@unwanted/matrix-sdk-mini 34.12.0-2 → 34.12.0-4

package/src/crypto/algorithms/olm.ts

@@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
-/*
-Copyright 2016 - 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
-
-Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-
-Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-limitations under the License.
-*/
-
-/**
- * Defines m.olm encryption/decryption
- */
-
-import type { IEventDecryptionResult } from "../../@types/crypto.ts";
-import { logger } from "../../logger.ts";
-import * as olmlib from "../olmlib.ts";
-import { DeviceInfo } from "../deviceinfo.ts";
-import { DecryptionAlgorithm, EncryptionAlgorithm, registerAlgorithm } from "./base.ts";
-import { Room } from "../../models/room.ts";
-import { IContent, MatrixEvent } from "../../models/event.ts";
-import { IEncryptedContent, IOlmEncryptedContent } from "../index.ts";
-import { IInboundSession } from "../OlmDevice.ts";
-import { DecryptionFailureCode } from "../../crypto-api/index.ts";
-import { DecryptionError } from "../../common-crypto/CryptoBackend.ts";
-
-const DeviceVerification = DeviceInfo.DeviceVerification;
-
-export interface IMessage {
-    type: number;
-    body: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Olm encryption implementation
- *
- * @param params - parameters, as per {@link EncryptionAlgorithm}
- */
-class OlmEncryption extends EncryptionAlgorithm {
-    private sessionPrepared = false;
-    private prepPromise: Promise<void> | null = null;
-
-    /**
-     * @internal
-
-     * @param roomMembers - list of currently-joined users in the room
-     * @returns Promise which resolves when setup is complete
-     */
-    private ensureSession(roomMembers: string[]): Promise<void> {
-        if (this.prepPromise) {
-            // prep already in progress
-            return this.prepPromise;
-        }
-
-        if (this.sessionPrepared) {
-            // prep already done
-            return Promise.resolve();
-        }
-
-        this.prepPromise = this.crypto
-            .downloadKeys(roomMembers)
-            .then(() => {
-                return this.crypto.ensureOlmSessionsForUsers(roomMembers);
-            })
-            .then(() => {
-                this.sessionPrepared = true;
-            })
-            .finally(() => {
-                this.prepPromise = null;
-            });
-
-        return this.prepPromise;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @param content - plaintext event content
-     *
-     * @returns Promise which resolves to the new event body
-     */
-    public async encryptMessage(room: Room, eventType: string, content: IContent): Promise<IOlmEncryptedContent> {
-        // pick the list of recipients based on the membership list.
-        //
-        // TODO: there is a race condition here! What if a new user turns up
-        // just as you are sending a secret message?
-
-        const members = await room.getEncryptionTargetMembers();
-
-        const users = members.map(function (u) {
-            return u.userId;
-        });
-
-        await this.ensureSession(users);
-
-        const payloadFields = {
-            room_id: room.roomId,
-            type: eventType,
-            content: content,
-        };
-
-        const encryptedContent: IEncryptedContent = {
-            algorithm: olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM,
-            sender_key: this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key!,
-            ciphertext: {},
-        };
-
-        const promises: Promise<void>[] = [];
-
-        for (const userId of users) {
-            const devices = this.crypto.getStoredDevicesForUser(userId) || [];
-
-            for (const deviceInfo of devices) {
-                const key = deviceInfo.getIdentityKey();
-                if (key == this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key) {
-                    // don't bother sending to ourself
-                    continue;
-                }
-                if (deviceInfo.verified == DeviceVerification.BLOCKED) {
-                    // don't bother setting up sessions with blocked users
-                    continue;
-                }
-
-                promises.push(
-                    olmlib.encryptMessageForDevice(
-                        encryptedContent.ciphertext,
-                        this.userId,
-                        this.deviceId,
-                        this.olmDevice,
-                        userId,
-                        deviceInfo,
-                        payloadFields,
-                    ),
-                );
-            }
-        }
-
-        return Promise.all(promises).then(() => encryptedContent);
-    }
-}
-
-/**
- * Olm decryption implementation
- *
- * @param params - parameters, as per {@link DecryptionAlgorithm}
- */
-class OlmDecryption extends DecryptionAlgorithm {
-    /**
-     * returns a promise which resolves to a
-     * {@link EventDecryptionResult} once we have finished
-     * decrypting. Rejects with an `algorithms.DecryptionError` if there is a
-     * problem decrypting the event.
