@venusprotocol/liquidity-hub 2.1.0-dev.4 → 2.1.0-dev.5

package/contracts/adapters/AdapterSpokeV1.sol

@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
+pragma solidity 0.8.25;
+
+import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
+import { IERC20Metadata } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol";
+import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
+
+import { IResourceAdapter } from "../interfaces/IResourceAdapter.sol";
+import { IVTokenIsolated } from "../interfaces/external/IVTokenIsolated.sol";
+import { ISpokeComptroller } from "../interfaces/external/ISpokeComptroller.sol";
+
+/**
+ * @title AdapterSpokeV1
+ * @author Venus
+ * @notice Stateless adapter for the liquidity side of a hub-funded spoke pool — an isolated-pools
+ *         `VToken` governed by a `SpokeComptroller`. ONE deployment serves every YieldGroup that
+ *         registers a spoke market; there is no per-(YieldGroup, market) instance, no proxy, no
+ *         clone factory.
+ * @dev Dispatch model: mutating functions (`deposit`, `withdraw`) MUST be invoked via DELEGATECALL
+ *      from a YieldGroup. They execute in the YieldGroup's storage context, so vTokens are credited
+ *      to / burned from the YieldGroup, not this adapter. View functions are invoked via normal
+ *      CALL / STATICCALL; those that name a `holder` read the position from that argument, while
+ *      {maxDeposit} and {validateRegistration} read `msg.sender` instead (see below).
+ *
+ *      Storage-safety invariants enforced by this contract:
+ *      1. Zero `internal`/`private`/`public` state variables are declared. Only `immutable` values
+ *         are used. Immutables live in bytecode, not storage slots, so they're delegatecall-safe.
+ *      2. No inline assembly performs `sstore`.
+ *      3. All external calls go to the supplied `resource` (vToken), its `underlying()`, or its
+ *         `comptroller()`. No arbitrary user-supplied call target.
+ *      4. {onlyDelegateCall} reverts when a mutating function is invoked directly on the adapter,
+ *         preventing accidents that would orphan vTokens here.
+ *
+ *      **Written-off debt stays in the mark.** {totalAssets} values the position at the market's own
+ *      exchange rate, as `AdapterCoreV1` does. That rate keeps `badDebt` in its numerator, so a
+ *      write-off in `healAccount` does not lower it. The written-off amount is not cash, so the
+ *      market cannot pay every supplier in full until its `shortfall` calls `badDebtRecovered`,
+ *      which lowers `badDebt` and raises cash by the same amount without moving the rate. Until
+ *      then, suppliers who exit first are paid at the full rate out of the cash that remains, and
+ *      {maxWithdraw} is bounded by that cash.
+ *
+ *      **Why this is not `AdapterCoreV1`.** The two speak nearly the same selectors and disagree on
+ *      the numbers below. Four differences, each verified against `isolated-pools`:
+ *
+ *      - **Liquidity is cash NET of reserves**, and both it and the position are floored to a whole
+ *        number of vTokens, because {withdraw} redeems by vToken COUNT rather than by underlying
+ *        amount. Naming the burn instead of letting `redeemUnderlying` derive it is what keeps a
+ *        certified amount inside the position's own balance: the derived burn rounds UP and is
+ *        subtracted in checked arithmetic, so an amount one unit too large panics rather than
+ *        failing gracefully.
+ *      - **No exit fee to gross up.** Isolated pools have no `treasuryPercent`; their cut is the
+ *        reserve factor, already netted out of the exchange rate. There is nothing unmodeled to
+ *        reject at registration, so {validateRegistration} guards the market listing and the supply
+ *        allowlist instead.
+ *      - **The supply cap has an uncapped sentinel**, `type(uint256).max` (see
+ *        {ISpokeComptroller-supplyCaps}).
+ *      - **Mutating calls carry no error code to check.** `mint`, `redeem` and `accrueInterest`
+ *        return `NO_ERROR` or revert; the Compound-style codes `AdapterCoreV1` inspects are set by
+ *        the legacy Core pool alone.
