@voltro/runtime 0.42.0 → 0.43.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -39,6 +39,166 @@ _Changes staged for the next release accumulate here (rolled up from
 
 ---
 
+## [0.43.1] — 2026-08-18
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **@voltro/database** — A write recorder that fails inside someone's transaction now says which recorder, on which write, and what the database actually said.
+
+  `@effect/sql` renders every driver failure as `SqlError: Failed to execute statement` — one sentence that fits a missing column, a dangling foreign key, an over-long value and a duplicate key equally. The driver's own words hang off a SYMBOL on a `FiberFailure`, so a caller who reaches for `.cause` gets `undefined` and concludes there is nothing there.
+
+  That is expensive precisely where recorders run: the caller's write was ordinary, and what failed was framework machinery one table over. The message now reads
+
+  ```
+  write recorder '_voltro_row_history' failed while recording an update on 'users':
+  Duplicate entry 'rowver_…' for key 'PRIMARY' [code=ER_DUP_ENTRY errno=1062 …]
+  ```
+
+  and the original error is kept as `cause` for anyone who does walk the chain. The failure still takes the transaction down — that is the guarantee and it is unchanged.
+
+  `describeDriverError` (`@voltro/database`) is the shared summariser, built on the existing cause extractor rather than a second walker. It returns nothing when the chain carries nothing driver-shaped, so an ordinary programming error from a recorder arrives as itself instead of wrapped in prose about a database.
+- **@voltro/database** — On MariaDB, a `varchar` column could introspect as `json` because a DIFFERENT table had a json column with the same column name.
+
+  MariaDB names a column-level CHECK after the COLUMN, and those names are unique per table, not per schema. `information_schema.check_constraints` on MySQL has no `TABLE_NAME`, so the introspector recovered it by joining `table_constraints` on `(schema, constraint_name)` — which on MariaDB cross-products every same-named check across every table. Measured on 11.8:
+
+  ```
+  a.payload  LONGTEXT      CHECK (json_valid(`payload`))
+  b.payload  VARCHAR(255)  CHECK (`payload` in ('x','y'))
+  
+  join result:  a → json_valid, a → in(…), b → json_valid, b → in(…)
+  ```
+
+  So `b.payload` reads as `json`, and `a.payload` picks up an enum it does not have. Downstream that is not a cosmetic label: the planner emits a blocked `alter-column-type` with `from: 'json'` that no `.narrowedFrom()` can honestly acknowledge, because the premise is false — and since the data-transfer manifest records introspected types, the same misreading travels into the bundle and reappears as schema drift on import.
+
+  MariaDB's own `check_constraints` HAS `TABLE_NAME`. The introspector asks for it directly now and keeps the join as the MySQL path, where check-constraint names are schema-unique and the join is sound. That asymmetry is why a single-engine test could not see this: the wrong query passes on MySQL.
+- **@voltro/database** — `voltro db apply` could not drop a CHECK constraint on the mysql family at all, and each of the three reasons hid the next.
+
+  **1. `DROP CHECK` is MySQL-8 syntax.** MariaDB has never had it — measured on 11.8, `ALTER TABLE t DROP CHECK c` is `ERROR 1064`, while `DROP CONSTRAINT c` works on both engines. A plan containing a `drop-check` therefore died on the first one, on a family whose migrations are NOT atomic: the run stopped with the earlier statements committed and no rollback.
+
+  **2. The name was assumed, not read.** The applier dropped `<table>_<column>_check` — which is only what its own `add-check` would have named it. A CHECK created at table bring-up is INLINE and UNNAMED, so the server names it (`CONSTRAINT_1` / `<table>_chk_1` / the column name). Dropping a name that does not exist reports "does not exist", which is indistinguishable from the "already gone" a resume legitimately produces — so the statement succeeded, the constraint stayed, and the plan re-proposed the identical `drop-check` forever. The name comes from the catalog now.
+
+  **3. A column-level CHECK cannot be dropped by name on MariaDB at all.** Measured: the catalog lists it under the column's name, `DROP CONSTRAINT` on that name answers 1091, and only redefining the column removes it. The applier now drops by catalog name, ASKS whether the constraint survived, and redefines the column when it did — so a rebuild happens only in the case that needs one.
+
+  **And the same investigation closed the MySQL `.oneOf()` round-trip gap.** `parseEnumCheck` was documented as handling MySQL's rendering and did not: MySQL backslash-escapes the string DELIMITERS (`_utf8mb4\'draft\'`), and the parser rewrote those to the SQL doubling `''` — which is how a quote INSIDE a value is written. Every delimiter became escaped content, every value came back empty, and the filter dropped them. `.oneOf()` now round-trips on MySQL, and the suite that asserted the gap as a known one asserts the round-trip instead.
+
+  Plus, on a failed apply: the error now states how many operations were already applied and whether this dialect rolls back. The ledger held that number; it never reached the operator, who had to re-plan and diff the counts to learn how far the run got.
+- **@voltro/plugin-versioning** — `versioningPlugin({ timing: 'in-transaction' })` built its history row's primary key from `(rowId, version)` while the version counter three lines above was scoped to `(tableName, rowId)`. Two versioned tables carrying the same row id therefore collided — permanently.
+
+  The shape is not exotic: `actors.id === users.id` is what the framework's own audit trail asks for, an `actors` row whose id is the user's so an audited write satisfies `createdBy → actors`. In an app that follows it, every user row has a twin.