-     */
-    public async decryptEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<IEventDecryptionResult> {
-        const content = event.getWireContent();
-        const deviceKey = content.sender_key;
-        const ciphertext = content.ciphertext;
-
-        if (!ciphertext) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_MISSING_CIPHERTEXT, "Missing ciphertext");
-        }
-
-        if (!(this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key! in ciphertext)) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_NOT_INCLUDED_IN_RECIPIENTS,
-                "Not included in recipients",
-            );
-        }
-        const message = ciphertext[this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key!];
-        let payloadString: string;
-
-        try {
-            payloadString = await this.decryptMessage(deviceKey, message);
-        } catch (e) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_BAD_ENCRYPTED_MESSAGE, "Bad Encrypted Message", {
-                sender: deviceKey,
-                err: e as Error,
-            });
-        }
-
-        const payload = JSON.parse(payloadString);
-
-        // check that we were the intended recipient, to avoid unknown-key attack
-        // https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2483
-        if (payload.recipient != this.userId) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_BAD_RECIPIENT,
-                "Message was intended for " + payload.recipient,
-            );
-        }
-
-        if (payload.recipient_keys.ed25519 != this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_BAD_RECIPIENT_KEY,
-                "Message not intended for this device",
-                {
-                    intended: payload.recipient_keys.ed25519,
-                    our_key: this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key!,
-                },
-            );
-        }
-
-        // check that the device that encrypted the event belongs to the user that the event claims it's from.
-        //
-        // If the device is unknown then we check that we don't have any pending key-query requests for the sender. If
-        // after that the device is still unknown, then we can only assume that the device logged out and accept it
-        // anyway. Some event handlers, such as secret sharing, may be more strict and reject events that come from
-        // unknown devices.
-        //
-        // This is a defence against the following scenario:
-        //
-        //   * Alice has verified Bob and Mallory.
-        //   * Mallory gets control of Alice's server, and sends a megolm session to Alice using her (Mallory's)
-        //     senderkey, but claiming to be from Bob.
-        //   * Mallory sends more events using that session, claiming to be from Bob.
-        //   * Alice sees that the senderkey is verified (since she verified Mallory) so marks events those events as
-        //     verified even though the sender is forged.
-        //
-        // In practice, it's not clear that the js-sdk would behave that way, so this may be only a defence in depth.
-
-        let senderKeyUser = this.crypto.deviceList.getUserByIdentityKey(olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM, deviceKey);
-        if (senderKeyUser === undefined || senderKeyUser === null) {
-            // Wait for any pending key query fetches for the user to complete before trying the lookup again.
-            try {
-                await this.crypto.deviceList.downloadKeys([event.getSender()!], false);
-            } catch (e) {
-                throw new DecryptionError(
-                    DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_BAD_SENDER_CHECK_FAILED,
-                    "Could not verify sender identity",
-                    {
-                        sender: deviceKey,
-                        err: e as Error,
-                    },
-                );
-            }
-
-            senderKeyUser = this.crypto.deviceList.getUserByIdentityKey(olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM, deviceKey);
-        }
-        if (senderKeyUser !== event.getSender() && senderKeyUser !== undefined && senderKeyUser !== null) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_BAD_SENDER,
-                "Message claimed to be from " + event.getSender(),
-                {
-                    real_sender: senderKeyUser,
-                },
-            );
-        }
-
-        // check that the original sender matches what the homeserver told us, to
-        // avoid people masquerading as others.
-        // (this check is also provided via the sender's embedded ed25519 key,
-        // which is checked elsewhere).
-        if (payload.sender != event.getSender()) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_FORWARDED_MESSAGE,
-                "Message forwarded from " + payload.sender,
-                {
-                    reported_sender: event.getSender()!,
-                },
-            );
-        }
-
-        // Olm events intended for a room have a room_id.
-        if (payload.room_id !== event.getRoomId()) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.OLM_BAD_ROOM,
-                "Message intended for room " + payload.room_id,
-                {
-                    reported_room: event.getRoomId() || "ROOM_ID_UNDEFINED",
-                },
-            );
-        }
-
-        const claimedKeys = payload.keys || {};
-
-        return {
-            clearEvent: payload,
-            senderCurve25519Key: deviceKey,
-            claimedEd25519Key: claimedKeys.ed25519 || null,
-        };
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Attempt to decrypt an Olm message
-     *
-     * @param theirDeviceIdentityKey -  Curve25519 identity key of the sender
-     * @param message -  message object, with 'type' and 'body' fields
-     *
-     * @returns payload, if decrypted successfully.
-     */
-    private decryptMessage(theirDeviceIdentityKey: string, message: IMessage): Promise<string> {
-        // This is a wrapper that serialises decryptions of prekey messages, because
-        // otherwise we race between deciding we have no active sessions for the message
-        // and creating a new one, which we can only do once because it removes the OTK.
