@veilo/sdk-core 0.4.0 → 0.6.0

package/dist/src/shield/computeBudget.d.ts

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Compute budget and transaction size constants for the shield path.
- *
- * These numbers are empirical and load-bearing. They are constants rather than
- * inline literals so a future program change that invalidates them has one
- * place to be fixed and one place to be read.
- */
-/**
- * Compute unit limit reserved for a shield.
- *
- * Measured usage for a deposit is ~377k CU; 700k leaves roughly 2× headroom
- * while staying low enough that Phantom's Lighthouse guard still fits its own
- * instructions alongside ours.
- *
- * Do NOT raise this to 1.4M (what the stale `client.ts` `deposit()` reserves).
- * An oversized CU reservation is one of the signals that makes Phantom render
- * the transaction with a malicious-dApp warning.
- *
- * Ported from veilo-dapp/features/transactions/handleDeposit.ts:673-681.
- */
-export declare const SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT = 700000;
-/** Typical measured usage. If real usage approaches the limit above, revisit both. */
-export declare const SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL = 377000;
-/** Default priority fee. Set to 0 to omit the instruction entirely (saves ~40 bytes). */
-export declare const SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS = 50000;
-/** Solana's hard cap on a serialized transaction, signatures included. */
-export declare const MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES = 1232;
-/** One ed25519 signature: 64 bytes plus the compact-array length prefix. */
-export declare const SIGNATURE_BYTES = 65;
-/**
- * `NullifierMarker::LEN` (privacy-program .../lib.rs:415). Two markers are
- * created per transact and paid for by the signer — see the note on sponsorship
- * in the module docs of `shield.ts`.
- */
-export declare const NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES = 10;
-/** Markers created per `transact` — one per circuit input. */
-export declare const NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT = 2;
-/** Default validity window for the on-chain `deadline` argument. */
-export declare const DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 3600;
-/**
- * Serialized size of the `transact` instruction data, for reference:
- *
- *   8   discriminator
- *  32   root
- *   2   input_tree_id
- *   2   output_tree_id
- *   8   public_amount
- *  32   ext_data_hash
- *  32   mint_address
- * 128   2 nullifiers + 2 commitments
- *   8   deadline
- * 112   ExtData (recipient, relayer, fee, refund, claimant)
- * 256   Groth16 proof (a:64, b:128, c:64)
- * 227   Option<NoteCiphers> (1 tag + 226)
- * ---
- * 847
- *
- * With 16 accounts this cannot fit in a legacy transaction (~1500 bytes), which
- * is why the shield path is v0-with-ALT and not optional.
- */
-export declare const TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES = 847;

package/dist/src/shield/computeBudget.js

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * Compute budget and transaction size constants for the shield path.
- *
- * These numbers are empirical and load-bearing. They are constants rather than
- * inline literals so a future program change that invalidates them has one
- * place to be fixed and one place to be read.
- */
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES = exports.DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS = exports.NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT = exports.NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES = exports.SIGNATURE_BYTES = exports.MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES = exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS = exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL = exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT = void 0;
-/**
- * Compute unit limit reserved for a shield.
- *
- * Measured usage for a deposit is ~377k CU; 700k leaves roughly 2× headroom
- * while staying low enough that Phantom's Lighthouse guard still fits its own
- * instructions alongside ours.
- *
- * Do NOT raise this to 1.4M (what the stale `client.ts` `deposit()` reserves).
- * An oversized CU reservation is one of the signals that makes Phantom render
- * the transaction with a malicious-dApp warning.
- *
- * Ported from veilo-dapp/features/transactions/handleDeposit.ts:673-681.
- */
-exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT = 700000;
-/** Typical measured usage. If real usage approaches the limit above, revisit both. */
-exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL = 377000;
-/** Default priority fee. Set to 0 to omit the instruction entirely (saves ~40 bytes). */
-exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS = 50000;
-/** Solana's hard cap on a serialized transaction, signatures included. */
-exports.MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES = 1232;
-/** One ed25519 signature: 64 bytes plus the compact-array length prefix. */
-exports.SIGNATURE_BYTES = 65;
-/**
- * `NullifierMarker::LEN` (privacy-program .../lib.rs:415). Two markers are
- * created per transact and paid for by the signer — see the note on sponsorship
- * in the module docs of `shield.ts`.
- */
-exports.NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES = 10;
-/** Markers created per `transact` — one per circuit input. */
-exports.NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT = 2;
-/** Default validity window for the on-chain `deadline` argument. */
-exports.DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 3600;
-/**
- * Serialized size of the `transact` instruction data, for reference:
- *
- *   8   discriminator
- *  32   root
- *   2   input_tree_id
- *   2   output_tree_id
- *   8   public_amount
- *  32   ext_data_hash
- *  32   mint_address
- * 128   2 nullifiers + 2 commitments
- *   8   deadline
- * 112   ExtData (recipient, relayer, fee, refund, claimant)
- * 256   Groth16 proof (a:64, b:128, c:64)
- * 227   Option<NoteCiphers> (1 tag + 226)
- * ---
- * 847
- *
- * With 16 accounts this cannot fit in a legacy transaction (~1500 bytes), which
- * is why the shield path is v0-with-ALT and not optional.
- */
-exports.TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES = 847;

