@useauthio/react 0.2.3 → 0.3.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +57 -0
- package/README.md +85 -18
- package/dist/index.cjs +682 -12
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +375 -17
- package/dist/index.d.ts +375 -17
- package/dist/index.js +665 -15
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -1
- package/src/PasskeyManager.tsx +164 -0
- package/src/activity.ts +95 -0
- package/src/device-signals.ts +86 -0
- package/src/index.ts +53 -2
- package/src/lobby-context.ts +8 -0
- package/src/locate.ts +42 -0
- package/src/passkeys.ts +247 -0
- package/src/provider.tsx +119 -14
- package/src/refresh.ts +41 -0
- package/src/sign-in.ts +189 -2
- package/src/telemetry.ts +11 -0
- package/src/types.ts +79 -0
- package/src/usePasskeys.ts +134 -0
- package/src/version.ts +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.cts
CHANGED
|
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ export { AuthioError } from '@useauthio/node';
|
|
|
24
24
|
* - `refresh_scheduled`: a future silent refresh has been timer-
|
|
25
25
|
* scheduled. `runAt` is the unix millisecond at which the refresh
|
|
26
26
|
* will fire (subject to the visibilitychange deferral).
|
|
27
|
+
* - `refresh_deferred`: a scheduled refresh was held back — `hidden`
|
|
28
|
+
* when the tab is in the background, `idle` when the user has not
|
|
29
|
+
* interacted since the last refresh and the session policy has an
|
|
30
|
+
* inactivity timeout. `refresh_resumed` follows when it re-arms.
|
|
27
31
|
* - `sign_in_started` / `sign_in_completed` / `sign_in_failed`: the
|
|
28
32
|
* three terminal states of a sign-in attempt. `method` says which
|
|
29
33
|
* surface initiated it.
|
|
@@ -50,6 +54,14 @@ type AuthioTelemetryEvent = {
|
|
|
50
54
|
kind: "refresh_scheduled";
|
|
51
55
|
timestamp: number;
|
|
52
56
|
runAt: number;
|
|
57
|
+
} | {
|
|
58
|
+
kind: "refresh_deferred";
|
|
59
|
+
timestamp: number;
|
|
60
|
+
/** `hidden`: background tab. `idle`: no user activity under an inactivity policy. */
|
|
61
|
+
reason: "hidden" | "idle";
|
|
62
|
+
} | {
|
|
63
|
+
kind: "refresh_resumed";
|
|
64
|
+
timestamp: number;
|
|
53
65
|
} | {
|
|
54
66
|
kind: "sign_in_started";
|
|
55
67
|
timestamp: number;
|
|
@@ -98,11 +110,65 @@ interface AuthioUser {
|
|
|
98
110
|
* - `unauthenticated` — no session; show your sign-in surface.
|
|
99
111
|
*/
|
|
100
112
|
type AuthioStatus = "loading" | "authenticated" | "unauthenticated";
|
|
113
|
+
/**
|
|
114
|
+
* Effective session-lifecycle policy for the current session, as reported
|
|
115
|
+
* by auth-core in the `session_policy` field of every session envelope
|
|
116
|
+
* (sign-in, refresh, switch-org). Values are minutes; `0` means "no limit
|
|
117
|
+
* at this layer". `null` on the context when auth-core predates the field.
|
|
118
|
+
*
|
|
119
|
+
* The SDK uses `idleTimeoutMin` to decide whether a timer-driven silent
|
|
120
|
+
* refresh should be held back while the user is inactive — see the
|
|
121
|
+
* `idleRefresh` provider prop.
