@visa/cli 4.1.0-rc.165 → 4.1.0-rc.166
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/checkout-engine/executor.d.ts +25 -2
- package/dist/checkout-engine/executor.js +56 -5
- package/dist/checkout-engine/live-fill-approval.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/checkout-engine/live-fill-approval.js +5 -0
- package/dist/checkout-engine/receipt.js +9 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +293 -293
- package/dist/mcp-server/index.js +247 -247
- package/native/bin/win32-x64/visa-keychain-win.exe +0 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/server.json +2 -2
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@@ -10,9 +10,32 @@ export { minorFromDecimal, pageCurrency } from './amount.js';
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export type CheckoutMode = 'dry-run' | 'submit';
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export type CheckoutOutcome = 'reviewed-dry-run'
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/** Historical receipt value from the credential-disclosing dry-run. */
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-
| 'filled-dry-run' | 'partial-fill' | 'adapter-required' | 'confirmed' | 'declined' | 'action-required' | 'cancelled' | 'blocked-by-mandate'
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| 'filled-dry-run' | 'partial-fill' | 'adapter-required' | 'confirmed' | 'declined' | 'action-required' | 'cancelled' | 'blocked-by-mandate'
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/**
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* KNOWN-NOT-CHARGED. Every `failed` path ends before the pay control was
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* clicked (or before a credential existed at all), so a caller may retry it
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* without risking a second charge.
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*/
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| 'failed'
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/**
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* SUBMITTED, OUTCOME UNKNOWN — the pay control WAS clicked and neither a
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* confirmation nor a decline was observed before the deadline. The charge may
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* have captured. NEVER retry this automatically.
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*
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* This case used to be reported as `failed`, and the difference is not
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* academic: on 2026-08-17 a whop.com checkout returned `failed` here, the
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* caller read that as "nothing happened" and re-ran the purchase, and the
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* second run drew a second $5 against the owner's mandate. `outcome.ts`
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* already treats an unrecognized post-submit page as the SAFE direction
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* ('unknown' → operator verification); collapsing it into `failed` at the
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* boundary is what threw that safety away. The distinction has to survive all
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* the way to the value consumers branch on.
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*/
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| 'unverified';
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/** Stable machine-readable cause for an expected terminal checkout result. */
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export type CheckoutFailureCode = 'card-number-field-unavailable' | 'human-action-required' | 'mandate-blocked'
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export type CheckoutFailureCode = 'card-number-field-unavailable' | 'human-action-required' | 'mandate-blocked'
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/** A detected, visible field we held a value for refused every fill attempt. */
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| 'required-field-unfillable';
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export type CredentialLifecycle = 'not-requested' | 'minted-not-exposed' | 'partially-exposed' | 'fully-filled';
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export type CredentialTiming = {
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approvedAt?: string;
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@@ -1116,9 +1116,30 @@ export async function submitApprovedCheckout(reviewId, opts, store = defaultPrep
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? []
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: ['expiry']),
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];
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// Roles the adapter TRIED to fill and never landed, across every reveal
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// attempt. A job only exists when the field was detected, was visible, and
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// we held a value for it (see `add()` in adapters/generic.ts) — so a failure
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// here is never "the page didn't ask for it". It means the page asked, we
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// answered, and the element refused.
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//
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// Roles that failed on an early attempt and succeeded after a reveal are
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// excluded: `successfulRoles` spans all four attempts, same as above.
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const failedFillRoles = [
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...new Set(evidence
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.getSteps()
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.filter((step) => step.type === 'field-fill' && step.data.ok === false)
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.map((step) => String(step.data.role))),
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]
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.filter((role) => !successfulRoles.has(role))
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.sort();
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evidence.step('fill-complete', {
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-
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// "Ready to submit", not "the card fields landed". Before 2026-08-17 this
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// read only the credential roles, so a whop.com run whose city/state/
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// postalCode all timed out recorded `ok: true` and clicked Get access on
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// a form it knew was incomplete.
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ok: missingCredentialRoles.length === 0 && failedFillRoles.length === 0,
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missingCredentialRoles,
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failedFillRoles,
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});
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if (options.debugShotsDir) {
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await captureDebugShot(page, options.debugShotsDir, checkout.review.id, '2-filled', evidence, state.fields);
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@@ -1177,6 +1198,20 @@ export async function submitApprovedCheckout(reviewId, opts, store = defaultPrep
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evidence.setSnapshotSummary(await snapshotSummary(page));
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return makeResult('failed', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, `credential fill incomplete: missing ${missingCredentialRoles.join(', ')}`);
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}
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// STOP BEFORE THE CLICK when any field we tried to fill refused. Submitting
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// a form we know is incomplete is how a PSP ends up holding a charge we
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// cannot then confirm or account for: the 2026-08-17 whop.com run filled the
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// card into Basis Theory iframes, watched city/state/postalCode time out at
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// 5s each, clicked Get access anyway, and could never observe an outcome.
