@unwanted/matrix-sdk-mini 34.12.0-2 → 34.12.0-3

package/src/crypto/index.ts

@@ -1,4414 +0,0 @@
-/*
-Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
-Copyright 2017 Vector Creations Ltd
-Copyright 2018-2019 New Vector Ltd
-Copyright 2019-2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
-
-Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-You may obtain a copy of the License at
-
-    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-
-Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-limitations under the License.
-*/
-
-import anotherjson from "another-json";
-import { v4 as uuidv4 } from "uuid";
-
-import type { IDeviceKeys, IEventDecryptionResult, IMegolmSessionData, IOneTimeKey } from "../@types/crypto.ts";
-import type { PkDecryption, PkSigning } from "@matrix-org/olm";
-import { EventType, ToDeviceMessageId } from "../@types/event.ts";
-import { TypedReEmitter } from "../ReEmitter.ts";
-import { logger } from "../logger.ts";
-import { IExportedDevice, OlmDevice } from "./OlmDevice.ts";
-import { IOlmDevice } from "./algorithms/megolm.ts";
-import * as olmlib from "./olmlib.ts";
-import { DeviceInfoMap, DeviceList } from "./DeviceList.ts";
-import { DeviceInfo, IDevice } from "./deviceinfo.ts";
-import type { DecryptionAlgorithm, EncryptionAlgorithm } from "./algorithms/index.ts";
-import * as algorithms from "./algorithms/index.ts";
-import { createCryptoStoreCacheCallbacks, CrossSigningInfo, DeviceTrustLevel, UserTrustLevel } from "./CrossSigning.ts";
-import { EncryptionSetupBuilder } from "./EncryptionSetup.ts";
-import { SecretStorage as LegacySecretStorage } from "./SecretStorage.ts";
-import { CrossSigningKey, ICreateSecretStorageOpts, IEncryptedEventInfo, IRecoveryKey } from "./api.ts";
-import { OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager } from "./OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.ts";
-import { IndexedDBCryptoStore } from "./store/indexeddb-crypto-store.ts";
-import { VerificationBase } from "./verification/Base.ts";
-import { ReciprocateQRCode, SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD, SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD } from "./verification/QRCode.ts";
-import { SAS as SASVerification } from "./verification/SAS.ts";
-import { keyFromPassphrase } from "./key_passphrase.ts";
-import { VerificationRequest } from "./verification/request/VerificationRequest.ts";
-import { InRoomChannel, InRoomRequests } from "./verification/request/InRoomChannel.ts";
-import { Request, ToDeviceChannel, ToDeviceRequests } from "./verification/request/ToDeviceChannel.ts";
-import { IllegalMethod } from "./verification/IllegalMethod.ts";
-import { KeySignatureUploadError } from "../errors.ts";
-import { DehydrationManager } from "./dehydration.ts";
-import { BackupManager, LibOlmBackupDecryptor, backupTrustInfoFromLegacyTrustInfo } from "./backup.ts";
-import { IStore } from "../store/index.ts";
-import { Room, RoomEvent } from "../models/room.ts";
-import { RoomMember, RoomMemberEvent } from "../models/room-member.ts";
-import { EventStatus, IContent, IEvent, MatrixEvent, MatrixEventEvent } from "../models/event.ts";
-import { ToDeviceBatch, ToDevicePayload } from "../models/ToDeviceMessage.ts";
-import { ClientEvent, IKeysUploadResponse, ISignedKey, IUploadKeySignaturesResponse, MatrixClient } from "../client.ts";
-import { IRoomEncryption, RoomList } from "./RoomList.ts";
-import { IKeyBackupInfo } from "./keybackup.ts";
-import { ISyncStateData } from "../sync.ts";
-import { CryptoStore } from "./store/base.ts";
-import { IVerificationChannel } from "./verification/request/Channel.ts";
-import { TypedEventEmitter } from "../models/typed-event-emitter.ts";
-import { IDeviceLists, ISyncResponse, IToDeviceEvent } from "../sync-accumulator.ts";
-import { ISignatures } from "../@types/signed.ts";
-import { IMessage } from "./algorithms/olm.ts";
-import {
-    BackupDecryptor,
-    CryptoBackend,
-    DecryptionError,
-    OnSyncCompletedData,
-} from "../common-crypto/CryptoBackend.ts";
-import { RoomState, RoomStateEvent } from "../models/room-state.ts";
-import { MapWithDefault, recursiveMapToObject } from "../utils.ts";
-import {
-    AccountDataClient,
-    AddSecretStorageKeyOpts,
-    calculateKeyCheck,
-    SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES,
-    SecretStorageKeyDescription,
-    SecretStorageKeyObject,
-    SecretStorageKeyTuple,
-    ServerSideSecretStorageImpl,
-} from "../secret-storage.ts";
-import { ISecretRequest } from "./SecretSharing.ts";
-import {
-    BackupTrustInfo,
-    BootstrapCrossSigningOpts,
-    CrossSigningKeyInfo,
-    CrossSigningStatus,
-    decodeRecoveryKey,
-    DecryptionFailureCode,
-    DeviceIsolationMode,
-    DeviceVerificationStatus,
-    encodeRecoveryKey,
-    EventEncryptionInfo,
-    EventShieldColour,
-    EventShieldReason,
-    ImportRoomKeysOpts,
-    KeyBackupCheck,
-    KeyBackupInfo,
-    OwnDeviceKeys,
-    CryptoEvent as CryptoApiCryptoEvent,
-    CryptoEventHandlerMap as CryptoApiCryptoEventHandlerMap,
-    KeyBackupRestoreResult,
-    KeyBackupRestoreOpts,
-} from "../crypto-api/index.ts";
-import { Device, DeviceMap } from "../models/device.ts";
-import { deviceInfoToDevice } from "./device-converter.ts";
-import { ClientPrefix, MatrixError, Method } from "../http-api/index.ts";
-import { decodeBase64, encodeBase64 } from "../base64.ts";
-import { KnownMembership } from "../@types/membership.ts";
-import decryptAESSecretStorageItem from "../utils/decryptAESSecretStorageItem.ts";
-import encryptAESSecretStorageItem from "../utils/encryptAESSecretStorageItem.ts";
-import { AESEncryptedSecretStoragePayload } from "../@types/AESEncryptedSecretStoragePayload.ts";
-
-/* re-exports for backwards compatibility */
-export type {
-    BootstrapCrossSigningOpts as IBootstrapCrossSigningOpts,
-    CryptoCallbacks as ICryptoCallbacks,
-} from "../crypto-api/index.ts";
-
-const DeviceVerification = DeviceInfo.DeviceVerification;
-
-const defaultVerificationMethods = {
-    [ReciprocateQRCode.NAME]: ReciprocateQRCode,
-    [SASVerification.NAME]: SASVerification,
-
-    // These two can't be used for actual verification, but we do
-    // need to be able to define them here for the verification flows
-    // to start.
-    [SHOW_QR_CODE_METHOD]: IllegalMethod,
-    [SCAN_QR_CODE_METHOD]: IllegalMethod,
-} as const;
-
-/**
- * verification method names
- */
-// legacy export identifier
-export const verificationMethods = {
-    RECIPROCATE_QR_CODE: ReciprocateQRCode.NAME,
-    SAS: SASVerification.NAME,
-} as const;
-
-export type VerificationMethod = keyof typeof verificationMethods | string;
-
-// minimum time between attempting to unwedge an Olm session, if we succeeded
-// in creating a new session
-const MIN_FORCE_SESSION_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour
-// minimum time between attempting to unwedge an Olm session, if we failed
-// to create a new session
-const FORCE_SESSION_RETRY_INTERVAL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
-
-interface IInitOpts {
-    exportedOlmDevice?: IExportedDevice;
-    pickleKey?: string;
-}
-
-/* eslint-disable camelcase */
-interface IRoomKey {
-    room_id: string;
-    algorithm: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * The parameters of a room key request. The details of the request may
- * vary with the crypto algorithm, but the management and storage layers for
- * outgoing requests expect it to have 'room_id' and 'session_id' properties.
- */
-export interface IRoomKeyRequestBody extends IRoomKey {
-    session_id: string;
-    sender_key: string;
-}
-
-/* eslint-enable camelcase */
-
-interface IDeviceVerificationUpgrade {
-    devices: DeviceInfo[];
-    crossSigningInfo: CrossSigningInfo;
-}
-
-export interface ICheckOwnCrossSigningTrustOpts {
-    allowPrivateKeyRequests?: boolean;
-}
-
-interface IUserOlmSession {
-    deviceIdKey: string;
-    sessions: {
-        sessionId: string;
-        hasReceivedMessage: boolean;
-    }[];
-}
-
-export interface IRoomKeyRequestRecipient {
-    userId: string;
-    deviceId: string;
-}
-
-interface ISignableObject {
-    signatures?: ISignatures;
-    unsigned?: object;
-}
-
-export interface IRequestsMap {
-    getRequest(event: MatrixEvent): VerificationRequest | undefined;
-    getRequestByChannel(channel: IVerificationChannel): VerificationRequest | undefined;
-    setRequest(event: MatrixEvent, request: VerificationRequest): void;
-    setRequestByChannel(channel: IVerificationChannel, request: VerificationRequest): void;
-}
-
-/* eslint-disable camelcase */
-export interface IOlmEncryptedContent {
-    algorithm: typeof olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM;
-    sender_key: string;
-    ciphertext: Record<string, IMessage>;
-    [ToDeviceMessageId]?: string;
-}
-
-export interface IMegolmEncryptedContent {
-    algorithm: typeof olmlib.MEGOLM_ALGORITHM;
-    sender_key: string;
-    session_id: string;
-    device_id: string;
-    ciphertext: string;
-    [ToDeviceMessageId]?: string;
-}
-/* eslint-enable camelcase */
-
-export type IEncryptedContent = IOlmEncryptedContent | IMegolmEncryptedContent;
-
-export enum CryptoEvent {
-    /** @deprecated Event not fired by the rust crypto */
-    DeviceVerificationChanged = "deviceVerificationChanged",
-    UserTrustStatusChanged = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.UserTrustStatusChanged,
-    /** @deprecated Event not fired by the rust crypto */
-    UserCrossSigningUpdated = "userCrossSigningUpdated",
-    /** @deprecated Event not fired by the rust crypto */
-    RoomKeyRequest = "crypto.roomKeyRequest",
-    /** @deprecated Event not fired by the rust crypto */
-    RoomKeyRequestCancellation = "crypto.roomKeyRequestCancellation",
-    KeyBackupStatus = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.KeyBackupStatus,
-    KeyBackupFailed = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.KeyBackupFailed,
-    KeyBackupSessionsRemaining = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.KeyBackupSessionsRemaining,
-
-    /**
-     * Fires when a new valid backup decryption key is in cache.
-     * This will happen when a secret is received from another session, from secret storage,
-     * or when a new backup is created from this session.
-     *
-     * The payload is the version of the backup for which we have the key for.
-     *
-     * This event is only fired by the rust crypto backend.
-     */
-    KeyBackupDecryptionKeyCached = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.KeyBackupDecryptionKeyCached,
-
-    /** @deprecated Event not fired by the rust crypto */
-    KeySignatureUploadFailure = "crypto.keySignatureUploadFailure",
-    /** @deprecated Use `VerificationRequestReceived`. */
-    VerificationRequest = "crypto.verification.request",
-
-    /**
-     * Fires when a key verification request is received.
-     *
-     * The payload is a {@link Crypto.VerificationRequest}.
-     */
-    VerificationRequestReceived = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.VerificationRequestReceived,
-
-    /** @deprecated Event not fired by the rust crypto */
-    Warning = "crypto.warning",
-    /** @deprecated Use {@link DevicesUpdated} instead when using rust crypto */
-    WillUpdateDevices = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.WillUpdateDevices,
-    DevicesUpdated = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.DevicesUpdated,
-    KeysChanged = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.KeysChanged,
-
-    /**
-     * Fires when data is being migrated from legacy crypto to rust crypto.
-     *
-     * The payload is a pair `(progress, total)`, where `progress` is the number of steps completed so far, and
-     * `total` is the total number of steps. When migration is complete, a final instance of the event is emitted, with
-     * `progress === total === -1`.
-     */
-    LegacyCryptoStoreMigrationProgress = CryptoApiCryptoEvent.LegacyCryptoStoreMigrationProgress,
-}
-
-export type CryptoEventHandlerMap = CryptoApiCryptoEventHandlerMap & {
-    /**
-     * Fires when a device is marked as verified/unverified/blocked/unblocked by
-     * {@link MatrixClient#setDeviceVerified | MatrixClient.setDeviceVerified} or
-     * {@link MatrixClient#setDeviceBlocked | MatrixClient.setDeviceBlocked}.
-     *
-     * @param userId - the owner of the verified device
-     * @param deviceId - the id of the verified device
-     * @param deviceInfo - updated device information
-     */
-    [CryptoEvent.DeviceVerificationChanged]: (userId: string, deviceId: string, deviceInfo: DeviceInfo) => void;
-    /**
-     * Fires when we receive a room key request
-     *
-     * @param request - request details
-     */
-    [CryptoEvent.RoomKeyRequest]: (request: IncomingRoomKeyRequest) => void;
-    /**
-     * Fires when we receive a room key request cancellation
-     */
-    [CryptoEvent.RoomKeyRequestCancellation]: (request: IncomingRoomKeyRequestCancellation) => void;
-    [CryptoEvent.KeySignatureUploadFailure]: (
-        failures: IUploadKeySignaturesResponse["failures"],
-        source: "checkOwnCrossSigningTrust" | "afterCrossSigningLocalKeyChange" | "setDeviceVerification",
-        upload: (opts: { shouldEmit: boolean }) => Promise<void>,
-    ) => void;
-    /**
-     * Fires when a key verification is requested.
-     *
-     * Deprecated: use `CryptoEvent.VerificationRequestReceived`.
-     */
-    [CryptoEvent.VerificationRequest]: (request: VerificationRequest<any>) => void;
-    /**
-     * Fires when the app may wish to warn the user about something related
-     * the end-to-end crypto.
-     *
-     * @param type - One of the strings listed above
-     */
-    [CryptoEvent.Warning]: (type: string) => void;
-    [CryptoEvent.UserCrossSigningUpdated]: (userId: string) => void;
-
-    [CryptoEvent.LegacyCryptoStoreMigrationProgress]: (progress: number, total: number) => void;
-};
-
-export class Crypto extends TypedEventEmitter<CryptoEvent, CryptoEventHandlerMap> implements CryptoBackend {
-    /**
-     * @returns The version of Olm.
-     */
-    public static getOlmVersion(): [number, number, number] {
-        return OlmDevice.getOlmVersion();
-    }
-
-    public readonly backupManager: BackupManager;
-    public readonly crossSigningInfo: CrossSigningInfo;
-    public readonly olmDevice: OlmDevice;
-    public readonly deviceList: DeviceList;
-    public readonly dehydrationManager: DehydrationManager;
-    public readonly secretStorage: LegacySecretStorage;
-
-    private readonly roomList: RoomList;
-    private readonly reEmitter: TypedReEmitter<CryptoEvent, CryptoEventHandlerMap>;
-    private readonly verificationMethods: Map<VerificationMethod, typeof VerificationBase>;
-    public readonly supportedAlgorithms: string[];
-    private readonly outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager: OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager;
-    private readonly toDeviceVerificationRequests: ToDeviceRequests;
-    public readonly inRoomVerificationRequests: InRoomRequests;
-
-    private trustCrossSignedDevices = true;
-    // the last time we did a check for the number of one-time-keys on the server.
-    private lastOneTimeKeyCheck: number | null = null;
-    private oneTimeKeyCheckInProgress = false;
-
-    // EncryptionAlgorithm instance for each room
-    private roomEncryptors = new Map<string, EncryptionAlgorithm>();
-    // map from algorithm to DecryptionAlgorithm instance, for each room
-    private roomDecryptors = new Map<string, Map<string, DecryptionAlgorithm>>();
-
-    private deviceKeys: Record<string, string> = {}; // type: key
-
-    public globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices = false;
-    public globalErrorOnUnknownDevices = true;
-
-    // list of IncomingRoomKeyRequests/IncomingRoomKeyRequestCancellations
-    // we received in the current sync.
-    private receivedRoomKeyRequests: IncomingRoomKeyRequest[] = [];
-    private receivedRoomKeyRequestCancellations: IncomingRoomKeyRequestCancellation[] = [];
-    // true if we are currently processing received room key requests
-    private processingRoomKeyRequests = false;
-    // controls whether device tracking is delayed
-    // until calling encryptEvent or trackRoomDevices,
-    // or done immediately upon enabling room encryption.
-    private lazyLoadMembers = false;
-    // in case lazyLoadMembers is true,
-    // track if an initial tracking of all the room members
-    // has happened for a given room. This is delayed
-    // to avoid loading room members as long as possible.
-    private roomDeviceTrackingState: { [roomId: string]: Promise<void> } = {};
-
-    // The timestamp of the minimum time at which we will retry forcing establishment
-    // of a new session for each device, in milliseconds.
-    // {
-    //     userId: {
-    //         deviceId: 1234567890000,
-    //     },
-    // }
-    // Map: user Id → device Id → timestamp
-    private forceNewSessionRetryTime: MapWithDefault<string, MapWithDefault<string, number>> = new MapWithDefault(
-        () => new MapWithDefault(() => 0),
-    );
-
-    // This flag will be unset whilst the client processes a sync response
-    // so that we don't start requesting keys until we've actually finished
-    // processing the response.
-    private sendKeyRequestsImmediately = false;
-
-    private oneTimeKeyCount?: number;
-    private needsNewFallback?: boolean;
-    private fallbackCleanup?: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;
-
-    /**
-     * Cryptography bits
-     *
-     * This module is internal to the js-sdk; the public API is via MatrixClient.
