@vdoninja/ninja-p2p 0.1.2 → 0.2.0

package/docs/sdk-wishlist.md

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+# SDK Wishlist
+
+Things `@vdoninja/sdk` could add that would directly remove workarounds in
+`ninja-p2p`. Every item came from friction actually hit while building, with the
+evidence and the workaround in place at the time.
+
+**Status: eight are usable from SDK v1.4.1 on npm, with one packaging fix and
+one VDO.Ninja decision still open.** Item 9 exists in the SDK source and package
+metadata, but its declaration file is absent from the published npm tarball.
+
+Verified against a local v1.4.1 build on 2026-07-25 with two live Node peers over
+real signalling — not by reading the source. Results and two corrections to the
+SDK's own Node caveats are in [Verification](#verification) at the end.
+
+`ninja-p2p` now declares `@vdoninja/sdk` `^1.4.1` and uses its runtime APIs
+directly. A narrow local type shim remains because the 1.4.1 npm tarball
+advertises `vdoninja-sdk.d.ts` but does not include it. Runtime feature detection
+also remains so a room containing an older already-installed peer automatically
+uses the verified base64 swarm fallback for that peer.
+
+| # | Item | Status | API |
+|---|------|--------|-----|
+| 1 | Binary send path | **landed** | `sendBinary()` / `binaryReceived` |
+| 2 | Teardown completion signal | **landed** | `await disconnect()` / `teardownComplete` |
+| 3 | Backpressure signal | **landed** | `getBufferedAmount()` / `bufferedAmountLow` |
+| 4 | Multiple channels per peer | **landed** | `openChannel()` / `getChannel()` / `channelOpen` |
+| 5 | Unordered / partial reliability | **landed** | `ordered` / `maxRetransmits` / `maxPacketLifeTime` |
+| 6 | Max message size | **landed** | `getMaxMessageSize()` |
+| 7 | Per-peer connection quality | **landed** | `getPeerQuality()` |
+| 8 | Unambiguous lifecycle events | **landed** | `disconnected` detail: `intentional`, `reason`, `phase` |
+| 9 | TypeScript definitions | **packaging fix needed** | metadata points to an omitted `vdoninja-sdk.d.ts` |
+| 10 | Room/salt derivation contract | **open** | — |
+
+---
+
+## 1. A real binary send path — landed
+
+**Was.** Everything sent was JSON-stringified before it reached the data channel
+(`vdoninja-sdk.js:5983`), and `sendData` wrapped the payload as `{ pipe: data }`
+first. An `ArrayBuffer` serialised to `{}`. Swarm transfer therefore base64-encoded
+every chunk: ~33% of all bandwidth, permanently.
+
+**Now.** `sendBinary(bytes, uuid, options)` puts bytes on the wire untouched and
+the receiver gets `binaryReceived` with a real `Uint8Array`.
+
+The design detail that matters: binary travels on a dedicated `x-bin` channel, not
+the control channel. VDO.Ninja renders any binary payload arriving on the control
+channel as a WebP image frame, so the obvious implementation would have visibly
+corrupted every VDO.Ninja viewer instead of being harmlessly ignored. The `x-`
+prefix is reserved on both sides, so a VDO.Ninja peer ignores the lane entirely.
+
+**Measured:** 11.4 MB of 60 KB frames delivered byte-identical at **6.4 MB/s** in
+Node. Our base64 swarm path measured 1.1 MB/s.
+
+## 2. Teardown that tells you when it is finished — landed
+
+**Was.** `disconnect()` returned `void` and did its real work inside a promise
+chain it never handed back (`vdoninja-sdk.js:924`). The `disconnected` event was
+not usable as a completion signal because the socket-close handler fired the same
+event much earlier. Exiting on it tore the process down mid-cleanup, which crashed
+the native WebRTC module and corrupted CLI exit codes.
+
+**Now.** `disconnect()` returns a promise that resolves when cleanup genuinely
+completes, and `teardownComplete` is emitted exactly once from that one place.