package/dist/src/shield/errors.d.ts

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-import { TransactionInstruction } from "@solana/web3.js";
-/**
- * Error taxonomy for the shield path.
- *
- * `parseOnChainError` already turns program codes into readable sentences. What
- * it does not give you is a *decision*: can this be retried, and how? That is
- * what integrators actually need, because the three retry classes have wildly
- * different costs:
- *
- *   - `rebuild`  — reuse the proof, new blockhash. Milliseconds.
- *   - `reshield` — the proof is stale, prove again. 10–30 seconds.
- *   - `none`     — retrying cannot help; something must change first.
- */
-export type ShieldRetryClass = "rebuild" | "reshield" | "none";
-export type ShieldErrorCode = "POOL_NOT_FOUND" | "POOL_PAUSED" | "AMOUNT_BELOW_MINIMUM" | "AMOUNT_ABOVE_MAXIMUM" | "TREE_FULL" | "INSUFFICIENT_SOL" | "INSUFFICIENT_TOKEN_BALANCE" | "TOKEN_ACCOUNT_MISSING" | "TOKEN_ACCOUNT_WRONG_MINT" | "TOKEN_ACCOUNT_WRONG_OWNER" | "TOKEN_ACCOUNT_DELEGATED" | "TOKEN_ACCOUNT_FROZEN" | "VAULT_ATA_MISSING" | "ALT_NOT_FOUND" | "ALT_INCOMPLETE" | "TX_TOO_LARGE" | "OWNER_INVARIANT_UNACKNOWLEDGED" | "UNRESOLVED_ACCOUNT" | "BLOCKHASH_EXPIRED" | "DEADLINE_EXPIRED" | "ROOT_STALE" | "NULLIFIER_COLLISION" | "COMPUTE_BUDGET_EXCEEDED" | "PROOF_REJECTED" | "UNKNOWN";
-export type ShieldErrorRemedy = {
-    /** Human-readable description of what would fix this. */
-    description: string;
-    /** Instructions that, once executed, clear the condition. */
-    instructions: TransactionInstruction[];
-};
-export declare class ShieldError extends Error {
-    readonly code: ShieldErrorCode;
-    /** Program error code (6000–6060) when this was derived from a chain error. */
-    readonly programCode?: number;
-    /** Whether and how a retry can succeed. */
-    readonly retryable: ShieldRetryClass;
-    /** Machine-readable detail: which account, what value, what was expected. */
-    readonly context?: Record<string, unknown>;
-    /** Present when the condition is fixable by executing instructions first. */
-    readonly remedy?: ShieldErrorRemedy;
-    readonly cause?: unknown;
-    constructor(code: ShieldErrorCode, message: string, opts?: {
-        programCode?: number;
-        retryable?: ShieldRetryClass;
-        context?: Record<string, unknown>;
-        remedy?: ShieldErrorRemedy;
-        cause?: unknown;
-    });
-}
-/** Extract a privacy_pool program error code from an arbitrary thrown value. */
-export declare function extractProgramCode(error: any): number | null;
-/**
- * Map a submission failure onto the taxonomy.
- *
- * Two mappings here are not obvious and are worth stating plainly:
- *
- * **Nullifier collision means "already landed", not "already spent."** The
- * marker PDAs are `init`, not `init_if_needed`, so a second submission of the
- * same shield fails at account resolution. For a deposit the nullifiers derive
- * from freshly generated random keys, so a genuine collision is impossible —
- * in practice this only ever means the first attempt succeeded. Telling a user
- * their funds were "already spent" here would be alarming and wrong.
- *
- * **`UnknownRoot` is recoverable but not by `rebuild()`.** The proof commits to
- * the root, so a stale root needs a fresh proof, not a fresh blockhash.
- */
-export declare function mapShieldError(error: unknown): ShieldError;

