@vaadin/bundles 25.1.3 → 25.1.4

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -10,24 +10,65 @@ __webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
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  /* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
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  /* harmony export */ "default": () => (/* binding */ purify)
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  /* harmony export */ });
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- /*! @license DOMPurify 3.3.3 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.3.3/LICENSE */
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+ /*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.8 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.8/LICENSE */
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- const {
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- entries,
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- setPrototypeOf,
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- isFrozen,
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- getPrototypeOf,
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- getOwnPropertyDescriptor
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- } = Object;
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- let {
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- freeze,
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- seal,
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- create
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- } = Object; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
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- let {
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- apply,
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- construct
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- } = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect;
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+ function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
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+ (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
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+ for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
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+ return n;
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+ }
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+ function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
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+ if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
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+ }
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+ function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
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+ var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
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+ if (null != t) {
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+ var e,
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+ n,
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+ i,
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+ u,
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+ a = [],
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+ f = true,
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+ o = false;
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+ try {
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+ if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
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+ } catch (r) {
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+ o = true, n = r;
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+ } finally {
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+ try {
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+ if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
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+ } finally {
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+ if (o) throw n;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ return a;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ function _nonIterableRest() {
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+ throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
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+ }
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+ function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
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+ return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
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+ }
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+ function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
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+ if (r) {
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+ if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
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+ var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
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+ return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ const entries = Object.entries,
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+ setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
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+ isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
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+ getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
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+ getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
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+ let freeze = Object.freeze,
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+ seal = Object.seal,
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+ create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
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+ let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
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+ apply = _ref.apply,
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+ construct = _ref.construct;
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  if (!freeze) {
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  freeze = function freeze(x) {
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  return x;
@@ -59,13 +100,19 @@ const arrayLastIndexOf = unapply(Array.prototype.lastIndexOf);
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  const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
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  const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
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  const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
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+ const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
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  const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
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  const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
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  const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
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  const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
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  const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
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  const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
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+ const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
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+ const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
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+ const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
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+ const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
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  const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
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+ const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
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  const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
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  const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
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  /**
@@ -115,6 +162,9 @@ function addToSet(set, array) {
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  // Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
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  setPrototypeOf(set, null);
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  }
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+ if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
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+ return set;
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+ }
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  let l = array.length;
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  while (l--) {
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  let element = array[l];
@@ -155,10 +205,13 @@ function cleanArray(array) {
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  */
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  function clone(object) {
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  const newObject = create(null);
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- for (const [property, value] of entries(object)) {
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+ for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
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+ var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
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+ const property = _ref3[0];
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+ const value = _ref3[1];
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  const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
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  if (isPropertyExist) {
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- if (Array.isArray(value)) {
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+ if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
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  newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
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  } else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
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  newObject[property] = clone(value);