-     *
-     * @internal
-     *
-     * @param baseApis - base matrix api interface
-     *
-     * @param userId - The user ID for the local user
-     *
-     * @param deviceId - The identifier for this device.
-     *
-     * @param clientStore - the MatrixClient data store.
-     *
-     * @param cryptoStore - storage for the crypto layer.
-     *
-     * @param verificationMethods - Array of verification methods to use.
-     *    Each element can either be a string from MatrixClient.verificationMethods
-     *    or a class that implements a verification method.
-     */
-    public constructor(
-        public readonly baseApis: MatrixClient,
-        public readonly userId: string,
-        private readonly deviceId: string,
-        private readonly clientStore: IStore,
-        public readonly cryptoStore: CryptoStore,
-        verificationMethods: Array<VerificationMethod | (typeof VerificationBase & { NAME: string })>,
-    ) {
-        super();
-
-        logger.debug("Crypto: initialising roomlist...");
-        this.roomList = new RoomList(cryptoStore);
-
-        this.reEmitter = new TypedReEmitter(this);
-
-        if (verificationMethods) {
-            this.verificationMethods = new Map();
-            for (const method of verificationMethods) {
-                if (typeof method === "string") {
-                    if (defaultVerificationMethods[method]) {
-                        this.verificationMethods.set(
-                            method,
-                            <typeof VerificationBase>defaultVerificationMethods[method],
-                        );
-                    }
-                } else if (method["NAME"]) {
-                    this.verificationMethods.set(method["NAME"], method as typeof VerificationBase);
-                } else {
-                    logger.warn(`Excluding unknown verification method ${method}`);
-                }
-            }
-        } else {
-            this.verificationMethods = new Map(Object.entries(defaultVerificationMethods)) as Map<
-                VerificationMethod,
-                typeof VerificationBase
-            >;
-        }
-
-        this.backupManager = new BackupManager(baseApis, async () => {
-            // try to get key from cache
-            const cachedKey = await this.getSessionBackupPrivateKey();
-            if (cachedKey) {
-                return cachedKey;
-            }
-
-            // try to get key from secret storage
-            const storedKey = await this.secretStorage.get("m.megolm_backup.v1");
-
-            if (storedKey) {
-                // ensure that the key is in the right format.  If not, fix the key and
-                // store the fixed version
-                const fixedKey = fixBackupKey(storedKey);
-                if (fixedKey) {
-                    const keys = await this.secretStorage.getKey();
-                    await this.secretStorage.store("m.megolm_backup.v1", fixedKey, [keys![0]]);
-                }
-
-                return decodeBase64(fixedKey || storedKey);
-            }
-
-            // try to get key from app
-            if (this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks && this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.getBackupKey) {
-                return this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.getBackupKey();
-            }
-
-            throw new Error("Unable to get private key");
-        });
-
-        this.olmDevice = new OlmDevice(cryptoStore);
-        this.deviceList = new DeviceList(baseApis, cryptoStore, this.olmDevice);
-
-        // XXX: This isn't removed at any point, but then none of the event listeners
-        // this class sets seem to be removed at any point... :/
-        this.deviceList.on(CryptoEvent.UserCrossSigningUpdated, this.onDeviceListUserCrossSigningUpdated);
-        this.reEmitter.reEmit(this.deviceList, [CryptoEvent.DevicesUpdated, CryptoEvent.WillUpdateDevices]);
-
-        this.supportedAlgorithms = Array.from(algorithms.DECRYPTION_CLASSES.keys());
-
-        this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager = new OutgoingRoomKeyRequestManager(
-            baseApis,
-            this.deviceId,
-            this.cryptoStore,
-        );
-
-        this.toDeviceVerificationRequests = new ToDeviceRequests();
-        this.inRoomVerificationRequests = new InRoomRequests();
-
-        const cryptoCallbacks = this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks || {};
-        const cacheCallbacks = createCryptoStoreCacheCallbacks(cryptoStore, this.olmDevice);
-
-        this.crossSigningInfo = new CrossSigningInfo(userId, cryptoCallbacks, cacheCallbacks);
-        // Yes, we pass the client twice here: see SecretStorage
-        this.secretStorage = new LegacySecretStorage(baseApis as AccountDataClient, cryptoCallbacks, baseApis);
-        this.dehydrationManager = new DehydrationManager(this);
-
-        // Assuming no app-supplied callback, default to getting from SSSS.
-        if (!cryptoCallbacks.getCrossSigningKey && cryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey) {
-            cryptoCallbacks.getCrossSigningKey = async (type): Promise<Uint8Array | null> => {
-                return CrossSigningInfo.getFromSecretStorage(type, this.secretStorage);
-            };
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Initialise the crypto module so that it is ready for use
-     *
-     * Returns a promise which resolves once the crypto module is ready for use.
-     *
-     * @param exportedOlmDevice - (Optional) data from exported device
-     *     that must be re-created.
-     */
-    public async init({ exportedOlmDevice, pickleKey }: IInitOpts = {}): Promise<void> {
-        logger.log("Crypto: initialising Olm...");
-        await globalThis.Olm.init();
-        logger.log(
-            exportedOlmDevice
-                ? "Crypto: initialising Olm device from exported device..."
-                : "Crypto: initialising Olm device...",
-        );
-        await this.olmDevice.init({ fromExportedDevice: exportedOlmDevice, pickleKey });
-        logger.log("Crypto: loading device list...");
-        await this.deviceList.load();
-
-        // build our device keys: these will later be uploaded
-        this.deviceKeys["ed25519:" + this.deviceId] = this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key!;
-        this.deviceKeys["curve25519:" + this.deviceId] = this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key!;
-
-        logger.log("Crypto: fetching own devices...");
-        let myDevices = this.deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(this.userId);
-
-        if (!myDevices) {
-            myDevices = {};
-        }
-
-        if (!myDevices[this.deviceId]) {
-            // add our own deviceinfo to the cryptoStore
-            logger.log("Crypto: adding this device to the store...");
-            const deviceInfo = {
-                keys: this.deviceKeys,
-                algorithms: this.supportedAlgorithms,
-                verified: DeviceVerification.VERIFIED,
-                known: true,
-            };
-
-            myDevices[this.deviceId] = deviceInfo;
-            this.deviceList.storeDevicesForUser(this.userId, myDevices);
-            this.deviceList.saveIfDirty();
-        }
-
-        await this.cryptoStore.doTxn("readonly", [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT], (txn) => {
-            this.cryptoStore.getCrossSigningKeys(txn, (keys) => {
-                // can be an empty object after resetting cross-signing keys, see storeTrustedSelfKeys
-                if (keys && Object.keys(keys).length !== 0) {
-                    logger.log("Loaded cross-signing public keys from crypto store");
-                    this.crossSigningInfo.setKeys(keys);
-                }
-            });
-        });
-        // make sure we are keeping track of our own devices
-        // (this is important for key backups & things)
-        this.deviceList.startTrackingDeviceList(this.userId);
-
-        logger.debug("Crypto: initialising roomlist...");
-        await this.roomList.init();
-
-        logger.log("Crypto: checking for key backup...");
-        this.backupManager.checkAndStart();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#setDeviceIsolationMode}.
-     */
-    public setDeviceIsolationMode(isolationMode: DeviceIsolationMode): void {
-        throw new Error("Not supported");
-    }
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getVersion}.
-     */
-    public getVersion(): string {
-        const olmVersionTuple = Crypto.getOlmVersion();
-        return `Olm ${olmVersionTuple[0]}.${olmVersionTuple[1]}.${olmVersionTuple[2]}`;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Whether to trust a others users signatures of their devices.
-     * If false, devices will only be considered 'verified' if we have
-     * verified that device individually (effectively disabling cross-signing).
-     *
-     * Default: true
-     *
-     * @returns True if trusting cross-signed devices
-     */
-    public getTrustCrossSignedDevices(): boolean {
-        return this.trustCrossSignedDevices;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
-     */
-    public getCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices(): boolean {
-        return this.trustCrossSignedDevices;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * See getCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices
-     *
-     * @param val - True to trust cross-signed devices
-     */
-    public setTrustCrossSignedDevices(val: boolean): void {
-        this.trustCrossSignedDevices = val;
-
-        for (const userId of this.deviceList.getKnownUserIds()) {
-            const devices = this.deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
-            for (const deviceId of Object.keys(devices)) {
-                const deviceTrust = this.checkDeviceTrust(userId, deviceId);
-                // If the device is locally verified then isVerified() is always true,
-                // so this will only have caused the value to change if the device is
-                // cross-signing verified but not locally verified
-                if (!deviceTrust.isLocallyVerified() && deviceTrust.isCrossSigningVerified()) {
-                    const deviceObj = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId)!;
-                    this.emit(CryptoEvent.DeviceVerificationChanged, userId, deviceId, deviceObj);
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
-     */
-    public setCryptoTrustCrossSignedDevices(val: boolean): void {
-        this.setTrustCrossSignedDevices(val);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Create a recovery key from a user-supplied passphrase.
-     *
-     * @param password - Passphrase string that can be entered by the user
-     *     when restoring the backup as an alternative to entering the recovery key.
-     *     Optional.
-     * @returns Object with public key metadata, encoded private
-     *     recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
-     *     and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
-     */
-    public async createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase(password?: string): Promise<IRecoveryKey> {
-        const decryption = new globalThis.Olm.PkDecryption();
-        try {
-            if (password) {
-                const derivation = await keyFromPassphrase(password);
-
-                decryption.init_with_private_key(derivation.key);
-                const privateKey = decryption.get_private_key();
-                return {
-                    keyInfo: {
-                        passphrase: {
-                            algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
-                            iterations: derivation.iterations,
-                            salt: derivation.salt,
-                        },
-                    },
-                    privateKey: privateKey,
-                    encodedPrivateKey: encodeRecoveryKey(privateKey),
-                };
-            } else {
-                decryption.generate_key();
-                const privateKey = decryption.get_private_key();
-                return {
-                    privateKey: privateKey,
-                    encodedPrivateKey: encodeRecoveryKey(privateKey),
-                };
-            }
-        } finally {
-            decryption?.free();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Checks if the user has previously published cross-signing keys
-     *
-     * This means downloading the devicelist for the user and checking if the list includes
-     * the cross-signing pseudo-device.
-     *
-     * @internal
-     */
-    public async userHasCrossSigningKeys(userId = this.userId): Promise<boolean> {
-        await this.downloadKeys([userId]);
-        return this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId) !== null;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Checks whether cross signing:
-     * - is enabled on this account and trusted by this device
-     * - has private keys either cached locally or stored in secret storage
-     *
-     * If this function returns false, bootstrapCrossSigning() can be used
-     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
-     * bootstrapCrossSigning() completes successfully, this function should
-     * return true.
-     *
-     * The cross-signing API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
-     *
-     * @returns True if cross-signing is ready to be used on this device
-     */
-    public async isCrossSigningReady(): Promise<boolean> {
-        const publicKeysOnDevice = this.crossSigningInfo.getId();
-        const privateKeysExistSomewhere =
-            (await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInKeyCache()) ||
-            (await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(this.secretStorage));
-
-        return !!(publicKeysOnDevice && privateKeysExistSomewhere);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Checks whether secret storage:
-     * - is enabled on this account
-     * - is storing cross-signing private keys
-     * - is storing session backup key (if enabled)
-     *
-     * If this function returns false, bootstrapSecretStorage() can be used
-     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
-     * bootstrapSecretStorage() completes successfully, this function should
-     * return true.
-     *
-     * The Secure Secret Storage API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
-     *
-     * @returns True if secret storage is ready to be used on this device
-     */
-    public async isSecretStorageReady(): Promise<boolean> {
-        const secretStorageKeyInAccount = await this.secretStorage.hasKey();
-        const privateKeysInStorage = await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(this.secretStorage);
-        const sessionBackupInStorage =
-            !this.backupManager.getKeyBackupEnabled() || (await this.baseApis.isKeyBackupKeyStored());
-
-        return !!(secretStorageKeyInAccount && privateKeysInStorage && sessionBackupInStorage);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getCrossSigningStatus}
-     */
-    public async getCrossSigningStatus(): Promise<CrossSigningStatus> {
-        const publicKeysOnDevice = Boolean(this.crossSigningInfo.getId());
-        const privateKeysInSecretStorage = Boolean(
-            await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(this.secretStorage),
-        );
-        const cacheCallbacks = this.crossSigningInfo.getCacheCallbacks();
-        const masterKey = Boolean(await cacheCallbacks.getCrossSigningKeyCache?.("master"));
-        const selfSigningKey = Boolean(await cacheCallbacks.getCrossSigningKeyCache?.("self_signing"));
-        const userSigningKey = Boolean(await cacheCallbacks.getCrossSigningKeyCache?.("user_signing"));
-
-        return {
-            publicKeysOnDevice,
-            privateKeysInSecretStorage,
-            privateKeysCachedLocally: {
-                masterKey,
-                selfSigningKey,
-                userSigningKey,
-            },
-        };
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Bootstrap cross-signing by creating keys if needed. If everything is already
-     * set up, then no changes are made, so this is safe to run to ensure
-     * cross-signing is ready for use.
-     *
-     * This function:
-     * - creates new cross-signing keys if they are not found locally cached nor in
-     *   secret storage (if it has been setup)
-     *
-     * The cross-signing API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
-     */
-    public async bootstrapCrossSigning({
-        authUploadDeviceSigningKeys,
-        setupNewCrossSigning,
-    }: BootstrapCrossSigningOpts = {}): Promise<void> {
-        logger.log("Bootstrapping cross-signing");
-
-        const delegateCryptoCallbacks = this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks;
-        const builder = new EncryptionSetupBuilder(this.baseApis.store.accountData, delegateCryptoCallbacks);
-        const crossSigningInfo = new CrossSigningInfo(
-            this.userId,
-            builder.crossSigningCallbacks,
-            builder.crossSigningCallbacks,
-        );
-
-        // Reset the cross-signing keys
-        const resetCrossSigning = async (): Promise<void> => {
-            crossSigningInfo.resetKeys();
-            // Sign master key with device key
-            await this.signObject(crossSigningInfo.keys.master);
-
-            // Store auth flow helper function, as we need to call it when uploading
-            // to ensure we handle auth errors properly.
-            builder.addCrossSigningKeys(authUploadDeviceSigningKeys, crossSigningInfo.keys);
-
-            // Cross-sign own device
-            const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(this.userId, this.deviceId)!;
-            const deviceSignature = await crossSigningInfo.signDevice(this.userId, device);
-            builder.addKeySignature(this.userId, this.deviceId, deviceSignature!);
-
-            // Sign message key backup with cross-signing master key
-            if (this.backupManager.backupInfo) {
-                await crossSigningInfo.signObject(this.backupManager.backupInfo.auth_data, "master");
-                builder.addSessionBackup(this.backupManager.backupInfo);
-            }
-        };
-
-        const publicKeysOnDevice = this.crossSigningInfo.getId();
-        const privateKeysInCache = await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInKeyCache();
-        const privateKeysInStorage = await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(this.secretStorage);
-        const privateKeysExistSomewhere = privateKeysInCache || privateKeysInStorage;
-
-        // Log all relevant state for easier parsing of debug logs.
-        logger.log({
-            setupNewCrossSigning,
-            publicKeysOnDevice,
-            privateKeysInCache,
-            privateKeysInStorage,
-            privateKeysExistSomewhere,
-        });
-
-        if (!privateKeysExistSomewhere || setupNewCrossSigning) {
-            logger.log("Cross-signing private keys not found locally or in secret storage, " + "creating new keys");
-            // If a user has multiple devices, it important to only call bootstrap
-            // as part of some UI flow (and not silently during startup), as they
-            // may have setup cross-signing on a platform which has not saved keys
-            // to secret storage, and this would reset them. In such a case, you
-            // should prompt the user to verify any existing devices first (and
-            // request private keys from those devices) before calling bootstrap.
-            await resetCrossSigning();
-        } else if (publicKeysOnDevice && privateKeysInCache) {
-            logger.log("Cross-signing public keys trusted and private keys found locally");
-        } else if (privateKeysInStorage) {
-            logger.log(
-                "Cross-signing private keys not found locally, but they are available " +
-                    "in secret storage, reading storage and caching locally",
-            );
-            await this.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust({
-                allowPrivateKeyRequests: true,
-            });
-        }
-
-        // Assuming no app-supplied callback, default to storing new private keys in
-        // secret storage if it exists. If it does not, it is assumed this will be
-        // done as part of setting up secret storage later.
-        const crossSigningPrivateKeys = builder.crossSigningCallbacks.privateKeys;
-        if (crossSigningPrivateKeys.size && !this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.saveCrossSigningKeys) {
-            const secretStorage = new ServerSideSecretStorageImpl(
-                builder.accountDataClientAdapter,
-                builder.ssssCryptoCallbacks,
-            );
-            if (await secretStorage.hasKey()) {
-                logger.log("Storing new cross-signing private keys in secret storage");
-                // This is writing to in-memory account data in
-                // builder.accountDataClientAdapter so won't fail
-                await CrossSigningInfo.storeInSecretStorage(crossSigningPrivateKeys, secretStorage);
-            }
-        }
-
-        const operation = builder.buildOperation();
-        await operation.apply(this);
-        // This persists private keys and public keys as trusted,
-        // only do this if apply succeeded for now as retry isn't in place yet
-        await builder.persist(this);
-
-        logger.log("Cross-signing ready");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Bootstrap Secure Secret Storage if needed by creating a default key. If everything is
-     * already set up, then no changes are made, so this is safe to run to ensure secret
-     * storage is ready for use.