package/dist/src/shield/errors.js

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.ShieldError = void 0;
-exports.extractProgramCode = extractProgramCode;
-exports.mapShieldError = mapShieldError;
-const client_js_1 = require("../client.js");
-class ShieldError extends Error {
-    constructor(code, message, opts = {}) {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = "ShieldError";
-        this.code = code;
-        this.programCode = opts.programCode;
-        this.retryable = opts.retryable ?? "none";
-        this.context = opts.context;
-        this.remedy = opts.remedy;
-        this.cause = opts.cause;
-    }
-}
-exports.ShieldError = ShieldError;
-/** Extract a privacy_pool program error code from an arbitrary thrown value. */
-function extractProgramCode(error) {
-    const raw = (error?.message ?? error?.toString() ?? "").toLowerCase();
-    const hex = raw.match(/custom program error:\s*0x([0-9a-f]+)/);
-    if (hex)
-        return parseInt(hex[1], 16);
-    const num = raw.match(/error number:\s*(\d+)/);
-    if (num)
-        return parseInt(num[1], 10);
-    if (typeof error?.error?.errorCode?.number === "number") {
-        return error.error.errorCode.number;
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-/**
- * Map a submission failure onto the taxonomy.
- *
- * Two mappings here are not obvious and are worth stating plainly:
- *
- * **Nullifier collision means "already landed", not "already spent."** The
- * marker PDAs are `init`, not `init_if_needed`, so a second submission of the
- * same shield fails at account resolution. For a deposit the nullifiers derive
- * from freshly generated random keys, so a genuine collision is impossible —
- * in practice this only ever means the first attempt succeeded. Telling a user
- * their funds were "already spent" here would be alarming and wrong.
- *
- * **`UnknownRoot` is recoverable but not by `rebuild()`.** The proof commits to
- * the root, so a stale root needs a fresh proof, not a fresh blockhash.
- */
-function mapShieldError(error) {
-    if (error instanceof ShieldError)
-        return error;
-    const err = error;
-    const raw = (err?.message ?? String(err ?? "")).toLowerCase();
-    const programCode = extractProgramCode(err);
-    const readable = (0, client_js_1.parseOnChainError)(err);
-    if (programCode !== null) {
-        switch (programCode) {
-            case 6000:
-                return new ShieldError("POOL_PAUSED", readable, { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6007:
-                return new ShieldError("ROOT_STALE", "The Merkle root this shield was proven against is no longer in the on-chain " +
-                    "history. Build a new shield — the proof cannot be reused.", { programCode, retryable: "reshield", cause: err });
-            case 6012:
-                return new ShieldError("PROOF_REJECTED", readable, { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6013:
-                return new ShieldError("TREE_FULL", readable, {
-                    programCode,
-                    retryable: "reshield",
-                    cause: err,
-                });
-            case 6017:
-                return new ShieldError("TOKEN_ACCOUNT_WRONG_MINT", readable, {
-                    programCode,
-                    cause: err,
-                });
-            case 6029:
-                return new ShieldError("TOKEN_ACCOUNT_DELEGATED", "The source token account has an active delegate. Revoke it, then shield again.", { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6033:
-                return new ShieldError("TOKEN_ACCOUNT_WRONG_OWNER", "The source token account is not owned by the signing wallet.", { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6035:
-                return new ShieldError("AMOUNT_BELOW_MINIMUM", readable, { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6036:
-                return new ShieldError("AMOUNT_ABOVE_MAXIMUM", readable, { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6050:
-                return new ShieldError("VAULT_ATA_MISSING", readable, { programCode, cause: err });
-            case 6005:
-            case 6046:
-            case 6052:
-                return new ShieldError("NULLIFIER_COLLISION", ALREADY_SHIELDED_MESSAGE, {
-                    programCode,
-                    cause: err,
-                });
-            case 6060:
-                return new ShieldError("DEADLINE_EXPIRED", "The shield's deadline passed before it landed. Rebuild it — the proof is still valid.", { programCode, retryable: "rebuild", cause: err });
-            default:
-                return new ShieldError("UNKNOWN", readable, { programCode, cause: err });
-        }
-    }
-    // Non-program failures.
-    if (raw.includes("block height exceeded") ||
-        raw.includes("blockhash not found") ||
-        err?.name === "TransactionExpiredBlockheightExceededError") {
-        return new ShieldError("BLOCKHASH_EXPIRED", "The blockhash expired before the shield landed. Rebuild it — the proof is still valid.", { retryable: "rebuild", cause: err });
-    }
-    if (raw.includes("already in use")) {
-        return new ShieldError("NULLIFIER_COLLISION", ALREADY_SHIELDED_MESSAGE, { cause: err });
-    }
-    if (raw.includes("exceeded cus") ||
-        raw.includes("computational budget exceeded") ||
-        raw.includes("exceeded compute")) {
-        return new ShieldError("COMPUTE_BUDGET_EXCEEDED", `The shield exceeded its compute budget. Real usage has grown past the reserved ` +
-            `limit — SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT needs revisiting.`, { cause: err });
-    }
-    if (raw.includes("too large") || raw.includes("transaction too large")) {
-        return new ShieldError("TX_TOO_LARGE", readable, { cause: err });
-    }
-    return new ShieldError("UNKNOWN", readable, { cause: err });
-}
-const ALREADY_SHIELDED_MESSAGE = "This shield has already been submitted — check the transaction signature before " +
-    "retrying. (The nullifier markers already exist on-chain, which for a deposit means " +
-    "the original transaction landed; it does not mean the funds were spent.)";

