: string;\n created_at: string;\n revoked_at?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ApiKeyCreateResult {\n api_key: ApiKey;\n raw_key: string; // shown exactly once\n}\n\n// ─── Auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface AuthTokens {\n access_token: string;\n refresh_token: string;\n expires_in: number;\n}\n\nexport interface LoginInput {\n email: string;\n password: string;\n}\n\nexport interface RegisterInput {\n org_name: string;\n email: string;\n password: string;\n name?: string;\n}\n\n// ─── API Response Envelope ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ApiResponse<T> {\n data: T;\n meta?: {\n page?: number;\n per_page?: number;\n total?: number;\n total_pages?: number;\n };\n}\n\nexport interface ApiError {\n error: {\n code: string;\n message: string;\n details?: Record<string, unknown>;\n request_id: string;\n };\n}\n\n// ─── Pagination ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface PaginationParams {\n page?: number;\n per_page?: number;\n sort_by?: string;\n sort_order?: 'asc' | 'desc';\n}\n\n// ─── Alert Rules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface AlertRule {\n id: string;\n org_id: string;\n name: string;\n event_type?: AuditEventType;\n condition: Record<string, unknown>;\n channels: AlertChannel[];\n enabled: boolean;\n created_by: string;\n created_at: string;\n updated_at: string;\n}\n\nexport type AlertChannelType = 'email' | 'slack' | 'pagerduty' | 'in_app';\n\nexport interface AlertChannel {\n type: AlertChannelType;\n config: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n// ─── Portable signed receipt (VAIP portable-receipt-v1) ────────────────\n\n/**\n * A self-contained, offline-verifiable statement that Vorim authorised one\n * specific agent action.\n *\n * The problem it solves: an integration that needs to prove an action was\n * authorised previously had to assemble that proof client-side from a\n * decision row, then hope its reconstruction matched whatever Vorim would\n * have signed. Two implementations of \"the same\" object drift, and the drift\n * only shows up as a signature that will not verify — usually in production,\n * usually months later.\n *\n * So the receipt is built and signed in ONE place, and the exact bytes that\n * were signed are reproducible by any verifier via\n * {@link portableReceiptCanonicalBytes}.\n *\n * Verification needs only the receipt and the public key from\n * `GET /trust/keys`: no Vorim, no chain, no network.\n */\nexport interface PortableSignedReceipt {\n version: 'vorim-portable-receipt-v1';\n decision: PortableReceiptDecision;\n binding: PortableReceiptBinding;\n /**\n * The platform-signed human approval, when this action was escalated and a\n * human approved it. `null` for an action that never needed one.\n *\n * Carried in full rather than by reference, so a holder of the receipt can\n * verify the human approval without a second lookup.\n */\n approval: PortableReceiptApproval | null;\n /** Issuing org. Scopes the receipt; also what `kid` belongs to. */\n org_id: string;\n issued_at: string;\n canonical_form: 'v1';\n /** `sha256:<hex>` over {@link portableReceiptCanonicalBytes}. */\n digest: string;\n /** `ed25519:<base64>` over those same bytes. */\n signature: string;\n /** Key id, resolvable via `GET /trust/keys`. */\n kid: string;\n alg: 'Ed25519';\n}\n\n/** The authorisation itself: what was allowed, for whom, under which policy. */\nexport interface PortableReceiptDecision {\n decision_id: string;\n /**\n * Only ever `allow` or `modify`.\n *\n * A receipt asserts \"this was authorised\". There is no honest receipt for a\n * denial, a fallback, or an unresolved escalation, so those are refused at\n * mint time rather than represented here.\n */\n verdict: 'allow' | 'modify';\n agent_id: string;\n required_scope: string | null;\n action_type: string;\n action_target: string | null;\n policy_version: number;\n /** The rule that fired, or null for a default decision. */\n decision_rule_id: string | null;\n requested_at: string;\n /** After this the decision is stale; a verifier should treat it as expired. */\n expires_at: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Binds the receipt to the exact action, so it cannot be replayed against a\n * different one.\n *\n * Hashes rather than payloads: the regulated record stays in the customer's\n * systems and in Vorim. A verifier who holds the payload can recompute the\n * hash and confirm the match; one who does not learns nothing from it.\n */\nexport interface PortableReceiptBinding {\n /** `sha256:<hex>` over the JCS bytes of the payload as proposed. */\n original_intent_hash: string | null;\n /**\n * `sha256:<hex>` over the payload as APPROVED. Differs from the original\n * exactly when policy modified it — which is the case that matters, since\n * settling the original amount after a policy reduction is the failure this\n * field exists to make detectable.\n */\n effective_intent_hash: string | null;\n policy_modified: boolean;\n}\n\n/** @see the `approval` field on a runtime decision — same shape, snake_case. */\nexport interface PortableReceiptApproval {\n resolution: 'approved';\n resolved_at: string;\n /** Opaque: a role name or a per-org commitment. Never a raw user id. */\n approver_ref: string | null;\n alg: 'Ed25519';\n kid: string;\n signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * The exact bytes a portable receipt's `digest` and `signature` cover.\n *\n * RFC 8785 JCS over an EXPLICITLY ENUMERATED body. This is the whole point of\n * the function, so it is worth being blunt about why: Vorim's v1 signed\n * bundles failed verification for three months in 2026 because a\n * server-stamped column leaked into a signed body that was built by\n * spreading a database row. Every field below is listed by hand. Adding one\n * means bumping `version` — never widening this object in place, and never\n * signing \"the row minus a few keys\".\n *\n * `digest`, `signature`, `kid` and `alg` are excluded: they are the output of\n * this computation, not inputs to it.\n */\nexport function portableReceiptCanonicalBytes(receipt: PortableSignedReceipt): string {\n return jcsCanonicalise({\n version: receipt.version,\n org_id: receipt.org_id,\n issued_at: receipt.issued_at,\n canonical_form: receipt.canonical_form,\n decision: {\n decision_id: receipt.decision.decision_id,\n verdict: receipt.decision.verdict,\n agent_id: receipt.decision.agent_id,\n required_scope: receipt.decision.required_scope,\n action_type: receipt.decision.action_type,\n action_target: receipt.decision.action_target,\n policy_version: receipt.decision.policy_version,\n decision_rule_id: receipt.decision.decision_rule_id,\n requested_at: receipt.decision.requested_at,\n expires_at: receipt.decision.expires_at,\n },\n binding: {\n original_intent_hash: receipt.binding.original_intent_hash,\n effective_intent_hash: receipt.binding.effective_intent_hash,\n policy_modified: receipt.binding.policy_modified,\n },\n approval: receipt.approval === null ? null : {\n resolution: receipt.approval.resolution,\n resolved_at: receipt.approval.resolved_at,\n approver_ref: receipt.approval.approver_ref,\n alg: receipt.approval.alg,\n kid: receipt.approval.kid,\n signature: receipt.approval.signature,\n },\n });\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// VORIM — Payload commitments\n//\n// WHY THIS EXISTS. `input_hash` and `output_hash` have always let a caller\n// send a digest instead of a prompt, so agent content never had to reach\n// Vorim. The digest format was a bare `sha256:<hex>`, and a bare SHA-256 of a\n// prompt is not a commitment — it is a lookup key. Prompts are low-entropy\n// and usually templated: given the digest and the template, an attacker (or\n// Vorim, or anyone who obtains an export) recovers the content by trying\n// candidates until a hash matches. Nothing about that is exotic; it is the\n// same reason unsalted password hashes fail.\n//\n// So \"we never see your prompts\" was true of the wire and false of the maths.\n// These helpers close that gap.\n//\n// WHAT TO USE. `commitPayload(content, key)` produces `hmac-sha256:<hex>`\n// under a key you hold and never send us. Without the key the digest is\n// unlinkable to any candidate content, so an exported bundle discloses that\n// an action happened and nothing about what was in it. You can still prove\n// the link later, to an auditor or a counterparty, by revealing the content\n// and the key and letting them recompute.\n//\n// `hashPayload` remains available and remains a bare SHA-256. It is correct\n// for content that is already high-entropy (a file digest, a random id) and\n// wrong for anything a person wrote. It is not deprecated, it is narrower\n// than it looks.\n//\n// FORMAT. Digests are `<alg>:<hex>` and the algorithm label travels with the\n// value, so a verifier reading a bundle years from now can tell a keyed\n// commitment from a bare hash without being told out of band, and a future\n// algorithm can be added without a migration.\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Prefix used for keyed commitments. */\nexport const HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX = 'hmac-sha256:';\n/** Prefix used for bare digests. */\nexport const SHA256_PREFIX = 'sha256:';\n\n/**\n * Key material for a payload commitment. Never transmitted by the SDK.\n *\n * A string is UTF-8 encoded. Prefer at least 32 bytes from a CSPRNG, held\n * wherever you already hold secrets. One key per org is fine; one per agent\n * or per tenant narrows what a single leaked key exposes.\n */\nexport type CommitmentKey = string | Uint8Array;\n\nfunction toBytes(v: string | Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n return typeof v === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(v) : v;\n}\n\nfunction toHex(buf: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n return Array.from(buf instanceof Uint8Array ? buf : new Uint8Array(buf))\n .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n .join('');\n}\n\n/**\n * Bare SHA-256 digest of `content`, as `sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * Correct only when `content` has enough entropy that guessing it is\n * infeasible. For prompts, responses, tool arguments or anything else a\n * human or a model wrote, use {@link commitPayload} instead.\n */\nexport async function hashPayload(content: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n const bytes = toBytes(content);\n const subtle = (globalThis as any).crypto?.subtle;\n if (subtle) {\n return SHA256_PREFIX + toHex(await subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes));\n }\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return SHA256_PREFIX + nodeCrypto.createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex');\n}\n\n/**\n * Keyed commitment to `content`, as `hmac-sha256:<hex>`.\n *\n * `key` never leaves this process. Vorim stores and signs over the digest\n * with no way to test a candidate plaintext against it.\n *\n * To disclose later, hand the verifier the content and the key; they\n * recompute and compare. Disclosure is per-key, so a key scoped to one agent\n * or one tenant lets you open that subset without opening the rest.\n *\n * Rotating the key does not invalidate past events. Old digests stay\n * verifiable under the old key, which is why the key you used has to be\n * retained for as long as you might need to prove the events it covers.\n */\nexport async function commitPayload(\n content: string | Uint8Array,\n key: CommitmentKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n const keyBytes = toBytes(key);\n if (keyBytes.length === 0) {\n // An empty key is an HMAC with a known key, which is a bare hash wearing\n // a different prefix. Fail rather than emit something that looks keyed.\n throw new Error(\n 'commitPayload: key must not be empty. An empty key makes the commitment ' +\n 'no stronger than hashPayload while labelling it as keyed.',\n );\n }\n const bytes = toBytes(content);\n\n const subtle = (globalThis as any).crypto?.subtle;\n if (subtle) {\n const cryptoKey = await subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n keyBytes,\n { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n false,\n ['sign'],\n );\n const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', cryptoKey, bytes);\n return HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX + toHex(sig);\n }\n\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX + nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', keyBytes).update(bytes).digest('hex');\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `digest` is a keyed commitment rather than a bare hash.\n *\n * Useful in a review or an export check: a bundle whose `input_hash` values\n * are all `sha256:` carries content that a determined reader may be able to\n * recover, and that is worth knowing before the bundle leaves the building.\n */\nexport function isKeyedCommitment(digest: unknown): boolean {\n return typeof digest === 'string' && digest.startsWith(HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX);\n}\n\n/** Shape of any digest this SDK will put in a hash field. */\nconst DIGEST_RE = /^(?:sha256|hmac-sha256):[0-9a-f]{64}$/;\n\n/**\n * True when `digest` is a well-formed `<alg>:<64 hex>` value in a form the\n * server and `@vorim/verify` both understand.\n */\nexport function isDigest(digest: unknown): boolean {\n return typeof digest === 'string' && DIGEST_RE.test(digest);\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// Vorim AI — HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) + Content-Digest (RFC 9530)\n//\n// A general RFC 9421 signer and verifier. Any HTTP request can be signed over a\n// chosen set of components (derived components such as @method, @target-uri,\n// @authority, @path, @query, @query-param, and any header field), and verified\n// against a public key or a key resolver.\n//\n// Algorithms: `ed25519` (RFC 8032) and `ecdsa-p256-sha256` (FIPS 186-5, raw\n// r||s). The algorithm is never hard-coded: it is read from the key material,\n// and when an `alg` parameter is present it must agree with the key. P-256 is\n// here because hardware key stores (iOS Secure Enclave, Android StrongBox) hold\n// P-256, not Ed25519.\n//\n// Runtime: uses Web Crypto when present (browsers, Workers, Deno, Bun, Node 20+)\n// and falls back to node:crypto otherwise. No dependencies.\n//\n// Usage:\n// import { signHttpRequest, verifyHttpRequest } from '@vorim/sdk/http-signatures';\n//\n// const { headers } = await signHttpRequest(\n// { method: 'POST', url: 'https://api.example.com/orders',\n// headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body },\n// { privateKey: pem, keyid: 'agid_abc123' },\n// );\n// await fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers }, body });\n//\n// const result = await verifyHttpRequest(incoming, { publicKey: spkiPem });\n// ============================================================================\n\nexport type HttpSignatureAlgorithm = 'ed25519' | 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\nexport type ContentDigestAlgorithm = 'sha-256' | 'sha-512';\n\n/** A request as seen by the signer or verifier. */\nexport interface HttpRequestLike {\n method: string;\n /** Absolute URL, e.g. https://api.example.com/path?x=1 */\n url: string;\n /** Header fields. Names are matched case-insensitively. Repeated fields may be given as an array. */\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n /** Message content. Used for Content-Digest. */\n body?: string | Uint8Array;\n}\n\n/**\n * A message for {@link createSignatureBase}. A request, or a response when\n * `status` is set (then `request` supplies the context for `;req` components).\n */\nexport interface HttpMessageLike {\n method?: string;\n url?: string;\n headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n body?: string | Uint8Array;\n status?: number;\n request?: HttpRequestLike;\n}\n\n/**\n * Signature parameters. Serialized in the object's own key order, which the\n * signer chooses and the verifier must keep.\n */\nexport interface SignatureParams {\n created?: number;\n expires?: number;\n nonce?: string;\n alg?: string;\n keyid?: string;\n tag?: string;\n [extra: string]: string | number | boolean | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface SignHttpRequestOptions {\n /** PKCS#8 PEM private key (Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256). */\n privateKey: string;\n /** Default: inferred from the key. Throws if it conflicts with the key. */\n alg?: HttpSignatureAlgorithm;\n keyid?: string;\n /** Dictionary label for Signature-Input / Signature. Default 'sig1'. */\n label?: string;\n /**\n * Covered components, e.g. ['@method', '@target-uri', 'content-type',\n * '@query-param;name=\"id\"']. Default: @method, @target-uri, @authority,\n * plus content-type when that header is present. When a body is given,\n * content-digest is always added.\n */\n components?: string[];\n /** Unix seconds. Default: now. */\n created?: number;\n /** Unix seconds. Default created + 300. Pass null to omit. */\n expires?: number | null;\n nonce?: string;\n tag?: string;\n /** Include the alg parameter. Default true. */\n includeAlg?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface SignHttpRequestResult {\n headers: {\n 'Signature-Input': string;\n 'Signature': string;\n 'Content-Digest'?: string;\n };\n signatureBase: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n /** SPKI PEM public key. */\n publicKey: string;\n alg?