@voltro/database 0.18.0 → 0.19.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -39,6 +39,159 @@ _Changes staged for the next release accumulate here (rolled up from
 
 ---
 
+## [0.19.0] — 2026-07-29
+
+### ⚠ BREAKING
+
+- **@voltro/plugin-audit** — **The durable audit sink stops writing credentials to a log table by default.** `redactInput` defaults to `'all'` — the payload becomes `{ __redacted: 'all' }`, which still proves a payload existed. `redactInput: 'none'` restores the previous behaviour, and a function gives field-level control.
+
+  `AuditEvent.input` is the raw mutation input, so an unredacted trail is where a password change, an API key at issuance and a PAT land — the one place nobody thinks to look for a credential. Losing payload detail is visible the first time you read a row; leaking a credential is not visible at all, which is why the default moved rather than staying opt-in.
+
+  **It is deliberately NOT driven by `.serverOnly()` / `.sensitive()`,** which is the design a consumer proposed and the one that cannot work: those markers live on TABLE COLUMNS and this is a mutation's INPUT. `changePassword({ oldPassword, newPassword })` has no column to consult, so a marker-driven default would cover exactly 0% of the motivating case while reading, to whoever configured it, like protection. (`.sensitive()` is also the export axis, not "unsafe to log" — the category error the three-marker table exists to prevent.)
+
+  Also:
+
+  - **`record: 'all' | 'errors' | predicate`** — filters by OUTCOME, where `include`/`exclude` filter by tag. `'errors'` is the forensic core and pairs with `plugin-versioning` for the successful writes. **`'all'` stays the default** on purpose: defaulting to errors would silently stop recording successes on upgrade, and "what did this compromised account touch" is answered by successes. - **`errorTag`** — the typed error's `_tag`, flattened out of the `outcome` json and indexable. `null` for an untagged failure rather than a guess: "this had no tag" and "the tag is 'Error'" are different, and a column that invents the second makes every filter on it quietly wrong. - **Two indices for the questions asked under pressure** — `(subjectId, status, at)` and `(tenantId, status, at)`. "Every denied call by subject X in the last 30 days" and "every failure against tenant Y" were both unindexed; the existing `byAuditTag` / `byAuditTrace` cannot serve either. - **Retention registers itself** — 365 days, `VOLTRO_AUDIT_LOG_TTL_HOURS`, drained by the boot sweep. "Pair it with the governance sweep" was a docs sentence rather than a default, so nobody did. - **Erasure is deliberately NOT auto-registered.** Erasing a subject must not delete the record that they were refused four hundred times — that record *is* the evidence. Anonymise instead; the docs carry the `subjectScopes` entry to paste, and it stays a decision the app makes explicitly.
+
+  **Migration** — `voltro update` prints it (`0.19.0/02_audit-redact-input-default`, `manual`, and it fires only for apps that mount the plugin). Nothing stops compiling and existing rows are untouched; what changes is what the NEXT row records. Keep the new default unless you know your mutation inputs carry no secrets; pass a function for field-level control; or opt back in explicitly with `redactInput: 'none'`. The codemod deliberately does NOT write `'none'` into your config — a transform could do it perfectly, which is exactly why it must not: it would pin every adopter to the behaviour the default moved away from and report the migration as complete.
+
+  *Why this is `BREAKING` and not `Changed`: it is a silent behaviour change on upgrade. Nothing fails, which is the problem — an operator who never reads this section keeps a trail that has quietly lost its payload detail. `BREAKING` is what routes it into `voltro update`.*
+- **@voltro/cli, @voltro/database** — **`.serverOnly()` now gates where it said it did.** A wire-reachable query that declares a `.serverOnly()` column of its source table in its `output` fails the boot under `voltro serve`, and makes `voltro doctor` exit non-zero. `voltro dev` still warns.
+
+  It shipped as one `log.warn` and nothing else — in every command — while `ColumnBuilder.serverOnly()`'s own doc comment and the seeded `AGENTS.md` marker table both said "**the boot audit — it FAILS the boot**, it does not warn". A team read the strong sentence, adopted the marker on four credential columns, injected a deliberate leak to check, and watched the server come up serving the leaking query. That is the register this repo keeps meeting from a new angle: *a check that prints instead of gating still reads as coverage* — here on the one marker whose entire job is the enforcement.
+
+  Two smaller things went with it, both of which had misled the reporter:
+
+  - **The message names the command.** It was emitted through a module-level logger scoped `voltro:dev`, so a warning from `voltro serve` announced itself as dev — which is why they concluded, and reported, that the audit does not run in production at all. It did; it just misattributed itself and stopped nothing. - **The audit is computed once, in `loadDiscovered`**, the discovery dev / serve / doctor / check all share — the same reasoning `validateRegisteredRelations()` lives there for. Dev and serve may disagree about what a leak COSTS; they must not disagree about what a leak IS.
+
+  `VOLTRO_SERVER_ONLY` moves the line both ways: `strict` fails `voltro dev` too, `warn` downgrades serve, `off` silences it. The downgrades are documented rather than hidden, because the alternative to a stated escape hatch is deleting the marker, and a check whose only way out is to disable it gets disabled.
+
+  `voltro check` deliberately does NOT run it: it has a live-api mode with no access to your table definitions, and a rule that fires in one of its two modes is worse than one that fires in neither.
+
+  **Migration** — `voltro update` prints it (`0.19.0/01_server-only-gates-the-boot`, `manual`, and it fires only for apps that actually use the marker). Run `voltro doctor` BEFORE you deploy: it reports exactly what `voltro serve` will now refuse, with no deploy involved. Each finding has two honest fixes and only its author can choose — the column is not wire-safe (drop it from the query's `output`, keep the marker), or the marker is wrong (drop the `.serverOnly()`). Do not substitute `.encrypted()`: that is the at-rest axis, the runtime decrypts for the handler, and reading it as "safe to expose" is the category error the three-marker table exists to prevent. To ship while triaging, `VOLTRO_SERVER_ONLY=warn` downgrades serve back to a warning — a bridge, not a setting to keep.
+
+  *Why this is `BREAKING` and not `Changed`: no signature moves and nothing that compiled stops compiling, so the literal type-level test does not catch it. It can still turn a booting production app into one that refuses — which is the point, the boot it refuses is the one shipping the column — and that failure lands at DEPLOY time. Filing it as `Changed` would have kept it out of the one section the stability contract names as the migration path, and out of `voltro update` entirely, because codemods hang off `BREAKING`. Both doc claims were corrected in the same change, so the `.d.ts`, the agent template and the docs site now describe the same behaviour.*
