@verajs/ssr 0.2.1 → 0.3.1

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Files changed (63) hide show
  1. package/README.md +522 -390
  2. package/dist/vera/diagnostics.d.ts +20 -0
  3. package/dist/vera/diagnostics.js +102 -0
  4. package/dist/vera/escaping.d.ts +155 -0
  5. package/dist/vera/escaping.js +293 -0
  6. package/dist/vera/events.d.ts +41 -0
  7. package/dist/vera/events.js +162 -0
  8. package/dist/vera/frames.d.ts +38 -0
  9. package/dist/vera/frames.js +195 -0
  10. package/dist/vera/index.d.ts +48 -0
  11. package/dist/vera/index.js +480 -0
  12. package/{types → dist/vera}/nodes.d.ts +389 -302
  13. package/dist/vera/nodes.js +2339 -0
  14. package/dist/vera/parse.d.ts +53 -0
  15. package/dist/vera/parse.js +485 -0
  16. package/dist/vera/reflections.d.ts +566 -0
  17. package/dist/vera/reflections.js +820 -0
  18. package/dist/vera/registry.d.ts +14 -0
  19. package/{src → dist}/vera/registry.js +5 -1
  20. package/dist/vera/report.d.ts +27 -0
  21. package/dist/vera/report.js +56 -0
  22. package/dist/vera/scan.d.ts +37 -0
  23. package/dist/vera/scan.js +143 -0
  24. package/dist/vera/select.d.ts +40 -0
  25. package/dist/vera/select.js +261 -0
  26. package/dist/vera/serializer.d.ts +39 -0
  27. package/dist/vera/serializer.js +1521 -0
  28. package/dist/vera/shim.d.ts +42 -0
  29. package/dist/vera/shim.js +853 -0
  30. package/dist/vera/slots.d.ts +5 -0
  31. package/dist/vera/slots.js +104 -0
  32. package/dist/vera/stylesheets.d.ts +62 -0
  33. package/dist/vera/stylesheets.js +180 -0
  34. package/dist/vera/tokenizer.d.ts +32 -0
  35. package/dist/vera/tokenizer.js +553 -0
  36. package/dist/vera/types.d.ts +121 -0
  37. package/dist/vera/views.d.ts +63 -0
  38. package/dist/vera/views.js +245 -0
  39. package/package.json +12 -13
  40. package/src/vera/escaping.js +0 -135
  41. package/src/vera/events.js +0 -164
  42. package/src/vera/frames.js +0 -102
  43. package/src/vera/index.js +0 -1187
  44. package/src/vera/nodes.js +0 -2294
  45. package/src/vera/parse.js +0 -381
  46. package/src/vera/reflections.js +0 -811
  47. package/src/vera/select.js +0 -234
  48. package/src/vera/serializer.js +0 -1080
  49. package/src/vera/shim.js +0 -761
  50. package/src/vera/stylesheets.js +0 -155
  51. package/src/vera/views.js +0 -240
  52. package/types/escaping.d.ts +0 -27
  53. package/types/events.d.ts +0 -4
  54. package/types/frames.d.ts +0 -12
  55. package/types/index.d.ts +0 -13
  56. package/types/parse.d.ts +0 -19
  57. package/types/reflections.d.ts +0 -657
  58. package/types/registry.d.ts +0 -8
  59. package/types/select.d.ts +0 -5
  60. package/types/serializer.d.ts +0 -26
  61. package/types/shim.d.ts +0 -23
  62. package/types/stylesheets.d.ts +0 -53
  63. package/types/views.d.ts +0 -26
@@ -0,0 +1,1521 @@
1
+ import { escapeHtml, escapeRawText } from './shim.js';
2
+ import { INLINE_HANDLER, NEWLINE_TAKERS, SCRIPT_URL, SCRIPT_URL_ITEM, URL_SINK, closedRawText, dataBlock, decodeCodePoint, decodeSchemeReferences, thrownMessage } from './escaping.js';
3
+ import { registry } from './registry.js';
4
+ import { PROSE, TWINS } from './diagnostics.js';
5
+ import { once, own, quoted, ssrMisuse, ssrWarning } from './report.js';
6
+ import { currentRenderingTag } from './stylesheets.js';
7
+ import { INSTANCE_ATTRIBUTE, NodeBaseShim, markPending } from './nodes.js';
8
+ import { PHASE_END_TAG_OPEN as END_TAG_OPEN, INERT_EDIT as EDIT_INERT, RAW_TEXT_TAGS as RAWTEXT, PHASE_TAG_NAME as TAG_NAME, PHASE_TAG_OPEN as TAG_OPEN, TEXT_ONLY_TAGS as TEXT_ONLY, closersOf, freshScan, isTokenizerSpace as isSpace, scanTag } from './tokenizer.js';
9
+ /** Module-local, because serializeValue (the hottest function here) reads it: an imported binding is a live one, which
10
+ * V8 reaches less directly (CLAUDE.md, measured on the tokenizer's constants). */
11
+ const NodeBase = NodeBaseShim;
12
+ /**
13
+ * The vera-native template serializer: flattens core's `html` template objects to markup with
14
+ * the renderer's sigil semantics applied server-side.
15
+ *
16
+ * `?bool=${x}` -> `bool=""` when truthy, nothing when falsy
17
+ * `.prop=${x}` -> on a rendered COMPONENT tag, delivered to the instance the nested scan
18
+ * renders (by identity, never markup); on a form control, mirrored to an
19
+ * attribute (value/checked/selected); else dropped
20
+ * `@event=${fn}` -> dropped (behavior is the client's job)
21
+ * `&ref=${r}` -> dropped
22
+ * `attr=${x}` -> quoted, escaped
23
+ * text `${x}` -> escaped; nested templates and arrays flatten; only null/undefined vanish
24
+ * (`false` renders the word, as the client and as a JS template literal do —
25
+ * measured on both sides; saying otherwise here described a divergence that
26
+ * does not exist and would have sent someone hunting a hydration bug)
27
+ *
28
+ * Like the client renderer, analysis is **per template identity**: each call site's frozen
29
+ * `strings` array is classified once into a plan (slot kinds + pre-trimmed static parts), cached
30
+ * in a WeakMap. Rendering a 100-row list re-uses one plan 100 times instead of re-running the
31
+ * sigil regexes per row — the same template-identity architecture, server-side.
32
+ *
33
+ * `keyed()`/`hold()` wrappers are client-renderer constructs — SSR templates use plain `.map`.
34
+ */
35
+ /** `.prop` bindings whose server-side truth belongs in an attribute. */
36
+ const FORM_ATTRIBUTES = ['value', 'checked', 'selected'];
37
+ /**
38
+ * Whether a property binding on `owner` is one this serializer writes. `selectedIndex` is a form property on a
39
+ * `<select>` only — it chooses an option, exactly as `value` does (see `SELECT_MARK`) — and on anything else it is
40
+ * the client's concern, with no markup. The written form and a spread key ask the same question, here.
41
+ */
42
+ const isFormProperty = (owner, name) => FORM_ATTRIBUTES.includes(name) || (owner === 'select' && name === 'selectedIndex');
43
+ /**
44
+ * `checked` and `selected` are **boolean** properties; `value` is a string one.
45
+ *
46
+ * The element coerces on assignment, so `.checked=${0}` leaves a browser with `checked === false`
47
+ * while `.value=${0}` leaves it with `"0"`. All three were treated as string-ish here — present
48
+ * unless nullish or exactly `false` — so every falsy-but-not-false value (`0`, `''`, `NaN`) served
49
+ * a **ticked** checkbox against a browser's unticked one, and hydration then had to throw the
50
+ * server's markup away to correct it.
51
+ */
52
+ const BOOLEAN_FORM_PROPERTIES = new Set(['checked', 'selected']);
53
+ /**
54
+ * …and the elements where that is true.
55
+ *
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+ * Mirroring `.value` to an attribute exists so hydration can read form state back out of the
57
+ * markup, which only means anything on a form control. Applied to every element, `.value` on a
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+ * `<b>` wrote `value="…"` server-side where the client sets a plain JS property and no attribute at
59
+ * all — a difference in the rendered DOM for no benefit. Anywhere else a `.prop` is client state,
60
+ * which is what it already was.
61
+ */
62
+ const FORM_ELEMENTS = new Set(['input', 'textarea', 'select', 'option']);
63
+ /** The first character of a sigil binding's name — see `compile`. */
64
+ const SIGILS = new Set(['.', '?', '@', '&', '!']);
65
+ /**
66
+ * Where a sigil or event binding's name is cut from the static before it: at the one whitespace character before the
67
+ * name, which the binding takes with it so a dropped binding leaves no residue (`compile` then trims one more space).
68
+ */
69
+ const nameCut = (text, nameAt) => (nameAt > 0 && isSpace(text[nameAt - 1]) ? nameAt - 1 : nameAt);
70
+ /**
71
+ * **An expression inside an attribute NAME is refused** — the twin of the client's rule (`nameHole` in the renderer),
72
+ * so the two halves refuse the same templates: inside a tag and outside a value, a hole a name character touches on
73
+ * either side (`<p data-${k}="1">`, `<b ${name}="x">`, `<p ${k}-x>`, `<p a${k}b>`) — never a ref, never the TAG name.
74
+ * Refused at plan time, from statics only: no value ever reaches the message.
75
+ */
76
+ const NAME_CHAR_BEFORE = /[^\s"'>=/]$/;
77
+ const NAME_CHAR_AFTER = /^(?:[^\s"'>=/]|[ \t\n\f\r]*=)/;
78
+ /**
79
+ * A bound `javascript:` URL, refused — said once per process per component and attribute. The VALUE is never printed:
80
+ * it is attacker-shaped by definition, and a server's console is a log pipeline (2026-10-09).
81
+ */
82
+ const refusedScriptUrl = (name) => {
83
+ const tag = currentRenderingTag();
84
+ if (once('script-url', `${tag} ${name}`))
85
+ console.warn(ssrWarning((tag ? `<${tag}>` : 'the page'), 'script-url', TWINS.scriptUrl(name)));
86
+ };
87
+ const nameHole = (before, after) => {
88
+ const prefix = (/[^\s"'>=/]*$/.exec(before) ?? [''])[0];
89
+ const suffix = (/^[^\s"'>=/]*/.exec(after) ?? [''])[0];
90
+ const value = /^[ \t\n\f\r]*=[ \t\n\f\r]*(?:"([^"]*)("?)|'([^']*)('?)|([^\s>]*))/.exec(after.slice(suffix.length));
91
+ const given = value === null ? "''" : value[2] === '"' ? JSON.stringify(value[1]) : value[4] === "'" ? JSON.stringify(value[3]) : value[5] ? JSON.stringify(value[5]) : '…';
92
+ throw own(new Error(ssrMisuse('name-expression', TWINS.nameExpression(`${prefix}${'${…}'}${suffix}`, given))));
93
+ };
94
+ /** Slot kinds: text, boolean, form-prop, dropped binding, plain attribute. */
95
+ const TEXT = 0;
96
+ const BOOLEAN = 1;
97
+ const FORM_PROP = 2;
98
+ const DROPPED = 3;
99
+ const ATTRIBUTE = 4;
100
+ /** `.prop` on a component tag: delivered to the instance the scan will render, never markup. */
101
+ const COMPONENT_PROP = 5;
102
+ /** `.innerHTML`/`.textContent` on a plain element: content written after the open tag, the one sanctioned trusted-markup door. */
103
+ const CONTENT = 6;
104
+ /** The two content properties the server renders; `innerText`/`outerHTML`/`outerText` stay client-only (README). */
105
+ const CONTENT_PROPS = new Set(['innerHTML', 'textContent']);
106
+ /** What `compile` answers for data shaped like a template: no plan, so `serializeTemplate` renders it as text. */
107
+ const FORGED = {};
108
+ const FORGED_TEXT = `${{}}`;
109
+ /** A tagged template literal's strings: an array owning `raw`, which nothing from `JSON.parse` can be (see `compile`). */
110
+ const isLiteral = (strings) => Array.isArray(strings) && Object.hasOwn(strings, 'raw');
111
+ /** strings identity -> { parts, kinds, names } — computed once per call site, ever. */
112
+ const plans = new WeakMap();
113
+ /**
114
+ * strings identity -> foreign depth -> plan, for a template that STARTS inside `<svg>`/`<math>` — an `svg`/`mathml`
115
+ * template, or any template rendered into a foreign-content position. The plan differs because raw text does (see
116
+ * `foreign` in `scanTag`), and the common case — depth 0 — keeps its one lookup.
