@vellumai/cli 0.10.11-dev.202607242127.a6bf2b2 → 0.10.11-staging.2

package/node_modules/@vellumai/service-contracts/src/secret-detection.ts

@@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Shared prefix-based secret patterns — the single source of truth.
- *
- * Ingress blocking, tool output scanning, log redaction, and client-side
- * composer detection all consume this list.  When adding a new integration,
- * add its API key pattern here.
- *
- * This module is intentionally data-only: no imports, no entropy logic,
- * no config — safe for hot-path consumers like log serializers, and
- * browser-safe so web clients can bundle it directly.
- *
- * The exported `PATTERNS`/constants are shared verbatim by the daemon and the
- * web clients, so the two sides agree on what a secret *looks like*. The web
- * composer scanner is a conservative superset pre-filter of the daemon ingress
- * check, not an identical twin: the daemon additionally applies a per-user
- * secret allowlist and config gating (`secretDetection.enabled` /
- * `blockIngress`) on top of these shared patterns, so the client may warn on a
- * few values the server would accept (e.g. an allowlisted token). Only the
- * shared patterns and length bounds in this module are guaranteed identical
- * across client and server.
- */
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Types
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export interface SecretPrefixPattern {
-  /** Human-readable label shown in block notices and redaction tags. */
-  label: string;
-  /**
-   * Regex that matches the token value.  Must NOT include the `g` flag or
-   * capture groups — consumers add those as needed.
-   */
-  regex: RegExp;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Prefix patterns
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * High-confidence, prefix-based secret patterns.
- *
- * Each entry matches a known API key / token format by its distinctive
- * prefix.  Patterns that require surrounding context (entropy analysis,
- * keyword proximity, URL structure) do NOT belong here — they stay in
- * `secret-scanner.ts` as scanner-only patterns.
- *
- * **When adding a new third-party integration, add its API key pattern
- * here.**  If the service uses only opaque OAuth access tokens (no fixed
- * prefix), no pattern is needed.
- */
-/** Detection label for PEM private-key matches. */
-export const PRIVATE_KEY_LABEL = "Private Key";
-
-// PEM private-key header/footer type variants, shared by the Private Key
-// pattern and the complete-block check.
-const PEM_KEY_TYPE = String.raw`(?:RSA |DSA |EC |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY(?:\s+BLOCK)?`;
-const PEM_BEGIN = String.raw`-----BEGIN ${PEM_KEY_TYPE}-----`;
-const PEM_END = String.raw`-----END ${PEM_KEY_TYPE}-----`;
-
-const PEM_COMPLETE_BLOCK = new RegExp(`${PEM_END}$`);
-
-/**
- * Whole-block PEM body atom: one tempered body character. `(?!-----BEGIN)`
- * keeps the body from crossing into an adjacent block, so two keys never
- * merge into one span.
- */
-const PEM_BLOCK_TAIL = String.raw`(?:(?!-----BEGIN)[\s\S])`;
-
-/**
- * Upper bound on the PEM body scan distance for the redaction matcher. An
- * RSA-8192 PEM is ~6.4 KB, so 16 KiB clears real keys with headroom while
- * capping the per-header rescan distance. The bound is what keeps the
- * redaction matcher O(n) on large serialized strings full of footerless
- * `-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----` headers: each header rescans at most this
- * far looking for a footer instead of to EOF, which is what the unbounded
- * whole-block matcher does (its O(n²) worst case).
- */
-export const PEM_REDACTION_MAX_BODY_LENGTH = 16384;
-
-/**
- * Whole-block private-key matcher for detect-AND-REDACT consumers (log
- * serializers, the tool-output scanner, staged-export rewrite).
- *
- * These consumers replace the matched span in place, so the match must cover
- * the ENTIRE key — header → body → footer — or the base64 body and `-----END-----`
- * footer survive redaction. This captures the whole block, but with a
- * length-BOUNDED body quantifier ({@link PEM_REDACTION_MAX_BODY_LENGTH}) so a
- * stream of footerless headers cannot drive the O(n²) worst case the unbounded
- * whole-block matcher incurs. The footer group is optional, so a truncated /
- * footerless key still matches header-only — preserving the detection-fires
- * guarantee ingress blocking relies on. Tempered + lazy + bounded ⇒ no
- * catastrophic backtracking.
- *
- * `detectSecretsInText` (chat) keeps the unbounded whole-block
- * {@link PREFIX_PATTERNS} entry, which the store/rewrite path relies on to
- * capture arbitrarily large keys in full.
