@volter/teams 0.2.13 → 0.2.15

package/event-limits.mjs

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 // What one published event may carry: the server refuses a source event whose `data` serializes above this many
 // bytes, and a publisher fits its snapshot to it before sending.
 export const EVENT_DATA_LIMIT = 262144;
+// The most event sources one enrolled machine makes: the server refuses its next, and its connector makes one per board
+// home registered with it, so it publishes at most this many homes.
+export const MACHINE_SOURCES = 16;

package/http-client.mjs

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ export function callerName(env=globalThis.process?.env,argv=globalThis.process?.
   return ([script,...words].join(' ')+(session?` in ${session}`:'')).replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/g,'?').slice(0,120);
 }
 const CALLER=callerName();
-// A call site may name itself after the process (`caller: 'board-relay publish'`), so one process's doors are told
+// A call site may name itself after the process (`caller: 'board events publish'`), so one process's doors are told
 // apart in the server's tally; the process's own words are kept, the site's words always fit.
 const callerHeader=site=>{if(!CALLER)return {};if(!site)return {'X-Supercode-Caller':CALLER};const named=String(site).replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/g,'?').slice(0,60);return {'X-Supercode-Caller':`${CALLER.slice(0,119-named.length)} ${named}`};};
 // Every write to a Teams server is redacted (@volter/teams/redact), but a sign-in or credential exchange, whose body is

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@volter/teams",
-  "version": "0.2.13",
+  "version": "0.2.15",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Volter Teams, the neutral team plane: machine identity and daemon core, the local door and server link, admission from machine grants, product doors, and the Teams server's neutral routes (company RFC 0008).",
   "license": "MIT",

package/server/agent-sessions.mjs

@@ -139,6 +139,19 @@ export async function agentSessionRoute(ctx){
     const receipt=await sendAgentMail(api,auth,decodeURIComponent(match[1]),body.text,req.headers['idempotency-key']);
     await send(res,200,result(api,auth,receipt),requestId);return true;
   }
+  if((match=/^\/machines\/([^/]+)\/agent-sessions$/.exec(sub))&&req.method==='POST'){
+    // A session this machine captured is declared its agent's by the machine itself, from the agent its launch named
+    // (the session's environment): the machine's custodian holds the session, so it records the lineage when it manages
+    // the agent, exactly as a declaration through /agents/{id}/sessions does.
+    if(auth.kind!=='machine'||auth.machine_id!==match[1])fail(403,'forbidden','the owning machine declares its sessions\' agents');
+    const body=await parseJson(req);exact(body,['session','agent','main']);
+    if(typeof body.session!=='string'||typeof body.agent!=='string'||body.main!==undefined&&typeof body.main!=='boolean')fail(400,'invalid_request','session, agent and optional main boolean are required');
+    const agent=await api.store.one('SELECT * FROM agents WHERE team_id=? AND id=?',[auth.team_id,body.agent]);
+    if(!agent)fail(404,'not_found','agent not found');
+    if(!await manageableAgent(api,auth,agent))fail(403,'forbidden','only the agent\'s custodian, parent or sponsor declares its sessions');
+    const {session,guards:machineGuards}=await machineProfileSession(api,auth,body.session);
+    await declareOwnership(ctx,agent,session,{main:body.main},machineGuards);return true;
+  }
   if((match=/^\/machines\/([^/]+)\/session-profiles$/.exec(sub))&&req.method==='POST'){
     if(auth.kind!=='machine'||auth.machine_id!==match[1])fail(403,'forbidden','the owning machine reports resolved profiles');
     const body=await parseJson(req);exact(body,['session','profile','observed_at','observation_id']);
@@ -203,6 +216,12 @@ export async function agentSessionRoute(ctx){
   const body=await parseJson(req);exact(body,['session','main','starter_session']);
   if(typeof body.session!=='string'||body.main!==undefined&&typeof body.main!=='boolean')fail(400,'invalid_request','session reference and optional main boolean are required');
   const session=await api.store.authorizedSession({teamId:auth.team_id,principalId:auth.principal_id,credentialId:auth.credential_id,ref:body.session,now});
+  await declareOwnership(ctx,agent,session,body,[]);return true;
+}
+/** One session declared as one agent's: the session's custodian, who manages the agent, records it (rule 1). */
+async function declareOwnership(ctx,agent,session,body,extraGuards){
+  const {api,res,auth,requestId,send,result,guardedMutation}=ctx;
+  const now=api.clock.nowMs();
   if(session.custodian_id!==auth.principal_id)fail(403,'forbidden','only your own session can be declared');
   const old=await api.store.one('SELECT * FROM agent_sessions WHERE team_id=? AND session_id=?',[auth.team_id,session.id]);
   if(old?.agent_id&&old.agent_id!==agent.id)fail(409,'conflict','a session already owned by an agent cannot change identity');
@@ -221,6 +240,6 @@ export async function agentSessionRoute(ctx){
   // The main session is an Agent field (ontology Agent.main_session): its change is the agent's change too.
   if(main&&agent.main_session_id!==session.id)statements.push(publication(api,auth,'agent.changed',agent.id,{...data.agent,revision:agent.revision+1},now));
   statements.push(stmt('UPDATE teams SET auth_epoch=auth_epoch+1 WHERE id=?',auth.team_id),publish(api,auth,session.id,data,now));
-  await guardedMutation(api,res,auth,[...memberGuards(auth,now),ownerGuard(auth,session),...standing,...await managementGuards(api,auth,agent),revisionGuard(auth.team_id,session.id,old)],statements,{status:old?200:201,body:result(api,auth,data),targetId:session.id});
-  send(res,old?200:201,result(api,auth,data),requestId);return true;
+  await guardedMutation(api,res,auth,[...memberGuards(auth,now),ownerGuard(auth,session),...standing,...await managementGuards(api,auth,agent),revisionGuard(auth.team_id,session.id,old),...extraGuards],statements,{status:old?200:201,body:result(api,auth,data),targetId:session.id});
+  send(res,old?200:201,result(api,auth,data),requestId);
 }