|
|
122
|
+
*/
|
|
123
|
+
interface SessionPolicy {
|
|
124
|
+
idleTimeoutMin: number;
|
|
125
|
+
absoluteMaxMin: number;
|
|
126
|
+
accessTokenTtlMin: number;
|
|
127
|
+
}
|
|
128
|
+
/** Wire shape of `session_policy` on auth-core envelopes. */
|
|
129
|
+
interface RawSessionPolicy {
|
|
130
|
+
idle_timeout_min?: number;
|
|
131
|
+
absolute_max_min?: number;
|
|
132
|
+
access_token_ttl_min?: number;
|
|
133
|
+
}
|
|
134
|
+
/**
|
|
135
|
+
* Normalise a raw `session_policy` object. Returns `null` when the field
|
|
136
|
+
* is absent or malformed (older auth-core), so callers can keep the
|
|
137
|
+
* legacy always-refresh behaviour.
|
|
138
|
+
*/
|
|
139
|
+
declare function coerceSessionPolicy(raw: RawSessionPolicy | null | undefined): SessionPolicy | null;
|
|
140
|
+
/**
|
|
141
|
+
* How the silent-refresh timer behaves while the user is inactive.
|
|
142
|
+
*
|
|
143
|
+
* - `"defer"` (default): when the effective policy has an inactivity
|
|
144
|
+
* timeout (`sessionPolicy.idleTimeoutMin > 0`) and there has been no
|
|
145
|
+
* user interaction since the last refresh, the scheduled refresh is
|
|
146
|
+
* held until the next interaction. Without an inactivity policy the
|
|
147
|
+
* refresh always runs — identical to previous SDK versions.
|
|
148
|
+
* - `"always"`: never hold a refresh for inactivity (tab-hidden
|
|
149
|
+
* deferral still applies). Escape hatch for apps whose background
|
|
150
|
+
* work needs a warm token even when nobody is at the keyboard.
|
|
151
|
+
*/
|
|
152
|
+
type AuthioIdleRefreshMode = "defer" | "always";
|
|
101
153
|
type AuthioStorageMode = "memory" | "localStorage" | "sessionStorage" | "none";
|
|
102
154
|
interface AuthioContextValue {
|
|
103
155
|
user: AuthioUser | null;
|
|
104
156
|
status: AuthioStatus;
|
|
105
157
|
accessToken: string | null;
|
|
158
|
+
/**
|
|
159
|
+
* Effective session-lifecycle policy reported by auth-core on the last
|
|
160
|
+
* envelope, or `null` when unknown (no session yet, or an auth-core
|
|
161
|
+
* that predates `session_policy`).
|
|
162
|
+
*/
|
|
163
|
+
sessionPolicy: SessionPolicy | null;
|
|
164
|
+
/** Same `apiUrl` passed to `<AuthioProvider>`. */
|
|
165
|
+
apiUrl: string;
|
|
166
|
+
/** Same `projectId` passed to `<AuthioProvider>`. */
|
|
167
|
+
projectId: string;
|
|
168
|
+
/** Resolved hosted sign-in URL (custom domain or Lobby default). */
|
|
169
|
+
signInUrl: string;
|
|
170
|
+
/** Custom fetch from provider props, if any. */
|
|
171
|
+
fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
|
|
106
172
|
/**
|
|
107
173
|
* Returns the current access token, silently refreshing if it's
|
|
108
174
|
* within 10 seconds of expiry. Returns `null` when no session
|
|
@@ -156,6 +222,8 @@ interface AuthioContextValue {
|
|
|
156
222
|
accessToken: string;
|
|
157
223
|
refreshToken?: string | null;
|
|
158
224
|
user?: AuthioUser | null;
|
|
225
|
+
/** Policy from the sign-in envelope, when the helper surfaced one. */
|
|
226
|
+
sessionPolicy?: SessionPolicy | null;
|
|
159
227
|
}) => Promise<void>;
|
|
160
228
|
}
|
|
161
229
|
/** Result of a single JWT verification attempt. */
|
|
@@ -186,6 +254,14 @@ interface AuthioProviderProps {
|
|
|
186
254
|
* a background tab.
