@vellumai/assistant 0.11.2-dev.202608071521.2d2f93e → 0.11.2-dev.202608071620.8afd4b3

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package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
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  "name": "@vellumai/assistant",
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- "version": "0.11.2-dev.202608071521.2d2f93e",
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+ "version": "0.11.2-dev.202608071620.8afd4b3",
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  "license": "MIT",
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  "type": "module",
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  "exports": {
@@ -101,17 +101,20 @@ import {
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  getRegisteredKinds,
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  getResolver,
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  } from "../approvals/guardian-request-resolvers.js";
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+ import { getConfig } from "../config/loader.js";
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  import { getDb } from "../persistence/db-connection.js";
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  import { getSqlite } from "../persistence/db-connection.js";
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  import { initializeDb } from "../persistence/db-init.js";
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  import { scopedApprovalGrants } from "../persistence/schema/index.js";
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  import {
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+ TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS,
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  ToolApprovalHandler,
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  waitForInlineGrant,
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  } from "../tools/tool-approval-handler.js";
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  import type { ToolContext } from "../tools/types.js";
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+ import { setConfig } from "./helpers/set-config.js";
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- /** Short wait config for tests — avoids blocking test suite on the 60s default. */
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+ /** Short wait config for tests: keeps escalation cases off the real budget. */
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  const TEST_INLINE_WAIT_CONFIG = { maxWaitMs: 100, intervalMs: 20 };
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  await initializeDb();
@@ -490,6 +493,42 @@ describe("inline wait-and-resume", () => {
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  expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(500);
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  });
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495
 
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+ test("waitForInlineGrant spends timeouts.permissionTimeoutSec when no explicit budget is given", async () => {
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+ // The guardian's escalation window must track the configured approval
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+ // budget rather than a compiled-in constant, so an operator raising
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+ // permissionTimeoutSec actually widens the window a guardian has to
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+ // answer in. Omitting maxWaitMs is what production does.
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+ const priorTimeouts = getConfig().timeouts;
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+ setConfig("timeouts", {
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+ ...priorTimeouts,
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+ permissionTimeoutSec: 0.15,
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+ });
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+ try {
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+ const req = seedGrantRequest("sha256:configbudget");
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+
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+ const start = Date.now();
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+ const result = await waitForInlineGrant(
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+ req.id,
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+ {
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+ toolName: "bash",
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+ inputDigest: "sha256:configbudget",
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+ consumingRequestId: "consume-config-budget",
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+ },
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+ { intervalMs: 20 },
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+ );
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+ const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
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+
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+ expect(result.outcome).toBe("timeout");
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+ // Bounded well under TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS: a regression that ignores
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+ // config and falls back to the constant blows this ceiling by ~400x.
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+ expect(elapsed).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(120);
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+ expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(3_000);
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+ expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS);
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+ } finally {
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+ setConfig("timeouts", priorTimeouts);
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+ }
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+ }, 10_000);
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+
493
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  test("waitForInlineGrant returns aborted when signal fires during wait", async () => {
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  const req = seedGrantRequest("sha256:abortwait");
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534
 
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ mock.module("../channels/gateway-guardian-requests.js", () => sim.module);
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  import { applyGuardianDecision } from "../approvals/guardian-decision-primitive.js";
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  import type { ActorContext } from "../approvals/guardian-request-resolvers.js";
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  import { getResolver } from "../approvals/guardian-request-resolvers.js";
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+ import { getConfig } from "../config/loader.js";
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  import type { TrustContext } from "../daemon/trust-context-types.js";
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  import { getDb } from "../persistence/db-connection.js";
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  import { initializeDb } from "../persistence/db-init.js";
@@ -177,12 +178,14 @@ import { scopedApprovalGrants } from "../persistence/schema/index.js";
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  import { bridgeConfirmationRequestToGuardian } from "../runtime/confirmation-request-guardian-bridge.js";
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  import { resolveRoutingState } from "../runtime/trust-context-resolver.js";
179
180
  import {
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+ resolveInlineGrantWaitMs,
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182
  TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS,
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183
  ToolApprovalHandler,
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  waitForInlineGrant,
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  } from "../tools/tool-approval-handler.js";
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  import type { ToolContext } from "../tools/types.js";
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  import { seedContactChannel } from "./helpers/seed-contact-channel.js";
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+ import { setConfig } from "./helpers/set-config.js";
186
189
 