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyHttpRequestOptions {\n /** SPKI PEM public key. Either this or resolveKey is required. */\n publicKey?: string;\n /** Look up the key by the signature's keyid. */\n resolveKey?: (keyid: string | undefined) => Promise<ResolvedKey | null | undefined> | ResolvedKey | null | undefined;\n /** Which signature to check. Default: the first label in Signature-Input. */\n label?: string;\n /** Reject when now - created exceeds this. Requires a created parameter. */\n maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n /** Unix seconds, for tests. Default: now. */\n now?: number;\n /** Component identifiers that must be covered, e.g. ['@method', 'content-digest']. */\n requiredComponents?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyHttpRequestResult {\n valid: boolean;\n reason?: string;\n label: string;\n keyid?: string;\n alg?: string;\n covered: string[];\n created?: number;\n expires?: number;\n /** True only when content-digest was covered, a body was supplied, and it was recomputed. */\n contentDigestChecked: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Tolerated clock skew for a `created` in the future, in seconds. */\nconst FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;\n\nexport class HttpSignatureError extends Error {\n constructor(message: string) {\n super(message);\n this.name = 'HttpSignatureError';\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Structured Fields (RFC 8941), the subset RFC 9421 needs ───────────────\n\ntype BareItem =\n | { t: 'int'; v: number }\n | { t: 'dec'; v: number }\n | { t: 'str'; v: string }\n | { t: 'tok'; v: string }\n | { t: 'bool'; v: boolean }\n | { t: 'bin'; v: Uint8Array };\n\ntype Params = Array<[string, BareItem]>;\ninterface SfItem { kind: 'item'; value: BareItem; params: Params }\ninterface SfInnerList { kind: 'list'; items: SfItem[]; params: Params }\ntype SfMember = SfItem | SfInnerList;\n\nclass SfParser {\n i = 0;\n constructor(private s: string) {}\n\n fail(msg: string): never {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`structured field parse error: ${msg} at ${this.i}`);\n }\n peek(): string { return this.s[this.i]; }\n eof(): boolean { return this.i >= this.s.length; }\n skipSP(): void { while (this.s[this.i] === ' ') this.i++; }\n skipOWS(): void { while (this.s[this.i] === ' ' || this.s[this.i] === '\\t') this.i++; }\n\n parseDictionary(): Array<[string, SfMember]> {\n const out: Array<[string, SfMember]> = [];\n this.skipSP();\n if (this.eof()) return out;\n for (;;) {\n const key = this.parseKey();\n let member: SfMember;\n if (this.peek() === '=') {\n this.i++;\n member = this.parseItemOrInnerList();\n } else {\n member = { kind: 'item', value: { t: 'bool', v: true }, params: this.parseParams() };\n }\n const existing = out.findIndex(([k]) => k === key);\n if (existing >= 0) out[existing] = [key, member];\n else out.push([key, member]);\n this.skipOWS();\n if (this.eof()) return out;\n if (this.peek() !== ',') this.fail('expected \",\"');\n this.i++;\n this.skipOWS();\n if (this.eof()) this.fail('trailing \",\"');\n }\n }\n\n parseItemOrInnerList(): SfMember {\n if (this.peek() === '(') return this.parseInnerList();\n return this.parseItem();\n }\n\n parseInnerList(): SfInnerList {\n if (this.peek() !== '(') this.fail('expected \"(\"');\n this.i++;\n const items: SfItem[] = [];\n for (;;) {\n this.skipSP();\n if (this.peek() === ')') {\n this.i++;\n return { kind: 'list', items, params: this.parseParams() };\n }\n if (this.eof()) this.fail('unterminated inner list');\n items.push(this.parseItem());\n const c = this.peek();\n if (c !== ' ' && c !== ')') this.fail('expected SP or \")\"');\n }\n }\n\n parseItem(): SfItem {\n const value = this.parseBareItem();\n return { kind: 'item', value, params: this.parseParams() };\n }\n\n parseParams(): Params {\n const out: Params = [];\n while (this.peek() === ';') {\n this.i++;\n this.skipSP();\n const key = this.parseKey();\n let value: BareItem = { t: 'bool', v: true };\n if (this.peek() === '=') {\n this.i++;\n value = this.parseBareItem();\n }\n const existing = out.findIndex(([k]) => k === key);\n if (existing >= 0) out[existing] = [key, value];\n else out.push([key, value]);\n }\n return out;\n }\n\n parseKey(): string {\n const m = /^[a-z*][a-z0-9_\\-.*]*/.exec(this.s.slice(this.i));\n if (!m) this.fail('expected key');\n this.i += m[0].length;\n return m[0];\n }\n\n parseBareItem(): BareItem {\n const c = this.peek();\n if (c === '\"') return this.parseString();\n if (c === ':') return this.parseBytes();\n if (c === '?') {\n const v = this.s[this.i + 1];\n if (v !== '0' && v !== '1') this.fail('bad boolean');\n this.i += 2;\n return { t: 'bool', v: v === '1' };\n }\n if (c === '-' || (c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {\n const m = /^-?\\d{1,15}(\\.\\d{1,3})?/.exec(this.s.slice(this.i));\n if (!m) this.fail('bad number');\n this.i += m[0].length;\n return m[1] ? { t: 'dec', v: Number(m[0]) } : { t: 'int', v: Number(m[0]) };\n }\n const tm = /^[A-Za-z*][!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z:/]*/.exec(this.s.slice(this.i));\n if (tm) {\n this.i += tm[0].length;\n return { t: 'tok', v: tm[0] };\n }\n this.fail('unexpected character');\n }\n\n parseString(): BareItem {\n this.i++;\n let out = '';\n for (;;) {\n if (this.eof()) this.fail('unterminated string');\n const c = this.s[this.i++];\n if (c === '\\\\') {\n const n = this.s[this.i++];\n if (n !== '\"' && n !== '\\\\') this.fail('bad escape');\n out += n;\n } else if (c === '\"') {\n return { t: 'str', v: out };\n } else {\n const code = c.charCodeAt(0);\n if (code < 0x20 || code > 0x7e) this.fail('non-printable in string');\n out += c;\n }\n }\n }\n\n parseBytes(): BareItem {\n this.i++;\n const end = this.s.indexOf(':', this.i);\n if (end < 0) this.fail('unterminated byte sequence');\n const b64 = this.s.slice(this.i, end);\n if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/.test(b64)) this.fail('bad base64');\n this.i = end + 1;\n return { t: 'bin', v: base64ToBytes(b64) };\n }\n}\n\nfunction serializeBareItem(b: BareItem): string {\n switch (b.t) {\n case 'int': return String(Math.trunc(b.v));\n case 'dec': {\n const r = Math.round(b.v * 1000) / 1000;\n return Number.isInteger(r) ? `${r}.0` : String(r);\n }\n case 'str': return serializeString(b.v);\n case 'tok': return b.v;\n case 'bool': return b.v ? '?1' : '?0';\n case 'bin': return `:${bytesToBase64(b.v)}:`;\n }\n}\n\nfunction serializeString(v: string): string {\n if (!/^[\\x20-\\x7e]*$/.test(v)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`string parameter must be printable ASCII: ${JSON.stringify(v)}`);\n return `\"${v.replace(/\\\\/g, '\\\\\\\\').replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"')}\"`;\n}\n\nfunction serializeParams(params: Params): string {\n return params\n .map(([k, v]) => (v.t === 'bool' && v.v === true ? `;${k}` : `;${k}=${serializeBareItem(v)}`))\n .join('');\n}\n\nfunction serializeItem(item: SfItem): string {\n return serializeBareItem(item.value) + serializeParams(item.params);\n}\n\nfunction serializeInnerList(list: SfInnerList): string {\n return `(${list.items.map(serializeItem).join(' ')})${serializeParams(list.params)}`;\n}\n\n// ─── Component identifiers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ComponentId {\n name: string;\n params: Params;\n}\n\nconst DERIVED = new Set([\n '@method', '@target-uri', '@authority', '@scheme', '@request-target',\n '@path', '@query', '@query-param', '@status',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Parse a component identifier given as `name`, `name;param=...`, or the\n * serialized form `\"name\";param=...`. Field names are lowercased.\n */\nfunction parseComponent(input: string): ComponentId {\n const s = input.trim();\n let name: string;\n let params: Params;\n if (s.startsWith('\"')) {\n const p = new SfParser(s);\n const item = p.parseItem();\n if (!p.eof()) throw new HttpSignatureError(`bad component identifier: ${input}`);\n if (item.value.t !== 'str') throw new HttpSignatureError(`bad component identifier: ${input}`);\n name = item.value.v;\n params = item.params;\n } else {\n const semi = s.indexOf(';');\n name = semi < 0 ? s : s.slice(0, semi);\n const p = new SfParser(semi < 0 ? '' : s.slice(semi));\n params = p.parseParams();\n if (!p.eof()) throw new HttpSignatureError(`bad component identifier: ${input}`);\n }\n if (!name) throw new HttpSignatureError('empty component name');\n if (!name.startsWith('@')) name = name.toLowerCase();\n return { name, params };\n}\n\nfunction serializeComponent(c: ComponentId): string {\n return serializeString(c.name) + serializeParams(c.params);\n}\n\n/** Equality key: parameter order is not significant for duplicate detection. */\nfunction componentKey(c: ComponentId): string {\n const sorted = [...c.params].sort(([a], [b]) => (a < b ? -1 : a > b ? 1 : 0));\n return serializeString(c.name) + serializeParams(sorted);\n}\n\nfunction componentToItem(c: ComponentId): SfItem {\n return { kind: 'item', value: { t: 'str', v: c.name }, params: c.params };\n}\n\n// ─── Component values ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction fieldValues(headers: HttpMessageLike['headers'], name: string): string[] | null {\n const out: string[] = [];\n let found = false;\n for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers ?? {})) {\n if (k.toLowerCase() !== name || v === undefined || v === null) continue;\n found = true;\n for (const one of Array.isArray(v) ? v : [v]) out.push(String(one));\n }\n return found ? out : null;\n}\n\nfunction cleanFieldValue(v: string): string {\n return v.replace(/\\r?\\n[ \\t]+/g, ' ').trim();\n}\n\n// application/x-www-form-urlencoded percent-encode set, with space as %20\n// (RFC 9421 §2.2.8 examples). Leaves only ALPHA / DIGIT / * - . _ unencoded.\nfunction formPercentEncode(s: string): string {\n const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(s);\n let out = '';\n for (const b of bytes) {\n const ch = String.fromCharCode(b);\n if (/[A-Za-z0-9*\\-._]/.test(ch)) out += ch;\n else out += '%' + b.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(2, '0');\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction parseUrl(url: string | undefined, what: string): URL {\n if (!url) throw new HttpSignatureError(`${what} requires the message url`);\n try {\n return new URL(url);\n } catch {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`invalid url: ${url}`);\n }\n}\n\nfunction derivedValue(c: ComponentId, msg: HttpMessageLike, isResponse: boolean): string {\n const nameParam = c.params.find(([k]) => k === 'name');\n if (c.name !== '@query-param' && nameParam) throw new HttpSignatureError(`parameter \"name\" is not valid on ${c.name}`);\n switch (c.name) {\n case '@method':\n if (isResponse || !msg.method) throw new HttpSignatureError('@method requires a request');\n return msg.method;\n case '@target-uri': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@target-uri requires a request');\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@target-uri');\n u.hash = '';\n return u.href;\n }\n case '@authority':\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@authority requires a request');\n return parseUrl(msg.url, '@authority').host.toLowerCase();\n case '@scheme':\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@scheme requires a request');\n return parseUrl(msg.url, '@scheme').protocol.replace(/:$/, '').toLowerCase();\n case '@request-target': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@request-target requires a request');\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@request-target');\n return (u.pathname || '/') + u.search;\n }\n case '@path':\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@path requires a request');\n return parseUrl(msg.url, '@path').pathname || '/';\n case '@query': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@query requires a request');\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@query');\n return u.search || '?';\n }\n case '@query-param': {\n if (isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError('@query-param requires a request');\n if (!nameParam || nameParam[1].t !== 'str') throw new HttpSignatureError('@query-param requires a name parameter (String)');\n const wanted = nameParam[1].v;\n const u = parseUrl(msg.url, '@query-param');\n const matches: string[] = [];\n for (const [n, v] of new URLSearchParams(u.search)) {\n if (formPercentEncode(n) === wanted) matches.push(v);\n }\n if (matches.length === 0) throw new HttpSignatureError(`query parameter \"${wanted}\" not found`);\n if (matches.length > 1) throw new HttpSignatureError(`query parameter \"${wanted}\" occurs more than once and cannot be signed individually`);\n return formPercentEncode(matches[0]);\n }\n case '@status':\n if (!isResponse || msg.status === undefined) throw new HttpSignatureError('@status is only valid on a response');\n return String(Math.trunc(msg.status)).padStart(3, '0');\n default:\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`unknown derived component ${c.name}`);\n }\n}\n\nconst FIELD_PARAMS = new Set(['req', 'bs']);\nconst DERIVED_PARAMS = new Set(['req', 'name']);\nconst UNSUPPORTED_FIELD_PARAMS = new Set(['sf', 'key', 'tr']);\n\nfunction componentValue(c: ComponentId, message: HttpMessageLike): string {\n const isDerived = c.name.startsWith('@');\n if (c.name === '@signature-params') throw new HttpSignatureError('@signature-params cannot be a covered component');\n if (isDerived && !DERIVED.has(c.name)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`unknown derived component ${c.name}`);\n for (const [k, v] of c.params) {\n const allowed = isDerived ? DERIVED_PARAMS : FIELD_PARAMS;\n if (!allowed.has(k)) {\n if (!isDerived && UNSUPPORTED_FIELD_PARAMS.has(k)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component parameter \"${k}\" is not supported`);\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`unknown component parameter \"${k}\" on ${c.name}`);\n }\n if ((k === 'req' || k === 'bs') && !(v.t === 'bool' && v.v === true)) {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`component parameter \"${k}\" must be a true Boolean`);\n }\n }\n\n let target = message;\n let isResponse = message.status !== undefined;\n if (c.params.some(([k]) => k === 'req')) {\n if (!isResponse) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} has the req parameter but the message is a request`);\n if (!message.request) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} has the req parameter but no related request was given`);\n target = message.request;\n isResponse = false;\n }\n\n let value: string;\n if (isDerived) {\n value = derivedValue(c, target, isResponse);\n } else {\n const raw = fieldValues(target.headers, c.name);\n if (raw === null) throw new HttpSignatureError(`header field \"${c.name}\" is missing`);\n if (c.params.some(([k]) => k === 'bs')) {\n value = raw\n .map((v) => `:${bytesToBase64(new TextEncoder().encode(cleanFieldValue(v)))}:`)\n .join(', ');\n } else {\n value = raw.map(cleanFieldValue).join(', ');\n }\n }\n if (/[\\r\\n]/.test(value)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} contains a newline`);\n if (!/^[\\x20-\\x7e\\t]*$/.test(value)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`component ${c.name} contains non-ASCII characters`);\n return value;\n}\n\n// ─── Signature base ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction paramsFromObject(params: SignatureParams): Params {\n const out: Params = [];\n for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(params ?? {})) {\n if (v === undefined || v === null) continue;\n if (!/^[a-z*][a-z0-9_\\-.*]*$/.test(k)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`invalid signature parameter name \"${k}\"`);\n if (typeof v === 'number') {\n if (!Number.isInteger(v)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`signature parameter \"${k}\" must be an integer`);\n out.push([k, { t: 'int', v }]);\n } else if (typeof v === 'boolean') {\n out.push([k, { t: 'bool', v }]);\n } else {\n out.push([k, { t: 'str', v: String(v) }]);\n }\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction buildBase(message: HttpMessageLike, components: ComponentId[], params: Params): { base: string; signatureParams: string } {\n const seen = new Set<string>();\n const lines: string[] = [];\n for (const c of components) {\n const key = componentKey(c);\n if (seen.has(key)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`duplicate component ${serializeComponent(c)}`);\n seen.add(key);\n lines.push(`${serializeComponent(c)}: ${componentValue(c, message)}`);\n }\n const signatureParams = serializeInnerList({ kind: 'list', items: components.map(componentToItem), params });\n lines.push(`\"@signature-params\": ${signatureParams}`);\n const base = lines.join('\\n');\n if (!/^[\\x20-\\x7e\\t\\n]*$/.test(base)) throw new HttpSignatureError('signature base is not ASCII');\n return { base, signatureParams };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the RFC 9421 signature base for a message.\n *\n * `components` are identifiers such as '@method', 'content-type' or\n * '@query-param;name=\"id\"'. `params` are serialized in their key order.\n * Throws {@link HttpSignatureError} on a duplicate, missing or invalid component.