@uuaid/pillar 0.2.0-alpha.9 → 2.0.1

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@uuaid/pillar",
-  "version": "0.2.0-alpha.9",
-  "description": "IAASO-3050 reference implementation. Every agent runs its own PDP pillar, discovers peers via a Kademlia DHT, and exchanges cryptographically signed + Noise-encrypted messages over libp2p. One command to install and join the network.",
+  "version": "2.0.1",
+  "description": "Pillar (Protocol for Inter-agent Linked Ledger And Relay) \u2014 the secure delivery layer of UACP, the Universal Agent Communication Protocol. UACP = UUAID (identity) + Envelope (signed, encrypted container) + Pillar (relay, mailbox, routing, store-and-forward). Reference implementation of the UACP delivery layer; includes VDA-1 (IAASO-3901, in ballot) delivery attestation and a blind escrow for the Zilligon ZGN / EVM rails.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/index.mjs",
@@ -10,29 +10,52 @@
     "pillar-carrier": "bin/carrier.mjs",
     "pillar-ask": "bin/pillar-ask.mjs",
     "pillar-responder": "bin/pillar-responder.mjs",
-    "pillar-seed": "bin/pillar-seed.mjs"
+    "pillar-seed": "bin/pillar-seed.mjs",
+    "pillar-directory": "bin/pillar-directory.mjs",
+    "pillar-escrow": "bin/pillar-escrow.mjs",
+    "pillar-blob": "bin/pillar-blob.mjs"
   },
   "exports": {
-    ".": "./src/index.mjs"
+    ".": "./src/index.mjs",
+    "./keychain": "./src/identity/keychain.mjs",
+    "./jcs": "./src/identity/jcs.mjs",
+    "./tier": "./src/identity/tier.mjs",
+    "./envelope": "./src/net/envelope.mjs",
+    "./delegation": "./src/net/delegation.mjs",
+    "./e2e": "./src/crypto/e2e.mjs",
+    "./carrier-client": "./src/net/carrier-client.mjs",
+    "./seed-tier": "./src/net/seed-tier.mjs",
+    "./seed-registry": "./src/net/seed-registry.mjs",
+    "./blob": "./src/blob/blob.mjs",
+    "./blob/http": "./src/blob/http.mjs",
+    "./blob/store": "./src/blob/store.mjs",
+    "./blob/broker": "./src/blob/broker.mjs",
+    "./refusals": "./src/net/refusals.mjs",
+    "./package.json": "./package.json"
   },
   "files": [
     "src",
     "bin",
     "README.md",
     "INTERACTION-CONVENTION.md",
+    "HOSTING-LIMITS.md",
     "LICENSE"
   ],
   "scripts": {
     "test": "node --test --test-reporter spec test/unit/*.test.mjs",
     "test:int": "node --test --test-reporter spec test/integration/*.test.mjs",
     "test:chaos": "node --test --test-reporter spec test/chaos/*.test.mjs",
-    "test:all": "node --test --test-reporter spec test/unit/*.test.mjs test/integration/*.test.mjs test/chaos/*.test.mjs"
+    "test:all": "node --test --test-reporter spec test/unit/*.test.mjs test/integration/*.test.mjs test/chaos/*.test.mjs",
+    "preflight": "node scripts/preflight-publish.mjs",
+    "prepublishOnly": "node scripts/preflight-publish.mjs",
+    "postpublish": "node scripts/verify-publish.mjs"
   },
   "engines": {
-    "node": ">=20"
+    "node": ">=22"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@chainsafe/libp2p-noise": "^17.0.0",
+    "@noble/hashes": "^2.3.0",
     "@chainsafe/libp2p-yamux": "^8.0.1",
     "@libp2p/autonat": "^3.0.26",
     "@libp2p/bootstrap": "^12.0.29",
@@ -48,7 +71,7 @@
     "@libp2p/websockets": "^10.1.19",
     "@multiformats/multiaddr": "^13.0.3",
     "@noble/curves": "^2.3.0",
-    "better-sqlite3": "^11.10.0",
+    "better-sqlite3": "^12.11.1",
     "it-pipe": "^3.0.1",
     "it-pushable": "^3.2.4",
     "libp2p": "^3.3.8",

package/src/blob/blob.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+/**
+ * Blob transport — the oversized-payload path for pillar envelopes.
