@veda-hq/kavach 0.0.0-stage → 0.5.6

package/python/kavach/command_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+"""The command guard: a Claude Code PreToolUse hook for Bash tool calls.
+
+Run as ``python3 <kavach>/python/kavach/command_guard.py`` with one PreToolUse
+event on stdin. Exit 0 allows the command; exit 2 refuses it, and stderr
+(``BLOCKED: ...``) is fed back to the agent. Any other end refuses too.
+
+It blocks git-hook bypasses, history-destroying pushes and what the
+consumer's settings (config.py, from the file KAVACH_CONFIG names) add: a
+command that sets a protected variable, and a commit that records one path
+of a paired change without the other. Each is read from the repository the
+command actually targets.
+
+Two checks, and the command runs only when both allow it: bash_guard.py
+first, then git_safety.py, which reads the code the first cannot (below)
+and runs against the adversarial corpus in ``corpus/``, every row of which
+is also executed in real bash and git.
+
+Limits of bash_guard.py, accepted: it is a static reading of one command
+line, not a shell. It cannot see code it would have to run: ``eval``,
+``bash -c '...'``, functions and aliases, ``$(...)`` that computes a path,
+``env -C``, or shell state set by an earlier Bash call (an exported GIT_DIR,
+a cd, ``set -P``) beyond the hook input's cwd. git_safety.py reads eval,
+``bash -c``, aliases, ``$(...)``, backticks, heredocs and pipes into a shell
+for hook bypasses, forced pushes and paired-change commits. Within one line
+bash_guard.py models git's own index writers (add, reset, an earlier
+commit…), but not files changed by other programs (rm, cp, ``>``
+redirection). Where a path is shell-computed it fails closed; where the
+command hides git inside another program it cannot. So the consumer should
+keep its own CI check behind the paired-change rule: one that fails any pull
+request whose ``requires`` side does not match its ``changes`` side. Heredoc
+bodies and quoted strings are stripped before the text checks, so flags are
+only caught as real arguments, not inside commit messages or echoed text.
+
+Both checks are imported, not fed on stdin, so Python keeps their compiled
+cache: code on stdin recompiles on every call. sys.path[0] is this file's
+directory instead of the cwd, so no file in the command's directory can
+stand in for a module of the guard or of the standard library (``os`` and
+``sys`` are loaded before this file runs). Any failure blocks, a module
+missing or any error raised in it: Claude Code lets a hook's exit 1
+through, so a crash would wave the command on. Still open: an interpreter
+that cannot start, or one killed by a signal. Only a check's integer 0 or 2
+is a verdict.
+
+The hook's stdin is read here, byte for byte, never passed on through a
+child's environment: Linux caps one environment string at 128 KiB and macOS
+all of exec's strings at about 1 MiB, and over the cap the exec fails, which
+Claude Code lets through. Both checks read HOOK_INPUT from os.environ, so
+the entry sets it there, decoded as the environment decodes it so a payload
+that is not UTF-8 still arrives. A failed read leaves the input unknown,
+however much of it arrived, so it blocks. Settings that cannot be read
+(config.ConfigError) block as well: a guard that misread its settings must
+not allow.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+
+HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))
+
+
+def isolate():
+    """Put this file's directory first on sys.path, where Python put the
+    script's directory (run as a file) or the cwd (``-c``, ``-m``). Under
+    ``-P`` or ``-I`` Python put neither there, so the directory goes in front."""
+    if sys.flags.safe_path:
+        sys.path.insert(0, HERE)
+    else:
+        sys.path[0] = HERE
+
+
+def verdict(check, run, missing, module):
+    """0 or 2 from one check. Any other end of it blocks and says why."""
+    try:
+        run()
+    except SystemExit as end:
+        # Only its two verdicts pass: the integers 0 (allow) and 2 (block). A bare
+        # sys.exit() (None) gives neither, and Python exits 1 for 2.0.