117
+ */
118
+ const foreignPlans = new WeakMap();
119
+ const claimInstance = (state, ordinal, tag) => {
120
+ let node = state.instances.get(ordinal);
121
+ if (node === undefined) {
122
+ node = new (registry.get(tag))();
123
+ node.localName = tag;
124
+ state.mark += ` ${INSTANCE_ATTRIBUTE}="${markPending(node)}"`;
125
+ state.instances.set(ordinal, node);
126
+ }
127
+ return node;
128
+ };
129
+ /**
130
+ * One delivery, shared by the written form and the spread form. `__proto__` is skipped for the
131
+ * same reason `renderToString`'s own `props` option skips it — `[[Set]]` replaces the element's
132
+ * prototype. What a failed assignment means is decided in the catch below, by the client's rule;
133
+ * `prepareInstance`'s `props` OPTION keeps its stricter throw-on-readonly contract deliberately —
134
+ * an API argument is the caller's explicit data, a template binding is a component boundary.
135
+ */
136
+ const deliverProperty = (node, tag, name, value) => {
137
+ if (name === '__proto__')
138
+ return;
139
+ try {
140
+ /** Any property the component declares, by name: the element is written as the open bag it is to a binding. */
141
+ node[name] = value;
142
+ }
143
+ catch (error) {
144
+ /**
145
+ * The CLIENT's rule, applied here so the two halves resolve the same contested state the same
146
+ * way: a getter with NO setter is a refusal — warned by name, the binding ignored, the render
147
+ * carried on, exactly what `init()`'s adoption does — while a setter that THREW is the
148
+ * component's own error and stays one, named against the tag and property rather than as
149
+ * `Cannot set property x of #<Class>`. Diverging here meant one binding produced a page on
150
+ * the client and an empty render server-side.
151
+ */
152
+ let carrier = node;
153
+ let refusable = false;
154
+ while (carrier !== null) {
155
+ const desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(carrier, name);
156
+ if (desc !== undefined) {
157
+ refusable = desc.get !== undefined && desc.set === undefined;
158
+ break;
159
+ }
160
+ carrier = Object.getPrototypeOf(carrier);
161
+ }
162
+ if (refusable) {
163
+ if (once('getter-only-prop', `${tag} ${name}`))
164
+ console.warn(ssrWarning(`<${tag}>`, 'getter-only-prop', TWINS.getterOnlyProp(name)));
165
+ return;
166
+ }
167
+ throw own(new TypeError(ssrMisuse('ssr-setter-threw', PROSE['ssr-setter-threw'](tag, name, quoted(thrownMessage(error)))), { cause: error }));
168
+ }
169
+ };
170
+ /** Attribute names written into the statics, so a duplicate can be spotted before a render. */
171
+ /**
172
+ * Preceded by whitespace, so a **tag name** is not counted as an attribute of itself, and allowed to
173
+ * end the string, because the emitted static of an unfinished tag has no `>` yet — `<b hidden` is
174
+ * how `<b hidden ?hidden=${x}>` arrives here, and its bare `hidden` is exactly the duplicate that
175
+ * has to be seen.
176
+ */
177
+ const STATIC_ATTRIBUTE = /\s([a-zA-Z][\w:-]*)(?==|[\s>]|$)/g;
178
+ /**
179
+ * An author's static, ready to sit inside the DOUBLE quotes the server writes around every bound value.
180
+ * Only a `"` can end them; an entity stays an entity, because the browser decodes one identically in any
181
+ * quoting.
182
+ */
183
+ const forDoubleQuotes = (text, quote) => (quote === '"' || !text.includes('"') ? text : text.replaceAll('"', '&#34;'));
184
+ /**
185
+ * Whether this static's LAST character — a `>`, which the caller has checked — ends a start tag that takes a leading
186
+ * line feed (`NEWLINE_TAKERS`). Only that position matters: content written as static text after the tag is parsed
187
+ * alike on both sides, while what the next binding writes there arrives on the client through the DOM, which takes
188
+ * nothing. Such a static gets one `\n` of its own, ALWAYS: the parser takes exactly one, so whatever comes first —
189
+ * a value, an empty one, a list, a nested template's static, the next static — arrives as the client has it, and the
190
+ * render does nothing at all (measured: 28 tag × content shapes, 2026-10-07). One byte per such element.
191
+ *
192
+ * Asked of the scan itself — the static minus its `>`, from a copy of the state before it — so a `<pre>` inside an
193
+ * attribute value, a comment or raw text is never mistaken for one. Whether it is HTML is the full scan's answer,
194
+ * after the `>`: a `<pre>` breaks out of `<svg>`. Plan time only.
195
+ */
196
+ const takesNewline = (text, before) => {
197
+ const at = scanTag(text.slice(0, -1), { ...before, opens: before.opens.slice() });
198
+ return (at.inTag && !at.closing && !(at.inValue && at.quote !== '') && at.comment === '' && NEWLINE_TAKERS.has(at.tagName));
199
+ };
200
+ /** A scan state to run `scanTag` from without touching the original (`scanTag` mutates `opens`). */
201
+ const copyScan = (state) => ({ ...state, opens: [...state.opens] });
202
+ /**
203
+ * **The start tag that OPENED the script hole `hole` sits in, as written** (a hole inside the tag as `\uFFFF`), read by
204
+ * THIS tokenizer, never searched for: the static in which `rawTag` turns `script`, the `>` that turns it (the shortest
205
+ * prefix of that static whose scan does), and where that tag began — in that static (`tagAt`) or in the earlier one it
206
+ * was left open in. Cold: once per script hole, once per template (`compile`).
207
+ */
208
+ const openingTag = (strings, hole, depth) => {
209
+ let state = freshScan(depth);
210
+ let open = [0, 0];
211
+ let found = '';
212
+ for (let j = 0; j <= hole; j++) {
213
+ const text = strings[j];
214
+ const after = scanTag(text, copyScan(state));
215
+ if (state.rawTag !== 'script' && after.rawTag === 'script') {
216
+ let end = 1;
217
+ while (scanTag(text.slice(0, end), copyScan(state)).rawTag !== 'script')
218
+ end++;
219
+ const before = scanTag(text.slice(0, end - 1), copyScan(state));
220
+ const [from, at] = before.tagAt >= 0 ? [j, before.tagAt] : open;
221
+ found = from === j ? text.slice(at, end) : strings[from].slice(at) + '\uFFFF' + strings.slice(from + 1, j).map((t) => `${t}\uFFFF`).join('') + text.slice(0, end);
222
+ }
223
+ if (after.inTag && after.tagAt >= 0)
224
+ open = [j, after.tagAt];
225
+ state = after;
226
+ }
227
+ return found;
228
+ };
229
+ const compile = (strings, depth) => {
230
+ /**
231
+ * **A template is a tagged template literal's, never data shaped like one.** Template detection is by shape (`strings`),
232
+ * so `JSON.parse('{"strings":["<img src=x onerror=…>"]}')` — a request body, an API field an attacker can make an
233
+ * object — was rendered as MARKUP wherever it was interpolated. A literal's strings array owns a `raw` property, which
234
+ * JSON cannot give an array (and an object that owns one is not an array): the check Lit makes, here on the plan
235
+ * cache's miss, which a forged array always is — so it costs a cached template nothing. A forgery is answered with
236
+ * `null` — the caller renders it as the ordinary object it is — and never a throw: the value is attacker-controlled
237
+ * by definition, and a throw would trade the injection for the whole response.
238
+ */
239
+ if (!isLiteral(strings)) {
240
+ /** Once per process per component (Brian, 2026-10-09); the forgery itself still renders as the object it is. */
241
+ const tag = currentRenderingTag();
242
+ if (once('forged-template', tag))
243
+ console.warn(ssrWarning((tag ? `<${tag}>` : 'the page'), 'forged-template', TWINS.forgedTemplate()));
244
+ return null;
245
+ }
246
+ const parts = [];
247
+ const kinds = [];
248
+ const names = [];
249
+ /**
250
+ * Whether a slot has to scan the open tag for an earlier write of its own name, and the tag it
251
+ * sits in.
252
+ *
253
+ * Both are properties of the *template*, not of a render: an attribute can only be duplicated by
254
+ * the statics around it, by an earlier binding in the same tag, or by a spread — and every one of
255
+ * those is visible here. Computing them per render cost 0.03–0.06 µs on every attribute, boolean
256
+ * and form-property binding, which is 18–68% of what those bindings cost in total. Almost no tag
257
+ * writes a name twice, so almost every one of those scans found nothing.
258
+ */
259
+ const strip = [];
260
+ const owners = [];
261
+ /** Which RAWTEXT element each binding sits inside, `''` when none. See `RAWTEXT`. */
262
+ const raws = [];
263
+ /**
264
+ * Per static, the raw-content bounds its scan reported (`rawFrom`, `rawUntil`) — read only for a JSON block or an
265
+ * HTML style, below.
266
+ */
267
+ const rawBounds = [];
268
+ /** Per child binding (sparse): the foreign-content depth it sits at, which a template rendered there starts from. */
269
+ const depths = [];
270
+ /** Per child binding (sparse): whether it sits in a text-only element, where a template is refused (see `serializeValue`). */
271
+ const texts = [];
272
+ /**
273
+ * Whether each slot is an **element position** — inside a tag but not inside an attribute value.
274
+ *
275
+ * `<b title="${x}">` is also a value inside a tag, and it is *not* an element position: the
276
+ * statics carry `title="` and `">` around it and the value is simply written between them. The
277
+ * difference is what the static ends with, so it is settled here rather than guessed at render.
278
+ */
279
+ const elementPositions = [];
280
+ /**
281
+ * Which ELEMENT each slot belongs to — an ordinal that advances when a tag opens. The owner tag
282
+ * NAME cannot tell two sibling `<x-row .item=${…}>`s apart, and component-prop delivery needs
283
+ * to: every slot sharing an ordinal delivers to one instance, per application.
284
+ */
285
+ const elements = [];
286
+ let elementOrdinal = 0;
287
+ /** Names written so far in the tag being built — statics and earlier bindings alike. */
288
+ let written = new Set();
289
+ /** A spread's keys are runtime values, so a tag holding one can never be settled here. */
290
+ let dynamicTag = false;
291
+ let owner = '';
292
+ /** The quote character a binding opened with, to be stripped off the front of the next static. */
293
+ let openQuote = '';
294
+ let wasInTag = false;
295
+ /** Carried across statics — see `scanTag`. */
296
+ let tagState = freshScan(depth);
297
+ /** Per binding: whether a component property's name is a URL sink. */
298
+ const urls = [];
299
+ /**
300
+ * Per attribute-value binding, by binding index (sparse): its attribute's group (shared by every hole in one value), the static
301
+ * written before the value — ready for double quotes — and that static decoded, for the URL check.
302
+ */
303
+ const groups = [];
304
+ const leads = [];
305
+ const decodedLeads = [];
306
+ for (let i = 0; i < strings.length - 1; i++) {
307
+ let part = strings[i];
308
+ if (openQuote && part.startsWith(openQuote))
309
+ part = part.slice(1);
310
+ /**
311
+ * Scanned from the **author's** static, not the trimmed one.
