@voltro/plugin-auth 0.43.0 → 0.43.2

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -39,6 +39,106 @@ _Changes staged for the next release accumulate here (rolled up from
 
 ---
 
+## [0.43.2] — 2026-08-18
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **@voltro/sql-mysql, @voltro/database, @voltro/cli** — The mysql-family binlog reader no longer keeps a table excluded after the very migration that fixed it.
+
+  A UNIQUE on an unbounded text column is a MariaDB hash long-unique, whose hidden `DB_ROW_HASH_n` column the reader can never account for — so the table is held out of binlog capture and the exclusion is reported. `voltro dev` builds its store BEFORE it migrates (kv, cross-replica broadcast and the analytics mirror all need one), so on a boot whose own auto-migration bounds the column, that finding was drawn from a schema that stopped existing about a second later. The exclusion then outlived its cause for the life of the process, and the message — correct when written, and typically the only error line in the boot log — went on describing the pre-migration database.
+
+  Three changes:
+
+  - `DataStore.refreshChangeCaptureExclusions()` (optional; implemented by the mysql-family store) re-runs the probe and re-points the LIVE reader, in both directions — schema work that CREATES the condition now excludes the table immediately instead of after three failed writes. `voltro dev` calls it once, after all its schema work. `voltro serve` needs no equivalent: it builds its store after every schema step and never applies DDL itself. - The definitive message now states its own durability — that it is the schema as read at reader attach, and that applying the remedy does not by itself lift the exclusion. - On a boot that will re-check, the finding is reported as a provisional note rather than as a verdict, so a boot that fixes the condition leaves no error line about it. The note escalates to the full verdict on its own if the re-check never runs. - Two reader fixes the re-check depended on: applying a new exclusion set now WAITS for a reconnect already in flight (it is what applies the set, so resolving before it landed meant the caller's next write hit the old filter), and the reconnect loop no longer keeps resuming from an offset it has just jumped away from — that turned one purged offset into a reconnect every watchdog interval, forever, delivering nothing.
+- **@voltro/data-transfer, @voltro/database, @voltro/sql-mysql, @voltro/sql-postgres, @voltro/sql-sqlite, @voltro/sql-mssql, @voltro/cli** — `voltro data import --mode replace` no longer leaves a target in neither state, and now works against schemas that have foreign keys.
+
+  The delete step ran table by table and stopped at the first refusal, so a run that could not finish left dozens of tables emptied and nothing loaded — and a second attempt destroyed more than the first, because it got further before hitting the same wall. The wall itself was not exotic: MySQL, MariaDB and SQL Server check a foreign key as each ROW is deleted, so a table that references ITSELF cannot be emptied by any ordering of the tables. `createdBy → actors` on the `actors` table is exactly that shape, and it is what an audit mixin on an actor table produces.
+
+  - `DataStore.emptyTables()` (per dialect) empties the whole set as one unit, in one transaction, with referential integrity suspended for the duration — `FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS` on the mysql family, a multi-table `TRUNCATE` on postgres, `defer_foreign_keys` on sqlite, per-table `NOCHECK`/`WITH CHECK CHECK` on mssql. All-or-nothing on every engine, including under `--atomic`, where it runs on the transaction the import already holds. - A **pre-flight refusal**: if a table OUTSIDE the bundle holds rows referencing one inside it, the import refuses before deleting anything and names the tables, the columns and the row counts. Those rows cannot be restored from the bundle, so forcing it is not an option. An EMPTY outside table blocks nothing. - Table-level failures carry the driver's own reason and code, the way row-level failures already did. `truncate <table> failed: Failed to execute statement` fits every plausible cause equally; the classification that produced `foreign key <name>: … [ER_NO_REFERENCED_ROW_2/1452]` one level down now applies one level up. The word "truncate" is gone from the message too — the step issues DELETE, and naming a statement it does not run sends whoever reads it to reproduce the wrong thing. - A typed refusal reaching the `--target api` transport keeps its text: the admin import endpoint answers `409` with the reason instead of flattening it to `import failed`, on the one transport where the operator has no other way to see it.