-     *
-     * This function
-     * - creates a new Secure Secret Storage key if no default key exists
-     *   - if a key backup exists, it is migrated to store the key in the Secret
-     *     Storage
-     * - creates a backup if none exists, and one is requested
-     * - migrates Secure Secret Storage to use the latest algorithm, if an outdated
-     *   algorithm is found
-     *
-     * The Secure Secret Storage API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
-     *
-     * Returns:
-     *     A promise which resolves to key creation data for
-     *     SecretStorage#addKey: an object with `passphrase` etc fields.
-     */
-    // TODO this does not resolve with what it says it does
-    public async bootstrapSecretStorage({
-        createSecretStorageKey = async (): Promise<IRecoveryKey> => ({}) as IRecoveryKey,
-        keyBackupInfo,
-        setupNewKeyBackup,
-        setupNewSecretStorage,
-        getKeyBackupPassphrase,
-    }: ICreateSecretStorageOpts = {}): Promise<void> {
-        logger.log("Bootstrapping Secure Secret Storage");
-        const delegateCryptoCallbacks = this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks;
-        const builder = new EncryptionSetupBuilder(this.baseApis.store.accountData, delegateCryptoCallbacks);
-        const secretStorage = new ServerSideSecretStorageImpl(
-            builder.accountDataClientAdapter,
-            builder.ssssCryptoCallbacks,
-        );
-
-        // the ID of the new SSSS key, if we create one
-        let newKeyId: string | null = null;
-
-        // create a new SSSS key and set it as default
-        const createSSSS = async (opts: AddSecretStorageKeyOpts): Promise<string> => {
-            const { keyId, keyInfo } = await secretStorage.addKey(SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES, opts);
-
-            // make the private key available to encrypt 4S secrets
-            builder.ssssCryptoCallbacks.addPrivateKey(keyId, keyInfo, opts.key);
-
-            await secretStorage.setDefaultKeyId(keyId);
-            return keyId;
-        };
-
-        const ensureCanCheckPassphrase = async (keyId: string, keyInfo: SecretStorageKeyDescription): Promise<void> => {
-            if (!keyInfo.mac) {
-                const key = await this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey?.(
-                    { keys: { [keyId]: keyInfo } },
-                    "",
-                );
-                if (key) {
-                    const privateKey = key[1];
-                    builder.ssssCryptoCallbacks.addPrivateKey(keyId, keyInfo, privateKey);
-                    const { iv, mac } = await calculateKeyCheck(privateKey);
-                    keyInfo.iv = iv;
-                    keyInfo.mac = mac;
-
-                    await builder.setAccountData(`m.secret_storage.key.${keyId}`, keyInfo);
-                }
-            }
-        };
-
-        const signKeyBackupWithCrossSigning = async (keyBackupAuthData: IKeyBackupInfo["auth_data"]): Promise<void> => {
-            if (this.crossSigningInfo.getId() && (await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInKeyCache("master"))) {
-                try {
-                    logger.log("Adding cross-signing signature to key backup");
-                    await this.crossSigningInfo.signObject(keyBackupAuthData, "master");
-                } catch (e) {
-                    // This step is not critical (just helpful), so we catch here
-                    // and continue if it fails.
-                    logger.error("Signing key backup with cross-signing keys failed", e);
-                }
-            } else {
-                logger.warn("Cross-signing keys not available, skipping signature on key backup");
-            }
-        };
-
-        const oldSSSSKey = await this.secretStorage.getKey();
-        const [oldKeyId, oldKeyInfo] = oldSSSSKey || [null, null];
-        const storageExists =
-            !setupNewSecretStorage && oldKeyInfo && oldKeyInfo.algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES;
-
-        // Log all relevant state for easier parsing of debug logs.
-        logger.log({
-            keyBackupInfo,
-            setupNewKeyBackup,
-            setupNewSecretStorage,
-            storageExists,
-            oldKeyInfo,
-        });
-
-        if (!storageExists && !keyBackupInfo) {
-            // either we don't have anything, or we've been asked to restart
-            // from scratch
-            logger.log("Secret storage does not exist, creating new storage key");
-
-            // if we already have a usable default SSSS key and aren't resetting
-            // SSSS just use it. otherwise, create a new one
-            // Note: we leave the old SSSS key in place: there could be other
-            // secrets using it, in theory. We could move them to the new key but a)
-            // that would mean we'd need to prompt for the old passphrase, and b)
-            // it's not clear that would be the right thing to do anyway.
-            const { keyInfo, privateKey } = await createSecretStorageKey();
-            newKeyId = await createSSSS({ passphrase: keyInfo?.passphrase, key: privateKey, name: keyInfo?.name });
-        } else if (!storageExists && keyBackupInfo) {
-            // we have an existing backup, but no SSSS
-            logger.log("Secret storage does not exist, using key backup key");
-
-            // if we have the backup key already cached, use it; otherwise use the
-            // callback to prompt for the key
-            const backupKey = (await this.getSessionBackupPrivateKey()) || (await getKeyBackupPassphrase?.());
-
-            // create a new SSSS key and use the backup key as the new SSSS key
-            const opts = { key: backupKey } as AddSecretStorageKeyOpts;
-
-            if (keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_salt && keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_iterations) {
-                // FIXME: ???
-                opts.passphrase = {
-                    algorithm: "m.pbkdf2",
-                    iterations: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_iterations,
-                    salt: keyBackupInfo.auth_data.private_key_salt,
-                    bits: 256,
-                };
-            }
-
-            newKeyId = await createSSSS(opts);
-
-            // store the backup key in secret storage
-            await secretStorage.store("m.megolm_backup.v1", encodeBase64(backupKey!), [newKeyId]);
-
-            // The backup is trusted because the user provided the private key.
-            // Sign the backup with the cross-signing key so the key backup can
-            // be trusted via cross-signing.
-            await signKeyBackupWithCrossSigning(keyBackupInfo.auth_data);
-
-            builder.addSessionBackup(keyBackupInfo);
-        } else {
-            // 4S is already set up
-            logger.log("Secret storage exists");
-
-            if (oldKeyInfo && oldKeyInfo.algorithm === SECRET_STORAGE_ALGORITHM_V1_AES) {
-                // make sure that the default key has the information needed to
-                // check the passphrase
-                await ensureCanCheckPassphrase(oldKeyId, oldKeyInfo);
-            }
-        }
-
-        // If we have cross-signing private keys cached, store them in secret
-        // storage if they are not there already.
-        if (
-            !this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.saveCrossSigningKeys &&
-            (await this.isCrossSigningReady()) &&
-            (newKeyId || !(await this.crossSigningInfo.isStoredInSecretStorage(secretStorage)))
-        ) {
-            logger.log("Copying cross-signing private keys from cache to secret storage");
-            const crossSigningPrivateKeys = await this.crossSigningInfo.getCrossSigningKeysFromCache();
-            // This is writing to in-memory account data in
-            // builder.accountDataClientAdapter so won't fail
-            await CrossSigningInfo.storeInSecretStorage(crossSigningPrivateKeys, secretStorage);
-        }
-
-        if (setupNewKeyBackup && !keyBackupInfo) {
-            logger.log("Creating new message key backup version");
-            const info = await this.baseApis.prepareKeyBackupVersion(
-                null /* random key */,
-                // don't write to secret storage, as it will write to this.secretStorage.
-                // Here, we want to capture all the side-effects of bootstrapping,
-                // and want to write to the local secretStorage object
-                { secureSecretStorage: false },
-            );
-            // write the key to 4S
-            const privateKey = decodeRecoveryKey(info.recovery_key);
-            await secretStorage.store("m.megolm_backup.v1", encodeBase64(privateKey));
-
-            // create keyBackupInfo object to add to builder
-            const data: IKeyBackupInfo = {
-                algorithm: info.algorithm,
-                auth_data: info.auth_data,
-            };
-
-            // Sign with cross-signing master key
-            await signKeyBackupWithCrossSigning(data.auth_data);
-
-            // sign with the device fingerprint
-            await this.signObject(data.auth_data);
-
-            builder.addSessionBackup(data);
-        }
-
-        // Cache the session backup key
-        const sessionBackupKey = await secretStorage.get("m.megolm_backup.v1");
-        if (sessionBackupKey) {
-            logger.info("Got session backup key from secret storage: caching");
-            // fix up the backup key if it's in the wrong format, and replace
-            // in secret storage
-            const fixedBackupKey = fixBackupKey(sessionBackupKey);
-            if (fixedBackupKey) {
-                const keyId = newKeyId || oldKeyId;
-                await secretStorage.store("m.megolm_backup.v1", fixedBackupKey, keyId ? [keyId] : null);
-            }
-            const decodedBackupKey = new Uint8Array(decodeBase64(fixedBackupKey || sessionBackupKey));
-            builder.addSessionBackupPrivateKeyToCache(decodedBackupKey);
-        } else if (this.backupManager.getKeyBackupEnabled()) {
-            // key backup is enabled but we don't have a session backup key in SSSS: see if we have one in
-            // the cache or the user can provide one, and if so, write it to SSSS
-            const backupKey = (await this.getSessionBackupPrivateKey()) || (await getKeyBackupPassphrase?.());
-            if (!backupKey) {
-                // This will require user intervention to recover from since we don't have the key
-                // backup key anywhere. The user should probably just set up a new key backup and
-                // the key for the new backup will be stored. If we hit this scenario in the wild
-                // with any frequency, we should do more than just log an error.
-                logger.error("Key backup is enabled but couldn't get key backup key!");
-                return;
-            }
-            logger.info("Got session backup key from cache/user that wasn't in SSSS: saving to SSSS");
-            await secretStorage.store("m.megolm_backup.v1", encodeBase64(backupKey));
-        }
-
-        const operation = builder.buildOperation();
-        await operation.apply(this);
-        // this persists private keys and public keys as trusted,
-        // only do this if apply succeeded for now as retry isn't in place yet
-        await builder.persist(this);
-
-        logger.log("Secure Secret Storage ready");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#resetKeyBackup}.
-     */
-    public async resetKeyBackup(): Promise<void> {
-        // Delete existing ones
-        // There is no use case for having several key backup version live server side.
-        // Even if not deleted it would be lost as the key to restore is lost.
-        // There should be only one backup at a time.
-        await this.backupManager.deleteAllKeyBackupVersions();
-
-        const info = await this.backupManager.prepareKeyBackupVersion();
-
-        await this.signObject(info.auth_data);
-
-        // add new key backup
-        const { version } = await this.baseApis.http.authedRequest<{ version: string }>(
-            Method.Post,
-            "/room_keys/version",
-            undefined,
-            info,
-            {
-                prefix: ClientPrefix.V3,
-            },
-        );
-
-        logger.log(`Created backup version ${version}`);
-
-        // write the key to 4S
-        const privateKey = info.privateKey;
-        await this.secretStorage.store("m.megolm_backup.v1", encodeBase64(privateKey));
-        await this.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(privateKey);
-
-        await this.backupManager.checkAndStart();
-        await this.backupManager.scheduleAllGroupSessionsForBackup();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#deleteKeyBackupVersion}.
-     */
-    public async deleteKeyBackupVersion(version: string): Promise<void> {
-        await this.backupManager.deleteKeyBackupVersion(version);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#addKey}.
-     */
-    public addSecretStorageKey(
-        algorithm: string,
-        opts: AddSecretStorageKeyOpts,
-        keyID?: string,
-    ): Promise<SecretStorageKeyObject> {
-        return this.secretStorage.addKey(algorithm, opts, keyID);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#hasKey}.
-     */
-    public hasSecretStorageKey(keyID?: string): Promise<boolean> {
-        return this.secretStorage.hasKey(keyID);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#getKey}.
-     */
-    public getSecretStorageKey(keyID?: string): Promise<SecretStorageKeyTuple | null> {
-        return this.secretStorage.getKey(keyID);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#store}.
-     */
-    public storeSecret(name: string, secret: string, keys?: string[]): Promise<void> {
-        return this.secretStorage.store(name, secret, keys);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#get}.
-     */
-    public getSecret(name: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
-        return this.secretStorage.get(name);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#isStored}.
-     */
-    public isSecretStored(name: string): Promise<Record<string, SecretStorageKeyDescription> | null> {
-        return this.secretStorage.isStored(name);
-    }
-
-    public requestSecret(name: string, devices: string[]): ISecretRequest {
-        if (!devices) {
-            devices = Object.keys(this.deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(this.userId));
-        }
-        return this.secretStorage.request(name, devices);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#getDefaultKeyId}.
-     */
-    public getDefaultSecretStorageKeyId(): Promise<string | null> {
-        return this.secretStorage.getDefaultKeyId();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#setDefaultKeyId}.
-     */
-    public setDefaultSecretStorageKeyId(k: string): Promise<void> {
-        return this.secretStorage.setDefaultKeyId(k);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link MatrixClient#secretStorage} and {@link SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage#checkKey}.
-     */
-    public checkSecretStorageKey(key: Uint8Array, info: SecretStorageKeyDescription): Promise<boolean> {
-        return this.secretStorage.checkKey(key, info);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Checks that a given secret storage private key matches a given public key.
-     * This can be used by the getSecretStorageKey callback to verify that the
-     * private key it is about to supply is the one that was requested.
-     *
-     * @param privateKey - The private key
-     * @param expectedPublicKey - The public key
-     * @returns true if the key matches, otherwise false
-     */
-    public checkSecretStoragePrivateKey(privateKey: Uint8Array, expectedPublicKey: string): boolean {
-        let decryption: PkDecryption | null = null;
-        try {
-            decryption = new globalThis.Olm.PkDecryption();
-            const gotPubkey = decryption.init_with_private_key(privateKey);
-            // make sure it agrees with the given pubkey
-            return gotPubkey === expectedPublicKey;
-        } finally {
-            decryption?.free();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Fetches the backup private key, if cached
-     * @returns the key, if any, or null
-     */
-    public async getSessionBackupPrivateKey(): Promise<Uint8Array | null> {
-        const encodedKey = await new Promise<Uint8Array | AESEncryptedSecretStoragePayload | string | null>(
-            (resolve) => {
-                this.cryptoStore.doTxn("readonly", [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT], (txn) => {
-                    this.cryptoStore.getSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, resolve, "m.megolm_backup.v1");
-                });
-            },
-        );
-
-        let key: Uint8Array | null = null;
-
-        // make sure we have a Uint8Array, rather than a string
-        if (typeof encodedKey === "string") {
-            key = new Uint8Array(decodeBase64(fixBackupKey(encodedKey) || encodedKey));
-            await this.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key);
-        }
-        if (encodedKey && typeof encodedKey === "object" && "ciphertext" in encodedKey) {
-            const pickleKey = Buffer.from(this.olmDevice.pickleKey);
-            const decrypted = await decryptAESSecretStorageItem(encodedKey, pickleKey, "m.megolm_backup.v1");
-            key = decodeBase64(decrypted);
-        }
-        return key;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Stores the session backup key to the cache
-     * @param key - the private key
-     * @returns a promise so you can catch failures
-     */
-    public async storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key: ArrayLike<number>, version?: string): Promise<void> {
-        if (!(key instanceof Uint8Array)) {
-            // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-base-to-string
-            throw new Error(`storeSessionBackupPrivateKey expects Uint8Array, got ${key}`);
-        }
-        const pickleKey = Buffer.from(this.olmDevice.pickleKey);
-        const encryptedKey = await encryptAESSecretStorageItem(encodeBase64(key), pickleKey, "m.megolm_backup.v1");
-        return this.cryptoStore.doTxn("readwrite", [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT], (txn) => {
-            this.cryptoStore.storeSecretStorePrivateKey(txn, "m.megolm_backup.v1", encryptedKey);
-        });
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage}.
-     */
-    public loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage(): Promise<void> {
-        throw new Error("Not implmeented");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the current status of key backup.
-     *
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.getActiveSessionBackupVersion}.
-     */
-    public async getActiveSessionBackupVersion(): Promise<string | null> {
-        if (this.backupManager.getKeyBackupEnabled()) {
-            return this.backupManager.version ?? null;
-        }
-        return null;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getKeyBackupInfo}.
-     */
-    public async getKeyBackupInfo(): Promise<KeyBackupInfo | null> {
-        throw new Error("Not implemented");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Determine if a key backup can be trusted.
-     *
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.isKeyBackupTrusted}.
-     */
-    public async isKeyBackupTrusted(info: KeyBackupInfo): Promise<BackupTrustInfo> {
-        const trustInfo = await this.backupManager.isKeyBackupTrusted(info);
-        return backupTrustInfoFromLegacyTrustInfo(trustInfo);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Force a re-check of the key backup and enable/disable it as appropriate.
-     *
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.checkKeyBackupAndEnable}.
-     */
-    public async checkKeyBackupAndEnable(): Promise<KeyBackupCheck | null> {
-        const checkResult = await this.backupManager.checkKeyBackup();
-        if (!checkResult || !checkResult.backupInfo) return null;
-        return {
-            backupInfo: checkResult.backupInfo,
-            trustInfo: backupTrustInfoFromLegacyTrustInfo(checkResult.trustInfo),
-        };
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Checks that a given cross-signing private key matches a given public key.
-     * This can be used by the getCrossSigningKey callback to verify that the
-     * private key it is about to supply is the one that was requested.
-     *
-     * @param privateKey - The private key
-     * @param expectedPublicKey - The public key
-     * @returns true if the key matches, otherwise false
-     */
-    public checkCrossSigningPrivateKey(privateKey: Uint8Array, expectedPublicKey: string): boolean {
-        let signing: PkSigning | null = null;
-        try {
-            signing = new globalThis.Olm.PkSigning();
-            const gotPubkey = signing.init_with_seed(privateKey);
-            // make sure it agrees with the given pubkey
-            return gotPubkey === expectedPublicKey;
-        } finally {
-            signing?.free();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Run various follow-up actions after cross-signing keys have changed locally
-     * (either by resetting the keys for the account or by getting them from secret
-     * storage), such as signing the current device, upgrading device
-     * verifications, etc.