187
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  await initializeDb();
188
191
 
@@ -754,7 +757,10 @@ describe("(f) timeout/stale flow: stale guardian decision after inline wait time
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  test("inline_wait_active staleness guard: expired marker allows retry notification", async () => {
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  // Create a guardian request with a stale inline_wait_active marker
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  // that simulates a daemon crash during the wait.
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- const staleTimestamp = Date.now() - TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS - 60_000;
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+ // Age the marker past the real wait budget, which the resolver's
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+ // staleness threshold tracks. Deriving it from the same helper the
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+ // waiter uses keeps this case meaningful if the budget changes.
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+ const staleTimestamp = Date.now() - resolveInlineGrantWaitMs() - 60_000;
758
764
  const req = sim.seedRequest({
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  id: `req-stale-${Date.now()}`,
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  kind: "tool_grant_request",
@@ -802,6 +808,67 @@ describe("(f) timeout/stale flow: stale guardian decision after inline wait time
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  expect(retryNotifications.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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  });
804
810
 
811
+ test("inline_wait_active marker older than the fallback constant but inside the real budget still suppresses retry", async () => {
812
+ // The staleness threshold must track the wait budget, not the fallback
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+ // constant. A marker aged past TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS + buffer but still
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+ // well inside the configured budget belongs to a waiter that is very
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+ // much alive: telling the requester to retry would race a call that is
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+ // about to resume, and the retry then fails against the one-time grant
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+ // the live waiter consumes.
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+ const priorTimeouts = getConfig().timeouts;
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+ // Seed the budget rather than leaning on the ambient default, so the
820
+ // window this case probes exists no matter what the suite's config holds.
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+ setConfig("timeouts", { ...priorTimeouts, permissionTimeoutSec: 300 });
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+ try {
823
+ const budgetMs = resolveInlineGrantWaitMs();
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+ // Comfortably past the old 90s threshold, comfortably short of the budget.
825
+ const markerAgeMs = TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS + 45_000;
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+ const liveTimestamp = Date.now() - markerAgeMs;
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+ expect(markerAgeMs).toBeLessThan(budgetMs);
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+
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+ const req = sim.seedRequest({
830
+ id: `req-live-${Date.now()}`,
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+ kind: "tool_grant_request",
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+ sourceType: "channel",
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+ sourceChannel: "telegram",
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+ sourceConversationId: "conv-live-1",
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+ requesterExternalUserId: "requester-1",
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+ requesterChatId: "requester-chat-1",
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+ guardianExternalUserId: "guardian-1",
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+ guardianPrincipalId: "test-principal-id",
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+ toolName: "bash",
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+ inputDigest: "sha256:livewait",
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+ expiresAt: Date.now() + 60_000,
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+ });
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+
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+ await sim.module.updateGuardianRequest(req.id, {
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+ followupState: `inline_wait_active:${liveTimestamp}`,
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+ });
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+
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+ deliveredReplies.length = 0;
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+ const approvalResult = await applyGuardianDecision({
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+ requestId: req.id,
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+ action: "approve_once",
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+ actorContext: guardianActor(),
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+ channelDeliveryContext: {
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+ replyCallbackUrl: "http://localhost:3000/reply",
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+ guardianChatId: "guardian-chat-1",
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+ assistantId: "self",
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+ },
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+ });
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+ expect(approvalResult.applied).toBe(true);
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+
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+ const retryNotifications = deliveredReplies.filter(
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+ (r) =>
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+ typeof r.payload.text === "string" &&
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+ (r.payload.text as string).includes("Please retry"),