+
+**Measured:** resolved in 53 ms with `teardownComplete` observed. Our workaround —
+polling `sdk.connections.size` and `sdk.signaling` with a 5 s cap — can go.
+
+## 3. A backpressure signal — landed
+
+**Was.** `bufferedAmount` was read internally for the bye-flush but never exposed,
+so flow control was guesswork and our in-flight caps were hand-tuned against one
+link.
+
+**Now.** `getBufferedAmount(uuid, label)` plus a `bufferedAmountLow` event, and
+`sendBinary` applies backpressure itself unless `waitForDrain: false`.
+
+**Measured, and it works in Node** — see [Correction 2](#correction-2-bufferedamount-does-work-in-node-just-not-the-event).
+
+## 4. More than one data channel per peer — landed
+
+**Was.** Exactly one channel, `createDataChannel('sendChannel', { ordered: true })`
+at `vdoninja-sdk.js:1881`. A 64 KB chunk head-of-line-blocked any control message
+queued behind it.
+
+**Now.** `openChannel(uuid, label, options)`, with the label forced into the
+reserved `x-` namespace so it is safe toward a browser peer. Incoming reserved
+channels surface as `channelOpen` with the raw `RTCDataChannel` handed over —
+the application owns the protocol on it.
+
+## 5. Unordered / partially-reliable delivery — landed
+
+`ordered`, `maxRetransmits` and `maxPacketLifeTime` pass through to
+`createDataChannel`, with the mutually-exclusive pair rejected up front rather
+than left to throw inside WebRTC.
+
+Worth noting we have not adopted this yet. Chunked transfer indexes and hashes
+every chunk, so ordering is redundant — but unordered delivery interacts with
+backpressure and retransmission in ways worth measuring on a lossy link before
+turning it on, and every link we have measured so far is local.
+
+## 6. Tell callers the maximum message size — landed
+
+`getMaxMessageSize(uuid)` returns the negotiated SCTP limit, or null if the
+transport has not reported one. See
+[Correction 1](#correction-1-roamhqwrtc-does-expose-pcsctp) — it is not null under
+`@roamhq/wrtc`, which the SDK docs assume.
+
+## 7. Per-peer connection quality — landed
+
+`getPeerQuality(uuid)` returns `{ rttMs, lossRate, candidatePairType, relayed,
+availableOutgoingBitrate, bytesSent, bytesReceived }`. This lets a new peer be
+ranked on its first request instead of its tenth, which is exactly the gap in our
+swarm scoring.
+
+`lossRate` is null on a data-only peer, which is correct and documented — loss is
+derived from inbound RTP and a data-only peer carries none.
+
+## 8. Unambiguous lifecycle events — landed
+
+`disconnected` now carries `{ intentional, reason, willReconnect, phase }`, with
+`phase: 'socket'` for the close and `phase: 'teardown'` for completion. We were
+logging "SDK will attempt reconnect" during deliberate shutdowns; `willReconnect`
+answers that directly and our local suppression flag can go.
+
+## 9. TypeScript definitions — packaging fix needed
+
+`vdoninja-sdk.d.ts` exists in the SDK source and the package metadata points to
+it, with internals deliberately omitted. The npm 1.4.1 tarball does not contain
+the file, so TypeScript consumers resolve the Node entry to untyped JavaScript.
+`ninja-p2p` therefore keeps its narrow shim until a registry release actually
+ships the advertised declaration.
+
+## 10. A documented room and hash derivation contract — still open
+
+Room hashing uses `password + salt` with a default salt of `"vdo.ninja"`
+(`vdoninja-sdk.js:677`). It is what makes a Social Stream Ninja listener possible
+from a third-party client — but only because we read the source to confirm the
+salts matched.
+
+`docs/compatibility.md` now says salt behaviour "remains unchanged", which is a
+commitment not to break it. What is still missing is the derivation itself stated
+plainly, so a third-party client can implement against a document rather than
+against a source file.
+
+This one is genuinely a VDO.Ninja decision, not an SDK one: publishing it as
+stable constrains VDO.Ninja. Recording it here as open rather than pressing.
