@vendoai/store 0.1.0 → 0.4.1

package/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# @vendoai/store
+
+`@vendoai/store` implements the `@vendoai/core` persistence seams with one Postgres schema. It uses PGlite for a zero-config local database and the same schema on a hosted Postgres service.
+
+Read [Persistence](https://docs.vendo.run/deploy/persistence).
+
+```ts
+import { createStore } from "@vendoai/store";
+
+const store = createStore({ dataDir: ".vendo/data" });
+await store.ensureSchema();
+```
+
+For production, pass a Postgres connection string explicitly, for example `createStore({ url: process.env.POSTGRES_URL })`. Without `url`, PGlite stores durable data in `dataDir` (default `.vendo/data`); `memory://` is also supported. PGlite is rejected on known serverless filesystems.
+
+## Tables
+
+| Table | Key columns (stable) | Holds |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `vendo_meta` | `key, value` | schema version, boot id |
+| `vendo_apps` | `id, subject, enabled, doc, created_at, updated_at` | each user's app document and ownership |
+| `vendo_records` | `collection, id, data, refs, created_at, updated_at, revision` | app data collections; `refs` is GIN-indexed for host joins; `revision` backs atomic writes |
+| `vendo_blobs` | `namespace, key, bytes, content_type, created_at` | file storage, exports, screenshots |
+| `vendo_state` | `app_id, subject, data, updated_at` | built-in per-user-per-app state singleton |
+| `vendo_threads` | `id, subject, messages, created_at, updated_at` | conversation threads |
+| `vendo_grants` | `id, subject, tool, descriptor_hash, scope, duration, app_id, source, granted_at, revoked_at, expires_at` | permission grants |
+| `vendo_approvals` | `id, subject, request, status, decided_at, session_id, consumed_at, created_at` | approval queue |
+| `vendo_audit` | `id, at, kind, subject, venue, presence, app_id, tool, event` | append-only audit log |
+| `vendo_runs` | `id, app_id, trigger, status, record, started_at, finished_at` | automation run records |
+| `vendo_secrets` | `name, ciphertext, created_at` | optional encrypted secret values |
+| `vendo_mcp_clients` | `id, data, refs, created_at, updated_at` | door-owned MCP client state |
+| `vendo_mcp_grants` | `id, data, refs, created_at, updated_at` | door-owned MCP grant state |
+| `vendo_sessions` | `subject, touched_at` | ephemeral (anonymous) session registry: last-activity touch per session, read by the TTL sweep |
+
+App storage uses `app:<appId>:<name>` by convention. App-scoped record and blob WRITES require an existing `vendo_apps` row and fail closed with `not-found` ("session may have expired") when there is none — the app never existed, or its ephemeral session was swept; reads on a missing app return empty. Except for the reserved names below, collection names remain opaque and use `vendo_records`; non-`app:`-prefixed collections and namespaces have no principal linkage.
+
+Generic record collections and the two door-owned tables expose the optional
+`RecordStore.claim` capability: one database statement compares the current
+`data` and `refs`, then replaces or deletes the row. Exactly one concurrent
+claimant receives `true`.
+
+Ordinary record collections expose optional `records(collection).atomic` operations: `insertIfAbsent(record)` for one-winner claims and `compareAndSwap(record, expectedRevision)` for revision-guarded updates. Both PGlite and hosted Postgres use the same atomic SQL. The capability is optional at the core seam and reserved typed-table routes may omit it.
+
+## Reserved collections (block seam)
+
+Blocks receive core's plain `StoreAdapter`, so these exact `records()` collection names route to their typed tables:
+
+| Collection | Primary key | Data | Synthesized refs | Record timestamps |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `vendo_grants` | grant id | `PermissionGrant` | `subject`, `tool`, optional `app_id` | `grantedAt` / `revokedAt ?? grantedAt` |
+| `vendo_approvals` | approval id | `{ request, status, decidedAt?, sessionId?, consumedAt? }` | `subject`, `status` | `request.createdAt` / `consumedAt ?? decidedAt ?? request.createdAt` |
+| `vendo_audit` | audit event id | `AuditEvent` | `subject`, `kind`, optional `app_id`, optional `tool` | `at` / `at` |
+| `vendo_threads` | thread id | `{ subject, messages }` | `subject` | table `created_at` / `updated_at` |
+| `vendo_runs` | run id | `{ appId, trigger, status, record, startedAt, finishedAt? }` | `app_id`, `status` | `startedAt` / `finishedAt ?? startedAt` |