-     */
-    private async afterCrossSigningLocalKeyChange(): Promise<void> {
-        logger.info("Starting cross-signing key change post-processing");
-
-        // sign the current device with the new key, and upload to the server
-        const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(this.userId, this.deviceId)!;
-        const signedDevice = await this.crossSigningInfo.signDevice(this.userId, device);
-        logger.info(`Starting background key sig upload for ${this.deviceId}`);
-
-        const upload = ({ shouldEmit = false }): Promise<void> => {
-            return this.baseApis
-                .uploadKeySignatures({
-                    [this.userId]: {
-                        [this.deviceId]: signedDevice!,
-                    },
-                })
-                .then((response) => {
-                    const { failures } = response || {};
-                    if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
-                        if (shouldEmit) {
-                            this.baseApis.emit(
-                                CryptoEvent.KeySignatureUploadFailure,
-                                failures,
-                                "afterCrossSigningLocalKeyChange",
-                                upload, // continuation
-                            );
-                        }
-                        throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
-                    }
-                    logger.info(`Finished background key sig upload for ${this.deviceId}`);
-                })
-                .catch((e) => {
-                    logger.error(`Error during background key sig upload for ${this.deviceId}`, e);
-                });
-        };
-        upload({ shouldEmit: true });
-
-        const shouldUpgradeCb = this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.shouldUpgradeDeviceVerifications;
-        if (shouldUpgradeCb) {
-            logger.info("Starting device verification upgrade");
-
-            // Check all users for signatures if upgrade callback present
-            // FIXME: do this in batches
-            const users: Record<string, IDeviceVerificationUpgrade> = {};
-            for (const [userId, crossSigningInfo] of Object.entries(this.deviceList.crossSigningInfo)) {
-                const upgradeInfo = await this.checkForDeviceVerificationUpgrade(
-                    userId,
-                    CrossSigningInfo.fromStorage(crossSigningInfo, userId),
-                );
-                if (upgradeInfo) {
-                    users[userId] = upgradeInfo;
-                }
-            }
-
-            if (Object.keys(users).length > 0) {
-                logger.info(`Found ${Object.keys(users).length} verif users to upgrade`);
-                try {
-                    const usersToUpgrade = await shouldUpgradeCb({ users: users });
-                    if (usersToUpgrade) {
-                        for (const userId of usersToUpgrade) {
-                            if (userId in users) {
-                                await this.baseApis.setDeviceVerified(userId, users[userId].crossSigningInfo.getId()!);
-                            }
-                        }
-                    }
-                } catch (e) {
-                    logger.log("shouldUpgradeDeviceVerifications threw an error: not upgrading", e);
-                }
-            }
-
-            logger.info("Finished device verification upgrade");
-        }
-
-        logger.info("Finished cross-signing key change post-processing");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check if a user's cross-signing key is a candidate for upgrading from device
-     * verification.
-     *
-     * @param userId - the user whose cross-signing information is to be checked
-     * @param crossSigningInfo - the cross-signing information to check
-     */
-    private async checkForDeviceVerificationUpgrade(
-        userId: string,
-        crossSigningInfo: CrossSigningInfo,
-    ): Promise<IDeviceVerificationUpgrade | undefined> {
-        // only upgrade if this is the first cross-signing key that we've seen for
-        // them, and if their cross-signing key isn't already verified
-        const trustLevel = this.crossSigningInfo.checkUserTrust(crossSigningInfo);
-        if (crossSigningInfo.firstUse && !trustLevel.isVerified()) {
-            const devices = this.deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
-            const deviceIds = await this.checkForValidDeviceSignature(userId, crossSigningInfo.keys.master, devices);
-            if (deviceIds.length) {
-                return {
-                    devices: deviceIds.map((deviceId) => DeviceInfo.fromStorage(devices[deviceId], deviceId)),
-                    crossSigningInfo,
-                };
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check if the cross-signing key is signed by a verified device.
-     *
-     * @param userId - the user ID whose key is being checked
-     * @param key - the key that is being checked
-     * @param devices - the user's devices.  Should be a map from device ID
-     *     to device info
-     */
-    private async checkForValidDeviceSignature(
-        userId: string,
-        key: CrossSigningKeyInfo,
-        devices: Record<string, IDevice>,
-    ): Promise<string[]> {
-        const deviceIds: string[] = [];
-        if (devices && key.signatures && key.signatures[userId]) {
-            for (const signame of Object.keys(key.signatures[userId])) {
-                const [, deviceId] = signame.split(":", 2);
-                if (deviceId in devices && devices[deviceId].verified === DeviceVerification.VERIFIED) {
-                    try {
-                        await olmlib.verifySignature(
-                            this.olmDevice,
-                            key,
-                            userId,
-                            deviceId,
-                            devices[deviceId].keys[signame],
-                        );
-                        deviceIds.push(deviceId);
-                    } catch {}
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        return deviceIds;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the user's cross-signing key ID.
-     *
-     * @param type - The type of key to get the ID of.  One of
-     *     "master", "self_signing", or "user_signing".  Defaults to "master".
-     *
-     * @returns the key ID
-     */
-    public getCrossSigningKeyId(type: CrossSigningKey = CrossSigningKey.Master): Promise<string | null> {
-        return Promise.resolve(this.getCrossSigningId(type));
-    }
-
-    // old name, for backwards compatibility
-    public getCrossSigningId(type: string): string | null {
-        return this.crossSigningInfo.getId(type);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the cross signing information for a given user.
-     *
-     * @param userId - the user ID to get the cross-signing info for.
-     *
-     * @returns the cross signing information for the user.
-     */
-    public getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId: string): CrossSigningInfo | null {
-        return this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check whether a given user is trusted.
-     *
-     * @param userId - The ID of the user to check.
-     *
-     * @returns
-     */
-    public checkUserTrust(userId: string): UserTrustLevel {
-        const userCrossSigning = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-        if (!userCrossSigning) {
-            return new UserTrustLevel(false, false, false);
-        }
-        return this.crossSigningInfo.checkUserTrust(userCrossSigning);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.getUserVerificationStatus}.
-     */
-    public async getUserVerificationStatus(userId: string): Promise<UserTrustLevel> {
-        return this.checkUserTrust(userId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.pinCurrentUserIdentity}.
-     */
-    public async pinCurrentUserIdentity(userId: string): Promise<void> {
-        throw new Error("not implemented");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check whether a given device is trusted.
-     *
-     * @param userId - The ID of the user whose device is to be checked.
-     * @param deviceId - The ID of the device to check
-     */
-    public async getDeviceVerificationStatus(
-        userId: string,
-        deviceId: string,
-    ): Promise<DeviceVerificationStatus | null> {
-        const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
-        if (!device) {
-            return null;
-        }
-        return this.checkDeviceInfoTrust(userId, device);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated Use {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.getDeviceVerificationStatus}.
-     */
-    public checkDeviceTrust(userId: string, deviceId: string): DeviceTrustLevel {
-        const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
-        return this.checkDeviceInfoTrust(userId, device);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check whether a given deviceinfo is trusted.
-     *
-     * @param userId - The ID of the user whose devices is to be checked.
-     * @param device - The device info object to check
-     *
-     * @deprecated Use {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.getDeviceVerificationStatus}.
-     */
-    public checkDeviceInfoTrust(userId: string, device?: DeviceInfo): DeviceTrustLevel {
-        const trustedLocally = !!device?.isVerified();
-
-        const userCrossSigning = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-        if (device && userCrossSigning) {
-            // The trustCrossSignedDevices only affects trust of other people's cross-signing
-            // signatures
-            const trustCrossSig = this.trustCrossSignedDevices || userId === this.userId;
-            return this.crossSigningInfo.checkDeviceTrust(userCrossSigning, device, trustedLocally, trustCrossSig);
-        } else {
-            return new DeviceTrustLevel(false, false, trustedLocally, false);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check whether one of our own devices is cross-signed by our
-     * user's stored keys, regardless of whether we trust those keys yet.
-     *
-     * @param deviceId - The ID of the device to check
-     *
-     * @returns true if the device is cross-signed
-     */
-    public checkIfOwnDeviceCrossSigned(deviceId: string): boolean {
-        const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(this.userId, deviceId);
-        if (!device) return false;
-        const userCrossSigning = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(this.userId);
-        return (
-            userCrossSigning?.checkDeviceTrust(userCrossSigning, device, false, true).isCrossSigningVerified() ?? false
-        );
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Event handler for DeviceList's userNewDevices event
-     */
-    private onDeviceListUserCrossSigningUpdated = async (userId: string): Promise<void> => {
-        if (userId === this.userId) {
-            // An update to our own cross-signing key.
-            // Get the new key first:
-            const newCrossSigning = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-            const seenPubkey = newCrossSigning ? newCrossSigning.getId() : null;
-            const currentPubkey = this.crossSigningInfo.getId();
-            const changed = currentPubkey !== seenPubkey;
-
-            if (currentPubkey && seenPubkey && !changed) {
-                // If it's not changed, just make sure everything is up to date
-                await this.checkOwnCrossSigningTrust();
-            } else {
-                // We'll now be in a state where cross-signing on the account is not trusted
-                // because our locally stored cross-signing keys will not match the ones
-                // on the server for our account. So we clear our own stored cross-signing keys,
-                // effectively disabling cross-signing until the user gets verified by the device
-                // that reset the keys
-                this.storeTrustedSelfKeys(null);
-                // emit cross-signing has been disabled
-                this.emit(CryptoEvent.KeysChanged, {});
-                // as the trust for our own user has changed,
-                // also emit an event for this
-                this.emit(CryptoEvent.UserTrustStatusChanged, this.userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
-            }
-        } else {
-            await this.checkDeviceVerifications(userId);
-
-            // Update verified before latch using the current state and save the new
-            // latch value in the device list store.
-            const crossSigning = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-            if (crossSigning) {
-                crossSigning.updateCrossSigningVerifiedBefore(this.checkUserTrust(userId).isCrossSigningVerified());
-                this.deviceList.setRawStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId, crossSigning.toStorage());
-            }
-
-            this.emit(CryptoEvent.UserTrustStatusChanged, userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
-        }
-    };
-
-    /**
-     * Check the copy of our cross-signing key that we have in the device list and
-     * see if we can get the private key. If so, mark it as trusted.
-     */
-    public async checkOwnCrossSigningTrust({
-        allowPrivateKeyRequests = false,
-    }: ICheckOwnCrossSigningTrustOpts = {}): Promise<void> {
-        const userId = this.userId;
-
-        // Before proceeding, ensure our cross-signing public keys have been
-        // downloaded via the device list.
-        await this.downloadKeys([this.userId]);
-
-        // Also check which private keys are locally cached.
-        const crossSigningPrivateKeys = await this.crossSigningInfo.getCrossSigningKeysFromCache();
-
-        // If we see an update to our own master key, check it against the master
-        // key we have and, if it matches, mark it as verified
-
-        // First, get the new cross-signing info
-        const newCrossSigning = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-        if (!newCrossSigning) {
-            logger.error(
-                "Got cross-signing update event for user " + userId + " but no new cross-signing information found!",
-            );
-            return;
-        }
-
-        const seenPubkey = newCrossSigning.getId()!;
-        const masterChanged = this.crossSigningInfo.getId() !== seenPubkey;
-        const masterExistsNotLocallyCached = newCrossSigning.getId() && !crossSigningPrivateKeys.has("master");
-        if (masterChanged) {
-            logger.info("Got new master public key", seenPubkey);
-        }
-        if (allowPrivateKeyRequests && (masterChanged || masterExistsNotLocallyCached)) {
-            logger.info("Attempting to retrieve cross-signing master private key");
-            let signing: PkSigning | null = null;
-            // It's important for control flow that we leave any errors alone for
-            // higher levels to handle so that e.g. cancelling access properly
-            // aborts any larger operation as well.
-            try {
-                const ret = await this.crossSigningInfo.getCrossSigningKey("master", seenPubkey);
-                signing = ret[1];
-                logger.info("Got cross-signing master private key");
-            } finally {
-                signing?.free();
-            }
-        }
-
-        const oldSelfSigningId = this.crossSigningInfo.getId("self_signing");
-        const oldUserSigningId = this.crossSigningInfo.getId("user_signing");
-
-        // Update the version of our keys in our cross-signing object and the local store
-        this.storeTrustedSelfKeys(newCrossSigning.keys);
-
-        const selfSigningChanged = oldSelfSigningId !== newCrossSigning.getId("self_signing");
-        const userSigningChanged = oldUserSigningId !== newCrossSigning.getId("user_signing");
-
-        const selfSigningExistsNotLocallyCached =
-            newCrossSigning.getId("self_signing") && !crossSigningPrivateKeys.has("self_signing");
-        const userSigningExistsNotLocallyCached =
-            newCrossSigning.getId("user_signing") && !crossSigningPrivateKeys.has("user_signing");
-
-        const keySignatures: Record<string, ISignedKey> = {};
-
-        if (selfSigningChanged) {
-            logger.info("Got new self-signing key", newCrossSigning.getId("self_signing"));
-        }
-        if (allowPrivateKeyRequests && (selfSigningChanged || selfSigningExistsNotLocallyCached)) {
-            logger.info("Attempting to retrieve cross-signing self-signing private key");
-            let signing: PkSigning | null = null;
-            try {
-                const ret = await this.crossSigningInfo.getCrossSigningKey(
-                    "self_signing",
-                    newCrossSigning.getId("self_signing")!,
-                );
-                signing = ret[1];
-                logger.info("Got cross-signing self-signing private key");
-            } finally {
-                signing?.free();
-            }
-
-            const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(this.userId, this.deviceId)!;
-            const signedDevice = await this.crossSigningInfo.signDevice(this.userId, device);
-            keySignatures[this.deviceId] = signedDevice!;
-        }
-        if (userSigningChanged) {
-            logger.info("Got new user-signing key", newCrossSigning.getId("user_signing"));
-        }
-        if (allowPrivateKeyRequests && (userSigningChanged || userSigningExistsNotLocallyCached)) {
-            logger.info("Attempting to retrieve cross-signing user-signing private key");
-            let signing: PkSigning | null = null;
-            try {
-                const ret = await this.crossSigningInfo.getCrossSigningKey(
-                    "user_signing",
-                    newCrossSigning.getId("user_signing")!,
-                );
-                signing = ret[1];
-                logger.info("Got cross-signing user-signing private key");
-            } finally {
-                signing?.free();
-            }
-        }
-
-        if (masterChanged) {
-            const masterKey = this.crossSigningInfo.keys.master;
-            await this.signObject(masterKey);
-            const deviceSig = masterKey.signatures![this.userId]["ed25519:" + this.deviceId];
-            // Include only the _new_ device signature in the upload.
-            // We may have existing signatures from deleted devices, which will cause
-            // the entire upload to fail.
-            keySignatures[this.crossSigningInfo.getId()!] = Object.assign({} as ISignedKey, masterKey, {
-                signatures: {
-                    [this.userId]: {
-                        ["ed25519:" + this.deviceId]: deviceSig,
-                    },
-                },
-            });
-        }
-
-        const keysToUpload = Object.keys(keySignatures);
-        if (keysToUpload.length) {
-            const upload = ({ shouldEmit = false }): Promise<void> => {
-                logger.info(`Starting background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`);
-                return this.baseApis
-                    .uploadKeySignatures({ [this.userId]: keySignatures })
-                    .then((response) => {
-                        const { failures } = response || {};
-                        logger.info(`Finished background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`);
-                        if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
-                            if (shouldEmit) {
-                                this.baseApis.emit(
-                                    CryptoEvent.KeySignatureUploadFailure,
-                                    failures,
-                                    "checkOwnCrossSigningTrust",
-                                    upload,
-                                );
-                            }
-                            throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
-                        }
-                    })
-                    .catch((e) => {
-                        logger.error(`Error during background key sig upload for ${keysToUpload}`, e);
-                    });
-            };
-            upload({ shouldEmit: true });
-        }
-
-        this.emit(CryptoEvent.UserTrustStatusChanged, userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
-
-        if (masterChanged) {
-            this.emit(CryptoEvent.KeysChanged, {});
-            await this.afterCrossSigningLocalKeyChange();
-        }
-
-        // Now we may be able to trust our key backup
-        await this.backupManager.checkKeyBackup();
-        // FIXME: if we previously trusted the backup, should we automatically sign
-        // the backup with the new key (if not already signed)?
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link CryptoBackend#getBackupDecryptor}.
-     */
-    public async getBackupDecryptor(backupInfo: KeyBackupInfo, privKey: ArrayLike<number>): Promise<BackupDecryptor> {
-        if (!(privKey instanceof Uint8Array)) {
-            throw new Error(`getBackupDecryptor expects Uint8Array`);
-        }
-
-        const algorithm = await BackupManager.makeAlgorithm(backupInfo, async () => {
-            return privKey;
-        });
-
-        // If the pubkey computed from the private data we've been given
-        // doesn't match the one in the auth_data, the user has entered
-        // a different recovery key / the wrong passphrase.
-        if (!(await algorithm.keyMatches(privKey))) {
-            return Promise.reject(new MatrixError({ errcode: MatrixClient.RESTORE_BACKUP_ERROR_BAD_KEY }));
-        }
-
-        return new LibOlmBackupDecryptor(algorithm);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link CryptoBackend#importBackedUpRoomKeys}.
-     */
-    public importBackedUpRoomKeys(
-        keys: IMegolmSessionData[],
-        backupVersion: string,
-        opts: ImportRoomKeysOpts = {},
-    ): Promise<void> {
-        opts.source = "backup";
-        return this.importRoomKeys(keys, opts);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Store a set of keys as our own, trusted, cross-signing keys.