+        if type(end.code) is int and end.code in (0, 2):
+            return end.code
+        reason = "exited with %r instead of a verdict" % (end.code,)
+    except BaseException as error:
+        if isinstance(error, (ModuleNotFoundError, FileNotFoundError)) and (
+            getattr(error, "name", None) == module or getattr(error, "filename", None) == module
+        ):
+            reason = "could not load " + missing
+        else:
+            reason = "failed (%s: %s)" % (type(error).__name__, error)
+    else:
+        reason = "finished without a verdict"
+    sys.stderr.write("BLOCKED: %s %s, so it cannot judge this command.\n" % (check, reason))
+    return 2
+
+
+def settings():
+    """The consumer's config.Config, or None once it has said why it blocks."""
+    try:
+        import config
+    except BaseException as error:
+        if isinstance(error, ModuleNotFoundError) and error.name == "config":
+            reason = "could not load config.py"
+        else:
+            reason = "could not load its settings (%s: %s)" % (type(error).__name__, error)
+        sys.stderr.write("BLOCKED: the command guard %s, so it cannot judge this command.\n" % reason)
+        return None
+    try:
+        return config.load()
+    except config.ConfigError as error:
+        reason = "has unusable settings (%s)" % (error,)
+    except BaseException as error:
+        reason = "could not load its settings (%s: %s)" % (type(error).__name__, error)
+    sys.stderr.write("BLOCKED: the command guard %s, so it cannot judge this command.\n" % reason)
+    return None
+
+
+def cannot_name_git():
+    """A command git_safety.py has nothing to read: no "git" in any case,
+    nothing that could spell it (quoting, an escape, an expansion, a glob or
+    a brace), and nothing that could feed a shell a program another command
+    wrote (a pipe, a redirection, a process substitution): `echo fhs otrg
+    --enqbd | tr a-z b-z | bash` runs `git push --force`. The fast exit in
+    bash_guard.py, narrowed."""
+    import json, re
+    try:
+        command = json.loads(os.environ["HOOK_INPUT"])["tool_input"]["command"]
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return isinstance(command, str) and not re.search(r"(?i)git|[\\\x27\"$`*?\[{|<>(]", command)
+
+
+def main():
+    isolate()
+    try:
+        os.environ["HOOK_INPUT"] = os.fsdecode(sys.stdin.buffer.read())
+    except BaseException as error:
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            "BLOCKED: the git-command check could not read its hook input (%s), so it cannot judge this command.\n"
+            % type(error).__name__
+        )
+        return 2
+    loaded = settings()
+    if loaded is None:
+        return 2
+    if verdict("the git-command check", lambda: __import__("bash_guard"), "bash_guard.py", "bash_guard") == 2:
+        return 2
+    if cannot_name_git():
+        return 0
+    return verdict(
+        "the shell-code check",
+        lambda: __import__("git_safety").hook_main(loaded),
+        "git_safety.py",
+        "git_safety",
+    )
+
+
+def run():
+    """``main``, with each refusal written to the refusal log (refusal_log.py)."""
+    isolate()
+    try:
+        import refusal_log
+    except BaseException as error:
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            "BLOCKED: the command guard could not load refusal_log.py (%s), so it cannot judge this command.\n"
+            % type(error).__name__
+        )
+        return 2
+    return refusal_log.guarded("command", main, lambda: os.environ.get("HOOK_INPUT", ""))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(run())

package/python/kavach/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+"""The consumer's settings for the guards, read from the JSON file named by
+the environment variable KAVACH_CONFIG.
+
+kavach knows no product. What one product trusts or requires (a script its
+agents may run from any checkout, environment variables an agent must leave
+alone, a file whose change needs another in the same commit) comes from this
+file, and with no file every such rule is off.
+
+A file that cannot be read, is not JSON, has a key this module does not know,
+or a value of the wrong shape raises ConfigError. Each guard's entry point
+turns that into a refusal: a guard that misread its settings must not allow.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Mapping
+
+ENV_VAR = "KAVACH_CONFIG"
+# A variable name as the shell accepts it in an assignment.
+VARIABLE_NAME = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*")
+
+
+class ConfigError(Exception):
+    """The settings file is unreadable or not in the shape below."""
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class TrustedCommand:
+    """A script in the consumer's repository that an agent may run from any
+    checkout, and the exact command lines that run it. `script` is a path
+    relative to the repository root; `pattern` must match the whole command."""
+
+    script: str
+    pattern: re.Pattern[str]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PairedChange:
+    """A commit that may record a path ending in `changes` must also certainly
+    record a path containing `requires`."""