+
+### Added
+
+- **@voltro/plugin-audit** — **`auditByTrace` / `auditBySubject` — the read side of the correlation join.**
+
+  `byAuditTrace` and `byAuditSubjectStatus` shipped in the same release with **no caller**. That is the identical defect the versioning side had and that its own entry points were added to fix, repeated on the other half of the join one file away: an index nobody can enter is a query the app still hand-writes, and the docs then demonstrate a raw select over a framework-internal table.
+
+  It surfaced by checking an adopting team's design document against the code rather than from memory. Their §6 asks for *"a read-side composition joining `_voltro_row_history` × the audit sink (on `traceId`) × `actors`"* — which needs BOTH halves to have an entry point, or neither is usable.
+
+  ```ts
+  const calls   = await auditByTrace(ctx.store, traceId)                     // who called, and was it refused
+  const changed = await historyByTrace(ctx.store, traceId, tenantId)         // what it changed
+  const denied  = await auditBySubject(ctx.store, actorId, { status: 'error' })
+  ```
+
+  `auditBySubject` takes `status` as a real argument rather than leaving the caller to filter in JS — the index is `(subjectId, status, at)`, so a filter applied after fetching would not use it. `limit` defaults to 100, because an actor's history is unbounded and an entry point that returns all of it is one you call once in production.
+
+  *They were also not exported from the package index when first written — built, tested, and unreachable. Caught before shipping; worth recording because "it has a test" and "a consumer can call it" are different claims.*
+- **@voltro/database, @voltro/runtime, @voltro/protocol, @voltro/cli, @voltro/plugin-versioning, @voltro/plugin-audit, @voltro/voltro** — **`ChangeEvent` carries the calling `traceId` and `subjectId`** — the join key that lets `plugin-versioning` (what changed) and `auditPlugin` (who called, and whether they were refused) be read as one trail.
+
+  Both halves shipped and neither could be joined to the other. A consumer put it exactly right: *"we are not asking you to build our audit feature. We are asking for the join key that lets anyone build one on the three pieces you have already shipped."*
+
+  **The mechanism, and the part that was an empirical question rather than a design one.** Identity is known one layer up (`subject` in the middleware, `traceId` at the rpc boundary) and the event is created several layers down, inside each dialect store's private emit. Threading a context argument through every `DataStore` method to reach it would change the port every driver implements, for metadata that is ambient by nature — so it rides an `AsyncLocalStorage` (`@voltro/database`'s `writeAttribution.ts`), the same shape as the existing trace and replica-routing contexts.
+
+  Whether that survives a SQL store was *not* obvious: the write goes through `ManagedRuntime.runPromise`, so the read happens inside an Effect fiber, and a scheduler draining fibers from a shared loop would run them under the async context of whoever created the drain. If that were true the attribution would be silently ABSENT — a join key that is simply never there, on a trail nobody checks until an incident. Verified against a real sqlite store, including the transactional path (which queues events and flushes them post-commit, *outside* the scope — which is why the stamp goes at event CREATION, not delivery).
+
+  - **One call site, not one per method.** The scope is established at the rpc executor boundary, so it covers every write the handler makes — `ctx.store`, `EffectStore`, the crud helpers, a plugin interceptor's own writes. Wrapping the store middleware instead would have meant wrapping each mutating method and hoping the next one added remembers. - **`subjectId` is the same identity `audit()` stamps** (`actingUserId`, now exported so there is one source). Two answers to "who wrote this row" on one write would be worse than one; which API *key* was used is recoverable from the audit row sharing the `traceId`. - **Absent is a fact, not a gap** — no request behind the write (seed, startup hook, schedule, workflow step), or an event from another replica, where stamping the local ambient trace would attribute a remote write to a local call. The keys are omitted rather than set to `undefined`, so an unattributed event is byte-identical to one from before this existed. - **`dev.ts` and `serveCommand.ts` no longer hand-mirror the plugin fan-out.** They built that object literal separately in two files; a field added to one and not the other gives a plugin the data in dev and silence in production, and both files typecheck alone. Now `toPluginChangeEvent`.
+
+  `_voltro_row_history` gains `traceId` / `subjectId` plus `byTrace` and `bySubject` indices — "what did this call touch" and "what did this actor touch" were previously unanswerable at any speed, since `byRow` requires already knowing which row you are asking about. `changedBy` now prefers the caller over the row's `audit()` stamp, which fixes a reported case for free: the stamp is `null` for every write through the boot store, so a login route produced version rows with no actor at all.
+
+  *`apiSurface: compatible`: every golden line this touches is either a pure addition (the new fields and `actingUserId`) or api-extractor renumbering an import alias — `Subject_2` became `Subject` across `runtime` and the `voltro` re-export because a new import changed the ordering. No declaration changed shape and no call site is affected.*
+- **@voltro/cli** — **`voltro doctor`'s hand-roll detector gains six rules and ranks its findings by file count.**
+
+  An adopting team audited four apps by hand against the framework's "reach for instead" table and produced twenty items, each with a count (`1631` files with a manual `rows[0]`, `500` queries with `input.offset`, `306` forms, `368` relations declared against `17` uses). **The detector already reported eleven of those twenty, with counts.** These are rules for what it missed — the findings that made a person do work a scan should have done:
+