+
+  The collision does not heal, and that is what turns a duplicate into an outage. The second table's insert fails, so its history row is never written, so `maxOf` for that table stays `null`, so the next attempt computes the same version and the same id. Every write to that row is dead from then on — surfacing as `ER_DUP_ENTRY` on an ordinary `store.update`, naming a row id in a table the caller never wrote to.
+
+  The key is `(table, rowId, version)` now — the same shape the post-commit path always built. It stays deterministic (no clock, no process-local counter), which is what lets it survive a replica restart; it just carries every part of the key it claims to be unique over.
+
+  **No cleanup is needed for rows already written.** They keep their old ids and belong to whichever table wrote them; the new keys cannot collide with them, and `byRow` is not unique. An app blocked by this is unblocked by the upgrade alone.
+
+  Covered twice: the recorder against a port that refuses duplicates (the mechanism, including that a repeat does not settle), and two versioned tables sharing an id against live postgres (the real primary key, inside the caller's transaction). The suite that existed exercised ONE table, which cannot produce a collision at all — and read exactly like a suite that covered this.
+
+### Internal (no consumer-facing effect)
+
+- **@voltro/sql-mysql** — Two test-only defects in `sql-mysql`, both found by a release gate, both of the same family: a check that could not fail, and a failure reported in the wrong place. No product code changed.
+
+  **An assertion that could not fail.** `dropCheckSyntax.integration.test.ts` fell back to a HAND-BUILT plan when the planner produced no operations — and the fabricated operation was a `drop-check`, which is exactly what the next line asserts the plan contains. So an engine whose planner stopped emitting it would have been handed one and reported green. The fallback is deleted; both engines produce the operation now, which is what this release fixed, and the assertion is load-bearing again (4/4 on mysql AND mariadb without it).
+
+  It surfaced as a TYPE error rather than a false pass, because the fallback's object widened `plan` into a union `applyPlan` does not accept. Worth noting which check caught it: `vitest` transpiles without type-checking, so the suite was green and only `tsc` objected — the gate's `typecheck` and `lint` steps are what went red.
+
+  **A wait that gave up in silence.** `waitFor` in both binlog CDC suites looped to a deadline and then RETURNED, so a "prove the reader is live" wait that expired let the test carry on, kill the binlog dump thread, and fail twenty lines later on `expect(ids).toContain('todo_wd_before')` — an assertion about a different claim, in a different place. It throws now, naming the wait and the window, and all twelve call sites carry a label.
+
+  The window is named too: `FIRST_ATTACH_MS = 30_000`, up from 12 s. The reasoning is the 40 s window already in the same file, whose comment says a re-attach plus binlog catch-up takes longer under a loaded full-suite run — a FIRST attach does both and only skips the backoff, so 12 s beside 40 s was an asymmetry the file's own reasoning did not support. That is an argument from the neighbouring comment, not a measurement; if it expires again, `waitFor` now says which wait and for how long, and that number is the one to argue with rather than raising this one twice.
+
+---
+
+## [0.43.0] — 2026-08-18
+
+### ⚠ BREAKING
+
+- **@voltro/data-transfer, @voltro/cli** — `DanglingReferenceError` is now `RowsRefusedError`, and it separates the rows that failed from the rows that failed because those rows did.
+
+  **The name.** The import raised it for EVERY row still refused after deferred-FK resolution, whatever the reason — a NOT NULL violation, a duplicate key, a value the database computes for itself. The tag named ONE possible cause and put it where a reader looks first, so any other refusal arrived mislabelled. The new name states the outcome; each row's `reason` states the cause, which is where a cause can honestly be claimed.
+
+  **The split.** A row is `derived` when one of its reference columns holds the primary key of another row that also failed in this run: it could not have landed whatever it contained, so its reason describes the parent's problem. The relation is transitive, decided from the DATA (the failed ids against the reference-typed values), so no schema knowledge is needed. `primaryCount` is the number an operator acts on, `rows` lists primary failures FIRST so the cap never spends its budget on consequences, and the CLI leads with both numbers:
+
+  ```
+  import refused 300 row(s), of which 1 are the actual failures — the rest could
+  not land because a row they reference did not.
+    teams t1  foreign key teams_ibfk_1: the referenced row does not exist [1452]
+    … and 299 row(s) behind them. Fix the 1 above and re-run; they resolve with
+    their parents.
+  ```
+
+  In an FK-dense bundle one refused parent takes its whole subtree with it, so the length of a flat list says how connected the data is, not how many problems there are — and the single row that explains all of them sits somewhere in the middle of it.
+
+  The codemod rewrites the import and every use of the symbol. It does NOT rewrite a tag STRING (`Effect.catchTag('DanglingReferenceError', …)`, `err._tag === '…'`) — change those to `'RowsRefusedError'` — and the payload gained `primaryCount` plus a `derived` flag per row.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **@voltro/cli** — `voltro doctor`'s `subject-write-no-guard` rule reads the DESCRIPTOR before it reports. It looked only at the executor, and the access decision is not declared there.
