@usesigil/kit 0.15.0 → 0.17.0

package/dist/policy/compute-policy-preview-digest.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/**
+ * TA-19 — Canonical policy preview digest (SDK side).
+ *
+ * Mirrors `programs/sigil/src/utils/policy_digest.rs` exactly. The SDK computes
+ * this off-chain, the owner signs `queue_policy_update` / `initialize_vault`
+ * with the digest as an arg, and the on-chain handler recomputes it from the
+ * resulting policy state. If the two digests do not match the handler rejects
+ * with `PolicyPreviewMismatch` (6080).
+ *
+ * Defense rationale:
+ *   - Sequence: SDK builds policy fields → SDK computes digest → owner signs
+ *     the transaction (digest is in the instruction data, signed alongside).
+ *   - On-chain handler reads the policy fields from the args, re-computes the
+ *     same digest, and asserts equality.
+ *   - The only ways the two digests can diverge are: (a) an owner blind-signed
+ *     mutated fields that the SDK never told them about; (b) a rogue program
+ *     tampered with the pending PDA between queue and apply (a future
+ *     discriminator-collision attack). Both cases reject — the owner sees a
+ *     mismatch error rather than silently committing.
+ *
+ * CANONICAL ENCODING (FIXED — DO NOT REORDER):
+ *   1. daily_spending_cap_usd: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   2. max_transaction_size_usd: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   3. max_slippage_bps: u16 LE (2 bytes)
+ *   4. developer_fee_rate: u16 LE (2 bytes) — PEN-CROSS-6 (Phase 2 close-up)
+ *   5. protocol_mode: u8 (1 byte)
+ *   6. protocols: Vec<Pubkey> = u32 LE length (4 bytes) ++ each Pubkey 32 bytes
+ *   7. destination_mode: u8 (1 byte)
+ *   8. allowed_destinations: Vec<Pubkey> = u32 LE length (4 bytes) ++ each Pubkey 32 bytes
+ *   9. timelock_duration: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   10. session_expiry_seconds: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   11. observe_only: bool as 1 byte (0 or 1)
+ *   12. has_constraints: bool as 1 byte (0 or 1)
+ *   13. has_post_assertions: u8 (1 byte)
+ *   14. created_at_slot: u64 LE (8 bytes) — PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up)
+ *   15. operating_hours: u32 LE (4 bytes) — TA-05 (Phase 3 pre-exec)
+ *   16. auto_promote_grays: bool as 1 byte (0/1) — TA-07 (Phase 3 pre-exec)
+ *   17. auto_revoke_threshold: u8 (1 byte) — TA-17 (Phase 3 pre-exec)
+ *   18. stable_balance_floor: u64 LE (8 bytes) — TA-12 (Phase 5 post-exec)
+ *   19. per_recipient_daily_cap_usd: u64 LE (8 bytes) — TA-14 (Phase 5 post-exec)
+ *   20. cosign_required: bool (1 byte 0/1) — G6 (audit 2026-05-18 cosign opt-in)
+ *   21. agent_set_hash: [u8; 32] — Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 (audit 2026-05-19)
+ *   22. cosign_session_pubkey: Pubkey (32 bytes) — D-5 (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1)
+ *
+ * Phase 3 append-only additions (TA-05/07/17): operating_hours,
+ * auto_promote_grays, auto_revoke_threshold are appended at positions 15-17
+ * to preserve the 14-field prefix (F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule).
+ *
+ * Phase 5 append-only additions (TA-12/TA-14): stable_balance_floor at
+ * position 18, per_recipient_daily_cap_usd at position 19. Both bound by
+ * TA-19 so silent SDK / pending-PDA mutations can't bypass the owner's
+ * signed digest.
+ *
+ * G6 append-only addition (audit 2026-05-18 cosign opt-in): cosign_required
+ * at position 20 (1 byte, 0/1). Owner's choice to opt into TA-09 cosign
+ * enforcement is part of the signed policy — a compromised SDK cannot
+ * silently disable cosign between owner approval and on-chain landing.
+ * Disabling cosign on a live policy where this is true is itself an
+ * elevated mutation per `queue_policy_update` (one-way ratchet).
+ *
+ * Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 append-only addition (Council ISC-66/A8/A9): the
+ * `agent_set_hash` at position 21 binds the EXISTING agent set into the
+ * signed digest. SHA-256 over Borsh of `Vec<(Pubkey, u8 capability)>`
+ * sorted by pubkey ascending. Closes the silent-insertion vector where
+ * a phished-owner `register_agent(capability=OPERATOR)` would otherwise
+ * grant operator-class without diverging the digest from the last value
+ * the owner signed. Empty Vec produces a deterministic 32-byte hash
+ * (`EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH` — SHA-256 of [0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00]).
