@voltro/logger 0.50.0 → 0.50.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -39,6 +39,62 @@ _Changes staged for the next release accumulate here (rolled up from
 
 ---
 
+## [0.50.1] — 2026-08-24
+
+### Added
+
+- **@voltro/cli** — A `0.51.0` upgrade note for the case 0.45.0's typed-`source:` note left open: a source that is COMPUTED but whose names are all known — a generic reader that takes its table from `input` or a registry. Both remedies the original offered are wrong there. There is no misspelled name to fix, and widening to `ReactivitySourceValue` (or casting) compiles instantly while taking that entire set of tables permanently out of the check the narrowing exists to provide.
+
+  The note carries the recipe that keeps the names — `as const satisfies`, with the key set recovered separately — and the trap under it: an ANNOTATION widens the keys back even when the literal carries `as const`, because it is checked against the literal and then replaces its type. Filed under an unreached version because codemod selection is `from < version <= to`: 0.45.0's note can never fire again for anyone already past it. Documented on the subscriptions page in both languages.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **@voltro/data-transfer** — The `mariadb-dump`-not-on-PATH hint now also warns that a MariaDB 12.x client requires TLS by default, so running it BY HAND against a server without TLS fails with `TLS/SSL error: SSL is required` (2026) and needs `--skip-ssl`. Our own invocation is unaffected. It is said here because this hint is what sends people to install that client package, and the next thing many of them do is run the tool by hand — where the failure reads like a broken install of the thing we just told them to install.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **@voltro/cli, @voltro/mcp** — `voltro check`'s `rbac/unguarded-mutation` no longer fires on `internal: true` procedures. Those are in no rpc group and on no route, so the finding's own sentence — "any caller who can reach the rpc surface can invoke it" — named a surface that does not exist, and neither remedy it offered was available: a guard protects nothing there, and `openAccess` is refused outright on an internal descriptor. An app with 990 internal mutations got 990 warnings and a `FAILED` exit from the same tree on which `voltro doctor` reported zero procedures without an access decision, which made `check` unusable as the CI gate it exists to be.
+
+  The capability manifest now carries `internal: true` per procedure (present only when true), and the rule reads it through `isWireReachable` — the same predicate the boot access gate and all three rpc-group assemblies use, rather than a fourth spelling of the same flag. A manifest that does not carry the field is read as REACHABLE, so the rule stays loud on an api older than the field rather than going quiet on it.
+- **@voltro/data-transfer, @voltro/cli** — `--assets` aborted the whole capture at the first blob reference the storage provider could not resolve. A dangling reference is a fact about the source data — a row pointing at an object that was deleted, or that never arrived because an earlier import ran without the flag — and no backup can put back bytes that are not there. Aborting made the flag unusable for exactly the deployment that needed it: 178 references, one resolvable, and the run stopped at the second.
+
+  The phase now records the key, steps over it, and the run reports how many were skipped. Only a genuine not-found (`status === 404`) is treated this way; a 403 from a rotated credential or a 5xx from a backend outage still fails the capture, because calling those "the object is gone" turns a recoverable outage into a backup that quietly contains nothing.
+
+  The same abort also cost the artefact its provenance: `voltro-backup-stamp.json` was written after the asset phase, so a backup taken WITH `--assets` had no stamp at all, and `restore` then greeted an artefact this tool had written minutes earlier as "an older/handmade backup. Cannot verify dialect or schema version." The stamp is now written on every path — it describes the dump, and the dump is on disk and correct by the time the assets run.
+- **@voltro/cli** — `voltro doctor`'s eager-loaded-relation rule resolves nested relations against their PARENT's target table instead of against the query's roots, so every level is reported in one pass. It flattened the `.with({ … })` tree before resolving, which meant a level-2 relation stayed invisible until level 1's table had been added to `source:` — each fix revealed the next level, and a clean run after the first fix meant nothing. One app ran `doctor → fix → doctor` twice before the output stopped producing new findings.
+
+  The one case that is still genuinely under-reported is now stated instead of being silent: when the executor's base table is neither declared nor textually readable, nothing resolves, and doctor prints which relation names it could not check rather than reporting clean.
+- **@voltro/data-transfer** — A native restore whose client exited before consuming its input took the whole CLI down with an unhandled `EPIPE`. `createReadStream(dump).pipe(child.stdin)` had no `error` listener, so Node threw on a write to a pipe with no reader:
+
+  Error: write EPIPE Emitted 'error' event on Socket instance at: at Socket.onerror (node:internal/streams/readable:1045:14)
+
+  What that cost is the point. The crash landed before `close`, so the step never resumed: the client's stderr — the one place the reason was written down — was discarded, the transfer row was never closed, the in-progress marker was never re-asserted, and the operator got a raw Node stack trace over a database that was now half replaced. A deployment met it on a 64 MB restore and could not diagnose it at all, because the only diagnosis had been thrown away.