\n */\nexport function createSignatureBase(\n message: HttpMessageLike,\n components: string[],\n params: SignatureParams = {},\n): string {\n return buildBase(message, components.map(parseComponent), paramsFromObject(params)).base;\n}\n\n// ─── Encoding helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n let s = '';\n for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) s += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);\n return btoa(s);\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n const raw = atob(b64);\n const out = new Uint8Array(raw.length);\n for (let i = 0; i < raw.length; i++) out[i] = raw.charCodeAt(i);\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction toBytes(body: string | Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n return typeof body === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(body) : body;\n}\n\nfunction pemToDer(pem: string): Uint8Array {\n const body = pem.replace(/-----BEGIN [^-]+-----/, '').replace(/-----END [^-]+-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '');\n if (!body) throw new HttpSignatureError('empty PEM');\n return base64ToBytes(body);\n}\n\nfunction toArrayBuffer(bytes: Uint8Array): ArrayBuffer {\n const out = new ArrayBuffer(bytes.length);\n new Uint8Array(out).set(bytes);\n return out;\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): boolean {\n if (a.length !== b.length) return false;\n let d = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) d |= a[i] ^ b[i];\n return d === 0;\n}\n\n// ─── Crypto (Web Crypto first, node:crypto fallback) ───────────────────────\n\nconst OID_ED25519 = [0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70];\nconst OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY = [0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01];\nconst OID_P256 = [0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07];\n\nfunction hasSeq(hay: Uint8Array, needle: number[]): boolean {\n outer: for (let i = 0; i + needle.length <= hay.length; i++) {\n for (let j = 0; j < needle.length; j++) if (hay[i + j] !== needle[j]) continue outer;\n return true;\n }\n return false;\n}\n\n/** Algorithm implied by a PKCS#8 or SPKI key (DER). */\nfunction algFromKeyDer(der: Uint8Array): HttpSignatureAlgorithm {\n // Only the AlgorithmIdentifier prefix is examined, so key bytes cannot\n // accidentally match an OID.\n const head = der.slice(0, 32);\n if (hasSeq(head, OID_ED25519)) return 'ed25519';\n if (hasSeq(head, OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY)) {\n if (hasSeq(der.slice(0, 40), OID_P256)) return 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\n throw new HttpSignatureError('unsupported EC curve (only P-256 is supported)');\n }\n throw new HttpSignatureError('unsupported key type (Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256 required)');\n}\n\n/** The HTTP signature algorithm implied by a PEM key (PKCS#8 or SPKI). */\nexport function httpSignatureAlgForKey(pem: string): HttpSignatureAlgorithm {\n return algFromKeyDer(pemToDer(pem));\n}\n\n// Minimal structural type for Web Crypto's SubtleCrypto, so this module does\n// not depend on the DOM lib being in the consumer's tsconfig.\ninterface SubtleLike {\n importKey(format: 'pkcs8' | 'spki', keyData: ArrayBuffer, algorithm: any, extractable: boolean, usages: string[]): Promise<any>;\n sign(algorithm: any, key: any, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<ArrayBuffer>;\n verify(algorithm: any, key: any, signature: ArrayBuffer, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<boolean>;\n digest(algorithm: string, data: ArrayBuffer): Promise<ArrayBuffer>;\n}\n\nfunction subtle(): SubtleLike | undefined {\n return (globalThis as { crypto?: { subtle?: SubtleLike } }).crypto?.subtle;\n}\n\nasync function digestBytes(alg: ContentDigestAlgorithm, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n const s = subtle();\n if (s) return new Uint8Array(await s.digest(alg === 'sha-256' ? 'SHA-256' : 'SHA-512', toArrayBuffer(data)));\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.createHash(alg === 'sha-256' ? 'sha256' : 'sha512').update(data).digest());\n}\n\nasync function signBytes(alg: HttpSignatureAlgorithm, privateKeyPem: string, data: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n const s = subtle();\n if (s) {\n const der = toArrayBuffer(pemToDer(privateKeyPem));\n if (alg === 'ed25519') {\n const key = await s.importKey('pkcs8', der, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['sign']);\n return new Uint8Array(await s.sign('Ed25519', key, toArrayBuffer(data)));\n }\n const key = await s.importKey('pkcs8', der, { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, false, ['sign']);\n // Web Crypto returns ECDSA signatures as raw r||s, which is what RFC 9421 wants.\n return new Uint8Array(await s.sign({ name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' }, key, toArrayBuffer(data)));\n }\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n if (alg === 'ed25519') return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.sign(null, data, privateKeyPem));\n return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.sign('sha256', data, { key: privateKeyPem, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }));\n}\n\nasync function verifyBytes(alg: HttpSignatureAlgorithm, publicKeyPem: string, data: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array): Promise<boolean> {\n if (sig.length !== 64) return false;\n const s = subtle();\n if (s) {\n const der = toArrayBuffer(pemToDer(publicKeyPem));\n if (alg === 'ed25519') {\n const key = await s.importKey('spki', der, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['verify']);\n return s.verify('Ed25519', key, toArrayBuffer(sig), toArrayBuffer(data));\n }\n const key = await s.importKey('spki', der, { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' }, false, ['verify']);\n return s.verify({ name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' }, key, toArrayBuffer(sig), toArrayBuffer(data));\n }\n const nodeCrypto = await import('node:crypto');\n if (alg === 'ed25519') return nodeCrypto.verify(null, data, publicKeyPem, sig);\n return nodeCrypto.verify('sha256', data, { key: publicKeyPem, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, sig);\n}\n\n// ─── Content-Digest (RFC 9530) ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * RFC 9530 Content-Digest field value for a body, e.g.\n * `sha-256=:X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=:`.\n */\nexport async function contentDigest(body: string | Uint8Array, alg: ContentDigestAlgorithm = 'sha-256'): Promise<string> {\n if (alg !== 'sha-256' && alg !== 'sha-512') throw new HttpSignatureError(`unsupported digest algorithm ${alg}`);\n return `${alg}=:${bytesToBase64(await digestBytes(alg, toBytes(body)))}:`;\n}\n\n/** Check a Content-Digest field value against a body. Returns a reason on failure. */\nasync function checkContentDigest(fieldValue: string, body: string | Uint8Array): Promise<string | null> {\n let dict: Array<[string, SfMember]>;\n try {\n dict = new SfParser(fieldValue).parseDictionary();\n } catch {\n return 'Content-Digest is not a valid structured field';\n }\n const bytes = toBytes(body);\n let checked = 0;\n for (const [alg, member] of dict) {\n if (alg !== 'sha-256' && alg !== 'sha-512') continue;\n if (member.kind !== 'item' || member.value.t !== 'bin') return `Content-Digest ${alg} is not a byte sequence`;\n const actual = await digestBytes(alg, bytes);\n if (!constantTimeEqual(actual, member.value.v)) return `Content-Digest ${alg} does not match the body`;\n checked++;\n }\n return checked > 0 ? null : 'Content-Digest has no supported algorithm (sha-256 or sha-512)';\n}\n\n// ─── Sign ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst LABEL_RE = /^[a-z*][a-z0-9_\\-.*]*$/;\n\n/**\n * Sign an HTTP request per RFC 9421. Returns the Signature-Input and Signature\n * headers (and Content-Digest when a body is given) to add to the request.\n */\nexport async function signHttpRequest(\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: SignHttpRequestOptions,\n): Promise<SignHttpRequestResult> {\n if (!options?.privateKey) throw new HttpSignatureError('signHttpRequest requires privateKey (PKCS#8 PEM)');\n const label = options.label ?? 'sig1';\n if (!LABEL_RE.test(label)) throw new HttpSignatureError(`invalid label \"${label}\"`);\n\n const keyAlg = httpSignatureAlgForKey(options.privateKey);\n if (options.alg && options.alg !== keyAlg) {\n throw new HttpSignatureError(`alg \"${options.alg}\" does not match the private key (${keyAlg})`);\n }\n const alg = keyAlg;\n\n const headers: HttpRequestLike['headers'] = { ...(request.headers ?? {}) };\n const hasBody = request.body !== undefined && request.body !== null;\n let digestHeader: string | undefined;\n if (hasBody) {\n digestHeader = await contentDigest(request.body as string | Uint8Array, 'sha-256');\n for (const k of Object.keys(headers)) if (k.toLowerCase() === 'content-digest') delete headers[k];\n headers['content-digest'] = digestHeader;\n }\n\n let componentStrs: string[];\n if (options.components) {\n componentStrs = [...options.components];\n } else {\n componentStrs = ['@method', '@target-uri', '@authority'];\n if (fieldValues(headers, 'content-type') !== null) componentStrs.push('content-type');\n }\n const components = componentStrs.map(parseComponent);\n if (hasBody && !components.some((c) => c.name === 'content-digest' && c.params.length === 0)) {\n components.push({ name: 'content-digest', params: [] });\n }\n\n const created = options.created ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n const expires = options.expires === null ? undefined : (options.expires ?? created + 300);\n const params: SignatureParams = { created };\n if (expires !== undefined) params.expires = expires;\n if (options.nonce !== undefined) params.nonce = options.nonce;\n if (options.includeAlg !== false) params.alg = alg;\n if (options.keyid !== undefined) params.keyid = options.keyid;\n if (options.tag !== undefined) params.tag = options.tag;\n\n const { base, signatureParams } = buildBase(\n { method: request.method, url: request.url, headers, body: request.body },\n components,\n paramsFromObject(params),\n );\n const sig = await signBytes(alg, options.privateKey, new TextEncoder().encode(base));\n\n const out: SignHttpRequestResult['headers'] = {\n 'Signature-Input': `${label}=${signatureParams}`,\n 'Signature': `${label}=:${bytesToBase64(sig)}:`,\n };\n if (digestHeader) out['Content-Digest'] = digestHeader;\n return { headers: out, signatureBase: base };\n}\n\n// ─── Verify ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst SUPPORTED_ALGS = new Set<string>(['ed25519', 'ecdsa-p256-sha256']);\n\n/**\n * Verify an RFC 9421 signature on a request. Never throws for a bad signature;\n * returns `{ valid: false, reason }`. Throws only when neither publicKey nor\n * resolveKey is given.\n */\nexport async function verifyHttpRequest(\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: VerifyHttpRequestOptions,\n): Promise<VerifyHttpRequestResult> {\n if (!options?.publicKey && !options?.resolveKey) {\n throw new HttpSignatureError('verifyHttpRequest requires publicKey or resolveKey');\n }\n const result: VerifyHttpRequestResult = {\n valid: false,\n label: options.label ?? '',\n covered: [],\n contentDigestChecked: false,\n };\n const fail = (reason: string): VerifyHttpRequestResult => ({ ...result, valid: false, reason });\n\n const inputRaw = fieldValues(request.headers, 'signature-input');\n const sigRaw = fieldValues(request.headers, 'signature');\n if (!inputRaw) return fail('missing Signature-Input header');\n if (!sigRaw) return fail('missing Signature header');\n\n let inputs: Array<[string, SfMember]>;\n let sigs: Array<[string, SfMember]>;\n try {\n inputs = new SfParser(inputRaw.map(cleanFieldValue).join(', ')).parseDictionary();\n sigs = new SfParser(sigRaw.map(cleanFieldValue).join(', ')).parseDictionary();\n } catch (e) {\n return fail(`malformed signature headers: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n }\n\n const label = options.label ?? inputs[0]?.[0];\n if (!label) return fail('Signature-Input has no signatures');\n result.label = label;\n const input = inputs.find(([k]) => k === label)?.[1];\n const sigMember = sigs.find(([k]) => k === label)?.[1];\n if (!input) return fail(`no Signature-Input for label \"${label}\"`);\n if (!sigMember) return fail(`no Signature for label \"${label}\"`);\n if (input.kind !== 'list') return fail('Signature-Input member is not an inner list');\n if (sigMember.kind !== 'item' || sigMember.value.t !== 'bin') return fail('Signature member is not a byte sequence');\n\n const components: ComponentId[] = [];\n for (const item of input.items) {\n if (item.value.t !== 'str') return fail('covered component is not a string');\n components.push({ name: item.value.v, params: item.params });\n }\n result.covered = components.map(serializeComponent);\n\n const p = new Map(input.params);\n const getInt = (k: string): number | undefined | null => {\n const v = p.get(k);\n if (v === undefined) return undefined;\n return v.t === 'int' ? v.v : null;\n };\n const getStr = (k: string): string | undefined | null => {\n const v = p.get(k);\n if (v === undefined) return undefined;\n return v.t === 'str' ? v.v : null;\n };\n const created = getInt('created');\n const expires = getInt('expires');\n const keyid = getStr('keyid');\n const algParam = getStr('alg');\n if (created === null) return fail('created must be an integer');\n if (expires === null) return fail('expires must be an integer');\n if (keyid === null) return fail('keyid must be a string');\n if (algParam === null) return fail('alg must be a string');\n result.created = created;\n result.expires = expires;\n result.keyid = keyid;\n\n // Application requirements: required components, time window.\n if (options.requiredComponents?.length) {\n const have = new Set(components.map(componentKey));\n for (const r of options.requiredComponents) {\n let rc: ComponentId;\n try {\n rc = parseComponent(r);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail((e as Error).message);\n }\n if (!have.has(componentKey(rc))) return fail(`required component ${serializeComponent(rc)} is not covered`);\n }\n }\n const now = options.now ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n if (expires !== undefined && now > expires) return fail('signature has expired');\n if (created !== undefined && created > now + FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS) return fail('signature created in the future');\n if (options.maxAgeSeconds !== undefined) {\n if (created === undefined) return fail('signature has no created parameter, so its age cannot be checked');\n if (now - created > options.maxAgeSeconds) return fail('signature is older than maxAgeSeconds');\n }\n\n // Key and algorithm.\n let publicKey = options.publicKey;\n let resolvedAlg: string | undefined;\n if (!publicKey) {\n let resolved: ResolvedKey | null | undefined;\n try {\n resolved = await options.resolveKey!(keyid);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail(`key resolution failed: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n }\n if (!resolved?.publicKey) return fail(`unknown key${keyid ? ` \"${keyid}\"` : ''}`);\n publicKey = resolved.publicKey;\n resolvedAlg = resolved.alg;\n }\n let keyAlg: HttpSignatureAlgorithm;\n try {\n keyAlg = httpSignatureAlgForKey(publicKey);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail((e as Error).message);\n }\n if (algParam !== undefined && !SUPPORTED_ALGS.has(algParam)) return fail(`unsupported algorithm \"${algParam}\"`);\n if (algParam !== undefined && algParam !== keyAlg) return fail(`alg \"${algParam}\" does not match the key (${keyAlg})`);\n if (resolvedAlg !== undefined && resolvedAlg !== keyAlg) return fail(`resolved key alg \"${resolvedAlg}\" does not match the key (${keyAlg})`);\n result.alg = keyAlg;\n\n // Rebuild the base from the received message and check the signature.\n let base: string;\n try {\n base = buildBase(\n { method: request.method, url: request.url, headers: request.headers, body: request.body },\n components,\n input.params,\n ).base;\n } catch (e) {\n return fail((e as Error).message);\n }\n let ok: boolean;\n try {\n ok = await verifyBytes(keyAlg, publicKey, new TextEncoder().encode(base), sigMember.value.v);\n } catch (e) {\n return fail(`signature check failed: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n }\n if (!ok) return fail('signature does not verify');\n\n // The signature covers the Content-Digest header; that only protects the\n // body if the digest is recomputed from the body we actually received.\n const coversDigest = components.some((c) => c.name === 'content-digest');\n if (coversDigest && request.body !== undefined && request.body !== null) {\n const dv = fieldValues(request.headers, 'content-digest');\n const reason = await checkContentDigest((dv ?? []).map(cleanFieldValue).join(', '), request.body);\n if (reason) return fail(reason);\n result.contentDigestChecked = true;\n }\n\n return { ...result, valid: true };\n}\n","// ============================================================================\n// VORIM SDK — TypeScript\n// Thin client wrapping the Vorim AI REST API\n// ============================================================================\n\nimport type {\n Agent, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult,\n TrustRecord, AuditEventInput, PermissionScope, PermissionCheckResult,\n AgentDelegationRecord, DelegationLinkClaims,\n BeforeActionInput, RuntimeDecision, DecisionVerdict, ApprovalAttestation,\n TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, BudgetSpend,\n WorkflowProvenanceGraph, CapabilityProfile,\n SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SharedMemoryListResult,\n SuspendPreview, SwarmView,\n} from './types.js';\nimport { jcsCanonicalise, hashPreviousEvent } from './replay.js';\nimport {\n portableReceiptCanonicalBytes,\n type PortableSignedReceipt,\n} from '@vorim/shared-types';\nimport { isDigest } from './commit.js';\nimport {\n signHttpRequest as signHttpRequestWithKey,\n type HttpRequestLike,\n type SignHttpRequestOptions,\n type SignHttpRequestResult,\n} from './httpSignatures.js';\n\n// __SDK_VERSION__ is replaced at build time (tsup define) with the package.json\n// version, so the User-Agent always matches the published version. Falls back to\n// '0.0.0' when run un-bundled (e.g. ts-node / tests) where the define isn't applied.