+ *
+ * Inline envelopes are capped by the carrier tier ladder (community
+ * 512 KiB ... 2 MiB; identity/tier.mjs — those limits are NOT redefined
+ * here) and by ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY as the direct hard cap on ANY send.
+ * Above the direct threshold the payload travels out-of-band instead:
+ *
+ *   1. ENCRYPT locally — a fresh random AES-256-GCM DEK per object and a
+ *      fresh 12-byte nonce.  The GCM AAD binds the ciphertext to the exact
+ *      envelope that will carry its reference:
+ *          jcs({ envelopeId, sender, recipient, object, v, expiry })
+ *      so a ciphertext cannot be transplanted into another envelope, sender,
+ *      recipient, object name, protocol version, or lifetime.
+ *   2. UPLOAD the ciphertext to a blob store (temporary-bucket semantics —
+ *      objects are ephemeral; expiry travels in the ref and is re-checked
+ *      on fetch).
+ *   3. SEND a signed blob-ref inside the normal sealed envelope.  The ref
+ *      carries DEK + content hash + size; its metadata view (what any
+ *      carrier-side log/telemetry may ever see) carries none of those.
+ *      The serialized ref must stay <= 4 KiB.
+ *   4. REDEEM on receipt: recipient checks the ref signature + expiry +
+ *      recipient binding, proves the sender (its UUAID derives from the key
+ *      that signed the ref, or else a registry badge names that key),
+ *      fetches and hash-checks the object, redeems the broker challenge
+ *      (single-use), then decrypts.
+ *
+ * Error contract: every failure throws a typed BlobError subclass with a
+ * stable `.code` — blob-too-large, blob-expired, blob-not-found,
+ * blob-upload-failed, blob-fetch-failed, blob-integrity-failed,
+ * blob-ref-invalid, blob-broker-*, blob-key-unproven, sender-key-not-active.
+ * A broker refusal carries the broker's own `.code` and `.fix` when the
+ * broker sends them (`.legacyCode` keeps the blob-broker-* value). A refusal
+ * that knows its next step has a one-line `.fix`.
+ */
+import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { jcs } from "../identity/jcs.mjs";
+import { Keychain, localIdFromKey } from "../identity/keychain.mjs";
+import { ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY, TIER_DEFAULTS } from "../identity/tier.mjs";
+import { REFUSAL_FIXES } from "../net/refusals.mjs";
+
+export const BLOB_REF_V = 1;
+export const BLOB_KIND = "blob-ref";
+export const MAX_BLOB_REF_BYTES = 4096;              // serialized ref ceiling
+export const MAX_INLINE_BODY_BYTES = ABSOLUTE_MAX_BODY; // 2 MiB direct hard cap
+export const MAX_BLOB_OBJECT_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024; // broker ciphertext cap
+export const MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES = MAX_BLOB_OBJECT_BYTES - 16; // GCM tag rides with ciphertext
+export const DEFAULT_BLOB_TTL_MS = 24 * 3600 * 1000;
+export const DEFAULT_DIRECT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 256_000;
+export const NONCE_BYTES = 12;
+export const DEK_BYTES = 32;
+/** keyId a broker request presents when the identity proves itself by its own key. */
+export const SELF_CERTIFIED_KEY_ID = "self-certified:ed25519";
+/** The one UUAID namespace and object type the broker accepts on the self-certified path. */
+export const SELF_CERTIFIED_NAMESPACE = "foundation";
+export const SELF_CERTIFIED_OBJECT_TYPE = "agent";
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- errors ---
+export class BlobError extends Error {
+  constructor(code, message, { fix = null } = {}) {
+    super(message ?? code); this.name = "BlobError"; this.code = code;
+    if (fix) this.fix = fix;
+  }
+}
+export class BlobSizeError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message, { size, max } = {}) { super("blob-too-large", message); this.size = size; this.max = max; }
+}
+export class BlobExpiryError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message, expiry) { super("blob-expired", message); this.expiry = expiry; }
+}
+export class BlobNotFoundError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(object) { super("blob-not-found", `blob object not found: ${object}`); this.object = object; }
+}
+export class BlobUploadError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message, cause = null) { super("blob-upload-failed", message); this.cause = cause; }
+}
+export class BlobFetchError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message, cause = null) { super("blob-fetch-failed", message); this.cause = cause; }
+}
+export class BlobIntegrityError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message) { super("blob-integrity-failed", message); }
+}
+export class BlobRefError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message) { super("blob-ref-invalid", message); }
+}
+/**
+ * `code` is the broker's own code when it sent one; `legacyCode` is the
+ * status-derived blob-broker-* code this client has always used (set on HTTP
+ * refusals); `body` is the refusal body, numbers included.