+  - **`offset-pagination`** — `.offset(` / `input.offset` / `.skip(` on a list query. `hand-cursor` did not catch this: it wants `hasMore` AND `limit+1`, which is a hand-rolled *keyset* pager. Plain OFFSET is a different smell with a worse ending — O(n) in the page number, so it does not fail, it just stops loading once the table is big, on the tables (audit logs, time entries) that get big first. - **`oauth-token-table`** — an `accessToken`/`refreshToken` column on an app table → `defineConnection({ kind: 'oauth2' })`. The reporting team's version of this leaked: a `json()` column holding a Slack payload with the token inside, readable by every colleague in the tenant. - **`non-incremental-aggregate`** — a `count/sum/avg/min/max` aggregate with no `incremental:`, rescanned in full on every refresh. - **`external-state-library`** — jotai / zustand / mobx / redux → `defineStore`. A second runtime beside the reactive engine, and one that does not participate in the subscription graph. - **`hand-route-module`** — importing a hand-maintained `routes` / `urls` module instead of `.framework/routes.generated`, where a renamed page is a compile error rather than a 404 someone finds in production. - **`hand-permission-check`** — a component reading a permission bag by hand instead of `useCan` / `useResourceCan`.
+
+  **And the findings are now ordered by file count rather than by the order the rules happen to be declared in.** A reader facing twenty findings acts on the top of the list, so an arbitrary order silently decides what gets fixed. The reporting team ranked their own work by exactly that number and had to count it by hand, because this printed the same facts unranked. Effort we cannot know; magnitude we can.
+
+  *Two of these rules were caught being wrong by their own tests before shipping: `offset-pagination`'s first version checked only `input.offset` and did not match its own fixture (a narrow rule reports nothing and reads like a clean codebase), and the ranking test passed with the sort deleted until the fixture was rebuilt so declaration order and count order disagree.*
+- **@voltro/plugin-versioning** — **`historyByTrace` / `historyBySubject` — the entry points the new indices existed for.** Plus their Effect twins.
+
+  The correlation bridge added `byTrace` and `bySubject` to `_voltro_row_history` in the same release, and shipped them with no caller: `rowHistory` requires a `rowId` you already have, which is the wrong way round during an incident, when what you have is a trace or an actor. The docs demonstrated a raw `ctx.store.select('_voltro_row_history')`, which is the shape an index is supposed to save you from writing.
+
+  Both are tenant-scoped exactly like `rowHistory` (own-tenant rows plus null-tenant rows from untenanted source tables; `undefined` skips the filter, for system paths only). `historyBySubject` takes a `limit`, default 100, because an actor's history is unbounded and an entry point that returns all of it is one you call once in production and never again.
+
+  **And a bug this surfaced.** The stored-row → `VersionRow` decoder was written inline inside `versionsOf`, before the bridge existed, and silently dropped `traceId` / `subjectId` — so `rowHistory()` returned rows missing the very field the feature exists to carry. Extracted to one `rowToVersion` now shared by all three readers, which is why the drift was possible in the first place.
+- **@voltro/cli, @voltro/database** — **`setRowFilter` is now named in the always-loaded agent core**, with the distinction that makes it findable.
+
+  A team migrating eleven hand-written row filters reported missing it **twice** — once in a full framework audit, and once while telling a colleague in writing that the framework has no row-filter primitive. The depth doc covers it well; a depth doc is opened by someone who already suspects the topic. The core's SERVER rubric asked *"a permission check?"* and answered with two BOOLEAN questions, so a reader holding a row-VISIBILITY question took the nearest-fitting answer and wrote the filter by hand. Eleven times.
+
+  The rubric now asks it directly, and the pairing is the point:
+
+  > `guards:` → *may I call this procedure?* → a typed `ScopeError`. > `setRowFilter` → *which rows may I see?* → the rows are simply absent.
+
+  Plus the failure it deletes — a `WHERE ownerId = me` in the list handler covers the query and **not** the subscription — and the trap they lost time to: `load` must read through an UNFILTERED store, because applying the filter to its own loader recurses until the stack blows.
+
+  Also:
+
+  - **`voltro doctor` gains `unexercised-row-filter`.** Their 7466 tests stayed green when the filter landed because not one passed `rowFilter:` to `makeTestContext`; they only noticed because they sabotage their own predicates before believing a pass, and four sabotages ran green. `makeTestContext({ rowFilter })` being opt-in is right — a process-global in a parallel suite would be worse — but the consequence is a visibility rule nothing verifies. Same class as a suite reporting `passed` with no database. - **`MATCHES_NO_ROWS` is exported from `@voltro/database`.** They wrote `eq('id', '')` for "this caller sees nothing", because the natural spelling `inSet(col, [])` is the one that is dangerous in most query builders: an empty `IN ()` gets dropped, and a dropped predicate does not narrow, it WIDENS to the whole tenant. Here it is safe — the SQL compiler emits `FALSE`, the memory evaluator returns false — but that held by accident, with no test enforcing it. Now pinned in both evaluators, including the mirror case: an empty `notIn` matches EVERYTHING.
+
+  *The doctor rule was itself wrong when first written: it read the normal source set, which excludes test files, so it could never observe the passing case and would have fired unconditionally on every app. Caught by writing the negative test.*
+- **@voltro/database, @voltro/plugin-versioning, @voltro/sql-postgres, @voltro/sql-mysql, @voltro/sql-mssql, @voltro/sql-sqlite** — **`versioningPlugin({ timing: 'in-transaction' })` — the history row commits or rolls back WITH the change it records.** Default stays `'post-commit'`.
+
+  Post-commit recording is lossy by construction: between COMMIT and the forked history write there is a window, and a process that dies inside it leaves the change permanent and the trail silent. The size of the window is not the point — the direction is. A missing entry cannot be told apart from "nothing happened", so a trail that can lose entries proves nothing. Retry does not close it either; the process that would retry is the one that died.
+
+  This was the sole reason an adopting team could not replace their hand-rolled audit writer — called from **315 of 358 mutation handlers**, with the 43 misses being what happens to any rule that depends on someone remembering.
+
+  **What a recorder receives is an `append`, not a store.** Bound to the caller's transaction, insert-only. It cannot open a nested transaction (which throws by design), cannot read-modify-write its way into a deadlock, and "append-only" stops being a docs claim and becomes the shape of the only thing it is handed.
+
+  **The rejection is the guarantee, not a defect.** When the history insert fails, a transaction offers exactly two outcomes: the mutation fails with it, or the error is swallowed and the change commits without its entry — which is post-commit's hole with the cost already paid. There is no third option, so recorders do not swallow.
+