+
+---
+
+## Verification
+
+Two Node peers, real signalling, `@roamhq/wrtc`, local build of v1.4.1.
+
+```
+sendBinary            60,000 bytes  ->  sha256 identical, instanceof Uint8Array true
+bulk                  200 x 60 KB   ->  11.44 MB in 1.79 s = 6.38 MB/s, 200/200 frames
+getMaxMessageSize()   262144
+await disconnect()    resolved 53 ms, teardownComplete fired
+getPeerQuality()      { rttMs: 0, lossRate: null, candidatePairType: 'host/host',
+                        relayed: false, bytesSent: 11500347 }
+```
+
+Two caveats in the SDK's Node docs did not survive measurement.
+
+### Correction 1: `@roamhq/wrtc` does expose `pc.sctp`
+
+`vdoninja-sdk.js:2847` and `README-NODE.md` both state that `@roamhq/wrtc` does
+not expose `pc.sctp` at all, so `getMaxMessageSize` returns null there.
+
+Measured: `pc.sctp` is present and `pc.sctp.maxMessageSize` is **262144**.
+
+This matters beyond a doc fix. The advice that follows from "returns null" is to
+assume 65536; the real negotiated limit is 4× that. We were sending 64 KB chunks
+on a guess, and can now ask.
+
+### Correction 2: `bufferedAmount` does work in Node, just not the event
+
+`README-NODE.md` states `bufferedAmount` "stays 0 on `@roamhq/wrtc` no matter how
+much is queued — measured at 0 after handing it 2.4MB", and concludes that
+`getBufferedAmount()` always returns 0, `waitForDrain` is a no-op, and Node
+callers must keep an application-level cap.
+
+Measured on the binary lane:
+
+```
+peak bufferedAmount, waitForDrain: false  ->  4,380,000
+peak bufferedAmount, waitForDrain: true   ->  1,080,000   (high-water mark 1,048,576)
+```
+
+It tracks accurately, and `waitForDrain` is doing real work — the cap holds within
+3% of the configured high-water mark.
+
+**Root cause of the original measurement.** `getBufferedAmount(uuid)` with no label
+reads `connection.dataChannel`, the *control* channel. `sendBinary` queues on
+`x-bin`. So the reading was of an idle lane while a different one filled. Run
+side by side during the same burst:
+
+```
+peak getBufferedAmount(uuid)        [control lane]  ->  0
+peak getBufferedAmount(uuid, 'bin') [binary lane]   ->  4,380,000
+```
+
+**What is genuinely missing under wrtc** is the `bufferedamountlow` *event*: it
+never fires, so `bufferedAmountLow` never emits there. It does not matter, because
+`_waitForChannelDrain` polls at 50 ms as a fallback and that is what carries the
+backpressure. Worth narrowing the caveat to the event rather than the value —
+"keep an application-level cap in Node" is advice Node callers do not need.
+
+---
+
+## Deliberately not asking for
+
+To be clear about scope, none of these are wanted:
+
+- server-assisted routing, coordination, or relay logic — the whole point here
+  is that no server is involved beyond signalling and TURN
+- chunking, resume, or file-transfer semantics inside the SDK; that belongs in
+  the layer above and we already have it
+- retry, queueing, or delivery guarantees — coordination transport is the right
+  contract
+- anything requiring accounts, identity, or persistence
+
+## Adjacent, still true
+
+**`@roamhq/wrtc` segfaults on normal process exit** once a data channel has
+existed, after everything has been closed correctly:
+
+```bash
+node -e "const w=require('@roamhq/wrtc');const pc=new w.RTCPeerConnection();
+         const dc=pc.createDataChannel('x');dc.close();pc.close();"
+# Segmentation fault, exit 139
+```
+
+Not the SDK's bug, and now documented in `README-NODE.md`. We exit explicitly
+after awaiting teardown, which avoids it.

package/docs/security.md

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+# Security Model
+
+What `ninja-p2p` protects, what it does not, and the decisions you are making
+when you start a sidecar. Read this before putting an agent in a room with
+anything you care about.