@@ -169,6 +222,58 @@ function clone(object) {
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  }
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  return newObject;
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
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+ *
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+ * @param value - The value to stringify.
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+ * @returns A string representation of the provided value.
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+ */
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+ function stringifyValue(value) {
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+ switch (typeof value) {
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+ case 'string':
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+ {
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+ return value;
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+ }
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+ case 'number':
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+ {
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+ return numberToString(value);
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+ }
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+ case 'boolean':
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+ {
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+ return booleanToString(value);
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+ }
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+ case 'bigint':
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+ {
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+ return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
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+ }
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+ case 'symbol':
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+ {
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+ return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
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+ }
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+ case 'undefined':
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+ {
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+ return objectToString(value);
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+ }
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+ case 'function':
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+ case 'object':
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+ {
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+ if (value === null) {
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+ return objectToString(value);
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+ }
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+ const valueAsRecord = value;
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+ const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
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+ if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
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+ const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
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+ return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
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+ }
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+ return objectToString(value);
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+ }
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+ default:
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+ {
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+ return objectToString(value);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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  /**
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  * This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
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  *
@@ -194,6 +299,14 @@ function lookupGetter(object, prop) {
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  }
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  return fallbackValue;
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  }
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+ function isRegex(value) {
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+ try {
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+ regExpTest(value, '');
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+ return true;
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+ } catch (_unused) {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ }
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  const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
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  const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
@@ -209,15 +322,14 @@ const mathMl$1 = freeze(['math', 'menclose', 'merror', 'mfenced', 'mfrac', 'mgly
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  const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
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  const text = freeze(['#text']);
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- const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns', 'slot']);
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+ const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
213
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  const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
214
- const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnsalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lspace', 'lquote', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
327
+ const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
215
328
  const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
216
329
 
217
- // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/better-regex
218
- const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/\{\{[\w\W]*|[\w\W]*\}\}/gm); // Specify template detection regex for SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES mode
219
- const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|[\w\W]*%>/gm);
220
- const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\$\{[\w\W]*/gm); // eslint-disable-line unicorn/better-regex
330
+ const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
331
+ const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
332
+ const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
221
333
  const DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
222
334
  const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
223
335
  const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
@@ -228,20 +340,6 @@ const ATTR_WHITESPACE = seal(/[\u0000-\u0020\u00A0\u1680\u180E\u2000-\u2029\u205
228
340
  const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
229
341
  const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
230
342
 
231
- var EXPRESSIONS = /*#__PURE__*/Object.freeze({
232
- __proto__: null,
233
- ARIA_ATTR: ARIA_ATTR,
234
- ATTR_WHITESPACE: ATTR_WHITESPACE,
235
- CUSTOM_ELEMENT: CUSTOM_ELEMENT,
236
- DATA_ATTR: DATA_ATTR,
237
- DOCTYPE_NAME: DOCTYPE_NAME,
238
- ERB_EXPR: ERB_EXPR,
239
- IS_ALLOWED_URI: IS_ALLOWED_URI,
240
- IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA: IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
241
- MUSTACHE_EXPR: MUSTACHE_EXPR,
242
- TMPLIT_EXPR: TMPLIT_EXPR
243
- });
244
-
245
343
  /* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/indent */
246
344
  // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
247
345
  const NODE_TYPE = {
@@ -317,7 +415,7 @@ const _createHooksMap = function _createHooksMap() {
317
415
  function createDOMPurify() {
318
416
  let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
319
417
  const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
320
- DOMPurify.version = '3.3.3';
418
+ DOMPurify.version = '3.4.8';
321
419
  DOMPurify.removed = [];
322
420
  if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
323
421
  // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -325,28 +423,29 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
325
423
  DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
326
424
  return DOMPurify;
327
425
  }
328
- let {
329
- document
330
- } = window;
426
+ let document = window.document;
331
427
  const originalDocument = document;
332
428
  const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
333
- const {
334
- DocumentFragment,
335
- HTMLTemplateElement,
336
- Node,
337
- Element,
338
- NodeFilter,
339
- NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap,
340
- HTMLFormElement,
341
- DOMParser,
342
- trustedTypes
343
- } = window;
429
+ window.DocumentFragment;
430
+ const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
431
+ Node = window.Node,
432
+ Element = window.Element,
433
+ NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
434
+ _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
435
+ _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
436
+ window.HTMLFormElement;
437
+ const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
438
+ trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
344
439
  const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
345
440
  const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
346
441
  const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
347
442
  const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
348
443
  const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
349
444
  const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
445
+ const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
446
+ const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
447
+ const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
448
+ const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
350
449
  // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
351
450
  // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
352
451
  // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -361,33 +460,43 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
361
460
  }
362
461
  let trustedTypesPolicy;
363
462
  let emptyHTML = '';
364
- const {
365
- implementation,
366
- createNodeIterator,
367
- createDocumentFragment,
368
- getElementsByTagName
369
- } = document;
370
- const {
371
- importNode
372
- } = originalDocument;
463
+ // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
464
+ // policy's `createHTML`. If the supplied `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML`
465
+ // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
466
+ // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
467
+ // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead.