+ *
+ *      **The supply allowlist and caller identity.** A spoke market can restrict minting to
+ *      allowlisted accounts, and the account it checks is the one CREDITED with the vTokens. Under
+ *      delegatecall that is the YieldGroup. {maxDeposit} and {validateRegistration} take no `holder`,
+ *      and both are invoked by the YieldGroup as a plain call, so `msg.sender` IS the prospective
+ *      supplier and reading the allowlist against it is exact rather than a convention. This matters
+ *      operationally: a YieldGroup whose grant is revoked reports zero room and is routed around,
+ *      instead of advertising capacity that every deposit then reverts on.
+ *
+ *      Fee-on-transfer underlyings are unsupported, matching the Hub. The market itself tolerates
+ *      them (it mints against the measured delta) but {deposit} reports the requested amount, so the
+ *      YieldGroup's accounting would drift.
+ */
+contract AdapterSpokeV1 is IResourceAdapter {
+    using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
+
+    // ============================== State (immutable only) ====================
+
+    /// @notice This adapter's own address, captured at deployment. Used by {onlyDelegateCall} to
+    ///         detect direct invocation. Immutables live in bytecode, not storage.
+    address private immutable _ADAPTER_SELF;
+
+    // ============================== State (constants) =========================
+
+    /// @notice Fixed-point scale matching Compound's mantissa (`1e18`).
+    uint256 public constant EXP_SCALE = 1e18;
+
+    /// @notice Deposit room reported for a market whose supply cap is the isolated-pools "uncapped"
+    ///         sentinel (`type(uint256).max`).
+    /// @dev Finite on purpose. `YieldGroupBase.maxDeposit()` SUMS the room of every queued resource
+    ///      in checked arithmetic, so reporting `type(uint256).max` would overflow that sum the
+    ///      moment a second uncapped market joined the queue — the YieldGroup's whole capacity view
+    ///      would revert and the Hub would read it as zero capacity with an immovable balance. At
+    ///      `2^128 - 1` the sum cannot overflow for any realistic queue, while the value is still
+    ///      unreachable for any real token (~3.4e20 whole units at 18 decimals). Mirrors the Flux
+    ///      family, where Fluid reports `int128.max` for the same reason. The binding controls on an
+    ///      uncapped market are the YieldGroup's per-resource cap and the Hub's dual cap, not this.
+    uint256 public constant UNCAPPED_DEPOSIT_ROOM = type(uint128).max;
+
+    /// @notice Scaling factor between mantissa-rate (`1e18`) and BPS (`1e4`).
+    uint256 internal constant MANTISSA_TO_BPS = 1e14;
+
+    /// @notice `Action.MINT` in the isolated-pools Comptroller enum.
+    uint8 internal constant ACTION_MINT = 0;
+
+    /// @notice `Action.REDEEM` in the isolated-pools Comptroller enum.
+    uint8 internal constant ACTION_REDEEM = 1;
+
+    /// @notice Fraction of raw supply-cap headroom withheld to absorb interest accrued between a
+    ///         `maxDeposit` read and the mint it sizes (`1/1000` = 0.1%).
+    uint256 internal constant CAP_TRIM_DIVISOR = 1000;
+
+    // ============================== Errors ===================================
+
+    /// @notice A mutating function was invoked directly (not via delegatecall).
+    error NotDelegateCall();
+
+    /**
+     * @notice A redeem succeeded but delivered less than the requested amount. Indicates a
+     *         fee-on-transfer underlying or a market bug — an isolated-pools redeem otherwise
+     *         delivers at least what was asked for.
+     * @param resource Resource that under-delivered.
+     * @param requested Underlying units expected.
+     * @param actual Underlying units actually received.
+     */
+    error VTokenUnderfilled(address resource, uint256 requested, uint256 actual);
+
+    /**
+     * @notice The deposit is too small to mint a single vToken, so the market would keep the
+     *         underlying and issue nothing for it.
+     * @dev Reverting hands the leg back to the YieldGroup's deposit cascade, which routes around it;
+     *      minting zero would strand the amount silently. Reachable when the Hub cascade leaves this
+     *      market a remainder under one vToken unit (about 1e10 wei for an 18-decimal underlying).
+     * @param resource Market that would have minted zero.
+     * @param amount Underlying units offered.
+     * @param minimum Underlying units needed to mint one vToken.
+     */
+    error DepositBelowOneVToken(address resource, uint256 amount, uint256 minimum);
+
+    /**
+     * @notice The market's supply allowlist is enabled and the prospective supplier is not on it.