+ *
+ * D-5 append-only addition (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1): the
+ * `cosign_session_pubkey` at position 22 binds the owner's chosen
+ * reactivate-time cosigner pubkey into the signed digest. The
+ * `reactivate_vault` handler reads this pubkey at runtime and requires
+ * a matching `is_signer == true` entry in `remaining_accounts` whenever
+ * the operation grafts a new agent at `FULL_CAPABILITY`. A tampered SDK
+ * cannot silently flip the gate between owner approval and on-chain
+ * landing — the digest mismatch closes that gap. Default
+ * `Pubkey::default()` (32 zero bytes) means the gate is OFF; owners
+ * opt in via `queue_policy_update`.
+ *
+ * The `destination_graylist: Vec<(Pubkey, i64)>` is intentionally NOT in
+ * the digest. Graylist entries are derived/ephemeral — they auto-populate
+ * when the owner adds a destination via queue_policy_update, and they
+ * only delay an already-signed allowlist entry. Promoting via
+ * promote_graylist_destination only accelerates the existing unlock — it
+ * cannot widen the allowlist. The owner-signed digest already binds the
+ * destination allowlist (position 8).
+ *
+ * Total bounded by MAX_ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS=10 + MAX_ALLOWED_DESTINATIONS=10 at
+ * 32 bytes each + fixed scalars ≈ 700 bytes worst case.
+ */
+import type { Address } from "../kit-adapter.js";
+import { digestsEqual as canonicalDigestsEqual } from "../canonical-encode.js";
+/**
+ * Canonical preview-fields shape. Matches the on-chain `PolicyPreviewFields`
+ * struct in `programs/sigil/src/utils/policy_digest.rs` exactly.
+ */
+export interface PolicyPreviewFields {
+    /** $ × 1e6 (USDC/USDT decimals). e.g. $500 = 500_000_000n. */
+    dailySpendingCapUsd: bigint;
+    /** $ × 1e6. */
+    maxTransactionSizeUsd: bigint;
+    /** Basis points (0-5000). */
+    maxSlippageBps: number;
+    /**
+     * Developer fee rate (rate / 1,000,000). Bound by the owner-signed digest
+     * since PEN-CROSS-6 (Phase 2 close-up). 0..=MAX_DEVELOPER_FEE_RATE (500).
+     */
+    developerFeeRate: number;
+    /** 1 = ALLOWLIST (Phase 2 Option A). Other values rejected on-chain. */
+    protocolMode: number;
+    /** Up to MAX_ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS (10) base58-encoded program IDs. */
+    protocols: readonly (Address | string)[];
+    /** 0 = RESTRICTED (Phase 2 Option A). Other values rejected on-chain. */
+    destinationMode: number;
+    /** Up to MAX_ALLOWED_DESTINATIONS (10) base58-encoded wallet pubkeys. */
+    allowedDestinations: readonly (Address | string)[];
+    /** Timelock duration in seconds (>= MIN_TIMELOCK_DURATION=1800). */
+    timelockDuration: bigint;
+    /** Owner-configurable session expiry (0 = use default 30s). */
+    sessionExpirySeconds: bigint;
+    /** TA-19: observe-only kill switch (rejects all validate_and_authorize). */
+    observeOnly: boolean;
+    /** Whether post-execution assertions are configured (0 = no, non-zero = yes). */
+    hasPostAssertions: number;
+    /**
+     * PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up): the slot at which `initialize_vault`
+     * minted the live policy. Bound by TA-19 at position 14. Closes the
+     * close+reinit replay window.
+     */
+    createdAtSlot: bigint;
+    /**
+     * TA-05 (Phase 3): 24-bit UTC operating-hours bitmask. Bit `n` (0..=23)
+     * set → the vault permits spending at UTC hour `n`. Default 0 when
+     * omitted by legacy callers (preserves existing test fixtures). Production
+     * SDK consumers should pass 0xFFFFFF (all 24h enabled) explicitly.
+     * Upper 8 bits MUST be zero — on-chain handler rejects with
+     * `ErrOutsideOperatingHours` (6084) if violated. Bound at position 15
+     * of the canonical encoding.
