@visa/cli 4.1.0-rc.44 → 4.1.0-rc.46

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@visa/cli",
-  "version": "4.1.0-rc.44",
+  "version": "4.1.0-rc.46",
   "description": "Visa CLI runtime for stable agent identity and separately authorized payment capabilities",
   "bin": {
     "visa-cli": "./bin/visa-cli.js",
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
     "test:smoke": "VISA_AUTH_URL=https://auth.visacli.sh jest --config jest.smoke.config.js",
     "test:integration": "jest --config jest.integration.config.js",
     "test:e2e": "jest --config jest.e2e.config.js",
-    "test:catalog-e2e": "jest --config jest.catalog-e2e.config.js",
     "test:all": "npm run test:unit && npm run test:integration && npm run test:e2e",
     "prepublishOnly": "npm run build && npm test",
     "lint": "eslint src/**/*.ts",

package/server.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-10-17/server.schema.json",
   "name": "io.github.visa-crypto-labs/visa-cli",
-  "version": "4.1.0-rc.44",
+  "version": "4.1.0-rc.46",
   "title": "Visa CLI",
   "description": "Pair a human-approved agent identity, configure payment capabilities separately, and discover and pay x402 services from your AI coding assistant.",
   "websiteUrl": "https://github.com/Visa-Crypto-Labs/Visa-mono/tree/main/packages/cli#readme",
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
     {
       "registryType": "npm",
       "identifier": "@visa/cli",
-      "version": "4.1.0-rc.44",
+      "version": "4.1.0-rc.46",
       "transport": {
         "type": "stdio"
       },

package/dist/checkout-engine/pay-args.d.ts

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Argv rewriter for the `pnpm pay` positional entry point, extracted pure so
- * it is unit-testable (the pay.ts script executes on import). Maps
- * `<checkout-url> <amount> [flags]` onto run-live-fill's inline flags.
- *
- * Strict by design — this drives a real-money run:
- *  - `--merchant-url`/`--amount` are REJECTED as passthrough flags: the
- *    runner's arg map lets a later flag win, so a stray duplicate would
- *    silently retarget the purchase away from the typed positionals.
- *  - Every flag must carry a value (same grammar as run-live-fill's args()),
- *    so a trailing bare flag fails HERE with pay's usage, not downstream with
- *    fill:live's.
- */
-export declare function rewritePayArgs(argv: string[]): string[];

package/dist/checkout-engine/pay-args.js

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Argv rewriter for the `pnpm pay` positional entry point, extracted pure so
- * it is unit-testable (the pay.ts script executes on import). Maps
- * `<checkout-url> <amount> [flags]` onto run-live-fill's inline flags.
- *
- * Strict by design — this drives a real-money run:
- *  - `--merchant-url`/`--amount` are REJECTED as passthrough flags: the
- *    runner's arg map lets a later flag win, so a stray duplicate would
- *    silently retarget the purchase away from the typed positionals.
- *  - Every flag must carry a value (same grammar as run-live-fill's args()),
- *    so a trailing bare flag fails HERE with pay's usage, not downstream with
- *    fill:live's.
- */
-const USAGE = 'usage: pnpm pay -- <checkout-url> <amount> [--merchant-name <name>] ' +
-    '[--country <CC>] [--currency <ISO>] [--mode dry-run|submit] [--contact-file <path>] ' +
-    '[--agent-credential-file <path>] [--approval-base-url <url>]';
-const RESERVED_FLAGS = ['--merchant-url', '--amount'];
-export function rewritePayArgs(argv) {
-    // pnpm forwards the literal `--` separator; drop it like run-live-fill does.