+     * @param resource Market whose allowlist rejected the supplier.
+     * @param supplier Account that would be credited with the vTokens (the YieldGroup).
+     */
+    error SupplyNotAllowed(address resource, address supplier);
+
+    /**
+     * @notice The market is not listed by the Comptroller it names, so it can never be minted.
+     * @param resource Market that its own Comptroller does not list.
+     */
+    error MarketNotListed(address resource);
+
+    // ============================== Modifiers ================================
+
+    /// @notice Reverts {NotDelegateCall} when the call is not arriving via delegatecall.
+    /// @dev During a delegatecall, `address(this)` is the caller's address; during a direct call it
+    ///      equals `_ADAPTER_SELF` (the address captured at construction).
+    modifier onlyDelegateCall() {
+        if (address(this) == _ADAPTER_SELF) revert NotDelegateCall();
+        _;
+    }
+
+    // ============================== Constructor ==============================
+
+    /// @notice Captures the adapter's own address into an immutable for {onlyDelegateCall}.
+    constructor() {
+        _ADAPTER_SELF = address(this);
+    }
+
+    // ============================== External — mutating =======================
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev `address(this)` here is the YieldGroup (delegatecall context), which already holds
+    ///      `amount` of underlying. We approve the market and mint; delegatecall preserves the caller
+    ///      context, so the market sees the YieldGroup as `msg.sender` and credits the vTokens there.
+    ///      That is also the account its supply allowlist checks.
+    function deposit(address resource, uint256 amount) external override onlyDelegateCall returns (uint256 deposited) {
+        uint256 minimum = _oneVTokenUnit(IVTokenIsolated(resource).exchangeRateStored());
+        if (amount < minimum) revert DepositBelowOneVToken(resource, amount, minimum);
+
+        IERC20 assetToken = IERC20(IVTokenIsolated(resource).underlying());
+        assetToken.forceApprove(resource, amount);
+        IVTokenIsolated(resource).mint(amount);
+        return amount;
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev `address(this)` here is the YieldGroup, so the redeem burns its vTokens and credits the
+    ///      underlying back to it.
+    ///
+    ///      Denominated in vTokens, not in underlying. `redeemUnderlying` DERIVES the burn from the
+    ///      request by rounding up, and that derived count is not bounded by the caller's balance —
+    ///      `_redeemFresh` subtracts it in checked arithmetic and panics when it overshoots. Naming
+    ///      the burn removes the derivation: {_burnFor} is the fewest vTokens worth at least
+    ///      `amount`, and {maxWithdraw} certifies nothing the position cannot cover that many times
+    ///      over.
+    ///
+    ///      The payout is `truncate(exchangeRate x tokens)`, so it is `>= amount` and exceeds it by
+    ///      up to one vToken unit. We forward exactly `amount` and leave the surplus as idle on the
+    ///      YieldGroup, where `totalAssets` counts it and the next withdrawal consumes it
+    ///      idle-first — the same treatment `AdapterCoreV1` gives its gross-up surplus, and what
+    ///      keeps the YieldGroup's `received == requested` invariant true.
+    ///
+    ///      Burns the whole balance instead when the vTokens left after the burn would be worth 0
+    ///      underlying and the market's payable cash covers the full redeem. Below a rate of `1e18`
+    ///      a few vTokens can be worth less than one unit, and the market refuses to redeem them on
+    ///      their own, so a drain would otherwise leave them stuck. The extra payout is at most one
+    ///      unit and stays idle like the surplus above.
+    function withdraw(address resource, uint256 amount, address to) external override onlyDelegateCall {
+        IERC20 assetToken = IERC20(IVTokenIsolated(resource).underlying());
+
+        // Settle first so the rate and cash read below are the ones the redeem will use.