+
+  The bulk empty emits no change events, where the per-table loop emitted one per row. An import through `--target api` now asks every live subscription to re-read once it lands — the coarse refresh the framework already uses after a broadcast gap — so neither the missing deletes nor a table the bundle carries EMPTY leaves a subscriber holding rows that are gone. Wired where the route is mounted, which is the one place both boot paths share.
+
+  On postgres the emptying is a `DELETE` per table, not a `TRUNCATE`, and the difference is not performance: postgres refuses `TRUNCATE` on a table with ANY incoming foreign key, rows or not, while the mysql family refuses a DELETE only when rows actually reference the doomed ones. A `TRUNCATE` version made an EMPTY table outside the bundle block a replace on postgres and not on mariadb — one import, refused on one engine and accepted on the other, over a table holding nothing.
+
+  `--target api` also no longer times out on a full bundle. Both api-target calls went through `fetch`, whose undici default gives up after 300 s — a bound on the caller's database size, on a call whose response arrives only when the import does. They wait as long as the instance needs now, stream the body instead of buffering the whole bundle, and take `--timeout <seconds>` when a deadline is wanted. If one is hit, the message says the instance is probably still importing — and gives different advice for `replace` than for the idempotent modes, since re-running the first while it is mid-flight would empty the target under it.
+
+  Two more, found by measuring rather than by reading:
+
+  - **`--atomic` on postgres could not import a bundle that needed the deferred-FK repair at all.** A failed statement aborts the transaction there, and that repair depends on a row whose parent has not loaded yet failing, being held, and being retried — so the first such row poisoned every write after it. Every tolerated write now runs inside a savepoint. Per-row savepoints measured 2.40x the time of none on 5 000 rows, so they are amortised: one savepoint per batch of 200, and a batch that fails rolls back whole and replays row by row. The mysql family and sqlite leave a transaction usable after a failed statement and pay nothing for any of this. - **The replace pre-flight asked the caller's snapshot.** Over `--target api` that is the app's DECLARED schema, which cannot show a table the app stopped declaring but the database still has — and rows in a table nobody declares are exactly the rows nobody is watching. `DataStore.incomingForeignKeys()` reads the live catalog per dialect; the snapshot remains the fallback for stores without one.
+
+  A bundle bigger than one chunk is now uploaded as a series of short requests, so a proxy body cap or an ingress read timeout has nothing large to choke on, and the switch is automatic — the packer's stream is buffered one chunk ahead, so a small bundle is sent exactly as before and nobody has to know in advance which table is the big one. The import still runs ONCE, at the end, over the whole bundle. Resume is byte-exact (`packBundle` is deterministic over a directory, which this package now asserts), guarded by a bundle key so a different bundle under the same upload id is refused rather than spliced into the partial one, and by a contiguity check so a mis-ordered append cannot produce an archive that only fails later during decode. `--chunk-size <mb>` overrides the 16 MiB default.
+
+---
+
+## [0.43.1] — 2026-08-18
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **@voltro/database** — A write recorder that fails inside someone's transaction now says which recorder, on which write, and what the database actually said.
+
+  `@effect/sql` renders every driver failure as `SqlError: Failed to execute statement` — one sentence that fits a missing column, a dangling foreign key, an over-long value and a duplicate key equally. The driver's own words hang off a SYMBOL on a `FiberFailure`, so a caller who reaches for `.cause` gets `undefined` and concludes there is nothing there.
+
+  That is expensive precisely where recorders run: the caller's write was ordinary, and what failed was framework machinery one table over. The message now reads
+
+  ```
+  write recorder '_voltro_row_history' failed while recording an update on 'users':
+  Duplicate entry 'rowver_…' for key 'PRIMARY' [code=ER_DUP_ENTRY errno=1062 …]
+  ```
+
+  and the original error is kept as `cause` for anyone who does walk the chain. The failure still takes the transaction down — that is the guarantee and it is unchanged.
