@vaultcompass/conductor 0.14.0 → 0.16.0

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@@ -519,6 +519,13 @@ export declare function preparationTimedOut(gate: GatePolicy, stopped: {
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  * only the first left the probe free to spawn whatever the head put at the
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  * second, and a probe RUNS a program as thoroughly as a scan does.
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  *
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+ * And every path the policy's `args:` name (`binary.argumentPaths`), because
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+ * an interpreter `command:` takes the program as an argument: with `command:
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+ * /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]` the script judges, and
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+ * vetting Node alone let a pull request rewrite the script (audit 2026-10-27,
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+ * B1). The version probe's argv is a prefix of those same args, so it is
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+ * covered by the same loop.
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+ *
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  * The first refusal wins and the rest is not consulted. The verdict is the
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  * same either way, and the sentence a reader has to act on should name one
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  * file rather than two.
@@ -655,3 +662,16 @@ export declare function runGate(gate: GatePolicy, options: RunGateOptions): Gate
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  */
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  /** The oldest git a history gate runs under on a pull-request run. */
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  export declare const HISTORY_GIT_FLOOR = "2.31.0";
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+ /**
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+ * cleanOutputLine, then every remaining character outside printable ASCII
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+ * escaped as \uXXXX (escapeNonAscii). For every preview line: there a gate
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+ * reads the head's own control files, so a rule id or a message can be
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+ * head-chosen text, a right-to-left override included (audit 2026-10-27,
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+ * N3). cleanOutputLine alone breaks a workflow command and keeps the
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+ * override. The primary run is NOT safe by the same argument: its rule ids
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+ * come from base-approved config, but its file paths are the head's own
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+ * names. So the primary text report escapes finding paths (subjectLabel,
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+ * src/output-text.ts), and only those; a primary gate message or stderr
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+ * excerpt that quotes a path keeps its characters, a known limit.
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+ */
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+ export declare function cleanPreviewLine(raw: string): string;
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ import { checkEmptiedAgainstBase, compareWithBase, comparisonFailed, } from './o
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  import { ExternalConfigError, materializeExternalConfig, nestedConfigProposals, } from './external-config.js';
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  import { osvLockfileKind, profileFor } from './products.js';
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  import { unreadManifestsNote } from './unread-manifests.js';
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- import { atLeastVersion, refuseHeadControlledProgram } from './trust-base.js';
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- import { ResolveError, candidateNames, nodeModulesCandidate, resolveGateBinary, } from './resolve.js';
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+ import { escapeNonAscii } from './policy-diff.js';
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+ import { atLeastVersion, refuseHeadControlledArgument, refuseHeadControlledData, refuseHeadControlledProgram, } from './trust-base.js';
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+ import { ResolveError, argumentCandidates, candidateNames, codeArguments, nodeModulesCandidate, resolveGateBinary, } from './resolve.js';
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  /** The longest excerpt of a gate's own reason that is carried. */
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  export const GATE_SAID_MAX_CHARS = 160;
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  /**
@@ -653,6 +654,13 @@ const EMPTY_RUN = {
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  * only the first left the probe free to spawn whatever the head put at the
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  * second, and a probe RUNS a program as thoroughly as a scan does.
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  *
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+ * And every path the policy's `args:` name (`binary.argumentPaths`), because
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+ * an interpreter `command:` takes the program as an argument: with `command:
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+ * /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]` the script judges, and
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+ * vetting Node alone let a pull request rewrite the script (audit 2026-10-27,
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+ * B1). The version probe's argv is a prefix of those same args, so it is
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+ * covered by the same loop.
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+ *
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  * The first refusal wins and the rest is not consulted. The verdict is the
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  * same either way, and the sentence a reader has to act on should name one
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  * file rather than two.
@@ -667,6 +675,21 @@ export function refuseHeadControlledBinary(repoRoot, trustBase, binary) {
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  return refusal;
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  }
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  }
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+ for (const argument of binary.argumentPaths) {
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+ const refusal = refuseHeadControlledArgument(repoRoot, trustBase, argument);
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+ if (refusal !== null) {
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+ return refusal;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ // A command that is the gate itself reads the rest of its args as data
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+ // (audit 2026-10-28, N1, and its review): what each path is comes from the
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+ // base tree, and a file or an option-value directory must be the base's.