468
+ let IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML = 0;
469
+ const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
470
+ if (IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML > 0) {
471
+ throw typeErrorCreate('The configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML must not call ' + 'DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes infinite recursion. Do not pass ' + 'a policy whose createHTML wraps DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; ' + 'see the "DOMPurify and Trusted Types" section of the README.');
472
+ }
473
+ IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML++;
474
+ try {
475
+ return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
476
+ } finally {
477
+ IN_POLICY_CREATE_HTML--;
478
+ }
479
+ };
480
+ const _document = document,
481
+ implementation = _document.implementation,
482
+ createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
483
+ createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
484
+ getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
485
+ const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
373
486
  let hooks = _createHooksMap();
374
487
  /**
375
488
  * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
376
489
  */
377
490
  DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
378
- const {
379
- MUSTACHE_EXPR,
380
- ERB_EXPR,
381
- TMPLIT_EXPR,
382
- DATA_ATTR,
383
- ARIA_ATTR,
384
- IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
385
- ATTR_WHITESPACE,
386
- CUSTOM_ELEMENT
387
- } = EXPRESSIONS;
388
- let {
389
- IS_ALLOWED_URI: IS_ALLOWED_URI$1
390
- } = EXPRESSIONS;
491
+ const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
492
+ ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
493
+ TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
494
+ DATA_ATTR$1 = DATA_ATTR,
495
+ ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
496
+ IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
497
+ ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
498
+ CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
499
+ let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
391
500
  /**
392
501
  * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
393
502
  * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
@@ -565,15 +674,15 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
565
674
  // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
566
675
  transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
567
676
  /* Set configuration parameters */
568
- ALLOWED_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
569
- ALLOWED_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
570
- ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
571
- URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
572
- DATA_URI_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
573
- FORBID_CONTENTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
574
- FORBID_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
575
- FORBID_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
576
- USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
677
+ ALLOWED_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
678
+ ALLOWED_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
679
+ ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES) ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
680
+ URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
681
+ DATA_URI_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS) ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
682
+ FORBID_CONTENTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
683
+ FORBID_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_TAGS) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
684
+ FORBID_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_ATTR) ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
685
+ USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
577
686
  ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
578
687
  ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
579
688
  ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
@@ -589,19 +698,20 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
589
698
  SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
590
699
  KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
591
700
  IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
592
- IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP || IS_ALLOWED_URI;
593
- NAMESPACE = cfg.NAMESPACE || HTML_NAMESPACE;
594
- MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS;
595
- HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS || HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS;
596
- CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || {};
597
- if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck)) {
598
- CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck;
701
+ IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
702
+ NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
703
+ MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']); // Default built-in map
704
+ HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']); // Default built-in map
705
+ const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
706
+ CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
707
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
708
+ CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
599
709
  }
600
- if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck)) {
601
- CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck;
710
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
711
+ CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
602
712
  }
603
- if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
604
- CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements;
713
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
714
+ CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
605
715
  }
606
716
  if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
607
717
  ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
@@ -633,44 +743,41 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
633
743
  addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
634
744
  }
635
745
  }
636
- /* Prevent function-based ADD_ATTR / ADD_TAGS from leaking across calls */
637
- if (!objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
638
- EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
639
- }
640
- if (!objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
641
- EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
642
- }
746
+ /* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
747
+ * leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
748
+ EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
749
+ EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
643
750
  /* Merge configuration parameters */
644
- if (cfg.ADD_TAGS) {
751
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
645
752
  if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
646
753
  EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
647
- } else {
754
+ } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
648
755
  if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
649
756
  ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
650
757
  }
651
758
  addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
652
759
  }
653
760
  }
654
- if (cfg.ADD_ATTR) {
761
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
655
762
  if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
656
763
  EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
657
- } else {
764
+ } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
658
765
  if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
659
766
  ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
660
767
  }
661
768
  addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
662
769
  }
663
770
  }
664
- if (cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) {
771
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
665
772
  addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
666
773
  }
667
- if (cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) {
774
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
668
775
  if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
669
776
  FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
670
777
  }
671
778
  addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
672
779
  }
673
- if (cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
780
+ if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
674
781
  if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
675
782
  FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
676
783
  }
@@ -697,19 +804,47 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
697
804
  throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
698
805
  }
699
806
  // Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
807
+ const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
700
808
  trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
701
- // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
702
- emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
809
+ // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
810
+ // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
811
+ // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
812
+ // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
813
+ try {
814
+ emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
815
+ } catch (error) {
816
+ trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
817
+ throw error;
818
+ }
703
819
  } else {
704
820
  // Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
705
- if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
821
+ if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined && cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY !== null) {
706
822
  trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
707
823
  }
708
824
  // If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
709
- if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
710
- emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
825
+ // Note: a falsy `trustedTypesPolicy` (null when policy creation failed or
826
+ // was skipped via `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null`, or undefined when no
827
+ // policy has been initialized yet) must be excluded here, otherwise we
828
+ // would call `.createHTML` on a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
829
+ if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
830
+ emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
711
831
  }
712
832
  }
833
+ /*
834
+ * Mirror the clone-before-mutate pattern already applied above for
835
+ * cfg.ADD_TAGS / cfg.ADD_ATTR: if any uponSanitize* hook is
836
+ * registered AND the set still points at the default constant,
837
+ * clone it. The hook then mutates the clone (in-call widening
838
+ * still works exactly as documented) and the next default-cfg
839
+ * call rebinds to the untouched original via the reassignment at
840
+ * the top of this function.