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+ );
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+ expect(retryNotifications.length).toBe(0);
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+ } finally {
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+ setConfig("timeouts", priorTimeouts);
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+ }
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+ });
871
+
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872
  test("fresh inline_wait_active marker suppresses retry notification", async () => {
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  // Create a request with a FRESH inline_wait_active marker
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  const freshTimestamp = Date.now();
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ import {
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  readBatchMetadata,
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  resolvePendingQuestion,
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  } from "../runtime/question-resolution.js";
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- import { TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS } from "../tools/tool-approval-handler.js";
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+ import { resolveInlineGrantWaitMs } from "../tools/tool-approval-handler.js";
58
58
  import { getLogger } from "../util/logger.js";
59
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  import {
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  channelCanAddressOneReaderInBand,
@@ -1587,7 +1587,10 @@ const toolGrantRequestResolver: GuardianRequestResolver = {
1587
1587
  // outlive the actual waiter if the daemon crashes or restarts during
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1588
  // the wait. To avoid permanently suppressing the retry notification, we
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1589
  // treat the marker as stale if the encoded start timestamp is older than
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- // the maximum wait budget plus a 30s buffer.
1590
+ // the maximum wait budget plus a 30s buffer. The budget is read from the
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+ // same resolver the waiter itself uses, so a config change moves both
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+ // together; sizing this off a constant would let it fall below the real
1593
+ // wait and declare a live waiter dead.
1591
1594
  const INLINE_WAIT_STALENESS_BUFFER_MS = 30_000;
1592
1595
  const freshRequest = await getGuardianRequestOrNull(request.id);
1593
1596
  const followupState = freshRequest?.followupState ?? "";
@@ -1604,7 +1607,7 @@ const toolGrantRequestResolver: GuardianRequestResolver = {
1604
1607
  ? Date.now() - waitStartMs
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1608
  : Infinity; // Treat unparseable timestamps as stale for safety.
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1609
  const stalenessThresholdMs =
1607
- TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS + INLINE_WAIT_STALENESS_BUFFER_MS;
1610
+ resolveInlineGrantWaitMs() + INLINE_WAIT_STALENESS_BUFFER_MS;
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1611
  if (markerAgeMs > stalenessThresholdMs) {
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1612
  log.warn(
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1613
  {
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export const TimeoutConfigSchema = z
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26
  .positive("timeouts.permissionTimeoutSec must be a positive number")
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27
  .default(300)
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28
  .describe(
29
- "How long to wait for user permission approval before timing out (seconds)",
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+ "How long to wait for a human to approve a tool call before timing out (seconds). Spent by both approval paths: the interactive permission prompt, and the inline wait when a contact's sensitive tool call is escalated to the guardian.",
30
30
  ),
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31
  questionResponseTimeoutSec: z
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32
  .number({ error: "timeouts.questionResponseTimeoutSec must be a number" })
@@ -6,11 +6,18 @@ const TIMEOUT_SENTINEL = Symbol("tool-timeout");
6
6
  /**
7
7
  * Convert a config-provided seconds value to a safe milliseconds value,
8
8
  * falling back to the default if the input is NaN, non-finite, zero, or negative.
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+ *
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+ * `fallbackMs` lets callers governed by a different budget (e.g. the inline
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+ * grant wait) keep their own floor instead of inheriting the tool-execution
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+ * default.
9
13
  */
10
- export function safeTimeoutMs(sec: unknown): number {
14
+ export function safeTimeoutMs(
15
+ sec: unknown,
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+ fallbackMs: number = DEFAULT_TOOL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT_SEC * 1000,
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+ ): number {
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18
  const n = Number(sec);
12
19
  if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n <= 0) {
13
- return DEFAULT_TOOL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT_SEC * 1000;
20
+ return fallbackMs;
14
21
  }
15
22
  return n * 1000;
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23
  }
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import { computeToolApprovalDigest } from "../security/tool-approval-digest.js";
39
39
  import { recordToolDenied, recordToolError } from "../telemetry/tool-audit.js";
40
40
  import { getLogger } from "../util/logger.js";
41
41
  import { resolveExecutionTarget } from "./execution-target.js";
42
+ import { safeTimeoutMs } from "./execution-timeout.js";
42
43
  import { channelCoordinatesFromToolContext } from "./policy-context.js";
43
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  import { getAllTools, getTool, getToolOwner } from "./registry.js";
44
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  import { isSideEffectTool } from "./side-effects.js";
@@ -127,9 +128,39 @@ export function buildInactiveToolMessage(args: {
127
128
 