+
+  `describeDriverError` (`@voltro/database`) is the shared summariser, built on the existing cause extractor rather than a second walker. It returns nothing when the chain carries nothing driver-shaped, so an ordinary programming error from a recorder arrives as itself instead of wrapped in prose about a database.
+- **@voltro/database** — On MariaDB, a `varchar` column could introspect as `json` because a DIFFERENT table had a json column with the same column name.
+
+  MariaDB names a column-level CHECK after the COLUMN, and those names are unique per table, not per schema. `information_schema.check_constraints` on MySQL has no `TABLE_NAME`, so the introspector recovered it by joining `table_constraints` on `(schema, constraint_name)` — which on MariaDB cross-products every same-named check across every table. Measured on 11.8:
+
+  ```
+  a.payload  LONGTEXT      CHECK (json_valid(`payload`))
+  b.payload  VARCHAR(255)  CHECK (`payload` in ('x','y'))
+  
+  join result:  a → json_valid, a → in(…), b → json_valid, b → in(…)
+  ```
+
+  So `b.payload` reads as `json`, and `a.payload` picks up an enum it does not have. Downstream that is not a cosmetic label: the planner emits a blocked `alter-column-type` with `from: 'json'` that no `.narrowedFrom()` can honestly acknowledge, because the premise is false — and since the data-transfer manifest records introspected types, the same misreading travels into the bundle and reappears as schema drift on import.
+
+  MariaDB's own `check_constraints` HAS `TABLE_NAME`. The introspector asks for it directly now and keeps the join as the MySQL path, where check-constraint names are schema-unique and the join is sound. That asymmetry is why a single-engine test could not see this: the wrong query passes on MySQL.
+- **@voltro/database** — `voltro db apply` could not drop a CHECK constraint on the mysql family at all, and each of the three reasons hid the next.
+
+  **1. `DROP CHECK` is MySQL-8 syntax.** MariaDB has never had it — measured on 11.8, `ALTER TABLE t DROP CHECK c` is `ERROR 1064`, while `DROP CONSTRAINT c` works on both engines. A plan containing a `drop-check` therefore died on the first one, on a family whose migrations are NOT atomic: the run stopped with the earlier statements committed and no rollback.
+
+  **2. The name was assumed, not read.** The applier dropped `<table>_<column>_check` — which is only what its own `add-check` would have named it. A CHECK created at table bring-up is INLINE and UNNAMED, so the server names it (`CONSTRAINT_1` / `<table>_chk_1` / the column name). Dropping a name that does not exist reports "does not exist", which is indistinguishable from the "already gone" a resume legitimately produces — so the statement succeeded, the constraint stayed, and the plan re-proposed the identical `drop-check` forever. The name comes from the catalog now.
+
+  **3. A column-level CHECK cannot be dropped by name on MariaDB at all.** Measured: the catalog lists it under the column's name, `DROP CONSTRAINT` on that name answers 1091, and only redefining the column removes it. The applier now drops by catalog name, ASKS whether the constraint survived, and redefines the column when it did — so a rebuild happens only in the case that needs one.
+
+  **And the same investigation closed the MySQL `.oneOf()` round-trip gap.** `parseEnumCheck` was documented as handling MySQL's rendering and did not: MySQL backslash-escapes the string DELIMITERS (`_utf8mb4\'draft\'`), and the parser rewrote those to the SQL doubling `''` — which is how a quote INSIDE a value is written. Every delimiter became escaped content, every value came back empty, and the filter dropped them. `.oneOf()` now round-trips on MySQL, and the suite that asserted the gap as a known one asserts the round-trip instead.
+
+  Plus, on a failed apply: the error now states how many operations were already applied and whether this dialect rolls back. The ledger held that number; it never reached the operator, who had to re-plan and diff the counts to learn how far the run got.
+- **@voltro/plugin-versioning** — `versioningPlugin({ timing: 'in-transaction' })` built its history row's primary key from `(rowId, version)` while the version counter three lines above was scoped to `(tableName, rowId)`. Two versioned tables carrying the same row id therefore collided — permanently.