package/dist/src/shield/finalize.d.ts

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-import { Connection, PublicKey } from "@solana/web3.js";
-import type { ShieldNote, ShieldOwner } from "./types.js";
-/**
- * Read the authoritative leaf index for a landed shield, and produce the
- * mailbox blob for optional relayer delivery.
- *
- * ## Why this is a separate step
- *
- * Every existing deposit implementation records `tree.nextIndex` read *before*
- * submission as the note's leaf index. Under concurrent deposits into the same
- * tree that value is wrong, and it is wrong permanently — the stored index is
- * what a later withdrawal builds its Merkle path from, so the note becomes
- * unspendable through the normal path.
- *
- * That race is rare for a single wallet and constant for an SDK: a platform
- * batching shields for many users will hit it routinely. So `shield()` reports
- * only a `predictedLeafIndex`, and the real one is read here from the
- * transaction's own `CommitmentEvent` after it confirms.
- *
- * ## What is optional
- *
- * Everything, strictly. The note is recoverable from chain data alone via the
- * on-chain compact cipher, so a caller that skips finalization has not lost the
- * funds — only the fast path to finding them. Persist nothing that depends on a
- * leaf index without calling this first.
- */
-export declare function finalizeShield(params: {
-    connection: Connection;
-    signature: string;
-    note: ShieldNote;
-    owner: ShieldOwner;
-    programId?: PublicKey;
-    /** Defaults to "confirmed". Use "finalized" if the index will be persisted. */
-    commitment?: "confirmed" | "finalized";
-}): Promise<{
-    leafIndex: number;
-    newRoot: Uint8Array;
-    treeId: number;
-    slot: number;
-    /** Encrypted note blob, ready for POST /notes/save if the caller wants mailbox delivery. */
-    blob: {
-        ephemeralPublicKey: Uint8Array;
-        encryptedBlob: string;
-    };
-}>;