-    const tokens = argv.filter((a) => a !== '--');
-    const positionals = [];
-    const flags = [];
-    for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
-        const token = tokens[i];
-        if (token.startsWith('--')) {
-            if (RESERVED_FLAGS.includes(token)) {
-                throw new Error(`${token} is derived from the positionals — pass the url and amount ` +
-                    `positionally instead of as flags\n${USAGE}`);
-            }
-            const value = tokens[i + 1];
-            if (value === undefined || value.startsWith('--')) {
-                throw new Error(`flag ${token} needs a value\n${USAGE}`);
-            }
-            flags.push(token, value);
-            i++;
-        }
-        else {
-            positionals.push(token);
-        }
-    }
-    if (positionals.length !== 2)
-        throw new Error(USAGE);
-    return ['--merchant-url', positionals[0], '--amount', positionals[1], ...flags];
-}

package/dist/checkout-engine/pay.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/checkout-engine/pay.js

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Positional sugar over run-live-fill's inline any-merchant mode:
- *
- *   pnpm pay -- <checkout-url> <amount> [--mode submit] [--merchant-name "X"] [...]
- *
- * Rewrites the two positionals into --merchant-url/--amount (pay-args.ts,
- * strict) and re-enters the runner, so every guardrail (typed PAY approval,
- * CHECKOUT_AGENT_ALLOW_SUBMIT, hosted/loopback ceremony, receipts) is exactly
- * the fill:live path — this file must never grow logic of its own.
- */
-import { rewritePayArgs } from './pay-args.js';
-process.argv = [process.argv[0], process.argv[1], ...rewritePayArgs(process.argv.slice(2))];
-await import('./run-live-fill.js');

package/dist/checkout-engine/run-live-fill.d.ts

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export {};

package/dist/checkout-engine/run-live-fill.js

@@ -1,495 +0,0 @@
-import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { createInterface } from 'node:readline/promises';
-import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { launchCheckoutBrowser } from './browser-launch.js';
-import { CURRENCY_NUMERIC, currencyNumeric, runInteractiveCeremony } from './ceremony.js';
-import { assertApprovalBaseUrl, resolveApprovalBaseUrl, runHostedApproval, } from './hosted-approval.js';
-import { inlineTargetFromFlags } from './inline-target.js';
-import { createIntent, fetchCryptogram, postConfirmation } from './vgs-gateway/fetch-credential.mjs';
-import { cancelPreparedCheckout, prepareCheckout, submitApprovedCheckout, } from './executor.js';
-import { approvalPhrase, approvalQuestion, assertSubmitAllowed, isRunSuccess, parseCheckoutMode, submitClickedWithoutConfirmation, } from './live-fill-approval.js';
-import { assertOwnerOnlyFile, readOwnerOnlyJson } from './owner-only-file.js';
-import { buildReceipt, writeReceipt } from './receipt.js';
-import { loadRepoEnvDefaults } from './repo-env.js';
-import { reportVicOutcome } from './vic-confirmation.js';
-import { decimalToMinor, VgsAssuranceInstrument, } from './vgs-live-instrument.js';
-import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
-/** VISA_V4_HOME/identity/mailbox.json — mirrors @visa/wallet's v4Home default. */
-function v4Identity(file) {
-    const home = process.env.VISA_V4_HOME || join(homedir(), '.visa-v4');
-    return join(home, 'identity', file);
-}
-/**
- * The agent's provisioned inbox address from mailbox.json, or null when no
- * inbox exists. Non-sensitive: address + opaque inbox id only. The exportable
- * scoped bearer credential is NEVER read here — OTP reads go through the
- * out-of-process resolver command (below), keeping the owner-only file gate
- * outside this package.
- */
-function loadAgentInboxEmail() {
-    try {
-        const raw = readFileSync(v4Identity('mailbox.json'), 'utf8');
-        const rec = JSON.parse(raw);
-        return typeof rec.email === 'string' && rec.email.includes('@') ? rec.email : null;
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null; // no mailbox provisioned, or unreadable — keep the contact-file email
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Build the injected email-OTP resolver, or undefined when none is configured.
- * @visa/checkout-engine depends on playwright-core ONLY, so it must not import
- * @visa/wallet-tools/@visa/agent-mail to read OTPs. Instead the operator wires
- * an OUT-OF-PROCESS command (VISA_V4_OTP_RESOLVER_CMD) that shells to the
- * owner-only-credential-gated `wallet_mail_await_otp` tool: the scoped-key read and the
- * from-domain guard live entirely behind that command. The command receives a
- * JSON request on argv and must print JSON `{code,fromDomain}` (or `null`) to
- * stdout. Absent ⇒ no resolver ⇒ the executor hands email OTP to a human.