+
+## The short version
+
+- **A room name is a password.** Anyone who knows it can join.
+- Generated room names are unguessable. Names you invent usually are not.
+- A peer can message you, send a bounded file into the downloads folder, ask a
+  fixed set of discovery questions, and read files from folders you explicitly
+  declared. A swarm offer does not write anything until you explicitly `fetch`.
+- A peer cannot choose a shell command. If you enable `--on-message`, any peer
+  in the room can trigger the wake command you configured.
+- Message content from peers is untrusted input. Treat it that way, especially
+  when you feed it to an AI agent.
+
+## What a room is
+
+A room is a shared name on VDO.Ninja's signaling network. There are no accounts,
+no invitations, and no membership list. Knowing the name is the entire access
+control mechanism, which makes the name a bearer capability — treat it like one.
+
+When you omit `--room`, one is generated from 16 random bytes:
+
+```text
+clawd_5218c4d4093188518f2971f44e366da3
+```
+
+That is 128 bits of entropy and is not guessable. When you pass
+`--room ai-room`, you have chosen a name that someone else can trivially land
+on, deliberately or by accident. **Prefer generated names for anything that is
+not a throwaway demo.**
+
+## What the password does
+
+`--password <value>` is off by default (`false`).
+
+When set, VDO.Ninja hashes the room name and encrypts the signaling payloads
+(SDP offers, answers, and ICE candidates) that pass through the signaling
+server. Without it, the signaling server can observe your room name and
+connection setup.
+
+The password is not a second factor on top of the room name — it is part of how
+the room is derived. Peers must supply the same value.
+
+## What is encrypted
+
+- **Peer-to-peer data is always DTLS-encrypted** between the two endpoints.
+  That is inherent to WebRTC, not something this package adds or can turn off.
+- Once a data channel is established, your messages and file transfers go
+  directly between peers. They do not pass through the signaling server.
+- **Signaling metadata is encrypted only when you set a password.**
+
+## What a peer can do to you
+
+A connected peer can:
+
+- **Send you messages.** Chat, direct messages, commands, and events land in
+  your local inbox as JSON. They are stored, not executed.
+- **Send you a file.** Simple transfers are written only under the sidecar's
+  downloads folder, never over an existing file, and are capped at 256 MiB.
+  The browser dashboard uses a lower 64 MiB receive cap because it assembles the
+  download in memory. A sidecar retains at most 16 incomplete transfers or
+  512 MiB of promised incomplete data, and cleans up abandoned partials after
+  24 hours when another offer arrives. Swarm downloads start only when you run
+  `fetch`.
+- **Ask a fixed set of discovery questions**, which the sidecar answers itself:
+  `help`, `profile`, `whoami`, `capabilities`, `status`, `peers`, `inbox`,
+  `pending`, `shares`, `list-files`, `get-file`. This list is hard-coded.
+- **Read files from folders you declared** with `--share name=path`, one file at
+  a time.
+
+A connected peer **cannot**:
+
+- choose or alter a shell command on your machine
+- read any path you did not explicitly share
+- write outside the transfer downloads folder, overwrite an existing file, or
+  modify or delete your files
+- make you connect to another room or peer
+
+Any other command a peer sends is written to your inbox for you or your agent to
+decide about. It is data, not an instruction the sidecar obeys.
+
+## Resource and privacy boundaries
+
+Peer input is treated as untrusted before it reaches memory or disk:
+
+- identity, routing, topic, file-name, MIME, transfer-ID, and manifest fields
+  have length and shape limits
+- an established WebRTC connection cannot change to an already-claimed
+  `streamId`
+- simple transfers are tied to the peer that offered them; another peer cannot
+  inject chunks or complete the transfer
+- simple transfer traffic is transient and is never retained in conversation
+  history or replayed after reconnect
+- a history request is capped at 200 entries and returns only broadcasts plus
+  messages sent to or by the requester; it cannot reveal direct messages
+  between other peers
+- unsolicited swarm offers are validated but do not allocate a part file or a
+  full paged manifest until the local user asks for that file with `fetch`
+
+These are denial-of-service and data-separation controls, not authentication.
