@vaultcompass/conductor 0.14.0 → 0.15.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ required.
168
168
  A commit with a staged credential in it prints the full report and exits 1:
169
169
 
170
170
  ```
171
- conductor 0.14.0
171
+ conductor 0.15.0
172
172
  verdict-token: blocked (1)
173
173
  conductor run: 2 gate(s), 1 finding(s)
174
174
 
@@ -786,7 +786,10 @@ merged by someone allowed to merge without this check passing. A `.guardrails.ya
786
786
  pull request never takes effect for that run, `command:` and `args:`
787
787
  included, so **a pull request cannot change the rules it is judged by, and
788
788
  cannot choose the program that judges it, as long as that program is
789
- self-contained** (see the directory rule below). The same ref is passed
789
+ self-contained** (see the directory rule below). "The program" includes a
790
+ script handed to an interpreter: with `command: /usr/bin/node` and
791
+ `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]`, the script is what judges, and it is vetted
792
+ exactly as a `command:` inside the tree would be. The same ref is passed
790
793
  down to every gate that supports it, so their contracts, configs and
791
794
  baselines come from the base branch too.
792
795
 
@@ -863,6 +866,61 @@ the message says to give it a directory: at the root the containing directory
863
866
  is the whole repository, so the rule would mean "no pull request may change
864
867
  anything".
865
868
 
869
+ **In-tree script arguments are vetted too.** Since 0.15.0 every entry of a
870
+ gate's `args:` that names something inside the working tree goes through the
871
+ same rule as the program, because an interpreter `command:` (Node, Python, a
872
+ shell) takes the program it runs as an argument. Before that, a base policy
873
+ of `command: /usr/bin/node` with `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs, scan]` let a
874
+ pull request rewrite `tools/gate/run.mjs` and report itself clean. Exactly
875
+ what counts:
876
+
877
+ - An entry is resolved against the repository root. Everything an
878
+ interpreter could load for it is vetted: the entry as written, and every
879
+ `<entry>.js`, `.mjs`, `.cjs`, `.json` or `.node` beside it, with or
880
+ without a slash. Node loads `tools/gate.js` before the directory
881
+ `tools/gate/`, and runs `run.js` for a bare `run`, so a sibling file the
882
+ pull request adds is refused because the base does not have it.
883
+ - A file (or a symbolic link) must meet the two conditions above; a
884
+ directory must have the same tree object id at the base and the head; the
885
+ repository root itself (`.`) is refused, since conductor already hands
886
+ each gate the repository it scans. A directory's `package.json` `main`
887
+ that points outside the directory is not vetted.
888
+ - `--name=value` is read for the value, so `--config=tools/gate/rules.json`
889
+ and `--import=./tools/gate/hook.mjs` are vetted. An option with no `=` and
890
+ a word that names nothing on disk are not paths and are never refused.
891
+ - The gate's own subcommand words (`scan`, `git`, `source`, `check`) are not
892
+ read as paths only when `command:` is the gate itself (its file name is
893
+ the gate's name, such as a vendored `vault-guard`). For an interpreter
894
+ they are paths like any other word: `node scan` runs `scan/index.js`.
895
+ A renamed gate binary, or any wrapper whose name is not a gate name, is
896
+ treated as an interpreter, so its `scan` or `source` is vetted if a file
897
+ or directory of that name exists, and a pull request touching it is
898
+ refused.
899
+ - Not recognised as a path, and **not** vetted: a Python `-m` module name, a
900
+ bare package name an interpreter resolves for itself, code passed as a
901
+ string (`node -e`, `bash -c`), and a package runner such as `npx`, which
902
+ resolves the gate from the head's own `node_modules`. Name the script by
903
+ its path, and do not run a gate through a package runner on pull requests.
904
+ - The sibling extensions tried are Node's (`.js`, `.mjs`, `.cjs`, `.json`,
905
+ `.node`). A TypeScript runner such as `tsx`, `ts-node` or `bun` also
906
+ resolves `.ts`, `.mts` and `.cts`, which are not tried, so name a
907
+ TypeScript script with its extension (`tools/gate/run.ts`, not
908
+ `tools/gate/run`).
909
+ - A script outside the working tree is accepted, as a program there is.
910
+
911
+ The version probe asks the script, not the interpreter: the args up to the
912
+ first non-option entry, when that entry names something loadable, then
913
+ `--version`, so `node tools/gate/run.mjs scan` is asked `node
914
+ tools/gate/run.mjs --version` and `node tools/gate` is asked `node
915
+ tools/gate --version`. The version conductor reports and checks against an
916
+ expected-version pin is then the gate's own. When the first non-option
917
+ entry names nothing loadable, or the command is the gate itself, the probe
918
+ is the command's own. One shape still reports the interpreter's version: a
919
+ flag that takes a file as its own entry before the script (`node -r
920
+ ./setup.js tools/gate/run.mjs`) makes `./setup.js` the first entry, so the
921
+ probe is `node -r ./setup.js --version`; under an expected-version pin that
922
+ gate is could-not-run. Write `--require=./setup.js` instead.
923
+
866
924
  A symlink inside the repository is refused on **its own entry**, before its
867
925
  target is considered: it is either untracked, or its tree entry is a link
868
926
  rather than a regular file, and either refuses. (A symlink whose own path is
@@ -1146,7 +1204,8 @@ policy with only `enabled`, `stage` and `enforce` taken from the head. Every
1146
1204
  other head value, `command:`, `args:`, `options` and `timeout-seconds`
1147
1205
  included, never reaches it: the base's command and the base's limit are what
1148
1206
  run, and a base `command:` that resolves inside the working tree is refused
1149
- there. A gate's own config is another matter: in the preview, dep-guard and
1207
+ there, as is a base `args:` entry that names a path inside it (an
1208
+ interpreter's script). A gate's own config is another matter: in the preview, dep-guard and
1150
1209
  vault-guard read their own `.dep-guard.json` and `.vault-guard.json` from the
1151
1210
  head, because previewing the proposed rules means their rules too, while
1152
1211
  gitleaks and osv-scanner keep the base's config. osv-scanner call analysis is
@@ -1167,7 +1226,13 @@ gate reached with no budget left is listed as over budget, and one that starts a
1167
1226
  uses the same words as a primary section, so a finding may read `BLOCKING`
1168
1227
  there: it means the finding would block under the proposed rules, and it does
1169
1228
  not affect this run. A pull-request comment is cut at 60000 characters, the
1170
- preview block first.