+
+  Every form of access decision the framework has — `internal: true`, `guards: [...]`, `openAccess:` — is declared on the DESCRIPTOR. So an app that declares them properly got a finding for each one, and on a codebase whose procedures are mostly `internal: true` the rule fires on essentially all of them and is wrong essentially every time.
+
+  That is worse than a rule that finds nothing: it is the longest line in the report and it reads like a security finding, so it teaches the reader to skim the place a real finding would have appeared.
+
+  The premise was structurally impossible for most of them, and the framework says so itself: `security.defaultDeny` refuses at boot any wire-exposed procedure declaring neither `guards:` nor `openAccess:`. So "an anonymous caller reaches the write" can only be true of an `openAccess` procedure. That is what the rule looks for now — plus the handler check it always honoured, plus an ownership comparison against `subject.id`, which is the refusal the rule says is missing. Where no descriptor can be read, it says nothing: the claim is about a declaration, and a finding whose evidence was never opened is the failure mode this fixes.
+
+  The `use:` line changed with it. It recommended `.guard(requireScope('…'))`; the shipped guide teaches declarative `guards:` and calls a hand-written per-executor scope check the thing `guards:` exists to delete. A rule may not recommend the shape the guide argues against.
+- **@voltro/database, @voltro/data-transfer** — A `voltro data` transfer no longer carries GENERATED column values, and no longer loses every row that has one.
+
+  The export wrote the computed values into the bundle and the import sent them back in the `INSERT` column list. MariaDB refuses that for any value except NULL (`1906: The value specified for generated column 'x' in table 't' has been ignored`); postgres refuses a non-DEFAULT value outright. So the transfer failed per ROW, not per table, and only for the rows whose generated value was non-NULL.
+
+  That selectivity is the dangerous part. `.uniqueActive()` lowers to exactly such a column on mysql/mariadb — a STORED generated column holding the key while the row is live and NULL once it is soft-deleted — so the refused rows are the LIVE ones and the accepted ones are the tombstones. A table can come out looking like "a few rows failed" or empty, depending only on how many of its rows are deleted, and any table with a foreign key into it fails behind it.
+
+  Both ends are fixed from one source of truth: **introspection now reports generated columns on every dialect** (`generatedAs`, from `information_schema.generation_expression` on mysql/mariadb, `is_generated` on postgres, `PRAGMA table_xinfo`'s hidden flag on sqlite, `sys.computed_columns` on mssql). It was declared-side only before — invisible to the planner, which does not compare it, and load-bearing for anything that writes rows back.
+
+  The exporter omits those columns, values and all. The importer strips them from every incoming row using the TARGET's snapshot, because a bundle already written still carries them and a file on disk is data, read where it is.
+
+  **`voltro serve`'s admin export/import needed a second fix, and without it this one reached only the direct transport.** The running instance hands those handlers `declaredSnapshot(tables)` — no dialect — and `.uniqueActive()` lowers to a generated column only when the snapshot knows the engine. So over `--target api` the snapshot described a schema with no generated columns while the database had several, and the export wrote their values back into the bundle exactly as before. It passes the dialect now (the variable was already on the next line).
+
+  `generatedAs` is also kept OUT of the schema fingerprint. Introspection can read the fact back but not a comparable value — the engine returns its own normalisation of the expression, never the declared spelling — so hashing it would make declared and live disagree permanently: a schema nobody touched reporting a changed declaration on every boot, and a transfer target that matches its bundle exactly refused as drifted.
+
+  Covered by a live mariadb→mariadb and mysql→mysql round trip over a `.uniqueActive()` table with live and soft-deleted rows, asserting the target recomputed the value rather than that the row merely arrived.
+- **@voltro/sql-mysql** — On mysql/mariadb, a write REJECTED by the database through `insertIgnore` was reported as a conflict when the caller was not inside a transaction — and never reached the caller as a typed `ConstraintViolation` at all.
+
+  Two causes, both measured against live MySQL 8.4 and MariaDB 11.
+
+  **The connection.** `INSERT IGNORE` demotes every error to a warning, so the store reads `SHOW WARNINGS` to tell a rejection from a conflict. That describes the last statement on a CONNECTION, and outside a transaction every statement acquires its own from the pool — so the read was unattributable and came back empty. The rejected write then surfaced as "the insert was skipped as a conflict, but no existing row matches conflictColumns […] the constraint that fired is unknown", whose enumeration lists only conflict causes. A rejection described as a conflict is the exact sentence this path was fixed once already for producing; it survived on the path that had no transaction to read on. The store now pins one connection for the whole decision — the same pinning `insertRecoverAutoId` does for `LAST_INSERT_ID()`.
+
+  **The classification.** The store swallowed the driver's error and raised a prose one of its own, so `classifyConstraintViolation` had nothing to read: this was the one write path where the typed error could not fire, while every other one produced it. The warning IS the driver's payload — `INSERT IGNORE` only changed how it was delivered — so it is handed on in the shape the driver would have thrown. A rejection now arrives as the same `ConstraintViolation { kind: 'foreignKey', … }` a plain `insert` produces. Nothing new crosses the wire: the classifier extracts the constraint NAME as a delimited group, never the sentence.