|
|
187
255
|
*/
|
|
188
256
|
refreshLeadSeconds?: number;
|
|
257
|
+
/**
|
|
258
|
+
* Silent-refresh behaviour while the user is inactive. Defaults to
|
|
259
|
+
* `"defer"`: under a project/org inactivity policy the timer-driven
|
|
260
|
+
* refresh waits for the next user interaction instead of keeping the
|
|
261
|
+
* session warm on an idle tab. Projects without an inactivity policy
|
|
262
|
+
* are unaffected. See {@link AuthioIdleRefreshMode}.
|
|
263
|
+
*/
|
|
264
|
+
idleRefresh?: AuthioIdleRefreshMode;
|
|
189
265
|
/**
|
|
190
266
|
* Optional sink for SDK telemetry (refresh outcomes, sign-in
|
|
191
267
|
* starts/completes, token verification results). Useful for
|
|
@@ -351,6 +427,87 @@ interface RedirectToSignInProps {
|
|
|
351
427
|
*/
|
|
352
428
|
declare function RedirectToSignIn({ returnTo, }: RedirectToSignInProps): React.ReactElement | null;
|
|
353
429
|
|
|
430
|
+
/**
|
|
431
|
+
* Optional browser device signals for Authio risk / device fingerprinting.
|
|
432
|
+
*
|
|
433
|
+
* Web browsers do not expose a hardware ID (IMEI, serial, MAC). These
|
|
434
|
+
* coarse, non-PII signals improve device recognition alongside the
|
|
435
|
+
* server-parsed user agent. auth-core hashes them server-side — never
|
|
436
|
+
* send a precomputed fingerprint from the client.
|
|
437
|
+
*/
|
|
438
|
+
interface DeviceSignalsCapture {
|
|
439
|
+
timezone?: string;
|
|
440
|
+
screen_resolution?: string;
|
|
441
|
+
language?: string;
|
|
442
|
+
platform?: string;
|
|
443
|
+
}
|
|
444
|
+
/** Collect coarse device signals available in a browser context. */
|
|
445
|
+
declare function collectDeviceSignals(): DeviceSignalsCapture;
|
|
446
|
+
/** Encode signals for the `X-Authio-Device-Signals` request header. */
|
|
447
|
+
declare function encodeDeviceSignalsHeader(signals: DeviceSignalsCapture): string;
|
|
448
|
+
/** Header name auth-core reads for optional client device signals. */
|
|
449
|
+
declare const DEVICE_SIGNALS_HEADER = "X-Authio-Device-Signals";
|
|
450
|
+
declare function deviceSignalsExtraHeaders(signals?: DeviceSignalsCapture): Record<string, string>;
|
|
451
|
+
|
|
452
|
+
/**
|
|
453
|
+
* Browser helpers for Authio Locate client attestation.
|
|
454
|
+
*
|
|
455
|
+
* Capture device geolocation and pass it to sign-in or standalone verify
|
|
456
|
+
* calls as `client_location`. Requires user consent (browser prompt).
|
|
457
|
+
*/
|
|
458
|
+
interface ClientLocationCapture {
|
|
459
|
+
latitude: number;
|
|
460
|
+
longitude: number;
|
|
461
|
+
accuracy_m: number;
|
|
462
|
+
captured_at: string;
|
|
463
|
+
source: "browser_geolocation";
|
|
464
|
+
}
|
|
465
|
+
interface CaptureClientLocationOptions {
|
|
466
|
+
timeoutMs?: number;
|
|
467
|
+
maximumAgeMs?: number;
|
|
468
|
+
enableHighAccuracy?: boolean;
|
|
469
|
+
}
|
|
470
|
+
/**
|
|
471
|
+
* Request the browser's current position. Rejects when geolocation is
|
|
472
|
+
* unavailable, denied, or times out.