+        IVTokenIsolated(resource).accrueInterest();
+        uint256 exchangeRate = IVTokenIsolated(resource).exchangeRateStored();
+        uint256 tokens = _burnFor(exchangeRate, amount);
+        uint256 vBal = IVTokenIsolated(resource).balanceOf(address(this));
+        if (tokens < vBal && ((vBal - tokens) * exchangeRate) / EXP_SCALE == 0) {
+            uint256 payableCash = IVTokenIsolated(resource).getCash() - IVTokenIsolated(resource).totalReserves();
+            if ((vBal * exchangeRate) / EXP_SCALE <= payableCash) tokens = vBal;
+        }
+
+        uint256 preBal = assetToken.balanceOf(address(this));
+        IVTokenIsolated(resource).redeem(tokens);
+        uint256 received = assetToken.balanceOf(address(this)) - preBal;
+        if (received < amount) revert VTokenUnderfilled(resource, amount, received);
+
+        assetToken.safeTransfer(to, amount);
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev Plain CALL, no `onlyDelegateCall`: `accrueInterest` mutates the market's own global
+    ///      index, not this caller's position, so it is safe (and cheaper) to run in the adapter's
+    ///      context. After it returns, every view below is fresh to the current block or timestamp.
+    function accrue(address resource) external override {
+        IVTokenIsolated(resource).accrueInterest();
+    }
+
+    // ============================== External — view ==========================
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    function asset(address resource) external view override returns (address) {
+        return IVTokenIsolated(resource).underlying();
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev `balance x exchangeRateStored`: the market's own valuation of the tokens, and what
+    ///      redeeming all of them would pay at the stored rate if the market had the cash. Includes
+    ///      the position's share of `badDebt`; see the contract NatSpec.
+    function totalAssets(address resource, address holder) external view override returns (uint256) {
+        uint256 vBal = IVTokenIsolated(resource).balanceOf(holder);
+        if (vBal == 0) return 0;
+        return (vBal * IVTokenIsolated(resource).exchangeRateStored()) / EXP_SCALE;
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev Honors, in order: the market's supply allowlist (against `msg.sender`, the prospective
+    ///      supplier — see the contract NatSpec), its MINT pause, and its supply cap. The headroom
+    ///      math mirrors `preMintHook`'s `nextTotalSupply = totalSupply x exchangeRate + mintAmount`
+    ///      check. Room below one vToken unit is reported as zero, because a deposit of it would
+    ///      mint nothing.
+    function maxDeposit(address resource) external view override returns (uint256) {
+        ISpokeComptroller comptrollerContract = ISpokeComptroller(IVTokenIsolated(resource).comptroller());
+        if (
+            comptrollerContract.isSupplyAllowlistEnabled(resource)
+                && !comptrollerContract.isAllowedSupplier(resource, msg.sender)
+        ) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if (comptrollerContract.actionPaused(resource, ACTION_MINT)) return 0;
+
+        uint256 supplyCap = comptrollerContract.supplyCaps(resource);
+        // A cap of zero is a real cap here, not an "unset" sentinel: `preMintHook` rejects every
+        // non-zero mint against it. The uncapped sentinel is `type(uint256).max`.
+        if (supplyCap == 0) return 0;
+        if (supplyCap == type(uint256).max) return UNCAPPED_DEPOSIT_ROOM;
+
+        uint256 exchangeRate = IVTokenIsolated(resource).exchangeRateStored();
+        uint256 supplied = (IVTokenIsolated(resource).totalSupply() * exchangeRate) / EXP_SCALE;
+        if (supplied >= supplyCap) return 0;
+
+        uint256 room = supplyCap - supplied;
+        // `exchangeRateStored` is pre-accrual, but the market re-checks the cap at mint AFTER
+        // `accrueInterest` raises the rate, so the raw headroom is slightly optimistic on an
+        // interest-accruing near-cap market. Withhold a small conservative margin so a normal accrual
+        // between this view and execution cannot push `deposit(maxDeposit())` over the cap. The
+        // routing cascade is the backstop for larger staleness (an over-cap leg is skipped, not
+        // bubbled), so this only needs to absorb a typical inter-slot accrual.
+        room -= room / CAP_TRIM_DIVISOR;
+        return room < _oneVTokenUnit(exchangeRate) ? 0 : room;
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev Two constraints: the position's value, and the market's payable cash
+    ///      (`getCash - totalReserves` — reserves sit inside cash but are not redeemable, and
+    ///      `_redeemFresh` gates on the difference). Subtracting reserves also makes this figure
+    ///      invariant across the reserve sweep `accrueInterest` performs, which lowers cash and
+    ///      reserves by the same amount.