+     */
+    operatingHours?: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-07 (Phase 3): owner-side toggle to bypass the 24h graylist friction
+     * for newly-added destinations. Default false (friction enforced).
+     * Bound by TA-19 at canonical position 16 so silent flips can't change
+     * the friction model.
+     */
+    autoPromoteGrays?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * TA-17 (Phase 3): consecutive-failure threshold for agent auto-revoke.
+     * Range 3..=20. Default 0 (legacy callers — but on-chain handler now
+     * requires this to be in [3, 20] at policy-write time). Bound at
+     * canonical position 17.
+     */
+    autoRevokeThreshold?: number;
+    /**
+     * TA-12 (Phase 5 post-exec): owner-chosen hard reserve on combined
+     * USDC+USDT vault balance, asserted at every `finalize_session`
+     * spending path completion. 6-decimal USDC face value (e.g.
+     * `$100 = 100_000_000n`). Default 0 (no reserve — preserves existing
+     * vault behavior). Bound at canonical position 18.
+     */
+    stableBalanceFloor?: bigint;
+    /**
+     * TA-14 (Phase 5 post-exec): owner-chosen rolling 24h per-recipient
+     * outflow cap. 6-decimal USDC face value. Default 0 (no per-recipient
+     * cap — preserves existing vault behavior). Bound at canonical
+     * position 19.
+     */
+    perRecipientDailyCapUsd?: bigint;
+    /**
+     * G6 (audit 2026-05-18 cosign opt-in): owner-chosen opt-in to TA-09
+     * cosign enforcement on elevated mutations. Default false (low-friction
+     * — preserves existing vault behavior; owner-signature-only flow on
+     * elevated mutations). When true, the `queue_policy_update` handler's
+     * 7-trigger elevation gate (raises caps, expands allowlists, weakens
+     * floor / per-recipient / protocol caps) requires a cosign session.
+     * Disabling cosign on a live policy where this is true is itself an
+     * elevated mutation (one-way ratchet). Bound at canonical position 20.
+     */
+    cosignRequired?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 (Council ISC-66/A8/A9): SHA-256 over Borsh of
+     * `Vec<(pubkey, u8 capability)>` sorted by pubkey ascending. Pass the
+     * result of `computeAgentSetHash(...)` over the live vault's agent set
+     * (use empty array for a freshly-initialized vault). Empty vault produces
+     * the deterministic `EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH` value. Bound at canonical
+     * position 21. Optional with default `EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH` so legacy
+     * fixtures (no agents) continue to compute the canonical digest.
+     */
+    agentSetHash?: Uint8Array;
+    /**
+     * D-5 (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1): the owner-chosen reactivate-time
+     * cosigner pubkey. Default `Pubkey::default()` (zero pubkey, encoded
+     * as 32 zero bytes) when omitted, matching the on-chain init state
+     * where the gate is disabled. Owners opt in by passing a non-default
+     * pubkey via `queue_policy_update` (the SDK helper here mirrors that
+     * value into the digest). Bound at canonical position 22.
+     *
+     * Type: base58 string (e.g. an Address) OR a 32-byte raw Uint8Array.
+     * The encoder accepts both shapes for parity with the protocols /
+     * allowedDestinations fields.
+     */
+    cosignSessionPubkey?: Address | string | Uint8Array;
+    /**
+     * F-Q6 (2026-06-02): owner-configured delay (in seconds) before an OPERATOR
+     * capability grant takes effect. Default 0n when omitted (matching the
+     * on-chain init default). An owner-set security control gating OPERATOR
+     * seating — bound by TA-19 at canonical position 22 so a tampered SDK or
+     * pending-PDA mutation cannot silently lower it between owner approval and
+     * on-chain landing. Owners change it only via the timelocked
+     * `queue_policy_update` path.
+     */
+    operatorGrantDelaySeconds?: bigint;
+}
+/** Mirrors `policy_digest.rs::POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT`.
+ *  M1-04: was 22; has_constraints removed (digest-version bump).
+ *  F-Q6 (2026-06-02): 21 → 22, binds operator_grant_delay_seconds. */
+export declare const POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT = 22;
+/**
+ * Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 (Council ISC-141): SHA-256 of the Borsh-encoded
+ * empty `Vec<(Pubkey, u8)>` — i.e. SHA-256 of [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00].
+ * Deterministic; pinned across Rust (`policy_digest.rs::EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH`)
+ * and TypeScript (this constant). Used by `computePolicyPreviewDigest`
+ * when the caller omits `agentSetHash` (legacy fixture path).