+  **Why the default did not move.** In-transaction makes the history table a hard dependency of every covered write path: its availability becomes your write path's availability, and every covered write holds locks longer. Post-commit loses at worst one entry; in-transaction can at worst stop writes to the covered tables. Right trade for a compliance trail, wrong one for the undo / time-travel use this plugin also serves.
+
+  **It refuses the in-memory store at boot** rather than silently no-op'ing. `memory` is the default dev store; an option that appears to work where it is cheapest to try and stops where it matters is worse than one that says so. Two limits hold in both timings and are documented: `store.raw()` produces no change event and is absent from the trail, and a write made outside a transaction is recorded immediately after rather than atomically.
+
+  *Two design claims in the plan for this were wrong and are corrected there. "Twelve write sites across three layers, no funnel" was true of `storeMiddleware` and irrelevant — each dialect store funnels every write through one private `routeEvent`, which is where this hooks. "Bulk writes have no per-row post-image" was simply false: `updateMany` already issues `RETURNING *` and emits one event per affected row, so bulk needed no special case at all. Both were found by looking in the middleware instead of the store — twice.*
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **@voltro/cli** — **A `voltro serve` that refuses to boot says why, instead of blaming the serve bundle.** A deliberate refusal — a missing `VOLTRO_SESSION_SECRET`, a `.serverOnly()` leak — came out of the launcher as:
+
+  ```
+  [voltro] serve bundle failed to load: VOLTRO_SESSION_SECRET is not set — refusing to serve. …
+  [voltro] FATAL: production `voltro serve` requires a precompiled serve bundle at …
+  but it is missing or failed to load. Run `voltro build` before serving …
+  ```
+
+  The real reason is on the first line, under a wrong headline, followed by a louder and more confident wrong instruction. An operator whose first deploy forgot the session secret is told to rebuild an artefact that is fine — and rebuilding it produces the identical output, so the loop has no exit.
+
+  The cause is a catch that has to exist: `bin/voltro.mjs` imports the precompiled serve bundle inside a `try`, because an unusable bundle must degrade to the tsx path rather than kill the boot. It could not tell "this artefact is broken" from "this app decided not to start". Refusals now carry a marker (`bootRefusal.ts`) and the launcher prints them and exits 1.
+
+  The marker is the error's `name`, a plain string, rather than a class: the serve bundle INLINES the framework, so the thrown Error crosses an instance boundary where `instanceof` does not survive — the same reason the core-table registry is keyed by `Symbol.for`.
+
+  Found by running the new `.serverOnly()` gate against a real fixture rather than by reading it, which is also how the misleading pair came into view: the session-secret case had been shipping that way for a while.
+- **@voltro/sql-postgres, @voltro/sql-mysql** — **`insertIgnore` explains a second-unique conflict instead of reporting an internal invariant.** The message was `row conflicted but lookup found nothing`, which tells a caller nothing they can act on.
+
+  It is reachable by ordinary means, and on mariadb it is the *common* path: `INSERT IGNORE` swallows ANY unique violation, so a row with a fresh `id` and a duplicate `slug` is skipped, and the lookup by the named `conflictColumns` then finds nothing. A team with `tenants (id PK, slug UNIQUE)` hits it on the first duplicate slug.
+
+  The message now names the columns that were checked, the table, and the actual cause — a different unique constraint fired, and `insertIgnore` models one conflict target. This is step 1 of `plans/framework-insertignore-any-unique.md` and is deliberately independent of the feature: whether or not `conflictColumns: 'any'` ever ships, this error should have been readable.
+- **@voltro/cli** — **`ui/unlinked` and `ui/orphaned` resolve through barrel re-exports.** A `*.component.ui.tsx` reached only via `export { X } from './x'` was reported as unrendered, however many pages actually rendered it.
+
+  On the app that reported it, `PageContent` is imported by 42 pages — every one of them through `@/components/shared` — and doctor said `imported only by: index.ts, its own test`. It was the last false positive standing after the alias fix took that app from 16 findings to 2.
+
+  The rules ask "does anything RENDER this". A barrel is a real importer and renders nothing, so stopping at the first importer answers a different question than the one asked — but only in an app that has an `index.ts`, which is why it survived.
+
+  The walk is narrowed by NAME rather than opened up wholesale: a downstream file counts only if it imports one of the names the barrel republishes from that file (aliases followed, `export *` expanded to the file's own exports, type-only re-exports ignored — they publish nothing at runtime). Without that narrowing, `export *` on a 40-entry barrel would credit its entire readership to every entry and `ui/orphaned` would quietly stop finding anything — trading a visible false positive for a silent false negative. There is a test for exactly that direction: a barrel with a used entry and a dead one must still report the dead one.
+
+### Internal (no consumer-facing effect)
+
+- **@voltro/protocol** — **`PluginHttpRouteRequest.store` names all four absences instead of one.** The docstring said "It is not tenant-scoped" and left soft-delete filtering, audit stamping and row-level security to be inferred from "everything that does not need a Subject".
+
+  A team planning to port 19 raw-SQL sites onto that seam inferred the opposite: they wrote down "a store read adds `deletedAt IS NULL`" as the trap with teeth on their list — a soft-deleted user logging back in would go from "found and revived" to "not found → insert → unique violation on email" — and deferred the whole port partly over it. The store does no such thing; it is the raw store plus the storage codec. Naming exactly one of four absences reads as an exhaustive list.
+
+  The docstring now carries the same table the `AuthStrategyInput.store` docs do, with the soft-delete row called out for anyone porting: a read here returns tombstones the way their SQL did, so a lookup that must see one needs no opt-out. (`.withDeleted()` is the opt-out on `ctx.store`, which *does* apply the filter.) Doc-only; the behaviour is unchanged and was already correct.
+- **`ci.yml` gains a `workflow_dispatch` trigger.** The full matrix — 11 database services plus the SQL Server AG init containers — is not reachable from a push to `main`: `paths-ignore` plus the job-level `if: github.event_name != 'push'` mean a main push runs static checks only.
+
+  So the only ways to exercise it were a pull request and the release gate, which meant a change to the workflow itself could sit unrun until it fired for the first time INSIDE a release — where a failure costs a ~40-minute round-trip and blocks the publish. That is precisely the position this repo was in.
+
+---
+
 ## [0.18.0] — 2026-07-28
 