- */
-export const PRIVATE_KEY_REDACTION_REGEX = new RegExp(
-  `${PEM_BEGIN}(?:${PEM_BLOCK_TAIL}{0,${PEM_REDACTION_MAX_BODY_LENGTH}}?${PEM_END})?`,
-);
-
-/**
- * True when a `Private Key` match is a complete PEM block — it ends at an
- * `-----END … PRIVATE KEY-----` footer (the pattern guarantees it starts at
- * the BEGIN header). A header-only match means the footer is absent from
- * the scanned text (truncated or partial paste), so the match does NOT
- * cover the key body: storing or replacing such a value would leave key
- * material behind.
- */
-export function isCompletePrivateKeyBlock(value: string): boolean {
-  return PEM_COMPLETE_BLOCK.test(value);
-}
-
-export const PREFIX_PATTERNS: SecretPrefixPattern[] = [
-  // -- Private keys --
-  // First in the list on purpose: `detectSecretsInText` resolves overlapping
-  // spans by list order, and a PEM body is base64 — it can embed runs that
-  // look like other tokens (e.g. `AKIA` + 16 chars). The whole-block match
-  // must win those overlaps or the block would be fragmented.
-  {
-    label: PRIVATE_KEY_LABEL,
-    // Matches the entire PEM block (header through footer) when the END
-    // footer is present, so consumers that store or replace the matched
-    // value handle the whole key. The block tail is optional: a header with
-    // no footer (truncated or streamed partial paste) still matches alone,
-    // which ingress blocking relies on. The body is tempered — it never
-    // crosses another BEGIN header — so adjacent blocks match separately.
-    regex: new RegExp(`${PEM_BEGIN}(?:${PEM_BLOCK_TAIL}*?${PEM_END})?`),
-  },
-
-  // -- AWS --
-  { label: "AWS Access Key", regex: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/ },
-
-  // -- GitHub --
-  { label: "GitHub Token", regex: /gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36,}/ },
-  { label: "GitHub Fine-Grained PAT", regex: /github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}/ },
-
-  // -- GitLab --
-  { label: "GitLab Token", regex: /glpat-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{20,}/ },
-
-  // -- Stripe --
-  { label: "Stripe Secret Key", regex: /sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}/ },
-  { label: "Stripe Restricted Key", regex: /rk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}/ },
-
-  // -- Slack --
-  {
-    label: "Slack Bot Token",
-    regex: /xoxb-[0-9]{10,}-[0-9]{10,}-[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}/,
-  },
-  {
-    label: "Slack User Token",
-    regex: /xoxp-[0-9]{10,}-[0-9]{10,}-[0-9]{10,}-[a-f0-9]{32}/,
-  },
-  {
-    label: "Slack App Token",
-    regex: /xapp-[0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9]+-[0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9]+/,
-  },
-
-  // -- Telegram --
-  {
-    label: "Telegram Bot Token",
-    // Format: <bot_id>:<secret> where bot_id is 8–10 digits, secret is 35 chars
-    regex: /[0-9]{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}/,
-  },
-
-  // -- Anthropic --
-  { label: "Anthropic API Key", regex: /sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{80,}/ },
-
-  // -- OpenAI --
-  {
-    label: "OpenAI API Key",
-    regex: /sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20}T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9]{20}/,
-  },
-  { label: "OpenAI Project Key", regex: /sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{40,}/ },
-
-  // -- Google --
-  { label: "Google API Key", regex: /AIza[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{35}/ },
-  {
-    label: "Google OAuth Client Secret",
-    regex: /GOCSPX-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{28}/,
-  },
-
-  // -- Twilio --
-  { label: "Twilio API Key", regex: /SK[0-9a-f]{32}/ },
-
-  // -- SendGrid --
-  {
-    label: "SendGrid API Key",
-    regex: /SG\.[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{43}/,
-  },
-
-  // -- Mailgun --
-  { label: "Mailgun API Key", regex: /key-[A-Za-z0-9]{32}/ },
-
-  // -- npm --
-  { label: "npm Token", regex: /npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}/ },
-
-  // -- PyPI --
-  { label: "PyPI API Token", regex: /pypi-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{50,}/ },
-
-  // -- Linear --
-  { label: "Linear API Key", regex: /lin_api_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}/ },
-
-  // -- Notion --
-  { label: "Notion Integration Token", regex: /ntn_[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}/ },
-
-  // -- OpenRouter --
-  { label: "OpenRouter API Key", regex: /sk-or-v1-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{40,}/ },
-
-  // -- Vercel AI Gateway --
-  { label: "Vercel AI Gateway API Key", regex: /vck_[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{24,}/ },
-
-  // -- Fireworks --
-  { label: "Fireworks API Key", regex: /fw_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}/ },
-
-  // -- Perplexity --
-  { label: "Perplexity API Key", regex: /pplx-[A-Za-z0-9]{40,}/ },
-
-  // -- Tavily --
-  { label: "Tavily API Key", regex: /tvly-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/ },
-
-  // -- Firecrawl --
-  { label: "Firecrawl API Key", regex: /fc-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/ },
-];
-
-/**
- * {@link PREFIX_PATTERNS} variant for detect-AND-redact consumers (log
- * serializers, the tool-output scanner, staged-export rewrite). Identical to
- * `PREFIX_PATTERNS` except the private-key entry uses the length-BOUNDED
- * whole-block matcher ({@link PRIVATE_KEY_REDACTION_REGEX}): those consumers
- * replace the matched span in place, so the match must cover the whole key
- * (header → body → footer) or the body leaks — but they route to the bounded
- * matcher to avoid the unbounded whole-block matcher's O(n²) worst case on
- * large serialized strings. `detectSecretsInText` (chat) uses `PREFIX_PATTERNS`
- * for unbounded full-block capture.