312
+ *
313
+ * `part` has already had a binding's opening quote removed by the `openQuote` handling above, so
314
+ * `?hidden='${x}'` reaches the scanner as `?hidden=` followed by `>bs</b>` — the closing quote
315
+ * gone. The scanner then waits for a `'` that never comes and reads the whole rest of the
316
+ * template as one attribute value, which made every element position after it invisible.
317
+ */
318
+ /**
319
+ * Whether this static ends with such a start tag. The cheap part is written out here, no call: on a cold server a
320
+ * newly compiled function costs its first render more than the check does (measured 2026-10-07). Only a static
321
+ * ending in `>` that continues such a tag, or holds `<pre`, `<lis` or `<tex` in any case, is asked properly —
322
+ * three letters, because one let `<p>`, `<li>`, `<td>` and `<title>` through and every template paid the scan.
323
+ */
324
+ let taker = false;
325
+ const text = strings[i];
326
+ if (text.charCodeAt(text.length - 1) === 62) {
327
+ const open = tagState.inTag ? tagState.tagName : '';
328
+ let maybe = open === 'pre' || open === 'listing' || open === 'textarea';
329
+ for (let at = text.indexOf('<'); !maybe && at !== -1; at = text.indexOf('<', at + 1)) {
330
+ const a = text.charCodeAt(at + 1);
331
+ const b = text.charCodeAt(at + 2);
332
+ const c = text.charCodeAt(at + 3);
333
+ /** `pre`, `lis` or `tex`, each letter in either case. */
334
+ maybe =
335
+ ((a === 112 || a === 80) && (b === 114 || b === 82) && (c === 101 || c === 69)) ||
336
+ ((a === 108 || a === 76) && (b === 105 || b === 73) && (c === 115 || c === 83)) ||
337
+ ((a === 116 || a === 84) && (b === 101 || b === 69) && (c === 120 || c === 88));
338
+ }
339
+ if (maybe)
340
+ taker = takesNewline(text, tagState);
341
+ }
342
+ tagState = scanTag(strings[i], tagState);
343
+ rawBounds[i] = [tagState.rawFrom, tagState.rawUntil];
344
+ if (taker && (tagState.foreign !== 0 || tagState.inert !== 0))
345
+ taker = false;
346
+ /**
347
+ * A hole in the content of an SVG `<script>` (or a MathML element of that name) is code too: refused as an HTML
348
+ * script's is (`ssr-script-hole`, every build), JSON or not — a foreign script is no data block (2026-11-18).
349
+ */
350
+ if (!tagState.inTag && tagState.opens.some((open) => open.name === 'script'))
351
+ throw own(new Error(ssrMisuse('ssr-script-hole', PROSE['ssr-script-hole']())));
352
+ /**
353
+ * **Every question about where this hole sits is answered by that scan** — whether it is inside a tag, which tag,
354
+ * whether a new one opened, and whether the hole is a sigil binding. They used to be answered beside it, by tests
355
+ * on the static's tail (its last `<` against its last `>`, a sigil pattern, a tag-name pattern), which knew nothing
356
+ * of comments, raw text or the tokenizer's names: `<!-- <div .innerHTML=${v}> -->` honored the binding INSIDE the
357
+ * comment, so a `-->` in `v` ended it, and `<textarea><b .innerHTML=${v}>` broke out of the textarea the same way.
358
+ */
359
+ const inTag = tagState.inTag;
360
+ /** `<template>`'s content: inert markup the client never walks, so it never reaches this
361
+ * binding — it neither renders the value nor keeps the attribute holding it. Nor does this.
362
+ */
363
+ const inert = tagState.inert > 0;
364
+ /** A new tag starts wherever this text opens one that is still open at its end; what the previous tag held is irrelevant. */
365
+ const opensTag = inTag && tagState.tagAt !== -1;
366
+ if (opensTag || (!inTag && wasInTag)) {
367
+ written = new Set();
368
+ dynamicTag = false;
369
+ if (opensTag)
370
+ elementOrdinal++;
371
+ }
372
+ wasInTag = inTag;
373
+ /** The tag a binding belongs to, by the name the tokenizer reads — the element's `localName` on the client. */
374
+ owner = inTag && !tagState.closing ? tagState.tagName : '';
375
+ /**
376
+ * Whether this hole is an attribute's WHOLE value as it opens — `name=${…}`, quoted or not, with space around `=`
377
+ * as the tokenizer allows. Only then can it be a sigil or event binding: a hole later in a value (`title="a
378
+ * .x=${…}"`) is part of that value.
379
+ */
380
+ const whole = inTag && tagState.inValue && tagState.opened && tagState.valueStart === strings[i].length;
381
+ /** Offsets are in the author's static; `part` may have lost a leading quote to the binding before it. */
382
+ const shift = strings[i].length - part.length;
383
+ /**
384
+ * Names in the statics are recorded from the text that is actually **emitted**, which is the
385
+ * part with this binding's own name already trimmed off. Scanning the raw part instead counts
386
+ * `title=` — the binding's own name — as a prior write, and in `<b title="a" title=${x}>` the
387
+ * two collapse into one entry, so the real duplicate goes unnoticed.
388
+ */
389
+ const record = (staticText) => {
390
+ if (inTag)
391
+ for (const [, found] of staticText.matchAll(STATIC_ATTRIBUTE))
392
+ written.add(found.toLowerCase());
393
+ };
394
+ /**
395
+ * **A sigil binding** — `.prop`, `?bool`, `@event`, `&ref`, `!live` — is an attribute whose name starts with the
396
+ * sigil and whose whole value is this hole, however it is quoted. The name after the sigil is any name character,
397
+ * as the client's scanner reads it: `._private` and `@_tap` are sigil bindings, and a sigil INSIDE a name is part
398
+ * of it (`data-x.y` is an attribute). A sigil the server does not know is not inert — it would fall through to the
399
+ * attribute path and emit an attribute named `!` — so every sigil is added here in the same pass it is added to
400
+ * the renderer.
401
+ */
402
+ if (whole && SIGILS.has(tagState.attrRaw[0])) {
403
+ /** The space that preceded the binding goes with it, so dropped bindings leave no residue. */
404
+ const before = part.slice(0, nameCut(strings[i], tagState.nameAt) - shift).replace(/ $/, '');
405
+ record(before);
406
+ parts.push(before);
407
+ openQuote = tagState.quote;
408
+ const kind = tagState.attrRaw[0];
409
+ /**
410
+ * Absent after a bare `&=`, which is an element ref with no name — legal: the renderer back-reads the name `&`
411
+ * and maps it to a ref, so the client renders nothing, and so does this. A nameless `.=`, `?=`, `@=` or `!=` has
412
+ * no meaning either, and is dropped the same way.
413
+ */
414
+ const sigilName = tagState.attrRaw.slice(1);
415
+ if (inert) {
416
+ kinds.push(DROPPED);
417
+ }
418
+ else if (kind === '?') {
419
+ kinds.push(BOOLEAN);
420
+ }
421
+ else if ((kind === '.' || kind === '!') && sigilName && owner.includes('-')) {
422
+ /**
423
+ * A property on a COMPONENT tag is neither markup nor a client concern: it is the data the
424
+ * child renders from, so it is delivered to the instance the nested-component scan will
425
+ * render — before `FORM_ATTRIBUTES`, because `.value` on `<my-input>` is that component's
426
+ * prop, not a form control's dirty value. `!name` is here beside `.name` for the same
427
+ * reason it serializes as `.name` on form controls, and because a spread reports `!` keys
428
+ * as properties — the two spellings of one binding must get one answer. Whether the tag is
429
+ * actually registered is a render-time question (the registry fills as modules execute),
430
+ * answered in the case below.
431
+ */
432
+ kinds.push(COMPONENT_PROP);
433
+ urls[kinds.length - 1] = URL_SINK.test(sigilName);
434
+ }
435
+ else if (kind === '.' && CONTENT_PROPS.has(sigilName)) {
436
+ /**
437
+ * `.innerHTML`/`.textContent` on a plain element is the trusted-markup door (`@verajs/renderer`'s property
438
+ * binding): the value is the element's content, written after the open tag. Its foreign depth is the host's
439
+ * INSIDE — the tag's depth, plus one when the host is itself `<svg>`/`<math>` — so a `<style>` in it is read
440
+ * the way the browser will read it. A custom-element host took the `COMPONENT_PROP` branch above.
441
+ */
442
+ kinds.push(CONTENT);
443
+ depths[kinds.length - 1] = tagState.foreign + (owner === 'svg' || owner === 'math' ? 1 : 0);
444
+ }
445
+ else if ((kind === '.' || kind === '!') && isFormProperty(owner, sigilName)) {
446
+ /**
447
+ * `!name` is a **live** property, and still a property: the sigil only changes when the client re-writes it,
448
+ * and a server has nothing to re-write against — so it serializes exactly as `.name` does, and the first
449
+ * paint is right before the client takes over.
450
+ */
451
+ kinds.push(FORM_PROP);
452
+ }
453
+ else {
454
+ kinds.push(DROPPED);
455
+ }
456
+ names.push(sigilName);
457
+ strip.push(dynamicTag || written.has(sigilName.toLowerCase()));
458
+ owners.push(owner);
459
+ raws.push(tagState.rawTag);
460
+ elementPositions.push(false);
461
+ elements.push(elementOrdinal);
462
+ if (sigilName)
463
+ written.add(sigilName.toLowerCase());
464
+ continue;
465
+ }
466
+ openQuote = '';
467
+ /** `onClick=${fn}` — the React-shaped event binding, named as the client names it: a client concern, dropped like `@`. */
468
+ if (whole && /^on[A-Z]/.test(tagState.attrRaw)) {
469
+ const before = part.slice(0, tagState.nameAt - shift).replace(/ $/, '');
470
+ record(before);
471
+ parts.push(before);
472
+ openQuote = tagState.quote;
473
+ kinds.push(DROPPED);
474
+ names.push('');
475
+ strip.push(false);
476
+ owners.push(owner);
477
+ raws.push(tagState.rawTag);
478
+ elementPositions.push(false);
479
+ elements.push(elementOrdinal);
480
+ continue;
481
+ }
482
+ /**
483
+ * **A bound attribute value, in any position** — double-quoted, single-quoted or unquoted, with space
484
+ * around `=`, with statics beside it, or several holes in one value.
485
+ *
486
+ * The client never lets the tokenizer see a value: it joins the attribute's statics and values and calls
487
+ * `setAttribute`. This streamed each position differently instead — a lone unquoted `title=${x}` was
488
+ * quoted, a quoted value was escaped between the author's quotes, and every other shape went out raw
489
+ * and UNQUOTED: `title=pre${x}`, `title=${a}${b}` and `title = ${x}` let a value carrying
490
+ * ` onmouseover=…` end the attribute and start a live handler, while the client rendered one harmless
491
+ * `title`. So every hole in one value shares ONE group, compiled here from `scanTag`'s state: the
492
+ * attribute's head (name, `=`, opening quote, static prefix) and tail (static suffix, closing quote)
493
+ * come off the statics, and the render writes the whole attribute once, always double-quoted — or not
494
+ * at all. Position stops mattering because nothing a value holds can reach the tokenizer.