1229
+ preview block first. Every character outside printable ASCII in the preview
1230
+ (in the report, the job log and the SARIF notes) is written as a `\uXXXX`
1231
+ escape, because a gate there can read text the head chose, a
1232
+ right-to-left override in a pattern name included. The primary text report
1233
+ escapes finding file paths the same way, since a pull request names its own
1234
+ files; other primary gate text, and every path in the SARIF log, is printed
1235
+ as the gate gave it.
1171
1236
 
1172
1237
  Ask for it with `--preview` on `conductor run`, or with the Action's `preview`
1173
1238
  input, which defaults to `true`; any other value turns it off. There is no
@@ -1469,7 +1534,7 @@ request being judged, and the version-pin protection described above
1469
1534
  "protects nothing" against a tree that controls its own judge (the
1470
1535
  validate step's own comment in `action.yml` says so in those words). A tag
1471
1536
  moves when someone pushes it. Name this action by owner and the full commit
1472
- SHA instead. The recipes in this README name vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0.
1537
+ SHA instead. The recipes in this README name vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0.
1473
1538
 
1474
1539
  ```yaml
1475
1540
  name: guardrails
@@ -1489,9 +1554,9 @@ jobs:
1489
1554
  fetch-depth: 0
1490
1555
  - uses: actions/setup-node@v7
1491
1556
  with:
1492
- node-version: '22.11.0'
1557
+ node-version: '22.23.4'
1493
1558
  - id: conductor
1494
- uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0
1559
+ uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0
1495
1560
  with:
1496
1561
  output: conductor.sarif
1497
1562
  - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
@@ -1554,8 +1619,10 @@ jobs:
1554
1619
  # Not a bare major: Node 22.0.0 ships npm 10.5.1, which the action
1555
1620
  # refuses because that client reports a clean install as tampered
1556
1621
  # with. 22.1.0 or later, or 20.13.0 or later, carries an npm that
1557
- # can verify.
1558
- node-version: '22.11.0'
1622
+ # can verify. 22.23.4 is the patched release this repository's own
1623
+ # release job pins after the 2026-10-21 Node security release; the
1624
+ # gates run over pull-request content under whatever Node you pick.
1625
+ node-version: '22.23.4'
1559
1626
  # NOTHING FROM THE PULL REQUEST RUNS BEFORE THE ACTION IN THIS JOB.
1560
1627
  # No `pnpm install`, `npm ci`, build or test step: an install runs the
1561
1628
  # repository's own lifecycle scripts (a root postinstall), and that code
@@ -1566,7 +1633,7 @@ jobs:
1566
1633
  # installs those itself, globally. Leave conductor-version unset so the
1567
1634
  # umbrella is the default in the pinned action.yml.
1568
1635
  - id: conductor
1569
- uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0
1636
+ uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0
1570
1637
  with:
1571
1638
  output: conductor.sarif
1572
1639
  # Exact versions, never a range and never "latest". These three
@@ -1577,9 +1644,9 @@ jobs:
1577
1644
  # request of their own. On a pull request the action refuses a pin
1578
1645
  # below what the pinned action.yml ships, and the three lines can
1579
1646
  # be left out entirely to take that action's own versions.
1580
- dep-guard-version: 0.16.1
1647
+ dep-guard-version: 0.17.0
1581
1648
  vault-guard-version: 1.12.1
1582
- intent-guard-version: 1.10.1
1649
+ intent-guard-version: 1.10.2
1583
1650
  - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
1584
1651
  # Always: the log is most worth having on the run that failed.
1585
1652
  if: always()
@@ -1603,7 +1670,7 @@ jobs:
1603
1670
  - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
1604
1671
  - uses: actions/setup-node@v7
1605
1672
  with:
1606
- node-version: '22.11.0'
1673
+ node-version: '22.23.4'
1607
1674
  cache: pnpm
1608
1675
  - run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
1609
1676
  - run: pnpm test
@@ -1775,11 +1842,11 @@ jobs:
1775
1842
  persist-credentials: false
1776
1843
  - uses: actions/setup-node@v7
1777
1844
  with:
1778
- node-version: '22.11.0'
1845
+ node-version: '22.23.4'
1779
1846
  - id: conductor
1780
1847
  # The primary run's need (here 5 minutes) plus 300 seconds.
1781
1848
  timeout-minutes: 10
1782
- uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0
1849
+ uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0
1783
1850
  with:
1784
1851
  pr-comment: true
1785
1852
  advisory: true
@@ -1915,7 +1982,7 @@ step and add `pull-requests: write` to the job's `permissions`:
1915
1982
  # the pull request runs before the action in this job: no install, build
1916
1983
  # or test step here; those belong in a separate job. ...
1917
1984
  - id: conductor
1918
- uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0
1985
+ uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0
1919
1986
  with:
1920
1987
  output: conductor.sarif
1921
1988
  pr-comment: true
@@ -1994,12 +2061,12 @@ per pull request.
1994
2061
 
1995
2062
  ```yaml
1996
2063
  - id: conductor-package-a
1997
- uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0
2064
+ uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0
1998
2065
  with:
1999
2066
  pr-comment: true
2000
2067
  pr-comment-marker: 'package-a'
2001
2068
  - id: conductor-package-b
2002
- uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.14.0
2069
+ uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@v0.15.0
2003
2070
  with:
2004
2071
  pr-comment: true
2005
2072
  pr-comment-marker: 'package-b'
@@ -2120,7 +2187,7 @@ an explicit pin is unaffected, which is how a stale pin can sit unnoticed
2120
2187
  until the first pull request after the upgrade.
2121
2188
 
2122
2189
  **Pin the action ref to a full commit SHA** with the tag as a comment, for
2123
- example `uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@<40-character SHA> # v0.14.0`. To
2190
+ example `uses: vaultcompasshq/conductor@<40-character SHA> # v0.15.0`. To
2124
2191
  find the SHA for a tag, run
2125
2192
  `gh api repos/vaultcompasshq/conductor/git/ref/tags/v0.12.0` or read it off
2126
2193
  the Releases page.
@@ -2143,6 +2210,7 @@ tag with no row here has an entry that does not state its defaults; read
2143
2210
 
2144
2211
  | Action tag | Kind | `conductor-version` default | Gate defaults the entry says moved |
2145
2212
  | --- | --- | --- | --- |
2213
+ | v0.15.0 | package | 0.15.0 | dep-guard 0.17.0 (from 0.16.1), intent-guard 1.10.2 (from 1.10.1) |
2146
2214
  | v0.14.0 | package | 0.14.0 | none (gate defaults unchanged) |
2147
2215
  | v0.13.2 | package | 0.13.2 | none (gate defaults unchanged) |
2148
2216
  | v0.13.1 | action-only | 0.13.0 | dep-guard 0.16.1 (from 0.15.0) |
@@ -519,6 +519,13 @@ export declare function preparationTimedOut(gate: GatePolicy, stopped: {
519
519
  * only the first left the probe free to spawn whatever the head put at the
520
520
  * second, and a probe RUNS a program as thoroughly as a scan does.