841
+ */
842
+ if ((hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) && ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
843
+ ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
844
+ }
845
+ if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0 && ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
846
+ ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
847
+ }
713
848
  // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
714
849
  // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
715
850
  if (freeze) {
@@ -869,7 +1004,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
869
1004
  // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
870
1005
  dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
871
1006
  }
872
- const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
1007
+ const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
873
1008
  /*
874
1009
  * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
875
1010
  * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
@@ -909,23 +1044,142 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
909
1044
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
910
1045
  NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
911
1046
  };
1047
+ /**
1048
+ * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
1049
+ * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
1050
+ * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
1051
+ * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
1052
+ * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
1053
+ *
1054
+ * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
1055
+ * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
1056
+ * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
1057
+ * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
1058
+ * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
1059
+ * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
1060
+ *
1061
+ * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
1062
+ * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
1063
+ *
1064
+ * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
1065
+ */
1066
+ const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
1067
+ var _node$querySelectorAl, _node$querySelectorAl2;
1068
+ node.normalize();
1069
+ const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
1070
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
1071
+ NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
1072
+ let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
1073
+ while (currentNode) {
1074
+ let data = currentNode.data;
1075
+ arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
1076
+ data = stringReplace(data, expr, ' ');
1077
+ });
1078
+ currentNode.data = data;
1079
+ currentNode = walker.nextNode();
1080
+ }
1081
+ // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
1082
+ // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
1083
+ // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
1084
+ const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = (_node$querySelectorAl2 = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl2 === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl2.call(node, 'template')) !== null && _node$querySelectorAl !== void 0 ? _node$querySelectorAl : [];
1085
+ arrayForEach(Array.from(templates), tmpl => {
1086
+ if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
1087
+ _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
1088
+ }
1089
+ });
1090
+ };
912
1091
  /**
913
1092
  * _isClobbered
914
1093
  *
1094
+ * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
1095
+ * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
1096
+ * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
1097
+ * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
1098
+ * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
1099
+ *
915
1100
  * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
916
1101
  * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
917
1102
  */
918
1103
  const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
919
- return element instanceof HTMLFormElement && (typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' || !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function');
1104
+ // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
1105
+ // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
1106
+ // (the caller's other defences still apply).
1107
+ const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
1108
+ if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
1109
+ return false;
1110
+ }
1111
+ if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
1112
+ return false;
1113
+ }
1114
+ return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
1115
+ // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
1116
+ // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
1117
+ // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
1118
+ // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
1119
+ // canonical NamedNodeMap.
1120
+ element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
1121
+ // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
1122
+ // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
1123
+ // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
1124
+ // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
1125
+ // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
1126
+ // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
1127
+ // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
1128
+ element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
1129
+ // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
1130
+ // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
1131
+ // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
1132
+ // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
1133
+ // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
1134
+ // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
1135
+ // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
1136
+ // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
1137
+ // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
1138
+ // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
1139
+ // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
1140
+ element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
920
1141
  };
921
1142
  /**
922
- * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node.