- */
-function buildOtpResolver() {
-    const cmd = process.env.VISA_V4_OTP_RESOLVER_CMD?.trim();
-    if (!cmd)
-        return undefined;
-    return (req) => new Promise((resolve) => {
-        execFile(cmd, [JSON.stringify(req)], { timeout: 150_000, maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024 }, (err, stdout) => {
-            if (err) {
-                process.stdout.write(`email OTP resolver command failed: ${err.message}\n`);
-                return resolve(null); // fail CLEAN — the executor falls back to a human
-            }
-            try {
-                const parsed = JSON.parse(stdout.trim() || 'null');
-                if (parsed &&
-                    typeof parsed.code === 'string' &&
-                    typeof parsed.fromDomain === 'string') {
-                    process.stdout.write(`email OTP auto-resolved (from ${parsed.fromDomain})\n`);
-                    return resolve({ code: parsed.code, fromDomain: parsed.fromDomain });
-                }
-            }
-            catch {
-                /* fall through to null */
-            }
-            resolve(null);
-        });
-    });
-}
-function usage() {
-    throw new Error('usage: pnpm fill:live --checkout-file <path> --contact-file <path> ' +
-        '[--purchase-assurance-file <path>] [--approval-base-url <url>] ' +
-        '[--agent-credential-file <path>] [--mode dry-run|submit] [--receipt-dir <path>]\n' +
-        'inline (any merchant, no checkout file): pnpm fill:live --merchant-url <url> ' +
-        '--amount <decimal> [--merchant-name <name>] [--country <CC>] [--currency <ISO>] — ' +
-        'merchant name defaults to the URL hostname, country to US, currency to USD; ' +
-        'positional sugar: pnpm pay -- <url> <amount> [flags]\n' +
-        '--contact-file defaults to ~/.visa-mcp/contact.json\n' +
-        'the repo-root .env is loaded as env DEFAULTS (already-set variables win), e.g. for ' +
-        'CHECKOUT_AGENT_MODE (--mode fallback); hosted approval on the deployed verify site ' +
-        "is the built-in default (CHECKOUT_APPROVAL_BASE_URL='' forces the loopback ceremony)\n" +
-        'Without --purchase-assurance-file the runner performs the device-binding ' +
-        'ceremony itself after the typed approval. With --approval-base-url (or ' +
-        'CHECKOUT_APPROVAL_BASE_URL) the passkey tap happens on the deployed verify ' +
-        "site's /approve page (no localhost anywhere); otherwise it opens a loopback " +
-        'Visa approval page. Either way the assurance arrives in-process (seconds old ' +
-        'at mint, never written to disk).\n' +
-        '--purchase-assurance-file holds the output of a fresh device-binding ceremony ' +
-        'scoped to this exact merchant, amount, and currency ({assuranceData, mintedAt, ' +
-        'merchantHost, transactionAmount, transactionCurrencyCode}); the enrollment ' +
-        'artifact is never purchase authorization (#5709)\n' +
-        '--mode submit clicks the pay control after a typed PAY approval; non-interactive ' +
-        '(scripted) submits additionally require CHECKOUT_AGENT_ALLOW_SUBMIT=1 ' +
-        '(default: dry-run, never submits)');
-}
-function args() {
-    const parsed = new Map();
-    for (let i = 2; i < process.argv.length; i++) {
-        const key = process.argv[i];
-        // pnpm forwards the literal `--` separator from `pnpm fill:live -- …`;
-        // every documented invocation uses it, so skip the bare token.
-        if (key === '--')
-            continue;
-        if (!key.startsWith('--'))
-            usage();
-        const value = process.argv[++i];
-        if (!value || value.startsWith('--'))
-            usage();
-        parsed.set(key, value);
-    }
-    return parsed;
-}
-// Repo-root .env as DEFAULTS, before any env read below: stable per-machine
-// config (VGS creds, CHECKOUT_AGENT_MODE, the scripted-run submit arm) lives
-// there once; explicitly-set environment always wins, and a missing file
-// changes nothing.