+
+  Every stream in the step now carries a handler. `EPIPE` on the child's stdin is deliberately swallowed — a child closes the pipe by dying, and its exit code and stderr are the actual failure — while any other stream error is carried and reported. The failure line now always includes the tool's stderr (and says so explicitly when the tool printed none), plus how many bytes of the artefact had been fed before it stopped. A source error also ends the child's stdin, which turns a restore that used to hang forever on a vanished dump into one that fails, and a clean exit over a broken input stream is reported as a failure rather than as a truncated success.
+- **@voltro/cli** — `voltro check`'s observed-vs-declared findings advised an op that does not exist. The recorder reports what the store did, and `store.upsert` is one call; a `target:` is `InsertTarget | UpdateTarget | DeleteTarget` and has no `upsert` member. So `observed/undeclared-write` said to add `{ table: '…', op: 'upsert' }` — a `TS2322`, from a line whose whole purpose is to be pasted. It now advises both halves, and the observed → declarable mapping is typed `Record<ObservedWriteOp, ReadonlyArray<TargetSpec['op']>>` so a new recorder op cannot ship without a declarable answer.
+
+  The remedy no longer produces a finding of its own either: declared targets are now collected per table as a SET. `new Map(targets.map(t => [t.table, t.op]))` kept only the last op, so the correct two-entry declaration read as "declares update" and the insert half came back as a `wrong-op`.
+- **@voltro/data-transfer, @voltro/cli** — The in-progress restore marker did not survive a native restore, on the exact dialects that were documented as safe. The claim — postgres and the mysql family drop only the objects the dump names, so the marker row survives — had a correct argument and a wrong premise: a native dump names the WHOLE database, `_voltro_replace_in_progress` included, and a mysql-family restore writes `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS` in front of each table. The table sorts early, so the guard was removed near the START of the window it exists to cover. Measured downstream as one row before and zero after, twice, once by hand and once through the command — and then a restore died and left a database with a schema, some of its tables, no users and no blobs, with nothing to stop the next boot.
+
+  Two changes, covering different dumps. `voltro data backup` now excludes the marker table (`--exclude-table` / `--ignore-table`), so an artefact we produce cannot carry the thing that erases the guard on the way back in. And `restore` re-asserts the marker after the tool exits, on the failing path as well as the succeeding one, which covers dumps taken before this change and dumps made by hand: rewritten is a warning, and unwritable is an error, because the guard is then off for that run.
+- **@voltro/plugin-storage, @voltro/cli** — `--assets` could not be refused when no storage was configured, and resolved the wrong backend when it was.
+
+  `resolveStorageProvider({})` is total: its final `default:` arm returns an in-process `memoryProvider`. So the three `if (!provider)` refusals in `voltro data backup` / `export` / `restore` — whose entire job is to refuse a flag the app cannot honour — were checking a condition that cannot hold. What they let through is worse than an unchecked flag: with no storage configured, `backup --assets` captured from a fresh memory provider, found nothing in it, and wrote an artefact stamped `assets: { count: 0 }` — a rollback story that says the blobs are in there.
+
+  It also ignored the provider the app REGISTERED. An app on `storagePlugin({ provider: s3(…) })` had its export/import/backup read and write the env-derived default instead, which surfaces later as "no object at key" — the exact drift `appStorageProvider()` exists to prevent, in call sites that never adopted it.
+
+  `configuredStorageProvider()` is the honest predicate: the app's registered provider, else the env-named one, else `undefined`. A memory provider nobody asked for is not a decision. The CLI now loads the app config BEFORE resolving — `storagePlugin(...)` registers at construction, so asking first answered with the default no matter what the app had configured.
+
+### Internal (no consumer-facing effect)
+
+- **@voltro/cli** — `voltro data backup` / `restore` / `clear-replace-marker` are now driven end to end, one case per declared option and one per refusal, as real CLI subprocesses against a real database.
+
+  Every defect this command has shipped lived in the SEQUENCE rather than in a function — an unhandled `EPIPE` that discarded the client's stderr before `close` fired, a marker erased by the restore's own artefact, an asset abort that skipped the provenance stamp, a refusal that could not fire — so none of them was reachable by testing a part. `nativeBackupRestore.e2e.test.ts` covers the whole surface against sqlite (a file copy: no vendor binary, runs anywhere) and `nativeBackupRestoreDialects.integration.test.ts` runs the vendor-tool half against postgres, mariadb and mysql, skipping BY NAME when the server or the client binary is absent — including when the client is present but too old for the server, which a "is it on PATH" check reports as ready.
+
+  The suite checks itself against `DATA_FLAGS`, the command's own declared option list, so an option cannot be added without a case that drives it.
+
+---
+
 ## [0.50.0] — 2026-08-23
 
 ### ⚠ BREAKING

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@voltro/logger",
-  "version": "0.50.0",
+  "version": "0.50.1",
   "description": "Effect-based structured logger with pretty terminal output + JSON for production.",
   "keywords": [
     "voltro",