 ### ⚠ BREAKING
@@ -116,6 +269,8 @@ _Changes staged for the next release accumulate here (rolled up from
   The consequence was a silent wrong answer rather than an error. An auth strategy reading an `.encrypted()` column got the literal string `enc:v1:…` back — which compares, concatenates, renders and logs perfectly well, and simply never matches the token it is compared to. The failure surfaces as "wrong credential". On the write side it was worse and unrecoverable: an insert through that store wrote PLAINTEXT into a column the schema declares encrypted.
 
   The line is now **everything that does not need a Subject**, not "less than `ctx.store`". Wired in `voltro dev` and `voltro serve` in the same change (`wrapStoreWithBootCodec`); `raw()` is deliberately left as a pass-through, since it is the documented escape hatch for hand-written SQL and re-encoding rows a caller asked for verbatim would be its own surprise.
+
+  **Upgrading: a reader that compensated for the missing codec by hand now gets the decoded value.** Two shapes, and they land differently. A hand-rolled `decryptField` on the way out is HARMLESS — it passes a non-`enc:v1:` value through unchanged, so the call simply stops doing anything. A hand-rolled `JSON.parse(row.someJsonColumn)` on a column the codec now deserialises is NOT: it is handed an object and throws. If you read an `.encrypted()` or array column through `AuthStrategyInput.store` / `PluginHttpRouteRequest.store` and unpacked it yourself, grep those call sites — the ones typed as a `string | ReadonlyArray<string>` union already survive, a bare `JSON.parse` does not. (Reported by an adopter whose two such reads happened to be written defensively, which is why their upgrade was silent.)
 - **@voltro/cli** — **The remaining file-moving codemods narrow their projects too**, and the shared project is no longer a stale snapshot.
 