+ */
+export declare const EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH: Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical `agent_set_hash` from a list of agents. SHA-256
+ * over Borsh of `Vec<(Pubkey, u8 capability)>` sorted by pubkey ascending.
+ * Mirrors `policy_digest.rs::compute_agent_set_hash` byte-for-byte.
+ *
+ * Pass the result into `computePolicyPreviewDigest({ ...fields, agentSetHash })`.
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to 32 bytes
+ */
+export declare function computeAgentSetHash(agents: ReadonlyArray<{
+    pubkey: Address | string;
+    capability: number;
+}>): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical SHA-256 of the policy preview fields.
+ *
+ * Returns a 32-byte Uint8Array. Identical to the on-chain helper
+ * `compute_policy_preview_digest` for the same input.
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to exactly 32 bytes
+ * @throws if a u64 is negative or out of range
+ */
+export declare function computePolicyPreviewDigest(fields: PolicyPreviewFields): Uint8Array;
+/**
+ * Equivalent of `Buffer.equals` for two `Uint8Array` digests. Re-exported
+ * from `../canonical-encode.ts` (constant-time XOR-accumulate; no early
+ * exit) so callers that previously imported it from this module continue
+ * to work after Batch C.
+ */
+export declare const digestsEqual: typeof canonicalDigestsEqual;
+//# sourceMappingURL=compute-policy-preview-digest.d.ts.map

package/dist/policy/compute-policy-preview-digest.d.ts.map

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package/dist/policy/compute-policy-preview-digest.js

@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/**
+ * TA-19 — Canonical policy preview digest (SDK side).
+ *
+ * Mirrors `programs/sigil/src/utils/policy_digest.rs` exactly. The SDK computes
+ * this off-chain, the owner signs `queue_policy_update` / `initialize_vault`
+ * with the digest as an arg, and the on-chain handler recomputes it from the
+ * resulting policy state. If the two digests do not match the handler rejects
+ * with `PolicyPreviewMismatch` (6080).
+ *
+ * Defense rationale:
+ *   - Sequence: SDK builds policy fields → SDK computes digest → owner signs
+ *     the transaction (digest is in the instruction data, signed alongside).
+ *   - On-chain handler reads the policy fields from the args, re-computes the
+ *     same digest, and asserts equality.
+ *   - The only ways the two digests can diverge are: (a) an owner blind-signed
+ *     mutated fields that the SDK never told them about; (b) a rogue program
+ *     tampered with the pending PDA between queue and apply (a future
+ *     discriminator-collision attack). Both cases reject — the owner sees a
+ *     mismatch error rather than silently committing.
+ *
+ * CANONICAL ENCODING (FIXED — DO NOT REORDER):
+ *   1. daily_spending_cap_usd: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   2. max_transaction_size_usd: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   3. max_slippage_bps: u16 LE (2 bytes)
+ *   4. developer_fee_rate: u16 LE (2 bytes) — PEN-CROSS-6 (Phase 2 close-up)
+ *   5. protocol_mode: u8 (1 byte)
+ *   6. protocols: Vec<Pubkey> = u32 LE length (4 bytes) ++ each Pubkey 32 bytes
+ *   7. destination_mode: u8 (1 byte)
+ *   8. allowed_destinations: Vec<Pubkey> = u32 LE length (4 bytes) ++ each Pubkey 32 bytes
+ *   9. timelock_duration: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   10. session_expiry_seconds: u64 LE (8 bytes)
+ *   11. observe_only: bool as 1 byte (0 or 1)
+ *   12. has_constraints: bool as 1 byte (0 or 1)
+ *   13. has_post_assertions: u8 (1 byte)
+ *   14. created_at_slot: u64 LE (8 bytes) — PEN-CROSS-2 (Phase 2 close-up)
+ *   15. operating_hours: u32 LE (4 bytes) — TA-05 (Phase 3 pre-exec)
+ *   16. auto_promote_grays: bool as 1 byte (0/1) — TA-07 (Phase 3 pre-exec)
+ *   17. auto_revoke_threshold: u8 (1 byte) — TA-17 (Phase 3 pre-exec)
+ *   18. stable_balance_floor: u64 LE (8 bytes) — TA-12 (Phase 5 post-exec)
+ *   19. per_recipient_daily_cap_usd: u64 LE (8 bytes) — TA-14 (Phase 5 post-exec)
+ *   20. cosign_required: bool (1 byte 0/1) — G6 (audit 2026-05-18 cosign opt-in)
+ *   21. agent_set_hash: [u8; 32] — Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 (audit 2026-05-19)
+ *   22. cosign_session_pubkey: Pubkey (32 bytes) — D-5 (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1)
+ *
+ * Phase 3 append-only additions (TA-05/07/17): operating_hours,
+ * auto_promote_grays, auto_revoke_threshold are appended at positions 15-17
+ * to preserve the 14-field prefix (F-14 APPEND-ONLY rule).
