@vorim/sdk 3.8.1 → 3.10.0

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Files changed (85) hide show
  1. package/dist/index.cjs +208 -1
  2. package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
  3. package/dist/index.d.cts +133 -3
  4. package/dist/index.d.ts +133 -3
  5. package/dist/index.js +208 -1
  6. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  7. package/dist/integrations/anthropic.d.cts +1 -1
  8. package/dist/integrations/anthropic.d.ts +1 -1
  9. package/dist/integrations/ap2.cjs +218 -0
  10. package/dist/integrations/ap2.cjs.map +1 -0
  11. package/dist/integrations/ap2.d.cts +95 -0
  12. package/dist/integrations/ap2.d.ts +95 -0
  13. package/dist/integrations/ap2.js +192 -0
  14. package/dist/integrations/ap2.js.map +1 -0
  15. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.cjs +173 -0
  16. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.cjs.map +1 -0
  17. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.d.cts +87 -0
  18. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.d.ts +87 -0
  19. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.js +147 -0
  20. package/dist/integrations/bank-rails.js.map +1 -0
  21. package/dist/integrations/circle.cjs +159 -0
  22. package/dist/integrations/circle.cjs.map +1 -0
  23. package/dist/integrations/circle.d.cts +75 -0
  24. package/dist/integrations/circle.d.ts +75 -0
  25. package/dist/integrations/circle.js +133 -0
  26. package/dist/integrations/circle.js.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/integrations/crewai.d.cts +1 -1
  28. package/dist/integrations/crewai.d.ts +1 -1
  29. package/dist/integrations/hermes.d.cts +1 -1
  30. package/dist/integrations/hermes.d.ts +1 -1
  31. package/dist/integrations/langchain.d.cts +1 -1
  32. package/dist/integrations/langchain.d.ts +1 -1
  33. package/dist/integrations/langgraph.d.cts +1 -1
  34. package/dist/integrations/langgraph.d.ts +1 -1
  35. package/dist/integrations/llamaindex.d.cts +1 -1
  36. package/dist/integrations/llamaindex.d.ts +1 -1
  37. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.cjs +178 -0
  38. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.cjs.map +1 -0
  39. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.d.cts +90 -0
  40. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.d.ts +90 -0
  41. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.js +152 -0
  42. package/dist/integrations/modern-treasury.js.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.cjs +165 -0
  44. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.cjs.map +1 -0
  45. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.d.cts +79 -0
  46. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.d.ts +79 -0
  47. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.js +139 -0
  48. package/dist/integrations/nekuda.js.map +1 -0
  49. package/dist/integrations/openai.d.cts +1 -1
  50. package/dist/integrations/openai.d.ts +1 -1
  51. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.cjs +215 -0
  52. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.cjs.map +1 -0
  53. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.d.cts +87 -0
  54. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.d.ts +87 -0
  55. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.js +189 -0
  56. package/dist/integrations/paypal-agent.js.map +1 -0
  57. package/dist/integrations/plaid.cjs +174 -0
  58. package/dist/integrations/plaid.cjs.map +1 -0
  59. package/dist/integrations/plaid.d.cts +86 -0
  60. package/dist/integrations/plaid.d.ts +86 -0
  61. package/dist/integrations/plaid.js +148 -0
  62. package/dist/integrations/plaid.js.map +1 -0
  63. package/dist/integrations/siem.d.cts +1 -1
  64. package/dist/integrations/siem.d.ts +1 -1
  65. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.cjs +166 -0
  66. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.cjs.map +1 -0