-loadRepoEnvDefaults();
-const input = args();
-const checkoutFile = input.get('--checkout-file');
-// Inline any-merchant mode: --merchant-url + --amount build the target
-// directly, so no checkout JSON has to exist. Throws its own scoped errors;
-// the shared validation block below still governs the resulting shape.
-const inlineTarget = inlineTargetFromFlags(input);
-const contactFile = input.get('--contact-file') ?? join(homedir(), '.visa-mcp', 'contact.json');
-const agentCredentialFile = input.get('--agent-credential-file') ?? join(homedir(), '.visa-mcp', 'agent-credential.json');
-// Optional in assurance (checkout-file) mode: purchase authorization is a
-// FRESH ceremony scoped to this purchase, never the enrollment artifact
-// (#5709). Without the file, the runner performs the ceremony itself after
-// the typed approval (interactive ceremony mode).
-const purchaseAssuranceFile = input.get('--purchase-assurance-file');
-// Exactly one target source: a checkout file or the inline flags.
-const targetSources = [typeof checkoutFile === 'string', inlineTarget !== null].filter(Boolean).length;
-if (targetSources !== 1 || typeof agentCredentialFile !== 'string') {
-    usage();
-}
-const receiptDir = input.get('--receipt-dir') ?? join(homedir(), '.visa-mcp', 'checkout-receipts');
-const mode = parseCheckoutMode(input.get('--mode'));
-// Opt-in human-in-the-loop for issuer challenges: CHECKOUT_AGENT_CHALLENGE_HOLD=<minutes>
-// keeps a detected 3DS challenge on screen so the operator can complete it
-// (e.g. type an SMS one-time code) instead of ending the run.
-const challengeHoldMinutes = Number(process.env.CHECKOUT_AGENT_CHALLENGE_HOLD ?? '');
-const challengeHoldMs = Number.isFinite(challengeHoldMinutes) && challengeHoldMinutes > 0
-    ? challengeHoldMinutes * 60_000
-    : undefined;
-// Refuse an unarmed submit before anything else runs — no file is read, no
-// browser launches, no credential can possibly be minted.
-assertSubmitAllowed(mode);
-const target = inlineTarget ??
-    (await readOwnerOnlyJson(checkoutFile, 'checkout file'));
-const contact = await readOwnerOnlyJson(contactFile, 'contact file');
-// Route merchant verification mail to the AGENT's provisioned inbox, not the
-// human's address: the merchant emails OTP/verification codes to whatever
-// contact.email it is given, and wallet_mail_await_otp can only read the
-// agent inbox. mailbox.json is non-sensitive provisioning state (address +
-// opaque inbox id — the scoped bearer credential is stored separately and never read here),
-// so the runner reads it directly. Only override when a mailbox exists;
-// otherwise keep the contact-file email.
-const agentInboxEmail = loadAgentInboxEmail();
-if (agentInboxEmail) {
-    contact.email = agentInboxEmail;
-    process.stdout.write(`Using agent inbox for merchant verification mail: ${agentInboxEmail}\n`);
-}
-// Optional out-of-process email-OTP resolver (see buildOtpResolver). Undefined
-// unless VISA_V4_OTP_RESOLVER_CMD is set — then merchant email codes are
-// auto-resolved single-use; otherwise email OTP falls to a human.
-const otpResolver = buildOtpResolver();
-if (typeof target.merchantName !== 'string' || !target.merchantName.trim()) {
-    throw new Error('checkout target requires merchantName');
-}
-if (typeof target.merchantCountryCode !== 'string' ||
-    !/^[A-Z]{2}$/.test(target.merchantCountryCode.toUpperCase())) {
-    throw new Error('checkout target merchantCountryCode must be a 2-letter ISO code');
-}
-// Normalize once so the instrument's strict uppercase re-check (which runs
-// after browser launch + operator confirmation) can't fail on a lowercase code
-// this loader already accepted.