+
+  This is the default `voltro data import` path (`--mode append`, `--on-conflict skip`, without `--atomic`), so a row rejected by a foreign key was reported to the operator as a conflict with an unknown cause.
+
+  `constraintViolation.integration.test.ts` now asserts the `insertIgnore` seam per dialect against live postgres 17, MySQL 8.4, MariaDB 11 and SQL Server 2022. It was the missing assertion behind a claim derived from the wiring — the classification does sit on all ten write paths, which is not the same as a classifiable error arriving on all ten.
+- **@voltro/protocol, @voltro/runtime** — The framework's store errors — `ConstraintViolation`, `TenantScopeViolation`, `TenantRowNotFound`, `ServerOnlyColumnWrite`, `TableValidationFailed`, `StoreOperationFailed` — are exported from `@voltro/protocol` and can therefore be declared in a descriptor's `error:` union. They could not be.
+
+  They lived in `@voltro/runtime`, which reaches `node:child_process`, `node:http` and `node:crypto`. A descriptor is loaded VALUE-LEVEL by the web client (the `RpcClient` needs every procedure's Schema), so a descriptor importing from there is refused at boot by the browser-safety guard — correctly. The typed half of these errors was therefore unreachable: the docs told you to declare them, and the boot said no.
+
+  What that leaves is the untyped half only. The error still arrives as an `InternalError` carrying a readable sentence, so telling `foreignKey` ("the row you picked is gone") from `foreignKeyInUse` ("this row is still referenced") — two different messages for the user — means parsing that sentence. Over a set of generated delete mutations that is a string comparison per procedure, which is the thing the typed error exists to delete.
+
+  `@voltro/runtime` re-exports all six, so server code is unchanged. The classes have no server dependency of any kind — the file imports `Schema` from `effect` and nothing else, and `browserSafetyGuard.test.ts` now pins a descriptor that declares one, so moving them back reads as a boot failure rather than as a passing rename.
+- **@voltro/database, @voltro/sql-mysql** — A blocked `alter-column-type` told every dialect to write a postgres cast.
+
+  The refusal is correct — a bare type change may not be value-preserving, so it is refused until acknowledged. Its `fix:` line was not:
+
+  ```
+  acknowledge it on the column: `.narrowedFrom('json', { using: 'meta::text' })`
+  ```
+
+  `USING <expr>` is postgres syntax and a postgres capability. The mysql arm of the applier emits `MODIFY COLUMN`, the mssql arm `ALTER COLUMN`, and sqlite rebuilds the table — none of them can carry a cast expression and none of them reads `using`. So an operator on any other engine was handed a line to paste into their schema containing syntax their database has never seen, inside an argument that is discarded. A refusal is read as an instruction, and the more carefully it is read the more thoroughly a wrong one is followed.
+
+  The fix line is dialect-aware now: postgres keeps the `using` half, everything else gets `.narrowedFrom('<type>')` plus the fact that the engine converts in place — because a refusal that offers no expressible fix reads as "the framework cannot do this at all".
+
+  Covered on live MySQL and MariaDB by both halves at once: what the refusal SAYS, and that following it applies AND converges with the row intact. A message test alone would keep passing over a broken apply; a convergence test alone is what let the wrong message survive this long.
+
+  Also on the same path: `upsert` with a PARTIAL row (one omitting a NOT NULL column that has no default) failed on MariaDB and succeeded on MySQL. The native `INSERT … ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` validates its insert half even when only the update half runs, so the row was rejected although the target existed and only needed patching. A partial row takes the lookup path on both engines now; the single-statement form still covers the complete-row case, which is what a data transfer and every generated CRUD write send.
+- **@voltro/sql-mysql** — On MariaDB, `upsert` could write a DIFFERENT row than the one it was given and report success.
+
+  `INSERT … ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE` fires on ANY unique key, not on the one named in `conflictColumns`. So an incoming row whose (say) `email` already belonged to a different primary key updated THAT row instead — and since `id` is excluded from the SET list, the row the caller handed over was never written. Measured on a live server: the call returned a row, the target kept the old id, the new row was absent, and the existing row had silently taken the incoming values. A bulk transfer on top of that prints `import complete` over missing data, which is the worst failure shape available: there is nothing to investigate.
+
+  The two engines of the family disagreed here, which is part of why it survived. The non-RETURNING path (MySQL) looks the row up by `conflictColumns` first, does not find it, and lets the INSERT fail with a duplicate-key error. Loud was always right.
+
+  Both refuse now, with a message naming both ids and the fact that the collision was on a constraint other than the one named. The check runs inside a transaction — a short one of the store's own when the caller is not already in one — so the wrong row is rolled back rather than reported after the fact: detecting this afterwards still leaves someone else's row overwritten.
+
+---
+
 ## [0.42.0] — 2026-08-17
 