  67. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.d.cts +80 -0
  68. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.d.ts +80 -0
  69. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.js +140 -0
  70. package/dist/integrations/skyfire.js.map +1 -0
  71. package/dist/integrations/stripe-acp.d.cts +1 -1
  72. package/dist/integrations/stripe-acp.d.ts +1 -1
  73. package/dist/integrations/ucp.d.cts +1 -1
  74. package/dist/integrations/ucp.d.ts +1 -1
  75. package/dist/integrations/vercel-ai.d.cts +1 -1
  76. package/dist/integrations/vercel-ai.d.ts +1 -1
  77. package/dist/integrations/x402.cjs +211 -0
  78. package/dist/integrations/x402.cjs.map +1 -0
  79. package/dist/integrations/x402.d.cts +87 -0
  80. package/dist/integrations/x402.d.ts +87 -0
  81. package/dist/integrations/x402.js +185 -0
  82. package/dist/integrations/x402.js.map +1 -0
  83. package/dist/{types-Cb6V-boJ.d.cts → types-zzK9YOoa.d.cts} +86 -1
  84. package/dist/{types-Cb6V-boJ.d.ts → types-zzK9YOoa.d.ts} +86 -1
  85. package/package.json +91 -1
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
- import { A as AgentRegistrationResult, R as RuntimeDecision, b as AgentRegistrationInput, T as TrustRecord, c as Agent, P as PermissionScope, d as PermissionCheckResult, D as DelegationLinkClaims, e as AgentDelegationRecord, B as BeforeActionInput, f as TokenBudgetInput, g as TokenBudget, h as BudgetSpend, a as AuditEventInput } from './types-Cb6V-boJ.js';
2
- export { i as AgentStatus, j as AuditEventType, k as AuditResult, l as BudgetEnforcement, m as BudgetScope, n as DecisionVerdict } from './types-Cb6V-boJ.js';
1
+ import { A as AgentRegistrationResult, R as RuntimeDecision, b as AgentRegistrationInput, T as TrustRecord, c as Agent, P as PermissionScope, d as PermissionCheckResult, D as DelegationLinkClaims, e as AgentDelegationRecord, W as WorkflowProvenanceGraph, S as SharedMemoryWriteInput, f as SharedMemoryEntry, g as SharedMemoryListResult, B as BeforeActionInput, h as TokenBudgetInput, i as TokenBudget, j as BudgetSpend, a as AuditEventInput } from './types-zzK9YOoa.js';
2
+ export { k as AgentStatus, l as AuditEventType, m as AuditResult, n as BudgetEnforcement, o as BudgetScope, p as DecisionVerdict, q as WorkflowGraphEdge, r as WorkflowGraphEvent, s as WorkflowGraphNode } from './types-zzK9YOoa.js';
3
3
 
4
4
  /**
5
5
  * Replayable agent decision evidence helpers.
@@ -430,6 +430,136 @@ declare class VorimSDK {
430
430
  revokeAgentDelegation(agentId: string, chainId: string): Promise<{
431
431
  revoked: number;
432
432
  }>;
433
+ /**
434
+ * Reconstruct a multi-agent workflow's provenance graph from a delegation
435
+ * chain id — the nodes (agents), edges (who delegated what to whom), and the
436
+ * audit events attributed to each agent within that workflow. Multi-agent
437
+ * fabric Phase 1: the tamper-evident answer to "which agents did what, and
438
+ * who authorised whom?" across a whole hand-off chain.
439
+ *
440
+ * @example
441
+ * ```ts
442
+ * const graph = await vorim.getWorkflowGraph('chain_abc123');
443
+ * for (const edge of graph.edges) {
444
+ * console.log(`${edge.from} -> ${edge.to} [${edge.scopes.join(', ')}]`);
445
+ * }
446
+ * ```
447
+ */
448
+ getWorkflowGraph(chainId: string, options?: {
449
+ maxEvents?: number;
450
+ }): Promise<WorkflowProvenanceGraph>;
451
+ /**
452
+ * Write (upsert) an entry into the org's governed shared-memory pool,
453
+ * attributed to `agentId`.
454
+ *
455
+ * If the SDK holds the agent's private key (via {@link VorimSDK.register}
456
+ * or {@link VorimSDK.useAgentKey}), the entry is signed at source with the
457
+ * agent's Ed25519 key over the canonical entry (namespace + key + value +
458
+ * agent_id) before it leaves the process, and the server verifies it against
459
+ * the agent's stored public key — rejecting a bad signature (fail closed).