+ */
+export class BlobBrokerError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(code, message, status = null, { fix = null, legacyCode = null, body = null } = {}) {
+    super(code, message, { fix });
+    this.status = status;
+    if (legacyCode) this.legacyCode = legacyCode;
+    if (body) this.body = body;
+  }
+}
+export class BlobSenderKeyError extends BlobError {
+  constructor(message, sender, status) {
+    super("sender-key-not-active", message, { fix: REFUSAL_FIXES["sender-key-not-active"] });
+    this.sender = sender; this.status = status;
+  }
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- crypto -----
+const HEX = { dek: 64, nonce: 24, hash: 64 }; // expected hex lengths
+
+/**
+ * Deterministic AAD: binds one ciphertext to exactly one envelope context.
+ * Every field is mandatory — a missing binding is a refusal, not a default.
+ */
+export function blobAad({ envelopeId, sender, recipient, object, v, expiry }) {
+  for (const [k, val] of Object.entries({ envelopeId, sender, recipient, object, expiry })) {
+    if (typeof val !== "string" || !val) throw new BlobRefError(`blob AAD: field "${k}" required`);
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(v)) throw new BlobRefError("blob AAD: field \"v\" required");
+  return jcs({ envelopeId, sender, recipient, object, v, expiry });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encrypt plaintext under a fresh per-object AES-256-GCM DEK.
+ * Returns Buffers { dek (32 B), nonce (12 B), ct, tag (16 B) }.
+ */
+export function encryptBlob(plaintext, ctx, { nonce = null } = {}) {
+  const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) ? plaintext : Buffer.from(plaintext);
+  const aad = blobAad(ctx);
+  const dek = randomBytes(DEK_BYTES);
+  const nv = nonce ?? randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
+  if (nv.length !== NONCE_BYTES) throw new BlobRefError(`blob nonce must be ${NONCE_BYTES} bytes`);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", dek, nv);
+  cipher.setAAD(Buffer.from(aad, "utf-8"));
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(buf), cipher.final()]);
+  return { dek, nonce: nv, ct, tag: cipher.getAuthTag() };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decrypt; throws BlobIntegrityError on ANY AAD/key/tag mismatch.
+ * `secret` fields may be Buffers or hex strings.
+ */
+export function decryptBlob({ dek, nonce, ct, tag = null }, ctx) {
+  const aad = blobAad(ctx);
+  try {
+    const stored = Buffer.from(ct, "hex");
+    const ciphertext = tag == null ? stored.subarray(0, stored.length - 16) : stored;
+    const authTag = tag == null ? stored.subarray(stored.length - 16) : Buffer.from(tag, "hex");
+    if (authTag.length !== 16) throw new Error("ciphertext is missing the GCM tag");
+    const d = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", Buffer.from(dek, "hex"), Buffer.from(nonce, "hex"));
+    d.setAAD(Buffer.from(aad, "utf-8"));
+    d.setAuthTag(authTag);
+    return Buffer.concat([d.update(ciphertext), d.final()]);
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new BlobIntegrityError(`blob integrity check failed: ${e.message}`);
+  }
+}
+
+export function contentHash(buf) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(buf).digest("hex");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unguessable upload token for a blob object.  Deliberately NOT content-
+ * addressed: the AAD must bind the object name before the ciphertext exists
+ * (no derivation cycle), and a content digest in the store key would leak a
+ * guessable plaintext's fingerprint to the store operator.
+ */
+export function mkObjectName() {
+  return randomBytes(32).toString("hex");
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------ self-certified ---
+/**
+ * The one UUAID a key self-certifies, rebuilt in full:
+ * `uuaid:foundation:agent:` + sha256(publicKey)[:16] as a UUID (localIdFromKey,
+ * the twin of pillar-client's localIdFromPublicKey). Null for a malformed key.