- */
-export const REDACTION_PREFIX_PATTERNS: SecretPrefixPattern[] =
-  PREFIX_PATTERNS.map((p) =>
-    p.label === PRIVATE_KEY_LABEL
-      ? { label: PRIVATE_KEY_LABEL, regex: PRIVATE_KEY_REDACTION_REGEX }
-      : p,
-  );
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Token-shape heuristic (whole-message only)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * A single token-shaped value: an alphanumeric head, a separator-delimited
- * secret keyword infix, and a >=16-char tail (e.g. `virlo_tkn_JF…`). The
- * capture group isolates the tail for placeholder checks. Applied only when
- * the entire trimmed message is one such token — the whole-message and
- * keyword-infix requirements keep false positives near zero without any
- * entropy scoring.
- */
-export const TOKEN_SHAPE =
-  /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]*[_-](?:tkn|token|key|secret|api|pat|sk|auth)[_-]([A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,})$/i;
-
-/**
- * Length bounds for the whole-message token-shape heuristic, shared by the
- * daemon ingress check and the web composer scanner so both accept and reject
- * the same whole-message tokens. Below the min a "token" is too short to be a
- * plausible secret; above the max it is almost certainly a paste of something
- * else (a base64 blob, a minified line) rather than a single credential.
- */
-export const TOKEN_SHAPE_MIN_LENGTH = 20;
-export const TOKEN_SHAPE_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
-
-/** Detection label for a whole-message token-shape match, shared by the daemon
- * ingress check and the web composer scanner so both report the same
- * user-facing type. */
-export const TOKEN_SHAPE_LABEL = "Token-shaped value";
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Placeholder suppression (ingress semantics: user-typed input, near-zero
-// false positives)
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export const KNOWN_PLACEHOLDERS = new Set([
-  "your-api-key-here",
-  "your_api_key_here",
-  "insert-your-key-here",
-  "insert_your_key_here",
-  "replace-with-your-key",
-  "replace_with_your_key",
-  "xxx",
-  "xxxxxxxx",
-  "test",
-  "example",
-  "sample",
-  "demo",
-  "placeholder",
-  "changeme",
-  "CHANGEME",
-  "TODO",
-  "FIXME",
-  "your-token-here",
-  "your_token_here",
-  "my-api-key",
-  "my_api_key",
-]);
-
-export const PLACEHOLDER_PREFIXES = [
-  "sk-test-",
-  "sk_test_",
-  "fake_",
-  "fake-",
-  "dummy_",
-  "dummy-",
-  "test_",
-  "test-",
-  "example_",
-  "example-",
-  "sample_",
-  "sample-",
-  "mock_",
-  "mock-",
-];
-
-/**
- * Check if the text immediately before a matched value indicates a
- * placeholder context (e.g. "fake_", "test_"): true when the pre-context
- * window ends with any `PLACEHOLDER_PREFIXES` entry, case-insensitive.
- */
-export function isPlaceholderContext(preContext: string): boolean {
-  const lower = preContext.toLowerCase();
-  for (const prefix of PLACEHOLDER_PREFIXES) {
-    if (lower.endsWith(prefix)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check if a matched value is a placeholder/test value that should not be
- * reported: exact `KNOWN_PLACEHOLDERS` membership, a `PLACEHOLDER_PREFIXES`
- * prefix (both case-insensitive), or a variable portion that is one repeated
- * character (e.g. `AKIA` + `X` x 16).