+
+  The shape is not exotic: `actors.id === users.id` is what the framework's own audit trail asks for, an `actors` row whose id is the user's so an audited write satisfies `createdBy → actors`. In an app that follows it, every user row has a twin.
+
+  The collision does not heal, and that is what turns a duplicate into an outage. The second table's insert fails, so its history row is never written, so `maxOf` for that table stays `null`, so the next attempt computes the same version and the same id. Every write to that row is dead from then on — surfacing as `ER_DUP_ENTRY` on an ordinary `store.update`, naming a row id in a table the caller never wrote to.
+
+  The key is `(table, rowId, version)` now — the same shape the post-commit path always built. It stays deterministic (no clock, no process-local counter), which is what lets it survive a replica restart; it just carries every part of the key it claims to be unique over.
+
+  **No cleanup is needed for rows already written.** They keep their old ids and belong to whichever table wrote them; the new keys cannot collide with them, and `byRow` is not unique. An app blocked by this is unblocked by the upgrade alone.
+
+  Covered twice: the recorder against a port that refuses duplicates (the mechanism, including that a repeat does not settle), and two versioned tables sharing an id against live postgres (the real primary key, inside the caller's transaction). The suite that existed exercised ONE table, which cannot produce a collision at all — and read exactly like a suite that covered this.
+
+### Internal (no consumer-facing effect)
+
+- **@voltro/sql-mysql** — Two test-only defects in `sql-mysql`, both found by a release gate, both of the same family: a check that could not fail, and a failure reported in the wrong place. No product code changed.
+
+  **An assertion that could not fail.** `dropCheckSyntax.integration.test.ts` fell back to a HAND-BUILT plan when the planner produced no operations — and the fabricated operation was a `drop-check`, which is exactly what the next line asserts the plan contains. So an engine whose planner stopped emitting it would have been handed one and reported green. The fallback is deleted; both engines produce the operation now, which is what this release fixed, and the assertion is load-bearing again (4/4 on mysql AND mariadb without it).
+
+  It surfaced as a TYPE error rather than a false pass, because the fallback's object widened `plan` into a union `applyPlan` does not accept. Worth noting which check caught it: `vitest` transpiles without type-checking, so the suite was green and only `tsc` objected — the gate's `typecheck` and `lint` steps are what went red.
+
+  **A wait that gave up in silence.** `waitFor` in both binlog CDC suites looped to a deadline and then RETURNED, so a "prove the reader is live" wait that expired let the test carry on, kill the binlog dump thread, and fail twenty lines later on `expect(ids).toContain('todo_wd_before')` — an assertion about a different claim, in a different place. It throws now, naming the wait and the window, and all twelve call sites carry a label.
+
+  The window is named too: `FIRST_ATTACH_MS = 30_000`, up from 12 s. The reasoning is the 40 s window already in the same file, whose comment says a re-attach plus binlog catch-up takes longer under a loaded full-suite run — a FIRST attach does both and only skips the backoff, so 12 s beside 40 s was an asymmetry the file's own reasoning did not support. That is an argument from the neighbouring comment, not a measurement; if it expires again, `waitFor` now says which wait and for how long, and that number is the one to argue with rather than raising this one twice.
+
+---
+
 ## [0.43.0] — 2026-08-18
 
 ### ⚠ BREAKING

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@voltro/plugin-auth",
-  "version": "0.43.0",
+  "version": "0.43.2",
   "description": "Authentication primitives: password hashing, session creation, schema mixin + tables. Pairs with the `auth` app template for the UI; both independently usable. Server-side only (uses node:crypto).",
   "keywords": [
     "voltro",
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@effect/sql": "^0.52.0",
-    "@voltro/database": "0.43.0",
-    "@voltro/protocol": "0.43.0"
+    "@voltro/database": "0.43.2",
+    "@voltro/protocol": "0.43.2"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "effect": "^3.22.0",