521
521
  *
522
+ * And every path the policy's `args:` name (`binary.argumentPaths`), because
523
+ * an interpreter `command:` takes the program as an argument: with `command:
524
+ * /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]` the script judges, and
525
+ * vetting Node alone let a pull request rewrite the script (audit 2026-10-27,
526
+ * B1). The version probe's argv is a prefix of those same args, so it is
527
+ * covered by the same loop.
528
+ *
522
529
  * The first refusal wins and the rest is not consulted. The verdict is the
523
530
  * same either way, and the sentence a reader has to act on should name one
524
531
  * file rather than two.
@@ -655,3 +662,16 @@ export declare function runGate(gate: GatePolicy, options: RunGateOptions): Gate
655
662
  */
656
663
  /** The oldest git a history gate runs under on a pull-request run. */
657
664
  export declare const HISTORY_GIT_FLOOR = "2.31.0";
665
+ /**
666
+ * cleanOutputLine, then every remaining character outside printable ASCII
667
+ * escaped as \uXXXX (escapeNonAscii). For every preview line: there a gate
668
+ * reads the head's own control files, so a rule id or a message can be
669
+ * head-chosen text, a right-to-left override included (audit 2026-10-27,
670
+ * N3). cleanOutputLine alone breaks a workflow command and keeps the
671
+ * override. The primary run is NOT safe by the same argument: its rule ids
672
+ * come from base-approved config, but its file paths are the head's own
673
+ * names. So the primary text report escapes finding paths (subjectLabel,
674
+ * src/output-text.ts), and only those; a primary gate message or stderr
675
+ * excerpt that quotes a path keeps its characters, a known limit.
676
+ */
677
+ export declare function cleanPreviewLine(raw: string): string;
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ import { checkEmptiedAgainstBase, compareWithBase, comparisonFailed, } from './o
30
30
  import { ExternalConfigError, materializeExternalConfig, nestedConfigProposals, } from './external-config.js';
31
31
  import { osvLockfileKind, profileFor } from './products.js';
32
32
  import { unreadManifestsNote } from './unread-manifests.js';
33
- import { atLeastVersion, refuseHeadControlledProgram } from './trust-base.js';
34
- import { ResolveError, candidateNames, nodeModulesCandidate, resolveGateBinary, } from './resolve.js';
33
+ import { escapeNonAscii } from './policy-diff.js';
34
+ import { atLeastVersion, refuseHeadControlledArgument, refuseHeadControlledProgram } from './trust-base.js';
35
+ import { ResolveError, argumentCandidates, candidateNames, commandIsGateProgram, nodeModulesCandidate, resolveGateBinary, } from './resolve.js';
35
36
  /** The longest excerpt of a gate's own reason that is carried. */
36
37
  export const GATE_SAID_MAX_CHARS = 160;
37
38
  /**
@@ -653,6 +654,13 @@ const EMPTY_RUN = {
653
654
  * only the first left the probe free to spawn whatever the head put at the
654
655
  * second, and a probe RUNS a program as thoroughly as a scan does.
655
656
  *
657
+ * And every path the policy's `args:` name (`binary.argumentPaths`), because
658
+ * an interpreter `command:` takes the program as an argument: with `command:
659
+ * /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]` the script judges, and
660
+ * vetting Node alone let a pull request rewrite the script (audit 2026-10-27,
661
+ * B1). The version probe's argv is a prefix of those same args, so it is
662
+ * covered by the same loop.
663
+ *
656
664
  * The first refusal wins and the rest is not consulted. The verdict is the
657
665
  * same either way, and the sentence a reader has to act on should name one
658
666
  * file rather than two.
@@ -667,6 +675,12 @@ export function refuseHeadControlledBinary(repoRoot, trustBase, binary) {
667
675
  return refusal;
668
676
  }
669
677
  }
678
+ for (const argument of binary.argumentPaths) {
679
+ const refusal = refuseHeadControlledArgument(repoRoot, trustBase, argument);
680
+ if (refusal !== null) {
681
+ return refusal;
682
+ }
683
+ }
670
684
  return null;
671
685
  }
672
686
  /**
@@ -1287,6 +1301,26 @@ function previewRefusal(gate, repoRoot) {
1287
1301
  detail: `preview under the proposed rules: the base command ${gate.command} is inside the working tree, so this gate was not run`,
1288
1302
  };
1289
1303
  }
1304
+ // THE SAME FOR A PATH IN args:, for the same reason (audit 2026-10-27, B1):
1305
+ // an interpreter command takes the program as an argument, and a script in
1306
+ // the tree imports from the head as surely as a command there does. Refused
1307
+ // outright, as the command is, rather than by the base-equality rule: that
1308
+ // rule still runs in runGate on every preview spawn, so this is the
1309
+ // stricter of the two. The root counts as inside, and so does a link whose
1310
+ // own entry is in the tree, wherever it points (its directory is checked).
1311
+ // The candidate set is the primary run's (argumentCandidates): the entry and
1312
+ // every loadable sibling of it, so a head-added tools/gate.js beside a base
1313
+ // tools/gate/ is refused here too.
1314
+ const exempt = commandIsGateProgram(gate);
1315
+ for (const arg of gate.args ?? []) {
1316
+ const candidates = argumentCandidates(arg, repoRoot, gate.product, exempt);
1317
+ if (candidates.some((named) => realPathInside(repoRoot, named) || realPathInside(repoRoot, path.dirname(named)))) {
1318
+ return {
1319
+ reason: 'gate-program-refused',
1320
+ detail: `preview under the proposed rules: the base args entry ${arg} names a path inside the working tree, so this gate was not run`,
1321
+ };
1322
+ }
1323
+ }
1290
1324
  return null;
1291
1325
  }
1292
1326
  /**
@@ -2359,3 +2393,18 @@ function spawnAndRead(ctx) {
2359
2393
  };
2360
2394
  }
2361
2395
  }
2396
+ /**
2397
+ * cleanOutputLine, then every remaining character outside printable ASCII
2398
+ * escaped as \uXXXX (escapeNonAscii). For every preview line: there a gate
2399
+ * reads the head's own control files, so a rule id or a message can be
2400
+ * head-chosen text, a right-to-left override included (audit 2026-10-27,
2401
+ * N3). cleanOutputLine alone breaks a workflow command and keeps the
2402
+ * override. The primary run is NOT safe by the same argument: its rule ids
2403
+ * come from base-approved config, but its file paths are the head's own
2404
+ * names. So the primary text report escapes finding paths (subjectLabel,
2405
+ * src/output-text.ts), and only those; a primary gate message or stderr
2406
+ * excerpt that quotes a path keeps its characters, a known limit.