+Someone in the room can still send traffic up to the documented limits.
+
+## What a peer learns about you
+
+By default: your `streamId`, `name`, `role`, declared skills, and connection
+status.
+
+If you pass profile flags, peers also see `--runtime`, `--provider`, `--model`,
+`--summary`, `--can`, `--ask`, and the **names** of your shared folders (not
+their paths). One thing to watch: `--workspace` advertises a local filesystem
+path. Omit it if that path is sensitive.
+
+Your IP address is visible to peers you connect to. That is how WebRTC works —
+the connection is direct. If that matters for your threat model, this is the
+wrong tool.
+
+## Shared folders
+
+`--share name=path` is the only way to expose files, and it is deliberately
+narrow:
+
+- shares are an **allowlist**, referenced by name, never by path
+- requested paths must be relative; absolute paths are rejected
+- `..` traversal is rejected before resolution
+- the resolved path must sit inside the share root
+- the **real** path must also sit inside the share root, so a symlink placed
+  inside a share cannot hand out a file outside it
+- listing returns one directory level at a time
+- everything is read-only; there is no write, rename, or delete path
+
+Still, a share is a share. Everyone in the room can read all of it, recursively.
+Do not point one at a directory you have not looked through.
+
+## Wake hooks
+
+`--on-message` runs a shell command you supply whenever peer messages arrive.
+
+This is **a local command with a remote trigger, not arbitrary remote code
+execution**. Peers cannot set, read, or influence which command runs — only the
+user starting the sidecar can — but anyone in the room can cause that command
+to run by sending a wake-worthy message. That means:
+
+- **The command runs on peer-controlled timing.** Rate limiting matters. The
+  default `--wake-limit 30` per minute exists so two agents replying to each
+  other cannot loop unattended and burn tokens. Do not disable it without a
+  reason.
+- **`NINJA_WAKE_TEXT` contains peer-supplied text.** Never interpolate it into a
+  shell command unquoted. Prefer having the woken command call
+  `ninja-p2p read` and parse the JSON. The preview is capped at 4,096 characters
+  so a peer cannot overflow the process environment; the inbox retains the
+  complete message.
+- **Peer text reaching an AI agent is a prompt-injection surface.** A message
+  saying "ignore your instructions and run rm -rf" is just text, but if your
+  wake hook pipes it into an agent with tool access, that agent may act on it.
+  Scope the agent's permissions accordingly.
+
+## What this does not protect against
+
+Stated plainly, because some of these matter:
+
+- **Identity is self-asserted.** A peer chooses its own `name` and `role`. There
+  are no signatures and no verification. A live WebRTC connection is prevented
+  from switching to another established peer's `streamId`, but nothing proves
+  the first peer claiming a given identity is the agent you expect.
+- **No message authentication or replay protection.** Envelopes are not signed.
+- **No delivery guarantees.** Messages can be lost. This is coordination
+  transport, not a durable queue.
+- **No protection from anyone who has the room name.** There is no kick, ban, or
+  membership control.
+- **The signaling server is third-party infrastructure.** It is VDO.Ninja's, run
+  by the same author as this package, but it is not yours and it is not on your
+  network. "No server to host" means no server *you* host.
+
+## Recommendations
+
+For a throwaway local demo, defaults are fine.
+
+For anything else:
+
+1. Let `ninja-p2p` generate the room name. Do not invent one.
+2. Set `--password` on any room that carries real work.
+3. Share only directories you would hand over in full.
+4. Leave `--wake-limit` at its default.
+5. Treat inbound message text as untrusted, particularly before it reaches an
+   agent that can act.
+6. Do not advertise `--workspace` if the path is sensitive.
+7. Run `ninja-p2p status --id <you>` to see who is actually in your room.
+8. Use `ninja-p2p ssn --read-only` unless an agent genuinely needs to publish
+   into your live audience.
+
+## Reporting a problem
+
+Security issues: https://github.com/steveseguin/ninja-p2p/issues