 ### ⚠ BREAKING

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import { ConnectionKind } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { ConnectionState } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { ConstraintFacts } from '@voltro/database';
 import { ConstraintKind } from '@voltro/database';
+import { ConstraintViolation } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { Context } from 'effect';
 import { createServer } from 'node:http';
 import { Cron } from 'effect';
@@ -76,9 +77,12 @@ import { Sampler } from '@opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base';
 import { Schedule } from 'effect';
 import { Schema } from 'effect';
 import { ScopeError } from '@voltro/protocol';
+import { ServerOnlyColumnWrite } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { SpanProcessor } from '@opentelemetry/sdk-trace-base';
 import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
 import { SqlClient } from '@effect/sql';
+import { StoreError } from '@voltro/protocol';
+import { StoreOperationFailed } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { Stream } from 'effect';
 import { Subject } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { SubjectResolution } from '@voltro/protocol';
@@ -87,6 +91,9 @@ import { SubscriptionEvent } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { sweepRetention } from '@voltro/database';
 import { SyncLogger } from '@voltro/logger';
 import { TableLike } from '@voltro/database';
+import { TableValidationFailed } from '@voltro/protocol';
+import { TenantRowNotFound } from '@voltro/protocol';
+import { TenantScopeViolation } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { Tracer } from 'effect';
 import { Unauthenticated } from '@voltro/protocol';
 import { WorkflowParentClosePolicy } from '@voltro/protocol';
@@ -1007,7 +1014,7 @@ export declare interface AppContext {
      *
      * This was typed as the OLD string-emitter facade (`emit(name, data)`) long
      * after that facade was deleted, so the documented call was a `tsc` error
-     * while the runtime carried only `publish` — a consumer measured
+     * while the runtime carried only `publish` — a deployment measured
      * `eventKeys: ["publish"], emitType: undefined` with a cron probe because the
      * type and the docs disagreed and they could not tell which was lying.
      *
@@ -1516,7 +1523,7 @@ export declare const bindMutation: <Input, Output, E = never>(execute: (input: I
  * ~2 KB for a one-line cause, with the message at the END so every tool that
  * truncates shows the useless half.
  *
- * A consumer met it with `TenantScopeViolation`. Adding that tag to
+ * A deployment met it with `TenantScopeViolation`. Adding that tag to
  * `INFRA_ERROR_TAGS` would have been wrong: `effectStore.ts` documents
  * `error: Schema.Union(TenantScopeViolation, StoreOperationFailed, …)` as a
  * supported declaration, so an app that DECLARES it must still receive it
@@ -1698,7 +1705,7 @@ export declare interface CacheScopeLeak {
  * serving another org's rows out of memory, with a TTL. The author has to be
  * wrong exactly once, in a field whose two legal values differ by one word.
  *
- * A consumer named this precisely while asking for the third option: *"'global'
+ * A deployment named this precisely while asking for the third option: *"'global'
  * would share across tenant boundaries. For data derived from
  * `subject.tenantId` that is not a cache, it is a leak."* They chose to
  * recompute an org-wide figure once per employee rather than write it — the
@@ -2141,63 +2148,7 @@ export { ConstraintFacts }
 
 export { ConstraintKind }
 
-/**
- * The database refused a write because it broke an integrity rule the SCHEMA
- * declares — a foreign key, a unique index, a NOT NULL, a CHECK.
- *
- * **Why this is typed at all.** Without it the driver failure is a `SqlError`,
- * which the rpc layer collapses to a bare `InternalError` on purpose (a
- * `SqlError`'s text is not safe to forward — see below). The caller then gets
- * "something went wrong" for a failure that is entirely about the input it just
- * sent, and the only way to find out which rule fired is to re-run the
- * statement by hand against the database. A consumer reported doing exactly
- * that.
- *
- * **Why it carries names and not the driver's sentence.** The temptation is to
- * forward `cause.message`, and it is measured to be wrong: postgres attaches
- * `Failing row contains (…)` — the complete row, every column — to a not-null
- * and a check violation; mysql and mssql echo the duplicate VALUE on a unique
- * violation. A constraint or column NAME is schema, which this framework
- * already puts on the wire (`TableValidationFailed.table`). A row is data, and
- * the caller who provoked the error is not automatically entitled to it.
- *
- * **Not every dialect can fill every field.** sqlite reports a foreign-key
- * failure as the bare sentence `FOREIGN KEY constraint failed` — no name, no
- * column, no direction — so `constraint` is absent there and the direction is
- * inferred from the operation. `kind` is the field that is always right.
- */
-export declare class ConstraintViolation extends ConstraintViolation_base {
-    /**
-     * A sentence built from the fields above and nothing else.
-     *
-     * It exists because an undeclared tagged error reaches the client through
-     * `defectMessage`, which renders `String(error)` — and a `Schema.TaggedError`
-     * with no `message` renders as `[object Object]`. Without this getter the
-     * caller would get a correctly-typed error carrying no information, which is
-     * the same dead end in a different shape.
-     */
-    get message(): string;
-}
-
-declare const ConstraintViolation_base: Schema.TaggedErrorClass<ConstraintViolation, "ConstraintViolation", {
-    readonly _tag: Schema.tag<"ConstraintViolation">;
-} & {
-    /**
-     * Which rule fired. `foreignKey` = the row you referenced does not exist;
-     * `foreignKeyInUse` = this row may not go, others still reference it. They
-     * are opposite situations with opposite fixes, so a UI branches on them
-     * separately.
-     */
-    kind: Schema.Literal<["foreignKey", "foreignKeyInUse", "unique", "notNull", "check"]>;
-    /** The table the write targeted — the framework's own name for it, not the driver's. */
-    table: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** Which store op was attempted: 'insert' | 'update' | 'delete' | …. */
-    operation: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** The constraint / index name, when the dialect names one. */
-    constraint: Schema.optional<typeof Schema.String>;
-    /** The column, when the dialect names one instead of (or beside) a constraint. */
-    column: Schema.optional<typeof Schema.String>;
-}>;
+export { ConstraintViolation }
 