+| `vendo_apps` | app id | `{ subject, enabled, doc }` | `subject` | table `created_at` / `updated_at` |
+| `vendo_mcp_clients` | client id | block-internal JSON | caller-supplied, arbitrary keys | table `created_at` / `updated_at` |
+| `vendo_mcp_grants` | grant id | block-internal JSON | caller-supplied, arbitrary keys | table `created_at` / `updated_at` |
+
+Typed reserved writes validate their data, require embedded ids to match the record id, and upsert the typed row — with two enforced exceptions. `vendo_audit` is append-only: `put` on an existing id and `delete` are both refused; audit rows are erased only through the erase API below. `vendo_apps`, `vendo_grants`, and `vendo_threads` refuse cross-subject flips atomically: a put whose id already belongs to another subject fails with a conflict. The data is authoritative: caller-supplied `refs` are ignored on write and synthesized from typed columns on read. Their routed `list({ refs })` accepts only the refs shown above. The two door-owned collections use generic record semantics in dedicated tables: the store does not validate their block-internal payloads, and refs filters accept arbitrary keys. Generic and routed record lists are uniformly newest-first by `(createdAt, id)`.
+
+Ephemeral principals take the SAME path as everyone else: their rows are ordinary disk rows under their subject. What makes a session ephemeral is its registration (`registerEphemeralSubject`); see the lifecycle section below.
+
+## Ephemeral session lifecycle
+
+Ephemeral (anonymous) principals write ordinary disk rows under their subject; the session itself is one row in `vendo_sessions`. `registerEphemeralSubject(store, subject, now?)` (async) upserts the touch row — registration == touch — and the umbrella calls it on every ephemeral-principal request, so idle time is measured from the last request, reads included. Data written for a subject that is never registered behaves like durable data (nothing sweeps it); the erase API below remains the cleanup path for such compositions.
+
+`sweepEphemeralSubjects(store, { idleMs, now? })` (async) erases every registered session idle for at least `idleMs` through the erase cascade — the subject's apps, records, blobs, state, threads, grants, approvals, audit, runs, and the session row itself — and returns the swept subjects so the caller can cascade further (the umbrella forwards them to `agent.evictSubject`). TTL policy is the caller's — the store stays config-free; `createVendo({ sessions })` owns the knobs and the sweep cadence.
+
+Writes after a sweep fail closed. App-scoped (`app:<appId>:<name>`) record and blob writes require an existing `vendo_apps` row; a write against a missing app — one that never existed or whose session was swept — throws `not-found` ("session may have expired") instead of recreating rows no cascade would reach again. Reads on missing apps return empty.
+
+Because the registry is a table in the same database, sessions survive restarts and are shared across instances — no sticky-session constraint. Anonymous audit events live in `vendo_audit` like any others and appear in `auditStore.export()` until their session is swept.
+
+`adoptEphemeralSubject(store, from, to)` is the anonymous-to-signed-in merge: threads, apps (with their app-scoped records/blobs), and state move to the signed-in subject; grants, approvals, audit, and the adopted apps' run history are deleted — consent and history do not transfer. Idempotent; nothing is ever stolen from an existing durable row.
+
+## Encryption
+
+`createStore({ encryption: { key } })` (base64 32-byte key) encrypts `vendo_secrets.ciphertext` with AES-256-GCM; everything else stays host-queryable plaintext by design. Encryption is production-owned: set `VENDO_STORE_ENCRYPTION_KEY` in the deploy environment and `createVendo` reads it when no store is passed; without a key, dev mode stores secrets unencrypted (`allowUnencryptedSecrets`, `plain@1:` envelope) and production secret writes fail closed. Ciphertext is bound to its secret name via AAD (`v2` envelope).
+
+## Retention and erasure
+
+`eraseStore(store)` is the store-level erase API — `bySubject(subject)` for full erasure and `byApp(appId)` — cascading the matching rows across all 14 tables (ephemeral subjects included — their rows are ordinary disk rows) and returning per-table deleted counts. It is the only sanctioned deletion path for `vendo_audit` rows. It is also re-exported from `@vendoai/vendo/server`. Host SQL remains available for everything else.