package/server/http.mjs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { appRoute, appPreAuth, appAuthentication, enforceAppScope, appAuthGuards, installedIssuer, identityIssuers } from './apps.mjs';
 import { machineEventStream } from './machine-events.mjs';
-import { publishedEventRoute } from './published-events.mjs';
+import { publishedEventRoute, OWN_SOURCE, sourceMachine } from './published-events.mjs';
 import { identityRecordRoute, identityAuthority } from './identity-record.mjs';
 import { AGENT_ACTIVE } from './agent-authority.mjs';
 import { APP_LINEAGE_REVOKED } from './auth.mjs';
@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ export function createHttpHandler(api){return async(req,res)=>{const requestId=a
   if(auth.kind==='user'&&auth.team_id===null){const membership=await api.store.one('SELECT role,active FROM memberships WHERE team_id=? AND principal_id=?',[teamId,auth.principal_id]);if(!membership?.active)fail(401,'authentication_required','authentication required');auth.role=membership.role;auth.active=membership.active;auth.team_id=teamId;auth.group_ids=(await api.store.query('SELECT group_id FROM group_members WHERE team_id=? AND principal_id=?',[teamId,auth.principal_id])).map(x=>x.group_id);}else if(auth.team_id!==teamId||!auth.active)fail(401,'authentication_required','authentication required');
   if(req.method!=='GET')res._auditRecord={teamId:auth.team_id,actorId:auth.principal_id,act:auth.act??[],operation:`${req.method} ${path}`};
   if(['machine','ingest'].includes(auth.kind)){
-    const machineDoor=auth.kind==='machine'&&(sub==='/machines/events'||/^\/machines\/[^/]+\/configuration$/.test(sub)||sub===`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/session-profiles`||sub.startsWith(`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/agent-closures`)||sub===`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/heartbeat`||sub.startsWith(`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/effects`)||new RegExp(`^/machines/${auth.machine_id}/attachments/[^/]+(?:/frames)?$`).test(sub));
+    // a machine credential also publishes its own boards' events (the connector follows `workflow events`, D138 step 4)
+    // and declares the agent each of its sessions' launch named (agent-sessions, D138 step 5)
+    const machineDoor=auth.kind==='machine'&&(sub==='/machines/events'||sub==='/event-sources'||/^\/event-sources\/[^/]+\/events$/.test(sub)||/^\/machines\/[^/]+\/configuration$/.test(sub)||sub===`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/session-profiles`||sub===`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/agent-sessions`||sub.startsWith(`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/agent-closures`)||sub===`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/heartbeat`||sub.startsWith(`/machines/${auth.machine_id}/effects`)||new RegExp(`^/machines/${auth.machine_id}/attachments/[^/]+(?:/frames)?$`).test(sub));
     const sourceDoor=sub.startsWith(`/sources/${auth.source_id}/captures`)||sub.startsWith(`/sources/${auth.source_id}/uploads`);
     if(!machineDoor&&!sourceDoor)fail(403,'forbidden','credential kind cannot use this operation');
   }
@@ -145,8 +147,8 @@ async function authorizeReplay(api,auth,method,sub,body){
     if(method==='DELETE') { const row=await api.store.one('SELECT created_by FROM identity_links WHERE team_id=? AND id=?',[auth.team_id,sub.split('/').at(-1)]); if(!row||(!(isAdmin(auth)&&!auth.installation_id)&&row.created_by!==auth.principal_id))fail(403,'forbidden','identity link authority changed'); }
     return;
   }
-  if(sub==='/event-sources'){if(!isAdmin(auth)&&!(auth.installation_id&&auth.app_actions.includes('events.publish')))fail(403,'forbidden','event source authorization changed');return;}
-  if((match=/^\/event-sources\/([^/]+)\/events$/.exec(sub))){if(!await api.store.one('SELECT 1 FROM event_sources WHERE team_id=? AND id=? AND principal_id=?',[auth.team_id,match[1],auth.principal_id]))fail(404,'not_found','event source not found');return;}
+  if(sub==='/event-sources'){if(auth.kind!=='machine'&&!isAdmin(auth)&&!(auth.installation_id&&auth.app_actions.includes('events.publish')))fail(403,'forbidden','event source authorization changed');return;}
+  if((match=/^\/event-sources\/([^/]+)\/events$/.exec(sub))){if(!await api.store.one(OWN_SOURCE,[auth.team_id,match[1],auth.principal_id,sourceMachine(auth)]))fail(404,'not_found','event source not found');return;}
   if(sub.startsWith('/apps')||sub.startsWith('/app-installations')){if(auth.installation_id&&sub===`/app-installations/${auth.installation_id}/delegations`&&method==='POST')return;if(!isAdmin(auth)||auth.installation_id)fail(403,'forbidden','application admin authorization changed');return;}
   if((match=/^\/sources\/([^/]+)\/captures$/.exec(sub))){const source=await api.store.one('SELECT state,machine_id,visibility FROM sources WHERE team_id=? AND id=?',[auth.team_id,match[1]]);if(!source||source.state!=='active'||auth.source_id!==match[1])fail(403,'forbidden','source authorization changed');if(auth.kind==='machine'){const rule=await api.store.one("SELECT 1 ok FROM machines m JOIN sync_rules r ON r.team_id=m.team_id AND r.machine_id=m.id WHERE m.team_id=? AND m.id=? AND m.revoked_at IS NULL AND r.id=? AND r.source_id=? AND r.state='active' AND r.revision=? AND r.visibility=?",[auth.team_id,auth.machine_id,body?.rule_id,match[1],body?.rule_revision,body?.visibility]);if(!rule)fail(403,'forbidden','sync rule authorization changed');}else if(auth.kind!=='ingest'||body?.visibility!==source.visibility)fail(403,'forbidden','source policy changed');return;}
   if((match=/^\/machines\/([^/]+)\/heartbeat$/.exec(sub))&&auth.kind==='machine'){const machine=await api.store.one('SELECT 1 ok FROM machines WHERE team_id=? AND id=? AND revoked_at IS NULL',[auth.team_id,match[1]]);if(!machine||auth.machine_id!==match[1])fail(403,'forbidden','machine authorization changed');return;}