+ */
+export function selfCertifiedUuaidFor(publicKeyHex) {
+  if (typeof publicKeyHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(publicKeyHex)) return null;
+  const localId = localIdFromKey(Buffer.from(publicKeyHex, "hex"));
+  return `uuaid:${SELF_CERTIFIED_NAMESPACE}:${SELF_CERTIFIED_OBJECT_TYPE}:${localId}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * True only when `uuaid` is EXACTLY the UUAID the key self-certifies (full
+ * string, namespace and object type included, the broker's rule); such an
+ * identity uses the broker without a registry badge. A device, a service,
+ * another namespace, or a matching local id under any other prefix is not
+ * self-certified: it needs a registry badge naming its key.
+ */
+export function isSelfCertifiedUuaid(uuaid, publicKeyHex) {
+  const expected = selfCertifiedUuaidFor(publicKeyHex);
+  return expected !== null && uuaid === expected;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Recipient sender gate, self-certified half: the ref's signature verifies
+ * under `ref.sig.publicKey`, and `ref.sender` derives from that same key.
+ * The sender field is inside the signed bytes, so the key that proves the
+ * UUAID is the key whose signature was checked. Checked here rather than
+ * trusted from an earlier validateBlobRef, so the gate stands on its own.
+ */
+export function senderSelfCertified(ref) {
+  return verifyBlobRefSig(ref) && isSelfCertifiedUuaid(ref?.sender, ref?.sig?.publicKey);
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------ refs ---
+function refSignable(ref) {
+  const { sig, ...rest } = ref;
+  return jcs(rest);
+}
+
+/** Sign a blob-ref body with the loaded keychain (sender identity). */
+export function signBlobRef(keychain, ref) {
+  if (!keychain?._identity) throw new Error("signBlobRef: keychain not loaded");
+  ref.sig = {
+    alg: "ed25519",
+    publicKey: keychain._identity.publicKeyHex,
+    signature: keychain.sign(Buffer.from(refSignable(ref), "utf-8")).toString("hex"),
+  };
+  return ref;
+}
+
+export function verifyBlobRefSig(ref) {
+  const sig = ref?.sig;
+  if (!sig || sig.alg !== "ed25519") return false;
+  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(sig.publicKey ?? "") || !/^[0-9a-f]{128}$/i.test(sig.signature ?? "")) return false;
+  try {
+    return Keychain.verifyDetached(sig.publicKey, Buffer.from(refSignable(ref), "utf-8"), Buffer.from(sig.signature, "hex"));
+  } catch (_e) { return false; }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Metadata view of a ref — safe for carrier-side logs/telemetry.
+ * Deliberately drops DEK, nonce, object id, hash and signature. This view is
+ * safe for counters only; the opaque capability never enters logs/telemetry.
+ */
+export function blobRefMetadata(ref) {
+  return {
+    v: ref.v,
+    kind: ref.kind,
+    size: ref.size,
+    plaintextSize: ref.plaintextSize,
+    expiry: ref.expiry,
+    createdAt: ref.createdAt,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Secret material of a ref — what only the sealed envelope may carry. */
+export function blobRefSecret(ref) {
+  return { dek: ref.dek, nonce: ref.nonce };
+}
+
+export function refSerializedBytes(ref) {
+  return Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(ref), "utf-8");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build + encrypt + sign a blob-ref for one plaintext payload.
+ * Returns { ref, metadata, ct, ctx }.  Ref is rejected if it would
+ * serialize above MAX_BLOB_REF_BYTES.
+ */
+export function makeBlobRef(keychain, { envelopeId, recipient, plaintext, ttlMs = DEFAULT_BLOB_TTL_MS, now = Date.now(), challengeId = null, objectId = null, broker = null }) {
+  const sender = keychain._identity?.uuaid;
+  if (!sender) throw new Error("makeBlobRef: keychain not loaded");
+  const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) ? plaintext : Buffer.from(plaintext);
+  const object = objectId ?? mkObjectName();
+  const expiry = new Date(now + ttlMs).toISOString();
+  const ctx = { envelopeId, sender, recipient, object, v: BLOB_REF_V, expiry };
+  const { dek, nonce, ct, tag } = encryptBlob(buf, ctx);
+  const stored = Buffer.concat([ct, tag]);
+  // Hash covers every STORED byte, including the GCM tag — checkable before decrypt.