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+ for (const data of binary.dataArguments) {
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+ const refusal = refuseHeadControlledData(repoRoot, trustBase, data);
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+ if (refusal !== null) {
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+ return refusal;
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+ }
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+ }
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  return null;
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  }
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  /**
@@ -1287,6 +1310,30 @@ function previewRefusal(gate, repoRoot) {
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  detail: `preview under the proposed rules: the base command ${gate.command} is inside the working tree, so this gate was not run`,
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  };
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  }
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+ // THE SAME FOR A PATH IN args:, for the same reason (audit 2026-10-27, B1):
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+ // an interpreter command takes the program as an argument, and a script in
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+ // the tree imports from the head as surely as a command there does. Refused
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+ // outright, as the command is, rather than by the base-equality rule: that
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+ // rule still runs in runGate on every preview spawn, so this is the
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+ // stricter of the two. The root counts as inside, and so does a link whose
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+ // own entry is in the tree, wherever it points (its directory is checked).
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+ // The candidate set is the primary run's (argumentCandidates): the entry and
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+ // every loadable sibling of it, so a head-added tools/gate.js beside a base
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+ // tools/gate/ is refused here too. The entries are the primary run's code
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+ // arguments (codeArguments): every entry for a command that is not the gate
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+ // itself, and only the code-extension ones for one that is. The gate's
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+ // other args are data it reads (audit 2026-10-28, N1), and runGate's data
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+ // check (refuseHeadControlledData, through refuseHeadControlledBinary) runs
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+ // on every preview spawn, an option-value directory included (review B1).
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+ for (const arg of codeArguments(gate)) {
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+ const candidates = argumentCandidates(arg, repoRoot);
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+ if (candidates.some((named) => realPathInside(repoRoot, named) || realPathInside(repoRoot, path.dirname(named)))) {
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+ return {
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+ reason: 'gate-program-refused',
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+ detail: `preview under the proposed rules: the base args entry ${arg} names a path inside the working tree, so this gate was not run`,
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+ };
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+ }
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+ }
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  return null;
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  }
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  /**
@@ -2359,3 +2406,18 @@ function spawnAndRead(ctx) {
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  };
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  }
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * cleanOutputLine, then every remaining character outside printable ASCII
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+ * escaped as \uXXXX (escapeNonAscii). For every preview line: there a gate
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+ * reads the head's own control files, so a rule id or a message can be
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+ * head-chosen text, a right-to-left override included (audit 2026-10-27,
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+ * N3). cleanOutputLine alone breaks a workflow command and keeps the
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+ * override. The primary run is NOT safe by the same argument: its rule ids
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+ * come from base-approved config, but its file paths are the head's own
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+ * names. So the primary text report escapes finding paths (subjectLabel,
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+ * src/output-text.ts), and only those; a primary gate message or stderr
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+ * excerpt that quotes a path keeps its characters, a known limit.
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+ */
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+ export function cleanPreviewLine(raw) {
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+ return escapeNonAscii(cleanOutputLine(raw));
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+ }
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
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  // normalize.ts, which is where the omission would stop mattering if the
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  // field were ever carried.
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  import { gateExitBlocks } from './exit-codes.js';
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- import { cleanOutputLine } from './gate-runner.js';
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+ import { cleanPreviewLine } from './gate-runner.js';
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  import { NATIVE_CONTRACT_PATH, isLegacyContractPath } from './intent-prepare.js';
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  import { INTENT_WARNING } from './normalize.js';
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  import { gateOutcomeWords, skewFound, skewPlace } from './output-text.js';
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ function previewNotifications(result) {
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  return [];
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  }
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  return guardPreview(() => preview.gates.map((gate) => {
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- const outcome = cleanOutputLine(gateOutcomeWords(gate));
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+ const outcome = cleanPreviewLine(gateOutcomeWords(gate));
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  return {
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  id: 'conductor/preview-under-proposed-rules',
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  message: 'Preview under the proposed rules, which does not affect the verdict: ' +
@@ -23,20 +23,26 @@
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  // everywhere is worth more here than a nicer-looking terminal.