+    ///
+    ///      Both are expressed as a whole number of vTokens and valued back into underlying, because
+    ///      {withdraw} redeems by count: an amount at or below `truncate(exchangeRate x t)` is
+    ///      coverable by `t` tokens, so flooring at `t` is what makes the bound executable rather
+    ///      than merely arithmetically true. The position side is `truncate(exchangeRate x vBal)`,
+    ///      already floored at the tokens held; the cash side is floored to the tokens the market
+    ///      can pay for. Flooring is exact rather than conservative — no margin is withheld — so the
+    ///      last vToken stays withdrawable, which is what lets a market be drained to zero and
+    ///      deregistered.
+    ///
+    ///      Reads stored state, so the figure is exact only for a caller that has already settled
+    ///      this market's interest in the same transaction — the Hub's routing paths all do, via
+    ///      {accrue}. Against an unaccrued market it is optimistic by the reserves the next accrual
+    ///      will book, since those come out of the payable cash.
+    function maxWithdraw(address resource, address holder) external view override returns (uint256) {
+        ISpokeComptroller comptrollerContract = ISpokeComptroller(IVTokenIsolated(resource).comptroller());
+        if (comptrollerContract.actionPaused(resource, ACTION_REDEEM)) return 0;
+
+        uint256 vBal = IVTokenIsolated(resource).balanceOf(holder);
+        if (vBal == 0) return 0;
+
+        uint256 exchangeRate = IVTokenIsolated(resource).exchangeRateStored();
+        if (exchangeRate == 0) return 0;
+
+        uint256 ourValue = (vBal * exchangeRate) / EXP_SCALE;
+        if (ourValue == 0) return 0;
+
+        uint256 cash = IVTokenIsolated(resource).getCash();
+        uint256 reserves = IVTokenIsolated(resource).totalReserves();
+        if (cash <= reserves) return 0;
+
+        uint256 payableTokens = ((cash - reserves) * EXP_SCALE) / exchangeRate;
+        uint256 cashBound = (payableTokens * exchangeRate) / EXP_SCALE;
+
+        return ourValue < cashBound ? ourValue : cashBound;
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev The `blocksPerYear` parameter is IGNORED. An isolated-pools market carries its own
+    ///      annualiser as an immutable and can be block-based or time-based, so a YieldGroup-level
+    ///      constant would misprice whichever kind it was not configured for; the market's own value
+    ///      always matches the unit of its own rate. Deploy the spoke YieldGroup with
+    ///      `blocksPerYear = 0`, as the Flux family already does.
+    ///
+    ///      An emptied market reports 0 rather than reverting: `JumpRateModelV2.getSupplyRate`
+    ///      divides by `cash + borrows + badDebt - reserves` with no zero guard. `PoolLens` guards
+    ///      the same read.
+    function spotAPYBps(
+        address resource,
+        uint256 /* blocksPerYear */
+    )
+        external
+        view
+        override
+        returns (uint64)
+    {
+        if (IVTokenIsolated(resource).totalSupply() == 0) return 0;
+
+        uint256 annualised =
+            (IVTokenIsolated(resource).supplyRatePerBlock() * IVTokenIsolated(resource).blocksOrSecondsPerYear())
+                / MANTISSA_TO_BPS;
+        // forge-lint: disable-next-line(unsafe-typecast)
+        return annualised > type(uint64).max ? type(uint64).max : uint64(annualised);
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    function receiptBalance(address resource, address holder) external view override returns (uint256) {
+        return IVTokenIsolated(resource).balanceOf(holder);
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    function resourceName(address resource) external view override returns (string memory) {
+        return IERC20Metadata(resource).name();
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IResourceAdapter
+    /// @dev Rejects the two configurations `preMintHook` would reject on every deposit, either of
+    ///      which would leave the resource holding a queue slot it can never fill: a market its own
+    ///      Comptroller does not list, and a market whose supply allowlist is enabled without the
+    ///      registering YieldGroup on it. `msg.sender` is the YieldGroup (see the contract NatSpec),
+    ///      which is the account the market's allowlist gates.