\ndeclare const __SDK_VERSION__: string | undefined;\nconst SDK_VERSION = typeof __SDK_VERSION__ !== 'undefined' ? __SDK_VERSION__ : '0.0.0';\nconst USER_AGENT = `vorim-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/** Promise-based delay. Used by the runtime escalation poller. */\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\n}\n\nexport interface VorimConfig {\n apiKey: string;\n baseUrl?: string;\n timeout?: number;\n /**\n * Auto-sign audit events with the agent's private key at emit time.\n * Default true in v3.1+. Set to false to opt out globally.\n * When enabled, the SDK signs the event using whichever private key was\n * stored via {@link VorimSDK.useAgentKey} or returned by\n * {@link VorimSDK.register}. Events for unknown agents pass through unsigned.\n */\n autoSign?: boolean;\n /**\n * Canonical form to use when signing. Default `\"v0\"` for backward-compat\n * with `@vorim/sdk` 3.1.x. Set to `\"v1\"` to sign the full event object\n * via RFC 8785 JCS, covering replayable-evidence fields (model_version,\n * tool_catalogue_hash, system_prompt_hash, prev_event_hash). v1 events\n * carry `canonical_form: \"v1\"` on the wire so the server can dispatch\n * verification correctly.\n */\n canonicalForm?: 'v0' | 'v1';\n /**\n * Hash-chain events per agent so deletion of a single audit row\n * becomes detectable. Default `false` (no chaining). When enabled,\n * the SDK sets `prev_event_hash` on each event to SHA-256 of the\n * previous event's canonical bytes for the same agent. The first\n * event after enable / process restart has `prev_event_hash = null`,\n * which the verifier reports as `chain_restart` (informational, not\n * a failure). Chain integrity is checked by `@vorim/verify`.\n */\n chainEvents?: boolean;\n /**\n * Refuse to transmit agent content. Default `false`.\n *\n * Vorim's event schema was already digest-shaped: `input_hash`,\n * `output_hash` and `system_prompt_hash` are the fields prompts and\n * responses are meant to travel as. Nothing enforced it, though. `metadata`\n * is `Record<string, unknown>`, so a caller could put a whole prompt in it\n * without noticing, and \"we never receive your content\" was a property of\n * how you happened to call the SDK rather than a guarantee.\n *\n * With `noPayload` on, {@link VorimSDK.emit} and {@link VorimSDK.emitBatch}\n * throw before anything is sent when an event would carry content:\n *\n * - any `metadata` value that is not a string, number, boolean or null\n * (objects and arrays can nest arbitrary text)\n * - any `metadata` string longer than `maxMetadataChars` (default 256)\n * - any hash field that is not a well-formed `sha256:` / `hmac-sha256:`\n * digest, which catches a raw prompt passed to `input_hash`\n *\n * This is distinct from the server-side Zero Data Retention setting. ZDR\n * drops `metadata` at persistence, so the content still crossed the network\n * and passed through our process. `noPayload` means it never left yours.\n * Enterprises asking \"can we send you nothing?\" are asking for this one.\n *\n * It does not restrict `action` or `resource`. Both are short structural\n * identifiers, both are covered by the v1 signature, and stripping them\n * would break bundle verification. Keep tool names in them, not arguments.\n */\n noPayload?: boolean | { maxMetadataChars?: number };\n /**\n * Client-side fail-open behaviour for {@link VorimSDK.beforeAction} when\n * the runtime decision API itself is unreachable (network error, DNS,\n * timeout, or 5xx). Default `false` (since 4.0.0): a transport failure\n * re-throws and the caller must decide, so an outage or a blocked path\n * to Vorim cannot be turned into an allow. Set `true` to fail open — a\n * transport failure then returns a synthetic `fallback` decision\n * (`decision: 'fallback'`, `isFallback: true`) so a momentary\n * control-plane outage does not block the agent. Choose that\n * deliberately, per deployment.\n *\n * Note: this governs only transport failures. A reachable server that\n * returns `deny` still denies regardless of this flag.\n */\n runtimeFailOpen?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * VAIP v0 canonical bytes used by Vorim's per-event signing.\n *\n * Pipe-joined content fields with empty-string substitution for missing values.\n * This is intentionally duplicated from `@vorim/shared-types` so the published\n * SDK ships with zero runtime dependencies. A parity test in this package\n * imports both definitions and asserts byte-exact equality across a fixture\n * matrix, so they cannot drift silently.\n *\n * To upgrade the format, version the function (`canonicalPayloadV1`) — never\n * edit this one. Old signatures must remain verifiable.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV0(event: AuditEventInput): string {\n return [\n event.event_type,\n event.action,\n event.resource ?? '',\n event.input_hash ?? '',\n event.output_hash ?? '',\n event.result,\n ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * VAIP v1 canonical bytes for audit-event signing (RFC 8785 JCS).\n *\n * Signs the full event object excluding `signature` (the field being\n * computed) and `canonical_form` (metadata about the recipe). Unlike v0,\n * v1 covers the replayable-evidence fields and the metadata field.\n *\n * Re-exports `jcsCanonicalise` from `./replay.js` which is the byte-exact\n * twin of `@vorim/shared-types`' implementation. The cross-language parity\n * script enforces equivalence with the Python SDK.\n */\nexport function canonicalPayloadV1(event: AuditEventInput): string {\n // Strip the fields that are out of scope for v1 signing.\n const { signature: _sig, canonical_form: _cf, ...rest } = event as Record<string, unknown> & AuditEventInput;\n return jcsCanonicalise(rest);\n}\n\n/**\n * Stable content digest of an audit event: `sha256:<hex>` over the event's\n * canonical bytes, dispatched on `canonical_form` the same way signing is.\n *\n * Byte-identical to `eventDigest` in `@vorim/verify` and to the digest the\n * server returns from `POST /audit/events`, so a counterparty can bind to a\n * reference you computed locally without trusting either of us to compute it.\n * It is also what `prev_event_hash` references, so a hash-chained emitter is\n * already producing these whether it names them or not.\n *\n * Content digest, not an identity: two byte-identical events share one\n * digest. Pair it with the `event_id` the server returns when you need a\n * unique handle.\n */\nexport async function eventDigest(event: AuditEventInput): Promise<string> {\n const form = (event as { canonical_form?: string }).canonical_form ?? 'v0';\n const bytes = form === 'v1' ? canonicalPayloadV1(event) : canonicalPayloadV0(event);\n return hashPreviousEvent(bytes);\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the Idempotency-Key header, or nothing when no key was given.\n *\n * The unit that gets retried is the request, so the key is per-call rather than\n * per-event. Send the same key on a retry and the server replays the first\n * response, original event ids included, instead of writing the batch twice.\n *\n * Pick a key that is stable across YOUR retries and distinct between genuine\n * calls: a request id, or a uuid generated once before the first attempt and\n * reused by the retry. Do NOT derive it from event content alone. Two\n * legitimately distinct events are often byte-identical (same agent, same tool,\n * same arguments, same result), and a content-derived key would make the server\n * drop the second one as a duplicate.\n */\nfunction idempotencyHeader(key?: string): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n return key ? { 'Idempotency-Key': key } : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow a server `approval` object to {@link ApprovalAttestation}.\n *\n * Every field is checked: a downstream integration decides whether to settle\n * a consequential action on the presence of this object, so a half-formed one\n * must read as ABSENT rather than as a weaker approval. Returning `null` makes\n * the caller's \"no signed approval → refuse\" branch fire, which is the safe\n * direction; returning a partial object would let it pass a truthiness check.\n *\n * The algorithm is pinned to Ed25519 because that is what the platform signs\n * with today. When device-bound P-256 approvals land, widen the check — do not\n * let an unrecognised `alg` through, or the receipt would assert a guarantee\n * the verifier cannot actually check.\n */\nfunction toApprovalAttestation(raw: any): ApprovalAttestation | null {\n if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object') return null;\n if (raw.resolution !== 'approved') return null;\n if (raw.alg !== 'Ed25519') return null;\n if (typeof raw.kid !== 'string' || !raw.kid) return null;\n if (typeof raw.signature !== 'string' || !raw.signature.startsWith('ed25519:')) return null;\n if (typeof raw.resolved_at !== 'string' || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(raw.resolved_at))) return null;\n return {\n resolution: 'approved',\n resolvedAt: raw.resolved_at,\n approverRef: typeof raw.approver_ref === 'string' ? raw.approver_ref : null,\n alg: 'Ed25519',\n kid: raw.kid,\n signature: raw.signature,\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a W3C `traceparent` (00-<trace_id>-<span_id>-<flags>) into the\n * `trace_id` / `span_id` fields Vorim stores. Explicit ids win; a malformed\n * header is dropped rather than sent (the server would 400 on a decision and\n * ignore it on an event). Exported for the OTel helpers.\n */\nexport function foldTraceparent<T extends { trace_id?: string; span_id?: string; traceparent?: string }>(input: T): T {\n if (!input.traceparent) return input;\n const { traceparent, ...rest } = input;\n const m = /^[0-9a-f]{2}-([0-9a-f]{32})-([0-9a-f]{16})-[0-9a-f]{2}$/i.exec(traceparent.trim());\n const out = { ...rest } as T;\n if (m) {\n if (!out.trace_id) out.trace_id = m[1].toLowerCase();\n if (!out.span_id) out.span_id = m[2].toLowerCase();\n }\n return out;\n}\n\nexport class VorimSDK {\n private apiKey: string;\n private baseUrl: string;\n private timeout: number;\n private autoSign: boolean;\n private canonicalForm: 'v0' | 'v1';\n private chainEvents: boolean;\n private runtimeFailOpen: boolean;\n private noPayload: boolean;\n private maxMetadataChars: number;\n /**\n * In-memory keyring mapping agent_id -> PEM-encoded Ed25519 private key.\n * Populated automatically by register() and registerEphemeral(), or\n * explicitly via useAgentKey(). Lost on process restart by design; the\n * caller is responsible for durable key storage.\n */\n private agentKeys: Map<string, string> = new Map();\n /**\n * Per-agent hash of the last emitted event's canonical bytes. Used to\n * populate prev_event_hash on the next emit when chainEvents is on.\n * Empty string ↔ no previous event (chain restart). Reset by\n * forgetAgentKey() so reusing an agent_id after revocation doesn't\n * link to the old chain.\n */\n private lastEventHash: Map<string, string> = new Map();\n /**\n * Per-agent monotonic counter incremented by `forgetAgentKey`. An\n * emit that started before `forgetAgentKey` ran will read a stale\n * epoch and refuse to repopulate the chain tail, preventing the\n * revoked agent from inheriting a new lastEventHash from the\n * in-flight emit that the lock was holding.\n */\n private agentForgetEpoch: Map<string, number> = new Map();\n /**\n * Per-agent emit promise. Each new emit awaits the previous one so\n * the chain is constructed in order. Concurrent emits to the same\n * agent are serialised (correct); concurrent emits to different\n * agents remain parallel (fast).\n */\n private chainLocks: Map<string, Promise<void>> = new Map();\n\n constructor(config: VorimConfig) {\n this.apiKey = config.apiKey;\n this.baseUrl = (config.baseUrl || 'https://api.vorim.ai').replace(/\\/$/, '') + '/v1';\n this.timeout = config.timeout || 10000;\n this.autoSign = config.autoSign !== false;\n // Default to v1 as of 3.4.0. v0 only covers six fields and any\n // metadata, delegation context, or replayable-evidence field is\n // unsigned tail — see crypto-1 in the deep-audit findings. Callers\n // who explicitly want v0 (legacy verifier compatibility) must opt\n // in. A console.warn fires the first time an SDK instance is\n // created with v0 so the deprecation is visible in dev.\n this.canonicalForm = config.canonicalForm ?? 'v1';\n if (config.canonicalForm === 'v0') {\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n console.warn(\n '[@vorim/sdk] canonicalForm=v0 is deprecated: it leaves metadata, ' +\n 'delegation context, and replayable-evidence fields unsigned. ' +\n 'Switch to canonicalForm=v1 (the new default in 3.4.0+) for full ' +\n 'tamper coverage. Pass canonicalForm: \"v0\" explicitly only if you ' +\n 'need byte-compat with verifiers older than @vorim/verify 0.2.0.',\n );\n } catch { /* ignore logger errors */ }\n }\n this.chainEvents = config.chainEvents ?? false;\n // Fail closed unless the integrator opts in to fail-open (4.0.0).\n this.runtimeFailOpen = config.runtimeFailOpen ?? false;\n this.noPayload = config.noPayload !== undefined && config.noPayload !== false;\n this.maxMetadataChars =\n typeof config.noPayload === 'object' && typeof config.noPayload.maxMetadataChars === 'number'\n ? config.noPayload.maxMetadataChars\n : 256;\n }\n\n /**\n * Register a previously-issued agent keypair so this SDK instance can\n * auto-sign events for it on emit. Use this when restoring an agent across\n * process restarts: read the agent's private_key from durable storage,\n * call useAgentKey(agentId, privateKey), and emit() will sign automatically.\n */\n useAgentKey(agentId: string, privateKeyPem: string): void {\n this.agentKeys.set(agentId, privateKeyPem);\n }\n\n /**\n * Forget an agent's signing key (e.g. after revocation). Subsequent emit()\n * calls for that agent will pass through unsigned unless a key is provided\n * inline. Also clears the per-agent chain state — re-using the same\n * agent_id after revocation does NOT link to the old chain.\n */\n forgetAgentKey(agentId: string): void {\n this.agentKeys.delete(agentId);\n this.lastEventHash.delete(agentId);\n this.chainLocks.delete(agentId);\n // Bump the per-agent epoch so any in-flight emit that completes\n // after this call refuses to write back a chain tail. Without\n // this, an emit that holds the chain lock can repopulate\n // lastEventHash after forgetAgentKey clears it, defeating the\n // revoked-agent isolation guarantee.\n this.agentForgetEpoch.set(agentId, (this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0) + 1);\n }\n\n /**\n * Cap on how many per-agent chain entries the SDK tracks. Set\n * generously — most callers will hold ≤ 1k agent_ids in memory.\n * Long-running processes that cycle through many agent_ids without\n * calling forgetAgentKey (e.g. ephemeral test agents) would\n * otherwise grow chainLocks / agentForgetEpoch / lastEventHash\n * unbounded.\n */\n private static readonly MAX_CHAIN_STATE_ENTRIES = 10_000;\n\n /**\n * Evict the oldest chain state entries when we cross the cap. Called\n * lazily from prepareEventChained — no scheduled task, no background\n * timer; only runs when the cap is breached during a real emit.\n */\n private evictChainStateIfNeeded(): void {\n if (this.chainLocks.size <= VorimSDK.MAX_CHAIN_STATE_ENTRIES) return;\n const toRemove = Math.ceil(this.chainLocks.size * 0.1); // drop oldest 10 %\n let removed = 0;\n for (const agentId of this.chainLocks.keys()) {\n if (removed >= toRemove) break;\n // Skip agents with an active key — they're in use.\n if (this.agentKeys.has(agentId)) continue;\n this.chainLocks.delete(agentId);\n this.lastEventHash.delete(agentId);\n this.agentForgetEpoch.delete(agentId);\n removed++;\n }\n }\n\n // ─── Health Check ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Ping the Vorim API to verify connectivity and API key validity.\n * Returns { status, timestamp } on success, throws VorimError on failure.\n */\n async ping(): Promise<{ status: string; timestamp: string }> {\n const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl.replace('/v1', '')}/health`, {\n headers: { 'User-Agent': USER_AGENT },\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeout),\n });\n if (!response.ok) throw new VorimError(response.status, 'UNREACHABLE', 'Vorim API is not reachable');\n return response.json() as Promise<{ status: string; timestamp: string }>;\n }\n\n // ─── Agent Identity ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register a new agent with Vorim AI.\n * Returns the agent identity and a private key (shown once).\n *\n * Side effect: the returned private_key is cached in this SDK instance's\n * in-memory keyring so subsequent emit() calls for this agent auto-sign.\n * The keyring is process-local; the caller is responsible for persisting\n * the private_key to durable storage if the agent should survive restarts.\n */\n async register(input: AgentRegistrationInput): Promise<AgentRegistrationResult> {\n const result = await this.post('/agents', input) as AgentRegistrationResult;\n if (result?.agent?.agent_id && result?.private_key) {\n this.agentKeys.set(result.agent.agent_id, result.private_key);\n }\n return result;\n }\n\n /**\n * Verify an agent's identity via the public Trust API.\n */\n async verify(agentId: string): Promise<TrustRecord> {\n return this.get(`/trust/verify/${agentId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Get agent details.