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  import { compareFindings } from './envelope.js';
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  import { EXIT_BLOCKED, EXIT_COULD_NOT_RUN, gateExitBlocks } from './exit-codes.js';
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- import { CONDUCTOR_OWN_REASONS, cleanOutputLine, conductorStatedReason, resolutionPlace, versionCharacters, versionSkewRemedy, } from './gate-runner.js';
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+ import { CONDUCTOR_OWN_REASONS, cleanOutputLine, cleanPreviewLine, conductorStatedReason, resolutionPlace, versionCharacters, versionSkewRemedy, } from './gate-runner.js';
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  import { isLegacyContractPath, legacyChangedSentence } from './intent-prepare.js';
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  import { SPEC_DIR } from './intent-spec.js';
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  import { PRODUCT_FOR_ROLE } from './policy.js';
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+ import { escapeNonAscii } from './policy-diff.js';
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  import { guardPreview } from './run.js';
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+ // A file path in a finding is the head's choice on any pull-request run (a
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+ // file named with a right-to-left override in it), so in the text report,
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+ // and so in the pull-request comment, every path is printed with
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+ // escapeNonAscii (audit 2026-10-27 fix round, N3). SARIF keeps the real path:
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+ // code scanning has to find the file.
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  function subjectLabel(finding) {
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  const subject = finding.subject;
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  switch (subject.kind) {
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  case 'package':
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- return `${subject.name} (${subject.manifest})`;
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+ return `${subject.name} (${escapeNonAscii(subject.manifest)})`;
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  case 'location':
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- return `${subject.file}:${subject.line}:${subject.column}`;
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+ return `${escapeNonAscii(subject.file)}:${subject.line}:${subject.column}`;
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  case 'paths':
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- return subject.paths.join(', ');
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+ return subject.paths.map(escapeNonAscii).join(', ');
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  case 'contract':
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  return subject.category === undefined ? 'intent contract' : `contract: ${subject.category}`;
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  case 'none':
@@ -83,7 +89,7 @@ function osvSubject(entry) {
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  const name = first.subject.kind === 'package' ? first.subject.name : '';
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  const installed = typeof first.details.version === 'string' ? first.details.version : '';
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  const where = entry.length === 1 && first.subject.kind === 'package'
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- ? `(${first.subject.manifest})`
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+ ? `(${escapeNonAscii(first.subject.manifest)})`
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  : `${entry.length} lockfiles`;
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  const fixed = typeof first.details.fixedVersion === 'string' ? `fix ${first.details.fixedVersion}` : 'no fix listed';
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  const dev = entry.filter(isDev).length;
@@ -150,7 +156,7 @@ function findingLines(entry, verbose, shortProblem) {
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  lines.push(...gitleaksLines(finding));
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  }
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  if (verbose && entry.length > 1) {
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- const manifests = entry.map((each) => (each.subject.kind === 'package' ? each.subject.manifest : ''));
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+ const manifests = entry.map((each) => (each.subject.kind === 'package' ? escapeNonAscii(each.subject.manifest) : ''));
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  lines.push(` lockfiles: ${manifests.join(', ')}`);
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  }
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  return lines;
@@ -229,6 +235,14 @@ function enforcementNote(gate) {
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  `${gate.exitCode ?? '?'}, and enforce is false for it in .guardrails.yaml, so the commit ` +
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  'proceeds. Set enforce: true there to make it block.');
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  }
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+ // A gate that ran and checked nothing (an intent gate with no contract, a
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+ // scanner with nothing to scan) found nothing because it looked at nothing,
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+ // and "found nothing to block on" reads as a clean result (audit
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+ // 2026-10-28, N5). The same predicate and words as the verdict's list.