495
+ */
496
+ if (tagState.inTag && tagState.inValue && (tagState.opened || groups[kinds.length - 1]?.serial === tagState.serial)) {
497
+ const previous = groups[kinds.length - 1];
498
+ let group;
499
+ if (previous !== undefined && previous.serial === tagState.serial) {
500
+ group = previous;
501
+ group.sole = false;
502
+ parts.push('');
503
+ leads[kinds.length] = forDoubleQuotes(part, group.quote);
504
+ decodedLeads[kinds.length] = decodeSchemeReferences(part);
505
+ }
506
+ else {
507
+ const before = part.slice(0, tagState.attrStart - shift);
508
+ const prefix = part.slice(tagState.valueStart - shift);
509
+ const lower = tagState.attrName;
510
+ /** Whether the name is a URL sink, and which kind (captured: from the start; not: item by item). */
511
+ const sink = URL_SINK.exec(lower);
512
+ record(before);
513
+ parts.push(before);
514
+ group = {
515
+ name: tagState.attrRaw,
516
+ /** Everything the render writes before the value: the separating space, the name, `=` and the quote. */
517
+ open: ` ${tagState.attrRaw}="`,
518
+ serial: tagState.serial,
519
+ quote: tagState.quote,
520
+ first: kinds.length,
521
+ last: kinds.length,
522
+ /**
523
+ * Never served (1): inert content, a bound `srcdoc` (it renders its value as a document) and a bound inline
524
+ * handler (`onclick=${…}` runs its value as code). A URL sink refuses `javascript:` (2), and an animation's
525
+ * value refuses it in any `;`-separated item (3) — as the client does. Above 1: the joined value is checked.
526
+ */
527
+ refuse: inert || lower === 'srcdoc' || INLINE_HANDLER.test(lower) ? 1 : sink === null ? 0 : sink[1] ? 2 : 3,
528
+ /** An earlier write of this name in the tag: the client's `setAttribute` replaces it, so it is removed. */
529
+ strip: dynamicTag || written.has(lower),
530
+ /** The WHOLE value is this one binding — the only shape where a nullish value removes the attribute. */
531
+ sole: prefix === '',
532
+ suffix: '',
533
+ decodedSuffix: '',
534
+ };
535
+ written.add(lower);
536
+ leads[kinds.length] = forDoubleQuotes(prefix, group.quote);
537
+ decodedLeads[kinds.length] = decodeSchemeReferences(prefix);
538
+ }
539
+ group.last = kinds.length;
540
+ groups[kinds.length] = group;
541
+ kinds.push(ATTRIBUTE);
542
+ names.push(group.name);
543
+ strip.push(false);
544
+ owners.push(owner);
545
+ raws.push(tagState.rawTag);
546
+ elementPositions.push(false);
547
+ elements.push(elementOrdinal);
548
+ continue;
549
+ }
550
+ record(part);
551
+ /**
552
+ * A binding dropped inside a comment leaves ONE space where it was, so the statics on either side cannot meet as
553
+ * a different token: `<!${…}--!>` read as a bogus comment, ended by its `>`, while the bare join `<!--!>` OPENS a
554
+ * comment that swallowed the page after it; `-${…}->` joined to `-->` and ended a comment early.
555
+ */
556
+ parts.push(tagState.comment !== '' && !inert ? part + ' ' : taker ? part + '\n' : part);
557
+ if (tagState.foreign)
558
+ depths[kinds.length] = tagState.foreign;
559
+ /**
560
+ * Inside `<noscript>` too, at any depth (2026-11-18): the client reads a noscript's content as raw text (Firefox, and
561
+ * the renderer's scanner everywhere) and writes its values as encoded text, so a template there cannot be placed —
562
+ * refused here as in a text-only element (`ssr-template-in-text`), one rule on both sides. Values stay escaped, and
563
+ * an attribute value stays quoted.
564
+ */
565
+ if (tagState.textTag || tagState.opens.some((open) => open.name === 'noscript'))
566
+ texts[kinds.length] = true;
567
+ /** A binding inside a comment is dropped, as the client drops it — never written into the comment. */
568
+ kinds.push(inert || tagState.comment ? DROPPED : TEXT);
569
+ names.push('');
570
+ strip.push(false);
571
+ owners.push(owner);
572
+ raws.push(tagState.rawTag);
573
+ /** Inside a tag, and not inside an attribute value: `<input ${ref} />`, `<b ${spread(…)}>`. */
574
+ const elementPosition = tagState.inTag && !tagState.inValue;
575
+ /**
576
+ * A TAG-name hole — right after `<` or `</`, or inside a tag name: refused in every build, the twin of the client's
577
+ * development refusal, one message.
578
+ */
579
+ const tagNameHole = tagState.phase === TAG_OPEN || tagState.phase === END_TAG_OPEN || tagState.phase === TAG_NAME;
580
+ if (tagNameHole)
581
+ throw own(new Error(ssrMisuse('tag-hole', TWINS.tagHole())));
582
+ if (elementPosition && !tagNameHole && (NAME_CHAR_BEFORE.test(part) || NAME_CHAR_AFTER.test(strings[i + 1])))
583
+ nameHole(part, strings[i + 1]);
584
+ elementPositions.push(elementPosition);
585
+ elements.push(elementOrdinal);
586
+ /** A spread's keys are unknown until it runs, so its tag can no longer be settled here. */
587
+ if (elementPosition)
588
+ dynamicTag = true;
589
+ }
590
+ let last = strings[strings.length - 1];
591
+ if (openQuote && last.startsWith(openQuote))
592
+ last = last.slice(1);
593
+ parts.push(last);
594
+ /** Each attribute's tail — its static suffix and closing quote — comes off the static after its last hole. */
595
+ for (let i = 0; i < groups.length; i++) {
596
+ const group = groups[i];
597
+ if (group === undefined || group.last !== i)
598
+ continue;
599
+ const next = parts[i + 1];
600
+ /**
601
+ * An unquoted value ends at the tokenizer's whitespace (never `\s`: a `\v` is value text, and cutting there left
602
+ * the rest to open a quote that never closed, losing the element) or `>` — and at a `/>` RIGHT after its last hole, which is the tag's
603
+ * self-close, not value text: the client's scanner keeps the slash out of the value the same way (`<circle
604
+ * r=${r}/>`). Taken as text, it served `r="5/"` and left the element open, nesting the next one inside it.
605
+ */
606
+ let end = group.quote ? next.indexOf(group.quote) : next.startsWith('/>') ? 0 : next.search(/[\t\n\f\r >]/);
607
+ /** A template that ends inside the value: the rest is the suffix, as the client's parser reads it. */
608
+ const closed = end !== -1;
609
+ if (!closed)
610
+ end = next.length;
611
+ const suffix = next.slice(0, end);
612
+ if (suffix !== '')
613
+ group.sole = false;
614
+ group.suffix = forDoubleQuotes(suffix, group.quote);
615
+ group.decodedSuffix = decodeSchemeReferences(suffix);
616
+ parts[i + 1] = next.slice(closed && group.quote ? end + 1 : end);
617
+ }
618
+ /**
619
+ * **A template ends where it began.** The client parses every template on its own, so whatever one leaves open — a
620
+ * comment, a `<style>`, a `<textarea>`, an `<svg>` — the parser closes at its end. The server concatenates, and
621
+ * left open, that state swallowed the PARENT's markup: `${html`<svg>`}<style>${x}</style>` wrote `x` raw inside what
622
+ * the browser parses as SVG, and `${html`<!--`}` let a `-->` in a later raw value end the comment. So the end closes
623
+ * what this template opened, innermost first — the client's own end-of-input rule, read off the statics once. A
624
+ * template that ends INSIDE a tag is refused, in every build: the client's parser drops an unfinished tag whole,
625
+ * which no closer can reproduce, and left open it swallowed the parent's next markup into its attributes. A bare `<`
626
+ * that never started a tag name, as in `a < b`, is text. The client refuses the same templates in development.
627
+ */
628
+ const end = scanTag(strings[strings.length - 1], tagState);
629
+ rawBounds[strings.length - 1] = [end.rawFrom, end.rawUntil];
630
+ if (end.inValue || (end.inTag && end.tagName))
631
+ throw own(new Error(ssrMisuse('ssr-unfinished-tag', PROSE['ssr-unfinished-tag']())));
632
+ const closers = closersOf(end);
633
+ if (closers)
634
+ parts[parts.length - 1] += closers;
635
+ /**
636
+ * A value in a `<script>` is code — on a served page it runs — so a script hole is refused (`ssr-script-hole`, every
637
+ * build) unless the script is a JSON data block, judged on the start tag that OPENED it (`openingTag`: this tokenizer's
638
+ * own reading, never a search back, so a `<script…>` inside a script's text or a quoted value is never taken for it).
639
+ * A data block's values are written with `<` as `\u003c` (`escapeRawText`'s `json`). Once per template, here.
640
+ */
641
+ for (let i = 0; i < raws.length; i++) {
642
+ if (raws[i] === 'script') {
643
+ /**
644
+ * A start tag holding a hole is no data block either (2026-11-18): a binding there — `?type=${false}`, a spread,
645
+ * `.type` — changes the type after it was judged, and the script is then served (or saved) as code.
646
+ */
647
+ const tag = openingTag(strings, i, depth);
648
+ if (!dataBlock(tag) || tag.includes('\uFFFF'))
649
+ throw own(new Error(ssrMisuse('ssr-script-hole', PROSE['ssr-script-hole']())));
650
+ raws[i] = 'json';
651
+ }
652
+ /**
653
+ * **The author's static text of a JSON block or an HTML `<style>` is written closed too** (2026-11-18), so the
654
+ * served text is the COMPOSED text closed (`closedRawText`), byte for byte what a client writes: in a block every
655
+ * `<` as `\u003c` (a static `<` before a value, `"<${'/script>…'}"`, otherwise closed it early; in valid JSON a `<` is
656
+ * only ever inside a string, so it is lossless), in a style each `</style` as `<\/style` (a static `</stylex` ends
657
+ * nothing, and is written so all the same). A closer formed ACROSS a style hole is `styleHole`'s, per render. The
658
+ * content in the static before this hole (from where its raw text began, or all of it inside the element) and in the
659
+ * static after (up to its end tag). Raw text follows the tag edits, so it is the same text in the part. Idempotent,
660
+ * so a static between two holes of one element may be visited twice.
661
+ */
662
+ if (raws[i] === 'json' || raws[i] === 'style') {
663
+ const json = raws[i] === 'json';
664
+ const [from] = rawBounds[i];
665
+ const [, until] = rawBounds[i + 1];
666
+ const before = parts[i];
667
+ const cut = from === -1 ? 0 : before.length - (strings[i].length - from);
668
+ parts[i] = before.slice(0, cut) + closedRawText(before.slice(cut), json);
669
+ const after = parts[i + 1];
670
+ const stop = until === -1 ? after.length : until;
671
+ parts[i + 1] = closedRawText(after.slice(0, stop), json) + after.slice(stop);
672
+ }
673
+ }
674
+ /**
675
+ * Dense, so the render loop reads a value at every binding: both are filled sparsely above, and a hole read falls
676
+ * through to the prototype chain on every child binding of every render — measured at about 3% of a server render.
677
+ */
678
+ const plan = {
679
+ parts, kinds, names, strip, owners, raws,
680
+ depths: Array.from(kinds, (_, i) => depths[i] ?? 0),
681
+ texts: Array.from(kinds, (_, i) => texts[i] === true),
682
+ elementPositions, elements, groups, leads, decodedLeads, urls,
683
+ };
684
+ if (depth === 0)
685
+ plans.set(strings, plan);
686
+ else {
687
+ let byDepth = foreignPlans.get(strings);
688
+ if (byDepth === undefined)
689
+ foreignPlans.set(strings, (byDepth = new Map()));
690
+ byDepth.set(depth, plan);
691
+ }
692
+ return plan;
693
+ };
694
+ /**
695
+ * `depth` is the foreign-content depth of the position the template renders into — 0 at the top and in HTML.
696
+ *
697
+ * **Where a template renders decides how its raw text parses, and the template cannot see it.** The browser parses
698
+ * the ONE string this produces, so `html`<svg>${child}</svg>`` puts `child`'s `<style>` inside SVG, where its
699
+ * content is markup, however `child` was written; and an `svg`/`mathml` template is foreign content wherever it
700
+ * goes, because the client parses it inside an `<svg>`/`<math>` wrapper. Scanning each template as though it began
701
+ * in HTML wrote both as raw text — unescaped — and the browser then parsed a value's `<img onerror>` as an element.