package/dist/blobs.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import type { BlobStore } from "@vendoai/core";
+import type { Db } from "./db.js";
+/** 01-core §12 */
+export declare function createBlobStore(db: Db, namespace: string): BlobStore;
+//# sourceMappingURL=blobs.d.ts.map

package/dist/blobs.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/blobs.js

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+import { appScopeId, escapeLike, requireKnownApp, text, unknownAppError } from "./helpers/utils.js";
+/** 01-core §12 */
+export function createBlobStore(db, namespace) {
+    const appId = appScopeId(namespace);
+    // STORE-1: mirrors records.ts — an app-scoped blob WRITE for an app with no
+    // vendo_apps row (never existed / session swept) fails closed rather than
+    // recreating rows no erase cascade would reach; reads come back empty. The
+    // row-creating put carries the gate IN the statement (structural, not
+    // ordering care); delete keeps the pre-check as its error signal.
+    const appGate = appId === undefined ? "" : "WHERE EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM vendo_apps WHERE id = $6)";
+    const appGateParams = appId === undefined ? [] : [appId];
+    return {
+        async put(key, bytes, meta) {
+            const result = await db.query(`INSERT INTO vendo_blobs (namespace, key, bytes, content_type, created_at)
+         SELECT $1::text, $2::text, $3::bytea, $4::text, $5::timestamptz
+         ${appGate}
+         ON CONFLICT (namespace, key) DO UPDATE
+         SET bytes = EXCLUDED.bytes, content_type = EXCLUDED.content_type
+         RETURNING key`, [
+                namespace,
+                key,
+                // node-postgres only recognizes Buffer as bytea; a plain Uint8Array
+                // would be serialized as JSON. PGlite accepts Buffer (a Uint8Array).
+                Buffer.isBuffer(bytes) ? bytes : Buffer.from(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength),
+                meta?.contentType ?? null,
+                new Date().toISOString(),
+                ...appGateParams,
+            ]);
+            // The upsert always returns a row unless the app-existence gate refused it.
+            if (result.rows[0] === undefined && appId !== undefined)
+                throw unknownAppError(appId);
+        },
+        async get(key) {
+            const result = await db.query("SELECT bytes, content_type FROM vendo_blobs WHERE namespace = $1 AND key = $2", [namespace, key]);
+            const row = result.rows[0];
+            if (!row)
+                return null;
+            const bytes = row["bytes"];
+            if (!(bytes instanceof Uint8Array))
+                throw new Error("Expected database bytea");
+            const contentType = row["content_type"];
+            return {
+                // Normalize to a plain Uint8Array so both drivers return one shape
+                // (pg hands back Buffer, PGlite hands back Uint8Array).
+                bytes: new Uint8Array(bytes),
+                ...(typeof contentType === "string" ? { contentType } : {}),
+            };
+        },
+        async delete(key) {
+            // DELETE never creates rows, so the pre-check is only the error signal.
+            await requireKnownApp(db, appId);
+            await db.query("DELETE FROM vendo_blobs WHERE namespace = $1 AND key = $2", [namespace, key]);
+        },
+        async list(prefix = "") {
+            const result = await db.query("SELECT key FROM vendo_blobs WHERE namespace = $1 AND key LIKE $2 ESCAPE '\\'", [namespace, `${escapeLike(prefix)}%`]);
+            // Sort in JS: SQL ORDER BY is collation-dependent (PGlite ships C,
+            // hosted Postgres usually a locale) — one deterministic order everywhere.
+            return result.rows.map((row) => text(row["key"])).sort();
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=blobs.js.map

package/dist/blobs.js.map

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package/dist/crypto.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export declare function validateEncryptionKey(value: string): Buffer;
+/** 02-store §4 — envelope version `v2`: AES-256-GCM with the secret NAME
+ *  bound as AAD, so a ciphertext swapped between rows (or served for the
+ *  wrong name) fails the auth tag instead of decrypting to another secret's
+ *  value. */
+export declare function encryptSecret(value: string, key: Buffer, name: string): string;
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export declare function decryptSecret(value: string, key: Buffer, name: string): string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=crypto.d.ts.map