+ *
+ * Phase 5 append-only additions (TA-12/TA-14): stable_balance_floor at
+ * position 18, per_recipient_daily_cap_usd at position 19. Both bound by
+ * TA-19 so silent SDK / pending-PDA mutations can't bypass the owner's
+ * signed digest.
+ *
+ * G6 append-only addition (audit 2026-05-18 cosign opt-in): cosign_required
+ * at position 20 (1 byte, 0/1). Owner's choice to opt into TA-09 cosign
+ * enforcement is part of the signed policy — a compromised SDK cannot
+ * silently disable cosign between owner approval and on-chain landing.
+ * Disabling cosign on a live policy where this is true is itself an
+ * elevated mutation per `queue_policy_update` (one-way ratchet).
+ *
+ * Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 append-only addition (Council ISC-66/A8/A9): the
+ * `agent_set_hash` at position 21 binds the EXISTING agent set into the
+ * signed digest. SHA-256 over Borsh of `Vec<(Pubkey, u8 capability)>`
+ * sorted by pubkey ascending. Closes the silent-insertion vector where
+ * a phished-owner `register_agent(capability=OPERATOR)` would otherwise
+ * grant operator-class without diverging the digest from the last value
+ * the owner signed. Empty Vec produces a deterministic 32-byte hash
+ * (`EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH` — SHA-256 of [0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00]).
+ *
+ * D-5 append-only addition (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1): the
+ * `cosign_session_pubkey` at position 22 binds the owner's chosen
+ * reactivate-time cosigner pubkey into the signed digest. The
+ * `reactivate_vault` handler reads this pubkey at runtime and requires
+ * a matching `is_signer == true` entry in `remaining_accounts` whenever
+ * the operation grafts a new agent at `FULL_CAPABILITY`. A tampered SDK
+ * cannot silently flip the gate between owner approval and on-chain
+ * landing — the digest mismatch closes that gap. Default
+ * `Pubkey::default()` (32 zero bytes) means the gate is OFF; owners
+ * opt in via `queue_policy_update`.
+ *
+ * The `destination_graylist: Vec<(Pubkey, i64)>` is intentionally NOT in
+ * the digest. Graylist entries are derived/ephemeral — they auto-populate
+ * when the owner adds a destination via queue_policy_update, and they
+ * only delay an already-signed allowlist entry. Promoting via
+ * promote_graylist_destination only accelerates the existing unlock — it
+ * cannot widen the allowlist. The owner-signed digest already binds the
+ * destination allowlist (position 8).
+ *
+ * Total bounded by MAX_ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS=10 + MAX_ALLOWED_DESTINATIONS=10 at
+ * 32 bytes each + fixed scalars ≈ 700 bytes worst case.
+ */
+import { base58Decode32 as base58Decode, sha256, writeU16Le, writeU32Le, writeU64Le, digestsEqual as canonicalDigestsEqual, } from "../canonical-encode.js";
+// Base58 decode + sha256 + cursor writers now live in `../canonical-encode.ts`
+// so the AL3 SealInput intent digest (`seal/intent-digest.ts`, Phase 9
+// Batch I) can reuse them. The shared module guarantees byte-identical
+// output for both TA-19 and AL3 — silent encoder drift between the two
+// would defeat the cross-impl Rust↔TS hash invariant.
+// ── §RP-2 L-NEW-1 forward-looking ratchet (audit 2026-05-19) ────────────────
+//
+// Mirrors the Rust-side `POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT` const-assert at
+// `programs/sigil/src/utils/policy_digest.rs:143` and the destructuring
+// test in `field_count_invariant`. The Rust defenses are exhaustive
+// (compile-time struct destructuring catches "field added but encoder
+// not updated"), but the TS encoder is a plain procedural write loop —
+// adding a 21st field to `PolicyPreviewFields` here AND bumping
+// `POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT` to 21 still passes the build if the
+// developer forgets to write the encoding line.