+  const hash = contentHash(stored);
+  const ref = {
+    v: BLOB_REF_V,
+    kind: BLOB_KIND,
+    envelopeId,
+    sender,
+    recipient,
+    object,
+    hash,
+    size: stored.length,
+    plaintextSize: buf.length,
+    dek: dek.toString("hex"),
+    nonce: nonce.toString("hex"),
+    ...(broker ? { broker } : {}),
+    expiry,
+    createdAt: new Date(now).toISOString(),
+    ...(challengeId ? { challengeId } : {}),
+  };
+  signBlobRef(keychain, ref);
+  const bytes = refSerializedBytes(ref);
+  if (bytes > MAX_BLOB_REF_BYTES) {
+    throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref serializes to ${bytes}B > ${MAX_BLOB_REF_BYTES}B ceiling`);
+  }
+  return { ref, metadata: blobRefMetadata(ref), ct: stored, ctx };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Structural + temporal validation of a received ref.  Throws typed errors.
+ * `recipient` (when given) must match ref.recipient; `now` injectable for
+ * tests.
+ */
+export function validateBlobRef(ref, { recipient = null, now = Date.now() } = {}) {
+  if (!ref || typeof ref !== "object") throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref: not an object");
+  if (ref.v !== BLOB_REF_V) throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: unsupported v ${ref.v}`);
+  if (ref.kind !== BLOB_KIND) throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: unexpected kind ${ref.kind}`);
+  for (const [k, len] of Object.entries(HEX)) {
+    if (typeof ref[k] !== "string" || !new RegExp(`^[0-9a-f]{${len}}$`, "i").test(ref[k])) {
+      throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: bad ${k}`);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const k of ["envelopeId", "sender", "recipient", "object"]) {
+    if (typeof ref[k] !== "string" || !ref[k]) throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: missing ${k}`);
+  }
+  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(ref.object)) throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref: object must be a 256-bit opaque id");
+  if (ref.broker !== undefined) {
+    let broker;
+    try { broker = new URL(ref.broker); } catch (_error) { throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref: invalid broker URL"); }
+    if (broker.protocol !== "https:" && broker.hostname !== "127.0.0.1" && broker.hostname !== "localhost") {
+      throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref: broker must use HTTPS");
+    }
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(ref.size) || ref.size <= 16 || ref.size > MAX_BLOB_OBJECT_BYTES) {
+    throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: bad size ${ref.size}`);
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(ref.plaintextSize) || ref.plaintextSize <= 0 || ref.plaintextSize !== ref.size - 16) {
+    throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: bad plaintextSize ${ref.plaintextSize}`);
+  }
+  const exp = Date.parse(ref.expiry);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(exp)) throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref: bad expiry");
+  if (exp < now) throw new BlobExpiryError(`blob-ref expired at ${ref.expiry}`, ref.expiry);
+  if (!verifyBlobRefSig(ref)) throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref: signature invalid");
+  if (recipient && ref.recipient !== recipient) {
+    throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref: addressed to ${ref.recipient}, not ${recipient}`);
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------- size decisions ----
+export function envelopeBodyBytes(envelope) {
+  return Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(envelope), "utf-8");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Exact preflight against the carrier limits — tier inline limit first,
+ * then the 2 MiB direct hard cap, which no tier grant can raise.
+ * Returns { ok, bytes, limit, source: "ok"|"tier"|"direct-cap" }.
+ */
+export function preflightBodyBytes(bodyBytes, { tier = "community", maxBodyBytes = null } = {}) {
+  const tierLimit = maxBodyBytes ?? (TIER_DEFAULTS[tier]?.maxBodyBytes ?? TIER_DEFAULTS.community.maxBodyBytes);
+  const bytes = Number.isInteger(bodyBytes) ? bodyBytes : -1;
+  if (bytes > MAX_INLINE_BODY_BYTES) return { ok: false, bytes, limit: MAX_INLINE_BODY_BYTES, source: "direct-cap" };
+  if (bytes > tierLimit) return { ok: false, bytes, limit: tierLimit, source: "tier" };
+  return { ok: true, bytes, limit: Math.min(tierLimit, MAX_INLINE_BODY_BYTES), source: "ok" };
+}
+
+/** Inline-vs-blob decision for a payload of `dataBytes` plaintext. */
+export function chooseTransport(dataBytes, { directThresholdBytes = DEFAULT_DIRECT_THRESHOLD_BYTES } = {}) {
+  return dataBytes <= directThresholdBytes ? "inline" : "blob";
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------- flows -------
+/**
+ * SEND side (client half).  Order is deliberate:
+ *   broker.reserve -> encrypt+sign ref -> store.put -> broker.finalize
+ * An upload failure surfaces as BlobUploadError BEFORE finalize, so a
+ * challenge is never finalized for an object that did not land.