 export declare type CoordinatedEffect = () => void | CoordinatedTickOutcome | Promise<void | CoordinatedTickOutcome>;
 
@@ -2897,7 +2848,7 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_ROW_FILTER_RETRY: Schedule.Schedule<unknown, unknow
  * `error:` union. It cannot match, by definition: a defect is precisely the
  * thing that is not in the union. What reached the browser was the entire
  * decode tree — every union member, the full `ExitEncoded<…>` type, and the
- * real cause on the last line. ~2 KB of type names, which one consumer's
+ * real cause on the last line. ~2 KB of type names, which one deployment's
  * account page rendered verbatim where a reason belonged, and which every app
  * otherwise has to condense heuristically to avoid putting a schema on screen.
  *
@@ -3080,7 +3031,7 @@ export declare class DeleteBuilder {
  *  nothing at all. Reporting a fixed 1 for all of them (which this used to do)
  *  turned the `rows` attribute into a liveness signal that reads like a data
  *  signal: an `employees.me` that resolved to `null` still traced `rows=1`, and
- *  a downstream consumer used exactly that span to conclude the server had
+ *  a downstream deployment used exactly that span to conclude the server had
  *  produced a value when it had not. Absent is 0, a single value is 1, an array
  *  is its length. */
 export declare const deliveredRowCount: (value: unknown) => number;
@@ -3344,7 +3295,7 @@ export declare const drainForShutdown: (options: {
     readonly exit: () => void;
     /** How the drain ended, for the caller to report. A completed drain and one
      *  CUT at the deadline are different incidents and were indistinguishable in
-     *  the log — asked for by a consumer who could see neither. */
+     *  the log — asked for by a deployment who could see neither. */
     readonly onOutcome?: (outcome: {
         readonly reason: "drained" | "deadline";
         readonly ms: number;
@@ -3433,7 +3384,7 @@ export declare const enableGraphObservation: () => void;
  * `cipher.encrypt(JSON.stringify(v))` — two encodings, one `enc:v1:` envelope,
  * nothing to tell them apart. The doc above promises these helpers "expose the
  * SAME registered cipher so those paths can encrypt on write and decrypt on read
- * by hand", and a consumer read that as interchangeable, which it said and was
+ * by hand", and a deployment read that as interchangeable, which it said and was
  * not: their session rows written here were unreadable through the store, and
  * the error blamed the key.
  */
@@ -3616,7 +3567,7 @@ export declare class EventBus {
         /**
          * Called SYNCHRONOUSLY at attach with the route's current watermarks.
          *
-         * It is how a consumer learns where the stream stood the instant it joined,
+         * It is how a deployment learns where the stream stood the instant it joined,
          * with no window for a publish to slip in between reading and subscribing.
          * The bridge needs it because a delivery dropped BEFORE the client's first
          * read would otherwise be invisible: with no baseline, the first serial it
@@ -3632,7 +3583,7 @@ export declare class EventBus {
      * since its last serial (from the watermark, which survives ring eviction);
      * `replayed` is what we can actually hand over. An origin the client never
      * mentioned is one that appeared while it was away, so everything retained
-     * from it is owed. A `gap` is emitted BEFORE the replay so a consumer reading
+     * from it is owed. A `gap` is emitted BEFORE the replay so a deployment reading
      * in order learns it is behind before it starts processing.
      */
     private replayForResume;
@@ -3719,7 +3670,7 @@ export declare interface EventEnvelope {
     /** `tenant · event · key`, NUL-separated — built by `eventRoute`, read with
      *  `parseEventRoute`. Never construct or split one by hand. */
     readonly route: string;
-    /** Declared event name, carried separately so a consumer of the raw envelope
+    /** Declared event name, carried separately so a deployment of the raw envelope
      *  (broadcast bridge, inspect, metrics) needn't re-parse the route. */
     readonly event: string;
     /** Publishing instance. Serials are only comparable WITHIN one origin. */
@@ -5260,7 +5211,7 @@ export declare const makeActionRunner: (deps: ActionRunnerDeps) => (action: Muta
  *
  * The bucket keying makes claims self-expiring as a DECISION: a crashed
  * winner doesn't block the next firing (= next bucket = new key). It did
- * not make them self-expiring as ROWS, and that distinction cost a consumer
+ * not make them self-expiring as ROWS, and that distinction cost a deployment
  * their whole deployment — 86 214 rows / 33 MB over two days, read in full
  * on every claim check, ten of a fifteen-slot pooler pinned on the scan, an
  * SSR render behind them at 300 490 ms, and a `rollout restart` that could
@@ -5704,7 +5655,7 @@ export declare const materializeIvm: (shape: AggregateShape, state: IvmState) =>
 }>;
 