460
+ * This is what makes a poisoned entry always traceable to its source
461
+ * (OWASP ASI06). If no key is available, the entry is written unsigned.
462
+ *
463
+ * A write to an existing (namespace, key) updates it, recording the new
464
+ * writer + signature.
465
+ *
466
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.
467
+ *
468
+ * @example
469
+ * ```ts
470
+ * await vorim.writeMemory('agid_researcher_abc', {
471
+ * namespace: 'research-run-42',
472
+ * key: 'sources',
473
+ * value: { urls: ['https://…'], gathered_at: '2026-07-25T…' },
474
+ * });
475
+ * ```
476
+ */
477
+ writeMemory(agentId: string, entry: SharedMemoryWriteInput): Promise<SharedMemoryEntry>;
478
+ /**
479
+ * Read one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key). Throws a 404
480
+ * {@link VorimError} if it does not exist. Returns the value plus
481
+ * provenance (which agent wrote it, content hash, whether it is signed).
482
+ *
483
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.
484
+ */
485
+ readMemory(input: {
486
+ namespace: string;
487
+ key: string;
488
+ }): Promise<SharedMemoryEntry>;
489
+ /**
490
+ * List entries in a namespace (paginated). Returns `{ entries, meta }`.
491
+ *
492
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.
493
+ */
494
+ listMemory(input: {
495
+ namespace: string;
496
+ page?: number;
497
+ perPage?: number;
498
+ }): Promise<SharedMemoryListResult>;
499
+ /**
500
+ * Delete one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key).
501
+ *
502
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.
503
+ */
504
+ deleteMemory(input: {
505
+ namespace: string;
506
+ key: string;
507
+ }): Promise<{
508
+ deleted: true;
509
+ namespace: string;
510
+ key: string;
511
+ }>;
512
+ /**
513
+ * Verified hand-off — the multi-agent-fabric primitive.
514
+ *
515
+ * Hands a task from one agent to another as ONE auditable operation that
516
+ * composes the three trust primitives:
517
+ * 1. (optional) VERIFY the receiving agent is trusted + active before
518
+ * handing it anything — fails closed if it is not (unless you opt out).
519
+ * 2. DELEGATE a strictly-attenuated subset of the sender's scopes to the
520
+ * receiver (the server enforces child ⊆ parent + depth; a scope the
521
+ * sender doesn't hold is rejected). Optionally as a signed capability
522
+ * link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable by `@vorim/verify`.
523
+ * 3. EMIT a signed audit event recording the hand-off, stamped with the
524
+ * delegation-chain provenance so the whole multi-agent workflow is
525
+ * reconstructable later.
526
+ *
527
+ * Returns the delegation record (with `public_chain_id`) plus the verification
528
+ * result. Throws before delegating if verification fails.
529
+ *
530
+ * @example
531
+ * ```ts
532
+ * const { chain } = await vorim.handOff('agid_planner', {
533
+ * to: 'agid_researcher',
534
+ * scopes: ['agent:read'], // researcher gets read-only, nothing more
535
+ * task: 'gather sources for Q3 report',
536
+ * maxChainDepth: 0, // researcher cannot re-delegate
537
+ * minTrustScore: 60,
538
+ * });
539
+ * console.log(chain.publicChainId);
540
+ * ```
541
+ */
542
+ handOff(fromAgentId: string, input: {
543
+ /** The receiving agent's id. */
544
+ to: string;
545
+ /** Scopes to delegate — must be a subset of what `fromAgentId` holds. */
546
+ scopes: PermissionScope[];
547
+ /** Human-readable description of the handed-off task (recorded in audit). */
548
+ task?: string;
549
+ /** How many further hops the receiver may make (default 0 — no re-delegation). */
550
+ maxChainDepth?: number;
551
+ /** Delegation expiry (ISO 8601). */
552
+ validUntil?: string;
553
+ /** Minimum trust score the receiver must have to accept the hand-off (default 50). */
554
+ minTrustScore?: number;
555
+ /** Skip the pre-delegation trust verification (NOT recommended). @default false */
556
+ skipVerify?: boolean;
557
+ /** Sign the delegation link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable. @default false */
558
+ signed?: boolean;
559
+ }): Promise<{
560
+ chain: AgentDelegationRecord;
561
+ verification?: TrustRecord;
562
+ }>;
433
563
  /**
434
564
  * Gate an agent action BEFORE it is performed. Calls
435
565
  * `POST /v1/runtime/decisions` and returns a typed {@link RuntimeDecision}.