-target.merchantCountryCode = target.merchantCountryCode.toUpperCase();
-if (!contact.fullName && !(contact.firstName && contact.lastName)) {
-    throw new Error('contact file needs fullName or firstName + lastName');
-}
-// || not ??: an empty-string fullName must fall through to first+last.
-const cardholderName = contact.fullName || `${contact.firstName} ${contact.lastName}`;
-if (typeof target.merchantUrl !== 'string') {
-    throw new Error('checkout target requires merchantUrl');
-}
-const url = new URL(target.merchantUrl);
-if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && url.hostname !== '127.0.0.1' && url.hostname !== 'localhost') {
-    throw new Error('checkout URL must use HTTPS (localhost is allowed for fixtures)');
-}
-if (typeof target.transactionAmount !== 'string') {
-    throw new Error('checkout target requires transactionAmount');
-}
-const parsedAmountMinor = decimalToMinor(target.transactionAmount);
-if (parsedAmountMinor === null || parsedAmountMinor <= 0) {
-    throw new Error('checkout target transactionAmount must be a positive decimal');
-}
-// Re-bound after the guard so the narrowed `number` type reaches the hoisted
-// persistReceipt declaration below.
-const amountMinor = parsedAmountMinor;
-if (typeof target.transactionCurrencyCode !== 'string') {
-    throw new Error('checkout target transactionCurrencyCode must be a 3-letter ISO code');
-}
-const currency = target.transactionCurrencyCode.toUpperCase();
-if (!/^[A-Z]{3}$/.test(currency)) {
-    throw new Error('checkout target transactionCurrencyCode must be a 3-letter ISO code');
-}
-// Normalize once on the target (same pattern as merchantCountryCode above) so
-// every downstream consumer — the hosted-approval registration, the assurance
-// scope, the instrument's re-check — sees the exact value this loader
-// validated; a lowercase code in the file must not 400 at the hosted relay.
-target.transactionCurrencyCode = currency;
-// Preflight the agent-credential + purchase-assurance artifacts (assurance
-// mode) BEFORE the browser launches: lstat-only — existence, regular file,
-// 0600, size cap. A missing or mis-permissioned artifact fails fast here
-// instead of after the operator has completed the manual checkout review and
-// typed the FILL phrase (review nit). Contents stay unread until after
-// approval — the guard reads nothing.
-await assertOwnerOnlyFile(agentCredentialFile, 'CLI agent credential', 40 * 1024);
-if (typeof purchaseAssuranceFile === 'string') {
-    await assertOwnerOnlyFile(purchaseAssuranceFile, 'purchase assurance', 40 * 1024);
-}
-// Interactive ceremony mode (no --purchase-assurance-file): the runner performs
-// the device-binding ceremony itself after the typed approval. With an
-// approval base URL the ceremony is HOSTED on the deployed verify site (no
-// loopback page, no local TLS/SDK/VGS-credential prerequisites); otherwise it
-// runs on the loopback page. Fail fast on the active mode's prerequisites
-// here, before any browser launches.
-const ceremonyMode = typeof purchaseAssuranceFile !== 'string';
-// Hosted approval on the deployed verify site is the DEFAULT; set
-// CHECKOUT_APPROVAL_BASE_URL='' (empty) to force the loopback ceremony.
-const approvalBaseUrl = resolveApprovalBaseUrl(input.get('--approval-base-url'));
-const hostedApproval = ceremonyMode && approvalBaseUrl !== '';
-// HTTPS-except-loopback — the same policy the checkout URL gets above; the
-// approval claim carries the verifier credential and never travels cleartext.
-if (hostedApproval)
-    assertApprovalBaseUrl(approvalBaseUrl);
-let ceremonyTls = null;
-let ceremonyVendorSdkJs = '';
-let ceremonyConsumerEmail = '';
-if (ceremonyMode) {
-    // The hosted page collects the enrollment email itself when the contact file
-    // carries none; the loopback page cannot, so local mode still requires it.