\n */\n async getAgent(agentId: string): Promise<Agent> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * List all agents in the organisation.\n */\n async listAgents(params?: { page?: number; per_page?: number; status?: string }): Promise<{ agents: Agent[]; meta: any }> {\n const qs = new URLSearchParams(params as any).toString();\n // The API returns { data: Agent[], meta }. The generic get() unwraps to\n // `data` only, dropping `meta`, so read the full envelope here to honour\n // the documented { agents, meta } return shape (pagination relies on meta).\n const env = await this.requestEnvelope('GET', `/agents${qs ? '?' + qs : ''}`);\n return { agents: (env.data ?? []) as Agent[], meta: env.meta ?? null };\n }\n\n /**\n * Update an agent's metadata or status.\n *\n * `status: 'suspended'` is the kill switch and, since 4.0.0, cascades to\n * every agent reachable through the agent's active identity delegations\n * unless `cascade: false`. Setting `status: 'active'` on a suspended agent\n * reverses exactly that cascade. The returned agent carries\n * `cascade.suspended` / `cascade.reactivated` with the agent ids touched.\n * See {@link suspendPreview} for the blast radius before acting.\n */\n async updateAgent(\n agentId: string,\n updates: Partial<Pick<Agent, 'name' | 'description' | 'status' | 'capabilities'>> & { cascade?: boolean },\n ): Promise<Agent & { cascade?: { suspended?: string[]; reactivated?: string[]; delegations_revoked?: number } }> {\n return this.patch(`/agents/${agentId}`, updates);\n }\n\n /**\n * What suspending (or revoking) this agent would touch: its delegation\n * subtree, how many of those agents are still active, open escalations\n * across the subtree, and live delegation links. Writes nothing.\n */\n async suspendPreview(agentId: string): Promise<SuspendPreview> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/suspend-preview`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke an agent (permanent deactivation).\n */\n async revoke(agentId: string): Promise<void> {\n await this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Permissions ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Check if an agent has a specific permission scope.\n * Target: < 5ms response via Redis cache.\n */\n async check(agentId: string, scope: PermissionScope): Promise<PermissionCheckResult> {\n return this.post(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions/verify`, { scope });\n }\n\n /**\n * Grant a permission scope to an agent.\n */\n async grant(agentId: string, scope: PermissionScope, options?: {\n valid_until?: string;\n rate_limit?: { max: number; window: string };\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions`, { scope, ...options });\n }\n\n /**\n * List all active permissions for an agent.\n */\n async listPermissions(agentId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke a specific permission scope from an agent.\n */\n async revokePermission(agentId: string, scope: PermissionScope): Promise<any> {\n return this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}/permissions/${scope}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Agent-to-Agent Identity Delegation (VAIP -02 § 5) ──────────────\n\n /**\n * Delegate the right to act on this agent's behalf to another agent\n * in the same org, with a strict subset of this agent's scopes.\n *\n * Multi-hop chains are supported up to depth 32. Scope subset is\n * enforced at every hop. Audit events emitted by the delegate carry\n * the chain context (`on_behalf_of`, `delegator_agent_id`,\n * `delegation_chain_id`, `delegation_depth`) so a verifier walking\n * the bundle can reconstruct the full chain.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const chain = await vorim.delegateToAgent('agid_parent_abc', {\n * delegate_agent_id: 'agid_child_xyz',\n * scopes_delegated: ['agent:read', 'agent:execute'],\n * max_chain_depth: 1, // delegate may make ONE further hop\n * valid_until: '2026-12-31T00:00:00Z',\n * });\n * console.log(chain.public_chain_id); // chain_<hex>\n * ```\n */\n async delegateToAgent(\n delegatorAgentId: string,\n input: {\n delegate_agent_id: string;\n scopes_delegated: PermissionScope[];\n max_chain_depth?: number;\n valid_until?: string;\n /**\n * The delegate's share of the swarm token budget per window, granted\n * out of the delegator's own share (conservation ledger). The server\n * refuses a share the delegator cannot cover (409 ALLOCATION_EXCEEDED\n * with the numbers). Needs the delegator to be in a swarm with a budget.\n */\n budget_tokens?: number;\n /**\n * Optional Ed25519-signed delegation link (VAIP -02 § 5). When\n * provided, the server verifies the signature against the\n * delegator's stored public key, persists alongside the chain\n * row, and exports it in bundle delegation_tokens so the chain\n * is offline-verifiable by `@vorim/verify`. Compute via\n * {@link signDelegationLink} or set manually if signing\n * elsewhere.\n */\n signed_link?: {\n claims: DelegationLinkClaims;\n signature: string;\n };\n },\n ): Promise<AgentDelegationRecord> {\n return this.post(`/agents/${delegatorAgentId}/delegations`, input);\n }\n\n /**\n * Sign a delegation link with the delegator's private key. Returns\n * the signed link in the shape accepted by `delegateToAgent`'s\n * `signed_link` field.\n *\n * The signature is Ed25519 over the RFC 8785 JCS-canonical bytes of\n * the claims object. Same algorithm the server and `@vorim/verify`\n * use for verification.\n *\n * Use this when the delegator's private key is in this SDK's\n * keyring (i.e. set via `register()` or `useAgentKey()`).\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const signed = await vorim.signDelegationLink({\n * v: 0,\n * type: 'vaip-delegation-link',\n * chain_id: 'chain_abc', // server returns this on first delegation\n * depth: 1,\n * delegator: 'agid_parent',\n * delegate: 'agid_child',\n * scopes: ['agent:read', 'agent:execute'],\n * max_chain_depth: 1,\n * valid_from: new Date().toISOString(),\n * valid_until: null,\n * parent_link_hash: null,\n * });\n * ```\n */\n async signDelegationLink(\n claims: DelegationLinkClaims,\n ): Promise<{ claims: DelegationLinkClaims; signature: string }> {\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(claims.delegator);\n if (!key) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 400,\n 'NO_AGENT_KEY',\n `SDK has no private key for delegator ${claims.delegator}`,\n );\n }\n // Sign using the SDK's local JCS. Byte-equivalent to shared-types\n // and the server (enforced by scripts/check-replay-parity.sh).\n const bytes = jcsCanonicalise(claims as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);\n const signature = await this.sign(bytes, key);\n return { claims, signature };\n }\n\n /**\n * List active identity-chain entries this agent participates in\n * (either as delegator or delegate). Useful for showing the current\n * delegation graph in an admin UI.\n */\n async listAgentDelegations(agentId: string): Promise<AgentDelegationRecord[]> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/delegations`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Walk a delegation chain by its public id. Returns the full chain\n * in depth order.\n */\n async getDelegationChain(\n agentId: string,\n chainId: string,\n ): Promise<AgentDelegationRecord[]> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/delegation-chain/${chainId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke this agent's delegation in a given chain. Cascades to all\n * descendants beneath this agent's depth in the chain.\n */\n async revokeAgentDelegation(\n agentId: string,\n chainId: string,\n ): Promise<{ revoked: number }> {\n return this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}/delegations/${chainId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Reconstruct a multi-agent workflow's provenance graph from a delegation\n * chain id — the nodes (agents), edges (who delegated what to whom), and the\n * audit events attributed to each agent within that workflow. Multi-agent\n * fabric Phase 1: the tamper-evident answer to \"which agents did what, and\n * who authorised whom?\" across a whole hand-off chain.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const graph = await vorim.getWorkflowGraph('chain_abc123');\n * for (const edge of graph.edges) {\n * console.log(`${edge.from} -> ${edge.to} [${edge.scopes.join(', ')}]`);\n * }\n * ```\n */\n async getWorkflowGraph(\n chainId: string,\n options?: { maxEvents?: number },\n ): Promise<WorkflowProvenanceGraph> {\n const qs = options?.maxEvents ? `?max_events=${options.maxEvents}` : '';\n return this.get(`/audit/workflow-graph/${chainId}${qs}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Read-only least-privilege analysis for an agent. Compares the scopes the\n * agent was granted against the scopes it actually used (from its audit\n * history) and suggests the tightest scope set that still covers its real\n * behaviour. Writes nothing — safe to call any time.\n *\n * @param agentId The agent to analyse.\n * @param options.windowDays How far back to look at audit history (default 30).\n */\n async getCapabilityProfile(\n agentId: string,\n options?: { windowDays?: number },\n ): Promise<CapabilityProfile> {\n const qs = options?.windowDays ? `?window=${options.windowDays}` : '';\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/capability-profile${qs}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Governed Shared Memory (multi-agent fabric, Phase 2) ──────────\n\n /**\n * Write (upsert) an entry into the org's governed shared-memory pool,\n * attributed to `agentId`.\n *\n * If the SDK holds the agent's private key (via {@link VorimSDK.register}\n * or {@link VorimSDK.useAgentKey}), the entry is signed at source with the\n * agent's Ed25519 key over the canonical entry (namespace + key + value +\n * agent_id) before it leaves the process, and the server verifies it against\n * the agent's stored public key — rejecting a bad signature (fail closed).\n * This is what makes a poisoned entry always traceable to its source\n * (OWASP ASI06). If no key is available, the entry is written unsigned.\n *\n * A write to an existing (namespace, key) updates it, recording the new\n * writer + signature.\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * await vorim.writeMemory('agid_researcher_abc', {\n * namespace: 'research-run-42',\n * key: 'sources',\n * value: { urls: ['https://…'], gathered_at: '2026-07-25T…' },\n * });\n * ```\n */\n async writeMemory(\n agentId: string,\n entry: SharedMemoryWriteInput,\n ): Promise<SharedMemoryEntry> {\n const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n agent_id: agentId,\n namespace: entry.namespace,\n key: entry.key,\n value: entry.value,\n };\n // Sign at source when we have the agent's key. Byte-identical canonical\n // form to the server's sharedMemoryCanonicalBytes (@vorim/shared-types)\n // and the Python SDK: JCS over { agent_id, key, namespace, value }.\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);\n if (key) {\n try {\n const canonical = jcsCanonicalise({\n agent_id: agentId,\n key: entry.key,\n namespace: entry.namespace,\n value: entry.value,\n });\n body.signature = await this.sign(canonical, key);\n } catch {\n // Signing failure is non-fatal: the entry still writes unsigned\n // rather than blocking the caller on a single bad key.\n }\n }\n return this.post('/memory', body);\n }\n\n /**\n * Read one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key). Throws a 404\n * {@link VorimError} if it does not exist. Returns the value plus\n * provenance (which agent wrote it, content hash, whether it is signed).\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.\n */\n async readMemory(input: { namespace: string; key: string }): Promise<SharedMemoryEntry> {\n return this.get(`/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(input.key)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * List entries in a namespace (paginated). Returns `{ entries, meta }`.\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.\n */\n async listMemory(input: {\n namespace: string;\n page?: number;\n perPage?: number;\n }): Promise<SharedMemoryListResult> {\n const params = new URLSearchParams();\n if (input.page) params.set('page', String(input.page));\n if (input.perPage) params.set('per_page', String(input.perPage));\n const qs = params.toString();\n const envelope = await this.requestEnvelope(\n 'GET',\n `/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ''}`,\n );\n return {\n entries: (envelope.data ?? []) as SharedMemoryEntry[],\n meta: envelope.meta,\n };\n }\n\n /**\n * Delete one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key).\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.\n */\n async deleteMemory(input: { namespace: string; key: string }): Promise<{ deleted: true; namespace: string; key: string }> {\n return this.delete(`/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(input.key)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Verified hand-off — the multi-agent-fabric primitive.\n *\n * Hands a task from one agent to another as ONE auditable operation that\n * composes the three trust primitives:\n * 1. (optional) VERIFY the receiving agent is trusted + active before\n * handing it anything — fails closed if it is not (unless you opt out).\n * 2. DELEGATE a strictly-attenuated subset of the sender's scopes to the\n * receiver (the server enforces child ⊆ parent + depth; a scope the\n * sender doesn't hold is rejected). Optionally as a signed capability\n * link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable by `@vorim/verify`.\n * 3. EMIT a signed audit event recording the hand-off, stamped with the\n * delegation-chain provenance so the whole multi-agent workflow is\n * reconstructable later.\n *\n * Returns the delegation record (with `public_chain_id`) plus the verification\n * result. Throws before delegating if verification fails.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const { chain } = await vorim.handOff('agid_planner', {\n * to: 'agid_researcher',\n * scopes: ['agent:read'], // researcher gets read-only, nothing more\n * task: 'gather sources for Q3 report',\n * maxChainDepth: 0, // researcher cannot re-delegate\n * minTrustScore: 60,\n * });\n * console.log(chain.publicChainId);\n * ```\n */\n async handOff(\n fromAgentId: string,\n input: {\n /** The receiving agent's id. */\n to: string;\n /** Scopes to delegate — must be a subset of what `fromAgentId` holds. */\n scopes: PermissionScope[];\n /** Human-readable description of the handed-off task (recorded in audit). */\n task?: string;\n /** How many further hops the receiver may make (default 0 — no re-delegation). */\n maxChainDepth?: number;\n /** Delegation expiry (ISO 8601). */\n validUntil?: string;\n /** Minimum trust score the receiver must have to accept the hand-off (default 50). */\n minTrustScore?: number;\n /** Skip the pre-delegation trust verification (NOT recommended). @default false */\n skipVerify?: boolean;\n /** Sign the delegation link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable. @default false */\n signed?: boolean;\n },\n ): Promise<{ chain: AgentDelegationRecord; verification?: TrustRecord }> {\n let verification: TrustRecord | undefined;\n\n // 1. Verify the receiver is trusted + active before delegating to it.\n if (!input.skipVerify) {\n try {\n verification = await this.verify(input.to);\n } catch {\n throw new VorimError(400, 'HANDOFF_VERIFY_FAILED',\n `Could not verify receiving agent ${input.to} — refusing hand-off (fail closed).`);\n }\n const minScore = input.minTrustScore ?? 50;\n if (verification.status !== 'active') {\n throw new VorimError(403, 'HANDOFF_RECEIVER_INACTIVE',\n `Receiving agent ${input.to} is ${verification.status}, not active — refusing hand-off.`);\n }\n if ((verification.trust_score ?? 0) < minScore) {\n throw new VorimError(403, 'HANDOFF_RECEIVER_UNTRUSTED',\n `Receiving agent ${input.to} trust score ${verification.trust_score} is below minimum ${minScore}.`);\n }\n }\n\n // 2. Delegate the attenuated scope subset (server enforces child ⊆ parent).\n const delegationInput: Parameters<VorimSDK['delegateToAgent']>[1] = {\n delegate_agent_id: input.to,\n scopes_delegated: input.scopes,\n max_chain_depth: input.maxChainDepth ?? 0,\n ...(input.validUntil ? { valid_until: input.validUntil } : {}),\n };\n if (input.signed) {\n // Sign the link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable end to end.\n const chainId = `chain_pending_${input.to}`; // server assigns the real id on root\n const signed = await this.signDelegationLink({\n v: 0,\n type: 'vaip-delegation-link',\n chain_id: chainId,\n depth: 1,\n delegator: fromAgentId,\n delegate: input.to,\n scopes: input.scopes,\n max_chain_depth: input.maxChainDepth ?? 0,\n valid_from: new Date().toISOString(),\n valid_until: input.validUntil ?? null,\n parent_link_hash: null,\n });\n delegationInput.signed_link = signed;\n }\n const chain = await this.delegateToAgent(fromAgentId, delegationInput);\n\n // 3. Emit a signed audit event recording the hand-off, carrying the\n // delegation-chain provenance so the whole workflow is reconstructable.\n try {\n await this.emit({\n agent_id: fromAgentId,\n event_type: 'permission_change',\n action: 'agent.handoff',\n resource: input.to,\n result: 'success',\n delegation_chain_id: chain.publicChainId,\n metadata: {\n framework: 'fabric',\n to: input.to,\n scopes: input.scopes,\n task: input.task,\n receiver_trust_score: verification?.trust_score,\n },\n }, { sign: true });\n } catch {\n // Audit failure never rolls back a completed delegation; it is logged\n // server-side. The hand-off itself succeeded.