- */
-export function isPlaceholderValue(value: string): boolean {
-  const lower = value.toLowerCase();
-  if (KNOWN_PLACEHOLDERS.has(lower)) {
-    return true;
-  }
-  for (const prefix of PLACEHOLDER_PREFIXES) {
-    if (lower.startsWith(prefix)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Repeated characters in the variable portion (e.g. "AKIA" + "X" x 16)
-  // Strip known prefixes to isolate the variable part
-  const variablePart = value
-    .replace(
-      /^(?:AKIA|gh[pousr]_|github_pat_|glpat-|sk_live_|rk_live_|xoxb-|xoxp-|xapp-|sk-ant-|sk-proj-|sk-or-v1-|AIza|GOCSPX-|SK|SG\.|npm_|pypi-|key-|lin_api_|ntn_|fw_|pplx-|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----)/,
-      "",
-    )
-    .replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/g, "");
-  if (variablePart.length >= 8) {
-    const firstChar = variablePart[0];
-    if (variablePart.split("").every((c) => c === firstChar)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Draft scanner
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export interface DetectedSecret {
-  /** Human-readable secret type label, e.g. "Anthropic API Key". */
-  label: string;
-  /** The matched secret text. */
-  value: string;
-  /** Start offset of the match in the scanned text (inclusive). */
-  start: number;
-  /** End offset of the match in the scanned text (exclusive). */
-  end: number;
-  /** True when the entire trimmed text is one token-shaped value. */
-  wholeMessage: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * Global clones of {@link PREFIX_PATTERNS}, compiled once so the draft
- * scanner never mutates the shared pattern objects' `lastIndex` and never
- * recompiles on the hot path (the composer scans on every draft change).
- */
-const GLOBAL_PREFIX_PATTERNS: SecretPrefixPattern[] = PREFIX_PATTERNS.map(
-  ({ label, regex }) => ({
-    label,
-    regex: new RegExp(
-      regex.source,
-      regex.flags.includes("g") ? regex.flags : regex.flags + "g",
-    ),
-  }),
-);
-
-/**
- * Scan a draft message for high-confidence secrets.
- *
- * Runs every `PREFIX_PATTERNS` entry over the text, suppressing placeholder
- * values and matches immediately preceded by a placeholder context (e.g.
- * `fake_` before a real-looking token) — the same suppression the daemon
- * applies at ingress, so client and server accept the same placeholders.
- * When no prefix pattern matches, the trimmed whole message is
- * tested against {@link TOKEN_SHAPE} — the same whole-message token-shape
- * heuristic the daemon blocks at ingress. Overlapping spans are deduped
- * (first pattern in list order wins); results are sorted by `start`.
- */
-export function detectSecretsInText(text: string): DetectedSecret[] {
-  const matches: DetectedSecret[] = [];
-
-  for (const { label, regex } of GLOBAL_PREFIX_PATTERNS) {
-    // Reset lastIndex — the compiled global regexes are shared across calls.
-    regex.lastIndex = 0;
-    let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
-
-    while ((match = regex.exec(text)) !== null) {
-      const value = match[0];
-
-      // Skip placeholders and test values (check both the match and
-      // a small window before it for placeholder prefixes like "fake_")
-      const contextStart = Math.max(0, match.index - 10);
-      const preContext = text.slice(contextStart, match.index);
-      if (isPlaceholderValue(value) || isPlaceholderContext(preContext)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      const start = match.index;
-      const end = start + value.length;
-      // Overlap dedupe: the first pattern in list order wins.
-      if (matches.some((m) => start < m.end && end > m.start)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      matches.push({ label, value, start, end, wholeMessage: false });
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (matches.length === 0) {
-    const trimmed = text.trim();
-    const shapeMatch =
-      trimmed.length >= TOKEN_SHAPE_MIN_LENGTH &&
-      trimmed.length <= TOKEN_SHAPE_MAX_LENGTH
-        ? TOKEN_SHAPE.exec(trimmed)
-        : null;
-    if (
-      shapeMatch !== null &&
-      !isPlaceholderValue(trimmed) &&
-      !isPlaceholderValue(shapeMatch[1]!)
-    ) {
-      const start = text.length - text.trimStart().length;
-      matches.push({
-        label: TOKEN_SHAPE_LABEL,
-        value: trimmed,
-        start,
-        end: start + trimmed.length,
-        wholeMessage: true,
-      });
-    }
-  }
-
-  return matches.sort((a, b) => a.start - b.start);
-}

package/node_modules/@vellumai/service-contracts/src/transport.ts

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Transport-level handshake and envelope schemas.