+//
+// `PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES` is a 1:1 array of the FIXED-WIDTH byte cost
+// of each canonical field (excluding the variable per-element 32-byte
+// pubkey appendages for protocols + allowed_destinations). The
+// `EXPECTED_FIXED_SIZE` derived sum + the runtime assertion against
+// the encoded buffer's length forces the developer to update this
+// table AND the encoder in lockstep. Silent bypass is closed.
+//
+// To add a field: (1) extend `PolicyPreviewFields` (2) extend
+// `PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES` with the new field's fixed byte cost (3)
+// bump `POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT` (4) write the encoder line. The
+// `assert_field_count_in_lockstep` IIFE catches step-skips at module
+// load.
+/** Mirrors `policy_digest.rs::POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT`.
+ *  M1-04: was 22; has_constraints removed (digest-version bump).
+ *  F-Q6 (2026-06-02): 21 → 22, binds operator_grant_delay_seconds. */
+export const POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT = 22;
+/**
+ * Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1 (Council ISC-141): SHA-256 of the Borsh-encoded
+ * empty `Vec<(Pubkey, u8)>` — i.e. SHA-256 of [0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00].
+ * Deterministic; pinned across Rust (`policy_digest.rs::EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH`)
+ * and TypeScript (this constant). Used by `computePolicyPreviewDigest`
+ * when the caller omits `agentSetHash` (legacy fixture path).
+ */
+export const EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH = (() => {
+    const empty = new Uint8Array(4); // u32 LE length prefix = 0
+    return sha256(empty);
+})();
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical `agent_set_hash` from a list of agents. SHA-256
+ * over Borsh of `Vec<(Pubkey, u8 capability)>` sorted by pubkey ascending.
+ * Mirrors `policy_digest.rs::compute_agent_set_hash` byte-for-byte.
+ *
+ * Pass the result into `computePolicyPreviewDigest({ ...fields, agentSetHash })`.
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to 32 bytes
+ */
+export function computeAgentSetHash(agents) {
+    // Decode + project to (rawBytes, capability) tuples.
+    const decoded = agents.map((a) => ({
+        raw: base58Decode(a.pubkey),
+        capability: a.capability & 0xff,
+    }));
+    // Sort by pubkey ascending — byte-wise lex order matches Solana's
+    // `Pubkey::cmp` (just a [u8;32] comparison).
+    decoded.sort((a, b) => {
+        for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+            if (a.raw[i] < b.raw[i])
+                return -1;
+            if (a.raw[i] > b.raw[i])
+                return 1;
+        }
+        return 0;
+    });
+    // Borsh encode: u32 LE length prefix + each (Pubkey: 32 bytes, capability: 1 byte).
+    // Per-entry size = 33 bytes; total = 4 + decoded.length * 33.
+    const buf = new Uint8Array(4 + decoded.length * 33);
+    new DataView(buf.buffer, buf.byteOffset, 4).setUint32(0, decoded.length, true);
+    let off = 4;
+    for (const e of decoded) {
+        buf.set(e.raw, off);
+        off += 32;
+        buf[off++] = e.capability;
+    }
+    return sha256(buf);
+}
+/**
+ * Fixed-width byte cost per canonical field. Variable parts (the
+ * per-element 32-byte pubkey appendages of protocols and
+ * allowed_destinations) are NOT included — those are accounted for
+ * separately at encode time. Indices map 1:1 to the canonical fields
+ * listed in the module header.
+ */
+const PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES = [
+    8, // 1.  daily_spending_cap_usd       (u64 LE)
+    8, // 2.  max_transaction_size_usd     (u64 LE)
+    2, // 3.  max_slippage_bps             (u16 LE)
+    2, // 4.  developer_fee_rate           (u16 LE)  PEN-CROSS-6
+    1, // 5.  protocol_mode                (u8)
+    4, // 6.  protocols                    (u32 LE length prefix; pubkeys variable)
+    1, // 7.  destination_mode             (u8)
+    4, // 8.  allowed_destinations         (u32 LE length prefix; pubkeys variable)
+    8, // 9.  timelock_duration            (u64 LE)
+    8, // 10. session_expiry_seconds       (u64 LE)
+    1, // 11. observe_only                 (bool as u8)
+    // M1-04: field 12 has_constraints REMOVED (digest-version bump); renumbered below.