702
+ * So a template starts at its position's depth, and at least 1 if it is foreign itself. Erring deep is the safe
703
+ * direction: an `svg` template rendered outside any `<svg>` is HTML to the browser, and its `<style>` then shows
704
+ * the escapes as text — a visible mismatch, never an injection.
705
+ */
706
+ export const serializeTemplate = (template, depth = 0) => {
707
+ const { strings, values } = template;
708
+ /** Absent on core's `html`, and `undefined > 1` is false — the answer wanted; the `!` only lets the comparison be written. */
709
+ if (template['_$litType$'] > 1 && depth === 0)
710
+ depth = 1;
711
+ /**
712
+ * `strings` is any value here, a forgery's included: the cast only names the key the maps hold, and `WeakMap#get`
713
+ * answers `undefined` for a key it could never hold, which sends a forgery on to `compile`'s refusal.
714
+ */
715
+ const { parts, kinds, names, strip, owners, raws, depths, texts, elementPositions, elements, groups, leads, decodedLeads, urls } = (depth === 0 ? plans.get(strings) : foreignPlans.get(strings)?.get(depth)) ??
716
+ compile(strings, depth) ??
717
+ FORGED;
718
+ /**
719
+ * Not a template — data shaped like one (see `compile`): the text a plain object renders as, the client's very
720
+ * constant. Never the forgery's own conversion: JSON can supply a `"toString"` key, and converting through it throws.
721
+ */
722
+ if (parts === undefined)
723
+ return FORGED_TEXT;
724
+ /** The attribute being built: its escaped value so far, and the value the client would join (for the URL check). */
725
+ let attribute = '';
726
+ let joined = '';
727
+ let out = '';
728
+ /**
729
+ * The instances this application is delivering properties to, allocated on the FIRST
730
+ * component-prop slot — `serializeTemplate` is the hot path the public SSR numbers rest on, and
731
+ * a template with no component props (almost all of them) must pay one `null` local and nothing
732
+ * else. `instances` is keyed by element ordinal, so `<x-row .a=${…} .b=${…}>` builds ONE
733
+ * instance for both keys while a list's N applications build N; `mark` is the marker text for a
734
+ * just-built instance, held rather than appended directly because the spread path folds `out`
735
+ * while delivering — each delivering case flushes it into the open tag it is building.
736
+ */
737
+ let adoption = null;
738
+ /**
739
+ * Content that belongs *after* the tag being built rather than inside it — a `<textarea>`'s
740
+ * value, which is text and not an attribute. Written into the next static right after the `>`
741
+ * that closes the tag, replacing whatever the author wrote there, exactly as assigning `.value`
742
+ * does on the client.
743
+ */
744
+ let pendingText = null;
745
+ /** The close tag `insertContent` strips to when flushing `pendingText` — the host whose content it is (`textarea` for a form value). */
746
+ let pendingStrip = 'textarea';
747
+ /**
748
+ * What each `<select>`'s `.value` or `.selectedIndex` asks for, resolved into `<option selected>` after the loop —
749
+ * the options are usually a nested template, so nothing can be decided until the string is whole.
750
+ */
751
+ const selectValues = [];
752
+ for (let i = 0; i < kinds.length; i++) {
753
+ const part = parts[i];
754
+ if (pendingText === null)
755
+ out += part;
756
+ else {
757
+ out += insertContent(part, pendingText, pendingStrip);
758
+ pendingText = null;
759
+ }
760
+ const value = values[i];
761
+ switch (kinds[i]) {
762
+ case TEXT:
763
+ /** A spread rewrites the open tag it sits in, so it is folded rather than appended. */
764
+ if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && typeof value._$attrs$ === 'function') {
765
+ /**
766
+ * A spread's property keys deliver exactly as the written form above does — `props()`
767
+ * IS a spread, so this is the surface the headline API arrives through. Lazily: the
768
+ * receiving instance is built on the spread's first property key, so a spread of plain
769
+ * attributes on a component never builds one.
770
+ */
771
+ const componentTag = owners[i].includes('-') && registry.has(owners[i]) ? owners[i] : '';
772
+ const folded = foldSpread(out, owners[i], value._$attrs$(), componentTag === ''
773
+ ? undefined
774
+ : (name, propValue) => {
775
+ adoption ??= { instances: new Map(), mark: '' };
776
+ deliverProperty(claimInstance(adoption, elements[i], componentTag), componentTag, name, propValue);
777
+ });
778
+ out = folded.out;
779
+ if (adoption !== null && adoption.mark !== '') {
780
+ out += adoption.mark;
781
+ adoption.mark = '';
782
+ }
783
+ /** With its own host: a stale `pendingStrip` from an earlier `.textContent` kept the author's content. */
784
+ if (folded.text !== null) {
785
+ pendingText = folded.text;
786
+ pendingStrip = owners[i];
787
+ }
788
+ if (folded.select !== null)
789
+ out += ` ${SELECT_MARK}="${selectValues.push(folded.select) - 1}"`;
790
+ }
791
+ /**
792
+ * An **element-position** expression that is not a spread is a ref — `<input ${myRef} />`,
793
+ * where the renderer hands the element to a function or assigns it to `.value`. It is
794
+ * client state, like `@event`, and has no markup.
795
+ *
796
+ * It used to be stringified into the open tag, so `<input ${ref(null)} />` served
797
+ * `<input [object Object]>` — which the parser then read as two attributes named
798
+ * `[object` and `object]`. A value in this position never has markup; only a spread does.
799
+ */
800
+ else if (elementPositions[i]) {
801
+ /**
802
+ * The space that introduced the binding goes with it, exactly as a dropped sigil binding's
803
+ * does. Leaving it served `<p >r</p>` where the client renders `<p>r</p>` — harmless to a
804
+ * parser, and still a difference between the two halves for something neither of them
805
+ * renders at all.
806
+ */
807
+ out = out.replace(/ $/, '');
808
+ break;
809
+ }
810
+ /**
811
+ * **Raw text is written raw, and its own end tag is neutralized.**
812
+ *
813
+ * A browser does not decode a character reference inside `<style>` or `<script>`, so
814
+ * escaping there protects nothing and corrupts the content: `<style>${'.a > .b'}</style>`
815
+ * served `.a &#62; .b`, a selector that matches nothing, while the client — which sets text
816
+ * through the DOM and never re-parses — rendered `.a > .b`. Every interpolated stylesheet
817
+ * was broken server-side and correct client-side, which is also a hydration divergence.
818
+ *
819
+ * Not escaping means the element's end tag has to be taken out of the value instead, or it
820
+ * closes the element and everything after it parses as markup. `<\/style` is valid CSS and
821
+ * `<\/script` is the canonical form in JavaScript; both render identically and neither is
822
+ * seen by the tokenizer.
823
+ *
824
+ * `<title>` and `<textarea>` are RCDATA, not RAWTEXT — references *are* decoded there — so
825
+ * they keep ordinary escaping, which is what the client produces for them too.
826
+ */
827
+ else if (raws[i] === 'style')
828
+ out = styleHole(out, escapeRawText(rawTextOf(value), 'style'), part, parts[i + 1]);
829
+ else if (raws[i])
830
+ out += escapeRawText(rawTextOf(value), raws[i]);
831
+ else
832
+ out += serializeValue(value, false, depths[i], texts[i]);
833
+ break;
834
+ case ATTRIBUTE: {
835
+ /** Every ATTRIBUTE slot has its group — `compile` sets the two together. */
836
+ const group = groups[i];
837
+ /**
838
+ * ONE conversion, the platform's own (`String`, as `setAttribute` does): the URL check reads the very
839
+ * string that is written, so a value whose `toString` answers differently each time cannot pass the
840
+ * check with one answer and be written with another.
841
+ */
842
+ const text = serializeValue(value, true);
843
+ /** Assembled two ways — one hole that is the whole value, or holes joined with statics — and escaped by one function. */
844
+ if (group.sole) {
845
+ attribute = group.open + escapeHtml(text);
846
+ joined = text;
847
+ }
848
+ else {
849
+ if (group.first === i) {
850
+ attribute = group.open;
851
+ joined = '';
852
+ }
853
+ attribute += leads[i] + escapeHtml(text);
854
+ /** Only a URL sink needs the value the client would join. */
855
+ if (group.refuse > 1)
856
+ joined += decodedLeads[i] + text;
857
+ if (group.last !== i)
858
+ break;
859
+ attribute += group.suffix;
860
+ if (group.refuse > 1)
861
+ joined += group.decodedSuffix;
862
+ }
863
+ /**
864
+ * ONE decision for every shape, written whole or not at all: a sole nullish value removes the attribute,
865
+ * and a bound srcdoc or a `javascript:` URL is refused — as the client decides each of them.
866
+ */
867
+ if ((group.sole && value == null) || group.refuse === 1)
868
+ break;
869
+ if (group.refuse > 1 && (group.refuse === 3 ? SCRIPT_URL_ITEM : SCRIPT_URL).test(joined)) {
870
+ refusedScriptUrl(group.name);
871
+ break;
872
+ }
873
+ if (group.strip)
874
+ out = removeAttribute(out, group.name);
875
+ out += attribute + '"';
876
+ break;
877
+ }
878
+ case BOOLEAN:
879
+ if (strip[i])
880
+ out = removeAttribute(out, names[i]);
881
+ if (value)
882
+ out += ` ${names[i]}=""`;
883
+ break;
884
+ case CONTENT:
885
+ pendingText = serverContent(value, owners[i], names[i], depths[i]);
886
+ pendingStrip = owners[i];
887
+ break;
888
+ case FORM_PROP:
889
+ if (!FORM_ELEMENTS.has(owners[i]))
890
+ break;
891
+ /**
892
+ * A `<textarea>`'s value is its **text content**. `<textarea value="x">` is ignored by
893
+ * every parser, so writing the attribute served an empty control while the client — which
894
+ * sets the property — showed the text. Held until the tag closes, because that is where the
895
+ * content goes; see `pendingText` below.
896
+ */
897
+ /**
898
+ * A `<select>`'s `value` is not an attribute — see `SELECT_MARK`. Marked here and resolved
899
+ * once the options exist; writing ` value="b"` on the tag, which is what this used to do,
900
+ * means nothing to a parser and left the control showing its first option.
901
+ */
902
+ if (owners[i] === 'select' && (names[i] === 'value' || names[i] === 'selectedIndex')) {
903
+ if (strip[i])
904
+ out = removeAttribute(out, names[i]);
905
+ out += ` ${SELECT_MARK}="${selectValues.push(selection(names[i], value)) - 1}"`;
906
+ break;
907
+ }
908
+ if (owners[i] === 'textarea' && names[i] === 'value') {
909
+ /**
910
+ * `null` and `undefined` are **not** the same value here, and treating them as one is what
911
+ * this used to do. `value` carries `[LegacyNullToEmptyString]` in its IDL, so assigning
912
+ * `null` gives `''` while `undefined` goes through the ordinary ToString and gives the text
913
+ * `"undefined"` — measured in Chromium, Firefox and WebKit, since that is the platform's
914
+ * rule and not this package's to guess. A `== null` test collapses them.
915
+ *
916
+ * The booleans used to be emptied too, which disagreed with `<input>` **one branch below**
917
+ * — the same property, on the same rule, serialized by a different branch: `true` served an
918
+ * empty `<textarea>` against the browser's `true`.
919
+ */
920
+ pendingText = value === null ? '' : escapeHtml(value);
921
+ break;
922
+ }
923
+ if (strip[i])
924
+ out = removeAttribute(out, names[i]);
925
+ if (BOOLEAN_FORM_PROPERTIES.has(names[i])) {
926
+ if (value)
927
+ out += ` ${names[i]}=""`;
928
+ }
929
+ else if (value !== null || owners[i] === 'option') {
930
+ /**
931
+ * A string property: `true` is `"true"`, exactly as assigning it to the element gives.