-     *
-     * @param keys - The new trusted set of keys
-     */
-    private async storeTrustedSelfKeys(keys: Record<string, CrossSigningKeyInfo> | null): Promise<void> {
-        if (keys) {
-            this.crossSigningInfo.setKeys(keys);
-        } else {
-            this.crossSigningInfo.clearKeys();
-        }
-        await this.cryptoStore.doTxn("readwrite", [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_ACCOUNT], (txn) => {
-            this.cryptoStore.storeCrossSigningKeys(txn, this.crossSigningInfo.keys);
-        });
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Check if the master key is signed by a verified device, and if so, prompt
-     * the application to mark it as verified.
-     *
-     * @param userId - the user ID whose key should be checked
-     */
-    private async checkDeviceVerifications(userId: string): Promise<void> {
-        const shouldUpgradeCb = this.baseApis.cryptoCallbacks.shouldUpgradeDeviceVerifications;
-        if (!shouldUpgradeCb) {
-            // Upgrading skipped when callback is not present.
-            return;
-        }
-        logger.info(`Starting device verification upgrade for ${userId}`);
-        if (this.crossSigningInfo.keys.user_signing) {
-            const crossSigningInfo = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-            if (crossSigningInfo) {
-                const upgradeInfo = await this.checkForDeviceVerificationUpgrade(userId, crossSigningInfo);
-                if (upgradeInfo) {
-                    const usersToUpgrade = await shouldUpgradeCb({
-                        users: {
-                            [userId]: upgradeInfo,
-                        },
-                    });
-                    if (usersToUpgrade.includes(userId)) {
-                        await this.baseApis.setDeviceVerified(userId, crossSigningInfo.getId()!);
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        logger.info(`Finished device verification upgrade for ${userId}`);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     */
-    public enableLazyLoading(): void {
-        this.lazyLoadMembers = true;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Tell the crypto module to register for MatrixClient events which it needs to
-     * listen for
-     *
-     * @param eventEmitter - event source where we can register
-     *    for event notifications
-     */
-    public registerEventHandlers(
-        eventEmitter: TypedEventEmitter<
-            RoomMemberEvent.Membership | ClientEvent.ToDeviceEvent | RoomEvent.Timeline | MatrixEventEvent.Decrypted,
-            any
-        >,
-    ): void {
-        eventEmitter.on(RoomMemberEvent.Membership, this.onMembership);
-        eventEmitter.on(ClientEvent.ToDeviceEvent, this.onToDeviceEvent);
-        eventEmitter.on(RoomEvent.Timeline, this.onTimelineEvent);
-        eventEmitter.on(MatrixEventEvent.Decrypted, this.onTimelineEvent);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @deprecated this does nothing and will be removed in a future version
-     */
-    public start(): void {
-        logger.warn("MatrixClient.crypto.start() is deprecated");
-    }
-
-    /** Stop background processes related to crypto */
-    public stop(): void {
-        this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.stop();
-        this.deviceList.stop();
-        this.dehydrationManager.stop();
-        this.backupManager.stop();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the Ed25519 key for this device
-     *
-     * @returns base64-encoded ed25519 key.
-     *
-     * @deprecated Use {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getOwnDeviceKeys}.
-     */
-    public getDeviceEd25519Key(): string | null {
-        return this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the Curve25519 key for this device
-     *
-     * @returns base64-encoded curve25519 key.
-     *
-     * @deprecated Use {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getOwnDeviceKeys}
-     */
-    public getDeviceCurve25519Key(): string | null {
-        return this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#getOwnDeviceKeys}.
-     */
-    public async getOwnDeviceKeys(): Promise<OwnDeviceKeys> {
-        if (!this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key) {
-            throw new Error("Curve25519 key not yet created");
-        }
-        if (!this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key) {
-            throw new Error("Ed25519 key not yet created");
-        }
-        return {
-            ed25519: this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key,
-            curve25519: this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key,
-        };
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Set the global override for whether the client should ever send encrypted
-     * messages to unverified devices.  This provides the default for rooms which
-     * do not specify a value.
-     *
-     * @param value - whether to blacklist all unverified devices by default
-     *
-     * @deprecated Set {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices | CryptoApi.globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices} directly.
-     */
-    public setGlobalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices(value: boolean): void {
-        this.globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices = value;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @returns whether to blacklist all unverified devices by default
-     *
-     * @deprecated Reference {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices | CryptoApi.globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices} directly.
-     */
-    public getGlobalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices(): boolean {
-        return this.globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Upload the device keys to the homeserver.
-     * @returns A promise that will resolve when the keys are uploaded.
-     */
-    public uploadDeviceKeys(): Promise<IKeysUploadResponse> {
-        const deviceKeys = {
-            algorithms: this.supportedAlgorithms,
-            device_id: this.deviceId,
-            keys: this.deviceKeys,
-            user_id: this.userId,
-        };
-
-        return this.signObject(deviceKeys).then(() => {
-            return this.baseApis.uploadKeysRequest({
-                device_keys: deviceKeys as Required<IDeviceKeys>,
-            });
-        });
-    }
-
-    public getNeedsNewFallback(): boolean {
-        return !!this.needsNewFallback;
-    }
-
-    // check if it's time to upload one-time keys, and do so if so.
-    private maybeUploadOneTimeKeys(): void {
-        // frequency with which to check & upload one-time keys
-        const uploadPeriod = 1000 * 60; // one minute
-
-        // max number of keys to upload at once
-        // Creating keys can be an expensive operation so we limit the
-        // number we generate in one go to avoid blocking the application
-        // for too long.
-        const maxKeysPerCycle = 5;
-
-        if (this.oneTimeKeyCheckInProgress) {
-            return;
-        }
-
-        const now = Date.now();
-        if (this.lastOneTimeKeyCheck !== null && now - this.lastOneTimeKeyCheck < uploadPeriod) {
-            // we've done a key upload recently.
-            return;
-        }
-
-        this.lastOneTimeKeyCheck = now;
-
-        // We need to keep a pool of one time public keys on the server so that
-        // other devices can start conversations with us. But we can only store
-        // a finite number of private keys in the olm Account object.
-        // To complicate things further then can be a delay between a device
-        // claiming a public one time key from the server and it sending us a
-        // message. We need to keep the corresponding private key locally until
-        // we receive the message.
-        // But that message might never arrive leaving us stuck with duff
-        // private keys clogging up our local storage.
-        // So we need some kind of engineering compromise to balance all of
-        // these factors.
-
-        // Check how many keys we can store in the Account object.
-        const maxOneTimeKeys = this.olmDevice.maxNumberOfOneTimeKeys();
-        // Try to keep at most half that number on the server. This leaves the
-        // rest of the slots free to hold keys that have been claimed from the
-        // server but we haven't received a message for.
-        // If we run out of slots when generating new keys then olm will
-        // discard the oldest private keys first. This will eventually clean
-        // out stale private keys that won't receive a message.
-        const keyLimit = Math.floor(maxOneTimeKeys / 2);
-
-        const uploadLoop = async (keyCount: number): Promise<void> => {
-            while (keyLimit > keyCount || this.getNeedsNewFallback()) {
-                // Ask olm to generate new one time keys, then upload them to synapse.
-                if (keyLimit > keyCount) {
-                    logger.info("generating oneTimeKeys");
-                    const keysThisLoop = Math.min(keyLimit - keyCount, maxKeysPerCycle);
-                    await this.olmDevice.generateOneTimeKeys(keysThisLoop);
-                }
-
-                if (this.getNeedsNewFallback()) {
-                    const fallbackKeys = await this.olmDevice.getFallbackKey();
-                    // if fallbackKeys is non-empty, we've already generated a
-                    // fallback key, but it hasn't been published yet, so we
-                    // can use that instead of generating a new one
-                    if (!fallbackKeys.curve25519 || Object.keys(fallbackKeys.curve25519).length == 0) {
-                        logger.info("generating fallback key");
-                        if (this.fallbackCleanup) {
-                            // cancel any pending fallback cleanup because generating
-                            // a new fallback key will already drop the old fallback
-                            // that would have been dropped, and we don't want to kill
-                            // the current key
-                            clearTimeout(this.fallbackCleanup);
-                            delete this.fallbackCleanup;
-                        }
-                        await this.olmDevice.generateFallbackKey();
-                    }
-                }
-
-                logger.info("calling uploadOneTimeKeys");
-                const res = await this.uploadOneTimeKeys();
-                if (res.one_time_key_counts && res.one_time_key_counts.signed_curve25519) {
-                    // if the response contains a more up to date value use this
-                    // for the next loop
-                    keyCount = res.one_time_key_counts.signed_curve25519;
-                } else {
-                    throw new Error(
-                        "response for uploading keys does not contain " + "one_time_key_counts.signed_curve25519",
-                    );
-                }
-            }
-        };
-
-        this.oneTimeKeyCheckInProgress = true;
-        Promise.resolve()
-            .then(() => {
-                if (this.oneTimeKeyCount !== undefined) {
-                    // We already have the current one_time_key count from a /sync response.
-                    // Use this value instead of asking the server for the current key count.
-                    return Promise.resolve(this.oneTimeKeyCount);
-                }
-                // ask the server how many keys we have
-                return this.baseApis.uploadKeysRequest({}).then((res) => {
-                    return res.one_time_key_counts.signed_curve25519 || 0;
-                });
-            })
-            .then((keyCount) => {
-                // Start the uploadLoop with the current keyCount. The function checks if
-                // we need to upload new keys or not.
-                // If there are too many keys on the server then we don't need to
-                // create any more keys.
-                return uploadLoop(keyCount);
-            })
-            .catch((e) => {
-                logger.error("Error uploading one-time keys", e.stack || e);
-            })
-            .finally(() => {
-                // reset oneTimeKeyCount to prevent start uploading based on old data.
-                // it will be set again on the next /sync-response
-                this.oneTimeKeyCount = undefined;
-                this.oneTimeKeyCheckInProgress = false;
-            });
-    }
-
-    // returns a promise which resolves to the response
-    private async uploadOneTimeKeys(): Promise<IKeysUploadResponse> {
-        const promises: Promise<unknown>[] = [];
-
-        let fallbackJson: Record<string, IOneTimeKey> | undefined;
-        if (this.getNeedsNewFallback()) {
-            fallbackJson = {};
-            const fallbackKeys = await this.olmDevice.getFallbackKey();
-            for (const [keyId, key] of Object.entries(fallbackKeys.curve25519)) {
-                const k = { key, fallback: true };
-                fallbackJson["signed_curve25519:" + keyId] = k;
-                promises.push(this.signObject(k));
-            }
-            this.needsNewFallback = false;
-        }
-
-        const oneTimeKeys = await this.olmDevice.getOneTimeKeys();
-        const oneTimeJson: Record<string, { key: string }> = {};
-
-        for (const keyId in oneTimeKeys.curve25519) {
-            if (oneTimeKeys.curve25519.hasOwnProperty(keyId)) {
-                const k = {
-                    key: oneTimeKeys.curve25519[keyId],
-                };
-                oneTimeJson["signed_curve25519:" + keyId] = k;
-                promises.push(this.signObject(k));
-            }
-        }
-
-        await Promise.all(promises);
-
-        const requestBody: Record<string, any> = {
-            one_time_keys: oneTimeJson,
-        };
-
-        if (fallbackJson) {
-            requestBody["org.matrix.msc2732.fallback_keys"] = fallbackJson;
-            requestBody["fallback_keys"] = fallbackJson;
-        }
-
-        const res = await this.baseApis.uploadKeysRequest(requestBody);
-
-        if (fallbackJson) {
-            this.fallbackCleanup = setTimeout(
-                () => {
-                    delete this.fallbackCleanup;
-                    this.olmDevice.forgetOldFallbackKey();
-                },
-                60 * 60 * 1000,
-            );
-        }
-
-        await this.olmDevice.markKeysAsPublished();
-        return res;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Download the keys for a list of users and stores the keys in the session
-     * store.
-     * @param userIds - The users to fetch.
-     * @param forceDownload - Always download the keys even if cached.
-     *
-     * @returns A promise which resolves to a map `userId->deviceId->{@link DeviceInfo}`.
-     */
-    public downloadKeys(userIds: string[], forceDownload?: boolean): Promise<DeviceInfoMap> {
-        return this.deviceList.downloadKeys(userIds, !!forceDownload);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the stored device keys for a user id
-     *
-     * @param userId - the user to list keys for.
-     *
-     * @returns list of devices, or null if we haven't
-     * managed to get a list of devices for this user yet.
-     */
-    public getStoredDevicesForUser(userId: string): Array<DeviceInfo> | null {
-        return this.deviceList.getStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the device information for the given list of users.
-     *
-     * @param userIds - The users to fetch.
-     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
-     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case such users will not appear at all in the result map.
-     *
-     * @returns A map `{@link DeviceMap}`.
-     */
-    public async getUserDeviceInfo(userIds: string[], downloadUncached = false): Promise<DeviceMap> {
-        const deviceMapByUserId = new Map<string, Map<string, Device>>();
-        // Keep the users without device to download theirs keys
-        const usersWithoutDeviceInfo: string[] = [];
-
-        for (const userId of userIds) {
-            const deviceInfos = await this.getStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
-            // If there are device infos for a userId, we transform it into a map
-            // Else, the keys will be downloaded after
-            if (deviceInfos) {
-                const deviceMap = new Map(
-                    // Convert DeviceInfo to Device
-                    deviceInfos.map((deviceInfo) => [deviceInfo.deviceId, deviceInfoToDevice(deviceInfo, userId)]),
-                );
-                deviceMapByUserId.set(userId, deviceMap);
-            } else {
-                usersWithoutDeviceInfo.push(userId);
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Download device info for users without device infos
-        if (downloadUncached && usersWithoutDeviceInfo.length > 0) {
-            const newDeviceInfoMap = await this.downloadKeys(usersWithoutDeviceInfo);
-
-            newDeviceInfoMap.forEach((deviceInfoMap, userId) => {
-                const deviceMap = new Map<string, Device>();
-                // Convert DeviceInfo to Device
-                deviceInfoMap.forEach((deviceInfo, deviceId) =>
-                    deviceMap.set(deviceId, deviceInfoToDevice(deviceInfo, userId)),
-                );
-
-                // Put the new device infos into the returned map
-                deviceMapByUserId.set(userId, deviceMap);
-            });
-        }
-
-        return deviceMapByUserId;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the stored keys for a single device
-     *
-     *
-     * @returns device, or undefined
-     * if we don't know about this device
-     */
-    public getStoredDevice(userId: string, deviceId: string): DeviceInfo | undefined {
-        return this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Save the device list, if necessary
-     *
-     * @param delay - Time in ms before which the save actually happens.
-     *     By default, the save is delayed for a short period in order to batch
-     *     multiple writes, but this behaviour can be disabled by passing 0.
-     *
-     * @returns true if the data was saved, false if
-     *     it was not (eg. because no changes were pending). The promise
-     *     will only resolve once the data is saved, so may take some time
-     *     to resolve.
-     */
-    public saveDeviceList(delay: number): Promise<boolean> {
-        return this.deviceList.saveIfDirty(delay);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Mark the given device as locally verified.
-     *
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#setDeviceVerified}.
-     */
-    public async setDeviceVerified(userId: string, deviceId: string, verified = true): Promise<void> {
-        await this.setDeviceVerification(userId, deviceId, verified);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Blindly cross-sign one of our other devices.
-     *
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#crossSignDevice}.
-     */
-    public async crossSignDevice(deviceId: string): Promise<void> {
-        await this.setDeviceVerified(this.userId, deviceId, true);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Update the blocked/verified state of the given device
-     *
-     * @param userId - owner of the device
-     * @param deviceId - unique identifier for the device or user's
-     * cross-signing public key ID.
-     *
-     * @param verified - whether to mark the device as verified. Null to
-     *     leave unchanged.
-     *
-     * @param blocked - whether to mark the device as blocked. Null to
-     *      leave unchanged.
-     *
-     * @param known - whether to mark that the user has been made aware of
-     *      the existence of this device. Null to leave unchanged
-     *
-     * @param keys - The list of keys that was present
-     * during the device verification. This will be double checked with the list
-     * of keys the given device has currently.
-     *
-     * @returns updated DeviceInfo
-     */
-    public async setDeviceVerification(
-        userId: string,
-        deviceId: string,
-        verified: boolean | null = null,
-        blocked: boolean | null = null,
-        known: boolean | null = null,
-        keys?: Record<string, string>,
-    ): Promise<DeviceInfo | CrossSigningInfo | CrossSigningKeyInfo | undefined> {
-        // Check if the 'device' is actually a cross signing key
-        // The js-sdk's verification treats cross-signing keys as devices
-        // and so uses this method to mark them verified.