package/dist/src/shield/finalize.js

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
-    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
-      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
-    }
-    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
-}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    o[k2] = m[k];
-}));
-var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
-    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
-}) : function(o, v) {
-    o["default"] = v;
-});
-var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
-    var ownKeys = function(o) {
-        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
-            var ar = [];
-            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
-            return ar;
-        };
-        return ownKeys(o);
-    };
-    return function (mod) {
-        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
-        var result = {};
-        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
-        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
-        return result;
-    };
-})();
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.finalizeShield = finalizeShield;
-const anchor = __importStar(require("@coral-xyz/anchor"));
-const program_js_1 = require("../program.js");
-const utxo_js_1 = require("../utxo.js");
-const poseidon_js_1 = require("../poseidon.js");
-const errors_js_1 = require("./errors.js");
-/**
- * Read the authoritative leaf index for a landed shield, and produce the
- * mailbox blob for optional relayer delivery.
- *
- * ## Why this is a separate step
- *
- * Every existing deposit implementation records `tree.nextIndex` read *before*
- * submission as the note's leaf index. Under concurrent deposits into the same
- * tree that value is wrong, and it is wrong permanently — the stored index is
- * what a later withdrawal builds its Merkle path from, so the note becomes
- * unspendable through the normal path.
- *
- * That race is rare for a single wallet and constant for an SDK: a platform
- * batching shields for many users will hit it routinely. So `shield()` reports
- * only a `predictedLeafIndex`, and the real one is read here from the
- * transaction's own `CommitmentEvent` after it confirms.
- *
- * ## What is optional
- *
- * Everything, strictly. The note is recoverable from chain data alone via the
- * on-chain compact cipher, so a caller that skips finalization has not lost the
- * funds — only the fast path to finding them. Persist nothing that depends on a
- * leaf index without calling this first.
- */
-async function finalizeShield(params) {
-    const { connection, signature, note, owner, programId = program_js_1.PRIVACY_POOL_PROGRAM_ID, commitment = "confirmed", } = params;
-    const tx = await connection.getTransaction(signature, {
-        commitment: commitment === "finalized" ? "finalized" : "confirmed",
-        maxSupportedTransactionVersion: 0,
-    });
-    if (!tx) {
-        throw new errors_js_1.ShieldError("UNKNOWN", `Transaction ${signature} not found at ${commitment} commitment. ` +
-            `If it was just submitted, wait for confirmation and retry.`, { context: { signature } });
-    }
-    if (tx.meta?.err) {
-        throw new errors_js_1.ShieldError("UNKNOWN", `Transaction ${signature} failed on-chain; there is no note to finalize.`, { context: { signature, err: tx.meta.err } });
-    }
-    const parser = new anchor.EventParser(programId, new anchor.BorshCoder(program_js_1.PRIVACY_POOL_IDL));
-    const wantCommitment = Buffer.from(note.commitment).toString("hex");
-    let match = null;
-    for (const event of parser.parseLogs(tx.meta?.logMessages ?? [])) {
-        if (event.name !== "CommitmentEvent" && event.name !== "commitmentEvent")
-            continue;
-        const data = event.data;
-        const emitted = Buffer.from(data.commitment).toString("hex");
-        if (emitted === wantCommitment) {
-            match = data;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    if (!match) {
-        throw new errors_js_1.ShieldError("UNKNOWN", `Transaction ${signature} landed but emitted no CommitmentEvent for this note's ` +
-            `commitment. The note may belong to a different transaction.`, { context: { signature, commitment: wantCommitment } });
-    }
-    const leafIndex = Number(match.leafIndex ?? match.leaf_index);
-    const treeId = Number(match.treeId ?? match.tree_id ?? note.treeId);
-    const newRoot = new Uint8Array(match.newRoot ?? match.new_root);
-    // Mailbox copy. Sending this to the relayer with a `recipientWalletPublicKey`
-    // buys instant delivery and a push notification, at the cost of writing the
-    // sender→recipient association into the relayer's database AND removing the
-    // note from the chain-recovery feed. For shield-to-someone-else, chain-only
-    // discovery is usually the better default — see the plan's Phase 3 note.
-    const blob = (0, utxo_js_1.encryptBlindMailboxNote)(owner.noteViewingKey.toBytes(), {
-        blinding: (0, poseidon_js_1.bigIntToBytesBE)(note.blinding),
-        leafIndex,
-        commitment: note.commitment,
-        amount: note.amount,
-        mintAddress: note.mint.toBase58(),
-        treeId,
-    });
-    return {
-        leafIndex,
-        newRoot,
-        treeId,
-        slot: tx.slot,
-        blob,
-    };
-}