|
|
473
|
+
*/
|
|
474
|
+
declare function captureClientLocation(opts?: CaptureClientLocationOptions): Promise<ClientLocationCapture>;
|
|
475
|
+
type LocateAction = "sign_in" | "wager_placed" | "contest_entry" | string;
|
|
476
|
+
interface VerifyLocateOptions {
|
|
477
|
+
apiUrl: string;
|
|
478
|
+
projectId: string;
|
|
479
|
+
accessToken: string;
|
|
480
|
+
action: LocateAction;
|
|
481
|
+
clientLocation?: ClientLocationCapture;
|
|
482
|
+
idempotencyKey?: string;
|
|
483
|
+
fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
|
|
484
|
+
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
485
|
+
}
|
|
486
|
+
interface LocateVerifyResult {
|
|
487
|
+
verification_id: string;
|
|
488
|
+
decision: "allow" | "block";
|
|
489
|
+
confidence: number;
|
|
490
|
+
method: string;
|
|
491
|
+
location: {
|
|
492
|
+
country: string;
|
|
493
|
+
region: string;
|
|
494
|
+
source: string;
|
|
495
|
+
};
|
|
496
|
+
network_signals: {
|
|
497
|
+
vpn: boolean;
|
|
498
|
+
datacenter: boolean;
|
|
499
|
+
tor: boolean;
|
|
500
|
+
anonymous_proxy: boolean;
|
|
501
|
+
satellite: boolean;
|
|
502
|
+
};
|
|
503
|
+
evasion_signals: string[];
|
|
504
|
+
}
|
|
505
|
+
/**
|
|
506
|
+
* @deprecated Use backend proxy with `@useauthio/node` `authio.locate.verify()` — see JB migration guide.
|
|
507
|
+
* This helper always throws; it must not send a user JWT to the sk_-only verify route.
|
|
508
|
+
*/
|
|
509
|
+
declare function verifyLocate(_opts: VerifyLocateOptions): Promise<LocateVerifyResult>;
|
|
510
|
+
|
|
354
511
|
interface SignInWithMagicLinkOptions {
|
|
355
512
|
/** Authio auth-core base URL. */
|
|
356
513
|
apiUrl: string;
|
|
@@ -402,12 +559,22 @@ interface SignInWithPasskeyOptions {
|
|
|
402
559
|
* the user picks their key from the browser's native chooser.
|
|
403
560
|
*/
|
|
404
561
|
email?: string;
|
|
562
|
+
/**
|
|
563
|
+
* Post-sign-in path on the app (`next`) forwarded to auth-core on
|
|
564
|
+
* the verify call. Older auth-core deployments ignore it; token
|
|
565
|
+
* handling on the client is unchanged either way.
|
|
566
|
+
*/
|
|
567
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
568
|
+
/** Organization scope (`org_…`) for org-policy enforcement. */
|
|
569
|
+
organizationId?: string;
|
|
405
570
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
406
571
|
fetch?: typeof fetch;
|
|
407
572
|
}
|
|
408
573
|
interface SignInWithPasskeyResult {
|
|
409
574
|
accessToken: string;
|
|
410
575
|
refreshToken?: string;
|
|
576
|
+
/** Effective session policy from the envelope, `null` on older auth-core. */
|
|
577
|
+
sessionPolicy: SessionPolicy | null;
|
|
411
578
|
user: AuthioUser;
|
|
412
579
|
}
|
|
413
580
|
/**
|
|
@@ -436,30 +603,187 @@ interface SignInWithPasskeyResult {
|
|
|
436
603
|
* canonical storage. Callers should typically discard `refreshToken`.
|
|
437
604
|
*/
|
|
438
605
|
declare function signInWithPasskey(opts: SignInWithPasskeyOptions): Promise<SignInWithPasskeyResult>;
|
|
606
|
+
interface SendEmailOtpOptions {
|
|
607
|
+
/** Authio auth-core base URL. */
|
|
608
|
+
apiUrl: string;
|
|
609
|
+
/** Project ID (`proj_…`). */
|
|
610
|
+
projectId: string;
|
|
611
|
+
/** Email address to send the 6-digit code to. */
|
|
612
|
+
email: string;
|
|
613
|
+
/**
|
|
614
|
+
* Where auth-core should consider the sign-in to be headed. Optional —
|
|
615
|
+
* when omitted, auth-core derives it from the request Origin.