128
129
  /** Default polling interval for inline grant wait (ms). */
129
130
  const TC_GRANT_WAIT_INTERVAL_MS = 500;
130
- /** Default maximum wait time for inline grant wait (ms). */
131
+ /**
132
+ * Fallback maximum wait for the inline grant wait (ms), used only when the
133
+ * deployed config cannot be read. The governing budget is
134
+ * `timeouts.permissionTimeoutSec` (see {@link resolveInlineGrantWaitMs}).
135
+ */
131
136
  export const TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS = 60_000;
132
137
 
138
+ /**
139
+ * Resolve the wait budget for an escalated tool grant.
140
+ *
141
+ * A guardian answering an escalated tool call is making the same decision as a
142
+ * local user answering a permission prompt, so both paths spend the same
143
+ * budget: `timeouts.permissionTimeoutSec` (read by `permissions/prompter.ts`).
144
+ * If anything, this path needs the larger share of it: the prompter's user
145
+ * already has the prompt on screen, while the guardian is notified
146
+ * out-of-band and has to context-switch before deciding.
147
+ *
148
+ * Falls back to {@link TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS} rather than the tool-execution
149
+ * default on a non-positive value, so a bad config can never collapse the
150
+ * window to zero and auto-deny every escalation.
151
+ *
152
+ * Exported because the grant resolver sizes its `inline_wait_active` staleness
153
+ * threshold off this same budget: if the two drift, an approval arriving while
154
+ * a waiter is still live gets misread as a dead waiter and the requester is
155
+ * told to retry a call that is about to resume on its own.
156
+ */
157
+ export function resolveInlineGrantWaitMs(): number {
158
+ return safeTimeoutMs(
159
+ getConfig().timeouts.permissionTimeoutSec,
160
+ TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS,
161
+ );
162
+ }
163
+
133
164
  /**
134
165
  * Inline wait result for trusted-contact grant polling.
135
166
  * - `granted`: a grant was minted and consumed within the wait window.
@@ -152,13 +183,16 @@ export type InlineGrantWaitOutcome =
152
183
  * and atomically consume the grant).
153
184
  *
154
185
  * Only called for trusted_contact actors with valid guardian bindings.
186
+ *
187
+ * `options.maxWaitMs` overrides the wait budget; omitting it spends the
188
+ * configured one from {@link resolveInlineGrantWaitMs}.
155
189
  */
156
190
  export async function waitForInlineGrant(
157
191
  escalationRequestId: string,
158
192
  consumeParams: Parameters<typeof consumeGrantForInvocation>[0],
159
193
  options?: { maxWaitMs?: number; intervalMs?: number; signal?: AbortSignal },
160
194
  ): Promise<InlineGrantWaitOutcome> {
161
- const maxWait = options?.maxWaitMs ?? TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS;
195
+ const maxWait = options?.maxWaitMs ?? resolveInlineGrantWaitMs();
162
196
  const interval = options?.intervalMs ?? TC_GRANT_WAIT_INTERVAL_MS;
163
197
  const signal = options?.signal;
164
198
  const deadline = Date.now() + maxWait;
@@ -592,9 +626,16 @@ export type PreExecutionGateResult =
592
626
  }
593
627
  | { allowed: false; result: ToolExecutionResult };
594
628
 
595
- /** Configuration for the inline grant wait behavior. */
629
+ /**
630
+ * Overrides for the inline grant wait behavior. Production leaves this empty
631
+ * so the wait spends the configured budget; tests inject short waits to keep
632
+ * escalation cases fast.
633
+ */
596
634
  export interface InlineGrantWaitConfig {
597
- /** Maximum time to wait for guardian approval (ms). Defaults to TC_GRANT_WAIT_MAX_MS. */
635
+ /**
636
+ * Maximum time to wait for guardian approval (ms). Defaults to the budget
637
+ * from {@link resolveInlineGrantWaitMs}.
638
+ */
598
639
  maxWaitMs?: number;
599
640
  /** Polling interval during the wait (ms). Defaults to TC_GRANT_WAIT_INTERVAL_MS. */
600
641
  intervalMs?: number;