 /** Told when the membership changes. `restarted` is a `left` + `joined` pair
- *  for one id, reported as such so a consumer drops the old state rather than
+ *  for one id, reported as such so a deployment drops the old state rather than
  *  resuming it. */
 export declare type MembershipEvent = {
     readonly kind: 'joined';
@@ -5728,7 +5679,7 @@ export declare interface MembershipHeartbeat {
      *
      * Carried as an IDENTITY, never compared to our clock. Its job is to make a
      * restart distinguishable from a hiccup: an instance that comes back with a
-     * NEW `startedAt` is a fresh process whose owned state is gone, so a consumer
+     * NEW `startedAt` is a fresh process whose owned state is gone, so a deployment
      * must drop what it held for the old one rather than resume it. A returning
      * instance with the SAME value only ever missed a few beats.
      */
@@ -8801,32 +8752,7 @@ export declare interface ServeRequestContext {
  */
 export declare const serverOnlyColumnNames: (tableName: string) => ReadonlyArray<string>;
 
-/**
- * A generated CRUD write (`crud.create` / `crud.update`) was handed a
- * `.serverOnly()` column in its INPUT.
- *
- * `.serverOnly()` is the WIRE-exposure axis: the column never crosses the
- * boundary in EITHER direction. Reads strip it; a write that accepts it is the
- * same violation mirrored — mass assignment of a column the schema declared the
- * client may not see, let alone set.
- *
- * Refused rather than silently stripped: a stripped field makes an attack
- * indistinguishable from a no-op and leaves an honest caller wondering why the
- * value it sent never landed. `columns` names what was rejected so the fix
- * (drop the field from the descriptor's input schema, or from the caller) is
- * mechanical.
- */
-export declare class ServerOnlyColumnWrite extends ServerOnlyColumnWrite_base {
-}
-
-declare const ServerOnlyColumnWrite_base: Schema.TaggedErrorClass<ServerOnlyColumnWrite, "ServerOnlyColumnWrite", {
-    readonly _tag: Schema.tag<"ServerOnlyColumnWrite">;
-} & {
-    /** The table the write targeted. */
-    table: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** The `.serverOnly()` columns the input tried to set. */
-    columns: Schema.Array$<typeof Schema.String>;
-}>;
+export { ServerOnlyColumnWrite }
 
 /** One leak: a wire query that declares a serverOnly column in its output. */
 export declare interface ServerOnlyLeak {
@@ -9101,12 +9027,7 @@ export declare interface StoreCredentialInput {
     readonly now?: () => Date;
 }
 
-/**
- * Discriminated union of all framework-owned store errors. Use it on
- * a mutation's `error:` schema when you want every kind surfaced
- * typed to the client.
- */
-export declare type StoreError = TenantScopeViolation | TenantRowNotFound | ServerOnlyColumnWrite | StoreOperationFailed | TableValidationFailed | ConstraintViolation;
+export { StoreError }
 
 export declare interface StoreMiddlewareContext {
     readonly subject: Subject;
@@ -9132,25 +9053,7 @@ export declare interface StoreMiddlewareContext {
     readonly rowFilter?: RowFilterScope;
 }
 
-/**
- * Anything else the underlying `DataStore` raised during a write or
- * query. `cause` is the stringified original error — sufficient for
- * logs + UI, doesn't try to serialise complex error chains across the
- * rpc boundary. The `_tag` discriminator stays cheap to pattern-match.
- */
-export declare class StoreOperationFailed extends StoreOperationFailed_base {
-}
-
-declare const StoreOperationFailed_base: Schema.TaggedErrorClass<StoreOperationFailed, "StoreOperationFailed", {
-    readonly _tag: Schema.tag<"StoreOperationFailed">;
-} & {
-    /** Which DataStore op was attempted: 'query' | 'insert' | 'update' | 'delete' | 'hardDelete'. */
-    operation: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** The table the op targeted. */
-    table: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** `String(originalError)` — round-trip-safe diagnostic form. */
-    cause: typeof Schema.String;
-}>;
+export { StoreOperationFailed }
 
 /**
  * Drop `columns` from every row. Preserves array AND per-row object identity when
@@ -9423,30 +9326,7 @@ export declare interface TableRoutingStats {
     readonly distinctTupleKeys: number;
 }
 