@@ -775,4 +905,4 @@ interface DeviceLoginResult {
775
905
  */
776
906
  declare function deviceLogin(opts: DeviceLoginOptions): Promise<DeviceLoginResult>;
777
907
 
778
- export { Agent, AgentDelegationRecord, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult, AuditEventInput, BeforeActionInput, BudgetSpend, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION, type CatalogueTool, DelegationLinkClaims, type DeviceLoginOptions, type DeviceLoginResult, PermissionCheckResult, PermissionScope, type ReplayContext, type ReplayInputs, RuntimeDecision, TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, TrustRecord, type VorimConfig, VorimDeniedError, VorimError, VorimSDK, canonicalPayloadV0, canonicalPayloadV1, createVorim as default, deviceLogin, hashPreviousEvent, hashSystemPrompt, hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, jcsCanonicalise, prepareReplayContext };
908
+ export { Agent, AgentDelegationRecord, AgentRegistrationInput, AgentRegistrationResult, AuditEventInput, BeforeActionInput, BudgetSpend, CANONICAL_TOOL_CATALOGUE_VERSION, type CatalogueTool, DelegationLinkClaims, type DeviceLoginOptions, type DeviceLoginResult, PermissionCheckResult, PermissionScope, type ReplayContext, type ReplayInputs, RuntimeDecision, SharedMemoryEntry, SharedMemoryListResult, SharedMemoryWriteInput, TokenBudget, TokenBudgetInput, TrustRecord, type VorimConfig, VorimDeniedError, VorimError, VorimSDK, WorkflowProvenanceGraph, canonicalPayloadV0, canonicalPayloadV1, createVorim as default, deviceLogin, hashPreviousEvent, hashSystemPrompt, hashTool, hashToolCatalogue, jcsCanonicalise, prepareReplayContext };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async function prepareReplayContext(inputs) {
75
75
  }
76
76
 
77
77
  // src/index.ts
78
- var SDK_VERSION = true ? "3.8.1" : "0.0.0";
78
+ var SDK_VERSION = true ? "3.10.0" : "0.0.0";
79
79
  var USER_AGENT = `vorim-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
80
80
  function sleep(ms) {
81
81
  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
@@ -374,6 +374,213 @@ var VorimSDK = class _VorimSDK {
374
374
  async revokeAgentDelegation(agentId, chainId) {
375
375
  return this.delete(`/agents/${agentId}/delegations/${chainId}`);
376
376
  }
377
+ /**
378
+ * Reconstruct a multi-agent workflow's provenance graph from a delegation
379
+ * chain id — the nodes (agents), edges (who delegated what to whom), and the
380
+ * audit events attributed to each agent within that workflow. Multi-agent
381
+ * fabric Phase 1: the tamper-evident answer to "which agents did what, and
382
+ * who authorised whom?" across a whole hand-off chain.
383
+ *
384
+ * @example
385
+ * ```ts
386
+ * const graph = await vorim.getWorkflowGraph('chain_abc123');
387
+ * for (const edge of graph.edges) {
388
+ * console.log(`${edge.from} -> ${edge.to} [${edge.scopes.join(', ')}]`);
389
+ * }
390
+ * ```
391
+ */
392
+ async getWorkflowGraph(chainId, options) {
393
+ const qs = options?.maxEvents ? `?max_events=${options.maxEvents}` : "";
394
+ return this.get(`/audit/workflow-graph/${chainId}${qs}`);
395
+ }
396
+ // ─── Governed Shared Memory (multi-agent fabric, Phase 2) ──────────
397
+ /**
398
+ * Write (upsert) an entry into the org's governed shared-memory pool,
399
+ * attributed to `agentId`.