-        const xsk = this.deviceList.getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId);
-        if (xsk?.getId() === deviceId) {
-            if (blocked !== null || known !== null) {
-                throw new Error("Cannot set blocked or known for a cross-signing key");
-            }
-            if (!verified) {
-                throw new Error("Cannot set a cross-signing key as unverified");
-            }
-            const gotKeyId = keys ? Object.values(keys)[0] : null;
-            if (keys && (Object.values(keys).length !== 1 || gotKeyId !== xsk.getId())) {
-                throw new Error(`Key did not match expected value: expected ${xsk.getId()}, got ${gotKeyId}`);
-            }
-
-            if (!this.crossSigningInfo.getId() && userId === this.crossSigningInfo.userId) {
-                this.storeTrustedSelfKeys(xsk.keys);
-                // This will cause our own user trust to change, so emit the event
-                this.emit(CryptoEvent.UserTrustStatusChanged, this.userId, this.checkUserTrust(userId));
-            }
-
-            // Now sign the master key with our user signing key (unless it's ourself)
-            if (userId !== this.userId) {
-                logger.info("Master key " + xsk.getId() + " for " + userId + " marked verified. Signing...");
-                const device = await this.crossSigningInfo.signUser(xsk);
-                if (device) {
-                    const upload = async ({ shouldEmit = false }): Promise<void> => {
-                        logger.info("Uploading signature for " + userId + "...");
-                        const response = await this.baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
-                            [userId]: {
-                                [deviceId]: device,
-                            },
-                        });
-                        const { failures } = response || {};
-                        if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
-                            if (shouldEmit) {
-                                this.baseApis.emit(
-                                    CryptoEvent.KeySignatureUploadFailure,
-                                    failures,
-                                    "setDeviceVerification",
-                                    upload,
-                                );
-                            }
-                            /* Throwing here causes the process to be cancelled and the other
-                             * user to be notified */
-                            throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
-                        }
-                    };
-                    await upload({ shouldEmit: true });
-
-                    // This will emit events when it comes back down the sync
-                    // (we could do local echo to speed things up)
-                }
-                return device!;
-            } else {
-                return xsk;
-            }
-        }
-
-        const devices = this.deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
-        if (!devices || !devices[deviceId]) {
-            throw new Error("Unknown device " + userId + ":" + deviceId);
-        }
-
-        const dev = devices[deviceId];
-        let verificationStatus = dev.verified;
-
-        if (verified) {
-            if (keys) {
-                for (const [keyId, key] of Object.entries(keys)) {
-                    if (dev.keys[keyId] !== key) {
-                        throw new Error(`Key did not match expected value: expected ${key}, got ${dev.keys[keyId]}`);
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-            verificationStatus = DeviceVerification.VERIFIED;
-        } else if (verified !== null && verificationStatus == DeviceVerification.VERIFIED) {
-            verificationStatus = DeviceVerification.UNVERIFIED;
-        }
-
-        if (blocked) {
-            verificationStatus = DeviceVerification.BLOCKED;
-        } else if (blocked !== null && verificationStatus == DeviceVerification.BLOCKED) {
-            verificationStatus = DeviceVerification.UNVERIFIED;
-        }
-
-        let knownStatus = dev.known;
-        if (known !== null) {
-            knownStatus = known;
-        }
-
-        if (dev.verified !== verificationStatus || dev.known !== knownStatus) {
-            dev.verified = verificationStatus;
-            dev.known = knownStatus;
-            this.deviceList.storeDevicesForUser(userId, devices);
-            this.deviceList.saveIfDirty();
-        }
-
-        // do cross-signing
-        if (verified && userId === this.userId) {
-            logger.info("Own device " + deviceId + " marked verified: signing");
-
-            // Signing only needed if other device not already signed
-            let device: ISignedKey | undefined;
-            const deviceTrust = this.checkDeviceTrust(userId, deviceId);
-            if (deviceTrust.isCrossSigningVerified()) {
-                logger.log(`Own device ${deviceId} already cross-signing verified`);
-            } else {
-                device = (await this.crossSigningInfo.signDevice(userId, DeviceInfo.fromStorage(dev, deviceId)))!;
-            }
-
-            if (device) {
-                const upload = async ({ shouldEmit = false }): Promise<void> => {
-                    logger.info("Uploading signature for " + deviceId);
-                    const response = await this.baseApis.uploadKeySignatures({
-                        [userId]: {
-                            [deviceId]: device!,
-                        },
-                    });
-                    const { failures } = response || {};
-                    if (Object.keys(failures || []).length > 0) {
-                        if (shouldEmit) {
-                            this.baseApis.emit(
-                                CryptoEvent.KeySignatureUploadFailure,
-                                failures,
-                                "setDeviceVerification",
-                                upload, // continuation
-                            );
-                        }
-                        throw new KeySignatureUploadError("Key upload failed", { failures });
-                    }
-                };
-                await upload({ shouldEmit: true });
-                // XXX: we'll need to wait for the device list to be updated
-            }
-        }
-
-        const deviceObj = DeviceInfo.fromStorage(dev, deviceId);
-        this.emit(CryptoEvent.DeviceVerificationChanged, userId, deviceId, deviceObj);
-        return deviceObj;
-    }
-
-    public findVerificationRequestDMInProgress(roomId: string, userId?: string): VerificationRequest | undefined {
-        return this.inRoomVerificationRequests.findRequestInProgress(roomId, userId);
-    }
-
-    public getVerificationRequestsToDeviceInProgress(userId: string): VerificationRequest[] {
-        return this.toDeviceVerificationRequests.getRequestsInProgress(userId);
-    }
-
-    public requestVerificationDM(userId: string, roomId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest> {
-        const existingRequest = this.inRoomVerificationRequests.findRequestInProgress(roomId);
-        if (existingRequest) {
-            return Promise.resolve(existingRequest);
-        }
-        const channel = new InRoomChannel(this.baseApis, roomId, userId);
-        return this.requestVerificationWithChannel(userId, channel, this.inRoomVerificationRequests);
-    }
-
-    /** @deprecated Use `requestOwnUserVerificationToDevice` or `requestDeviceVerification` */
-    public requestVerification(userId: string, devices?: string[]): Promise<VerificationRequest> {
-        if (!devices) {
-            devices = Object.keys(this.deviceList.getRawStoredDevicesForUser(userId));
-        }
-        const existingRequest = this.toDeviceVerificationRequests.findRequestInProgress(userId, devices);
-        if (existingRequest) {
-            return Promise.resolve(existingRequest);
-        }
-        const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(this.baseApis, userId, devices, ToDeviceChannel.makeTransactionId());
-        return this.requestVerificationWithChannel(userId, channel, this.toDeviceVerificationRequests);
-    }
-
-    public requestOwnUserVerification(): Promise<VerificationRequest> {
-        return this.requestVerification(this.userId);
-    }
-
-    public requestDeviceVerification(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest> {
-        return this.requestVerification(userId, [deviceId]);
-    }
-
-    private async requestVerificationWithChannel(
-        userId: string,
-        channel: IVerificationChannel,
-        requestsMap: IRequestsMap,
-    ): Promise<VerificationRequest> {
-        let request = new VerificationRequest(channel, this.verificationMethods, this.baseApis);
-        // if transaction id is already known, add request
-        if (channel.transactionId) {
-            requestsMap.setRequestByChannel(channel, request);
-        }
-        await request.sendRequest();
-        // don't replace the request created by a racing remote echo
-        const racingRequest = requestsMap.getRequestByChannel(channel);
-        if (racingRequest) {
-            request = racingRequest;
-        } else {
-            logger.log(
-                `Crypto: adding new request to ` + `requestsByTxnId with id ${channel.transactionId} ${channel.roomId}`,
-            );
-            requestsMap.setRequestByChannel(channel, request);
-        }
-        return request;
-    }
-
-    public beginKeyVerification(
-        method: string,
-        userId: string,
-        deviceId: string,
-        transactionId: string | null = null,
-    ): VerificationBase<any, any> {
-        let request: Request | undefined;
-        if (transactionId) {
-            request = this.toDeviceVerificationRequests.getRequestBySenderAndTxnId(userId, transactionId);
-            if (!request) {
-                throw new Error(`No request found for user ${userId} with ` + `transactionId ${transactionId}`);
-            }
-        } else {
-            transactionId = ToDeviceChannel.makeTransactionId();
-            const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(this.baseApis, userId, [deviceId], transactionId, deviceId);
-            request = new VerificationRequest(channel, this.verificationMethods, this.baseApis);
-            this.toDeviceVerificationRequests.setRequestBySenderAndTxnId(userId, transactionId, request);
-        }
-        return request.beginKeyVerification(method, { userId, deviceId });
-    }
-
-    public async legacyDeviceVerification(
-        userId: string,
-        deviceId: string,
-        method: VerificationMethod,
-    ): Promise<VerificationRequest> {
-        const transactionId = ToDeviceChannel.makeTransactionId();
-        const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(this.baseApis, userId, [deviceId], transactionId, deviceId);
-        const request = new VerificationRequest(channel, this.verificationMethods, this.baseApis);
-        this.toDeviceVerificationRequests.setRequestBySenderAndTxnId(userId, transactionId, request);
-        const verifier = request.beginKeyVerification(method, { userId, deviceId });
-        // either reject by an error from verify() while sending .start
-        // or resolve when the request receives the
-        // local (fake remote) echo for sending the .start event
-        await Promise.race([verifier.verify(), request.waitFor((r) => r.started)]);
-        return request;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get information on the active olm sessions with a user
-     * <p>
-     * Returns a map from device id to an object with keys 'deviceIdKey' (the
-     * device's curve25519 identity key) and 'sessions' (an array of objects in the
-     * same format as that returned by
-     * {@link OlmDevice#getSessionInfoForDevice}).
-     * <p>
-     * This method is provided for debugging purposes.
-     *
-     * @param userId - id of user to inspect
-     */
-    public async getOlmSessionsForUser(userId: string): Promise<Record<string, IUserOlmSession>> {
-        const devices = this.getStoredDevicesForUser(userId) || [];
-        const result: { [deviceId: string]: IUserOlmSession } = {};
-        for (const device of devices) {
-            const deviceKey = device.getIdentityKey();
-            const sessions = await this.olmDevice.getSessionInfoForDevice(deviceKey);
-
-            result[device.deviceId] = {
-                deviceIdKey: deviceKey,
-                sessions: sessions,
-            };
-        }
-        return result;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get the device which sent an event
-     *
-     * @param event - event to be checked
-     */
-    public getEventSenderDeviceInfo(event: MatrixEvent): DeviceInfo | null {
-        const senderKey = event.getSenderKey();
-        const algorithm = event.getWireContent().algorithm;
-
-        if (!senderKey || !algorithm) {
-            return null;
-        }
-
-        if (event.isKeySourceUntrusted()) {
-            // we got the key for this event from a source that we consider untrusted
-            return null;
-        }
-
-        // senderKey is the Curve25519 identity key of the device which the event
-        // was sent from. In the case of Megolm, it's actually the Curve25519
-        // identity key of the device which set up the Megolm session.
-
-        const device = this.deviceList.getDeviceByIdentityKey(algorithm, senderKey);
-
-        if (device === null) {
-            // we haven't downloaded the details of this device yet.
-            return null;
-        }
-
-        // so far so good, but now we need to check that the sender of this event
-        // hadn't advertised someone else's Curve25519 key as their own. We do that
-        // by checking the Ed25519 claimed by the event (or, in the case of megolm,
-        // the event which set up the megolm session), to check that it matches the
-        // fingerprint of the purported sending device.
-        //
-        // (see https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2215)
-
-        const claimedKey = event.getClaimedEd25519Key();
-        if (!claimedKey) {
-            logger.warn("Event " + event.getId() + " claims no ed25519 key: " + "cannot verify sending device");
-            return null;
-        }
-
-        if (claimedKey !== device.getFingerprint()) {
-            logger.warn(
-                "Event " +
-                    event.getId() +
-                    " claims ed25519 key " +
-                    claimedKey +
-                    " but sender device has key " +
-                    device.getFingerprint(),
-            );
-            return null;
-        }
-
-        return device;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get information about the encryption of an event
-     *
-     * @param event - event to be checked
-     *
-     * @returns An object with the fields:
-     *    - encrypted: whether the event is encrypted (if not encrypted, some of the
-     *      other properties may not be set)
-     *    - senderKey: the sender's key
-     *    - algorithm: the algorithm used to encrypt the event
-     *    - authenticated: whether we can be sure that the owner of the senderKey
-     *      sent the event
-     *    - sender: the sender's device information, if available
-     *    - mismatchedSender: if the event's ed25519 and curve25519 keys don't match
-     *      (only meaningful if `sender` is set)
-     */
-    public getEventEncryptionInfo(event: MatrixEvent): IEncryptedEventInfo {
-        const ret: Partial<IEncryptedEventInfo> = {};
-
-        ret.senderKey = event.getSenderKey() ?? undefined;
-        ret.algorithm = event.getWireContent().algorithm;
-
-        if (!ret.senderKey || !ret.algorithm) {
-            ret.encrypted = false;
-            return ret as IEncryptedEventInfo;
-        }
-        ret.encrypted = true;
-
-        if (event.isKeySourceUntrusted()) {
-            // we got the key this event from somewhere else
-            // TODO: check if we can trust the forwarders.
-            ret.authenticated = false;
-        } else {
-            ret.authenticated = true;
-        }
-
-        // senderKey is the Curve25519 identity key of the device which the event
-        // was sent from. In the case of Megolm, it's actually the Curve25519
-        // identity key of the device which set up the Megolm session.
-
-        ret.sender = this.deviceList.getDeviceByIdentityKey(ret.algorithm, ret.senderKey) ?? undefined;
-
-        // so far so good, but now we need to check that the sender of this event
-        // hadn't advertised someone else's Curve25519 key as their own. We do that
-        // by checking the Ed25519 claimed by the event (or, in the case of megolm,
-        // the event which set up the megolm session), to check that it matches the
-        // fingerprint of the purported sending device.
-        //
-        // (see https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2215)
-
-        const claimedKey = event.getClaimedEd25519Key();
-        if (!claimedKey) {
-            logger.warn("Event " + event.getId() + " claims no ed25519 key: " + "cannot verify sending device");
-            ret.mismatchedSender = true;
-        }
-
-        if (ret.sender && claimedKey !== ret.sender.getFingerprint()) {
-            logger.warn(
-                "Event " +
-                    event.getId() +
-                    " claims ed25519 key " +
-                    claimedKey +
-                    "but sender device has key " +
-                    ret.sender.getFingerprint(),
-            );
-            ret.mismatchedSender = true;
-        }
-
-        return ret as IEncryptedEventInfo;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi.getEncryptionInfoForEvent}.
-     */
-    public async getEncryptionInfoForEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<EventEncryptionInfo | null> {
-        const encryptionInfo = this.getEventEncryptionInfo(event);
-        if (!encryptionInfo.encrypted) {
-            return null;
-        }
-
-        const senderId = event.getSender();
-        if (!senderId || encryptionInfo.mismatchedSender) {
-            // something definitely wrong is going on here
-
-            // previously: E2EState.Warning -> E2ePadlockUnverified -> Red/"Encrypted by an unverified session"
-            return {
-                shieldColour: EventShieldColour.RED,
-                shieldReason: EventShieldReason.MISMATCHED_SENDER_KEY,
-            };
-        }
-
-        const userTrust = this.checkUserTrust(senderId);
-        if (!userTrust.isCrossSigningVerified()) {
-            // If the message is unauthenticated, then display a grey
-            // shield, otherwise if the user isn't cross-signed then
-            // nothing's needed
-            if (!encryptionInfo.authenticated) {
-                // previously: E2EState.Unauthenticated -> E2ePadlockUnauthenticated -> Grey/"The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device."
-                return {
-                    shieldColour: EventShieldColour.GREY,
-                    shieldReason: EventShieldReason.AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED,
-                };
-            } else {
-                // previously: E2EState.Normal -> no icon
-                return { shieldColour: EventShieldColour.NONE, shieldReason: null };
-            }
-        }
-
-        const eventSenderTrust =
-            senderId &&
-            encryptionInfo.sender &&
-            (await this.getDeviceVerificationStatus(senderId, encryptionInfo.sender.deviceId));
-
-        if (!eventSenderTrust) {
-            // previously: E2EState.Unknown -> E2ePadlockUnknown -> Grey/"Encrypted by a deleted session"
-            return {
-                shieldColour: EventShieldColour.GREY,
-                shieldReason: EventShieldReason.UNKNOWN_DEVICE,
-            };
-        }
-
-        if (!eventSenderTrust.isVerified()) {
-            // previously: E2EState.Warning -> E2ePadlockUnverified -> Red/"Encrypted by an unverified session"
-            return {
-                shieldColour: EventShieldColour.RED,
-                shieldReason: EventShieldReason.UNSIGNED_DEVICE,
-            };
-        }
-
-        if (!encryptionInfo.authenticated) {
-            // previously: E2EState.Unauthenticated -> E2ePadlockUnauthenticated -> Grey/"The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device."
-            return {
-                shieldColour: EventShieldColour.GREY,
-                shieldReason: EventShieldReason.AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED,
-            };
-        }
-
-        // previously: E2EState.Verified -> no icon
-        return { shieldColour: EventShieldColour.NONE, shieldReason: null };
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Forces the current outbound group session to be discarded such
-     * that another one will be created next time an event is sent.
-     *
-     * @param roomId - The ID of the room to discard the session for
-     *
-     * This should not normally be necessary.
-     */
-    public forceDiscardSession(roomId: string): Promise<void> {
-        const alg = this.roomEncryptors.get(roomId);
-        if (alg === undefined) throw new Error("Room not encrypted");
-        if (alg.forceDiscardSession === undefined) {
-            throw new Error("Room encryption algorithm doesn't support session discarding");
-        }
-        alg.forceDiscardSession();
-        return Promise.resolve();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Configure a room to use encryption (ie, save a flag in the cryptoStore).
-     *
-     * @param roomId - The room ID to enable encryption in.
-     *
-     * @param config - The encryption config for the room.
-     *
-     * @param inhibitDeviceQuery - true to suppress device list query for
-     *   users in the room (for now). In case lazy loading is enabled,
-     *   the device query is always inhibited as the members are not tracked.
-     *
-     * @deprecated It is normally incorrect to call this method directly. Encryption
-     *   is enabled by receiving an `m.room.encryption` event (which we may have sent
-     *   previously).
-     */
-    public async setRoomEncryption(
-        roomId: string,
-        config: IRoomEncryption,
-        inhibitDeviceQuery?: boolean,
-    ): Promise<void> {
-        const room = this.clientStore.getRoom(roomId);
-        if (!room) {
-            throw new Error(`Unable to enable encryption tracking devices in unknown room ${roomId}`);
-        }
-        await this.setRoomEncryptionImpl(room, config);
-        if (!this.lazyLoadMembers && !inhibitDeviceQuery) {
-            this.deviceList.refreshOutdatedDeviceLists();
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Set up encryption for a room.