+ */
+export async function prepareBlobSend(keychain, { data, envelopeId, recipient, ttlMs = DEFAULT_BLOB_TTL_MS, now = Date.now(), store, broker = null }) {
+  const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Buffer.from(data);
+  if (buf.length > MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES) {
+    throw new BlobSizeError(`blob payload ${buf.length}B exceeds the ${MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES}B plaintext cap`, { size: buf.length, max: MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES });
+  }
+  if (!store) throw new BlobError("no-store", "prepareBlobSend: a blob store is required");
+  let challengeId = null;
+  if (broker) {
+    const reserved = await broker.reserve({ sender: keychain._identity.uuaid, recipient, size: buf.length + 16 });
+    challengeId = reserved.challengeId;
+  }
+  const { ref, metadata, ct, ctx } = makeBlobRef(keychain, { envelopeId, recipient, plaintext: buf, ttlMs, now, challengeId });
+  try {
+    await store.put(ref.object, ct);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof BlobError) throw e;
+    throw new BlobUploadError(`blob upload failed for ${ref.object}: ${e.message}`, e);
+  }
+  if (broker) await broker.finalize({ challengeId, object: ref.object, hash: ref.hash, size: ref.size });
+  return { ref, metadata, ctx, size: buf.length, hash: ref.hash, object: ref.object };
+}
+
+/**
+ * RECEIVE side.  Gate order: ref validation (sig/expiry/recipient) ->
+ * sender key gate -> fetch -> content-hash check -> broker redemption
+ * (single-use, only after every prior gate passed) -> decrypt -> size check.
+ *
+ * `senderKeyCheck(uuaid, pubkeyHex) => status` is the registry check for a
+ * sender whose UUAID does NOT derive from the key that signed the ref. A
+ * derived sender is proven by the verified ref signature alone (the same
+ * rule its envelope was accepted on), so the check is not consulted for it.
+ */
+export async function fetchAndDecryptBlob({ ref, store, envelopeId, now = Date.now(), broker = null, senderKeyCheck = null }) {
+  validateBlobRef(ref, { recipient: null, now });
+  if (typeof ref.envelopeId === "string" && envelopeId && ref.envelopeId !== envelopeId) {
+    throw new BlobRefError(`blob-ref bound to envelope ${ref.envelopeId}, received in ${envelopeId}`);
+  }
+  // Sender key gate — BEFORE any redemption burns. Only a non-derived sender
+  // needs the registry to vouch for its key.
+  const selfCertified = senderSelfCertified(ref);
+  if (senderKeyCheck && !selfCertified) {
+    const status = await senderKeyCheck(ref.sender, ref.sig?.publicKey);
+    if (status !== "active") {
+      throw new BlobSenderKeyError(`sender key for ${ref.sender} is ${status ?? "unknown"}, not active — refusing redemption`, ref.sender, status);
+    }
+  }
+  let ct;
+  try {
+    ct = await store.get(ref.object);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e instanceof BlobError) throw e;
+    throw new BlobFetchError(`blob fetch failed for ${ref.object}: ${e.message}`, e);
+  }
+  if (ct == null) throw new BlobNotFoundError(ref.object);
+  if (contentHash(ct) !== ref.hash) {
+    throw new BlobIntegrityError(`blob content hash mismatch for ${ref.object}`);
+  }
+  if (broker && ref.challengeId) await broker.redeem({ challengeId: ref.challengeId });
+  const data = decryptBlob({ ...blobRefSecret(ref), ct: Buffer.from(ct).toString("hex") }, {
+    envelopeId: ref.envelopeId, sender: ref.sender, recipient: ref.recipient,
+    object: ref.object, v: ref.v, expiry: ref.expiry,
+  });
+  if (data.length !== ref.plaintextSize) {
+    throw new BlobIntegrityError(`blob size mismatch: decrypted ${data.length}B, ref says ${ref.plaintextSize}B`);
+  }
+  return {
+    data, object: ref.object, hash: ref.hash, size: ref.size,
+    sender: ref.sender, senderProof: selfCertified ? "self-certified" : senderKeyCheck ? "sender-key-check" : "unchecked",