\n }\n\n return { chain, verification };\n }\n\n // ─── Runtime Control (Strategy A) ──────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Gate an agent action BEFORE it is performed. Calls\n * `POST /v1/runtime/decisions` and returns a typed {@link RuntimeDecision}.\n *\n * By default (`throwOnDeny: true`) a `deny` verdict throws\n * {@link VorimDeniedError} — deny is carried in the response body, not\n * the HTTP status, so without this the caller would treat a denial as\n * success. Pass `{ throwOnDeny: false }` to handle deny yourself.\n *\n * On a `modify` verdict, use `decision.modifiedPayload` in place of your\n * original payload (e.g. a policy rule masked PII). This is\n * client-cooperative: Vorim returns the sanitised payload but does not sit\n * inline and does not enforce that you send it — carry `decisionId` into\n * the matching {@link emit} so the action stays auditable. On `escalate`,\n * poll {@link waitForDecisionResolution} for the human decision.\n *\n * Transport failures (network/DNS/timeout/5xx) respect the constructor's\n * `runtimeFailOpen` flag: when false (default) the underlying error is\n * re-thrown; when true a synthetic `fallback` decision is returned so a\n * control-plane blip does not block the agent.\n *\n * Always pass the public `agid_*` id as `agentId`.\n *\n * @example\n * const d = await vorim.beforeAction({\n * agentId: 'agid_acme_evilbot',\n * actionType: 'tool_call',\n * actionTarget: 'sendEmail',\n * requiredScope: 'agent:communicate',\n * payload: { to: 'customer@example.com' },\n * });\n * if (d.decision === 'allow') await sendEmail(d.modifiedPayload ?? payload);\n */\n async beforeAction(\n input: BeforeActionInput,\n options: { throwOnDeny?: boolean } = {},\n ): Promise<RuntimeDecision> {\n const throwOnDeny = options.throwOnDeny ?? true;\n const body = {\n agent_id: input.agentId,\n action_type: input.actionType,\n action_target: input.actionTarget,\n payload: input.payload,\n context: input.context,\n required_scope: input.requiredScope,\n idempotency_key: input.idempotencyKey,\n workflow_id: input.workflowId,\n estimated_tokens: input.estimatedTokens,\n trace_id: input.traceId,\n span_id: input.spanId,\n traceparent: input.traceparent,\n };\n\n let raw: any;\n try {\n raw = await this.post('/runtime/decisions', body);\n } catch (err) {\n // Transport-level failure. A VorimError carrying a real HTTP status\n // < 500 (e.g. 400/403/404) is a genuine server verdict/validation\n // error and must propagate. Only network errors and 5xx are\n // candidates for client-side fail-open.\n const status = err instanceof VorimError ? err.status : 0;\n const code = err instanceof VorimError ? err.code : undefined;\n // A malformed (non-JSON) control-plane response is NOT eligible for\n // fail-open: we can't trust a policy plane we can't parse, so it must\n // fail closed (the error propagates and the gate denies). Everything\n // else with status 0 or >= 500 is a genuine transport failure.\n const isTransport = (status === 0 || status >= 500) && code !== 'MALFORMED_RESPONSE';\n if (isTransport && this.runtimeFailOpen) {\n return {\n decisionId: '',\n decision: 'fallback',\n reason: 'Runtime decision API unreachable; client fail-open applied',\n decisionRuleId: null,\n modifiedPayload: null,\n expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000).toISOString(),\n latencyMs: 0,\n isFallback: true,\n policyVersion: 0,\n swarmId: null,\n escalationResolution: null,\n approval: null,\n };\n }\n throw err;\n }\n\n const decision = this.toRuntimeDecision(raw);\n if (decision.decision === 'deny' && throwOnDeny) {\n throw new VorimDeniedError(decision);\n }\n return decision;\n }\n\n // ─── Token Budgets (AI Cost Management) ──────────────────────────────\n //\n // A budget is a rolling token ceiling for one agent or one workflow.\n // Enforcement runs inside beforeAction(): pass `workflowId` + `estimatedTokens`\n // on the action, and a `token_budget_gt` policy rule denies the action before\n // the spend if it would breach the budget. These methods manage the budgets\n // and read live spend. They need an API key holding the `runtime:manage`\n // scope (deliberately separate from `runtime:decide`, so an agent's own key\n // cannot raise its ceiling).\n\n /**\n * Create or update a token budget for an agent or workflow. One budget per\n * (scope, scope_ref) — calling this again for the same target updates it.\n *\n * A budget is a ceiling; a policy rule enforces it. Add a rule with\n * `match_conditions: { token_budget_gt: { scope } }` and a `deny` (or\n * `escalate`) decision, otherwise actions are still allowed once the budget\n * is used up.\n *\n * @example\n * await vorim.setBudget({\n * scope: 'workflow', scope_ref: 'nightly-summariser',\n * max_tokens: 2_000_000, window_seconds: 86400, enforcement: 'hard',\n * });\n */\n async setBudget(input: TokenBudgetInput): Promise<TokenBudget> {\n return this.put('/runtime/budgets', input);\n }\n\n /** List the org's configured token budgets. */\n async listBudgets(): Promise<TokenBudget[]> {\n return this.get('/runtime/budgets');\n }\n\n /** Live rolling spend, remaining allowance, and monthly total per budget. */\n async getBudgetSpend(): Promise<BudgetSpend[]> {\n return this.get('/runtime/budgets/spend');\n }\n\n /** Remove a token budget by id. */\n async deleteBudget(budgetId: string): Promise<void> {\n await this.delete(`/runtime/budgets/${encodeURIComponent(budgetId)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Poll a decision until it leaves the `escalate` state (a human\n * approved or denied it) or the timeout elapses. Returns the resolved\n * decision; throws {@link VorimError} `ESCALATION_TIMEOUT` (408) if the\n * decision is still pending when the timeout is reached.\n *\n * Requires an API key with the `runtime:decide` scope (the same scope\n * `beforeAction` uses).\n */\n async waitForDecisionResolution(\n decisionId: string,\n options: { timeoutMs?: number; pollIntervalMs?: number } = {},\n ): Promise<RuntimeDecision> {\n const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 300_000;\n const pollIntervalMs = options.pollIntervalMs ?? 1000;\n const start = Date.now();\n // Always poll at least once even if timeoutMs is 0.\n do {\n const raw = await this.get(`/runtime/decisions/${decisionId}`);\n // The GET projection carries escalation_resolution; once set (or\n // once the verdict is no longer 'escalate') the escalation is done.\n if (raw?.decision !== 'escalate' || raw?.escalation_resolution) {\n return this.toRuntimeDecision(raw);\n }\n // Sleep only as long as the deadline allows, so the final throw\n // fires at ~timeoutMs rather than up to one pollIntervalMs late.\n const remaining = timeoutMs - (Date.now() - start);\n if (remaining <= 0) break;\n await sleep(Math.min(pollIntervalMs, remaining));\n } while (Date.now() - start < timeoutMs);\n throw new VorimError(\n 408,\n 'ESCALATION_TIMEOUT',\n `Decision ${decisionId} still pending after ${timeoutMs}ms`,\n { decisionId },\n );\n }\n\n /**\n * Mint a portable signed receipt for a decision: a self-contained,\n * offline-verifiable statement that Vorim authorised this action.\n *\n * Use it when something OUTSIDE Vorim has to be convinced — a settlement\n * layer, a downstream anchor, a counterparty's auditor. Verification needs\n * the receipt and the public key from `GET /trust/keys`: no call back to\n * Vorim, no chain, no network.\n *\n * Reproduce the signed bytes with `portableReceiptCanonicalBytes` from\n * `@vorim/shared-types` (also re-exported here), then check `signature`\n * against the key matching `kid`. Never re-derive those bytes by hand: the\n * canonical form is defined once precisely so two implementations cannot\n * drift into signatures that do not verify.\n *\n * Throws 409 when the decision is not an authorisation — a denial, a\n * fail-open fallback, an unresolved escalation, or one a human refused.\n * A receipt only ever means yes, so there is nothing to return for a no.\n *\n * @example\n * const d = await vorim.beforeAction({ ... });\n * if (d.decision === 'allow') {\n * const receipt = await vorim.mintPortableSignedReceipt(d.decisionId);\n * await settleWith(receipt); // the counterparty verifies it alone\n * }\n */\n async mintPortableSignedReceipt(decisionId: string): Promise<PortableSignedReceipt> {\n return this.get(`/runtime/decisions/${decisionId}/receipt`) as Promise<PortableSignedReceipt>;\n }\n\n /**\n * Map a snake_case decision row (from POST or GET) to the camelCase\n * {@link RuntimeDecision}. The SDK has no generic camelizer, so the\n * mapping is explicit — and tolerant of either the POST shape\n * (`decision_rule_id`, `latency_ms`) or absent fields on a GET row.\n *\n * Escalation-resolution translation (load-bearing): the server resolves\n * an escalation by setting `escalation_resolution` but does NOT flip the\n * row's `decision` column off `'escalate'`. If we returned that verbatim,\n * a caller's obvious `if (d.decision === 'deny')` check would never fire\n * on a human DENIAL — a silent fail-open. So when a resolution is present\n * we translate the verdict: approved → 'allow', denied → 'deny', and\n * timed_out (nobody answered within the org's escalation window) → 'deny'.\n * The raw resolution is also surfaced as `escalationResolution` for\n * callers that want it explicitly.\n *\n * A missing verdict (malformed/truncated response) fails CLOSED to 'deny'\n * rather than 'fallback', so the deny check fires on garbled input.\n */\n private toRuntimeDecision(raw: any): RuntimeDecision {\n // Runtime-narrow to the enum: a surprise server value (e.g. 'pending')\n // collapses to null rather than leaking through the typed field, and\n // never drives a translation.\n const resolution: 'approved' | 'denied' | 'timed_out' | null =\n raw?.escalation_resolution === 'approved' ? 'approved'\n : raw?.escalation_resolution === 'denied' ? 'denied'\n : raw?.escalation_resolution === 'timed_out' ? 'timed_out'\n : null;\n const hasVerdict = typeof raw?.decision === 'string';\n let decision: DecisionVerdict;\n // Only translate the resolution when the row is actually an escalation.\n // Gating on raw.decision==='escalate' means a resolution that somehow\n // appears on a payload-bearing 'modify' row can never override it and\n // drop modifiedPayload (defensive — the server only sets resolution on\n // escalate rows today).\n if (raw?.decision === 'escalate' && resolution === 'approved') decision = 'allow';\n else if (raw?.decision === 'escalate' && (resolution === 'denied' || resolution === 'timed_out')) decision = 'deny';\n else if (hasVerdict) decision = raw.decision as DecisionVerdict;\n else decision = 'deny'; // fail closed on a verdict-less response\n\n return {\n decisionId: raw?.decision_id ?? '',\n decision,\n reason: raw?.reason ?? (hasVerdict ? '' : 'Malformed decision response (no verdict); failing closed'),\n decisionRuleId: raw?.decision_rule_id ?? null,\n modifiedPayload: raw?.modified_payload ?? null,\n // Avoid '' (Date.parse('') === NaN). A verdict-less row gets an epoch\n // timestamp so any staleness check treats it as already expired.\n expiresAt: raw?.expires_at ?? (hasVerdict ? '' : new Date(0).toISOString()),\n latencyMs: raw?.latency_ms ?? 0,\n isFallback: raw?.is_fallback ?? !hasVerdict,\n policyVersion: raw?.policy_version ?? 0,\n swarmId: typeof raw?.swarm_id === 'string' ? raw.swarm_id : null,\n escalationResolution: resolution,\n approval: toApprovalAttestation(raw?.approval),\n };\n }\n\n // ─── Audit ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Emit an audit event for an agent action.\n *\n * By default (autoSign=true on the SDK), the event is signed with the\n * agent's private key before it leaves the process. Set options.sign=false\n * to skip signing (e.g. for testing). If the SDK has no private key for the\n * event's agent_id, the event is sent unsigned and a warning is not\n * raised — callers that require signing should check event.signature on\n * the returned event after a round-trip, or use a server-side enforcement\n * flag (VORIM_VERIFY_AUDIT_SIGNATURES).\n */\n async emit(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n options?: { sign?: boolean; idempotencyKey?: string },\n ): Promise<{ ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean }> {\n const prepared = await this.prepareEvent(event, options?.sign);\n const result = await this.post(\n '/audit/events',\n { events: [prepared] },\n idempotencyHeader(options?.idempotencyKey),\n ) as { ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean };\n this.warnOnPartialIngest(1, result?.ingested ?? 0);\n return result;\n }\n\n /**\n * Emit a batch of audit events (up to 1,000). Each event is signed\n * independently using its agent_id to look up the signing key. See\n * {@link VorimSDK.emit} for signing behaviour and opt-out.\n *\n * When the server returns `ingested < events.length` (e.g. one event\n * referenced an unknown agent_id), a `console.warn` is emitted so\n * operators don't silently lose audit rows. The result is returned\n * unchanged so callers can inspect / act on it.\n */\n async emitBatch(\n events: AuditEventInput[],\n options?: { sign?: boolean; idempotencyKey?: string },\n ): Promise<{ ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean }> {\n const prepared = await Promise.all(events.map(e => this.prepareEvent(e, options?.sign)));\n const result = await this.post(\n '/audit/events',\n { events: prepared },\n idempotencyHeader(options?.idempotencyKey),\n ) as { ingested: number; events?: { event_id: string; digest?: string }[]; rejected_invalid_signature?: number; replayed?: boolean };\n this.warnOnPartialIngest(events.length, result?.ingested ?? 0);\n return result;\n }\n\n private warnOnPartialIngest(submitted: number, ingested: number): void {\n if (ingested < submitted) {\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n console.warn(\n `[@vorim/sdk] partial ingest: server stored ${ingested}/${submitted} events. ` +\n `Common causes: unknown agent_id (cross-org or typo), invalid signature when strict ` +\n `verification is enabled.`,\n );\n } catch {\n /* ignore logger errors */\n }\n }\n }\n\n /**\n * Internal: prepare an event for transmission. Auto-signs if the SDK has a\n * key for this agent and signing isn't explicitly opted out. Pre-existing\n * signatures on the event are respected (caller-signed events are not\n * re-signed). Per-agent failure is non-fatal: if signing throws, the event\n * still sends unsigned so a single bad key doesn't break a batch.\n *\n * Canonical-form dispatch:\n * - If the event already carries `canonical_form`, that wins (caller\n * opted in/out for this specific event).\n * - Otherwise the SDK-level `canonicalForm` (config) applies.\n * - v0 signs the pipe-joined 6 fields. v1 signs the RFC 8785 JCS\n * bytes over the full event minus signature and canonical_form,\n * and the event goes on the wire with `canonical_form: \"v1\"`.\n *\n * Chain construction:\n * - When chainEvents is on, the event gets `prev_event_hash` set to\n * the SHA-256 of the previous event's canonical bytes for the\n * same agent, set BEFORE the signature is computed (so v1\n * signatures cover the chain link).\n * - Chain ops are serialised per-agent via `chainLocks` so\n * concurrent emits to the same agent build a deterministic chain.\n */\n /**\n * Fail closed when `noPayload` is on and an event would carry content.\n *\n * Runs before signing and before any network call, so a rejected event is\n * one Vorim never saw. Throwing rather than stripping is deliberate: a\n * silent strip would leave the caller believing they had logged something\n * they had not, and would change the bytes after they were signed.\n */\n private assertNoPayload(event: AuditEventInput): void {\n if (!this.noPayload) return;\n\n for (const field of ['input_hash', 'output_hash', 'system_prompt_hash', 'tool_catalogue_hash'] as const) {\n const value = (event as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[field];\n if (value === undefined || value === null) continue;\n if (!isDigest(value)) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: ${field} must be a sha256: or hmac-sha256: digest, got ` +\n `${typeof value === 'string' ? `${value.length} chars` : typeof value}. ` +\n `Hash it locally first — commitPayload() for anything a human or a model wrote, ` +\n `hashPayload() only for content that is already high-entropy.`,\n { field },\n );\n }\n }\n\n const metadata = event.metadata;\n if (metadata === undefined || metadata === null) return;\n for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(metadata)) {\n if (value === null) continue;\n const t = typeof value;\n if (t === 'object') {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: metadata.${key} is ${Array.isArray(value) ? 'an array' : 'an object'}. ` +\n `Nested values can carry arbitrary content, so only string, number, boolean and null ` +\n `are allowed. Summarise it, or commit to it with commitPayload() and send the digest.`,\n { field: `metadata.${key}` },\n );\n }\n if (t !== 'string' && t !== 'number' && t !== 'boolean') {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: metadata.${key} is ${t}, which is not a permitted metadata type.`,\n { field: `metadata.${key}` },\n );\n }\n if (t === 'string' && (value as string).length > this.maxMetadataChars) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 0,\n 'PAYLOAD_BLOCKED',\n `noPayload: metadata.${key} is ${(value as string).length} chars, over the ` +\n `${this.maxMetadataChars} limit. A value this long is content, not a label. ` +\n `Raise the limit with noPayload: { maxMetadataChars } if this really is a label.`,\n { field: `metadata.