+    ///
+    ///      The listing check is also what ties `resource` to the Comptroller it names: any contract
+    ///      can return a real `SpokeComptroller` from `comptroller()`, but only a market that
+    ///      Comptroller actually lists passes here. The allowlist accessors then pin the Comptroller
+    ///      to the spoke fork, since they exist nowhere else and the call reverts against any other
+    ///      Comptroller. Nothing else is asserted. In particular an unset `deviationBoundedOracle`
+    ///      is NOT grounds for rejection: it blocks borrowing, and so the market's yield, but leaves
+    ///      the Hub's own paths intact — `preMintHook` never reads a price, and `preRedeemHook`
+    ///      returns before the priced liquidity check for an account that is not a market member,
+    ///      which a supply-only YieldGroup never becomes.
+    function validateRegistration(address resource) external view override {
+        ISpokeComptroller comptrollerContract = ISpokeComptroller(IVTokenIsolated(resource).comptroller());
+        if (!comptrollerContract.isMarketListed(resource)) revert MarketNotListed(resource);
+        if (
+            comptrollerContract.isSupplyAllowlistEnabled(resource)
+                && !comptrollerContract.isAllowedSupplier(resource, msg.sender)
+        ) {
+            revert SupplyNotAllowed(resource, msg.sender);
+        }
+    }
+
+    // ============================== Private — pure ===========================
+
+    /**
+     * @notice Underlying value of exactly one vToken, rounded up.
+     * @param exchangeRate Market's stored exchange rate, scaled by `1e18`.
+     * @return unit `ceil(exchangeRate / 1e18)`.
+     */
+    function _oneVTokenUnit(uint256 exchangeRate) private pure returns (uint256 unit) {
+        return (exchangeRate + EXP_SCALE - 1) / EXP_SCALE;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * @notice Fewest vTokens worth at least `amount` of underlying.
+     * @dev `ceil(amount x 1e18 / exchangeRate)`. A token-denominated redeem pays
+     *      `truncate(exchangeRate x tokens)`, and this ceiling is the smallest count whose payout
+     *      reaches `amount` — so {withdraw} never under-delivers, and never burns more than
+     *      {maxWithdraw} certified the position and the market's cash can cover.
+     *
+     *      Non-increasing in the exchange rate. The market accrues before redeeming and that rate
+     *      only ever rises, so a count sized here stays inside the balance at execution and its
+     *      payout stays at or above `amount`.
+     * @param exchangeRate Market's stored exchange rate, scaled by `1e18`.
+     * @param amount Underlying units the caller intends to redeem.
+     * @return tokens vToken units to burn.
+     */
+    function _burnFor(uint256 exchangeRate, uint256 amount) private pure returns (uint256 tokens) {
+        if (exchangeRate == 0) return 0;
+        return (amount * EXP_SCALE + exchangeRate - 1) / exchangeRate;
+    }
+}

package/contracts/interfaces/IHub.sol

@@ -129,6 +129,12 @@ interface IHub is IERC4626Upgradeable {
     /// @param isDeposit True if the skipped leg was a deposit, false for a withdraw
     event YieldGroupSkipped(address indexed yieldGroup, bool isDeposit);
 
+    /// @notice Emitted when an emergency reallocation could not settle a YieldGroup's resources because the
+    ///         group's own `accrue()` reverted. The wind-down continues over the remaining groups rather
+    ///         than bubbling the revert; a healthy system emits this zero times.
+    /// @param yieldGroup YieldGroup that could not be settled
+    event YieldGroupAccrualFailed(address indexed yieldGroup);
+
     /// @notice Emitted when the management fee rate is changed; pending fees accrued at OLD rate first
     /// @param oldBps Previous rate in BPS
     /// @param newBps New rate in BPS

package/contracts/interfaces/IHubLens.sol

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
+pragma solidity 0.8.25;
+
+/**
+ * @title IHubLens
+ * @author Venus
+ * @notice Read-only view surface for a {Hub}: the numbers the Hub itself no longer computes.
+ * @dev The Hub's own `maxDeposit` / `maxMint` return `type(uint256).max`, because computing the
+ *      real ceiling on every `deposit` / `mint` puts the whole cap solve on the hot path. Caps are
+ *      still enforced — `Hub._routeDeposit` reverts with `HubCapacityExceeded` on anything the
+ *      cascade cannot place. This interface is how a frontend or an integrator sizes a deposit so
+ *      that revert never happens.