|
|
616
|
+
*/
|
|
617
|
+
redirectUri?: string;
|
|
618
|
+
/** Post-sign-in path on the app, carried through to the session redirect. */
|
|
619
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
620
|
+
/** Organization scope (`org_…`) for org-policy enforcement. */
|
|
621
|
+
organizationId?: string;
|
|
622
|
+
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
623
|
+
fetch?: typeof fetch;
|
|
624
|
+
}
|
|
625
|
+
/**
|
|
626
|
+
* POSTs `/v1/auth/email-otp/send` — the same endpoint/body shape the
|
|
627
|
+
* hosted Lobby's "Email me a code" button uses. Returns `void` on
|
|
628
|
+
* success; the code is now in the user's inbox. Throws `AuthioError`
|
|
629
|
+
* on any failure (rate-limit, invalid email, org policy, network).
|
|
630
|
+
*
|
|
631
|
+
* Note: unlike `verifyEmailOtp`, the send endpoint does not accept
|
|
632
|
+
* `client_location` — capture location once and pass it to verify.
|
|
633
|
+
*/
|
|
634
|
+
declare function sendEmailOtp(opts: SendEmailOtpOptions): Promise<void>;
|
|
635
|
+
interface VerifyEmailOtpOptions {
|
|
636
|
+
apiUrl: string;
|
|
637
|
+
projectId: string;
|
|
638
|
+
/** Email address the code was sent to. */
|
|
639
|
+
email: string;
|
|
640
|
+
/** The 6-digit code from the user's inbox. */
|
|
641
|
+
code: string;
|
|
642
|
+
/** Fallback redirect target when the send call didn't record one. */
|
|
643
|
+
redirectUri?: string;
|
|
644
|
+
/** Post-sign-in path on the app. */
|
|
645
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
646
|
+
/** Organization scope (`org_…`) for org-policy enforcement. */
|
|
647
|
+
organizationId?: string;
|
|
648
|
+
/** Optional browser geolocation for Authio Locate attestation. */
|
|
649
|
+
clientLocation?: ClientLocationCapture;
|
|
650
|
+
/** Optional coarse device signals for risk / device recognition. */
|
|
651
|
+
deviceSignals?: DeviceSignalsCapture;
|
|
652
|
+
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
653
|
+
fetch?: typeof fetch;
|
|
654
|
+
}
|
|
655
|
+
interface VerifyEmailOtpResult {
|
|
656
|
+
accessToken: string;
|
|
657
|
+
refreshToken?: string;
|
|
658
|
+
/** Effective session policy from the envelope, `null` on older auth-core. */
|
|
659
|
+
sessionPolicy: SessionPolicy | null;
|
|
660
|
+
user: AuthioUser;
|
|
661
|
+
}
|
|
662
|
+
/**
|
|
663
|
+
* POSTs `/v1/auth/email-otp/verify` with the code the user typed —
|
|
664
|
+
* mirrors the hosted Lobby's verify body shape. On success returns
|
|
665
|
+
* `{ accessToken, refreshToken, user }`; auth-core also sets the
|
|
666
|
+
* session cookie via `Set-Cookie` (the request runs with
|
|
667
|
+
* `credentials: "include"`), which is the canonical storage.
|
|
668
|
+
*
|
|
669
|
+
* Throws `AuthioError`:
|
|
670
|
+
*
|
|
671
|
+
* - `invalid_code` for a wrong/expired code (auth-core's code).
|
|
672
|
+
* - `step_up_required` when the risk engine withholds the session
|
|
673
|
+
* pending a second factor — finish the sign-in on the hosted UI.
|
|
674
|
+
* - Whatever else auth-core returns (rate-limit, policy, etc.).
