@vibekiln/cutline-mcp-cli 0.3.0 → 0.4.0

package/dist/servers/cutline-server.js

@@ -4365,6 +4365,39 @@ var UNIVERSAL_CONSTRAINTS = [
     file_patterns: ["**/api/auth/**", "**/api/login*", "**/api/callback*", "**/api/checkout*", "**/middleware/**"],
     framework: "baseline"
   },
+  {
+    id_suffix: "sensitive_tokens_not_in_urls",
+    category: "security",
+    summary: "Auth/session/API tokens MUST NOT be passed in URL query parameters during redirects. Sensitive tokens in URLs leak via logs, browser history, and referrers.",
+    keywords: ["token", "query-param", "callback", "returnUrl", "redirect", "referrer", "url-leakage"],
+    severity: "critical",
+    action: "Use Authorization headers or httpOnly cookies for token transport. Validate callback/return URLs against an allowlist and never append bearer/session tokens to redirected URLs.",
+    checklist_ref: "D11",
+    file_patterns: ["**/auth/**", "**/api/auth/**", "**/api/**/checkout*", "**/mcp-auth*", "**/session/**", "**/middleware/**"],
+    framework: "baseline"
+  },
+  {
+    id_suffix: "no_secrets_in_query_params",
+    category: "security",
+    summary: "Secrets (revalidation secrets, API secrets, webhook secrets) MUST NOT be transported via URL query parameters. Query-string secrets are leaked through logs, referrers, and browser history.",
+    keywords: ["secret", "query-param", "url", "revalidate", "webhook", "referrer", "leakage"],
+    severity: "critical",
+    action: "Accept secrets only via headers or signed request bodies. Reject secret-bearing query params in production endpoints. Rotate any secret previously sent in URLs.",
+    checklist_ref: "D12",
+    file_patterns: ["**/api/**", "**/webhooks/**", "**/revalidate/**", "**/middleware/**"],
+    framework: "baseline"
+  },
+  {
+    id_suffix: "no_state_change_get_cookie_auth",
+    category: "security",
+    summary: "State-changing operations MUST NOT be reachable via GET when cookie authentication is accepted. GET + cookie auth creates CSRF risk.",
+    keywords: ["csrf", "get", "state-change", "cookie-auth", "origin-check", "referer", "method-safety"],
+    severity: "critical",
+    action: "Use POST/PUT/DELETE for side effects. If GET fallback is unavoidable, enforce strict same-origin checks (Origin/Referer/sec-fetch-site) and avoid cookie-based auth fallback where possible.",
+    checklist_ref: "D13",
+    file_patterns: ["**/api/**", "**/auth/**", "**/checkout/**", "**/middleware/**"],
+    framework: "baseline"
+  },
   {
     id_suffix: "ai_cost_caps",
     category: "security",
@@ -5551,6 +5584,9 @@ D7. Do sensitive actions (account deletion, email change, role escalation) requi
 D8. Is payment/billing logic validated server-side? Can prices or quantities be tampered with client-side?
 D9. Are redirect URLs validated against an allowlist? Can open redirects be exploited for phishing?
 D10. Are webhook signatures verified before processing payment or event data?
+D11. Are auth/session/API tokens kept out of URL query params (including callback/returnUrl redirects) and transported via headers or httpOnly cookies instead?
+D12. Are secrets (revalidate/API/webhook/etc.) kept out of URL query params and accepted only via headers or signed bodies?
+D13. Are side-effecting endpoints using non-GET methods, and are cookie-auth GET fallbacks protected with strict same-origin checks?
 
 ### E. Security Rules & Infrastructure
 E1. For Firestore/database rules: do they enforce per-user data isolation?
@@ -5629,7 +5665,7 @@ Return a JSON object with exactly these fields:
 - targetUsers (string): Who uses this product, from a security perspective.
 - referenceClasses (string[]): Security frameworks or standards that apply (e.g., "OWASP Top 10 2021", "SOC 2 Type II").
 - constraints (object?): Resource constraints \u2014 team, budget_usd, deadline_days, must_ship_scope.
-- checklist_summary (object): Keys are checklist IDs (A1-A8, B1-B6, C1-C7, D1-D8, E1-E4, F1-F3, G-*, H1-H3, I1-I8, J1-J6, K1-K8), values are "pass"|"fail"|"warn"|"not_applicable". This forces systematic coverage.
+- checklist_summary (object): Keys are checklist IDs (A1-A8, B1-B6, C1-C8, D1-D13, E1-E7, F1-F4, G-*, H1-H3, I1-I8, J1-J6, K1-K8), values are "pass"|"fail"|"warn"|"not_applicable". This forces systematic coverage.
 - compliance_signals (array of {framework: "pci_dss"|"hipaa"|"fedramp"|"gdpr_ccpa"|"owasp_llm"|"glba"|"ferpa_coppa"|"csa_ccm"|"ios_app_store", signal: string, confidence: number}?): Detected compliance framework signals. Return [] if none.
 
 Be concrete and specific. Reference file paths and line numbers where possible. If a checklist item cannot be assessed from the provided files, mark it "not_applicable" and note why. Cover ALL sections A through K.`;
@@ -5855,6 +5891,11 @@ var SECURITY_PATH_PATTERNS = [
   /\/permissions?/i,
   /\/roles?/i,
   /\/tokens?/i,
+  /\/redirect/i,
+  /\/callback/i,
+  /returnurl/i,
+  /\/mcp-auth/i,
+  /checkout-link/i,
   /\/csrf/i,
   /\/rate-limit/i,
   /\/encrypt/i,
@@ -6538,6 +6579,11 @@ var SECURITY_PATH_PATTERNS2 = [
   /billing/i,
   /stripe/i,
   /webhook/i,
+  /redirect/i,
+  /callback/i,
+  /returnurl/i,
+  /mcp-auth/i,
+  /checkout-link/i,
   // Scalability & reliability patterns
   /\/db\//i,
   /queries?\//i,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
     "name": "@vibekiln/cutline-mcp-cli",
-    "version": "0.3.0",
+    "version": "0.4.0",
     "description": "CLI and MCP servers for Cutline — authenticate, then run constraint-aware MCP servers in Cursor or any MCP client.",
     "type": "module",
     "main": "dist/index.js",