400
+ *
401
+ * If the SDK holds the agent's private key (via {@link VorimSDK.register}
402
+ * or {@link VorimSDK.useAgentKey}), the entry is signed at source with the
403
+ * agent's Ed25519 key over the canonical entry (namespace + key + value +
404
+ * agent_id) before it leaves the process, and the server verifies it against
405
+ * the agent's stored public key — rejecting a bad signature (fail closed).
406
+ * This is what makes a poisoned entry always traceable to its source
407
+ * (OWASP ASI06). If no key is available, the entry is written unsigned.
408
+ *
409
+ * A write to an existing (namespace, key) updates it, recording the new
410
+ * writer + signature.
411
+ *
412
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.
413
+ *
414
+ * @example
415
+ * ```ts
416
+ * await vorim.writeMemory('agid_researcher_abc', {
417
+ * namespace: 'research-run-42',
418
+ * key: 'sources',
419
+ * value: { urls: ['https://…'], gathered_at: '2026-07-25T…' },
420
+ * });
421
+ * ```
422
+ */
423
+ async writeMemory(agentId, entry) {
424
+ const body = {
425
+ agent_id: agentId,
426
+ namespace: entry.namespace,
427
+ key: entry.key,
428
+ value: entry.value
429
+ };
430
+ const key = this.agentKeys.get(agentId);
431
+ if (key) {
432
+ try {
433
+ const canonical = jcsCanonicalise({
434
+ agent_id: agentId,
435
+ key: entry.key,
436
+ namespace: entry.namespace,
437
+ value: entry.value
438
+ });
439
+ body.signature = await this.sign(canonical, key);
440
+ } catch {
441
+ }
442
+ }
443
+ return this.post("/memory", body);
444
+ }
445
+ /**
446
+ * Read one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key). Throws a 404
447
+ * {@link VorimError} if it does not exist. Returns the value plus
448
+ * provenance (which agent wrote it, content hash, whether it is signed).
449
+ *
450
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.
451
+ */
452
+ async readMemory(input) {
453
+ return this.get(`/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(input.key)}`);
454
+ }
455
+ /**
456
+ * List entries in a namespace (paginated). Returns `{ entries, meta }`.
457
+ *
458
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:read` scope.
459
+ */
460
+ async listMemory(input) {
461
+ const params = new URLSearchParams();
462
+ if (input.page) params.set("page", String(input.page));
463
+ if (input.perPage) params.set("per_page", String(input.perPage));
464
+ const qs = params.toString();
465
+ const envelope = await this.requestEnvelope(
466
+ "GET",
467
+ `/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`
468
+ );
469
+ return {
470
+ entries: envelope.data ?? [],
471
+ meta: envelope.meta
472
+ };
473
+ }
474
+ /**
475
+ * Delete one shared-memory entry by (namespace, key).
476
+ *
477
+ * Requires an API key with the `memory:write` scope.
478
+ */
479
+ async deleteMemory(input) {
480
+ return this.delete(`/memory/${encodeURIComponent(input.namespace)}/${encodeURIComponent(input.key)}`);
481
+ }
482
+ /**
483
+ * Verified hand-off — the multi-agent-fabric primitive.
484
+ *
485
+ * Hands a task from one agent to another as ONE auditable operation that
486
+ * composes the three trust primitives:
487
+ * 1. (optional) VERIFY the receiving agent is trusted + active before
488
+ * handing it anything — fails closed if it is not (unless you opt out).
489
+ * 2. DELEGATE a strictly-attenuated subset of the sender's scopes to the
490
+ * receiver (the server enforces child ⊆ parent + depth; a scope the
491
+ * sender doesn't hold is rejected). Optionally as a signed capability
492
+ * link so the hand-off is offline-verifiable by `@vorim/verify`.