-     *
-     * This is called when an <tt>m.room.encryption</tt> event is received. It saves a flag
-     * for the room in the cryptoStore (if it wasn't already set), sets up an "encryptor" for
-     * the room, and enables device-list tracking for the room.
-     *
-     * It does <em>not</em> initiate a device list query for the room. That is normally
-     * done once we finish processing the sync, in onSyncCompleted.
-     *
-     * @param room - The room to enable encryption in.
-     * @param config - The encryption config for the room.
-     */
-    private async setRoomEncryptionImpl(room: Room, config: IRoomEncryption): Promise<void> {
-        const roomId = room.roomId;
-
-        // ignore crypto events with no algorithm defined
-        // This will happen if a crypto event is redacted before we fetch the room state
-        // It would otherwise just throw later as an unknown algorithm would, but we may
-        // as well catch this here
-        if (!config.algorithm) {
-            logger.log("Ignoring setRoomEncryption with no algorithm");
-            return;
-        }
-
-        // if state is being replayed from storage, we might already have a configuration
-        // for this room as they are persisted as well.
-        // We just need to make sure the algorithm is initialized in this case.
-        // However, if the new config is different,
-        // we should bail out as room encryption can't be changed once set.
-        const existingConfig = this.roomList.getRoomEncryption(roomId);
-        if (existingConfig) {
-            if (JSON.stringify(existingConfig) != JSON.stringify(config)) {
-                logger.error("Ignoring m.room.encryption event which requests " + "a change of config in " + roomId);
-                return;
-            }
-        }
-        // if we already have encryption in this room, we should ignore this event,
-        // as it would reset the encryption algorithm.
-        // This is at least expected to be called twice, as sync calls onCryptoEvent
-        // for both the timeline and state sections in the /sync response,
-        // the encryption event would appear in both.
-        // If it's called more than twice though,
-        // it signals a bug on client or server.
-        const existingAlg = this.roomEncryptors.get(roomId);
-        if (existingAlg) {
-            return;
-        }
-
-        // _roomList.getRoomEncryption will not race with _roomList.setRoomEncryption
-        // because it first stores in memory. We should await the promise only
-        // after all the in-memory state (roomEncryptors and _roomList) has been updated
-        // to avoid races when calling this method multiple times. Hence keep a hold of the promise.
-        let storeConfigPromise: Promise<void> | null = null;
-        if (!existingConfig) {
-            storeConfigPromise = this.roomList.setRoomEncryption(roomId, config);
-        }
-
-        const AlgClass = algorithms.ENCRYPTION_CLASSES.get(config.algorithm);
-        if (!AlgClass) {
-            throw new Error("Unable to encrypt with " + config.algorithm);
-        }
-
-        const alg = new AlgClass({
-            userId: this.userId,
-            deviceId: this.deviceId,
-            crypto: this,
-            olmDevice: this.olmDevice,
-            baseApis: this.baseApis,
-            roomId,
-            config,
-        });
-        this.roomEncryptors.set(roomId, alg);
-
-        if (storeConfigPromise) {
-            await storeConfigPromise;
-        }
-
-        logger.log(`Enabling encryption in ${roomId}`);
-
-        // we don't want to force a download of the full membership list of this room, but as soon as we have that
-        // list we can start tracking the device list.
-        if (room.membersLoaded()) {
-            await this.trackRoomDevicesImpl(room);
-        } else {
-            // wait for the membership list to be loaded
-            const onState = (_state: RoomState): void => {
-                room.off(RoomStateEvent.Update, onState);
-                if (room.membersLoaded()) {
-                    this.trackRoomDevicesImpl(room).catch((e) => {
-                        logger.error(`Error enabling device tracking in ${roomId}`, e);
-                    });
-                }
-            };
-            room.on(RoomStateEvent.Update, onState);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Make sure we are tracking the device lists for all users in this room.
-     *
-     * @param roomId - The room ID to start tracking devices in.
-     * @returns when all devices for the room have been fetched and marked to track
-     * @deprecated there's normally no need to call this function: device list tracking
-     *    will be enabled as soon as we have the full membership list.
-     */
-    public trackRoomDevices(roomId: string): Promise<void> {
-        const room = this.clientStore.getRoom(roomId);
-        if (!room) {
-            throw new Error(`Unable to start tracking devices in unknown room ${roomId}`);
-        }
-        return this.trackRoomDevicesImpl(room);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Make sure we are tracking the device lists for all users in this room.
-     *
-     * This is normally called when we are about to send an encrypted event, to make sure
-     * we have all the devices in the room; but it is also called when processing an
-     * m.room.encryption state event (if lazy-loading is disabled), or when members are
-     * loaded (if lazy-loading is enabled), to prepare the device list.
-     *
-     * @param room - Room to enable device-list tracking in
-     */
-    private trackRoomDevicesImpl(room: Room): Promise<void> {
-        const roomId = room.roomId;
-        const trackMembers = async (): Promise<void> => {
-            // not an encrypted room
-            if (!this.roomEncryptors.has(roomId)) {
-                return;
-            }
-            logger.log(`Starting to track devices for room ${roomId} ...`);
-            const members = await room.getEncryptionTargetMembers();
-            members.forEach((m) => {
-                this.deviceList.startTrackingDeviceList(m.userId);
-            });
-        };
-
-        let promise = this.roomDeviceTrackingState[roomId];
-        if (!promise) {
-            promise = trackMembers();
-            this.roomDeviceTrackingState[roomId] = promise.catch((err) => {
-                delete this.roomDeviceTrackingState[roomId];
-                throw err;
-            });
-        }
-        return promise;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Try to make sure we have established olm sessions for all known devices for
-     * the given users.
-     *
-     * @param users - list of user ids
-     * @param force - If true, force a new Olm session to be created. Default false.
-     *
-     * @returns resolves once the sessions are complete, to
-     *    an Object mapping from userId to deviceId to
-     *    `IOlmSessionResult`
-     */
-    public ensureOlmSessionsForUsers(
-        users: string[],
-        force?: boolean,
-    ): Promise<Map<string, Map<string, olmlib.IOlmSessionResult>>> {
-        // map user Id → DeviceInfo[]
-        const devicesByUser: Map<string, DeviceInfo[]> = new Map();
-
-        for (const userId of users) {
-            const userDevices: DeviceInfo[] = [];
-            devicesByUser.set(userId, userDevices);
-
-            const devices = this.getStoredDevicesForUser(userId) || [];
-            for (const deviceInfo of devices) {
-                const key = deviceInfo.getIdentityKey();
-                if (key == this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key) {
-                    // don't bother setting up session to ourself
-                    continue;
-                }
-                if (deviceInfo.verified == DeviceVerification.BLOCKED) {
-                    // don't bother setting up sessions with blocked users
-                    continue;
-                }
-
-                userDevices.push(deviceInfo);
-            }
-        }
-
-        return olmlib.ensureOlmSessionsForDevices(this.olmDevice, this.baseApis, devicesByUser, force);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get a list containing all of the room keys
-     *
-     * @returns a list of session export objects
-     */
-    public async exportRoomKeys(): Promise<IMegolmSessionData[]> {
-        const exportedSessions: IMegolmSessionData[] = [];
-        await this.cryptoStore.doTxn("readonly", [IndexedDBCryptoStore.STORE_INBOUND_GROUP_SESSIONS], (txn) => {
-            this.cryptoStore.getAllEndToEndInboundGroupSessions(txn, (s) => {
-                if (s === null) return;
-
-                const sess = this.olmDevice.exportInboundGroupSession(s.senderKey, s.sessionId, s.sessionData!);
-                delete sess.first_known_index;
-                sess.algorithm = olmlib.MEGOLM_ALGORITHM;
-                exportedSessions.push(sess);
-            });
-        });
-
-        return exportedSessions;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get a JSON list containing all of the room keys
-     *
-     * @returns a JSON string encoding a list of session
-     *    export objects, each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
-     */
-    public async exportRoomKeysAsJson(): Promise<string> {
-        return JSON.stringify(await this.exportRoomKeys());
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Import a list of room keys previously exported by exportRoomKeys
-     *
-     * @param keys - a list of session export objects
-     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
-     */
-    public importRoomKeys(keys: IMegolmSessionData[], opts: ImportRoomKeysOpts = {}): Promise<void> {
-        let successes = 0;
-        let failures = 0;
-        const total = keys.length;
-
-        function updateProgress(): void {
-            opts.progressCallback?.({
-                stage: "load_keys",
-                successes,
-                failures,
-                total,
-            });
-        }
-
-        return Promise.all(
-            keys.map((key) => {
-                if (!key.room_id || !key.algorithm) {
-                    logger.warn("ignoring room key entry with missing fields", key);
-                    failures++;
-                    if (opts.progressCallback) {
-                        updateProgress();
-                    }
-                    return null;
-                }
-
-                const alg = this.getRoomDecryptor(key.room_id, key.algorithm);
-                return alg.importRoomKey(key, opts).finally(() => {
-                    successes++;
-                    if (opts.progressCallback) {
-                        updateProgress();
-                    }
-                });
-            }),
-        ).then();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Import a JSON string encoding a list of room keys previously
-     * exported by exportRoomKeysAsJson
-     *
-     * @param keys - a JSON string encoding a list of session export
-     *    objects, each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
-     * @param opts - options object
-     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
-     */
-    public async importRoomKeysAsJson(keys: string, opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void> {
-        return await this.importRoomKeys(JSON.parse(keys));
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Counts the number of end to end session keys that are waiting to be backed up
-     * @returns Promise which resolves to the number of sessions requiring backup
-     */
-    public countSessionsNeedingBackup(): Promise<number> {
-        return this.backupManager.countSessionsNeedingBackup();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Perform any background tasks that can be done before a message is ready to
-     * send, in order to speed up sending of the message.
-     *
-     * @param room - the room the event is in
-     */
-    public prepareToEncrypt(room: Room): void {
-        const alg = this.roomEncryptors.get(room.roomId);
-        if (alg) {
-            alg.prepareToEncrypt(room);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Encrypt an event according to the configuration of the room.
-     *
-     * @param event -  event to be sent
-     *
-     * @param room - destination room.
-     *
-     * @returns Promise which resolves when the event has been
-     *     encrypted, or null if nothing was needed
-     */
-    public async encryptEvent(event: MatrixEvent, room: Room): Promise<void> {
-        const roomId = event.getRoomId()!;
-
-        const alg = this.roomEncryptors.get(roomId);
-        if (!alg) {
-            // MatrixClient has already checked that this room should be encrypted,
-            // so this is an unexpected situation.
-            throw new Error(
-                "Room " +
-                    roomId +
-                    " was previously configured to use encryption, but is " +
-                    "no longer. Perhaps the homeserver is hiding the " +
-                    "configuration event.",
-            );
-        }
-
-        // wait for all the room devices to be loaded
-        await this.trackRoomDevicesImpl(room);
-
-        let content = event.getContent();
-        // If event has an m.relates_to then we need
-        // to put this on the wrapping event instead
-        const mRelatesTo = content["m.relates_to"];
-        if (mRelatesTo) {
-            // Clone content here so we don't remove `m.relates_to` from the local-echo
-            content = Object.assign({}, content);
-            delete content["m.relates_to"];
-        }
-
-        // Treat element's performance metrics the same as `m.relates_to` (when present)
-        const elementPerfMetrics = content["io.element.performance_metrics"];
-        if (elementPerfMetrics) {
-            content = Object.assign({}, content);
-            delete content["io.element.performance_metrics"];
-        }
-
-        const encryptedContent = (await alg.encryptMessage(room, event.getType(), content)) as IContent;
-
-        if (mRelatesTo) {
-            encryptedContent["m.relates_to"] = mRelatesTo;
-        }
-        if (elementPerfMetrics) {
-            encryptedContent["io.element.performance_metrics"] = elementPerfMetrics;
-        }
-
-        event.makeEncrypted(
-            "m.room.encrypted",
-            encryptedContent,
-            this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key!,
-            this.olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key!,
-        );
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Decrypt a received event
-     *
-     *
-     * @returns resolves once we have
-     *  finished decrypting. Rejects with an `algorithms.DecryptionError` if there
-     *  is a problem decrypting the event.
-     */
-    public async decryptEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<IEventDecryptionResult> {
-        if (event.isRedacted()) {
-            // Try to decrypt the redaction event, to support encrypted
-            // redaction reasons.  If we can't decrypt, just fall back to using
-            // the original redacted_because.
-            const redactionEvent = new MatrixEvent({
-                room_id: event.getRoomId(),
-                ...event.getUnsigned().redacted_because,
-            });
-            let redactedBecause: IEvent = event.getUnsigned().redacted_because!;
-            if (redactionEvent.isEncrypted()) {
-                try {
-                    const decryptedEvent = await this.decryptEvent(redactionEvent);
-                    redactedBecause = decryptedEvent.clearEvent as IEvent;
-                } catch (e) {
-                    logger.warn("Decryption of redaction failed. Falling back to unencrypted event.", e);
-                }
-            }
-
-            return {
-                clearEvent: {
-                    room_id: event.getRoomId(),
-                    type: "m.room.message",
-                    content: {},
-                    unsigned: {
-                        redacted_because: redactedBecause,
-                    },
-                },
-            };
-        } else {
-            const content = event.getWireContent();
-            const alg = this.getRoomDecryptor(event.getRoomId()!, content.algorithm);
-            return alg.decryptEvent(event);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Handle the notification from /sync that device lists have
-     * been changed.
-     *
-     * @param deviceLists - device_lists field from /sync
-     */
-    public async processDeviceLists(deviceLists: IDeviceLists): Promise<void> {
-        // Here, we're relying on the fact that we only ever save the sync data after
-        // sucessfully saving the device list data, so we're guaranteed that the device
-        // list store is at least as fresh as the sync token from the sync store, ie.
-        // any device changes received in sync tokens prior to the 'next' token here
-        // have been processed and are reflected in the current device list.
-        // If we didn't make this assumption, we'd have to use the /keys/changes API
-        // to get key changes between the sync token in the device list and the 'old'
-        // sync token used here to make sure we didn't miss any.
-        await this.evalDeviceListChanges(deviceLists);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Send a request for some room keys, if we have not already done so
-     *
-     * @param resend - whether to resend the key request if there is
-     *    already one
-     *
-     * @returns a promise that resolves when the key request is queued
-     */
-    public requestRoomKey(
-        requestBody: IRoomKeyRequestBody,
-        recipients: IRoomKeyRequestRecipient[],
-        resend = false,
-    ): Promise<void> {
-        return this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager
-            .queueRoomKeyRequest(requestBody, recipients, resend)
-            .then(() => {
-                if (this.sendKeyRequestsImmediately) {
-                    this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.sendQueuedRequests();
-                }
-            })
-            .catch((e) => {
-                // this normally means we couldn't talk to the store
-                logger.error("Error requesting key for event", e);
-            });
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Cancel any earlier room key request
-     *
-     * @param requestBody - parameters to match for cancellation
-     */
-    public cancelRoomKeyRequest(requestBody: IRoomKeyRequestBody): void {
-        this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.cancelRoomKeyRequest(requestBody).catch((e) => {
-            logger.warn("Error clearing pending room key requests", e);
-        });
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Re-send any outgoing key requests, eg after verification
-     * @returns
-     */
-    public async cancelAndResendAllOutgoingKeyRequests(): Promise<void> {
-        await this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.cancelAndResendAllOutgoingRequests();
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * handle an m.room.encryption event
-     *
-     * @param room - in which the event was received
-     * @param event - encryption event to be processed
-     */
-    public async onCryptoEvent(room: Room, event: MatrixEvent): Promise<void> {
-        const content = event.getContent<IRoomEncryption>();
-        await this.setRoomEncryptionImpl(room, content);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Called before the result of a sync is processed
-     *
-     * @param syncData -  the data from the 'MatrixClient.sync' event
-     */
-    public async onSyncWillProcess(syncData: ISyncStateData): Promise<void> {
-        if (!syncData.oldSyncToken) {
-            // If there is no old sync token, we start all our tracking from
-            // scratch, so mark everything as untracked. onCryptoEvent will
-            // be called for all e2e rooms during the processing of the sync,
-            // at which point we'll start tracking all the users of that room.
-            logger.log("Initial sync performed - resetting device tracking state");
-            this.deviceList.stopTrackingAllDeviceLists();
-            // we always track our own device list (for key backups etc)
-            this.deviceList.startTrackingDeviceList(this.userId);
-            this.roomDeviceTrackingState = {};
-        }
-
-        this.sendKeyRequestsImmediately = false;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * handle the completion of a /sync
-     *
-     * This is called after the processing of each successful /sync response.
-     * It is an opportunity to do a batch process on the information received.
-     *
-     * @param syncData -  the data from the 'MatrixClient.sync' event
-     */
-    public async onSyncCompleted(syncData: OnSyncCompletedData): Promise<void> {
-        this.deviceList.setSyncToken(syncData.nextSyncToken ?? null);
-        this.deviceList.saveIfDirty();
-
-        // we always track our own device list (for key backups etc)
-        this.deviceList.startTrackingDeviceList(this.userId);
-
-        this.deviceList.refreshOutdatedDeviceLists();
-
-        // we don't start uploading one-time keys until we've caught up with
-        // to-device messages, to help us avoid throwing away one-time-keys that we
-        // are about to receive messages for
-        // (https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/2782).
-        if (!syncData.catchingUp) {
-            this.maybeUploadOneTimeKeys();
-            this.processReceivedRoomKeyRequests();
-
-            // likewise don't start requesting keys until we've caught up
-            // on to_device messages, otherwise we'll request keys that we're
-            // just about to get.
-            this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.sendQueuedRequests();
-
-            // Sync has finished so send key requests straight away.