-/**
- * Pre-INSERT row validation against a table's `.validate(Schema)`
- * decoder failed. The MutationStore runs the table's `insertSchema`
- * AFTER defaults + computed + audit/tenant stamps; failure means
- * the stamped row didn't satisfy the decoder. `issues` is the
- * formatted ArrayFormatter output (cheap to render in UI, doesn't
- * leak the original Schema instance).
- */
-export declare class TableValidationFailed extends TableValidationFailed_base {
-}
-
-declare const TableValidationFailed_base: Schema.TaggedErrorClass<TableValidationFailed, "TableValidationFailed", {
-    readonly _tag: Schema.tag<"TableValidationFailed">;
-} & {
-    /** The table the row targeted. */
-    table: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** Top-level explanation for logs + UI ("user.email failed pattern check"). */
-    summary: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** Flat list of `{ path, message }` per failing leaf. Path uses dot-notation. */
-    issues: Schema.Array$<Schema.Struct<{
-        path: typeof Schema.String;
-        message: typeof Schema.String;
-    }>>;
-}>;
+export { TableValidationFailed }
 
 /** The standing compute-cost attribution for one tenant — the chargeback /
  *  showback row + the "why is my bill high" breakdown. Maintained incrementally:
@@ -9464,59 +9344,9 @@ export declare interface TenantCostState {
     readonly lastUpdatedAt: number | null;
 }
 
-/**
- * A keyed-by-primary-key write (`ctx.store.update(table, id, patch)`,
- * `delete(table, id)`, `hardDelete(table, id)`, `patchJson(table, id, …)`) on a
- * `tenant()`-scoped table did not resolve to a row inside the CALLER's tenant.
- *
- * **One error for two situations, on purpose.** It is raised identically when
- * the row does not exist at all and when it exists but belongs to another
- * tenant, and it carries no field that separates them. That is the whole point:
- *
- *   - Reporting "forbidden" for a foreign row and "not found" for a missing one
- *     turns any keyed write into a cross-tenant EXISTENCE ORACLE — an attacker
- *     walks ids and learns which ones are real in someone else's tenant, which
- *     is exactly the isolation the `tenant()` mixin exists to provide.
- *   - Collapsing the other way — silently affecting zero rows — is worse than
- *     either: the handler reads it as "the row is gone", not "you may not touch
- *     it", so a genuine isolation breach shows up in an app as a confusing
- *     absent-row branch and never as a security signal.
- *
- * So both cases fail LOUDLY and IDENTICALLY. `id` is the key the caller itself
- * supplied — never another tenant's data.
- */
-export declare class TenantRowNotFound extends TenantRowNotFound_base {
-}
-
-declare const TenantRowNotFound_base: Schema.TaggedErrorClass<TenantRowNotFound, "TenantRowNotFound", {
-    readonly _tag: Schema.tag<"TenantRowNotFound">;
-} & {
-    /** The table the keyed write targeted. */
-    table: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** The primary key the CALLER supplied. Echoing it leaks nothing. */
-    id: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** Human-readable explanation for diagnostics + UI. */
-    reason: typeof Schema.String;
-}>;
+export { TenantRowNotFound }
 
-/**
- * A write was attempted against a `tenant()`-scoped table, but the
- * authenticated subject's `tenantId` is null — either anonymous, or
- * an apiKey / serviceAccount without a tenant binding. Refusing the
- * write at the boundary is the safe default; a future "system writes"
- * subject type can opt out.
- */
-export declare class TenantScopeViolation extends TenantScopeViolation_base {
-}
-
-declare const TenantScopeViolation_base: Schema.TaggedErrorClass<TenantScopeViolation, "TenantScopeViolation", {
-    readonly _tag: Schema.tag<"TenantScopeViolation">;
-} & {
-    /** The table the violating write targeted. */
-    table: typeof Schema.String;
-    /** Human-readable explanation for diagnostics + UI. */
-    reason: typeof Schema.String;
-}>;
+export { TenantScopeViolation }
 
 export declare type TimeBucket = 'minute' | 'hour' | 'day' | 'week' | 'month';
 
@@ -9770,7 +9600,7 @@ export declare interface TransportSecurityOptions {
  * `on:` takes a `defineEvent` descriptor and reads its NAME, so the trigger and
  * the producer cannot drift: rename the event and this call site moves with it,
  * where the string form silently stops matching and the workflow simply never
- * runs again. That failure is exactly what a consumer reported having with their
+ * runs again. That failure is exactly what a deployment reported having with their
  * own string channels — `on-game-scores` beside `games/evo5/on-game-scores`,
  * both live, one dead since the day it was written — and it is the reason the
  * string form is going away rather than being kept as an alternative.
@@ -9827,7 +9657,7 @@ export declare type TupleSource = (req: {
      * The whole caller, not just their id.
      *
      * `subjectId` alone cannot express a credential that is NARROWER than the
-     * person holding it, and an API key is exactly that. A consumer reported it
+     * person holding it, and an API key is exactly that. A deployment reported it
      * precisely: their key carries its binding in `metadata` (`keyType`,
      * `teamId`), while `subject.id` is the OWNING USER — so a tuple source could
      * only resolve the owner's memberships and was blind to which team the key