package/server/migrations/022.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// An event source an enrolled machine made is that machine's: only its own machine credential publishes into it or
+// finds it by name, and no other credential of its custodian does (D138 step 4). A source with no machine is its
+// principal's, and no machine credential publishes into it.
+export default `
+ALTER TABLE event_sources ADD COLUMN machine_id TEXT;
+CREATE INDEX event_sources_machine ON event_sources(team_id, machine_id);
+`;

package/server/migrations/index.mjs

@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ import m018 from './018.mjs';
 import m019 from './019.mjs';
 import m020 from './020.mjs';
 import m021 from './021.mjs';
-export const MIGRATIONS = [m001, m002, m003, m004, m005, m006, m007, m008, m009, m010, m011, m012, m013, m014, m015, m016, m017, m018, m019, m020, m021];
+import m022 from './022.mjs';
+export const MIGRATIONS = [m001, m002, m003, m004, m005, m006, m007, m008, m009, m010, m011, m012, m013, m014, m015, m016, m017, m018, m019, m020, m021, m022];
 /** A message row's `until_revision` while its session's current version still holds it (schema 9). */
 export const OPEN_REVISION = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER;
 /** SQL: message row `m` belongs to the version at revision ?1 (bind the revision twice). */

package/server/published-events.mjs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { exact } from './request-json.mjs';
 import { canonicalJson } from './wire.mjs';
 import { sseRoom, writeSse, holdStream } from './events.mjs';
 import { APP_EVENTS, PUBLISHABLE_EVENTS, eventReadAction } from './event-catalogue.mjs';
-import { EVENT_DATA_LIMIT } from '../event-limits.mjs';
+import { EVENT_DATA_LIMIT, MACHINE_SOURCES } from '../event-limits.mjs';
 
 const stmt = (sql, ...params) => ({sql, params});
 // A Durable Object binds at most 100 parameters to a statement, so id lists go in batches.
@@ -14,9 +14,16 @@ const holes = list => list.map(() => '?').join(',');
 const fail = (status,code,message) => {throw Object.assign(new Error(message),{status,code});};
 const text = (value,label) => {if(typeof value!=='string'||!value||value.length>256||/[\x00-\x1f]/.test(value))fail(400,'invalid_request',`${label} must be a nonempty string of at most 256 characters`);return value;};
 const eventOf = row => ({id:row.id,org:row.team_id,at:row.created_at,actor:JSON.parse(row.actor_json),kind:row.kind,resource:{kind:row.resource_kind,id:row.resource_id},data:JSON.parse(row.data_json)});
+// A machine credential's principal is its custodian, so a source is the caller's only when its machine is the caller's
+// machine too: a machine never publishes into its custodian's hand-made sources or another machine's, and no other
+// credential of the custodian publishes into a machine's source as that machine.
+export const sourceMachine=auth=>auth.kind==='machine'?auth.machine_id:null;
+export const OWN_SOURCE='SELECT 1 FROM event_sources WHERE team_id=? AND id=? AND principal_id=? AND machine_id IS ?';
 const authorityGuards=(auth,now)=>[
   {sql:'SELECT 1 FROM credentials WHERE id=? AND revoked_at IS NULL AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at>?)',params:[auth.credential_id,now],status:401,code:'authentication_required',message:'event credential revoked'},
   {sql:'SELECT 1 FROM memberships WHERE team_id=? AND principal_id=? AND active=1',params:[auth.team_id,auth.principal_id],status:401,code:'authentication_required',message:'event membership revoked'},
+  // a machine credential publishes while its machine stays enrolled
+  ...(auth.kind==='machine'?[{sql:'SELECT 1 FROM machines WHERE team_id=? AND id=? AND revoked_at IS NULL',params:[auth.team_id,auth.machine_id],status:401,code:'authentication_required',message:'event machine revoked'}]:[]),
 ];
 