2407
+ */
2408
+ export function cleanPreviewLine(raw) {
2409
+ return escapeNonAscii(cleanOutputLine(raw));
2410
+ }
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
118
118
  // normalize.ts, which is where the omission would stop mattering if the
119
119
  // field were ever carried.
120
120
  import { gateExitBlocks } from './exit-codes.js';
121
- import { cleanOutputLine } from './gate-runner.js';
121
+ import { cleanPreviewLine } from './gate-runner.js';
122
122
  import { NATIVE_CONTRACT_PATH, isLegacyContractPath } from './intent-prepare.js';
123
123
  import { INTENT_WARNING } from './normalize.js';
124
124
  import { gateOutcomeWords, skewFound, skewPlace } from './output-text.js';
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ function previewNotifications(result) {
724
724
  return [];
725
725
  }
726
726
  return guardPreview(() => preview.gates.map((gate) => {
727
- const outcome = cleanOutputLine(gateOutcomeWords(gate));
727
+ const outcome = cleanPreviewLine(gateOutcomeWords(gate));
728
728
  return {
729
729
  id: 'conductor/preview-under-proposed-rules',
730
730
  message: 'Preview under the proposed rules, which does not affect the verdict: ' +
@@ -23,20 +23,26 @@
23
23
  // everywhere is worth more here than a nicer-looking terminal.
24
24
  import { compareFindings } from './envelope.js';
25
25
  import { EXIT_BLOCKED, EXIT_COULD_NOT_RUN, gateExitBlocks } from './exit-codes.js';
26
- import { CONDUCTOR_OWN_REASONS, cleanOutputLine, conductorStatedReason, resolutionPlace, versionCharacters, versionSkewRemedy, } from './gate-runner.js';
26
+ import { CONDUCTOR_OWN_REASONS, cleanOutputLine, cleanPreviewLine, conductorStatedReason, resolutionPlace, versionCharacters, versionSkewRemedy, } from './gate-runner.js';
27
27
  import { isLegacyContractPath, legacyChangedSentence } from './intent-prepare.js';
28
28
  import { SPEC_DIR } from './intent-spec.js';
29
29
  import { PRODUCT_FOR_ROLE } from './policy.js';
30
+ import { escapeNonAscii } from './policy-diff.js';
30
31
  import { guardPreview } from './run.js';
32
+ // A file path in a finding is the head's choice on any pull-request run (a
33
+ // file named with a right-to-left override in it), so in the text report,
34
+ // and so in the pull-request comment, every path is printed with
35
+ // escapeNonAscii (audit 2026-10-27 fix round, N3). SARIF keeps the real path:
36
+ // code scanning has to find the file.
31
37
  function subjectLabel(finding) {
32
38
  const subject = finding.subject;
33
39
  switch (subject.kind) {
34
40
  case 'package':
35
- return `${subject.name} (${subject.manifest})`;
41
+ return `${subject.name} (${escapeNonAscii(subject.manifest)})`;
36
42
  case 'location':
37
- return `${subject.file}:${subject.line}:${subject.column}`;
43
+ return `${escapeNonAscii(subject.file)}:${subject.line}:${subject.column}`;
38
44
  case 'paths':
39
- return subject.paths.join(', ');
45
+ return subject.paths.map(escapeNonAscii).join(', ');
40
46
  case 'contract':
41
47
  return subject.category === undefined ? 'intent contract' : `contract: ${subject.category}`;
42
48
  case 'none':
@@ -83,7 +89,7 @@ function osvSubject(entry) {
83
89
  const name = first.subject.kind === 'package' ? first.subject.name : '';
84
90
  const installed = typeof first.details.version === 'string' ? first.details.version : '';
85
91
  const where = entry.length === 1 && first.subject.kind === 'package'
86
- ? `(${first.subject.manifest})`
92
+ ? `(${escapeNonAscii(first.subject.manifest)})`
87
93
  : `${entry.length} lockfiles`;
88
94
  const fixed = typeof first.details.fixedVersion === 'string' ? `fix ${first.details.fixedVersion}` : 'no fix listed';
89
95
  const dev = entry.filter(isDev).length;
@@ -150,7 +156,7 @@ function findingLines(entry, verbose, shortProblem) {
150
156
  lines.push(...gitleaksLines(finding));
151
157
  }
152
158
  if (verbose && entry.length > 1) {
153
- const manifests = entry.map((each) => (each.subject.kind === 'package' ? each.subject.manifest : ''));
159
+ const manifests = entry.map((each) => (each.subject.kind === 'package' ? escapeNonAscii(each.subject.manifest) : ''));
154
160
  lines.push(` lockfiles: ${manifests.join(', ')}`);
155
161
  }
156
162
  return lines;
@@ -750,7 +756,9 @@ export function previewLines(result, verbose) {
750
756
  }
751
757
  return lines;
752
758
  }, (message) => [`preview: could not be completed (${message})`]);
753
- return ['', PREVIEW_HEADER, ...body].map(cleanOutputLine);
759
+ // cleanPreviewLine, not cleanOutputLine: a head .vault-guard.json can name
760
+ // a pattern id with a right-to-left override in it (audit 2026-10-27, N3).
761
+ return ['', PREVIEW_HEADER, ...body].map(cleanPreviewLine);
754
762
  }
755
763
  /**
756
764
  * The preview's job log lines: one per preview gate in the per-gate lines'
@@ -767,7 +775,7 @@ export function previewLogLines(result) {
767
775
  ...preview.overBudget.map((role) => `conductor: preview ${role} (${PRODUCT_FOR_ROLE[role]}) over budget`),
768
776
  ...(preview.deferred.includes('intent') ? ['conductor: preview intent (intent-guard) deferred'] : []),
769
777
  ], (message) => [`conductor: preview could not be completed (${message})`]);
770
- return lines.map(cleanOutputLine);
778
+ return lines.map(cleanPreviewLine);
771
779
  }
772
780
  /**
773
781
  * One plain line per gate, for the job log: which gate, which version, what
@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@ export declare const HEAD_POLICY_KEY = ".guardrails.yaml";
14
14
  * file's. A null head (absent or unparseable) is one change that says so.