-    if (!hostedApproval && (typeof contact.email !== 'string' || !contact.email.trim())) {
-        throw new Error('interactive ceremony needs an email in the contact file');
-    }
-    ceremonyConsumerEmail = typeof contact.email === 'string' ? contact.email : '';
-    if (!currencyNumeric(currency)) {
-        throw new Error(`interactive ceremony supports ${Object.keys(CURRENCY_NUMERIC).join('/')} — ` +
-            `pass --purchase-assurance-file for ${currency}`);
-    }
-    // Loopback mode only: the Visa device-binding iframe requires an HTTPS
-    // parent page (dev-harness certs) and the vendored SDK. The hosted page
-    // brings its own origin and SDK — no local prerequisites.
-    if (!hostedApproval) {
-        // GA graduation: the harness moved into this package (was
-        // apps/v4-verify-web/dev-harness); the vendored SDK ships with apps/web.
-        const harnessDir = fileURLToPath(new URL('../dev-harness/', import.meta.url));
-        try {
-            ceremonyTls = {
-                key: readFileSync(join(harnessDir, 'certs', 'key.pem')),
-                cert: readFileSync(join(harnessDir, 'certs', 'cert.pem')),
-            };
-        }
-        catch {
-            throw new Error('interactive ceremony needs the dev-harness HTTPS certs — run ' +
-                'packages/checkout-engine/dev-harness/generate-certs.sh once');
-        }
-        const vendorSdkPath = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../apps/web/public/vendor/vgs-agentic-auth.js', import.meta.url));
-        try {
-            ceremonyVendorSdkJs = readFileSync(vendorSdkPath, 'utf8');
-        }
-        catch {
-            throw new Error(`missing vendored VgsAgenticAuth module at ${vendorSdkPath}`);
-        }
-    }
-}
-// Client-credentials mint for the ceremony page's short-lived browser token —
-// same wire call as the dev-harness /api/token, served on loopback only.
-async function mintCeremonyAccessToken() {
-    const clientId = process.env.VGS_USERNAME;
-    const clientSecret = process.env.VGS_PASSWORD;
-    if (!clientId || !clientSecret) {
-        throw new Error('Set VGS_USERNAME and VGS_PASSWORD (the VGS service-account id/secret).');
-    }
-    const body = new URLSearchParams({
-        client_id: clientId,
-        client_secret: clientSecret,
-        grant_type: 'client_credentials',
-    });
-    const r = await fetch('https://auth.verygoodsecurity.com/auth/realms/vgs/protocol/openid-connect/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' }, body });
-    if (!r.ok)
-        throw new Error(`VGS token grant failed (${r.status})`);
-    const doc = (await r.json());
-    if (!doc.access_token)
-        throw new Error('VGS token grant returned no access_token');
-    return doc.access_token;
-}
-// Persist the redacted receipt for this attempt (LIVE_VIC_GUEST_CHECKOUT.md
-// step 8) and return the path for the printed result. Persisting never throws:
-// a failed write degrades to a stderr warning — the run result (and any
-// completed charge) must not be lost to a full disk or a permission error.
-async function persistReceipt(reviewId, result, vicConfirmation) {
-    const report = await writeReceipt(receiptDir, buildReceipt({
-        mode,
-        reviewId,
-        merchant: { name: target.merchantName, host: url.hostname },
-        transaction: { amount: target.transactionAmount, amountMinor, currency },
-        result,
-        vicConfirmation,
-    }));
-    if (!report.written) {
-        process.stderr.write(`WARNING: receipt not written — ${report.reason}\n`);
-        return null;
-    }
-    if (report.panRedactions > 0) {
-        process.stderr.write(`WARNING: ${report.panRedactions} PAN-like digit run(s) were redacted from the receipt — ` +
-            'upstream evidence must never contain one; investigate before the next run.\n');
-    }
-    return report.path;
-}
-const browser = await launchCheckoutBrowser();
-try {
-    const mandate = {
-        maxAmountMinor: amountMinor,
-        currency,
-        merchantHost: url.hostname,
-        expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 15 * 60 * 1000).toISOString(),
-    };
-    const debugShotsDir = join(receiptDir, 'shots');
-    process.stdout.write(`debug screenshots (credential fields masked): ${debugShotsDir}\n`);
-    const preparation = await prepareCheckout({
-        url: target.merchantUrl,
-        mandate,
-        amountMinor,
-        currency,
-        browser,
-        contact,
-        debugShotsDir,
-    });
-    if (preparation.status === 'finished') {
-        // Refused before a review existed (blocked-by-mandate, adapter-required,
-        // …). Still a recorded attempt: the merchant-test matrix reconciles
-        // compatibility findings, not just submissions.