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//
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// This refusal happens BEFORE the submit click, so nothing can be charged by
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// it — the safe direction, and the reason it is allowed to be strict. A
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// merchant whose address widget we cannot drive now fails cleanly and
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// retryably instead of dangerously.
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if (failedFillRoles.length > 0) {
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evidence.setSnapshotSummary(await snapshotSummary(page));
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return makeResult('partial-fill', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, `required field fill failed: ${failedFillRoles.join(', ')} — not submitting an incomplete form. Nothing was charged.`, undefined, 'required-field-unfillable');
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}
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if (!submit) {
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evidence.setSnapshotSummary(await snapshotSummary(page));
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return makeResult('failed', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, 'no submit control detected');
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@@ -1337,19 +1372,35 @@ export async function submitApprovedCheckout(reviewId, opts, store = defaultPrep
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});
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return makeResult('confirmed', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, undefined, confirmationRef);
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}
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// The pay control was clicked and the observer reached its deadline with no
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// definitive answer. This is NOT a failure — it is the absence of an answer,
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// and the charge may well have captured. Reporting it as `failed` is what
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// let a caller re-run the 2026-08-17 whop.com purchase and draw a second $5.
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evidence.step('outcome', {
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outcome: '
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outcome: 'unverified',
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reason: 'no confirmation or decline signal',
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lastSeen: observed.lastSeen,
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attempts: observed.attempts,
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elapsedMs: observed.elapsedMs,
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});
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return makeResult('
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? 'submitted but outcome unknown (page still processing at deadline)'
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: 'submitted but outcome unknown');
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return makeResult('unverified', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, observed.lastSeen === 'processing'
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? 'submitted but outcome unknown (page still processing at deadline) — the charge may have gone through; verify with the merchant before any retry'
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: 'submitted but outcome unknown — the charge may have gone through; verify with the merchant before any retry');
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}
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catch (err) {
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const detail = err.message;
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// A throw AFTER the pay control was clicked (browser teardown, navigation
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// race, evidence I/O) leaves the same open question as the deadline path: we
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// clicked, and we do not know what happened. It must not report `failed`
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// either. A throw before the click never disclosed a payable form, so it
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// stays a clean, retry-safe failure.
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const submitted = evidence
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.getSteps()
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.some((step) => step.type === 'submit' && step.data.clicked === true);
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if (submitted) {
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evidence.step('outcome', { outcome: 'unverified', error: detail });
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return makeResult('unverified', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, `${detail} — the pay control was already clicked; the charge may have gone through, so verify with the merchant before any retry`);
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}
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evidence.step('outcome', { outcome: 'failed', error: detail });
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return makeResult('failed', state.fields, evidence, requiresAdapter, detail);
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}
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@@ -28,5 +28,10 @@ export declare function isRunSuccess(mode: CheckoutMode, outcome: CheckoutOutcom
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* so no charge can exist until it is completed — the double-charge warning
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* would misdirect the operator, and the runner prints the challenge-specific
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* notice instead.
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*
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* The executor now NAMES this state in the outcome itself ('unverified'), so
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* the two agree by construction. This predicate stays the broader guard: it
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* also catches a post-click throw or any future outcome that leaves the same
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* question open, and it is what the receipt's reconciliation list reads.
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*/
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export declare function submitClickedWithoutConfirmation(result: CheckoutResult): boolean;
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@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ export function isRunSuccess(mode, outcome) {
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* so no charge can exist until it is completed — the double-charge warning
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* would misdirect the operator, and the runner prints the challenge-specific
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* notice instead.
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*
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* The executor now NAMES this state in the outcome itself ('unverified'), so
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* the two agree by construction. This predicate stays the broader guard: it
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* also catches a post-click throw or any future outcome that leaves the same
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* question open, and it is what the receipt's reconciliation list reads.
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*/
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export function submitClickedWithoutConfirmation(result) {
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if (result.outcome === 'confirmed' ||
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@@ -37,7 +37,15 @@ export function buildReceipt(input) {
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? 'No action needed.'
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: result.outcome === 'declined'
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? 'Review the decline before trying again.'
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:
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: result.outcome === 'unverified'
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? // Defensive: reconciliationFor() already pushes the richer
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// submit-clicked reason for this outcome, so this line is only
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// reached if that ever stops firing. It must still not invite a
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// retry.
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'The charge may have gone through. Confirm with the merchant before retrying.'
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: result.outcome === 'partial-fill'
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? 'Nothing was submitted and nothing was charged. Safe to try again once the checkout can be filled.'
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: 'Review this outcome before retrying.';
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const recoveryActions = reconciliation.reasons.length > 0 ? reconciliation.reasons : [fallbackAction];
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const cardLast4 = input.cardLast4 && /^\d{4}$/.test(input.cardLast4) ? input.cardLast4 : null;
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const checkoutUrl = input.merchant.url && KNOWN_MERCHANT_IDENTITIES[input.merchant.url] ? input.merchant.url : null;
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