${key}`, length: (value as string).length },\n );\n }\n }\n }\n\n private async prepareEvent(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n signOverride?: boolean\n ): Promise<AuditEventInput> {\n this.assertNoPayload(event);\n // A W3C traceparent becomes trace_id + span_id BEFORE signing, so the\n // signature covers the stored columns and never a field the server drops.\n event = foldTraceparent(event);\n const shouldSign = signOverride ?? this.autoSign;\n if (!shouldSign && !this.chainEvents) return event;\n // Even unsigned events participate in the chain if chaining is on.\n if (this.chainEvents) {\n return this.prepareEventChained(event, shouldSign);\n }\n if (!shouldSign) return event;\n if (event.signature) return event;\n return this.signEventNow(event, shouldSign);\n }\n\n /** Serialise per-agent and apply chain hash + sign. */\n private async prepareEventChained(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n shouldSign: boolean,\n ): Promise<AuditEventInput> {\n const agentId = event.agent_id;\n this.evictChainStateIfNeeded();\n const prior = this.chainLocks.get(agentId) ?? Promise.resolve();\n let release!: () => void;\n const next = new Promise<void>(r => { release = r; });\n this.chainLocks.set(agentId, prior.then(() => next));\n await prior;\n // Snapshot the forget-epoch BEFORE doing any chain work. If the\n // epoch advances while we're in flight, forgetAgentKey() ran and\n // we must not write back the chain tail.\n const startEpoch = this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0;\n try {\n // Insert prev_event_hash if we have a previous bytes-hash for this\n // agent. First event after enable / process restart has none.\n const prev = this.lastEventHash.get(agentId);\n const eventWithPrev: AuditEventInput = prev\n ? { ...event, prev_event_hash: prev }\n : event;\n\n // Sign (or pass through unsigned if signing not requested / no\n // key). If forgetAgentKey runs between the lock acquisition and\n // the sign call, skip signing — the key has been revoked and\n // we must not use it. The event still ships unsigned, which the\n // caller can detect via the missing `signature` field.\n const epochBeforeSign = this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0;\n const keyStillPresent = this.agentKeys.has(agentId);\n const prepared = shouldSign && !eventWithPrev.signature && keyStillPresent && epochBeforeSign === startEpoch\n ? await this.signEventNow(eventWithPrev, shouldSign)\n : eventWithPrev;\n\n // Record this event's canonical bytes hash as the chain's new tail.\n // Use the v1 form for v1 events (matches what the signature covered);\n // v0 form for v0 events.\n const wireForm = (prepared.canonical_form as 'v0' | 'v1' | undefined) ?? 'v0';\n const bytes = wireForm === 'v1' ? canonicalPayloadV1(prepared) : canonicalPayloadV0(prepared);\n try {\n const tail = await hashPreviousEvent(bytes);\n // Only commit the tail if forgetAgentKey didn't run while we\n // were in flight. Without this guard the revoked agent\n // silently inherits a new chain tail from the in-flight emit.\n if ((this.agentForgetEpoch.get(agentId) ?? 0) === startEpoch) {\n this.lastEventHash.set(agentId, tail);\n }\n } catch {\n // hashing failure (extreme edge) is non-fatal; chain restarts next time\n this.lastEventHash.delete(agentId);\n }\n return prepared;\n } finally {\n release();\n }\n }\n\n /** Sign an event right now, no chain handling.\n *\n * On signing failure (malformed key, Web Crypto unavailable, etc.)\n * the event ships with its requested `canonical_form` preserved and\n * a one-line warning is logged via `console.warn`. The previous\n * behaviour silently dropped both the signature AND the\n * canonical_form marker, which caused the event to be classified\n * server-side as a v0 `signature_missing` instead of a v1 attempt\n * that failed — making the breakage invisible to operators. */\n private async signEventNow(\n event: AuditEventInput,\n _shouldSign: boolean,\n ): Promise<AuditEventInput> {\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(event.agent_id);\n if (!key) return event;\n const form: 'v0' | 'v1' = (event.canonical_form as 'v0' | 'v1' | undefined) ?? this.canonicalForm;\n const withForm: AuditEventInput = form === 'v0'\n ? event\n : { ...event, canonical_form: 'v1' };\n try {\n const payload = form === 'v1' ? canonicalPayloadV1(withForm) : canonicalPayloadV0(withForm);\n const signature = await this.sign(payload, key);\n return { ...withForm, signature };\n } catch (err) {\n // Surface the failure rather than silently dropping the signature.\n // Operators need a signal to detect broken signing at the SDK\n // boundary; verifiers will otherwise misattribute the cause.\n try {\n // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n console.warn(\n // Don't echo agent_id verbatim — emit a short prefix for\n // correlation while keeping log-sink content lower-cardinality\n // and avoiding accidental leakage of org-identifiable ids.\n `[@vorim/sdk] signing failed for agent_id=${(event.agent_id ?? '').slice(0, 12)}... form=${form}: ${(err as Error)?.message ?? err}. ` +\n `Event will be emitted unsigned with canonical_form retained.`,\n );\n } catch {\n /* ignore logger errors */\n }\n // Preserve canonical_form so the event is still classified as a\n // v1 attempt server-side, just without a signature. This makes\n // the breakage detectable via the signature_missing + v1 form\n // pair instead of looking like a legacy v0 unsigned event.\n return withForm;\n }\n }\n\n /**\n * Export a signed audit bundle for a date range.\n * The server only supports 'json' (the sole allowed export format).\n */\n async exportAudit(from: string, to: string, format: 'json' = 'json'): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/audit/export', { from, to, format });\n }\n\n // ─── API Keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * List all API keys for the organisation.\n * Requires an API key with the apikeys:read scope (or a dashboard JWT).\n */\n async listApiKeys(): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get('/api-keys');\n }\n\n /**\n * Create a new API key.\n * Requires an API key with the apikeys:write scope (or a dashboard JWT).\n */\n async createApiKey(name: string, options?: { scopes?: string[]; expires_at?: string }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/api-keys', { name, ...options });\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke an API key. Returns the revoked key object (server returns the\n * formatted api_key record, not a { revoked } flag).\n * Requires an API key with the apikeys:write scope (or a dashboard JWT).\n */\n async deleteApiKey(keyId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.delete(`/api-keys/${keyId}`);\n }\n\n // ─── Ephemeral Agents ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register an ephemeral agent with W3C did:key identity.\n * The agent auto-expires after the specified TTL.\n *\n * Side effect: the returned private_key is cached in this SDK instance's\n * in-memory keyring (matching register()).\n */\n async registerEphemeral(input: {\n capabilities: string[];\n scopes: string[];\n ttl_seconds?: number;\n /**\n * The agent this worker is spawned for. The worker joins the parent's\n * swarm (minted on the parent if it has none), so swarm budgets,\n * behaviour windows and cascading suspend cover it.\n */\n parent_agent_id?: string;\n /**\n * The worker's share of the swarm token budget per window, granted out\n * of the parent's own share (conservation ledger). Needs parent_agent_id\n * and a swarm budget; refused when the parent cannot cover it.\n */\n budget_tokens?: number;\n }): Promise<any> {\n const result = await this.post('/agents/ephemeral', input);\n const agentId: string | undefined = result?.agent?.agent_id ?? result?.did_key;\n if (agentId && result?.private_key) {\n this.agentKeys.set(agentId, result.private_key);\n }\n return result;\n }\n\n /**\n * The server-minted swarm an agent belongs to and every member of it.\n * `{ swarm_id: null, members: [] }` for a standalone agent.\n */\n async getSwarm(agentId: string): Promise<SwarmView> {\n return this.get(`/agents/${agentId}/swarm`);\n }\n\n // ─── Many agents at once ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register up to 50 agents in one call: an explicit list, or a template\n * repeated `count` times (names `<prefix>-1` .. `<prefix>-N`), optionally\n * grouped into a new swarm (`swarm: { name?, root? }`; the first created\n * agent roots it when `root` is absent). Each created agent's private key\n * is cached, like `register()`, so the SDK can sign for it at once. The\n * plan allowance is checked for the whole batch first; a single failure is\n * listed in `failed`, not thrown.\n */\n async registerMany(input: {\n agents?: Array<{ name: string; description?: string; capabilities?: string[]; scopes: string[] }>;\n template?: { name_prefix: string; description?: string; capabilities?: string[]; scopes: string[] };\n count?: number;\n swarm?: { name?: string; root?: string };\n }): Promise<{ created: any[]; failed: Array<{ name: string; error: string }>; swarm: { swarm_id: string; name: string | null; root_agent_id: string } | null }> {\n const result = await this.post('/agents/bulk', input);\n for (const c of result?.created ?? []) {\n const id: string | undefined = c?.agent?.agent_id;\n if (id && c?.private_key) this.agentKeys.set(id, c.private_key);\n }\n return result;\n }\n\n // ─── Declarative swarm spec (vorim.swarm/v1) ─────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Create or update a swarm from a spec: root, members and who they report\n * to, guardians, charter, budget and shares, breakers, tripwires. Pass the\n * YAML or JSON text, or the parsed object. `dryRun` returns the plan\n * without writing. Needs an org key with `runtime:manage`.\n */\n async applySwarmSpec(spec: string | Record<string, unknown>, opts: { dryRun?: boolean } = {}): Promise<any> {\n const body = typeof spec === 'string' ? { spec } : spec;\n return this.post(`/swarms/apply?dry_run=${opts.dryRun ? 'true' : 'false'}`, body);\n }\n\n /**\n * Rehearse a swarm: every active member against a scenario set, through\n * the real decision pipeline with nothing written, signed with the roster,\n * charter, budget and policy version it ran under. `preset: 'hazards'`\n * (default) runs generic side tasks plus one main task; `'replay'` re-judges\n * the swarm's last 100 decisions; `scenarios` runs your own (each with\n * `expect: 'allow' | 'not_allow' | 'deny' | 'escalate'`). Verdict is pass,\n * pass_with_findings or fail. Needs `runtime:manage`.\n */\n async rehearseSwarm(swarmId: string, input: { preset?: 'hazards' | 'replay'; scenarios?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>; label?: string } = {}): Promise<any> {\n return this.post(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/rehearse`, input);\n }\n\n /** Past rehearsals, newest first (summary only; fetch `/swarms/:id/rehearsals/:rid` for the signed payload). */\n async listSwarmRehearsals(swarmId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/rehearsals`);\n }\n\n /**\n * A swarm's trust: `min` (gate on it: the least trusted active member),\n * `weighted_mean` (display, weighted by recent activity), `trimmed_mean`\n * (for anything derived from peer reports), per member.\n */\n async getSwarmScore(swarmId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/score`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Issue a platform-signed attestation of the swarm as it is now: roster\n * and its hash, policy version and rules hash, charter, budget, kills,\n * latest rehearsal, receipt chain head and the three scores. Valid 24 h.\n * Hand it to a counterparty; they verify it against GET /trust/keys.\n */\n async attestSwarm(swarmId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.post(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/attest`, {});\n }\n\n /** Past attestations, newest first (fetch one by id for the signed payload). */\n async listSwarmAttestations(swarmId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/attestations`);\n }\n\n /** A swarm as it is now, as a spec: `{ spec, yaml }`. Keep the YAML in git and apply it again. */\n async getSwarmSpec(swarmId: string): Promise<{ spec: Record<string, unknown>; yaml: string }> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/spec`);\n }\n\n /**\n * A swarm's attention picture: escalations in the last hour against its\n * budget, the rate to expect, median time to resolve, mean time between\n * interventions, and the fan-out estimate after Olsen and Goodrich (how\n * many swarms like this one person could supervise).\n */\n async getSwarmAttention(swarmId: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.get(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}/attention`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Set the swarm's attention budget: `perHour` escalations per rolling hour\n * a person may be asked to read (null = no budget). Past it `onExceed`\n * decides: 'deny' (the escalation is denied unread, the default) or\n * 'suspend' (the whole swarm stops). Returns the swarm detail.\n */\n async setSwarmAttention(swarmId: string, input: { perHour?: number | null; onExceed?: 'deny' | 'suspend' }): Promise<any> {\n const body: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n if (input.perHour !== undefined) body.attention_budget_per_hour = input.perHour;\n if (input.onExceed !== undefined) body.attention_exceeded_action = input.onExceed;\n return this.patch(`/swarms/${encodeURIComponent(swarmId)}`, body);\n }\n\n // ─── OpenTelemetry ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Attributes for the agent's own spans: the OTel GenAI `gen_ai.agent.id`\n * plus Vorim's swarm and parent-agent ids (the conventions have no field\n * for either), so any OTel backend can group a swarm's spans. Cached for\n * 60 seconds per agent. Pass the active span's trace/span id back to\n * `beforeAction` / `emit` and Vorim's OTLP connector parents its spans\n * under yours.\n */\n async otelAttributes(agentId: string): Promise<Record<string, string>> {\n const cached = this.otelCache.get(agentId);\n if (cached && cached.expires > Date.now()) return cached.attrs;\n const attrs: Record<string, string> = { 'gen_ai.agent.id': agentId, 'vorim.agent.id': agentId };\n try {\n const swarm = await this.getSwarm(agentId);\n if (swarm?.swarm_id) {\n attrs['vorim.swarm.id'] = swarm.swarm_id;\n const me = swarm.members?.find((m) => m.agent_id === agentId);\n if (me?.parent_agent_id) attrs['vorim.parent_agent.id'] = me.parent_agent_id;\n }\n } catch {\n // The agent's own id is still worth stamping when the lookup fails.\n }\n this.otelCache.set(agentId, { attrs, expires: Date.now() + 60_000 });\n return attrs;\n }\n private otelCache = new Map<string, { attrs: Record<string, string>; expires: number }>();\n\n // ─── Guardian agents ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n //\n // An agent with metadata.class = 'guardian' judges escalations that a rule\n // with approver_role 'guardian' assigned to its swarm. It reads the queue\n // from the server (never from a peer) and answers with a verdict signed by\n // its own key over one canonical line, so the approval is verifiable\n // offline against the agent's registered public key. An unanswered\n // escalation times out as denied: an absent guardian fails closed.\n\n /** Pending escalations this guardian may judge (empty for a non-guardian). */\n async listGuardianEscalations(agentId: string): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get(`/runtime/guardian/escalations?agent_id=${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Approve or veto an escalation as a guardian. Needs the agent's private\n * key (loaded by register(), registerEphemeral() or useAgentKey()). A\n * quorum rule returns `{ status: 'partial', approvals, required_approvals }`\n * until enough distinct approvals arrive; one veto denies at once.\n */\n async guardianResolve(agentId: string, decisionId: string, resolution: 'approved' | 'denied'): Promise<any> {\n const key = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);\n if (!key) {\n throw new VorimError(400, 'AGENT_KEY_NOT_LOADED',\n `No private key is cached for agent ${agentId}. Call register() or useAgentKey(agentId, privateKeyPem) first.`);\n }\n const signedAt = new Date().toISOString();\n // Byte-identical to the server's approvalSigningLine().\n const line = `vorim-escalation-approval|v1|${decisionId}|${resolution}|agent:${agentId}|${signedAt}`;\n const signature = await this.sign(line, key);\n return this.post('/runtime/guardian/resolve', {\n agent_id: agentId, decision_id: decisionId, resolution, signed_at: signedAt, signature,\n });\n }\n\n // ─── Credential Delegation ──────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Register an OAuth provider for credential delegation.\n */\n async registerProvider(input: {\n provider_key: string;\n display_name?: string;\n client_id: string;\n client_secret: string;\n auth_url: string;\n token_url: string;\n revoke_url?: string;\n scopes_available?: string[];\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/credentials/providers', input);\n }\n\n /**\n * List registered OAuth providers.\n */\n async listProviders(): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get('/credentials/providers');\n }\n\n /**\n * Store an OAuth connection (user's authorized tokens).\n */\n async storeConnection(input: {\n provider_id: string;\n refresh_token: string;\n scopes_granted: string[];\n external_account_id?: string;\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/credentials/connections', input);\n }\n\n /**\n * List OAuth connections.