   `0.14.0/03_pages-suffix` is gated on `/src/pages/` throughout — plus each app's `app.config.ts`, which is how it tells a real web app's pages from a library that merely keeps components under `src/pages/`. `0.15.0/01_undo-mistaken-taxonomy-renames` only ever renames `*.component[.ui].ts(x)` and an export-less `*.types.ts(x)`. Both now declare that scope and take the importer closure instead of the workspace.
@@ -169,15 +324,15 @@ _Changes staged for the next release accumulate here (rolled up from
   The catalogue said a `*.component.tsx` promises "exactly one component **(+ types)**", which reads as "types are the only exception". It never was — the rule counts components, and a `const COLUMNS = […]` beside the table that renders it was always allowed. The docs now say so in both languages.
 - **@voltro/cli** — **The seeded `AGENTS.md` / `CLAUDE.md` never mentioned `.serverOnly()` — the one marker that decides leak vs no leak.**
 
-  Reported from a strict-mode pass over five apps: the template documents `.encrypted()`, `audit()`, `tenant()`, `softDelete()`, `.check()`, `validate()` — and not the marker whose absence the **boot audit hard-fails on**. Depth existed (`database/sensitivity`, `data/crud`, both languages); the always-loaded core simply never pointed at it, so an agent or a human following the template never learned the marker exists.
+  Reported from a strict-mode pass over five apps: the template documents `.encrypted()`, `audit()`, `tenant()`, `softDelete()`, `.check()`, `validate()` — and not the marker that decides leak vs no leak. *(Corrected after publication: this entry said the boot audit "hard-fails" on it. It did not — it was a single `log.warn`, in every command. The next release makes the claim true; see that entry.)* Depth existed (`database/sensitivity`, `data/crud`, both languages); the always-loaded core simply never pointed at it, so an agent or a human following the template never learned the marker exists.
 
   The core now carries a short section on the three markers as ORTHOGONAL questions, because the substitution is the real hazard:
 
-  | Marker | Answers | Enforced by | |---|---|---| | `.serverOnly()` | may this leave the server at all? | the boot audit — it FAILS the boot | | `.sensitive()` / `.safe()` | may it appear in an export? | the masking profile, fail-closed | | `.encrypted()` | is it encrypted at rest? | the store's codec |
+  | Marker | Answers | Enforced by | |---|---|---| | `.serverOnly()` | may this leave the server at all? | an audit — see the correction above | | `.sensitive()` / `.safe()` | may it appear in an export? | the masking profile, fail-closed | | `.encrypted()` | is it encrypted at rest? | the store's codec |
 
   Reading `.encrypted()` as "safe to expose" is a category error and a plausible one — the runtime decrypts for the handler, so an encrypted column reaches a client like any other unless it is ALSO `.serverOnly()`.
 
-  **The doc-drift guard is why this survived, so it grew the missing half.** It asserted the core carries the EXPORT axis (`.sensitive(`, fail-closed, the export endpoint) and said nothing about the wire axis. There is now a matching assertion for `.serverOnly()`, the boot audit, and the orthogonality — verified by deleting the section and watching it go red.
+  **The doc-drift guard is why this survived, so it grew the missing half.** It asserted the core carries the EXPORT axis (`.sensitive(`, fail-closed, the export endpoint) and said nothing about the wire axis. There is now a matching assertion for `.serverOnly()`, the enforcement, and the orthogonality — verified by deleting the section and watching it go red. *(It asked only for the words "boot audit", which the template supplied while promising a failure nothing performed. The next release makes it name the commands that gate.)*
 - **@voltro/cli** — **`voltro dev` could not start at all in a strict-pnpm install: the supervisor respawned with a bare `--import tsx`.**
 
   Node resolves a bare specifier against the CHILD's working directory. `@voltro/cli` declares tsx; the user's app does not — so under a non-hoisting layout tsx lives inside `node_modules/.pnpm/@voltro+cli@…/node_modules/tsx` and is invisible from the app root. The first respawn died with `Cannot find package 'tsx'`, naming a package the reader never asked for and cannot usefully install.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -159,6 +159,24 @@ export declare const arrayOverlaps: <RowOf = Record<string, unknown>, K extends
  */
 export declare const attachEagerLoads: (rows: ReadonlyArray<Row_2>, spec: WithSpec, sourceTable: TableLike, lookup: EagerLookup) => Promise<ReadonlyArray<Row_2>>;
 