15
15
  */
16
16
  export declare function diffPolicies(base: Policy, head: Policy | null): PolicyKeyChange[];
17
+ /**
18
+ * Every character outside printable ASCII as a \uXXXX escape (an astral
19
+ * character as its two surrogate escapes), so head-chosen text cannot smuggle
20
+ * a bidi override or a zero-width character into the report. Used for a head
21
+ * policy value here, and for every preview line (cleanPreviewLine,
22
+ * src/gate-runner.ts), whose gate text the head's own control files can
23
+ * choose (audit 2026-10-27, N3).
24
+ */
25
+ export declare function escapeNonAscii(text: string): string;
17
26
  /** One proposal line for one changed key. */
18
27
  export declare function policyChangeLine(change: PolicyKeyChange): string;
19
28
  /**
@@ -92,14 +92,22 @@ export function diffPolicies(base, head) {
92
92
  }
93
93
  return changes;
94
94
  }
95
+ /**
96
+ * Every character outside printable ASCII as a \uXXXX escape (an astral
97
+ * character as its two surrogate escapes), so head-chosen text cannot smuggle
98
+ * a bidi override or a zero-width character into the report. Used for a head
99
+ * policy value here, and for every preview line (cleanPreviewLine,
100
+ * src/gate-runner.ts), whose gate text the head's own control files can
101
+ * choose (audit 2026-10-27, N3).
102
+ */
103
+ export function escapeNonAscii(text) {
104
+ return text.replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/g, (ch) => `\\u${ch.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0')}`);
105
+ }
95
106
  function renderValue(value) {
96
107
  if (value === undefined)
97
108
  return '(absent)';
98
109
  const text = JSON.stringify(value) ?? '(absent)';
99
- // Every character outside printable ASCII becomes a \uXXXX escape (an
100
- // astral character as its two surrogate escapes), so a head option value
101
- // cannot smuggle a bidi override or a zero-width character into the report.
102
- const escaped = text.replace(/[^\x20-\x7e]/g, (ch) => `\\u${ch.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).padStart(4, '0')}`);
110
+ const escaped = escapeNonAscii(text);
103
111
  if (escaped.length <= MAX_VALUE_LENGTH)
104
112
  return escaped;
105
113
  // Keep whole tokens up to 77 characters, so no escape sequence is split.
package/dist/resolve.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -34,6 +34,20 @@ export interface ResolvedBinary {
34
34
  program: string;
35
35
  /** Arguments placed before the ones the umbrella adds. */
36
36
  argvPrefix: string[];
37
+ /**
38
+ * Every file or directory the policy's own `args:` names on disk, as an
39
+ * absolute path, with every loadable sibling of each (`argumentCandidates`),
40
+ * in args order. Empty when the policy has no `args:`.
41
+ *
42
+ * Carried because an interpreter `command:` hands the program to run as an
43
+ * ARGUMENT: with `command: /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs]`
44
+ * the script is what judges, not Node, and the pull-request provenance check
45
+ * has to vet it the way it vets `program` (audit 2026-10-27, B1). Only the
46
+ * policy's args, never a candidate's built-in prefix (`scan`, `source`):
47
+ * those are subcommands this package wrote, and a directory of the same
48
+ * name in somebody's repository is not a program.
49
+ */
50
+ argumentPaths: string[];
37
51
  source: ResolutionSource;
38
52
  /** The candidate name this matched, for the report's gate header. */
39
53
  candidate: string;
@@ -89,3 +103,57 @@ export declare function nodeModulesCandidate(gate: GatePolicy, repoRoot: string)
89
103
  export declare function resolveGateBinary(gate: GatePolicy, repoRoot: string, pathValue: string, options?: ResolveOptions): ResolvedBinary | null;
90
104
  /** Every name resolution would try, for the missing-gate finding's message. */
91
105
  export declare function candidateNames(product: Product): string[];
106
+ /**
107
+ * Whether the policy's `command:` is itself the gate program, so its `args:`
108
+ * are that gate's own argv rather than something an interpreter will load.
109
+ *
110
+ * True when the command's name is a candidate name (`vault-guard`,
111
+ * `intent-guard.js`), and for a non-executable `.js` command, which this
112
+ * package runs through its own Node with the script as the program. False
113
+ * for anything else, an interpreter such as `node` or `python3` above all.
114
+ * Only then are the product's subcommand words (`scan`, `source`) exempt
115
+ * from being read as paths: an interpreter handed `scan` runs `scan.js` or
116
+ * `scan/index.js`, so for it the word is a path like any other (audit
117
+ * 2026-10-27 fix round, MB3).
118
+ */
119
+ export declare function commandIsGateProgram(gate: GatePolicy): boolean;
120
+ /**
121
+ * Every path an interpreter could load for one `args:` entry, as absolute
122
+ * paths, in the order checked; empty when the entry names nothing on disk
123
+ * (audit 2026-10-27, B1, and its fix round).
124
+ *
125
+ * Relative entries are resolved against `repoRoot`. That is the working
126
+ * directory of the version probe and of the gate's own spawn for every
127
+ * product except one whose base config can name further files
128
+ * (`followsConfigExtend`): on a pull request that gate runs from a temporary
129
+ * directory holding the base ref's copies (src/gate-runner.ts, spawnCwd), so
130
+ * a relative script there resolves against base copies or not at all, never
131
+ * against the head tree. The rules, in order:
132
+ *
133
+ * - An option with no `=` (`--json`, `-r`) names nothing. An option with one
134
+ * (`--config=tools/cfg.json`, `--import=./hook.mjs`) is read for the value
135
+ * after the first `=`, since that is where an interpreter takes a file to
136
+ * load and a gate takes a file to read its rules from.
137
+ * - When `exemptSubcommands` is true (the command is the gate program
138
+ * itself, commandIsGateProgram), a bare word that is one of the product's
139
+ * own subcommands (`scan`, `git`, `source`, `check`) names nothing, even
140
+ * when a directory of that name exists. For an interpreter nothing is
141
+ * exempt.
142
+ * - The entry as written, when it exists as a file, a directory or a
143
+ * symlink, without following the symlink, so the caller can refuse an
144
+ * in-tree link on its own entry.
145
+ * - Then every `<entry>.js`, `.mjs`, `.cjs`, `.json` and `.node` that exists,
146
+ * slash or not, and whether or not the entry itself exists: Node tries
147
+ * those before a directory of the same name, and a bare `run` runs
148
+ * `run.js`. A sibling the head ADDED is listed too, which is what refuses
149
+ * it: the base does not track it.