1143
+ * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
1144
+ *
1145
+ * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
1146
+ * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
1147
+ * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
1148
+ * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
1149
+ *
1150
+ * @param value object to check
1151
+ * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
1152
+ */
1153
+ const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
1154
+ if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
1155
+ return false;
1156
+ }
1157
+ try {
1158
+ return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
1159
+ } catch (_) {
1160
+ return false;
1161
+ }
1162
+ };
1163
+ /**
1164
+ * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
1165
+ * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
1166
+ * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
1167
+ * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
1168
+ * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
1169
+ * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
923
1170
  *
924
1171
  * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
925
- * @return true is object is a DOM node
1172
+ * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
926
1173
  */
927
1174
  const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
928
- return typeof Node === 'function' && value instanceof Node;
1175
+ if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
1176
+ return false;
1177
+ }
1178
+ try {
1179
+ return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
1180
+ } catch (_) {
1181
+ return false;
1182
+ }
929
1183
  };
930
1184
  function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
931
1185
  arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
@@ -951,7 +1205,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
951
1205
  return true;
952
1206
  }
953
1207
  /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
954
- const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
1208
+ const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
955
1209
  /* Execute a hook if present */
956
1210
  _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
957
1211
  tagName,
@@ -962,6 +1216,11 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
962
1216
  _forceRemove(currentNode);
963
1217
  return true;
964
1218
  }
1219
+ /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
1220
+ if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
1221
+ _forceRemove(currentNode);
1222
+ return true;
1223
+ }
965
1224
  /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
966
1225
  if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.progressingInstruction) {
967
1226
  _forceRemove(currentNode);
@@ -973,7 +1232,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
973
1232
  return true;
974
1233
  }
975
1234
  /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
976
- if (!(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName])) {
1235
+ if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
977
1236
  /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
978
1237
  if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
979
1238
  if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
@@ -983,15 +1242,21 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
983
1242
  return false;
984
1243
  }
985
1244
  }
986
- /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */
1245
+ /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
1246
+ Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
1247
+ had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
1248
+ fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
1249
+ value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
1250
+ path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
1251
+ ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
1252
+ parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
987
1253
  if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
988
- const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;
989
- const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;
1254
+ const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
1255
+ const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
990
1256
  if (childNodes && parentNode) {
991
1257
  const childCount = childNodes.length;
992
1258
  for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
993
1259
  const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
994
- childClone.__removalCount = (currentNode.__removalCount || 0) + 1;
995
1260
  parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
996
1261
  }
997
1262
  }
@@ -999,8 +1264,14 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
999
1264
  _forceRemove(currentNode);
1000
1265
  return true;
1001
1266
  }
1002
- /* Check whether element has a valid namespace */
1003
- if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
1267
+ /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
1268
+ Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
1269
+ nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
1270
+ bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
1271
+ realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
1272
+ slip past the namespace check entirely. */
1273
+ const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
1274
+ if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
1004
1275
  _forceRemove(currentNode);
1005
1276
  return true;
1006
1277
  }
@@ -1013,7 +1284,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1013
1284
  if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
1014
1285
  /* Get the element's text content */
1015
1286
  content = currentNode.textContent;
1016
- arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
1287
+ arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
1017
1288
  content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
1018
1289
  });
1019
1290
  if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
@@ -1045,11 +1316,12 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1045
1316
  if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
1046
1317
  return false;
1047
1318
  }
1319
+ const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
1048
1320
  /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
1049
1321
  (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
1050
1322
  XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
1051
1323
  We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
1052
- if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR, lcName)) ; else if (EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag)) ; else if (!ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
1324
+ if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
1053
1325
  if (
1054
1326
  // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
1055
1327
  // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
@@ -1061,11 +1333,15 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1061
1333
  return false;
1062
1334
  }
1063
1335
  /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
1064
- } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))) ; else if (value) {
1336
+ } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if (value) {
1065
1337
  return false;
1066
1338
  } else ;
1067
1339
  return true;
1068
1340
  };
1341
+ /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
1342
+ * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
1343
+ * CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
1344
+ const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
1069
1345
  /**
1070
1346
  * _isBasicCustomElement
1071
1347
  * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
@@ -1075,7 +1351,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1075
1351
  * @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
1076
1352
  */
1077