|
|
675
|
+
*/
|
|
676
|
+
declare function verifyEmailOtp(opts: VerifyEmailOtpOptions): Promise<VerifyEmailOtpResult>;
|
|
439
677
|
|
|
678
|
+
interface AuthioPasskey {
|
|
679
|
+
id: string;
|
|
680
|
+
nickname: string | null;
|
|
681
|
+
aaguid: string | null;
|
|
682
|
+
authenticator_name: string;
|
|
683
|
+
transports: string[];
|
|
684
|
+
sign_count: number;
|
|
685
|
+
last_used_at: string | null;
|
|
686
|
+
created_at: string;
|
|
687
|
+
}
|
|
688
|
+
/** Shared options for authenticated `/v1/me/passkeys` calls. */
|
|
689
|
+
interface PasskeyApiOptions {
|
|
690
|
+
apiUrl: string;
|
|
691
|
+
projectId: string;
|
|
692
|
+
accessToken: string;
|
|
693
|
+
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
694
|
+
fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
|
|
695
|
+
}
|
|
696
|
+
interface AddPasskeyOptions extends PasskeyApiOptions {
|
|
697
|
+
email: string;
|
|
698
|
+
/**
|
|
699
|
+
* WebAuthn ceremony origin (sent as `X-Authio-Origin`). Defaults to
|
|
700
|
+
* `window.location.origin` in the browser.
|
|
701
|
+
*/
|
|
702
|
+
origin?: string;
|
|
703
|
+
}
|
|
704
|
+
interface EnrollPasskeyOptions extends PasskeyApiOptions {
|
|
705
|
+
email: string;
|
|
706
|
+
/** Hosted sign-in UI base URL (lobby / custom domain). */
|
|
707
|
+
signInUrl: string;
|
|
708
|
+
/** Where to return after enrollment (`redirect_uri` query param). */
|
|
709
|
+
returnUrl?: string;
|
|
710
|
+
/** Post-login path on the return host (`next` query param). */
|
|
711
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
712
|
+
}
|
|
713
|
+
interface BuildEnrollPasskeyUrlOptions {
|
|
714
|
+
signInUrl: string;
|
|
715
|
+
projectId: string;
|
|
716
|
+
email: string;
|
|
717
|
+
registerToken: string;
|
|
718
|
+
redirectUri?: string;
|
|
719
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
720
|
+
}
|
|
721
|
+
/** Normalize a hosted-UI base URL (no trailing slash). */
|
|
722
|
+
declare function signInOrigin(signInUrl: string): string;
|
|
440
723
|
/**
|
|
441
|
-
*
|
|
724
|
+
* True when inline WebAuthn registration can run on the current page
|
|
725
|
+
* (same origin as the hosted sign-in UI / custom auth domain).
|
|
726
|
+
*/
|
|
727
|
+
declare function canEnrollPasskeyEmbedded(signInUrl: string): boolean;
|
|
728
|
+
/** Build the hosted-UI URL for `mode=add_credential` passkey enrollment. */
|
|
729
|
+
declare function buildEnrollPasskeyUrl(opts: BuildEnrollPasskeyUrlOptions): string;
|
|
730
|
+
/** Mint a short-lived JWT for add-credential WebAuthn (`register-intent`). */
|
|
731
|
+
declare function mintPasskeyRegisterIntent(opts: PasskeyApiOptions): Promise<{
|
|
732
|
+
token: string;
|
|
733
|
+
expiresIn: number;
|
|
734
|
+
}>;
|
|
735
|
+
/**
|
|
736
|
+
* Enroll a passkey by redirecting to the hosted sign-in UI on the
|
|
737
|
+
* sign-in origin (`mode=add_credential`). Use when the SPA origin
|
|
738
|
+
* differs from the WebAuthn RP ID.
|
|
739
|
+
*/
|
|
740
|
+
declare function enrollPasskey(opts: EnrollPasskeyOptions): Promise<void>;
|
|
741
|
+
/**
|
|
742
|
+
* Enroll a passkey inline on the current origin via WebAuthn.