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+ if (gateCheckedNothing(gate)) {
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+ return (' not enforced: enforce is false for this gate in .guardrails.yaml, and it checked ' +
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+ `nothing here: ${checkedNothingWording(gate)}. This is not a clean result.`);
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+ }
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  return ' not enforced: enforce is false for this gate in .guardrails.yaml. It found nothing to block on here.';
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  }
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  /**
@@ -750,7 +764,9 @@ export function previewLines(result, verbose) {
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  }
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  return lines;
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  }, (message) => [`preview: could not be completed (${message})`]);
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- return ['', PREVIEW_HEADER, ...body].map(cleanOutputLine);
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+ // cleanPreviewLine, not cleanOutputLine: a head .vault-guard.json can name
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+ // a pattern id with a right-to-left override in it (audit 2026-10-27, N3).
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+ return ['', PREVIEW_HEADER, ...body].map(cleanPreviewLine);
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  }
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  /**
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  * The preview's job log lines: one per preview gate in the per-gate lines'
@@ -767,7 +783,7 @@ export function previewLogLines(result) {
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  ...preview.overBudget.map((role) => `conductor: preview ${role} (${PRODUCT_FOR_ROLE[role]}) over budget`),
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  ...(preview.deferred.includes('intent') ? ['conductor: preview intent (intent-guard) deferred'] : []),
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  ], (message) => [`conductor: preview could not be completed (${message})`]);
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- return lines.map(cleanOutputLine);
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+ return lines.map(cleanPreviewLine);
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  }
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  /**
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  * One plain line per gate, for the job log: which gate, which version, what
@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@ export declare const HEAD_POLICY_KEY = ".guardrails.yaml";
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  * file's. A null head (absent or unparseable) is one change that says so.
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  */
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  export declare function diffPolicies(base: Policy, head: Policy | null): PolicyKeyChange[];
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+ /**
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+ * Every character outside printable ASCII as a \uXXXX escape (an astral
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+ * character as its two surrogate escapes), so head-chosen text cannot smuggle
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+ * a bidi override or a zero-width character into the report. Used for a head
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+ * policy value here, and for every preview line (cleanPreviewLine,
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+ * src/gate-runner.ts), whose gate text the head's own control files can
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+ * choose (audit 2026-10-27, N3).
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+ */
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+ export declare function escapeNonAscii(text: string): string;
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  /** One proposal line for one changed key. */
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  export declare function policyChangeLine(change: PolicyKeyChange): string;
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  /**
@@ -92,14 +92,22 @@ export function diffPolicies(base, head) {
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  }
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  return changes;
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * Every character outside printable ASCII as a \uXXXX escape (an astral
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+ * character as its two surrogate escapes), so head-chosen text cannot smuggle
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+ * a bidi override or a zero-width character into the report. Used for a head
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+ * policy value here, and for every preview line (cleanPreviewLine,
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+ * src/gate-runner.ts), whose gate text the head's own control files can
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+ * choose (audit 2026-10-27, N3).
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+ */
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+ export function escapeNonAscii(text) {
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+ return text.replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/g, (ch) => `\\u${ch.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0')}`);
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+ }
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  function renderValue(value) {
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  if (value === undefined)
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  return '(absent)';
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  const text = JSON.stringify(value) ?? '(absent)';
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- // Every character outside printable ASCII becomes a \uXXXX escape (an
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- // astral character as its two surrogate escapes), so a head option value
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- // cannot smuggle a bidi override or a zero-width character into the report.
