@vincemakes/kiso-tools-node 0.1.29 → 0.1.31

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * explicit timeout and an output cap so a runaway command cannot flood the
  * context.
  *
- * Token 轮: reads are RANGEABLE (read_file offset/limit, default head 200
+ * the token round: reads are RANGEABLE (read_file offset/limit, default head 200
  * lines) and search/list are capped (50 / 200) — every truncation carries
  * an actionable continuation note (deterministic per file state), so the
  * model always has a path to the full content.
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export declare class PathEscapeError extends Error {
 }
 export declare function resolveWithinRoot(root: string, input: string): string;
 /**
- * 十: the canonical path a tool will actually touch, as an ABSOLUTE path.
+ * round 10: the canonical path a tool will actually touch, as an ABSOLUTE path.
  * Symlinks in the deepest EXISTING ancestor are resolved — a file to be
  * created under a symlinked directory lands in the TARGET, not in the
  * link — and the not-yet-existing tail is re-appended. Shared by the
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ export interface WorkspaceToolsOptions {
     /** The workspace the tools may touch; everything else is refused. */
     readonly workspaceRoot: string;
     /**
-     * 自举 #3 (发现#7): "inherit" keeps kiso's own provider credentials in
+     * bootstrap #3 (finding #7): "inherit" keeps kiso's own provider credentials in
      * the shell child's environment. DEFAULT (absent): the credentials are
      * STRIPPED — a shell command must not inherit the agent's API keys (a
      * nested kiso would hit the REAL provider and blow up faux e2e runs;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * explicit timeout and an output cap so a runaway command cannot flood the
  * context.
  *
- * Token 轮: reads are RANGEABLE (read_file offset/limit, default head 200
+ * the token round: reads are RANGEABLE (read_file offset/limit, default head 200
  * lines) and search/list are capped (50 / 200) — every truncation carries
  * an actionable continuation note (deterministic per file state), so the
  * model always has a path to the full content.
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:pat
 import { defineTool } from "@vincemakes/kiso-core";
 const OUTPUT_CAP = 100_000; // chars of output a tool result may carry
 const DEFAULT_SHELL_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
-// Token 轮: the scoped-read defaults — read_file shows the head 200 lines
+// the token round: the scoped-read defaults — read_file shows the head 200 lines
 // of a large file (with an actionable continuation note, never a silent
 // drop), search_text caps at 50 excerpts, list_dir at 200 entries. The
 // red line: every truncation names its continuation — the model always
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ export function resolveWithinRoot(root, input) {
     return canonical;
 }
 /**
- * 十: the canonical path a tool will actually touch, as an ABSOLUTE path.
+ * round 10: the canonical path a tool will actually touch, as an ABSOLUTE path.
  * Symlinks in the deepest EXISTING ancestor are resolved — a file to be
  * created under a symlinked directory lands in the TARGET, not in the
  * link — and the not-yet-existing tail is re-appended. Shared by the
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ export function canonicalTargetPath(input) {
     return missingTail.length > 0 ? join(ancestorReal, ...missingTail) : ancestorReal;
 }
 /**
- * The inode-boundary policy for READS (八): a hard link inside the workspace
+ * The inode-boundary policy for READS (round 8): a hard link inside the workspace
  * may point at an inode whose OTHER links live outside (e.g. /etc/passwd) —
  * reading it would silently exfiltrate external content. Policy:
  *   - regular, single-link files: read;
@@ -132,13 +132,13 @@ function inodeReadPolicy(root, full) {
         return `not a regular file — refusing to read (${full})`;
     if (st.nlink <= 1)
         return null;
-    // 第四轮: the link count is verified STRUCTURALLY, never by counting
+    // round 4: the link count is verified STRUCTURALLY, never by counting
     // newline-split text. `find -print0` emits NUL-separated paths — a file
     // named "inside\nspoof" is ONE path, not two — and every match is then
     // re-statted and checked for the EXACT dev+ino pair (an inode number
     // alone is not identity across devices). Any failure to verify every
     // link is fail-closed: the file is refused.
-    // 第五轮(P2-3): the workspace root is CANONICALIZED before the scan —
+    // round 5(P2-3): the workspace root is CANONICALIZED before the scan —
     // find on a symlinked root would not follow the symlink into the real
     // tree, undercounting the in-workspace links and misjudging a legal
     // hard link as an external escape.
@@ -335,8 +335,8 @@ export function searchTextTool(opts) {
                     }
                     else if (entry.isFile()) {
                         try {
-                            // 八: same inode boundary as read_file — a hard link
-                            // to an external inode is not searched. 第四轮(对抗):
+                            // round 8: same inode boundary as read_file — a hard link
+                            // to an external inode is not searched. round 4 (adversarial):
                             // the link count is verified against the WORKSPACE
                             // root, not the search subroot — a link that lives
                             // inside the workspace but outside the search dir is
@@ -397,12 +397,12 @@ export function writeFileTool(opts) {
             const tmp = `${full}.kiso-tmp-${process.pid}-${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
             let preservedMode;
             try {
-                // E 组: SAFE REPLACEMENT — write a temp file next to the
+                // E group: SAFE REPLACEMENT — write a temp file next to the
                 // target and rename it over the directory entry. A hard link
                 // inside the workspace that shares an EXTERNAL inode is
                 // therefore never overwritten: rename replaces the entry,
                 // not the shared inode.