+
+    changes: str
+    requires: str
+    reason: str
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Config:
+    trusted_commands: tuple[TrustedCommand, ...] = ()
+    protected_variables: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    protected_variables_reason: str = ""
+    paired_changes: tuple[PairedChange, ...] = ()
+
+
+DEFAULT = Config()
+
+SHAPE: dict[str, set[str]] = {
+    "": {"worktree", "command"},
+    "worktree": {"trustedCommands"},
+    "command": {"protectedVariables", "protectedVariablesReason", "pairedChanges"},
+}
+
+
+def _object(value: Any, where: str, allowed: set[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, dict):
+        raise ConfigError(f"{where or 'the settings'} must be a JSON object")
+    unknown = sorted(set(value) - allowed)
+    if unknown:
+        raise ConfigError(f"{where or 'the settings'} has unknown key(s): {', '.join(unknown)}")
+    return value
+
+
+def _text(value: Any, where: str) -> str:
+    if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+        raise ConfigError(f"{where} must be a non-empty string")
+    return value
+
+
+def _list(value: Any, where: str) -> list[Any]:
+    if not isinstance(value, list):
+        raise ConfigError(f"{where} must be a JSON array")
+    return value
+
+
+def _trusted(value: Any, index: int) -> TrustedCommand:
+    where = f"worktree.trustedCommands[{index}]"
+    entry = _object(value, where, {"script", "pattern"})
+    script = _text(entry.get("script"), f"{where}.script")
+    if script.startswith("/") or ".." in script.split("/"):
+        raise ConfigError(f"{where}.script must be a path inside the repository")
+    source = _text(entry.get("pattern"), f"{where}.pattern")
+    try:
+        pattern = re.compile(source)
+    except re.error as error:
+        raise ConfigError(f"{where}.pattern is not a regular expression: {error}") from None
+    return TrustedCommand(script, pattern)
+
+
+def _paired(value: Any, index: int) -> PairedChange:
+    where = f"command.pairedChanges[{index}]"
+    entry = _object(value, where, {"changes", "requires", "reason"})
+    return PairedChange(
+        _text(entry.get("changes"), f"{where}.changes"),
+        _text(entry.get("requires"), f"{where}.requires"),
+        _text(entry.get("reason"), f"{where}.reason"),
+    )
+
+
+def parse(data: Any) -> Config:
+    """The Config a decoded JSON document describes."""
+    top = _object(data, "", SHAPE[""])
+    worktree = _object(top.get("worktree", {}), "worktree", SHAPE["worktree"])
+    command = _object(top.get("command", {}), "command", SHAPE["command"])
+    trusted = tuple(
+        _trusted(entry, index)
+        for index, entry in enumerate(_list(worktree.get("trustedCommands", []), "worktree.trustedCommands"))
+    )
+    variables = tuple(
+        _text(name, f"command.protectedVariables[{index}]")
+        for index, name in enumerate(_list(command.get("protectedVariables", []), "command.protectedVariables"))
+    )
+    for index, name in enumerate(variables):
+        if not VARIABLE_NAME.fullmatch(name):
+            raise ConfigError(f"command.protectedVariables[{index}] is not a variable name: {name!r}")
+    reason = command.get("protectedVariablesReason", "")
+    if variables:
+        reason = _text(reason, "command.protectedVariablesReason")
+    elif reason != "":
+        raise ConfigError("command.protectedVariablesReason needs command.protectedVariables")
+    paired = tuple(
+        _paired(entry, index)
+        for index, entry in enumerate(_list(command.get("pairedChanges", []), "command.pairedChanges"))
+    )
+    return Config(trusted, variables, reason, paired)
+
+
+def load(environ: Mapping[str, str] | None = None) -> Config:
+    """The settings named by KAVACH_CONFIG, or DEFAULT when it is unset or empty."""
+    env = os.environ if environ is None else environ
+    path = env.get(ENV_VAR, "")
+    if not path:
+        return DEFAULT
+    try:
+        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            text = handle.read()
+    except OSError as error:
+        raise ConfigError(f"{ENV_VAR} names {path!r}, which cannot be read ({type(error).__name__})") from None
+    try:
+        data = json.loads(text)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError as error:
+        raise ConfigError(f"{path} is not JSON: {error}") from None
+    return parse(data)