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- const escaped = text.replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/g, (ch) => `\\u${ch.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0')}`);
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+ const escaped = escapeNonAscii(text);
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  if (escaped.length <= MAX_VALUE_LENGTH)
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  return escaped;
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  // Keep whole tokens up to 77 characters, so no escape sequence is split.
package/dist/resolve.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ export interface VersionProbe {
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  command: string;
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  argv: string[];
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  }
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+ /** One args entry of a gate-named command that could name a path (`dataArgumentPaths`). */
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+ export interface DataArgument {
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+ /** Absolute, resolved against the repository root. */
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+ path: string;
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+ /** False for an option's value (`--x=v`, the word after `--x`, `-xv`): data the gate reads. */
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+ positional: boolean;
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+ /** The args entry as written, for the refusal message. */
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+ entry: string;
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+ }
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  export interface ResolvedBinary {
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  /** What to spawn. */
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  command: string;
@@ -34,6 +43,38 @@ export interface ResolvedBinary {
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  program: string;
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  /** Arguments placed before the ones the umbrella adds. */
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  argvPrefix: string[];
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+ /**
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+ * Every file or directory the policy's own `args:` names on disk, as an
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+ * absolute path, with every loadable sibling of each (`argumentCandidates`),
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+ * in args order. Empty when the policy has no `args:`.
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+ *
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+ * Carried because an interpreter `command:` hands the program to run as an
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+ * ARGUMENT: with `command: /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]`
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+ * the script is what judges, not Node, and the pull-request provenance check
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+ * has to vet it the way it vets `program` (audit 2026-10-27, B1). Only the
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+ * policy's args, never a candidate's built-in prefix (`scan`, `source`):
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+ * those are subcommands this package wrote, and a directory of the same
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+ * name in somebody's repository is not a program.
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+ *
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+ * When `command:` is the gate itself (commandIsGateProgram) only the args
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+ * entries with a code extension are listed here (`codeArguments`); the
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+ * rest of its args are its own argv, read as data, and land in
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+ * `dataArguments` instead.
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+ */
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+ argumentPaths: string[];
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+ /**
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+ * Every args entry that could name a path, when `command:` is the gate
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+ * itself (`dataArgumentPaths`), in args order, by POSITION and never by
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+ * what the head's disk holds. Empty for every other command, and when
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+ * resolution found the gate.
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+ *
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+ * The pull-request check (refuseHeadControlledData) decides from the BASE
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+ * tree what each one is: a file must be the base's blob, a directory given
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+ * as an option's value must be the base's tree, and a positional directory
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+ * is a scan target and is not compared (audit 2026-10-28, N1, and its
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+ * review, B1 and N-a).
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+ */
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+ dataArguments: DataArgument[];
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  source: ResolutionSource;
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  /** The candidate name this matched, for the report's gate header. */
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  candidate: string;
@@ -89,3 +130,93 @@ export declare function nodeModulesCandidate(gate: GatePolicy, repoRoot: string)
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  export declare function resolveGateBinary(gate: GatePolicy, repoRoot: string, pathValue: string, options?: ResolveOptions): ResolvedBinary | null;
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  /** Every name resolution would try, for the missing-gate finding's message. */
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  export declare function candidateNames(product: Product): string[];
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+ /**
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+ * Whether the policy's `command:` is itself the gate program, so its `args:`
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+ * are that gate's own argv rather than something an interpreter will load.
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+ *
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+ * True only when the command's NAME is a candidate name (`vault-guard`,
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+ * `intent-guard.js`, executable or not). False for anything else: an
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+ * interpreter such as `node` or `python3`, a renamed gate binary, and any
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+ * wrapper or dispatcher whose name is not a gate name, a non-executable
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+ * `my-build.js` included. Only when true are the product's subcommand words
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+ * (`scan`, `source`) exempt from being read as paths, and the args read as
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+ * the gate's own data rather than as code (`dataArgumentPaths`): an
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+ * interpreter handed `scan` runs `scan.js` or `scan/index.js`, so for it the
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+ * word is a path like any other (audit 2026-10-27 fix round, MB3).
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+ *
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+ * The name is the only test. An earlier version also counted every
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+ * non-executable `.js` command, because this package runs one through its own
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+ * Node with the script as the program; but how a file is RUN says nothing
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+ * about what it LOADS, and a dispatcher that requires the script its first
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+ * argument names let a pull request rewrite `scan.js` and pass (audit
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+ * 2026-10-28, MB1).