932
+ *
933
+ * Three rules, not one, and they were measured rather than assumed:
934
+ *
935
+ * - `<input>` and `<textarea>` carry `[LegacyNullToEmptyString]`, so `null` means the empty
936
+ * string. Omitting the attribute is how markup says that — a parsed `<input>` with no
937
+ * `value` answers `''`.
938
+ * - `<option>` does **not**. `option.value = null` is the text `"null"` in every engine, and
939
+ * omitting the attribute is worse than wrong there: `option.value` then falls back to the
940
+ * element's own text.
941
+ * - `undefined` is never the empty string on any of them. It is `"undefined"`, which looks
942
+ * like a bug because it *is* one — but it is the client's bug too, and the two sides
943
+ * disagreeing about it is a hydration mismatch on top of it.
944
+ */
945
+ out += ` ${names[i]}="${escapeHtml(value)}"`;
946
+ }
947
+ break;
948
+ case COMPONENT_PROP:
949
+ /**
950
+ * Delivered only when the tag is REGISTERED — a component this process will render, whose
951
+ * server output should come from the same data its client render gets. An unregistered
952
+ * dashed tag (client-only, autoloaded later) is left exactly as before: the tag passes
953
+ * through as markup, the property is the client's to apply, nothing here to receive it.
954
+ * Registration is asked per render, not per plan, because the registry fills as component
955
+ * modules execute.
956
+ */
957
+ if (registry.has(owners[i]) && !(urls[i] && value != null && SCRIPT_URL.test(`${value}`))) {
958
+ adoption ??= { instances: new Map(), mark: '' };
959
+ deliverProperty(claimInstance(adoption, elements[i], owners[i]), owners[i], names[i], value);
960
+ if (adoption.mark !== '') {
961
+ out += adoption.mark;
962
+ adoption.mark = '';
963
+ }
964
+ }
965
+ break;
966
+ /** DROPPED: '@' and '&' and a non-component, non-form '.' or '!': nothing — client concerns. */
967
+ }
968
+ }
969
+ const tail = parts[kinds.length];
970
+ const finished = pendingText === null ? out + tail : out + insertContent(tail, pendingText, pendingStrip);
971
+ return selectValues.length ? resolveSelects(finished, selectValues) : finished;
972
+ };
973
+ /**
974
+ * Puts `text` inside the element the static closes, replacing what the author wrote there.
975
+ *
976
+ * Only `<textarea>` needs this, and only for `.value` — every other form property is an attribute.
977
+ * `<textarea .value=${x}>anything</textarea>` must serve `x`, because that is what the element
978
+ * will hold on the client the moment the property is assigned.
979
+ */
980
+ /**
981
+ * A `<select>` has **no `value` content attribute**. Assigning the property *selects an option*, so
982
+ * the only way markup can express it is `<option selected>` on the matching one — which is what
983
+ * React's server renderer does, and what this does. Lit's SSR drops the binding entirely and serves
984
+ * a control showing the wrong option.
985
+ *
986
+ * The mark is an index into a per-render list rather than the value itself, so nothing has to be
987
+ * escaped on the way in and unescaped on the way out; it is removed again by `resolveSelects`, and
988
+ * removing it is what terminates that loop.
989
+ *
990
+ * `selectedIndex` chooses an option too, by position rather than by value, so it rides the same mark: the list holds
991
+ * a string for `value` and a number for `selectedIndex`. A tag carrying two marks resolves to its LAST, because on the
992
+ * client the later assignment is the one that stands. Two things each guarantee it, so either may change alone: the
993
+ * greedy `[^>]*` in `MARKED_SELECT` reads a tag's last mark, and a pass removes only one mark, so the tag is resolved
994
+ * again (clearing what the previous pass marked) until its last mark is gone.
995
+ */
996
+ const SELECT_MARK = 'data-vm-select';
997
+ /**
998
+ * What a `<select>` binding asks for: the value's string, or the index as the platform converts it — `selectedIndex`
999
+ * is a WebIDL `long`, and `| 0` is exactly its conversion (ToInt32: `'1'` is 1, `null` and `NaN` are 0, 1.7 is 1).
1000
+ */
1001
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise -- ToInt32, exactly the WebIDL `long` conversion described above
1002
+ const selection = (name, value) => (name === 'value' ? `${value}` : value | 0);
1003
+ const MARKED_SELECT = new RegExp(`<select\\b[^>]*\\s${SELECT_MARK}="(\\d+)"[^>]*>`, 'i');
1004
+ const OPTION = /<option\b([^>]*)>([\s\S]*?)<\/option>/gi;
1005
+ const OPTION_VALUE = /\bvalue\s*=\s*(?:"([^"]*)"|'([^']*)'|([^\s>]+))/i;
1006
+ const SELECTED_ATTR = /(<option\b[^>]*?)\s+selected(?:\s*=\s*(?:"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s>]*))?/gi;
1007
+ const NAMED = { amp: '&', lt: '<', gt: '>', quot: '"', apos: "'" };
1008
+ /**
1009
+ * Enough of a decoder to compare an option against a value.
1010
+ *
1011
+ * Everything this serializer writes is escaped as a numeric reference, and the five named ones are
1012
+ * what an author writes by hand. A full entity table would be several kilobytes to decide which
1013
+ * `<option>` is selected, and anything it missed would simply fail to match — which is the same
1014
+ * outcome as an option that genuinely does not match, and is already a documented divergence.
1015
+ */
1016
+ const decodeRefs = (text) => text.replace(/&(?:#(\d+)|#[xX]([0-9a-fA-F]+)|(amp|lt|gt|quot|apos));/g, (whole, dec, hex, name) =>
1017
+ /** Neither number matched, so the name did. */
1018
+ dec ? decodeCodePoint(+dec) : hex ? decodeCodePoint(parseInt(hex, 16)) : NAMED[name] ?? whole);
1019
+ /**
1020
+ * What an engine reports for `option.value`: the `value` attribute verbatim if there is one, and
1021
+ * otherwise the option's text **stripped and collapsed**. Both halves measured in Chromium, Firefox
1022
+ * and WebKit — `tests/browser/select-value.test.js` — because the fallback is easy to assume is the
1023
+ * raw text, and it is not.
1024
+ */
1025
+ const optionValue = (attributes, text) => {
1026
+ const attribute = OPTION_VALUE.exec(attributes);
1027
+ if (attribute)
1028
+ return decodeRefs(attribute[1] ?? attribute[2] ?? attribute[3]);
1029
+ return decodeRefs(text).replace(/[\t\n\f\r ]+/g, ' ').trim();
1030
+ };
1031
+ /**
1032
+ * Marks the first option matching `wanted`, and clears any `selected` the author wrote.
1033
+ *
1034
+ * Clearing is not tidiness: a property assignment overrides markup, so `<option selected>` beside a
1035
+ * `.value` binding loses on the client and has to lose here too. **First match wins**, which is the
1036
+ * engines' rule for duplicate values.
1037
+ *
1038
+ * When nothing matches, nothing is marked — and that is a divergence markup cannot close. The client
1039
+ * leaves `selectedIndex` at `-1` with nothing showing; a parsed `<select>` with no selected option
1040
+ * takes its **first**. See the SSR README. An index is the same: one out of range — `-1` included — selects nothing
1041
+ * on the client, and marks nothing here.
1042
+ */
1043
+ const markSelected = (content, wanted) => {
1044
+ const cleared = content.replace(SELECTED_ATTR, '$1');
1045
+ OPTION.lastIndex = 0;
1046
+ let at = 0;
1047
+ for (let match = OPTION.exec(cleared); match; match = OPTION.exec(cleared)) {
1048
+ if (typeof wanted === 'number' ? at++ !== wanted : optionValue(match[1], match[2]) !== wanted)
1049
+ continue;
1050
+ const open = match[0].slice(0, match[0].indexOf('>'));
1051
+ return (cleared.slice(0, match.index) +
1052
+ open.replace(/\s*\/?$/, '') +
1053
+ ' selected>' +
1054
+ match[0].slice(match[0].indexOf('>') + 1) +
1055
+ cleared.slice(match.index + match[0].length));
1056
+ }
1057
+ return cleared;
1058
+ };
1059
+ /** Resolves every marked `<select>` once its options are in the string — see `SELECT_MARK`. */
1060
+ const resolveSelects = (markup, wanted) => {
1061
+ for (let match = MARKED_SELECT.exec(markup); match; match = MARKED_SELECT.exec(markup)) {
1062
+ const openTag = match[0].replace(new RegExp(`\\s*${SELECT_MARK}="\\d+"`, 'i'), '');
1063
+ const contentStart = match.index + match[0].length;
1064
+ const closeAt = markup.toLowerCase().indexOf('</select', contentStart);
1065
+ const end = closeAt === -1 ? markup.length : closeAt;
1066
+ markup =
1067
+ markup.slice(0, match.index) +
1068
+ openTag +
1069
+ markSelected(markup.slice(contentStart, end), wanted[+match[1]]) +
1070
+ markup.slice(end);
1071
+ }
1072
+ return markup;
1073
+ };
1074
+ /** The type that makes a classic script inert; written FIRST, so the parser's first-duplicate-wins rule defeats any author `type`. */
1075
+ const INERT_TYPE = ' type="text/x-vera-inert"';
1076
+ /**
1077
+ * **Trusted `innerHTML` markup, made to behave as an `innerHTML` ASSIGNMENT rather than as parsed page markup** —
1078
+ * inert, and self-contained. The two parses differ in exactly two ways a served page would otherwise run: a
1079
+ * `<script>` executes when the browser parses it from the response but never when assigned through `innerHTML`, and a
1080
+ * `<template shadowrootmode>` attaches a shadow root when parsed but not when assigned. Both are neutralized wherever
1081
+ * the tokenizer reads a start tag — never inside a comment, an attribute value or raw text, which `innerHTML` does not
1082
+ * act on either — so the served page matches the client's assignment, and hydration (which re-assigns) agrees.
1083
+ *
1084
+ * **The tags come from `scanTag`, the scan every template gets.** This used to run its own mini-tokenizer, and the two
1085
+ * drifted: it read a quote inside an attribute NAME as opening a value, so `<b x"><script>` served live, and it
1086
+ * skipped `<style>` content inside `<svg>`, where it is markup, so `<svg><style><script>` served live. Reading a tag
1087
+ * where the browser does not is only ever safe in one direction — over-neutralizing a `<script` that was text makes
1088
+ * an inert thing inert — and `scanTag` errs that way wherever it is deliberately incomplete (see its foreign depth).
1089
+ *
1090
+ * Whatever the markup leaves open is closed, so it cannot reach the host's parent: its comment, raw-text element and
1091
+ * svg/math/noscript/template (`closersOf`). An UNFINISHED tag is dropped, as an assignment's parser drops it at the
1092
+ * end of input — served, it swallowed the page's next markup into its attributes. A `<` or `</` that never started a
1093
+ * tag is text, written escaped, so the host's own end tag cannot become the rest of it.