1353
  const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
1078
- return tagName !== 'annotation-xml' && stringMatch(tagName, CUSTOM_ELEMENT);
1354
+ return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
1079
1355
  };
1080
1356
  /**
1081
1357
  * _sanitizeAttributes
@@ -1090,9 +1366,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1090
1366
  const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
1091
1367
  /* Execute a hook if present */
1092
1368
  _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
1093
- const {
1094
- attributes
1095
- } = currentNode;
1369
+ const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
1096
1370
  /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
1097
1371
  if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
1098
1372
  return;
@@ -1108,11 +1382,9 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1108
1382
  /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
1109
1383
  while (l--) {
1110
1384
  const attr = attributes[l];
1111
- const {
1112
- name,
1113
- namespaceURI,
1114
- value: attrValue
1115
- } = attr;
1385
+ const name = attr.name,
1386
+ namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
1387
+ attrValue = attr.value;
1116
1388
  const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
1117
1389
  const initValue = attrValue;
1118
1390
  let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
@@ -1126,12 +1398,14 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1126
1398
  /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
1127
1399
  * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
1128
1400
  */
1129
- if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name')) {
1401
+ if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
1130
1402
  // Remove the attribute with this value
1131
1403
  _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
1132
1404
  // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
1133
1405
  value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
1134
1406
  }
1407
+ // Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
1408
+ // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
1135
1409
  /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
1136
1410
  if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
1137
1411
  _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
@@ -1158,7 +1432,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1158
1432
  }
1159
1433
  /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
1160
1434
  if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
1161
- arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
1435
+ arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
1162
1436
  value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
1163
1437
  });
1164
1438
  }
@@ -1174,7 +1448,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1174
1448
  switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
1175
1449
  case 'TrustedHTML':
1176
1450
  {
1177
- value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
1451
+ value = _createTrustedHTML(value);
1178
1452
  break;
1179
1453
  }
1180
1454
  case 'TrustedScriptURL':
@@ -1212,7 +1486,7 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1212
1486
  *
1213
1487
  * @param fragment to iterate over recursively
1214
1488
  */
1215
- const _sanitizeShadowDOM = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
1489
+ const _sanitizeShadowDOM2 = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
1216
1490
  let shadowNode = null;
1217
1491
  const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);
1218
1492
  /* Execute a hook if present */
@@ -1224,14 +1498,98 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1224
1498
  _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
1225
1499
  /* Check attributes next */
1226
1500
  _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
1227
- /* Deep shadow DOM detected */
1228
- if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
1229
- _sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content);
1501
+ /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
1502
+ Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
1503
+ DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
1504
+ recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
1505
+ if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
1506
+ _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
1507
+ }
1508
+ /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
1509
+ shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
1510
+ trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
1511
+ previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
1512
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
1513
+ doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
1514
+ above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
1515
+ Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
1516
+ shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
1517
+ iterator also surfaces. */
1518
+ const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
1519
+ if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
1520
+ const innerSr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(shadowNode) : shadowNode.shadowRoot;
1521
+ if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
1522
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(innerSr);
1523
+ _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
1524
+ }
1230
1525
  }
1231
1526
  }
1232
1527
  /* Execute a hook if present */
1233
1528
  _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
1234
1529
  };
1530
+ /**
1531
+ * _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
1532
+ *
1533
+ * Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
1534
+ * the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
1535
+ * does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
1536
+ * shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
1537
+ *
1538
+ * Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
1539
+ * 1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
1540
+ * 2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
1541
+ * shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
1542
+ *
1543
+ * This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
1544
+ * existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
1545
+ * untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
1546
+ *
1547
+ * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
1548
+ */
1549
+ const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2 = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
1550
+ const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(root) : root.nodeType;
1551
+ if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
1552
+ const sr = getShadowRoot ? getShadowRoot(root) : root.shadowRoot;
1553
+ // Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType-based
1554
+ // detection rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is
1555
+ // realm-bound and silently skipped shadow roots whose host element
1556
+ // belonged to a foreign realm (e.g. iframe.contentDocument
1557
+ // attachShadow). A foreign-realm ShadowRoot extends the foreign
1558
+ // realm's DocumentFragment, not ours, so the old instanceof check
1559
+ // returned false and the shadow subtree was never walked.
1560
+ if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
1561
+ // Recurse first so that nested shadow roots are reached even if
1562
+ // _sanitizeShadowDOM removes hosts at this level.
1563
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(sr);
1564
+ _sanitizeShadowDOM2(sr);
1565
+ }
1566
+ }
1567
+ // Snapshot children before recursing. Sanitization of one subtree
1568
+ // (e.g. via an uponSanitizeShadowNode hook) may detach siblings,
1569
+ // and naive nextSibling traversal would silently skip the rest of
1570
+ // the list once a node is detached.