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+ */
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+ export declare function commandIsGateProgram(gate: GatePolicy): boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * Every path an interpreter could load for one `args:` entry, as absolute
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+ * paths, in the order checked; empty when the entry names nothing on disk
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+ * (audit 2026-10-27, B1, and its fix round).
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+ *
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+ * Relative entries are resolved against `repoRoot`. That is the working
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+ * directory of the version probe and of the gate's own spawn for every
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+ * product except one whose base config can name further files
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+ * (`followsConfigExtend`): on a pull request that gate runs from a temporary
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+ * directory holding the base ref's copies (src/gate-runner.ts, spawnCwd), so
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+ * a relative script there resolves against base copies or not at all, never
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+ * against the head tree. The rules, in order:
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+ *
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+ * - An option with no `=` (`--json`, `-r`) names nothing. An option with one
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+ * (`--config=tools/cfg.json`, `--import=./hook.mjs`) is read for the value
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+ * after the first `=`, since that is where an interpreter takes a file to
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+ * load and a gate takes a file to read its rules from.
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+ * - Nothing else is exempt, the product's own subcommand words (`scan`,
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+ * `source`) included: this is only ever asked for a command that is not
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+ * the gate itself (commandIsGateProgram), and an interpreter handed `scan`
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+ * runs `scan.js` or `scan/index.js`. The gate itself has no code args;
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+ * its args are data (dataArgumentPaths).
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+ * - The entry as written, when it exists as a file, a directory or a
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+ * symlink, without following the symlink, so the caller can refuse an
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+ * in-tree link on its own entry.
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+ * - Then every `<entry>.js`, `.mjs`, `.cjs`, `.json` and `.node` that exists,
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+ * slash or not, and whether or not the entry itself exists: Node tries
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+ * those before a directory of the same name, and a bare `run` runs
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+ * `run.js`. A sibling the head ADDED is listed too, which is what refuses
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+ * it: the base does not track it.
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+ *
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+ * A directory's contents are covered by the caller's tree comparison, so
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+ * `index.js` and `package.json` inside it are not listed separately; a
188
+ * `main` that points outside the directory is not vetted, the same limit as
189
+ * a program's directory. Everything else, a Python `-m` module name, a bare
190
+ * package specifier an interpreter resolves for itself, code passed as a
191
+ * string (`node -e`, `bash -c`), is not recognised as a path. The README says
192
+ * so.
193
+ */
194
+ export declare function argumentCandidates(arg: string, repoRoot: string): string[];
195
+ /**
196
+ * The args entries vetted as CODE: every entry when the command is not the
197
+ * gate itself, and only the code-extension values (`hasCodeExtension`) when
198
+ * it is. Each goes through `argumentCandidates`, here and in the preview.
199
+ */
200
+ export declare function codeArguments(gate: GatePolicy): string[];
201
+ /**
202
+ * The args entries of a gate-named command that are its own DATA, when
203
+ * `command:` is the gate itself (commandIsGateProgram), in args order; empty
204
+ * for every other command (audit 2026-10-28, N1, and its review, B1, N-a,
205
+ * N-b, N-e).
206
+ *
207
+ * Every non-code entry (`gateArgEntries`, less the code-extension ones in
208
+ * `codeArguments`) is listed with its position, resolved against the
209
+ * repository root, WHETHER OR NOT the head's disk has it and whatever kind of
210
+ * thing the disk holds there: a head must not be able to delete a path or
211
+ * change it from a file to a directory to move it out of vetting. What each
212
+ * one is, and so which rule applies, is decided from the base tree by
213
+ * refuseHeadControlledData. No `<entry>.js` sibling is tried: that is how an
214
+ * interpreter resolves a name, and this command is not one.
215
+ *
216
+ * What this trusts is the NAME: a program named like a gate is taken to be
217
+ * that gate, except that a code-extension entry keeps the code rule. A
218
+ * wrapper given a gate's name that hands an extension-less entry to an
219
+ * interpreter is a wrapper, vetted no further than this (README,
220
+ * pull-request trust boundary).
221
+ */
222
+ export declare function dataArgumentPaths(gate: GatePolicy, repoRoot: string): DataArgument[];