-        if (message.type !== 0) {
-            // not a prekey message: we can safely just try & decrypt it
-            return this.reallyDecryptMessage(theirDeviceIdentityKey, message);
-        } else {
-            const myPromise = this.olmDevice.olmPrekeyPromise.then(() => {
-                return this.reallyDecryptMessage(theirDeviceIdentityKey, message);
-            });
-            // we want the error, but don't propagate it to the next decryption
-            this.olmDevice.olmPrekeyPromise = myPromise.catch(() => {});
-            return myPromise;
-        }
-    }
-
-    private async reallyDecryptMessage(theirDeviceIdentityKey: string, message: IMessage): Promise<string> {
-        const sessionIds = await this.olmDevice.getSessionIdsForDevice(theirDeviceIdentityKey);
-
-        // try each session in turn.
-        const decryptionErrors: Record<string, string> = {};
-        for (const sessionId of sessionIds) {
-            try {
-                const payload = await this.olmDevice.decryptMessage(
-                    theirDeviceIdentityKey,
-                    sessionId,
-                    message.type,
-                    message.body,
-                );
-                logger.log("Decrypted Olm message from " + theirDeviceIdentityKey + " with session " + sessionId);
-                return payload;
-            } catch (e) {
-                const foundSession = await this.olmDevice.matchesSession(
-                    theirDeviceIdentityKey,
-                    sessionId,
-                    message.type,
-                    message.body,
-                );
-
-                if (foundSession) {
-                    // decryption failed, but it was a prekey message matching this
-                    // session, so it should have worked.
-                    throw new Error(
-                        "Error decrypting prekey message with existing session id " +
-                            sessionId +
-                            ": " +
-                            (<Error>e).message,
-                    );
-                }
-
-                // otherwise it's probably a message for another session; carry on, but
-                // keep a record of the error
-                decryptionErrors[sessionId] = (<Error>e).message;
-            }
-        }
-
-        if (message.type !== 0) {
-            // not a prekey message, so it should have matched an existing session, but it
-            // didn't work.
-
-            if (sessionIds.length === 0) {
-                throw new Error("No existing sessions");
-            }
-
-            throw new Error(
-                "Error decrypting non-prekey message with existing sessions: " + JSON.stringify(decryptionErrors),
-            );
-        }
-
-        // prekey message which doesn't match any existing sessions: make a new
-        // session.
-
-        let res: IInboundSession;
-        try {
-            res = await this.olmDevice.createInboundSession(theirDeviceIdentityKey, message.type, message.body);
-        } catch (e) {
-            decryptionErrors["(new)"] = (<Error>e).message;
-            throw new Error("Error decrypting prekey message: " + JSON.stringify(decryptionErrors));
-        }
-
-        logger.log("created new inbound Olm session ID " + res.session_id + " with " + theirDeviceIdentityKey);
-        return res.payload;
-    }
-}
-
-registerAlgorithm(olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM, OlmEncryption, OlmDecryption);

package/src/crypto/api.ts

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-/*
-Copyright 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
-
-Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-
-Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-limitations under the License.
-*/
-
-import { DeviceInfo } from "./deviceinfo.ts";
-
-/* re-exports for backwards compatibility. */
-// CrossSigningKey is used as a value in `client.ts`, we can't export it as a type
-export { CrossSigningKey } from "../crypto-api/index.ts";
-export type {
-    GeneratedSecretStorageKey as IRecoveryKey,
-    CreateSecretStorageOpts as ICreateSecretStorageOpts,
-} from "../crypto-api/index.ts";
-
-export type {
-    ImportRoomKeyProgressData as IImportOpts,
-    ImportRoomKeysOpts as IImportRoomKeysOpts,
-} from "../crypto-api/index.ts";
-
-export type {
-    AddSecretStorageKeyOpts as IAddSecretStorageKeyOpts,
-    PassphraseInfo as IPassphraseInfo,
-    SecretStorageKeyDescription as ISecretStorageKeyInfo,
-} from "../secret-storage.ts";
-
-// TODO: Merge this with crypto.js once converted
-
-export interface IEncryptedEventInfo {
-    /**
-     * whether the event is encrypted (if not encrypted, some of the other properties may not be set)
-     */
-    encrypted: boolean;
-
-    /**
-     * the sender's key
-     */
-    senderKey: string;
-
-    /**
-     * the algorithm used to encrypt the event
-     */
-    algorithm: string;
-
-    /**
-     * whether we can be sure that the owner of the senderKey sent the event
-     */
-    authenticated: boolean;
-
-    /**
-     * the sender's device information, if available
-     */
-    sender?: DeviceInfo;
-
-    /**
-     * if the event's ed25519 and curve25519 keys don't match (only meaningful if `sender` is set)
-     */
-    mismatchedSender: boolean;
-}