- *
- * Extracted from the aggregate index to allow credential-rpc.ts to import
- * the full transport surface without creating a circular dependency through
- * index.ts.
- */
-
-import { z } from "zod";
-import { RpcErrorSchema } from "./error.js";
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Transport handshake
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** Semantic version of the CES wire protocol. */
-export const CES_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "0.1.0" as const;
-
-/**
- * Sent by the initiator (assistant) when opening a CES transport channel.
- * The responder (CES) replies with a HandshakeAck.
- */
-export const HandshakeRequestSchema = z.object({
-  type: z.literal("handshake_request"),
-  protocolVersion: z.string(),
-  /** Opaque session identifier chosen by the initiator. */
-  sessionId: z.string(),
-  /**
-   * Optional assistant API key passed from the assistant runtime.
-   * In managed (sidecar) mode the API key is provisioned after hatch,
-   * so the assistant forwards it during the bootstrap handshake so CES
-   * can use it for platform credential materialisation.
-   */
-  assistantApiKey: z.string().optional(),
-  /**
-   * Optional platform assistant ID passed from the assistant runtime.
-   * The assistant ID is not available at CES startup (warm-pool pods),
-   * so the assistant forwards it here for platform credential materialisation.
-   */
-  assistantId: z.string().optional(),
-});
-export type HandshakeRequest = z.infer<typeof HandshakeRequestSchema>;
-
-export const HandshakeAckSchema = z.object({
-  type: z.literal("handshake_ack"),
-  protocolVersion: z.string(),
-  sessionId: z.string(),
-  /** Whether the responder accepted the requested protocol version. */
-  accepted: z.boolean(),
-  /** Human-readable reason when `accepted` is false. */
-  reason: z.string().optional(),
-});
-export type HandshakeAck = z.infer<typeof HandshakeAckSchema>;
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// RPC envelope
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Every message on the wire is wrapped in an RpcEnvelope so both sides can
- * demux by `method`, correlate responses via `id`, and distinguish requests
- * from responses via `kind`.
- */
-export const RpcEnvelopeSchema = z.object({
-  /** Monotonically increasing per-session request id. */
-  id: z.string(),
-  kind: z.enum(["request", "response"]),
-  method: z.string(),
-  /** JSON-serialisable payload; schema depends on `method`. */
-  payload: z.unknown(),
-  /** ISO-8601 timestamp of when the message was created. */
-  timestamp: z.string(),
-});
-export type RpcEnvelope = z.infer<typeof RpcEnvelopeSchema>;
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Tool request / response base shapes
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Base shape for a tool execution request sent from the assistant to CES.
- * Concrete tool requests extend this with tool-specific `params`.
- */
-export const ToolRequestBaseSchema = z.object({
-  /** The tool identifier as known to both sides. */
-  toolName: z.string(),
-  /** Opaque handle referencing the credential context for this execution. */
-  credentialHandle: z.string(),
-  /** Tool-specific parameters; schema varies per tool. */
-  params: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),
-});
-export type ToolRequestBase = z.infer<typeof ToolRequestBaseSchema>;
-
-/**
- * Base shape for a tool execution response sent from CES back to the
- * assistant. Modeled as a discriminated union on `success` so malformed
- * payloads (e.g. `success: false` without `error`, or `success: true`
- * with `error`) are rejected at parse time.
- */
-const ToolResponseSuccessSchema = z
-  .object({
-    success: z.literal(true),
-    /** Tool output. */
-    result: z.unknown().optional(),
-  })
-  .strict();
-
-const ToolResponseErrorSchema = z.object({
-  success: z.literal(false),
-  /** Structured error describing the failure. */
-  error: RpcErrorSchema,
-});
-
-export const ToolResponseBaseSchema = z.discriminatedUnion("success", [
-  ToolResponseSuccessSchema,
-  ToolResponseErrorSchema,
-]);
-export type ToolResponseBase = z.infer<typeof ToolResponseBaseSchema>;
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Aggregate transport message union
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Union of all top-level message types that can appear on the transport.
- * Useful for a single discriminated-union parse at the transport layer.
- */
-export const TransportMessageSchema = z.discriminatedUnion("type", [
-  HandshakeRequestSchema,
-  HandshakeAckSchema,
-  RpcEnvelopeSchema.extend({ type: z.literal("rpc") }),
-]);
-export type TransportMessage = z.infer<typeof TransportMessageSchema>;