493
+ * 3. EMIT a signed audit event recording the hand-off, stamped with the
494
+ * delegation-chain provenance so the whole multi-agent workflow is
495
+ * reconstructable later.
496
+ *
497
+ * Returns the delegation record (with `public_chain_id`) plus the verification
498
+ * result. Throws before delegating if verification fails.
499
+ *
500
+ * @example
501
+ * ```ts
502
+ * const { chain } = await vorim.handOff('agid_planner', {
503
+ * to: 'agid_researcher',
504
+ * scopes: ['agent:read'], // researcher gets read-only, nothing more
505
+ * task: 'gather sources for Q3 report',
506
+ * maxChainDepth: 0, // researcher cannot re-delegate
507
+ * minTrustScore: 60,
508
+ * });
509
+ * console.log(chain.publicChainId);
510
+ * ```
511
+ */
512
+ async handOff(fromAgentId, input) {
513
+ let verification;
514
+ if (!input.skipVerify) {
515
+ try {
516
+ verification = await this.verify(input.to);
517
+ } catch {
518
+ throw new VorimError(
519
+ 400,
520
+ "HANDOFF_VERIFY_FAILED",
521
+ `Could not verify receiving agent ${input.to} \u2014 refusing hand-off (fail closed).`
522
+ );
523
+ }
524
+ const minScore = input.minTrustScore ?? 50;
525
+ if (verification.status !== "active") {
526
+ throw new VorimError(
527
+ 403,
528
+ "HANDOFF_RECEIVER_INACTIVE",
529
+ `Receiving agent ${input.to} is ${verification.status}, not active \u2014 refusing hand-off.`
530
+ );
531
+ }
532
+ if ((verification.trust_score ?? 0) < minScore) {
533
+ throw new VorimError(
534
+ 403,
535
+ "HANDOFF_RECEIVER_UNTRUSTED",
536
+ `Receiving agent ${input.to} trust score ${verification.trust_score} is below minimum ${minScore}.`
537
+ );
538
+ }
539
+ }
540
+ const delegationInput = {
541
+ delegate_agent_id: input.to,
542
+ scopes_delegated: input.scopes,
543
+ max_chain_depth: input.maxChainDepth ?? 0,
544
+ ...input.validUntil ? { valid_until: input.validUntil } : {}
545
+ };
546
+ if (input.signed) {
547
+ const chainId = `chain_pending_${input.to}`;
548
+ const signed = await this.signDelegationLink({
549
+ v: 0,
550
+ type: "vaip-delegation-link",
551
+ chain_id: chainId,
552
+ depth: 1,
553
+ delegator: fromAgentId,
554
+ delegate: input.to,
555
+ scopes: input.scopes,
556
+ max_chain_depth: input.maxChainDepth ?? 0,
557
+ valid_from: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
558
+ valid_until: input.validUntil ?? null,
559
+ parent_link_hash: null
560
+ });
561
+ delegationInput.signed_link = signed;
562
+ }
563
+ const chain = await this.delegateToAgent(fromAgentId, delegationInput);
564
+ try {
565
+ await this.emit({
566
+ agent_id: fromAgentId,
567
+ event_type: "permission_change",
568
+ action: "agent.handoff",
569
+ resource: input.to,
570
+ result: "success",
571
+ delegation_chain_id: chain.publicChainId,
572
+ metadata: {
573
+ framework: "fabric",
574
+ to: input.to,
575
+ scopes: input.scopes,
576
+ task: input.task,
577
+ receiver_trust_score: verification?.trust_score
578
+ }
579
+ }, { sign: true });
580
+ } catch {
581
+ }
582
+ return { chain, verification };
583
+ }
377
584
  // ─── Runtime Control (Strategy A) ──────────────────────────────────
378
585
  /**
379
586
  * Gate an agent action BEFORE it is performed. Calls