1571
+ const childNodes = getChildNodes ? getChildNodes(root) : root.childNodes;
1572
+ if (!childNodes) {
1573
+ return;
1574
+ }
1575
+ const snapshot = [];
1576
+ arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
1577
+ arrayPush(snapshot, child);
1578
+ });
1579
+ for (const child of snapshot) {
1580
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(child);
1581
+ }
1582
+ /* When the root is a <template>, also descend into root.content */
1583
+ if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
1584
+ const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(root) : null;
1585
+ if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
1586
+ const content = root.content;
1587
+ if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
1588
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(content);
1589
+ }
1590
+ }
1591
+ }
1592
+ };
1235
1593
  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
1236
1594
  DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
1237
1595
  let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
@@ -1248,13 +1606,9 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1248
1606
  }
1249
1607
  /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
1250
1608
  if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
1251
- if (typeof dirty.toString === 'function') {
1252
- dirty = dirty.toString();
1253
- if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
1254
- throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
1255
- }
1256
- } else {
1257
- throw typeErrorCreate('toString is not a function');
1609
+ dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
1610
+ if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
1611
+ throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
1258
1612
  }
1259
1613
  }
1260
1614
  /* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
@@ -1272,14 +1626,35 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1272
1626
  IN_PLACE = false;
1273
1627
  }
1274
1628
  if (IN_PLACE) {
1275
- /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */
1276
- if (dirty.nodeName) {
1277
- const tagName = transformCaseFunc(dirty.nodeName);
1629
+ /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
1630
+ Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
1631
+ child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
1632
+ the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
1633
+ validation entirely. */
1634
+ const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
1635
+ if (typeof nn === 'string') {
1636
+ const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
1278
1637
  if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
1279
1638
  throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
1280
1639
  }
1281
1640
  }
1282
- } else if (dirty instanceof Node) {
1641
+ /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
1642
+ removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
1643
+ falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
1644
+ is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
1645
+ then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
1646
+ because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
1647
+ result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
1648
+ event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
1649
+ the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
1650
+ the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
1651
+ if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
1652
+ throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
1653
+ }
1654
+ /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
1655
+ The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. */
1656
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(dirty);
1657
+ } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
1283
1658
  /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
1284
1659
  elements being stripped by the parser */
1285
1660
  body = _initDocument('<!---->');
@@ -1293,12 +1668,18 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1293
1668
  // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
1294
1669
  body.appendChild(importedNode);
1295
1670
  }
1671
+ /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
1672
+ them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
1673
+ descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
1674
+ cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
1675
+ cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
1676
+ _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots2(importedNode);
1296
1677
  } else {
1297
1678
  /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
1298
1679
  if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
1299
1680
  // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
1300
1681
  dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
1301
- return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
1682
+ return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
1302
1683
  }
1303
1684
  /* Initialize the document to work on */
1304
1685
  body = _initDocument(dirty);
@@ -1319,17 +1700,26 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1319
1700
  _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
1320
1701
  /* Check attributes next */
1321
1702
  _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
1322
- /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
1323
- if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
1324
- _sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content);
1703
+ /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
1704
+ Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
1705
+ instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
1706
+ walked correctly. */
1707
+ if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
1708
+ _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
1325
1709
  }
1326
1710
  }
1327
1711
  /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
1328
1712
  if (IN_PLACE) {
1713
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
1714
+ _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
1715
+ }
1329
1716
  return dirty;
1330
1717
  }
1331
1718
  /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
1332
1719
  if (RETURN_DOM) {
1720
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
1721
+ _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
1722
+ }
1333
1723
  if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
1334
1724
  returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
1335
1725
  while (body.firstChild) {
@@ -1358,11 +1748,11 @@ function createDOMPurify() {
1358
1748
  }
1359
1749
  /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
1360
1750
  if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
1361
- arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
1751
+ arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ERB_EXPR$1, TMPLIT_EXPR$1], expr => {
1362
1752
  serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
1363
1753
  });
1364
1754
  }
1365
- return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
1755
+ return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
1366
1756
  };
1367
1757
  DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
1368
1758
  let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};