+/**
+ * The attribution fields to spread onto a `ChangeEvent` at creation.
+ *
+ * Returns an object with the keys OMITTED rather than set to `undefined`, so an
+ * unattributed event is byte-identical to one from before this existed — no
+ * `traceId: undefined` appearing in a snapshot, a broadcast payload, or a
+ * consumer's `Object.keys`.
+ *
+ * **Call it where the event is CREATED, not where it is delivered.** A
+ * transactional write queues its events and flushes them after commit, by which
+ * time the async-local scope is gone. Stamping at creation is what makes the
+ * transactional path carry identity at all.
+ */
+export declare const attributionFields: () => {
+    traceId?: string;
+    subjectId?: string | null;
+};
+
 /**
  * Audit a list of tables in one call. Convenience for the CLI's boot
  * path; same shape as calling `auditTableIndexes` per table and
@@ -464,6 +482,32 @@ export declare type ChangeEvent = {
      * so the consumer must elect a single worker instead.
      */
     readonly origin?: 'inline' | 'injected';
+    /**
+     * The trace this write happened under — the SAME id `auditPlugin` records as
+     * `AuditEvent.traceId` and `voltro logs --trace` resolves.
+     *
+     * This is the correlation bridge. Without it `plugin-versioning` knows WHAT
+     * changed and the audit sink knows WHO called and whether it was refused, and
+     * nothing joins the two. With it, "what did this call touch" is one query.
+     *
+     * Absent means the write had no request behind it: a seed, a `*.startup.tsx`,
+     * a schedule, a workflow step — or an event injected from another replica.
+     * For `origin: 'injected'` the honest answer is the ORIGINATING replica's
+     * trace or nothing at all; stamping the receiving replica's ambient trace
+     * would attribute a remote write to a local request, which is worse than
+     * silence.
+     */
+    readonly traceId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The acting identity behind the write — the same one `audit()` stamps into
+     * `createdBy`/`updatedBy`, so a row's stamp and its change event never
+     * disagree. For an API-key subject that is the person, not the credential;
+     * which key was used is recoverable from the audit row sharing `traceId`.
+     *
+     * `null` = a resolved subject with no acting user (anonymous / system).
+     * `undefined` = no request context at all. The two are different facts.
+     */
+    readonly subjectId?: string | null;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -492,6 +536,9 @@ export declare const clearRetentions: () => void;
 /** Wipe — used by tests + the dev-loop hot-reload. */
 export declare const clearTableRegistry: () => void;
 
+/** Test seam / dev-restart seam. */
+export declare const clearWriteRecorders: () => void;
+
 /**
  * The value to bind for `column`, given what the table declares it as.
  * Returns `value` unchanged whenever nothing unambiguous applies — including
@@ -564,8 +611,25 @@ export declare class ColumnBuilder<TsType, Type extends ColumnType, HasDefault e
      *     keyHash: text().serverOnly(),
      *
      * A column is exposed to both server and client by default; this opts it OUT of
-     * the client. The `crud.*` read helpers strip it from every returned row, and
-     * the boot audit fails a wire-reachable query that declares it in its output.
+     * the client. The `crud.*` read helpers strip it from every returned row.
+     *
+     * A HAND-WRITTEN query output is the case `crud.*` cannot cover, so an audit
+     * checks it: a wire-reachable query whose `source` table carries a serverOnly
+     * column that its output DECLARES. What that costs depends on the command,
+     * and the difference is deliberate — a refused boot mid-edit is worse than
+     * the bug; in production it is not:
+     *
+     * | command                        | on a leak                          |
+     * |--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
+     * | `voltro serve`                 | **boot fails**                     |
+     * | `voltro doctor`                | **exits non-zero**                 |
+     * | `voltro dev`                   | warns                              |
+     *
+     * `VOLTRO_SERVER_ONLY=strict` makes `voltro dev` fail too; `=warn` downgrades
+     * serve; `=off` silences it. (`voltro check` does NOT run this — it has a
+     * live-api mode with no access to your table definitions, and a rule that
+     * fires in one of its two modes would be worse than one that fires in
+     * neither.)
      */
     serverOnly(): this;
     /**
@@ -1005,8 +1069,9 @@ export declare interface ColumnDefinition<TsType, Type extends ColumnType = Colu
      * but not encrypted; a private note the owner may read is encrypted but not
      * serverOnly. The default is exposed to BOTH server and client; `.serverOnly()`
      * opts a column OUT of the client. The table-aware read paths (`crud.*`) strip
-     * it automatically, and the boot audit flags a wire-reachable query whose
-     * `source` table carries a serverOnly column that its output declares.
+     * it automatically, and an audit flags a wire-reachable query whose `source`
+     * table carries a serverOnly column that its output declares. What that audit
+     * COSTS is per command — see `serverOnly()` below for the matrix.
      */
     readonly serverOnly?: boolean;
     /**
@@ -1328,6 +1393,9 @@ export declare const count: (alias?: string) => AggregateColumn;
 
 export declare const countDistinct: (column: string, alias?: string) => AggregateColumn;
 
+/** The attribution on the current async stack, or `undefined` outside a request. */
+export declare const currentWriteAttribution: () => WriteAttribution | undefined;
+
 /**
  * The application's `database` handle. Indexed by table name; each entry is
  * a `Query` over the table's row type AND a `using()` constraint over the
@@ -2799,6 +2867,24 @@ export declare interface ManyToManyRelation {
     readonly targetKey: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * A predicate that matches NO row — the "this caller may see nothing" case a
+ * row filter needs and the one it is most expensive to get wrong.
+ *
+ * The natural spelling is `inSet(col, [])`, and in many query builders that is
+ * the dangerous one: an empty `IN ()` gets dropped, and a DROPPED predicate does
+ * not narrow — it WIDENS, to the whole tenant. Here it is safe (the SQL
+ * compiler emits `FALSE`, the in-memory evaluator returns false, and both are
+ * pinned by tests) but an adopting team wrote `eq('id', '')` instead, because
+ * they could not tell from the outside and would not bet a visibility rule on
+ * it. They were right not to.
+ *
+ * So this exists to say the thing rather than encode it: a reviewer reading
+ * `MATCHES_NO_ROWS` sees the intent, where `eq('id', '')` looks like a bug and
+ * `inSet(col, [])` looks like an oversight.
+ */
+export declare const MATCHES_NO_ROWS: PredicateLeaf;
+
 /**
  * A mixin's materialised, SERIALIZABLE field shape: `FieldDefinitions<Input>`
  * run through `Resolve` so it's emitted as the concrete
@@ -4039,6 +4125,29 @@ declare interface RawSqlFragment {
  *  would truncate. */
 export declare const real: () => ColumnBuilder<number, "real", boolean>;
 