\n */\n async listConnections(): Promise<any[]> {\n return this.get('/credentials/connections');\n }\n\n /**\n * Delegate a credential to an agent.\n * The agent will be able to request short-lived access tokens\n * for the delegated scopes without ever seeing the refresh token.\n */\n async delegateCredential(input: {\n connection_id: string;\n agent_id: string;\n scopes_delegated: string[];\n max_requests_per_hr?: number;\n valid_until?: string;\n }): Promise<any> {\n return this.post('/credentials/delegations', input);\n }\n\n /**\n * List credential delegations for the organisation or a specific agent.\n */\n async listDelegations(agentId?: string): Promise<any[]> {\n const params = agentId ? `?agent_id=${agentId}` : '';\n return this.get(`/credentials/delegations${params}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Revoke a credential delegation (cascades to delegation chains).\n */\n async revokeDelegation(delegationId: string): Promise<{ revoked: boolean }> {\n return this.delete(`/credentials/delegations/${delegationId}`);\n }\n\n /**\n * Request a short-lived access token for an agent.\n * The agent must have an active credential delegation.\n * The refresh token is never exposed — the platform proxies the request.\n */\n async requestToken(input: {\n agent_id: string;\n scope: string;\n provider_id?: string;\n }): Promise<{\n access_token: string;\n token_type: string;\n expires_in: number;\n scope: string;\n delegation_id: string;\n }> {\n return this.post('/credentials/token', input);\n }\n\n // ─── HTTP Message Signatures (RFC 9421) ─────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Sign an outbound HTTP request (RFC 9421) with an agent's cached Ed25519\n * key, so the receiver can tell which Vorim agent sent it. `keyid` is the\n * agent_id, `alg` is `ed25519`, and `tag` defaults to `vorim`. When the\n * request has a body, a Content-Digest header is added and covered.\n *\n * The key must already be in this instance's keyring (from `register()`,\n * `registerEphemeral()` or `useAgentKey()`). Returns the headers to add.\n *\n * ```ts\n * const { headers } = await vorim.signHttpRequest(agentId, {\n * method: 'POST', url: 'https://agent-b.example/tasks',\n * headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }, body,\n * });\n * await fetch(url, { method: 'POST', headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers }, body });\n * ```\n */\n async signHttpRequest(\n agentId: string,\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: Omit<SignHttpRequestOptions, 'privateKey' | 'keyid' | 'alg'> = {},\n ): Promise<SignHttpRequestResult> {\n const privateKey = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);\n if (!privateKey) {\n throw new VorimError(\n 400,\n 'AGENT_KEY_NOT_LOADED',\n `No private key is cached for agent ${agentId}. Call register() or useAgentKey(agentId, privateKeyPem) first.`,\n );\n }\n return signHttpRequestWithKey(request, {\n ...options,\n tag: options.tag ?? 'vorim',\n privateKey,\n keyid: agentId,\n alg: 'ed25519',\n });\n }\n\n /**\n * Verify an RFC 9421 signed request through Vorim. The server resolves the\n * signature's keyid (an agent_id) to that agent's registered public key,\n * rejects suspended or revoked agents, and checks Content-Digest when the\n * body is passed. Public endpoint: no API key scope is needed.\n *\n * Pass the request exactly as received: method, full URL, headers, and the\n * raw body if `content-digest` is covered.\n */\n async verifyHttpRequest(\n request: HttpRequestLike,\n options: { label?: string; maxAgeSeconds?: number } = {},\n ): Promise<HttpSignatureVerification> {\n const payload: Record<string, unknown> = {\n method: request.method,\n url: request.url,\n headers: request.headers,\n };\n if (typeof request.body === 'string') {\n payload.body = request.body;\n } else if (request.body instanceof Uint8Array) {\n let bin = '';\n for (let i = 0; i < request.body.length; i++) bin += String.fromCharCode(request.body[i]);\n payload.body_base64 = btoa(bin);\n }\n if (options.label !== undefined) payload.label = options.label;\n if (options.maxAgeSeconds !== undefined) payload.max_age_seconds = options.maxAgeSeconds;\n return this.post('/http-signatures/verify', payload);\n }\n\n // ─── Signing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n /**\n * Sign a payload with an Ed25519 private key (client-side).\n * Uses the Web Crypto API or Node.js crypto.\n */\n async sign(payload: string, privateKeyPem: string): Promise<string> {\n if (typeof globalThis.crypto?.subtle !== 'undefined') {\n // Web Crypto API\n const keyData = this.pemToArrayBuffer(privateKeyPem);\n const key = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'pkcs8', keyData, { name: 'Ed25519' }, false, ['sign']\n );\n const signature = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign(\n 'Ed25519', key, new TextEncoder().encode(payload)\n );\n return `ed25519:${this.arrayBufferToBase64(signature)}`;\n } else {\n // Node.js crypto fallback\n const crypto = await import('node:crypto');\n const sign = crypto.sign(null, Buffer.from(payload), privateKeyPem);\n return `ed25519:${sign.toString('base64')}`;\n }\n }\n\n // ─── HTTP Client ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n private async get(path: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('GET', path);\n }\n\n private async post(path: string, body: any, headers?: Record<string, string>): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('POST', path, body, true, headers);\n }\n\n private async patch(path: string, body: any): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('PATCH', path, body);\n }\n\n private async put(path: string, body: any): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('PUT', path, body);\n }\n\n private async delete(path: string): Promise<any> {\n return this.request('DELETE', path);\n }\n\n /** Like request() but returns the FULL { data, meta, ... } envelope\n * instead of unwrapping to `data`. Used where meta (pagination) matters. */\n private async requestEnvelope(method: string, path: string, body?: any): Promise<Record<string, any>> {\n return this.request(method, path, body, false);\n }\n\n private async request(\n method: string,\n path: string,\n body?: any,\n unwrap = true,\n extraHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n ): Promise<any> {\n const controller = new AbortController();\n const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), this.timeout);\n\n try {\n const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {\n method,\n headers: {\n 'Authorization': `Bearer ${this.apiKey}`,\n 'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n 'User-Agent': USER_AGENT,\n ...extraHeaders,\n },\n body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,\n signal: controller.signal,\n });\n\n if (!response.ok) {\n const errBody = await response.json().catch(() => ({})) as Record<string, any>;\n throw new VorimError(\n response.status,\n errBody.error?.code || 'UNKNOWN_ERROR',\n errBody.error?.message || `HTTP ${response.status}`,\n errBody.error?.details\n );\n }\n\n // A 204 No Content (e.g. DELETE endpoints) is a legitimate success with\n // an empty body — there is nothing to parse. Return early so the JSON\n // guard below doesn't misclassify the empty body as MALFORMED_RESPONSE.\n if (response.status === 204) {\n return unwrap ? undefined : {};\n }\n\n // Guard the success-body parse: a 2xx whose body is not valid JSON\n // (e.g. a proxy/CDN/captive-portal \"200 OK\" HTML interstitial) would\n // otherwise throw a bare SyntaxError that beforeAction's catch\n // misclassifies as a status-0 transport failure and, under\n // runtimeFailOpen, silently ALLOWS the gated action. We throw a\n // VorimError with a distinct MALFORMED_RESPONSE code so the gate\n // fails closed (see the isTransport check in beforeAction). Python's\n // before_action catches json.JSONDecodeError the same way.\n let json: Record<string, any>;\n try {\n json = await response.json() as Record<string, any>;\n } catch {\n throw new VorimError(502, 'MALFORMED_RESPONSE', 'Control plane returned a non-JSON success response');\n }\n return unwrap ? json.data : json;\n } finally {\n clearTimeout(timeoutId);\n }\n }\n\n private pemToArrayBuffer(pem: string): ArrayBuffer {\n const b64 = pem.replace(/-----[^-]+-----/g, '').replace(/\\s/g, '');\n const binary = atob(b64);\n const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n }\n return bytes.buffer;\n }\n\n private arrayBufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer): string {\n const bytes = new Uint8Array(buffer);\n let binary = '';\n for (const byte of bytes) {\n binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n }\n return btoa(binary);\n }\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link VorimSDK.verifyHttpRequest}, from POST /v1/http-signatures/verify. */\nexport interface HttpSignatureVerification {\n valid: boolean;\n reason?: string;\n label: string;\n keyid: string | null;\n agent_id: string | null;\n org_name: string | null;\n agent_status: string | null;\n trust_score: number | null;\n covered: string[];\n created: number | null;\n expires: number | null;\n content_digest_checked: boolean;\n}\n\nexport class VorimError extends Error {\n constructor(\n public status: number,\n public code: string,\n message: string,\n public details?: Record<string, unknown>\n ) {\n super(message);\n this.name = 'VorimError';\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown by {@link VorimSDK.beforeAction} when the runtime decision is\n * `deny` and `throwOnDeny` is left at its default (`true`). Carries the\n * full {@link RuntimeDecision} so the caller can inspect the reason and\n * the decision id. Status is 403 with code `DECISION_DENIED`.\n */\nexport class VorimDeniedError extends VorimError {\n constructor(public decision: RuntimeDecision) {\n super(403, 'DECISION_DENIED', decision.reason, { decisionId: decision.decisionId });\n this.name = 'VorimDeniedError';\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Convenience export ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport default function createVorim(config: VorimConfig): VorimSDK {\n return new VorimSDK(config);\n}\n\n// ─── Device-flow onboarding (RFC 8628) ──────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DeviceLoginOptions {\n baseUrl?: string;\n /** Shown to the human on the consent screen, e.g. \"Cursor\" or \"my-app\". */\n clientName?: string;\n /** Scopes to request; the server clamps to its ceiling regardless. */\n requestedScopes?: string[];\n /**\n * Requested lifetime for the minted key, in days (1..90). Omit for the\n * 90-day default. A short-lived task agent can ask for 1; the server clamps\n * to 1..90, so a shorter key is honoured and an out-of-range value can never\n * mint a longer-lived key than policy allows.\n */\n keyTtlDays?: number;\n /**\n * Called once with the code + URL to show the human. The agent MUST surface\n * `user_code` and `verification_uri` verbatim — do not summarise or truncate.\n */\n onUserCode: (info: { user_code: string; verification_uri: string; verification_uri_complete: string; expires_in: number }) => void;\n /** Stop polling after this many ms (default: the server's expires_in). */\n timeoutMs?: number;\n /**\n * After the key is minted, also register a first agent identity with it, so\n * the agent is fully set up in one call. Pass `true` for a sensible default,\n * or an object to customise. The agent's one-time private key is returned in\n * `result.agent.private_key` — store it; it cannot be retrieved again.\n */\n registerAgent?: boolean | { name?: string; capabilities?: string[]; scopes?: string[] };\n}\n\nexport interface DeviceLoginResult {\n api_key: string;\n key_prefix: string;\n scopes: string[];\n org_id: string;\n /** Present only when `registerAgent` was set — the auto-registered identity. */\n agent?: AgentRegistrationResult;\n}\n\n/**\n * Onboard via the device-authorization flow: obtain a scoped Vorim API key by\n * polling, after a human approves in the browser. No existing key needed — this\n * is the pre-auth bootstrap. Resolves with the key once the human approves;\n * rejects on denial, expiry, or timeout (fail-closed — never returns a partial\n * or unverified credential).\n *\n * @example\n * const { api_key } = await deviceLogin({\n * clientName: 'my-app',\n * onUserCode: ({ user_code, verification_uri }) =>\n * console.log(`Approve at ${verification_uri} — code: ${user_code}`),\n * });\n */\nexport async function deviceLogin(opts: DeviceLoginOptions): Promise<DeviceLoginResult> {\n const base = (opts.baseUrl || 'https://api.vorim.ai').replace(/\\/$/, '') + '/v1';\n\n const startRes = await fetch(`${base}/auth/device`, {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ client_name: opts.clientName, requested_scopes: opts.requestedScopes, key_ttl_days: opts.keyTtlDays }),\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),\n });\n if (!startRes.ok) throw new VorimError(startRes.status, 'DEVICE_START_FAILED', `Could not start device authorization (HTTP ${startRes.status})`);\n const start = ((await startRes.json()) as { data: any }).data;\n\n opts.onUserCode({\n user_code: start.user_code,\n verification_uri: start.verification_uri,\n verification_uri_complete: start.verification_uri_complete,\n expires_in: start.expires_in,\n });\n\n const intervalMs = Math.max(1, start.interval || 5) * 1000;\n const deadline = Date.now() + (opts.timeoutMs ?? start.expires_in * 1000);\n let wait = intervalMs;\n\n // Poll until approved, denied, expired, or our deadline.\n for (;;) {\n if (Date.now() >= deadline) throw new VorimError(408, 'DEVICE_TIMEOUT', 'Device authorization timed out before approval');\n await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, wait));\n\n const pollRes = await fetch(`${base}/auth/device/token`, {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ device_code: start.device_code }),\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000),\n });\n const json = (await pollRes.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { data?: any; error?: { code?: string } };\n\n if (pollRes.ok && json.data?.api_key) {\n const result: DeviceLoginResult = {\n api_key: json.data.api_key, key_prefix: json.data.key_prefix, scopes: json.data.scopes, org_id: json.data.org_id,\n };\n // Optionally finish setup: register a first agent identity with the\n // freshly-minted key so the caller gets back a fully-wired agent. Done\n // SDK-side (a normal authenticated POST /agents) — the device endpoints\n // themselves never create agents, keeping that audited surface unchanged.\n if (opts.registerAgent) {\n const cfg = typeof opts.registerAgent === 'object' ? opts.registerAgent : {};\n const sdk = new VorimSDK({ apiKey: result.api_key, baseUrl: opts.baseUrl });\n result.agent = await sdk.register({\n name: cfg.name || opts.clientName || 'my-agent',\n capabilities: cfg.capabilities || [],\n scopes: (cfg.scopes as any) || ['agent:read', 'agent:execute'],\n });\n }\n return result;\n }\n const code = json.error?.code;\n if (code === 'access_denied') throw new VorimError(403, 'DEVICE_DENIED', 'The human denied the authorization request');\n if (code === 'expired_token') throw new VorimError(410, 'DEVICE_EXPIRED', 'The device code expired before approval');\n if (code === 'slow_down') { wait += intervalMs; continue; } // back off per RFC 8628\n // authorization_pending (or any transient): keep polling at the base interval.\n wait = intervalMs;\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * The exact bytes a {@link PortableSignedReceipt}'s signature covers.\n *\n * Re-exported so a verifier holding only this SDK has ONE source for the\n * canonical form. Reimplementing it is the failure mode the shared definition\n * exists to prevent.\n */\nexport { portableReceiptCanonicalBytes };\nexport type { PortableSignedReceipt } from '@vorim/shared-types';\n\n// Re-export types for consumers\nexport type {\n Agent, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult,\n TrustRecord, AuditEventInput, AuditEventType, AuditResult,\n PermissionScope, PermissionCheckResult, AgentStatus,\n AgentDelegationRecord, DelegationLinkClaims,\n BeforeActionInput, RuntimeDecision, DecisionVerdict, ApprovalAttestation,\n TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, BudgetSpend, BudgetScope, BudgetEnforcement,\n WorkflowProvenanceGraph, WorkflowGraphNode, WorkflowGraphEdge, WorkflowGraphEvent,\n SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryWriteInput, SharedMemoryListResult,\n SuspendPreview, SwarmView,\n} from './types.js';\n\n// Re-export replayable evidence helpers (VAIP -02 schema field hashing)\nexport {\n hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, hashSystemPrompt, hashPreviousEvent,\n jcsCanonicalise, prepareReplayContext, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION,\n} from './replay.js';\nexport type { CatalogueTool, ReplayInputs, ReplayContext } from './replay.js';\nexport {\n commitPayload, hashPayload, isKeyedCommitment, isDigest,\n HMAC_SHA256_PREFIX, SHA256_PREFIX,\n} from './commit.js';\nexport type { CommitmentKey } from './commit.js';\n\n// RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures + RFC 9530 Content-Digest (also available\n// as the '@vorim/sdk/http-signatures' subpath).\nexport {\n createSignatureBase, signHttpRequest, verifyHttpRequest, contentDigest,\n httpSignatureAlgForKey, HttpSignatureError,\n} from './httpSignatures.js';\nexport type {\n HttpRequestLike, HttpMessageLike, SignatureParams, SignHttpRequestOptions,\n SignHttpRequestResult, VerifyHttpRequestOptions, VerifyHttpRequestResult,\n ResolvedKey, HttpSignatureAlgorithm, ContentDigestAlgorithm,\n} from 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