150
+ *
151
+ * A directory's contents are covered by the caller's tree comparison, so
152
+ * `index.js` and `package.json` inside it are not listed separately; a
153
+ * `main` that points outside the directory is not vetted, the same limit as
154
+ * a program's directory. Everything else, a Python `-m` module name, a bare
155
+ * package specifier an interpreter resolves for itself, code passed as a
156
+ * string (`node -e`, `bash -c`), is not recognised as a path. The README says
157
+ * so.
158
+ */
159
+ export declare function argumentCandidates(arg: string, repoRoot: string, product: Product, exemptSubcommands: boolean): string[];
package/dist/resolve.js CHANGED
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
59
59
  // depend on a package cache the report cannot describe, and a gate that
60
60
  // "ran" from an unknown version is worse than one that is honestly
61
61
  // reported missing.
62
- import { accessSync, constants, statSync } from 'node:fs';
62
+ import { accessSync, constants, lstatSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
63
63
  import path from 'node:path';
64
64
  import { profileFor } from './products.js';
65
65
  export const CANDIDATES = {
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ export function resolveGateBinary(gate, repoRoot, pathValue, options = {}) {
220
220
  const prefix = gate.args ?? inferred?.prefix ?? table[0].prefix;
221
221
  const candidateName = inferred?.name ?? baseName(gate.command);
222
222
  const candidate = inferred ?? table[0];
223
+ const argumentPaths = argumentPathsOf(gate, repoRoot);
223
224
  // A build directory holds plain .js files with a shebang but no
224
225
  // executable bit surprisingly often (a fresh tsc output, a file copied
225
226
  // out of a tarball). Running it through this same Node is exactly what
@@ -231,6 +232,7 @@ export function resolveGateBinary(gate, repoRoot, pathValue, options = {}) {
231
232
  // Node is the command; the script is what actually decides anything.
232
233
  program: gate.command,
233
234
  argvPrefix: [gate.command, ...prefix],
235
+ argumentPaths,
234
236
  source: 'policy',
235
237
  candidate: candidateName,
236
238
  versionProbe: candidate.versionSafe && profileFor(gate.product).versionProbe !== null
@@ -241,13 +243,20 @@ export function resolveGateBinary(gate, repoRoot, pathValue, options = {}) {
241
243
  : versionProbeFor(gate.product, candidate, gate.command, repoRoot, pathValue, skipNodeModules),
242
244
  };
243
245
  }
246
+ // A command that is not itself a gate name (an interpreter, typically)
247
+ // and whose args hand it a script is asked through the script, or the
248
+ // version reported is the interpreter's (audit 2026-10-27, N4). A
249
+ // version-unsafe candidate keeps its sibling lookup: rule 2 above.
250
+ const viaScript = inferred === undefined && candidate.versionSafe ? scriptVersionProbe(gate, repoRoot) : null;
244
251
  return {
245
252
  command: gate.command,
246
253
  program: gate.command,
247
254
  argvPrefix: prefix,
255
+ argumentPaths,
248
256
  source: 'policy',
249
257
  candidate: candidateName,
250
- versionProbe: versionProbeFor(gate.product, candidate, gate.command, repoRoot, pathValue, skipNodeModules),
258
+ versionProbe: viaScript ??
259
+ versionProbeFor(gate.product, candidate, gate.command, repoRoot, pathValue, skipNodeModules),
251
260
  };
252
261
  }
253
262
  for (const candidate of table) {
@@ -259,6 +268,7 @@ export function resolveGateBinary(gate, repoRoot, pathValue, options = {}) {
259
268
  command: found.command,
260
269
  program: found.command,
261
270
  argvPrefix: [...candidate.prefix],
271
+ argumentPaths: [],
262
272
  source: found.source,
263
273
  candidate: candidate.name,
264
274
  versionProbe: versionProbeFor(gate.product, candidate, found.command, repoRoot, pathValue, skipNodeModules),
@@ -270,3 +280,147 @@ export function resolveGateBinary(gate, repoRoot, pathValue, options = {}) {
270
280
  export function candidateNames(product) {
271
281
  return CANDIDATES[product].map((candidate) => candidate.name);
272
282
  }
283
+ /**
284
+ * The extensions an interpreter can add to an entry before it looks at the
285
+ * entry as written: Node's main-entry resolution tries `.js`, `.json` and
286
+ * `.node` BEFORE a directory of the same name (`node tools/gate` runs
287
+ * `tools/gate.js` over `tools/gate/index.js`, measured on Node 22), and the
288
+ * ES module forms are listed too, so a sibling a loader might take is vetted
289
+ * whether or not this Node takes it (audit 2026-10-27 fix round, MB1 and
290
+ * MB2).
291
+ */
292
+ const LOADABLE_EXTENSIONS = ['.js', '.mjs', '.cjs', '.json', '.node'];
293
+ function existsAtAll(candidate) {
294
+ try {
295
+ lstatSync(candidate);
296
+ return true;
297
+ }
298
+ catch {
299
+ return false;
300
+ }
301
+ }
302
+ /**
303
+ * Whether the policy's `command:` is itself the gate program, so its `args:`
304
+ * are that gate's own argv rather than something an interpreter will load.
305
+ *
306
+ * True when the command's name is a candidate name (`vault-guard`,
307
+ * `intent-guard.js`), and for a non-executable `.js` command, which this
308
+ * package runs through its own Node with the script as the program. False
309
+ * for anything else, an interpreter such as `node` or `python3` above all.
310
+ * Only then are the product's subcommand words (`scan`, `source`) exempt
311
+ * from being read as paths: an interpreter handed `scan` runs `scan.js` or
312
+ * `scan/index.js`, so for it the word is a path like any other (audit
313
+ * 2026-10-27 fix round, MB3).
314
+ */
315
+ export function commandIsGateProgram(gate) {
316
+ if (gate.command === undefined) {
317
+ return true;
318
+ }
319
+ if (!isExecutableFile(gate.command) && /\.(?:js|mjs|cjs)$/.test(gate.command)) {
320
+ return true;
321
+ }
322
+ const name = baseName(gate.command);
323
+ return CANDIDATES[gate.product].some((candidate) => candidate.name === name);
324
+ }
325
+ /**
326
+ * Every path an interpreter could load for one `args:` entry, as absolute
327
+ * paths, in the order checked; empty when the entry names nothing on disk
328
+ * (audit 2026-10-27, B1, and its fix round).