 /** Re-evaluate the installation and each correlated session's current ACL before every delivery or replay. */
@@ -62,11 +69,17 @@ function cursorCodec(api,auth,query) {
 export async function publishedEventRoute(ctx) {
   const {api,req,res,auth,sub,url,requestId,parseJson,send,result,guardedMutation}=ctx;
   if(sub==='/event-sources'&&req.method==='POST'){
-    if(!isAdmin(auth)&&!(auth.installation_id&&auth.app_actions.includes('events.publish')))fail(403,'forbidden','an admin or a consented publisher installation must authorize an event source');
+    // An enrolled machine's connector publishes its own boards' events under its machine credential (D138 step 4).
+    if(auth.kind!=='machine'&&!isAdmin(auth)&&!(auth.installation_id&&auth.app_actions.includes('events.publish')))fail(403,'forbidden','an admin, an enrolled machine or a consented publisher installation must authorize an event source');
     const body=await parseJson(req);exact(body,['name']);text(body.name,'name');
+    const machine=sourceMachine(auth);
+    // A machine's sources are named under its own id, so no machine finds or squats another's name.
+    if(machine&&!body.name.startsWith(`${machine}:`))fail(400,'invalid_request',`a machine's event source is named under its machine id (${machine}:…)`);
     const old=await api.store.one('SELECT * FROM event_sources WHERE team_id=? AND principal_id=? AND name=?',[auth.team_id,auth.principal_id,body.name]);
+    if(old&&(old.machine_id??null)!==machine)fail(403,'forbidden','that event source belongs to another publisher');
     const id=old?.id??api.ids.next('event_source'),response=result(api,auth,{id,name:body.name});
-    await guardedMutation(api,res,auth,authorityGuards(auth,api.clock.nowMs()),old?[]:[stmt('INSERT INTO event_sources VALUES (?,?,?,?)',auth.team_id,id,auth.principal_id,body.name)],{status:201,body:response,targetId:id});
+    const guards=[...authorityGuards(auth,api.clock.nowMs()),...(machine&&!old?[{sql:'SELECT 1 WHERE (SELECT count(*) FROM event_sources WHERE team_id=? AND machine_id=?)<?',params:[auth.team_id,machine,MACHINE_SOURCES],status:409,code:'source_limit',message:`a machine publishes into at most ${MACHINE_SOURCES} event sources`}]:[])];
+    await guardedMutation(api,res,auth,guards,old?[]:[stmt('INSERT INTO event_sources(team_id,id,principal_id,name,machine_id) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?)',auth.team_id,id,auth.principal_id,body.name,machine)],{status:201,body:response,targetId:id});
     send(res,201,response,requestId);return true;
   }
   const publication=/^\/event-sources\/([^/]+)\/events$/.exec(sub);
@@ -75,13 +88,13 @@ export async function publishedEventRoute(ctx) {
     text(body.id,'id');text(body.resource?.id,'resource.id');exact(body.resource,['kind','id']);
     if(!PUBLISHABLE_EVENTS.includes(body.kind)||body.resource.kind!==body.kind.split('.')[0]||!body.resource.id.startsWith(`${publication[1]}:`)||!Number.isSafeInteger(body.revision)||body.revision<1||!body.data||typeof body.data!=='object'||Array.isArray(body.data)||Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(body.data))>EVENT_DATA_LIMIT)fail(400,'invalid_request','invalid source event or snapshot');