+ *
+ *      Every function takes the Hub as a parameter, so one deployment serves every Hub.
+ *
+ *      Fault behaviour follows the Hub's own split. A YieldGroup whose quantity views revert
+ *      contributes 0 and the rest of the figure still comes back; a YieldGroup whose
+ *      `totalAssets()` reverts halts every function here, because `Hub.totalAssets()` halts first
+ *      and a figure priced against a wrong NAV is worse than none.
+ */
+interface IHubLens {
+    /**
+     * @notice Asset units `hub` would accept in a single deposit right now.
+     * @dev 0 while the Hub is paused. Priced at the TVL the deposit itself produces, because
+     *      `Hub._routeDeposit` prices the percentage caps there too. Each YieldGroup's room is
+     *      trimmed by 0.01% of its mark, covering the interest the deposit settles before it prices
+     *      caps; an accrual past that margin reverts rather than over-filling a cap.
+     * @param hub Hub to measure.
+     * @return assets Asset units that could be deposited right now.
+     */
+    function maxDeposit(address hub) external view returns (uint256 assets);
+
+    /**
+     * @notice Shares `hub` would mint for {maxDeposit}.
+     * @dev Carries the same 0.01% margin twice over: once through {maxDeposit}, and once on the
+     *      shares themselves, because the interest the deposit settles also raises the price the
+     *      mint is charged at.
+     * @param hub Hub to measure.
+     * @return shares `hub.convertToShares(maxDeposit(hub))`, less that margin.
+     */
+    function maxMint(address hub) external view returns (uint256 shares);
+
+    /**
+     * @notice {maxDeposit} split by the YieldGroup that would receive it.
+     * @dev Where a maximum-sized deposit would land, in cascade order, so `Σ room == maxDeposit`.
+     *      Not "how much could this YieldGroup take on its own": a YieldGroup late in the deposit
+     *      queue reads 0 whenever the ones ahead of it absorb everything. Both arrays are empty
+     *      while the Hub is paused.
+     * @param hub Hub to measure.
+     * @return groups Routable YieldGroups, in deposit-queue order. Paused, unregistered and
+     *         view-reverting YieldGroups are left out, as is one registered but not queued for
+     *         deposits, which {spotAPYBps} still counts.
+     * @return room Each YieldGroup's share of the ceiling, aligned index-for-index with `groups`.
+     */
+    function depositCapacityBreakdown(address hub)
+        external
+        view
+        returns (address[] memory groups, uint256[] memory room);
+
+    /**
+     * @notice Blended spot APY across everything `hub` holds, in BPS.
+     * @dev A weighted average, not a sum: each YieldGroup's `spotAPYBps()` weighted by the part of
+     *      it that is invested, over the Hub's whole `totalAssets()`. Idle assets therefore count
+     *      at 0% rather than being dropped, whether they sit on the Hub or on a YieldGroup, so the
+     *      figure is what an LP actually earns. A YieldGroup whose views revert is skipped,
+     *      contributing 0.
+     * @param hub Hub to measure.
+     * @return apyBps Blended APY in BPS, 0 when the Hub holds nothing.
+     */
+    function spotAPYBps(address hub) external view returns (uint64 apyBps);
+}

package/contracts/interfaces/IResourceAdapter.sol

@@ -60,9 +60,11 @@ interface IResourceAdapter {
      *      Post-conditions:
      *      - `to` receives exactly `amount` of underlying.
      *      - Some adapters redeem slightly more than `amount` and leave the excess as idle on
-     *        the YieldGroup (e.g. AdapterCoreV1's treasury-fee gross-up and its sub-one-vToken
-     *        dust bump). Such surplus is counted in `totalAssets` and consumed idle-first on the
-     *        next call. Fee-free adapters (Flux, FRV) leave no surplus.
+     *        the YieldGroup (AdapterCoreV1's treasury-fee gross-up and its sub-one-vToken dust
+     *        bump; AdapterSpokeV1 on every redeem, because an isolated-pools market rounds its
+     *        burn up and then recomputes the payout from the rounded-up token count). Such
+     *        surplus is counted in `totalAssets` and consumed idle-first on the next call.
+     *        Fee-free adapters (Flux, FRV) leave no surplus.
      * @param resource Underlying yield protocol address.