-        const receipt = await persistReceipt(null, preparation.result, null);
-        process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify({ ...preparation.result, receipt }, null, 2)}\n`);
-        process.exitCode = 1;
-    }
-    else {
-        const review = preparation.checkout.review;
-        // The full review contract (LIVE_VIC_GUEST_CHECKOUT.md step 1): merchant,
-        // exact total, currency, mandate cap/expiry, and the fingerprint of the
-        // exact control a submit-mode approval would click. Contains no credential.
-        process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify({ reviewId: review.id, merchantHost: review.merchantHost, amountMinor: review.amountMinor, currency: review.currency, mandateMaxAmountMinor: review.mandateMaxAmountMinor, mandateExpiresAt: review.mandateExpiresAt, submitTarget: review.submitTarget, submitTargetFingerprint: review.submitTargetFingerprint, detectedRoles: review.detectedRoles }, null, 2)}\n`);
-        const terminal = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout });
-        const expected = approvalPhrase(mode, review.id);
-        const answer = await terminal.question(approvalQuestion(mode, review, expected));
-        terminal.close();
-        let result;
-        let vicConfirmation = null;
-        if (answer === expected) {
-            // Assurance-mode inputs. In interactive ceremony mode the assurance is
-            // produced NOW — after the typed approval, seconds before the mint (the
-            // freshest possible configuration; see the 2026-07-17 PENDING-intent
-            // contrast) — and exists in process memory only.
-            let ceremonyFailure = null;
-            let credential = null;
-            let purchase = null;
-            credential = await readOwnerOnlyJson(agentCredentialFile, 'CLI agent credential', 40 * 1024);
-            if (typeof purchaseAssuranceFile === 'string') {
-                // Fresh, purchase-scoped assurance — the instrument validates its
-                // declared merchant/amount/currency scope + freshness against the
-                // checkout target before any intent is minted (#5709).
-                purchase = await readOwnerOnlyJson(purchaseAssuranceFile, 'purchase assurance', 40 * 1024);
-            }
-            else if (typeof credential.tokenId !== 'string' || !credential.tokenId.trim()) {
-                ceremonyFailure = 'CLI agent credential requires tokenId';
-            }
-            else {
-                process.stdout.write('approval received — complete the passkey on the Visa approval page…\n');
-                try {
-                    purchase = hostedApproval
-                        ? await runHostedApproval({
-                            baseUrl: approvalBaseUrl,
-                            tokenId: credential.tokenId,
-                            target,
-                            ...(ceremonyConsumerEmail ? { consumerEmail: ceremonyConsumerEmail } : {}),
-                            log: (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n`),
-                        })
-                        : await runInteractiveCeremony({
-                            page: {
-                                tokenId: credential.tokenId,
-                                environment: process.env.VGS_ENVIRONMENT === 'sandbox' ? 'sandbox' : 'live',
-                                consumerEmail: ceremonyConsumerEmail,
-                                merchantName: target.merchantName,
-                                amount: target.transactionAmount,
-                                currency,
-                                currencyNumericCode: currencyNumeric(currency),
-                            },
-                            target,
-                            vendorSdkJs: ceremonyVendorSdkJs,
-                            tls: ceremonyTls,
-                            mintAccessToken: mintCeremonyAccessToken,
-                            log: (line) => process.stdout.write(`${line}\n`),
-                        });
-                    process.stdout.write('passkey approved — minting the credential…\n');
-                }
-                catch (err) {
-                    ceremonyFailure = err.message;
-                }
-            }
-            if (ceremonyFailure !== null) {
-                result = await cancelPreparedCheckout(review.id, `device-binding ceremony failed: ${ceremonyFailure}`);
-            }
-            else {
-                const instrument = new VgsAssuranceInstrument(credential, purchase, target, cardholderName, 
-                // The minter surfaces the fresh intentId (unlike getCredential,
-                // which discards it) so the VIC confirmation below can target it.