1094
+ */
1095
+ const fortify = (markup, depth) => {
1096
+ const edits = [];
1097
+ const end = scanTag(markup, freshScan(depth), edits);
1098
+ let stop = markup.length;
1099
+ let tail = '';
1100
+ if (end.phase === TAG_OPEN || end.phase === END_TAG_OPEN) {
1101
+ stop = end.tagAt;
1102
+ tail = '&lt;' + markup.slice(stop + 1);
1103
+ }
1104
+ else if (end.inTag) {
1105
+ stop = end.tagAt;
1106
+ /** An unfinished END tag of the raw-text element it was ending leaves that element open — so it is closed. */
1107
+ if (end.closing && end.foreign === 0 && (RAWTEXT.has(end.tagName) || TEXT_ONLY.has(end.tagName)))
1108
+ tail = `</${end.tagName}>`;
1109
+ }
1110
+ let out = '';
1111
+ let from = 0;
1112
+ for (let i = 0; i < edits.length && edits[i] < stop; i += 2) {
1113
+ const at = edits[i];
1114
+ out += markup.slice(from, at) + (edits[i + 1] === EDIT_INERT ? INERT_TYPE : 'data-vera-');
1115
+ from = at;
1116
+ }
1117
+ return out + markup.slice(from, stop) + tail + closersOf(end);
1118
+ };
1119
+ /**
1120
+ * **A value written into a `<style>`, with every closer it takes part in neutralized** (2026-11-18). `</style` (any
1121
+ * case) ends the element wherever it is formed, and it can be formed ACROSS a hole: the static before a value and the
1122
+ * value (`"<${'/style><img…>'}"`), the value and the static after, or several values. A closer is 7 characters, so one
1123
+ * that crosses this hole lies within the 6 characters already written, the value, and the next static's first 6; each
1124
+ * such closer gets a `\` before its `/` (`<\/style`, the same CSS), wherever the `/` falls — in what is written, the
1125
+ * value, or the next static (the `\` then goes after the value). A closer wholly inside the next static is the element's
1126
+ * own end tag, and one wholly in what was written was dealt with at its own hole. Statics alone never hold a closer, so
1127
+ * the output is the composed text's: byte for byte what a client writes.
1128
+ */
1129
+ const styleHole = (out, value, before, next) => {
1130
+ /**
1131
+ * What was written last, read from the static just written when it holds 6 characters — `out` is the whole document
1132
+ * so far, and slicing it flattens that string on every hole (measured: most of a page's style-hole cost, 2026-11-18).
1133
+ * A closer crossing this hole starts with a `<` in it or in the value; with neither, nothing crosses.
1134
+ */
1135
+ const tail = before.length >= 6 ? before.slice(-6) : out.slice(-6);
1136
+ if (!value.includes('<') && !tail.includes('<'))
1137
+ return out + value;
1138
+ const head = next.slice(0, 6);
1139
+ const window = tail + value + head;
1140
+ const start = tail.length;
1141
+ const stop = start + value.length;
1142
+ /** Where, in the window, a `\` goes: before each crossing closer's `/`. */
1143
+ const at = [];
1144
+ for (const match of window.matchAll(/<\/style/gi)) {
1145
+ const m = match.index;
1146
+ if (m < stop && m + 7 > start)
1147
+ at.push(m + 1);
1148
+ }
1149
+ if (at.length === 0)
1150
+ return out + value;
1151
+ let written = out.slice(0, out.length - tail.length);
1152
+ let from = 0;
1153
+ const marked = window.slice(0, stop);
1154
+ for (const p of at) {
1155
+ written += marked.slice(from, Math.min(p, stop)) + '\\';
1156
+ from = Math.min(p, stop);
1157
+ }
1158
+ return written + marked.slice(from);
1159
+ };
1160
+ /**
1161
+ * The content a `.innerHTML`/`.textContent` binding writes after the host's open tag. `innerHTML` is
1162
+ * `[LegacyNullToEmptyString]` (so `null` is `''` but `undefined` is `"undefined"`); `textContent` is nullable (both
1163
+ * are `''`) — measured against a browser, not guessed. The host decides escaping: a RAWTEXT host (`<style>`,
1164
+ * `<script>`) neutralizes its own close tag and is otherwise raw; a text-only or foreign host, and any
1165
+ * `textContent`, is escaped text; only `innerHTML` on an ordinary HTML host is live markup, made inert first.
1166
+ */
1167
+ const serverContent = (value, owner, property, depth) => {
1168
+ const text = value === null || (value === undefined && property === 'textContent') ? '' : `${value}`;
1169
+ if (RAWTEXT.has(owner))
1170
+ return escapeRawText(text, owner);
1171
+ if (property === 'textContent' || TEXT_ONLY.has(owner) || owner === 'noscript' || depth > 0)
1172
+ return escapeHtml(text);
1173
+ return fortify(text, depth);
1174
+ };
1175
+ const insertContent = (staticText, text, strip) => {
1176
+ const close = staticText.indexOf('>');
1177
+ if (close === -1)
1178
+ return staticText;
1179
+ const rest = staticText.slice(close + 1);
1180
+ const end = rest.toLowerCase().indexOf('</' + strip);
1181
+ /** One line feed for the parser to take, always — the client sets this content through the DOM (see `takesNewline`). */
1182
+ const guard = NEWLINE_TAKERS.has(strip) ? '\n' : '';
1183
+ return staticText.slice(0, close + 1) + guard + text + (end === -1 ? rest : rest.slice(end));
1184
+ };
1185
+ /**
1186
+ * Fold resolved spread bindings into the tag being built, mirroring what the client does.
1187
+ *
1188
+ * Appending is not enough, and the difference is a correctness bug rather than a nicety.
1189
+ * `<input type="text" ${spread({ type: 'number' })}>` appends a second `type`, and an HTML parser
1190
+ * keeps the **first** duplicate — so the server would render `type="text"` while the client, where
1191
+ * `setAttribute` overwrites, renders `type="number"`. Same template, two answers, and a hydration
1192
+ * mismatch between them.
1193
+ *
1194
+ * So a spread key removes any attribute of that name already written into the open tag before
1195
+ * adding its own — including when it adds nothing, because `?disabled: false` and `id: null` both
1196
+ * *remove* on the client and must remove here too. Kinds that never touch attributes client-side
1197
+ * (events, non-form properties) leave the tag alone.
1198
+ *
1199
+ * Splitting on the last `<` is safe: attribute values are escaped, so no raw `<` can appear inside
1200
+ * one.
1201
+ */
1202
+ /**
1203
+ * Removes an attribute already written into the open tag being built, so the last write wins.
1204
+ *
1205
+ * An HTML parser keeps the **first** of a duplicate pair; `setAttribute` on the client overwrites,
1206
+ * so the **last** wins there. `<b title="a" title=${x}>` therefore showed `a` on a server-rendered
1207
+ * page and `b` in the browser — the same disagreement `foldSpread` was written to fix for spreads,
1208
+ * which is where this logic came from. It applies to anything that writes a name into the tag.
1209
+ */
1210
+ /**
1211
+ * One pattern per attribute name, built once. `new RegExp` per binding was 16% of a 100-row render.
1212
+ */
1213
+ const removalPatterns = new Map();
1214
+ /**
1215
+ * The name is **escaped** before it becomes a pattern. A spread's keys are runtime data, and an
1216
+ * attribute name may legally contain regular-expression metacharacters — `a|b`, `a.b`, `a*` are all
1217
+ * names `setAttribute` accepts — so interpolating one raw built a pattern that matched something
1218
+ * else entirely. `a|b` compiled to an alternation and removed text nowhere near the attribute it
1219
+ * named.
1220
+ */
1221
+ const escapeForPattern = (name) => name.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
1222
+ const removalPattern = (name) => {
1223
+ let pattern = removalPatterns.get(name);
1224
+ if (!pattern)
1225
+ removalPatterns.set(name, (pattern = new RegExp(`\\s${escapeForPattern(name)}(=("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\\s>]*))?`, 'i')));
1226
+ return pattern;
1227
+ };
1228
+ /**
1229
+ * A name that cannot be written into a tag safely.
1230
+ *
1231
+ * A spread's keys are the one part of a template that is runtime data — that is what the module is
1232
+ * for — and they were interpolated into the open tag with no check at all, while every *value*
1233
+ * around them was escaped. A key carrying a quote or a `>` therefore closed the attribute, or the
1234
+ * element:
1235
+ *
1236
+ * spread({ 'x><script>alert(1)</script': '1' })
1237
+ * -> <b x><script>alert(1)</script="1">x</b>
1238
+ *
1239
+ * The set is the HTML attribute-name restriction — control characters, whitespace, `"`, `'`, `>`,
1240
+ * `/`, `=` — plus `<` and a backtick, which the specification permits and no real name uses.
1241
+ *
1242
+ * It is deliberately **stricter than `setAttribute`**, which was measured in Chromium and accepts
1243
+ * `"`, `'` and `<` while rejecting whitespace, `>`, `=`, `/` and NUL. A name the platform accepts
1244
+ * but markup cannot carry is unusable in a framework that server-renders, so `@verajs/renderer/spread`
1245
+ * applies this same rule client-side and the two sides agree on every key rather than one of them
1246
+ * quietly serving different markup.
1247
+ *
1248
+ * The control-character range is the point of the rule, not a mistake in it: a name carrying one
1249
+ * is exactly what must never reach markup.
1250
+ */
1251
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
1252
+ export const UNSAFE_ATTRIBUTE_NAME = /^$|[\s"'>/=<`]|[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/;
1253
+ /**
1254
+ * Strips one attribute out of an open tag, and the one place that knows how.
1255
+ *
1256
+ * `foldSpread` had its own copy of this pattern, character for character — so a fix to one was a
1257
+ * fix to one. It also rebuilt the pattern on every key of every spread, which is the per-render
1258
+ * work `tests/ssr-serializer-work.test.mjs` exists to refuse.
1259
+ */
1260
+ const stripAttribute = (tag, name) =>
1261
+ /**
1262
+ * Almost no tag carries the name twice, and a substring search settles that far faster than a
1263
+ * pattern match does. Case-insensitive to match the pattern it guards, which HTML requires.
1264
+ */
1265
+ tag.toLowerCase().includes(name.toLowerCase()) ? tag.replace(removalPattern(name), '') : tag;
1266
+ const removeAttribute = (out, name) => {
1267
+ const tagStart = out.lastIndexOf('<');
1268
+ if (tagStart === -1)
1269
+ return out;
1270
+ return out.slice(0, tagStart) + stripAttribute(out.slice(tagStart), name);
1271
+ };
1272
+ const foldSpread = (out,
1273
+ /** The tag the spread sits in, as the template's scan named it (see `compile`). */
1274
+ owner, entries, deliverProp) => {
1275
+ const tagStart = out.lastIndexOf('<');
1276
+ let tag = out.slice(tagStart);
1277
+ let added = '';
1278
+ /** A `<textarea>`'s value is its text content, so a `.value` key here is not an attribute. */
1279
+ let text = null;
1280
+ /** A `<select>`'s value is not an attribute either; the caller marks the tag — see `SELECT_MARK`. */
1281
+ let select = null;
1282
+ const isFormElement = FORM_ELEMENTS.has(owner);
1283
+ for (const [kind, name, value] of entries) {
1284
+ /**
1285
+ * A property key on a rendered component tag is handed to the caller's delivery — the same
1286
+ * door the written `.prop=${…}` form takes, because `props()` IS a spread and a key must mean
1287
+ * the same thing in both spellings. The callback exists only when the owner is a registered
1288
+ * component; everywhere else the key falls through to the rules below unchanged.
1289
+ */
1290
+ if (kind === 'p' && deliverProp !== undefined) {
1291
+ deliverProp(name, value);
1292
+ continue;
1293
+ }
1294
+ const serializes = kind === 'a' || kind === 'b' || (kind === 'p' && isFormElement && isFormProperty(owner, name));
1295
+ if (!serializes)
1296
+ continue;
1297
+ /**
1298
+ * Dropped, and dropped **before** anything is done with the name — `stripAttribute` compiles it
1299
+ * into a pattern, so an unchecked name is a second way in.
1300
+ *
1301
+ * Silent here on purpose. A key that reaches this is either a mistake, which the identical check
1302
+ * in `@verajs/renderer/spread` reports in development where the author will see it, or it is
1303
+ * hostile — and a server that logs a line per hostile key hands an attacker the log file.
