@vellumai/assistant 0.12.6-dev.202609301914.f1340c9 → 0.12.6-dev.202609302019.cd99c75

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package/ARCHITECTURE.md CHANGED
@@ -1243,14 +1243,10 @@ graph TB
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  EXEC -->|"file_read / file_write / file_edit"| SB_FILE_TOOLS["Sandbox file tools<br/>path-scoped to sandbox root"]
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  SB_FILE_TOOLS --> SB_FS
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- EXEC -->|"bash"| WRAP["wrapCommand()<br/>sandbox.ts"]
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-
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- WRAP --> NATIVE["NativeBackend"]
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-
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- NATIVE -->|"macOS"| SBPL["sandbox-exec<br/>SBPL profile<br/>deny-default + allow workdir"]
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- NATIVE -->|"Linux"| BWRAP["bwrap<br/>bubblewrap<br/>ro-root + rw-workdir<br/>unshare-net + unshare-pid"]
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- SBPL --> SB_FS["Sandbox filesystem root<br/>$VELLUM_WORKSPACE_DIR"]
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- BWRAP --> SB_FS
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+ EXEC -->|"bash"| WRAP["buildShellInvocation()<br/>(packages/environments/shell)"]
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+ WRAP --> SHELL["bash -c in $VELLUM_WORKSPACE_DIR<br/>sanitized env (safe-env allowlist)"]
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+ SHELL --> SB_FS["Workspace filesystem root<br/>$VELLUM_WORKSPACE_DIR"]
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+ SHELL -.->|containerized deployments| CONTAINER["Container boundary<br/>(Docker / remote host) provides<br/>OS-level isolation"]
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  EXEC -->|"host_file_* / host_bash"| HOST_TOOLS["Host-target tools<br/>(unchanged by backend choice)"]
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  EXEC -->|"computer_use_* (skill-projected<br/>in CU sessions only)"| SKILL_CU_TOOLS["CU skill tools<br/>(bundled computer-use skill)"]
@@ -1264,9 +1260,8 @@ graph TB
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  USER --> CHECK
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  ```
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- - **Native backend**: Uses OS-level sandboxing — `sandbox-exec` with SBPL profiles on macOS, `bwrap` (bubblewrap) on Linux. Denies network access and restricts filesystem writes to the sandbox root, `/tmp`, `/private/tmp`, and `/var/folders` (macOS) or the sandbox root and `/tmp` (Linux).
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- - **Fail-closed**: The native backend refuses to execute unsandboxed if its prerequisites are unavailable, throwing `ToolError` with actionable messages on failure.
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- - **Host tools unchanged**: `host_bash`, `host_file_read`, `host_file_write`, and `host_file_edit` always execute directly on the host regardless of which sandbox backend is active.
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+ - **Workspace scoping (software-enforced)**: `file_read`, `file_write`, and `file_edit` path-check every access against `$VELLUM_WORKSPACE_DIR`, including symlink resolution. `bash` spawns `bash -c` in the workspace directory with a sanitized environment and is not OS-confined on local installs; commands are gated by risk classification and the conversation's auto-approve threshold, with workspace path checks applied to allowlisted commands on non-containerized installs. Containerized deployments (`vellum hatch --remote docker`, remote hosts) get OS-level isolation from the container boundary. Workflow scripts run in a separate QuickJS-WASM sandbox with no ambient capabilities.
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+ - **Host tools unchanged**: `host_bash`, `host_file_read`, `host_file_write`, and `host_file_edit` always execute directly on the host regardless of deployment mode.
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  - Sandbox defaults: `file_*` and `bash` execute within `$VELLUM_WORKSPACE_DIR`.
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  - Host access is explicit: `host_file_read`, `host_file_write`, `host_file_edit`, and `host_bash` are separate tools.
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  - Prompt defaults: host tools and `computer_use_*` skill-projected actions default to `ask` unless a trust rule allowlists/denylists them.
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ Scripts executed via the `bash` tool can optionally run through a per-session HT
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  ### Proxied Bash Execution Path
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- When a bash command requires network access with credential injection, the sandbox backend switches from `network=none` to `network=bridge` and injects proxy environment variables so all HTTP/HTTPS traffic routes through the session proxy.
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+ When a bash command requires network access with credential injection, the tool injects proxy environment variables into the spawned shell so all HTTP/HTTPS traffic routes through the session proxy.
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  ```mermaid
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  graph TB
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ graph TB
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  PROMPT["Prompt user<br/>persistentDecisionsAllowed: false<br/>(no trust rule saving for proxied bash)"]
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  end
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- subgraph "Sandbox"
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- SANDBOX["NativeBackend.wrap()<br/>networkMode: 'proxied'"]
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+ subgraph "Shell Execution"
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+ SHELL["bash -c spawn<br/>(buildShellInvocation)"]
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  ENV_INJECT["Inject env vars:<br/>HTTP_PROXY, HTTPS_PROXY,<br/>NO_PROXY, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS"]
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  end
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@@ -298,8 +298,8 @@ graph TB
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  BASH_CALL --> EXECUTOR
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  EXECUTOR --> PERM
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  PERM --> PROMPT
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- PROMPT -->|"allowed"| SANDBOX
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- SANDBOX --> ENV_INJECT
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+ PROMPT -->|"allowed"| SHELL
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+ SHELL --> ENV_INJECT
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  ENV_INJECT -->|"HTTP"| HTTP_FWD
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  ENV_INJECT -->|"HTTPS CONNECT"| CONNECT
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  CONNECT --> ROUTER
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@vellumai/assistant",
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- "version": "0.12.6-dev.202609301914.f1340c9",
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+ "version": "0.12.6-dev.202609302019.cd99c75",
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  "license": "MIT",
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  "type": "module",
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  "exports": {