+  };
+}
+
+/** Production send path through the recipient-authenticated UUAID HTTP broker. */
+export async function prepareBrokerBlobSend(keychain, { data, envelopeId, recipient, ttlMs = DEFAULT_BLOB_TTL_MS, now = Date.now(), client }) {
+  if (!client) throw new BlobError("no-broker-client", "prepareBrokerBlobSend: broker client required");
+  const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Buffer.from(data);
+  if (buf.length > MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES) {
+    throw new BlobSizeError(`blob payload ${buf.length}B exceeds the ${MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES}B plaintext cap`, { size: buf.length, max: MAX_BLOB_PLAINTEXT_BYTES });
+  }
+  const challenge = await client.challenge("reserve");
+  const prepared = makeBlobRef(keychain, {
+    envelopeId,
+    recipient,
+    plaintext: buf,
+    ttlMs,
+    now,
+    objectId: challenge.object_id,
+    broker: client.baseUrl,
+  });
+  const reserved = await client.reserve(challenge, {
+    recipient,
+    ciphertextSha256: prepared.ref.hash,
+    ciphertextBytes: prepared.ref.size,
+    expiresAt: prepared.ref.expiry,
+  });
+  if (reserved.object_id !== prepared.ref.object || reserved.expires_at !== prepared.ref.expiry) {
+    throw new BlobIntegrityError("broker reservation does not match the prepared blob-ref");
+  }
+  await client.upload(reserved.upload, prepared.ct);
+  const finalized = await client.finalize(prepared.ref.object);
+  client.crossCheckRedemption(prepared.ref, finalized.blob_ref);
+  return { ...prepared, size: buf.length, hash: prepared.ref.hash, object: prepared.ref.object };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Production receive path; the sender key gate precedes broker redemption.
+ * A sender whose UUAID is exactly the uuaid:foundation:agent UUAID of the
+ * ref's verified signing key passes without a badge; any other sender needs
+ * a fresh registry badge naming that key (client.assertRegistryActiveSender).
+ *
+ * The result names the sender and how it was proven (`senderProof`):
+ * "self-certified" means the key holder is proven but the identity is
+ * UNVERIFIED (no registry name or badge applies; show the UUAID only);
+ * "registry-badge" means a fresh registry badge names the signing key.
+ */
+export async function fetchBrokerBlob({ ref, envelopeId, recipient, now = Date.now(), client }) {
+  if (!client) throw new BlobError("no-broker-client", "fetchBrokerBlob: broker client required");
+  validateBlobRef(ref, { recipient, now });
+  if (ref.envelopeId !== envelopeId) throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref envelope binding mismatch");
+  if (ref.broker !== client.baseUrl) throw new BlobRefError("blob-ref broker binding mismatch");
+  const selfCertified = senderSelfCertified(ref);
+  if (!selfCertified) await client.assertRegistryActiveSender(ref.sender, ref.sig?.publicKey);
+  const redeemed = await client.redeem(ref.object);
+  client.crossCheckRedemption(ref, redeemed.blob);
+  const stored = await client.download(redeemed.download);
+  if (stored.length !== ref.size) throw new BlobIntegrityError(`blob ciphertext size mismatch: ${stored.length}B != ${ref.size}B`);
+  if (contentHash(stored) !== ref.hash) throw new BlobIntegrityError("blob ciphertext hash mismatch");
+  const data = decryptBlob({ ...blobRefSecret(ref), ct: stored.toString("hex") }, {
+    envelopeId: ref.envelopeId,
+    sender: ref.sender,
+    recipient: ref.recipient,
+    object: ref.object,
+    v: ref.v,
+    expiry: ref.expiry,
+  });
+  if (data.length !== ref.plaintextSize) {
+    throw new BlobIntegrityError(`blob plaintext size mismatch: ${data.length}B != ${ref.plaintextSize}B`);
+  }
+  return {
+    data, object: ref.object, hash: ref.hash, size: ref.plaintextSize,
+    sender: ref.sender, senderProof: selfCertified ? "self-certified" : "registry-badge",
+  };
+}