+    1, // 12. has_post_assertions          (u8)
+    8, // 13. created_at_slot              (u64 LE) PEN-CROSS-2
+    4, // 14. operating_hours              (u32 LE) TA-05
+    1, // 15. auto_promote_grays           (bool as u8) TA-07
+    1, // 16. auto_revoke_threshold        (u8) TA-17
+    8, // 17. stable_balance_floor         (u64 LE) TA-12
+    8, // 18. per_recipient_daily_cap_usd  (u64 LE) TA-14
+    1, // 19. cosign_required              (bool as u8) G6
+    32, // 20. agent_set_hash              ([u8;32]) Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1
+    32, // 21. cosign_session_pubkey       (Pubkey)  D-5 (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1)
+    8, // 22. operator_grant_delay_seconds (u64 LE)  F-Q6 (2026-06-02)
+];
+/** Derived sum — must match the encoder's `fixedSize` exactly. */
+const EXPECTED_FIXED_SIZE = PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES.reduce((a, b) => a + b, 0);
+// Module-load assertion: enforce that PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES.length and
+// POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT diverge → throw at import time. Catches a
+// developer who bumps the count without updating the table (or vice
+// versa). Cheap one-time cost, runs once per process.
+(function assert_field_count_in_lockstep() {
+    if (PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES.length !== POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT) {
+        throw new Error(`§RP-2 L-NEW-1 (TA-19 ratchet): PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES.length=${PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES.length} ` +
+            `diverges from POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT=${POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT}. ` +
+            "Either add the missing field's byte cost to PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES, " +
+            "or update POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT, in the SAME commit. " +
+            "Silent diverge would bypass TA-19 (PEN-7 class).");
+    }
+})();
+// ── Encoders ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Cursor writers (writeU8 / writeU16Le / writeU32Le / writeU64Le / writeBool)
+// now live in `../canonical-encode.ts` and are imported at the top of this
+// file. The hand-rolled versions previously here were byte-identical.
+/**
+ * Compute the canonical SHA-256 of the policy preview fields.
+ *
+ * Returns a 32-byte Uint8Array. Identical to the on-chain helper
+ * `compute_policy_preview_digest` for the same input.
+ *
+ * @throws if any pubkey doesn't base58-decode to exactly 32 bytes
+ * @throws if a u64 is negative or out of range
+ */
+export function computePolicyPreviewDigest(fields) {
+    // Pre-size: 8+8+2+1 + 4+32*10 + 1 + 4+32*10 + 8+8+1+1+1 = ~684 bytes worst case
+    const protocols = fields.protocols;
+    const dests = fields.allowedDestinations;
+    // Decode pubkeys first so any error surfaces with a useful message before
+    // we start the hash walk.
+    const protoBytes = protocols.map((p) => base58Decode(p));
+    const destBytes = dests.map((p) => base58Decode(p));
+    // §RP-2 L-NEW-1: fixedSize is now derived from the PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES
+    // table above (must equal POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT entries). The inline
+    // "8 + 8 + ..." literal was the original hand-summed form — a 21st-field
+    // bug would silently bypass it. The table-driven form forces the
+    // developer to update both the table AND the encoder body when adding
+    // a field (the offset assertion at the bottom catches the inconsistency).
+    const fixedSize = EXPECTED_FIXED_SIZE;
+    const variableSize = protoBytes.length * 32 + destBytes.length * 32;
+    const buf = new Uint8Array(fixedSize + variableSize);
+    const view = new DataView(buf.buffer, buf.byteOffset, buf.byteLength);
+    let off = 0;
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.dailySpendingCapUsd);
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.maxTransactionSizeUsd);
+    off = writeU16Le(view, off, fields.maxSlippageBps);
+    // PEN-CROSS-6: developer_fee_rate at position 4 of canonical encoding.
+    off = writeU16Le(view, off, fields.developerFeeRate);
+    buf[off++] = fields.protocolMode;
+    off = writeU32Le(view, off, protoBytes.length);
+    for (const pk of protoBytes) {
+        buf.set(pk, off);
+        off += 32;
+    }
+    buf[off++] = fields.destinationMode;
+    off = writeU32Le(view, off, destBytes.length);
+    for (const pk of destBytes) {
+        buf.set(pk, off);
+        off += 32;
+    }
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.timelockDuration);
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.sessionExpirySeconds);
+    buf[off++] = fields.observeOnly ? 1 : 0;
+    // M1-04: has_constraints byte removed (digest-version bump).
+    buf[off++] = fields.hasPostAssertions;
+    // PEN-CROSS-2: created_at_slot at position 14 of canonical encoding.
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.createdAtSlot);
+    // TA-05 (Phase 3): operating_hours at position 15 of canonical encoding.