-                // 八: an existing file keeps its mode — a 0755 script stays
+                // round 8: an existing file keeps its mode — a 0755 script stays
                 // 0755 after replacement (rename drops the temp's default
                 // mode, so it is copied onto the temp first).
                 if (existsSync(full))
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ export function writeFileTool(opts) {
                 return { content: `wrote ${path} (${content.length} chars)`, isError: false };
             }
             catch (err) {
-                // 八: a failed write never leaves a temp file with the FULL
+                // round 8: a failed write never leaves a temp file with the FULL
                 // content behind — it is unlinked in every failure path.
                 try {
                     unlinkSync(tmp);
@@ -468,8 +468,8 @@ export function editFileTool(opts) {
                 if (index === -1) {
                     return { content: `edit_file: pattern not found in ${path}`, isError: true, errorKind: "invalid_input" };
                 }
-                // E 组: safe replacement — never rewrite a shared external inode via a hard link.
-                // 八: the edited file keeps its mode.
+                // E group: safe replacement — never rewrite a shared external inode via a hard link.
+                // round 8: the edited file keeps its mode.
                 preservedMode = statSync(full).mode & 0o7777;
                 writeFileSync(tmp, text.slice(0, index) + replace + text.slice(index + search.length), "utf8");
                 chmodSync(tmp, preservedMode);
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ export function editFileTool(opts) {
                 return { content: `edited ${path}`, isError: false };
             }
             catch (err) {
-                // 八: a failed edit never leaves a temp file behind.
+                // round 8: a failed edit never leaves a temp file behind.
                 try {
                     unlinkSync(tmp);
                 }
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ export function editFileTool(opts) {
     });
 }
 /**
- * 自举 #3 (发现#7): the explicit credential list stripped from shell
+ * bootstrap #3 (finding #7): the explicit credential list stripped from shell
  * children — the agent's own provider surface (both families' keys, base
  * URLs, and model choices) plus the generic API-key / auth-token patterns
  * that cover other providers. Everything else in the environment passes
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
         },
         execute: async ({ command, timeoutMs }, ctx) => {
             const timeout = timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_SHELL_TIMEOUT_MS;
-            // E 组: a PRE-aborted signal never spawns the command.
+            // E group: a PRE-aborted signal never spawns the command.
             if (ctx.signal.aborted) {
                 return { content: "shell aborted before start", isError: true, errorKind: "fatal" };
             }
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
                 // detached: the command gets its OWN process group, so a
                 // timeout/abort can kill the WHOLE TREE (children included),
                 // not just the outer shell (Area 4). cwd is the workspace.
-                // 自举 #3 (发现#7): the shell child NEVER inherits kiso's own
+                // bootstrap #3 (finding #7): the shell child NEVER inherits kiso's own
                 // provider credentials by default — only the explicit
                 // shellEnv: "inherit" opt-in keeps them.
                 const child = spawn(command, {
@@ -562,13 +562,13 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
                         return;
                     settled = true;
                     clearTimeout(timer);
-                    // E 组: the abort listener is removed once settled — it
+                    // E group: the abort listener is removed once settled — it
                     // must not accumulate across runs.
                     ctx.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
                     resolvePromise(result);
                 };
                 /**
-                 * Kill the whole tree and CONFIRM it exited (八/十一):
+                 * Kill the whole tree and CONFIRM it exited (rounds 8/11):
                  *
                  * 1. FREEZE the root (SIGSTOP) FIRST — a stopped shell cannot
                  *    fork new descendants while we enumerate;
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
                  */
                 const killTree = () => new Promise((resolveKill) => {
                     const tracked = new Set();
-                    // 十一(对抗): the ROOT itself is tracked too — the
+                    // round 11 (adversarial): the ROOT itself is tracked too — the
                     // verdict must not read "aborted" while the root
                     // survives. DOCUMENTED LIMITS: (1) a process that
                     // forks between SIGSTOP delivery and the next scan,
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
                         }
                         previous = current;
                     }
-                    // The process group (E 组: never kill an undefined/0
+                    // The process group (E group: never kill an undefined/0
                     // pid), which also takes the frozen root down.
                     if (child.pid !== undefined && child.pid > 0) {
                         try {
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
                         : { content: `exit ${code}: ${combined}`, isError: true, errorKind: "fatal" });
                 });
                 // The kernel's abort reaches the command AND its whole tree.
-                // The listener is removed by settle (E 组).
+                // The listener is removed by settle (E group).
                 const uncertainVerdict = (unconfirmed) => unconfirmed.length > 0
                     ? `could not confirm ${unconfirmed.length} descendant(s) exited (pids ${unconfirmed.join(", ")}) — treat the side effect as UNCERTAIN`
                     : "";
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ export function shellTool(opts) {
 }
 /**
  * All live pids whose ancestor chain includes `pid`, from the pid table
- * (八: `ps -axo pid=,ppid=` — the ONLY way to see a setsid()-escaped
+ * (round 8: `ps -axo pid=,ppid=` — the ONLY way to see a setsid()-escaped
  * process, which is in its own group and invisible to a group kill).
  */
 function descendantsOf(pid) {
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ function descendantsOf(pid) {
 /**
  * Poll the pid table until NONE of the tracked pids is alive (bounded).
  * Returns the pids still alive at the deadline — the caller MUST NOT
- * report "aborted"/"timed out" while any tracked pid survives (十一).
+ * report "aborted"/"timed out" while any tracked pid survives (round 11).
  */
 function waitAllDead(pids) {
     if (pids.length === 0)

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@vincemakes/kiso-tools-node",
-  "version": "0.1.29",
+  "version": "0.1.31",
   "description": "kiso coding tools for Node hosts — read file, list directory, search text, write/edit file, shell command.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "MIT",
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
     "test": "vitest run"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@vincemakes/kiso-core": "0.1.29"
+    "@vincemakes/kiso-core": "0.1.30"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^26.1.2",