329
+ *
330
+ * Relative entries are resolved against `repoRoot`. That is the working
331
+ * directory of the version probe and of the gate's own spawn for every
332
+ * product except one whose base config can name further files
333
+ * (`followsConfigExtend`): on a pull request that gate runs from a temporary
334
+ * directory holding the base ref's copies (src/gate-runner.ts, spawnCwd), so
335
+ * a relative script there resolves against base copies or not at all, never
336
+ * against the head tree. The rules, in order:
337
+ *
338
+ * - An option with no `=` (`--json`, `-r`) names nothing. An option with one
339
+ * (`--config=tools/cfg.json`, `--import=./hook.mjs`) is read for the value
340
+ * after the first `=`, since that is where an interpreter takes a file to
341
+ * load and a gate takes a file to read its rules from.
342
+ * - When `exemptSubcommands` is true (the command is the gate program
343
+ * itself, commandIsGateProgram), a bare word that is one of the product's
344
+ * own subcommands (`scan`, `git`, `source`, `check`) names nothing, even
345
+ * when a directory of that name exists. For an interpreter nothing is
346
+ * exempt.
347
+ * - The entry as written, when it exists as a file, a directory or a
348
+ * symlink, without following the symlink, so the caller can refuse an
349
+ * in-tree link on its own entry.
350
+ * - Then every `<entry>.js`, `.mjs`, `.cjs`, `.json` and `.node` that exists,
351
+ * slash or not, and whether or not the entry itself exists: Node tries
352
+ * those before a directory of the same name, and a bare `run` runs
353
+ * `run.js`. A sibling the head ADDED is listed too, which is what refuses
354
+ * it: the base does not track it.
355
+ *
356
+ * A directory's contents are covered by the caller's tree comparison, so
357
+ * `index.js` and `package.json` inside it are not listed separately; a
358
+ * `main` that points outside the directory is not vetted, the same limit as
359
+ * a program's directory. Everything else, a Python `-m` module name, a bare
360
+ * package specifier an interpreter resolves for itself, code passed as a
361
+ * string (`node -e`, `bash -c`), is not recognised as a path. The README says
362
+ * so.
363
+ */
364
+ export function argumentCandidates(arg, repoRoot, product, exemptSubcommands) {
365
+ let value = arg;
366
+ if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
367
+ const equals = arg.indexOf('=');
368
+ if (equals < 0) {
369
+ return [];
370
+ }
371
+ value = arg.slice(equals + 1);
372
+ }
373
+ else if (exemptSubcommands && CANDIDATES[product].some((candidate) => candidate.prefix.includes(arg))) {
374
+ return [];
375
+ }
376
+ if (value === '') {
377
+ return [];
378
+ }
379
+ const absolute = path.resolve(repoRoot, value);
380
+ return [absolute, ...LOADABLE_EXTENSIONS.map((extension) => absolute + extension)].filter(existsAtAll);
381
+ }
382
+ /** `argumentCandidates` for every entry of a policy's `args:`, flattened. */
383
+ function argumentPathsOf(gate, repoRoot) {
384
+ const exempt = commandIsGateProgram(gate);
385
+ return (gate.args ?? []).flatMap((arg) => argumentCandidates(arg, repoRoot, gate.product, exempt));
386
+ }
387
+ /**
388
+ * The version probe for a policy `command:` that is not itself a gate name,
389
+ * when its `args:` hand it a script: the args up to and including the first
390
+ * non-option entry, when that entry names something the interpreter can load
391
+ * (argumentCandidates: a file, a directory, or a bare or extension-less name
392
+ * with a loadable sibling), then the product's own probe argv. The entry is
393
+ * passed as written, so the interpreter resolves it exactly as it will for
394
+ * the scan. So `node tools/gate/run.mjs scan` is asked `node
395
+ * tools/gate/run.mjs --version`, `node tools/gate` is asked `node tools/gate
396
+ * --version`, and the version reported is the script's, not Node's (audit
397
+ * 2026-10-27, N4). Null when the first non-option entry names nothing, or
398
+ * there is none, and the caller keeps the probe it would have made anyway.
399
+ *
400
+ * Only the first: everything after the script is the script's own argv, and
401
+ * carrying a subcommand or a target into a probe would make it do work,
402
+ * which is the one thing a probe must not do.
403
+ * An interpreter flag that takes a file as a separate entry (`-r
404
+ * ./setup.js`) makes that file the first, so the probe asks the interpreter
405
+ * and reports its version, as it did before; under an expected-version pin
406
+ * that is could-not-run, the fail-closed direction.
407
+ */
408
+ function scriptVersionProbe(gate, repoRoot) {
409
+ const spec = profileFor(gate.product).versionProbe;
410
+ if (spec === null || gate.command === undefined || gate.args === undefined) {
411
+ return null;
412
+ }
413
+ for (let index = 0; index < gate.args.length; index += 1) {
414
+ const arg = gate.args[index];
415
+ if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
416
+ continue;
417
+ }
418
+ // Only the FIRST non-option entry can be the script. A later file is the
419
+ // script's own argument (`my-build check rules.json`), and a probe that
420
+ // carried the subcommand before it would make the gate do work.
421
+ return argumentCandidates(arg, repoRoot, gate.product, false).length > 0
422
+ ? { command: gate.command, argv: [...gate.args.slice(0, index + 1), ...spec.argv] }
423
+ : null;
424
+ }
425
+ return null;
426
+ }
@@ -336,3 +336,37 @@ export declare function refuseHeadControlledProgram(repoRoot: string, trustBase:
336
336
  * for every repository pinning an older gate.
337
337
  */
338
338
  export declare function atLeastVersion(version: string | null, minimum: string): boolean;
339
+ /**
340
+ * Why a path named in a gate's `args:` cannot be trusted on a pull-request
341
+ * run, or null (audit 2026-10-27, B1).
342
+ *
343
+ * An interpreter `command:` takes the program as an argument: with
344
+ * `command: /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs, scan]` the script
345
+ * judges and Node only runs it, so vetting `command:` alone let a pull request
346
+ * rewrite the script and choose its own judge. `argumentCandidates`
347
+ * (src/resolve.ts) lists every path an interpreter could load for an entry,
348
+ * the entry and each of its loadable siblings (`tools/gate.js` beside
349
+ * `tools/gate/`), and each one is asked here separately; this decides
350
+ * whether that one path is the base's.
351
+ *
352
+ * - A FILE, or a symlink of any kind, goes through refuseHeadControlledProgram
353
+ * unchanged: blob and containing directory identical at both refs, an
354
+ * in-tree link refused on its own entry, the root refused, anything outside
355
+ * the tree accepted. The same rule as a `command:`, because it is the same
356
+ * question.
357
+ * - A DIRECTORY inside the tree is accepted only when it is a tracked tree
358
+ * at both refs with the same tree object id: when no sibling file wins,
359
+ * an interpreter handed a directory (`node tools/gate`) runs what is
360
+ * inside it, so the whole subtree is the unit, as it is beside a program.