+    // Default 0 when omitted by legacy callers; production SDK consumers
+    // should pass 0xFFFFFF explicitly via `initializeVault`/`queuePolicyUpdate`.
+    off = writeU32Le(view, off, fields.operatingHours ?? 0);
+    // TA-07 (Phase 3): auto_promote_grays at position 16.
+    buf[off++] = fields.autoPromoteGrays ? 1 : 0;
+    // TA-17 (Phase 3): auto_revoke_threshold at position 17.
+    buf[off++] = fields.autoRevokeThreshold ?? 0;
+    // TA-12 (Phase 5): stable_balance_floor at position 18.
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.stableBalanceFloor ?? 0n);
+    // TA-14 (Phase 5): per_recipient_daily_cap_usd at position 19.
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.perRecipientDailyCapUsd ?? 0n);
+    // G6 (audit 2026-05-18 cosign opt-in): cosign_required at position 20.
+    buf[off++] = fields.cosignRequired ? 1 : 0;
+    // Phase 8 PEN-CROSS-1: agent_set_hash at position 21. Default
+    // EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH so legacy callers (no agents) continue to
+    // produce a canonical digest without explicit setup.
+    const agentSetHash = fields.agentSetHash ?? EMPTY_AGENT_SET_HASH;
+    if (agentSetHash.length !== 32) {
+        throw new Error(`agentSetHash must be exactly 32 bytes, got ${agentSetHash.length}`);
+    }
+    buf.set(agentSetHash, off);
+    off += 32;
+    // D-5 (audit 2026-05-19, F-RP3-1): cosign_session_pubkey at position
+    // 22. Default `Pubkey::default()` (32 zero bytes) so legacy callers
+    // that don't opt into the reactivate-cosign gate continue to produce
+    // the canonical digest. Owner opt-in passes a base58 string OR a
+    // 32-byte Uint8Array; the encoder normalises both into the canonical
+    // 32-byte buffer.
+    const cosignSessionRaw = fields.cosignSessionPubkey;
+    let cosignSessionBytes;
+    if (cosignSessionRaw === undefined) {
+        cosignSessionBytes = new Uint8Array(32); // Pubkey::default()
+    }
+    else if (cosignSessionRaw instanceof Uint8Array) {
+        cosignSessionBytes = cosignSessionRaw;
+    }
+    else {
+        cosignSessionBytes = base58Decode(cosignSessionRaw);
+    }
+    if (cosignSessionBytes.length !== 32) {
+        throw new Error(`cosignSessionPubkey must decode to exactly 32 bytes, got ${cosignSessionBytes.length}`);
+    }
+    buf.set(cosignSessionBytes, off);
+    off += 32;
+    // F-Q6 (2026-06-02): operator_grant_delay_seconds at position 22 (u64 LE).
+    // Default 0n so legacy callers that don't configure a delay continue to
+    // produce the canonical digest. Owner opts in via queue_policy_update.
+    off = writeU64Le(view, off, fields.operatorGrantDelaySeconds ?? 0n);
+    // §RP-2 L-NEW-1 forward-looking ratchet: the encoder MUST write
+    // exactly `fixedSize + variableSize` bytes. `fixedSize` is now
+    // derived from the PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES table (which is asserted
+    // at module load to be 1:1 with POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT). A
+    // future engineer who adds a 21st field MUST update both the table
+    // AND the encoder body — if they update only the table (bumping
+    // EXPECTED_FIXED_SIZE) but forget to write the encoder line, this
+    // assertion fires with a clear mismatch. If they update only the
+    // encoder line, the SAME assertion fires (the buffer was too small
+    // and the OOB write at line `buf[off++] = ...` already threw).
+    if (off !== buf.length) {
+        throw new Error(`computePolicyPreviewDigest: encoded ${off} bytes, expected ${buf.length}. ` +
+            `If you added a field to PolicyPreviewFields, update PER_FIELD_FIXED_SIZES + ` +
+            `POLICY_PREVIEW_FIELD_COUNT AND write the encoder line in the SAME commit.`);
+    }
+    return sha256(buf);
+}
+/**
+ * Equivalent of `Buffer.equals` for two `Uint8Array` digests. Re-exported
+ * from `../canonical-encode.ts` (constant-time XOR-accumulate; no early
+ * exit) so callers that previously imported it from this module continue
+ * to work after Batch C.
+ */
+export const digestsEqual = canonicalDigestsEqual;
+//# sourceMappingURL=compute-policy-preview-digest.js.map

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