|
|
442
743
|
*
|
|
443
|
-
*
|
|
444
|
-
*
|
|
744
|
+
* 1. `POST /v1/me/passkeys/register-intent`
|
|
745
|
+
* 2. `POST /v1/auth/passkey/register/options` + ceremony
|
|
746
|
+
* 3. `POST /v1/auth/passkey/register/verify`
|
|
445
747
|
*/
|
|
446
|
-
|
|
447
|
-
|
|
448
|
-
|
|
449
|
-
|
|
450
|
-
|
|
451
|
-
|
|
748
|
+
declare function addPasskey(opts: AddPasskeyOptions): Promise<void>;
|
|
749
|
+
/** List passkeys for the signed-in user (`GET /v1/me/passkeys`). */
|
|
750
|
+
declare function listPasskeys(opts: PasskeyApiOptions): Promise<AuthioPasskey[]>;
|
|
751
|
+
/** Rename a passkey (`PATCH /v1/me/passkeys/{credentialId}`). */
|
|
752
|
+
declare function renamePasskey(opts: PasskeyApiOptions, credentialId: string, name: string): Promise<void>;
|
|
753
|
+
/** Revoke a passkey (`DELETE /v1/me/passkeys/{credentialId}`). */
|
|
754
|
+
declare function revokePasskey(opts: PasskeyApiOptions, credentialId: string): Promise<void>;
|
|
755
|
+
|
|
756
|
+
interface UsePasskeysResult {
|
|
757
|
+
passkeys: AuthioPasskey[];
|
|
758
|
+
loading: boolean;
|
|
759
|
+
error: string | null;
|
|
760
|
+
refresh: () => Promise<void>;
|
|
761
|
+
rename: (credentialId: string, nickname: string) => Promise<void>;
|
|
762
|
+
revoke: (credentialId: string) => Promise<void>;
|
|
763
|
+
enroll: (opts?: {
|
|
764
|
+
returnUrl?: string;
|
|
765
|
+
next?: string;
|
|
766
|
+
}) => Promise<void>;
|
|
452
767
|
}
|
|
453
|
-
|
|
454
|
-
|
|
455
|
-
|
|
456
|
-
|
|
768
|
+
/**
|
|
769
|
+
* Load and mutate the signed-in user's passkeys via `/v1/me/passkeys`.
|
|
770
|
+
* Requires `<AuthioProvider>` with a live session.
|
|
771
|
+
*/
|
|
772
|
+
declare function usePasskeys(): UsePasskeysResult;
|
|
773
|
+
|
|
774
|
+
interface PasskeyManagerProps {
|
|
775
|
+
className?: string;
|
|
776
|
+
/** Passed to {@link enrollPasskey} as `returnUrl`. */
|
|
777
|
+
enrollReturnUrl?: string;
|
|
778
|
+
enrollNext?: string;
|
|
457
779
|
}
|
|
458
780
|
/**
|
|
459
|
-
*
|
|
460
|
-
*
|
|
781
|
+
* Drop-in passkey device list for customer apps. Lists, renames, and
|
|
782
|
+
* revokes via `/v1/me/passkeys`; "Add passkey" redirects to the hosted
|
|
783
|
+
* sign-in UI (`mode=add_credential`) so the WebAuthn ceremony runs on
|
|
784
|
+
* the sign-in origin.