package/dist/crypto.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"crypto.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/crypto.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA,kBAAkB;AAClB,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAO3D;AAED;;;aAGa;AACb,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAO9E;AAED,kBAAkB;AAClB,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAmB9E"}

package/dist/crypto.js

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+import { VendoError } from "@vendoai/core";
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export function validateEncryptionKey(value) {
+    const validCharacters = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/.test(value);
+    const decoded = Buffer.from(value, "base64");
+    if (!validCharacters || decoded.byteLength !== 32) {
+        throw new VendoError("validation", "encryption.key must be a base64-encoded 32-byte key");
+    }
+    return decoded;
+}
+/** 02-store §4 — envelope version `v2`: AES-256-GCM with the secret NAME
+ *  bound as AAD, so a ciphertext swapped between rows (or served for the
+ *  wrong name) fails the auth tag instead of decrypting to another secret's
+ *  value. */
+export function encryptSecret(value, key, name) {
+    const iv = randomBytes(12);
+    const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
+    cipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(name, "utf8"));
+    const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(value, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
+    const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+    return `v2:${iv.toString("base64")}:${tag.toString("base64")}:${ciphertext.toString("base64")}`;
+}
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export function decryptSecret(value, key, name) {
+    try {
+        const [version, ivValue, tagValue, ciphertextValue, extra] = value.split(":");
+        if (version !== "v2"
+            || !ivValue || !tagValue || ciphertextValue === undefined || extra !== undefined) {
+            throw new Error("invalid ciphertext envelope");
+        }
+        const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, Buffer.from(ivValue, "base64"));
+        decipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(name, "utf8"));
+        decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagValue, "base64"));
+        return Buffer.concat([
+            decipher.update(Buffer.from(ciphertextValue, "base64")),
+            decipher.final(),
+        ]).toString("utf8");
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new VendoError("validation", "Stored secret could not be decrypted");
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=crypto.js.map

package/dist/crypto.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/db.d.ts

@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
-import { drizzle as drizzlePglite } from "drizzle-orm/pglite";
-import { drizzle as drizzlePg } from "drizzle-orm/node-postgres";
-import { Pool } from "pg";
-export interface VendoDatabaseConfig {
-    connectionString?: string;
-    pglite?: {
-        dataDir: string;
+/** 02-store §1 */
+export interface StoreConfig {
+    url?: string;
+    dataDir?: string;
+    encryption?: {
+        key: string;
     };
+    /** 02-store §4 — dev-mode escape hatch: store secrets unencrypted when no
+        encryption key is configured. Never enable in production; secret writes
+        without a key fail closed there. */
+    allowUnencryptedSecrets?: boolean;
 }
-export type VendoDb = {
-    kind: "pglite";
-    db: ReturnType<typeof drizzlePglite>;
-    cacheKey: string;
-} | {
-    kind: "pg";
-    db: ReturnType<typeof drizzlePg>;
-    cacheKey: string;
-};
-/**
- * pg.Pool re-emits idle-client errors (backend restart, dropped connection)
- * on itself; with no 'error' listener Node escalates that to an uncaught
- * exception and kills the host process. The pool already discards the dead
- * client — log and keep serving.
- */
-export declare function createPgPool(connectionString: string): Pool;
-export declare function createVendoDatabase(config?: VendoDatabaseConfig): Promise<VendoDb>;
-/** Idempotent, race-safe (advisory lock on real PG), memoized per handle. */
-export declare function migrateVendoDatabase(handle: VendoDb): Promise<void>;
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export interface Db {
+    kind: "pg" | "pglite";
+    query(text: string, params?: unknown[]): Promise<{
+        rows: Record<string, unknown>[];
+    }>;
+    close(): Promise<void>;
+    raw(): unknown;
+}
+type Query = Db["query"];
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export declare function createDb(config?: StoreConfig): Db;
+/** 02-store §4 */
+export declare function withSchemaLock<T>(db: Db, work: (query: Query) => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=db.d.ts.map

package/dist/db.d.ts.map

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