-                async (input) => {
-                    const { intentId, status } = await createIntent(input);
-                    try {
-                        const payment = await fetchCryptogram({
-                            tokenId: input.tokenId,
-                            intentId,
-                            transaction: input.transaction,
-                        });
-                        return { payment, intentId };
-                    }
-                    catch (err) {
-                        // HTTP 201 at intent creation ≠ an authorized intent — carry
-                        // the creation-time status so a not-completed cryptogram is
-                        // diagnosable in place (#5709).
-                        throw new Error(`${err.message} (intent status at creation: ${status ?? 'unknown'})`);
-                    }
-                });
-                result = await submitApprovedCheckout(review.id, {
-                    approval: { approved: true, reviewId: review.id },
-                    instrument,
-                    contact,
-                    mode,
-                    challengeHoldMs,
-                    ...(otpResolver ? { resolveEmailOtp: otpResolver } : {}),
-                    onChallengeHold: (signal) => process.stdout.write(signal === 'body:link-wallet'
-                        ? `Stripe Link wallet login appeared despite network suppression — this means Link engaged through an endpoint isStripeLinkConsumerRequest does not yet match. Do NOT enter the code (it would pay with a Link-saved card, not the minted credential): close the modal to continue as guest, then pull the Link request URL from the evidence log (note "linkSuppressed"/network trace) and extend the route predicate to cover it. Holding up to ${challengeHoldMinutes} min…\n`
-                        : `issuer challenge detected (${signal ?? 'challenge'}) — complete the bank verification in the browser window (enter the code your bank sent). Holding up to ${challengeHoldMinutes} min…\n`),
-                });
-                if (mode === 'submit') {
-                    // Report the OBSERVED outcome to VIC for the consumed intent. Only
-                    // definitive answers post (confirmed → APPROVED, declined → DECLINED);
-                    // unknown outcomes are resolved with the merchant first, never
-                    // guessed. A ceremony failure never reaches here — no intent was
-                    // consumed, so there is nothing to confirm.
-                    vicConfirmation = await reportVicOutcome({
-                        target: instrument.confirmationTarget(),
-                        outcome: result.outcome,
-                        transaction: {
-                            transactionAmount: target.transactionAmount,
-                            transactionCurrencyCode: currency,
-                        },
-                        post: postConfirmation,
-                    });
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        else {
-            result = await cancelPreparedCheckout(review.id, 'operator declined the checkout review');
-        }
-        const receipt = await persistReceipt(review.id, result, vicConfirmation);
-        process.stdout.write(`${JSON.stringify({ outcome: result.outcome, confirmationRef: result.confirmationRef ?? null, vicConfirmation, receipt, credentialLifecycle: result.credentialLifecycle, credentialTiming: result.credentialTiming, detectedRoles: Object.keys(result.fields), requiresAdapter: result.requiresAdapter, detail: result.detail ?? null }, null, 2)}\n`);
-        if (submitClickedWithoutConfirmation(result)) {
-            process.stderr.write('WARNING: the pay control was clicked but no confirmation was detected — the charge ' +
-                'may still have gone through. Verify with the merchant before any retry; a blind ' +
-                'rerun risks a double charge.\n');
-        }
-        if (result.outcome === 'action-required') {
-            process.stderr.write('NOTICE: the issuer asked for human verification (3-D Secure) and the run stopped ' +
-                'there — no charge exists until the challenge is completed. Complete the purchase ' +
-                'manually if still wanted; any rerun needs a new review and a fresh credential.\n');
-        }
-        if (vicConfirmation && !vicConfirmation.posted && isRunSuccess(mode, result.outcome)) {
-            process.stderr.write(`WARNING: purchase confirmed but the VIC confirmation was not posted — ${vicConfirmation.reason}\n`);
-        }
-        if (!isRunSuccess(mode, result.outcome))
-            process.exitCode = 1;
-    }
-}
-finally {
-    await browser.close();
-}