      * @param amount Net underlying units to deliver to `to`.
      * @param to Recipient of the underlying.
@@ -75,8 +77,9 @@ interface IResourceAdapter {
      *         one-cycle-stale one.
      * @dev Invoked via normal CALL (not delegatecall): it mutates the resource's own global
      *      interest state, not the holder's position, so receipt tokens never move. Only
-     *      block-lazy adapters do real work here — Core pokes the vToken's `accrueInterest`;
-     *      Flux and FRV implement it as a no-op (their NAV is not a block-lazy exchange rate).
+     *      block-lazy adapters do real work here — Core and Spoke poke their vToken's
+     *      `accrueInterest`; Flux and FRV implement it as a no-op (their NAV is not a block-lazy
+     *      exchange rate).
      * @param resource Underlying yield protocol address to settle interest on.
      */
     function accrue(address resource) external;
@@ -122,7 +125,8 @@ interface IResourceAdapter {
      * @notice Spot supply-side APY for `resource` in BPS.
      * @dev `blocksPerYear` is consumed only by block-rate adapters (e.g. Core annualises a
      *      per-block supply rate with it). Adapters whose yieldGroup is already annualised — Flux
-     *      (Fluid APR) and FRV (time-based fixed APY) — ignore the parameter.
+     *      (Fluid APR) and FRV (time-based fixed APY) — ignore the parameter, as does Spoke, whose
+     *      markets each carry their own annualiser and may be block- or time-based.
      * @param resource Underlying yield protocol address.
      * @param blocksPerYear Per-chain block cadence (chain-dependent; ~10_512_000 on BNB Chain);
      *        used only by block-rate adapters, ignored by the rest.
@@ -142,12 +146,24 @@ interface IResourceAdapter {
      */
     function receiptBalance(address resource, address holder) external view returns (uint256 shares);
 
+    /**
+     * @notice Human-readable name of `resource`, for display by off-chain consumers.
+     * @dev Not every resource is an ERC-20 with its own `name()` (e.g. an ERC-7540 vault keeps it on
+     *      its share token), so each adapter reads it from wherever its protocol exposes it.
+     * @param resource Underlying yield protocol address.
+     * @return name Display name of the resource.
+     */
+    function resourceName(address resource) external view returns (string memory name);
+
     /**
      * @notice Revert if `resource` fails a protocol-specific precondition for registration.
      * @dev Called by `YieldGroup.addResource`. AdapterCoreV1 rejects a vToken whose Comptroller
      *      charges a non-zero `treasuryPercent` — that exit fee leaves the pool on every redeem
      *      without burning shares, so it is unmodeled in the Hub's gross NAV and must not be
-     *      registered. FRV and Flux have no per-redeem pool fee and implement this as a no-op.
+     *      registered. AdapterSpokeV1 rejects a market whose supply allowlist is enabled without
+     *      the registering YieldGroup on it, since every deposit would revert; that call also
+     *      proves the market belongs to a spoke pool, because no other Comptroller exposes the
+     *      allowlist. FRV and Flux have no per-redeem pool fee and implement this as a no-op.
      * @param resource Underlying yield protocol address being registered.
      */
     function validateRegistration(address resource) external view;

package/contracts/interfaces/IYieldGroupBase.sol

@@ -455,7 +455,12 @@ interface IYieldGroupBase {
      *      lifecycle clock (FRV, whose vaults exit `Fundraising` by time) can report stale
      *      non-zero capacity from this view until a state-advancing call refreshes it; the
      *      honesty contract holds against current state, not a time-due future one.
-     * @return capacity Spare deposit capacity in asset units.
+     * @dev Venue room only — NOT the Hub's cap on this YieldGroup, which the Hub applies itself in
+     *      both places that matter. Do not clamp this to the Hub's cap: a YieldGroup can only read
+     *      it at the Hub's current TVL, but a deposit is sized against the TVL it will produce, so
+     *      clamping makes a percentage-capped Hub un-bootstrappable — at TVL 0 every percentage cap
+     *      is 0. Pinned by `tests/foundry/Integration/PercentageCapCapacity.t.sol`.
+     * @return capacity Spare deposit capacity in asset units, before the Hub's own cap.
      */
     function maxDeposit() external view returns (uint256 capacity);