package/dist/src/shield/index.d.ts

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Wallet-agnostic shielding.
- *
- * `shield()` builds an unsigned transaction that deposits public funds into the
- * privacy pool, creating a note owned by an arbitrary recipient. Any external
- * wallet — a browser extension, or a third-party platform's managed wallet —
- * signs and submits it. The SDK never touches a secret key.
- *
- * ```ts
- * const owner = await resolveShieldOwner({ username: "alice" });
- * const { transaction, note, proofCache } = await shield({
- *   connection, amount, mint, owner,
- *   signer: { publicKey: wallet.publicKey },
- *   prover: createTransactionProver(artifacts),
- * });
- *
- * const signed = await wallet.signTransaction(transaction);
- * const sig = await connection.sendRawTransaction(signed.serialize());
- * ```
- *
- * On blockhash expiry, `rebuild(result, { connection })` re-assembles with a
- * fresh blockhash and deadline without re-proving.
- */
-export { shield, rebuild, serializeProofCache, deserializeProofCache } from "./shield.js";
-export { resolveShieldOwner, unsafeShieldOwner } from "./owner.js";
-export { finalizeShield } from "./finalize.js";
-export { preflightShield } from "./preflight.js";
-export { buildTransactInstruction, TRANSACT_ACCOUNT_NAMES } from "./ix.js";
-export type { TransactAccounts, TransactArgs } from "./ix.js";
-export { sharedDepositAlt, explicitAlt, auditDepositAlt, expectedDepositAltKeys, requiredAltKeys, SHARED_DEPOSIT_ALT, SHARED_ALT_MINTS, } from "./alt.js";
-export { onChainTreeSource, staticTreeSource, memoryCache, noCache } from "./ports.js";
-export { ShieldError, mapShieldError, extractProgramCode, } from "./errors.js";
-export type { ShieldErrorCode, ShieldRetryClass, ShieldErrorRemedy } from "./errors.js";
-export { SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT, SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS, SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL, MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES, SIGNATURE_BYTES, TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES, NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES, NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT, DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS, } from "./computeBudget.js";
-export type { ShieldOwner, ShieldSigner, ShieldParams, ShieldResult, ShieldNote, ShieldProofCache, ShieldQuote, TreeSource, AltSource, ShieldCachePort, DepositTarget, PreflightOptions, } from "./types.js";

package/dist/src/shield/index.js

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * Wallet-agnostic shielding.
- *
- * `shield()` builds an unsigned transaction that deposits public funds into the
- * privacy pool, creating a note owned by an arbitrary recipient. Any external
- * wallet — a browser extension, or a third-party platform's managed wallet —
- * signs and submits it. The SDK never touches a secret key.
- *
- * ```ts
- * const owner = await resolveShieldOwner({ username: "alice" });
- * const { transaction, note, proofCache } = await shield({
- *   connection, amount, mint, owner,
- *   signer: { publicKey: wallet.publicKey },
- *   prover: createTransactionProver(artifacts),
- * });
- *
- * const signed = await wallet.signTransaction(transaction);
- * const sig = await connection.sendRawTransaction(signed.serialize());
- * ```
- *
- * On blockhash expiry, `rebuild(result, { connection })` re-assembles with a
- * fresh blockhash and deadline without re-proving.
- */
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS = exports.NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT = exports.NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES = exports.TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES = exports.SIGNATURE_BYTES = exports.MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES = exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL = exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS = exports.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT = exports.extractProgramCode = exports.mapShieldError = exports.ShieldError = exports.noCache = exports.memoryCache = exports.staticTreeSource = exports.onChainTreeSource = exports.SHARED_ALT_MINTS = exports.SHARED_DEPOSIT_ALT = exports.requiredAltKeys = exports.expectedDepositAltKeys = exports.auditDepositAlt = exports.explicitAlt = exports.sharedDepositAlt = exports.TRANSACT_ACCOUNT_NAMES = exports.buildTransactInstruction = exports.preflightShield = exports.finalizeShield = exports.unsafeShieldOwner = exports.resolveShieldOwner = exports.deserializeProofCache = exports.serializeProofCache = exports.rebuild = exports.shield = void 0;
-var shield_js_1 = require("./shield.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "shield", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return shield_js_1.shield; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "rebuild", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return shield_js_1.rebuild; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "serializeProofCache", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return shield_js_1.serializeProofCache; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "deserializeProofCache", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return shield_js_1.deserializeProofCache; } });
-var owner_js_1 = require("./owner.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "resolveShieldOwner", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return owner_js_1.resolveShieldOwner; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "unsafeShieldOwner", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return owner_js_1.unsafeShieldOwner; } });
-var finalize_js_1 = require("./finalize.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "finalizeShield", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return finalize_js_1.finalizeShield; } });
-var preflight_js_1 = require("./preflight.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "preflightShield", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return preflight_js_1.preflightShield; } });
-var ix_js_1 = require("./ix.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "buildTransactInstruction", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ix_js_1.buildTransactInstruction; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "TRANSACT_ACCOUNT_NAMES", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ix_js_1.TRANSACT_ACCOUNT_NAMES; } });
-var alt_js_1 = require("./alt.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "sharedDepositAlt", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.sharedDepositAlt; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "explicitAlt", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.explicitAlt; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "auditDepositAlt", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.auditDepositAlt; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "expectedDepositAltKeys", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.expectedDepositAltKeys; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "requiredAltKeys", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.requiredAltKeys; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "SHARED_DEPOSIT_ALT", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.SHARED_DEPOSIT_ALT; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "SHARED_ALT_MINTS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return alt_js_1.SHARED_ALT_MINTS; } });
-var ports_js_1 = require("./ports.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "onChainTreeSource", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ports_js_1.onChainTreeSource; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "staticTreeSource", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ports_js_1.staticTreeSource; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "memoryCache", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ports_js_1.memoryCache; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "noCache", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return ports_js_1.noCache; } });
-var errors_js_1 = require("./errors.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "ShieldError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return errors_js_1.ShieldError; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "mapShieldError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return errors_js_1.mapShieldError; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "extractProgramCode", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return errors_js_1.extractProgramCode; } });
-var computeBudget_js_1 = require("./computeBudget.js");
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_LIMIT; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNIT_PRICE_MICRO_LAMPORTS; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.SHIELD_COMPUTE_UNITS_MEASURED_TYPICAL; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.MAX_TRANSACTION_BYTES; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "SIGNATURE_BYTES", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.SIGNATURE_BYTES; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.TRANSACT_INSTRUCTION_DATA_BYTES; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.NULLIFIER_MARKER_ACCOUNT_BYTES; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.NULLIFIER_MARKERS_PER_TRANSACT; } });
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return computeBudget_js_1.DEFAULT_DEADLINE_SECONDS; } });