     // A source can prove only its own principal. A plain session is evidence, never principal identity.
-    const actor={principal:auth.principal_id,session:null,lineage:auth.act??[]};
+    const actor={principal:auth.principal_id,session:null,lineage:auth.act??[],...(auth.kind==='machine'?{machine:auth.machine_id}:{})};
     if(body.actor!=null){exact(body.actor,['session']);if(body.actor.session!=null){text(body.actor.session,'actor.session');if(!body.actor.session.startsWith('session:'))fail(400,'invalid_request','actor.session must name a session');actor.session=body.actor.session;}}
-    const source=await api.store.one('SELECT 1 FROM event_sources WHERE team_id=? AND id=? AND principal_id=?',[auth.team_id,publication[1],auth.principal_id]);
+    const source=await api.store.one(OWN_SOURCE,[auth.team_id,publication[1],auth.principal_id,sourceMachine(auth)]);
     if(!source)fail(404,'not_found','event source not found');
     const old=await api.store.one('SELECT * FROM org_events WHERE id=?',[body.id]);
     if(old){if(old.team_id!==auth.team_id||old.source_id!==publication[1]||old.kind!==body.kind||old.resource_id!==body.resource.id||old.source_revision!==body.revision||canonicalJson(JSON.parse(old.data_json))!==canonicalJson(body.data)||canonicalJson(JSON.parse(old.actor_json))!==canonicalJson(actor))fail(409,'idempotency_conflict','event id already names another event');send(res,200,result(api,auth,eventOf(old)),requestId);return true;}
-    const now=api.clock.nowMs(),guards=[...authorityGuards(auth,now),{sql:'SELECT 1 FROM event_sources WHERE team_id=? AND id=? AND principal_id=?',params:[auth.team_id,publication[1],auth.principal_id],status:403,code:'forbidden',message:'event source authority changed'},
+    const now=api.clock.nowMs(),guards=[...authorityGuards(auth,now),{sql:OWN_SOURCE,params:[auth.team_id,publication[1],auth.principal_id,sourceMachine(auth)],status:403,code:'forbidden',message:'event source authority changed'},
       {sql:'SELECT 1 WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM event_resources WHERE team_id=? AND source_id=? AND resource_kind=? AND resource_id=? AND source_revision>=?)',params:[auth.team_id,publication[1],body.resource.kind,body.resource.id,body.revision],status:409,code:'revision_mismatch',message:'resource publication is older than its current snapshot'}];
     const event={id:body.id,org:auth.team_id,at:now,actor,kind:body.kind,resource:body.resource,data:body.data},response=result(api,auth,event);
     await guardedMutation(api,res,auth,guards,[stmt('INSERT INTO org_events(id,team_id,source_id,source_revision,kind,resource_kind,resource_id,actor_json,data_json,created_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)',body.id,auth.team_id,publication[1],body.revision,body.kind,body.resource.kind,body.resource.id,JSON.stringify(actor),JSON.stringify(body.data),now)],{status:201,body:response,targetId:body.resource.id});