|
|
461
785
|
*/
|
|
462
|
-
declare function
|
|
786
|
+
declare function PasskeyManager({ className, enrollReturnUrl, enrollNext, }: PasskeyManagerProps): React.ReactElement;
|
|
463
787
|
|
|
464
788
|
/**
|
|
465
789
|
* Wrap a native fetch rejection (network error, abort, timeout) in
|
|
@@ -468,4 +792,38 @@ declare function captureClientLocation(opts?: CaptureClientLocationOptions): Pro
|
|
|
468
792
|
*/
|
|
469
793
|
declare function wrapFetchError(err: unknown, fallbackCode?: string): AuthioError;
|
|
470
794
|
|
|
471
|
-
|
|
795
|
+
type ActivityListener = (at: number) => void;
|
|
796
|
+
/**
|
|
797
|
+
* Tracks the last moment the user interacted with the page. Used by the
|
|
798
|
+
* provider to decide whether a scheduled silent refresh should run or
|
|
799
|
+
* be deferred: when the project/org has an inactivity (idle) timeout,
|
|
800
|
+
* refreshing on a timer while nobody is at the keyboard would bump the
|
|
801
|
+
* server's `last_active_at` and defeat that policy. See `RefreshScheduler`.
|
|
802
|
+
*
|
|
803
|
+
* SSR-safe — under SSR `lastActivityAt()` is `0` and listeners are never
|
|
804
|
+
* attached.
|
|
805
|
+
*/
|
|
806
|
+
declare class ActivityTracker {
|
|
807
|
+
private last;
|
|
808
|
+
private listeners;
|
|
809
|
+
private handler;
|
|
810
|
+
private visibilityHandler;
|
|
811
|
+
private destroyed;
|
|
812
|
+
constructor(now?: () => number);
|
|
813
|
+
private readonly now;
|
|
814
|
+
/** Unix ms of the most recent recorded interaction, `0` if none yet. */
|
|
815
|
+
lastActivityAt(): number;
|
|
816
|
+
/**
|
|
817
|
+
* Record activity now. Throttled to one write per second; listeners
|
|
818
|
+
* fire only when a write actually happens. Exposed so tests (and
|
|
819
|
+
* embedders with their own activity signal) can poke it directly.
|
|
820
|
+
*/
|
|
821
|
+
mark(): void;
|
|
822
|
+
/** Subscribe to recorded activity. Returns an unsubscribe function. */
|
|
823
|
+
onActivity(listener: ActivityListener): () => void;
|
|
824
|
+
destroy(): void;
|
|
825
|
+
}
|
|
826
|
+
|
|
827
|
+
type RefreshDeferReason = "hidden" | "idle";
|
|
828
|
+
|
|
829
|
+
export { type ActivityListener, ActivityTracker, type AddPasskeyOptions, AuthioContext, type AuthioContextValue, type AuthioIdleRefreshMode, type AuthioPasskey, AuthioProvider, type AuthioProviderProps, type AuthioStatus, type AuthioStorageMode, type AuthioTelemetryEvent, type AuthioTokenVerification, type AuthioTokenVerifier, type AuthioUser, type CaptureClientLocationOptions, type ClientLocationCapture, DEVICE_SIGNALS_HEADER, type DeviceSignalsCapture, type EnrollPasskeyOptions, type LocateAction, type LocateVerifyResult, type PasskeyApiOptions, PasskeyManager, type PasskeyManagerProps, type RawSessionPolicy, RedirectToSignIn, type RedirectToSignInProps, type RefreshDeferReason, type SendEmailOtpOptions, type SessionPolicy, type SignInWithMagicLinkOptions, type SignInWithPasskeyOptions, type SignInWithPasskeyResult, SignedIn, type SignedInProps, SignedOut, type SignedOutProps, type UseAuthioRequiredOptions, type UseAuthioRequiredResult, type UsePasskeysResult, type VerifyEmailOtpOptions, type VerifyEmailOtpResult, type VerifyLocateOptions, addPasskey, buildEnrollPasskeyUrl, canEnrollPasskeyEmbedded, captureClientLocation, coerceSessionPolicy, collectDeviceSignals, deviceSignalsExtraHeaders, encodeDeviceSignalsHeader, enrollPasskey, listPasskeys, mintPasskeyRegisterIntent, renamePasskey, revokePasskey, sendEmailOtp, signInOrigin, signInWithMagicLink, signInWithPasskey, useAuthio, useAuthioRequired, usePasskeys, verifyEmailOtp, verifyLocate, wrapFetchError };
|