package/dist/src/shield/ix.d.ts

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-import { PublicKey, TransactionInstruction } from "@solana/web3.js";
-import type { TransactionProofStruct } from "../proof.js";
-/**
- * `transact` instruction assembly, driven by the IDL rather than by a
- * hand-written account list.
- *
- * Every existing deposit implementation spells out all sixteen accounts by hand
- * in an `accountsStrict({...})` literal. That works until the IDL changes, at
- * which point a silently misordered or missing account produces a runtime
- * failure that is very hard to trace. Here the account list and the ordering
- * come from the IDL itself, and an unresolved name throws at build time.
- *
- * Building the instruction directly also means no Anchor `Provider` and no
- * `Wallet` — which is the whole point of a wallet-agnostic shield.
- */
-/** Account names the IDL declares for `transact`, in order. */
-export type TransactAccounts = Record<string, PublicKey>;
-export type TransactArgs = {
-    root: Uint8Array;
-    inputTreeId: number;
-    outputTreeId: number;
-    publicAmount: bigint;
-    extDataHash: Uint8Array;
-    mintAddress: PublicKey;
-    inputNullifiers: [Uint8Array, Uint8Array];
-    outputCommitments: [Uint8Array, Uint8Array];
-    deadline: bigint;
-    extData: {
-        recipient: PublicKey;
-        relayer: PublicKey;
-        fee: bigint;
-        refund: bigint;
-        claimant: PublicKey;
-    };
-    proof: TransactionProofStruct;
-    noteCiphers: {
-        note0EphemeralKey: Uint8Array;
-        note0Encrypted: Uint8Array;
-        note0ViewTag: number;
-        note1EphemeralKey: Uint8Array;
-        note1Encrypted: Uint8Array;
-        note1ViewTag: number;
-    } | null;
-};
-/** Account names in IDL order. Exported so callers can see what must be resolved. */
-export declare const TRANSACT_ACCOUNT_NAMES: string[];
-/**
- * Build the `transact` instruction.
- *
- * @throws ShieldError('UNRESOLVED_ACCOUNT') if the IDL declares an account the
- *         caller did not supply — a loud failure is the point, because the
- *         alternative is a misordered account list that fails opaquely on-chain.
- */
-export declare function buildTransactInstruction(accounts: TransactAccounts, args: TransactArgs, programId?: PublicKey): TransactionInstruction;