1304
+ */
1305
+ if (UNSAFE_ATTRIBUTE_NAME.test(name))
1306
+ continue;
1307
+ /** Quoted, single-quoted, unquoted, or valueless — whatever the template author wrote. */
1308
+ tag = stripAttribute(tag, name);
1309
+ /**
1310
+ * A `<textarea>`'s `.value` is its **content**, exactly as it is for a written binding — the
1311
+ * attribute this would otherwise write is ignored by every parser, so the control arrived empty
1312
+ * while the client, which sets the property, showed the text. The written form was fixed and
1313
+ * this one was not: a spread key means what the written binding means, always.
1314
+ */
1315
+ if (kind === 'p' && owner === 'select' && (name === 'value' || name === 'selectedIndex')) {
1316
+ /** A spread key means what the written binding means, always — see `SELECT_MARK`. */
1317
+ select = selection(name, value);
1318
+ continue;
1319
+ }
1320
+ if (kind === 'p' && owner === 'textarea' && name === 'value') {
1321
+ text = value === null ? '' : escapeHtml(value);
1322
+ continue;
1323
+ }
1324
+ /**
1325
+ * Same coercions as a written binding, kind by kind — which is the contract, and which this had
1326
+ * only approximately.
1327
+ *
1328
+ * A **boolean** is truthiness, and so are `checked` and `selected`. A plain **attribute** takes
1329
+ * anything that is not nullish, `false` included: `String(false)` is `"false"`, which is what
1330
+ * `setAttribute` writes and what the written form already emitted. Treating `false` as removal
1331
+ * for every kind meant `${spread({ title: false })}` dropped the attribute while
1332
+ * `title=${false}` kept it — the same value, two answers, from the two spellings of one binding.
1333
+ */
1334
+ if (kind === 'b' || (kind === 'p' && BOOLEAN_FORM_PROPERTIES.has(name))) {
1335
+ if (value)
1336
+ added += ` ${name}=""`;
1337
+ }
1338
+ else if (kind === 'p') {
1339
+ /**
1340
+ * **A string form property and a plain attribute are no longer the same rule**, which is why
1341
+ * this branch split. An attribute is removed by either nullish value — the renderer's own
1342
+ * documented behavior, matching lit, on both sides. A `value` property is not: its IDL carries
1343
+ * `[LegacyNullToEmptyString]` on `<input>` and `<textarea>`, so `null` alone means the empty
1344
+ * string, `undefined` is the text `"undefined"`, and `<option>` has neither rule and takes
1345
+ * `"null"`. Written and spread must agree about all of it —
1346
+ * `tests/ssr-spread-equivalence.test.mjs` is what caught this one, and it caught it the same
1347
+ * afternoon the written form was corrected.
1348
+ */
1349
+ if (value !== null || owner === 'option')
1350
+ added += ` ${name}="${escapeHtml(value)}"`;
1351
+ }
1352
+ else if (value != null) {
1353
+ /**
1354
+ * A plain attribute takes anything not nullish and is removed by either nullish value.
1355
+ * `false` is `"false"` and `true` is `"true"`, because that is what `setAttribute` produces.
1356
+ */
1357
+ added += ` ${name}="${escapeHtml(serializeValue(value, true))}"`;
1358
+ }
1359
+ }
1360
+ /**
1361
+ * The element-position slot already carries the separating space, so the first addition drops its
1362
+ * own. When a spread contributes nothing — every key nullish, or all of them client concerns —
1363
+ * that space is left dangling before the `>`, which the parser ignores and which is still a byte
1364
+ * in every response and untidy in a view-source.
1365
+ */
1366
+ return {
1367
+ out: out.slice(0, tagStart) + (added ? tag + added.slice(1) : tag.replace(/ $/, '')),
1368
+ /** Written into the next static, after the `>` that closes this tag — see `insertContent`. */
1369
+ text,
1370
+ select,
1371
+ };
1372
+ };
1373
+ /**
1374
+ * **Out of line on purpose: `serializeValue` must stay under V8's inlining budget.** It is inlined into
1375
+ * `serializeTemplate`'s per-binding loop only while its bytecode is at most 460 bytes (`--max-inlined-bytecode-size`), and
1376
+ * it sat at 455: the DOM-node case (2026-10-09) took it to 467 and cost 3.6% steady on renders that never reach the
1377
+ * case — any statement did (a never-taken branch alone measured +4.0%). A refusal's error construction is the cheapest
1378
+ * thing to move out: it runs once, at the throw.
1379
+ */
1380
+ const refuseTemplateInText = () => {
1381
+ throw own(new Error(ssrMisuse('ssr-template-in-text', PROSE['ssr-template-in-text']())));
1382
+ };
1383
+ /**
1384
+ * **A value in a `<style>` or JSON data block, as text** — the rule `<textarea>`/`<title>` already follow, and every
1385
+ * client writes (2026-11-18): nothing for `null`/`undefined`, a list its items' text (nested lists flattened by the same
1386
+ * rule), a template refused (`ssr-template-in-text`), anything else `String`. Before, `String(value)` wrote a list as
1387
+ * `a,b` (commas between CSS rules) and a template as `[object Object]`.
1388
+ */
1389
+ const rawTextOf = (value) => {
1390
+ if (value == null)
1391
+ return '';
1392
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) {
1393
+ let out = '';
1394
+ for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++)
1395
+ out += rawTextOf(value[i]);
1396
+ return out;
1397
+ }
1398
+ if (typeof value === 'object' && isLiteral(value.strings))
1399
+ refuseTemplateInText();
1400
+ return `${value}`;
1401
+ };
1402
+ /**
1403
+ * **A child value that applies itself (`_$child$`) renders on a server what it would show FIRST on a client** (2026-10-26,
1404
+ * found by `@verajs/renderer/until`'s server row: every such value served `[object Object]`). The applier runs against a
1405
+ * server part whose `_$commit$` keeps what it commits; the last SYNCHRONOUS commit is served, as the client's first
1406
+ * frame shows it. A commit that arrives later (a promise settling) lands on a part already served and dropped. Out of
1407
+ * line: `serializeValue` sits near V8's inlining budget (`tests/ssr-inlining-budget.test.mjs`).
1408
+ */
1409
+ const serializeChild = (value, depth, text) => {
1410
+ let committed;
1411
+ value._$child$.call(value, { _$commit$: (next) => { committed = next; }, $R: null }, undefined, false);
1412
+ return serializeValue(committed, false, depth, text);
1413
+ };
1414
+ export const serializeValue = (value, raw = false, depth = 0, text = false) => {
1415
+ /**
1416
+ * Only `null` and `undefined` are empty, exactly as on the client — `false` and `0` render.
1417
+ * `false` used to serialize as empty here, which made `${cond && 'x'}` emit nothing on the server
1418
+ * and the text `false` in the browser: a silent content difference on a static page, and a full
1419
+ * re-render on a hydrated one.
1420
+ */
1421
+ if (value == null)
1422
+ return '';
1423
+ /**
1424
+ * **An attribute stringifies exactly as the platform does, and nothing else.**
1425
+ *
1426
+ * A child position renders a value — a template becomes markup, an array renders every item, a
1427
+ * function is client state and disappears. An attribute does none of that: it goes through
1428
+ * `setAttribute`, which is `String(value)` and only that. The two are different rules and this
1429
+ * had one of them.
1430
+ *
1431
+ * Measured against a browser, every one of these disagreed: `[1, 2]` served `12` against `1,2`
1432
+ * (arrays have their own `toString`), a `Set` served `1,2` against `[object Set]`, a function
1433
+ * served nothing against its own source, and a **template served its markup into an attribute
1434
+ * value** against `[object Object]`. Escaped, so not an injection — and still a completely
1435
+ * different page before and after hydration.
1436
+ */
1437
+ if (raw)
1438
+ return `${value}`;
1439
+ /**
1440
+ * Loops, never `map` with an arrow: an arrow capturing `depth`/`text` makes V8 heap-allocate a context on EVERY call of
1441
+ * this function, whichever branch runs — measured at about 5% of a server render.
1442
+ */
1443
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) {
1444
+ let out = '';
1445
+ for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++)
1446
+ out += serializeValue(value[i], false, depth, text);
1447
+ return out;
1448
+ }
1449
+ if (typeof value === 'function')
1450
+ return '';
1451
+ if (typeof value === 'object') {
1452
+ /** Template-shaped (core's html, by shape) recurses. `keyed()` mutates one, so it arrives here. */
1453
+ /**
1454
+ * Inside `<textarea>`, `<title>` and the other text-only elements a template is refused: their content is text to
1455
+ * the browser, where the client's elements are never shown, and a template's markup there is the one way a value
1456
+ * can CLOSE the element — `${html`</textarea>`}` — and turn the statics after it into unchecked markup.
1457
+ */
1458
+ if (value.strings) {
1459
+ if (text && isLiteral(value.strings))
1460
+ refuseTemplateInText();
1461
+ return serializeTemplate(value, depth);
1462
+ }
1463
+ /**
1464
+ * `hold(result)` is `{ $h: result }` — a client-renderer construct that keeps the DOM of a
1465
+ * toggled-away subtree alive so form values and scroll positions survive the round trip. There
1466
+ * is no previous DOM on a server, so the wrapper means nothing here and the template inside it
1467
+ * means everything.
1468
+ *
1469
+ * It used to fall through to `String(value)` and serve the text `[object Object]` into the
1470
+ * page. `keyed()` works because it mutates the template and hands the same object back; `hold`
1471
+ * wraps one, and nothing unwrapped it.
1472
+ */
1473
+ if (value.$h)
1474
+ return serializeValue(value.$h, raw, depth, text);
1475
+ /**
1476
+ * A spread (`@verajs/renderer/spread`) at element position. It hands back resolved bindings and this
1477
+ * decides what reaches markup: attributes and truthy booleans do, form properties do because
1478
+ * hydration reads them back, and events and other properties are client state. Escaping happens
1479
+ * here and only here — principle #8 puts it at the render boundary, not at the source.
1480
+ */
1481
+ if (typeof value._$attrs$ === 'function')
1482
+ return '';
1483
+ if (typeof value._$child$ === 'function')
1484
+ return serializeChild(value, depth, text);
1485
+ /**
1486
+ * **A DOM node writes nothing** (2026-10-09). The client inserts the node itself, and hydration's contract is that
1487
+ * the server rendered nothing for it — the renderer README's "the one thing the server cannot have rendered", which
1488
+ * adoption relies on to keep everything around it. This fell through to `String(value)` and served
1489
+ * `[object EventTarget]` into the page, which the client then refused as markup the template does not describe:
1490
+ * junk on the static page AND the whole container's adoption discarded. Before the iterable test, so a fragment
1491
+ * (whose children are a node list) never reads as a list.
1492
+ */
1493
+ if (value instanceof NodeBase)
1494
+ return '';
1495
+ /**
1496
+ * An iterable renders its entries, exactly as the client's child position does — a `Set` or a
1497
+ * `Map` reaching a template is not obviously deliberate, but the two sides have to agree about
1498
+ * it or hydration is discarded.
1499
+ */
1500
+ if (typeof value[Symbol.iterator] === 'function') {
1501
+ let out = '';
1502
+ for (const entry of value)
1503
+ out += serializeValue(entry, false, depth, text);
1504
+ return out;
1505
+ }
1506
+ /**
1507
+ * Everything else falls through to `String(value)`, which is what the client does.
1508
+ *
1509
+ * This used to return `''` for any object that was not template-shaped, and the client has
1510
+ * never agreed: a `Date` rendered its full date string there and nothing here, an object with a
1511
+ * `toString` rendered its text, a `Promise` rendered `[object Promise]`. Whether any of those is
1512
+ * a *sensible* thing to interpolate is beside the point — the two sides disagreeing is a silent
1513
+ * hydration mismatch, and matching junk is worth more than differing junk.
1514
+ *
1515
+ * A DOM node is the one exception, and it cannot occur: the server has no document to have
1516
+ * built one.
1517
+ */
1518
+ }
1519
+ /** `raw` cannot be true here — it returned at the top of the function. */
1520
+ return escapeHtml(value);
1521
+ };