361
+ * A sibling file that would win is a separate candidate, vetted as a file.
362
+ * - THE REPOSITORY ROOT ITSELF is refused (`node .` runs the head's own
363
+ * package.json main). Approving it would mean comparing the whole tree,
364
+ * which differs on every pull request; conductor already hands every gate
365
+ * the repository it scans, so no gate needs the root in `args:`.
366
+ *
367
+ * NOTHING HERE READS THE WORKING TREE's CONTENTS, as for the program: both
368
+ * sides are `git ls-tree` listings. Only whether the entry is a directory is
369
+ * read from disk, and a link is never followed for that, so a link is always
370
+ * vetted as a link.
371
+ */
372
+ export declare function refuseHeadControlledArgument(repoRoot: string, trustBase: string, argumentPath: string): string | null;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
71
71
  // RUN proceeds, so the caller can still learn the trees matched
72
72
  // (`headTreeEqualsBase` below) and run only the gates whose input is
73
73
  // history rather than the tree.
74
- import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
74
+ import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
75
75
  import path from 'node:path';
76
76
  import { parse as parseYaml } from 'yaml';
77
77
  import { gitComplaint, runGit, runGitBytes } from './git.js';
@@ -886,3 +886,85 @@ export function atLeastVersion(version, minimum) {
886
886
  }
887
887
  return true;
888
888
  }
889
+ /**
890
+ * Why a path named in a gate's `args:` cannot be trusted on a pull-request
891
+ * run, or null (audit 2026-10-27, B1).
892
+ *
893
+ * An interpreter `command:` takes the program as an argument: with
894
+ * `command: /usr/bin/node` and `args: [tools/gate/run.mjs, scan]` the script
895
+ * judges and Node only runs it, so vetting `command:` alone let a pull request
896
+ * rewrite the script and choose its own judge. `argumentCandidates`
897
+ * (src/resolve.ts) lists every path an interpreter could load for an entry,
898
+ * the entry and each of its loadable siblings (`tools/gate.js` beside
899
+ * `tools/gate/`), and each one is asked here separately; this decides
900
+ * whether that one path is the base's.
901
+ *
902
+ * - A FILE, or a symlink of any kind, goes through refuseHeadControlledProgram
903
+ * unchanged: blob and containing directory identical at both refs, an
904
+ * in-tree link refused on its own entry, the root refused, anything outside
905
+ * the tree accepted. The same rule as a `command:`, because it is the same
906
+ * question.
907
+ * - A DIRECTORY inside the tree is accepted only when it is a tracked tree
908
+ * at both refs with the same tree object id: when no sibling file wins,
909
+ * an interpreter handed a directory (`node tools/gate`) runs what is
910
+ * inside it, so the whole subtree is the unit, as it is beside a program.
911
+ * A sibling file that would win is a separate candidate, vetted as a file.
912
+ * - THE REPOSITORY ROOT ITSELF is refused (`node .` runs the head's own
913
+ * package.json main). Approving it would mean comparing the whole tree,
914
+ * which differs on every pull request; conductor already hands every gate
915
+ * the repository it scans, so no gate needs the root in `args:`.
916
+ *
917
+ * NOTHING HERE READS THE WORKING TREE's CONTENTS, as for the program: both
918
+ * sides are `git ls-tree` listings. Only whether the entry is a directory is
919
+ * read from disk, and a link is never followed for that, so a link is always
920
+ * vetted as a link.
921
+ */
922
+ export function refuseHeadControlledArgument(repoRoot, trustBase, argumentPath) {
923
+ const repoReal = realOrNull(repoRoot);
924
+ if (repoReal === null) {
925
+ return `the repository root ${repoRoot} could not be resolved, so the gate arguments could not be checked against "${trustBase}". Nothing was checked by this gate.`;
926
+ }
927
+ const spellings = [withResolvedParent(argumentPath), realOrNull(argumentPath)].filter((spelling) => spelling !== null);
928
+ if (spellings.some((spelling) => path.relative(repoReal, spelling) === '')) {
929
+ return (`the gate's args: name the repository root (${argumentPath}), so what would run is decided by ` +
930
+ `the whole working tree, and this pull request differs from "${trustBase}" somewhere in it. ` +
931
+ 'conductor already hands each gate the repository it scans; name a script in its own ' +
932
+ 'directory instead. Nothing was checked by this gate.');
933
+ }
934
+ let isDirectory;
935
+ try {
936
+ isDirectory = lstatSync(argumentPath).isDirectory();
937
+ }
938
+ catch {
939
+ // Gone between resolution and now: nothing for a child to run from here,
940
+ // and nothing for the program rule to approve either. Asking it anyway
941
+ // is the fail-closed direction, since an untracked or absent path refuses.
942
+ isDirectory = false;
943
+ }
944
+ if (!isDirectory) {
945
+ return refuseHeadControlledProgram(repoRoot, trustBase, argumentPath);
946
+ }
947
+ for (const spelling of new Set(spellings)) {
948
+ if (!insideWorkingTree(repoReal, spelling)) {
949
+ continue;
950
+ }
951
+ const relative = path.relative(repoReal, spelling).split(path.sep).join('/');
952
+ const baseEntry = treeEntryAt(repoRoot, trustBase, relative);
953
+ const headEntry = treeEntryAt(repoRoot, 'HEAD', relative);
954
+ for (const listed of [baseEntry, headEntry]) {
955
+ if (listed.kind === 'error') {
956
+ return (`the directory ${relative} named in the gate's args: could not be checked against ` +
957
+ `"${trustBase}": ${listed.detail}. Nothing was checked by this gate.`);
958
+ }
959
+ }
960
+ const base = baseEntry.kind === 'entry' ? baseEntry : null;
961
+ const head = headEntry.kind === 'entry' ? headEntry : null;
962
+ if (base === null || head === null || base.type !== 'tree' || head.type !== 'tree' || base.sha !== head.sha) {
963
+ return (`the directory ${relative} named in the gate's args: is not what "${trustBase}" approved: ` +
964
+ 'this pull request adds, removes or changes something in it, and an interpreter handed a ' +
965
+ 'directory runs what is inside. Land the change on the base branch first, or name a ' +
966
+ 'script outside the repository. Nothing was checked by this gate.');
967
+ }
968
+ }
969
+ return null;
970
+ }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@vaultcompass/conductor",
3
- "version": "0.14.0",
3
+ "version": "0.15.0",
4
4
  "type": "module",
5
5
  "description": "Umbrella installer and combined report over the independently installable guardrail gates.",
6
6
  "keywords": [