+/** One write, as the store sees it at the moment it happens. */
+export declare interface RecordedWrite {
+    readonly table: string;
+    readonly op: 'insert' | 'update' | 'delete';
+    /** Row AFTER the write — present on insert/update, null on delete. */
+    readonly next: Row | null;
+    /** Row BEFORE the write, where the store had it. */
+    readonly prev: Row | null;
+    /** Request identity, when the write had a request behind it. */
+    readonly traceId?: string | undefined;
+    readonly subjectId?: string | null | undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Is ANY recorder interested in `table`?
+ *
+ * The stores call this on every write, so it is the hot path: a store with no
+ * recorders registered pays one `Map.size` check and nothing else, and never
+ * awaits. Keeping `routeEvent`'s cost at zero for the default configuration is
+ * what makes shipping this as an opt-in honest.
+ */
+export declare const recordsTable: (table: string) => boolean;
+
 /**
  * Foreign-key reference to another table's id column.
  *
@@ -4113,6 +4222,14 @@ export declare const registerRetention: (spec: RetentionSpec) => void;
  */
 export declare const registerTable: (table: TableLike) => void;
 
+/** Register (or replace) a recorder. Replacing is what a plugin re-activating
+ *  on a dev restart needs. */
+export declare const registerWriteRecorder: (id: string, registration: {
+    readonly recorder: WriteRecorder;
+    readonly tables: Iterable<string>;
+    readonly ownTables: Iterable<string>;
+}) => void;
+
 export declare type Relation = OneRelation | ManyRelation | ManyToManyRelation;
 
 /**
@@ -4332,6 +4449,23 @@ export declare const rowSchema: <T extends TableLike>(table: T, options?: {
     readonly omit?: ReadonlyArray<string>;
 }) => Schema.Schema.Any;
 
+/**
+ * Run `fn` with `attribution` active for its whole (sync + awaited) execution.
+ *
+ * Nesting is last-wins by design: a plugin that re-enters the store inside a
+ * handler is still acting under that request.
+ */
+export declare const runWithWriteAttribution: <T>(attribution: WriteAttribution, fn: () => T) => T;
+
+/**
+ * Run every recorder that claims `write.table`.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT error-swallowing — see the header. Swallowing here would
+ * reproduce the post-commit hole while looking like it had closed it, which is
+ * the worse of the two by a distance.
+ */
+export declare const runWriteRecorders: (append: TxnAppend, write: RecordedWrite) => Promise<void>;
+
 /**
  * Lower a tenant id to the safe identifier fragment used inside a
  * namespace name. ONLY `[a-z0-9_]` survive; every other character —
@@ -5334,6 +5468,9 @@ export declare const timestampMs: Schema.Schema<Date, number>;
  */
 export declare const timestampMsOrNull: Schema.Schema<Date | null, number | null>;
 
+/** Append one row inside the caller's transaction. Insert-only by design. */
+export declare type TxnAppend = (table: string, row: Row) => Promise<void>;
+
 /** The minimal store surface `insertRow` needs — satisfied by `ctx.store`. */
 export declare interface TypedInsertStore {
     readonly insert: (table: string, row: Row) => Promise<Row>;
@@ -5387,6 +5524,8 @@ export declare interface UniqueSpec {
     readonly dedup?: 'fail' | 'suffix-counter' | Statement.Fragment;
 }
 
+export declare const unregisterWriteRecorder: (id: string) => void;
+
 /**
  * Bulk-update rows matching `where`, typed against the table: the patch is a
  * `Partial<InferRow<T>>`, so a misspelled column or a value of the wrong type
@@ -5733,4 +5872,22 @@ export declare interface WindowSpec {
 /** Tree of relations to eager-load. */
 export declare type WithSpec = Readonly<Record<string, true | EagerLoadSpec>>;
 
+/**
+ * Who is writing, and under which call.
+ *
+ * `subjectId` is the ACTING identity — the same one the `audit()` mixin stamps
+ * into `createdBy`/`updatedBy`. For an API key that is the person behind the
+ * credential, not the credential: two answers to "who wrote this row" on one
+ * write would be worse than one. Which KEY was used is recoverable from the
+ * audit sink row sharing this `traceId` — that is what the bridge is for.
+ */
+export declare interface WriteAttribution {
+    readonly traceId?: string;
+    /** `null` is meaningful: a resolved subject with no acting user (an
+     *  anonymous or system call), as distinct from `undefined` = no request. */
+    readonly subjectId?: string | null;
+}
+
+export declare type WriteRecorder = (append: TxnAppend, write: RecordedWrite) => Promise<void>;
+
 export { }