-            this.sendKeyRequestsImmediately = true;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Trigger the appropriate invalidations and removes for a given
-     * device list
-     *
-     * @param deviceLists - device_lists field from /sync, or response from
-     * /keys/changes
-     */
-    private async evalDeviceListChanges(deviceLists: Required<ISyncResponse>["device_lists"]): Promise<void> {
-        if (Array.isArray(deviceLists?.changed)) {
-            deviceLists.changed.forEach((u) => {
-                this.deviceList.invalidateUserDeviceList(u);
-            });
-        }
-
-        if (Array.isArray(deviceLists?.left) && deviceLists.left.length) {
-            // Check we really don't share any rooms with these users
-            // any more: the server isn't required to give us the
-            // exact correct set.
-            const e2eUserIds = new Set(await this.getTrackedE2eUsers());
-
-            deviceLists.left.forEach((u) => {
-                if (!e2eUserIds.has(u)) {
-                    this.deviceList.stopTrackingDeviceList(u);
-                }
-            });
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get a list of all the IDs of users we share an e2e room with
-     * for which we are tracking devices already
-     *
-     * @returns List of user IDs
-     */
-    private async getTrackedE2eUsers(): Promise<string[]> {
-        const e2eUserIds: string[] = [];
-        for (const room of this.getTrackedE2eRooms()) {
-            const members = await room.getEncryptionTargetMembers();
-            for (const member of members) {
-                e2eUserIds.push(member.userId);
-            }
-        }
-        return e2eUserIds;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get a list of the e2e-enabled rooms we are members of,
-     * and for which we are already tracking the devices
-     *
-     * @returns
-     */
-    private getTrackedE2eRooms(): Room[] {
-        return this.clientStore.getRooms().filter((room) => {
-            // check for rooms with encryption enabled
-            const alg = this.roomEncryptors.get(room.roomId);
-            if (!alg) {
-                return false;
-            }
-            if (!this.roomDeviceTrackingState[room.roomId]) {
-                return false;
-            }
-
-            // ignore any rooms which we have left
-            const myMembership = room.getMyMembership();
-            return myMembership === KnownMembership.Join || myMembership === KnownMembership.Invite;
-        });
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Encrypts and sends a given object via Olm to-device messages to a given
-     * set of devices.
-     * @param userDeviceInfoArr - the devices to send to
-     * @param payload - fields to include in the encrypted payload
-     * @returns Promise which
-     *     resolves once the message has been encrypted and sent to the given
-     *     userDeviceMap, and returns the `{ contentMap, deviceInfoByDeviceId }`
-     *     of the successfully sent messages.
-     *
-     * @deprecated Instead use {@link encryptToDeviceMessages} followed by {@link MatrixClient.queueToDevice}.
-     */
-    public async encryptAndSendToDevices(userDeviceInfoArr: IOlmDevice<DeviceInfo>[], payload: object): Promise<void> {
-        try {
-            const toDeviceBatch = await this.prepareToDeviceBatch(userDeviceInfoArr, payload);
-
-            try {
-                await this.baseApis.queueToDevice(toDeviceBatch);
-            } catch (e) {
-                logger.error("sendToDevice failed", e);
-                throw e;
-            }
-        } catch (e) {
-            logger.error("encryptAndSendToDevices promises failed", e);
-            throw e;
-        }
-    }
-
-    private async prepareToDeviceBatch(
-        userDeviceInfoArr: IOlmDevice<DeviceInfo>[],
-        payload: object,
-    ): Promise<ToDeviceBatch> {
-        const toDeviceBatch: ToDeviceBatch = {
-            eventType: EventType.RoomMessageEncrypted,
-            batch: [],
-        };
-
-        await Promise.all(
-            userDeviceInfoArr.map(async ({ userId, deviceInfo }) => {
-                const deviceId = deviceInfo.deviceId;
-                const encryptedContent: IEncryptedContent = {
-                    algorithm: olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM,
-                    sender_key: this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key!,
-                    ciphertext: {},
-                    [ToDeviceMessageId]: uuidv4(),
-                };
-
-                toDeviceBatch.batch.push({
-                    userId,
-                    deviceId,
-                    payload: encryptedContent,
-                });
-
-                await olmlib.ensureOlmSessionsForDevices(
-                    this.olmDevice,
-                    this.baseApis,
-                    new Map([[userId, [deviceInfo]]]),
-                );
-                await olmlib.encryptMessageForDevice(
-                    encryptedContent.ciphertext,
-                    this.userId,
-                    this.deviceId,
-                    this.olmDevice,
-                    userId,
-                    deviceInfo,
-                    payload,
-                );
-            }),
-        );
-
-        // prune out any devices that encryptMessageForDevice could not encrypt for,
-        // in which case it will have just not added anything to the ciphertext object.
-        // There's no point sending messages to devices if we couldn't encrypt to them,
-        // since that's effectively a blank message.
-        toDeviceBatch.batch = toDeviceBatch.batch.filter((msg) => {
-            if (Object.keys(msg.payload.ciphertext).length > 0) {
-                return true;
-            } else {
-                logger.log(`No ciphertext for device ${msg.userId}:${msg.deviceId}: pruning`);
-                return false;
-            }
-        });
-
-        return toDeviceBatch;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#encryptToDeviceMessages}.
-     */
-    public async encryptToDeviceMessages(
-        eventType: string,
-        devices: { userId: string; deviceId: string }[],
-        payload: ToDevicePayload,
-    ): Promise<ToDeviceBatch> {
-        const userIds = new Set(devices.map(({ userId }) => userId));
-        const deviceInfoMap = await this.downloadKeys(Array.from(userIds), false);
-
-        const userDeviceInfoArr: IOlmDevice<DeviceInfo>[] = [];
-
-        devices.forEach(({ userId, deviceId }) => {
-            const devices = deviceInfoMap.get(userId);
-            if (!devices) {
-                logger.warn(`No devices found for user ${userId}`);
-                return;
-            }
-
-            if (devices.has(deviceId)) {
-                // Send the message to a specific device
-                userDeviceInfoArr.push({ userId, deviceInfo: devices.get(deviceId)! });
-            } else {
-                logger.warn(`No device found for user ${userId} with id ${deviceId}`);
-            }
-        });
-
-        return this.prepareToDeviceBatch(userDeviceInfoArr, payload);
-    }
-
-    private onMembership = (event: MatrixEvent, member: RoomMember, oldMembership?: string): void => {
-        try {
-            this.onRoomMembership(event, member, oldMembership);
-        } catch (e) {
-            logger.error("Error handling membership change:", e);
-        }
-    };
-
-    public async preprocessToDeviceMessages(events: IToDeviceEvent[]): Promise<IToDeviceEvent[]> {
-        // all we do here is filter out encrypted to-device messages with the wrong algorithm. Decryption
-        // happens later in decryptEvent, via the EventMapper
-        return events.filter((toDevice) => {
-            if (
-                toDevice.type === EventType.RoomMessageEncrypted &&
-                !["m.olm.v1.curve25519-aes-sha2"].includes(toDevice.content?.algorithm)
-            ) {
-                logger.log("Ignoring invalid encrypted to-device event from " + toDevice.sender);
-                return false;
-            }
-            return true;
-        });
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Stores the current one_time_key count which will be handled later (in a call of
-     * onSyncCompleted).
-     *
-     * @param currentCount - The current count of one_time_keys to be stored
-     */
-    private updateOneTimeKeyCount(currentCount: number): void {
-        if (isFinite(currentCount)) {
-            this.oneTimeKeyCount = currentCount;
-        } else {
-            throw new TypeError("Parameter for updateOneTimeKeyCount has to be a number");
-        }
-    }
-
-    public processKeyCounts(oneTimeKeysCounts?: Record<string, number>, unusedFallbackKeys?: string[]): Promise<void> {
-        if (oneTimeKeysCounts !== undefined) {
-            this.updateOneTimeKeyCount(oneTimeKeysCounts["signed_curve25519"] || 0);
-        }
-
-        if (unusedFallbackKeys !== undefined) {
-            // If `unusedFallbackKeys` is defined, that means `device_unused_fallback_key_types`
-            // is present in the sync response, which indicates that the server supports fallback keys.
-            //
-            // If there's no unused signed_curve25519 fallback key, we need a new one.
-            this.needsNewFallback = !unusedFallbackKeys.includes("signed_curve25519");
-        }
-
-        return Promise.resolve();
-    }
-
-    private onToDeviceEvent = (event: MatrixEvent): void => {
-        try {
-            logger.log(
-                `received to-device ${event.getType()} from: ` +
-                    `${event.getSender()} id: ${event.getContent()[ToDeviceMessageId]}`,
-            );
-
-            if (event.getType() == "m.room_key" || event.getType() == "m.forwarded_room_key") {
-                this.onRoomKeyEvent(event);
-            } else if (event.getType() == "m.room_key_request") {
-                this.onRoomKeyRequestEvent(event);
-            } else if (event.getType() === "m.secret.request") {
-                this.secretStorage.onRequestReceived(event);
-            } else if (event.getType() === "m.secret.send") {
-                this.secretStorage.onSecretReceived(event);
-            } else if (event.getType() === "m.room_key.withheld") {
-                this.onRoomKeyWithheldEvent(event);
-            } else if (event.getContent().transaction_id) {
-                this.onKeyVerificationMessage(event);
-            } else if (event.getContent().msgtype === "m.bad.encrypted") {
-                this.onToDeviceBadEncrypted(event);
-            } else if (event.isBeingDecrypted() || event.shouldAttemptDecryption()) {
-                if (!event.isBeingDecrypted()) {
-                    event.attemptDecryption(this);
-                }
-                // once the event has been decrypted, try again
-                event.once(MatrixEventEvent.Decrypted, (ev) => {
-                    this.onToDeviceEvent(ev);
-                });
-            }
-        } catch (e) {
-            logger.error("Error handling toDeviceEvent:", e);
-        }
-    };
-
-    /**
-     * Handle a key event
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event - key event
-     */
-    private onRoomKeyEvent(event: MatrixEvent): void {
-        const content = event.getContent();
-
-        if (!content.room_id || !content.algorithm) {
-            logger.error("key event is missing fields");
-            return;
-        }
-
-        if (!this.backupManager.checkedForBackup) {
-            // don't bother awaiting on this - the important thing is that we retry if we
-            // haven't managed to check before
-            this.backupManager.checkAndStart();
-        }
-
-        const alg = this.getRoomDecryptor(content.room_id, content.algorithm);
-        alg.onRoomKeyEvent(event);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Handle a key withheld event
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event - key withheld event
-     */
-    private onRoomKeyWithheldEvent(event: MatrixEvent): void {
-        const content = event.getContent();
-
-        if (
-            (content.code !== "m.no_olm" && (!content.room_id || !content.session_id)) ||
-            !content.algorithm ||
-            !content.sender_key
-        ) {
-            logger.error("key withheld event is missing fields");
-            return;
-        }
-
-        logger.info(
-            `Got room key withheld event from ${event.getSender()} ` +
-                `for ${content.algorithm} session ${content.sender_key}|${content.session_id} ` +
-                `in room ${content.room_id} with code ${content.code} (${content.reason})`,
-        );
-
-        const alg = this.getRoomDecryptor(content.room_id, content.algorithm);
-        if (alg.onRoomKeyWithheldEvent) {
-            alg.onRoomKeyWithheldEvent(event);
-        }
-        if (!content.room_id) {
-            // retry decryption for all events sent by the sender_key.  This will
-            // update the events to show a message indicating that the olm session was
-            // wedged.
-            const roomDecryptors = this.getRoomDecryptors(content.algorithm);
-            for (const decryptor of roomDecryptors) {
-                decryptor.retryDecryptionFromSender(content.sender_key);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Handle a general key verification event.
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event - verification start event
-     */
-    private onKeyVerificationMessage(event: MatrixEvent): void {
-        if (!ToDeviceChannel.validateEvent(event, this.baseApis)) {
-            return;
-        }
-        const createRequest = (event: MatrixEvent): VerificationRequest | undefined => {
-            if (!ToDeviceChannel.canCreateRequest(ToDeviceChannel.getEventType(event))) {
-                return;
-            }
-            const content = event.getContent();
-            const deviceId = content && content.from_device;
-            if (!deviceId) {
-                return;
-            }
-            const userId = event.getSender()!;
-            const channel = new ToDeviceChannel(this.baseApis, userId, [deviceId]);
-            return new VerificationRequest(channel, this.verificationMethods, this.baseApis);
-        };
-        this.handleVerificationEvent(event, this.toDeviceVerificationRequests, createRequest);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Handle key verification requests sent as timeline events
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event - the timeline event
-     * @param room - not used
-     * @param atStart - not used
-     * @param removed - not used
-     * @param whether - this is a live event
-     */
-    private onTimelineEvent = (
-        event: MatrixEvent,
-        room: Room,
-        atStart: boolean,
-        removed: boolean,
-        { liveEvent = true } = {},
-    ): void => {
-        if (!InRoomChannel.validateEvent(event, this.baseApis)) {
-            return;
-        }
-        const createRequest = (event: MatrixEvent): VerificationRequest => {
-            const channel = new InRoomChannel(this.baseApis, event.getRoomId()!);
-            return new VerificationRequest(channel, this.verificationMethods, this.baseApis);
-        };
-        this.handleVerificationEvent(event, this.inRoomVerificationRequests, createRequest, liveEvent);
-    };
-
-    private async handleVerificationEvent(
-        event: MatrixEvent,
-        requestsMap: IRequestsMap,
-        createRequest: (event: MatrixEvent) => VerificationRequest | undefined,
-        isLiveEvent = true,
-    ): Promise<void> {
-        // Wait for event to get its final ID with pendingEventOrdering: "chronological", since DM channels depend on it.
-        if (event.isSending() && event.status != EventStatus.SENT) {
-            let eventIdListener: () => void;
-            let statusListener: () => void;
-            try {
-                await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
-                    eventIdListener = resolve;
-                    statusListener = (): void => {
-                        if (event.status == EventStatus.CANCELLED) {
-                            reject(new Error("Event status set to CANCELLED."));
-                        }
-                    };
-                    event.once(MatrixEventEvent.LocalEventIdReplaced, eventIdListener);
-                    event.on(MatrixEventEvent.Status, statusListener);
-                });
-            } catch (err) {
-                logger.error("error while waiting for the verification event to be sent: ", err);
-                return;
-            } finally {
-                event.removeListener(MatrixEventEvent.LocalEventIdReplaced, eventIdListener!);
-                event.removeListener(MatrixEventEvent.Status, statusListener!);
-            }
-        }
-        let request: VerificationRequest | undefined = requestsMap.getRequest(event);
-        let isNewRequest = false;
-        if (!request) {
-            request = createRequest(event);
-            // a request could not be made from this event, so ignore event
-            if (!request) {
-                logger.log(
-                    `Crypto: could not find VerificationRequest for ` +
-                        `${event.getType()}, and could not create one, so ignoring.`,
-                );
-                return;
-            }
-            isNewRequest = true;
-            requestsMap.setRequest(event, request);
-        }
-        event.setVerificationRequest(request);
-        try {
-            await request.channel.handleEvent(event, request, isLiveEvent);
-        } catch (err) {
-            logger.error("error while handling verification event", err);
-        }
-        const shouldEmit =
-            isNewRequest &&
-            !request.initiatedByMe &&
-            !request.invalid && // check it has enough events to pass the UNSENT stage
-            !request.observeOnly;
-        if (shouldEmit) {
-            this.baseApis.emit(CryptoEvent.VerificationRequest, request);
-            this.baseApis.emit(CryptoEvent.VerificationRequestReceived, request);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Handle a toDevice event that couldn't be decrypted
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event - undecryptable event
-     */
-    private async onToDeviceBadEncrypted(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<void> {
-        const content = event.getWireContent();
-        const sender = event.getSender();
-        const algorithm = content.algorithm;
-        const deviceKey = content.sender_key;
-
-        this.baseApis.emit(ClientEvent.UndecryptableToDeviceEvent, event);
-
-        // retry decryption for all events sent by the sender_key.  This will
-        // update the events to show a message indicating that the olm session was
-        // wedged.
-        const retryDecryption = (): void => {
-            const roomDecryptors = this.getRoomDecryptors(olmlib.MEGOLM_ALGORITHM);
-            for (const decryptor of roomDecryptors) {
-                decryptor.retryDecryptionFromSender(deviceKey);
-            }
-        };
-
-        if (sender === undefined || deviceKey === undefined || deviceKey === undefined) {
-            return;
-        }
-
-        // check when we can force a new session with this device: if we've already done so
-        // recently, don't do it again.
-        const forceNewSessionRetryTimeDevices = this.forceNewSessionRetryTime.getOrCreate(sender);
-        const forceNewSessionRetryTime = forceNewSessionRetryTimeDevices.getOrCreate(deviceKey);
-        if (forceNewSessionRetryTime > Date.now()) {
-            logger.debug(
-                `New session already forced with device ${sender}:${deviceKey}: ` +
-                    `not forcing another until at least ${new Date(forceNewSessionRetryTime).toUTCString()}`,
-            );
-            await this.olmDevice.recordSessionProblem(deviceKey, "wedged", true);
-            retryDecryption();
-            return;
-        }
-
-        // make sure we don't retry to unwedge too soon even if we fail to create a new session
-        forceNewSessionRetryTimeDevices.set(deviceKey, Date.now() + FORCE_SESSION_RETRY_INTERVAL_MS);
-
-        // establish a new olm session with this device since we're failing to decrypt messages
-        // on a current session.
-        // Note that an undecryptable message from another device could easily be spoofed -
-        // is there anything we can do to mitigate this?
-        let device = this.deviceList.getDeviceByIdentityKey(algorithm, deviceKey);
-        if (!device) {
-            // if we don't know about the device, fetch the user's devices again
-            // and retry before giving up
-            await this.downloadKeys([sender], false);
-            device = this.deviceList.getDeviceByIdentityKey(algorithm, deviceKey);
-            if (!device) {
-                logger.info("Couldn't find device for identity key " + deviceKey + ": not re-establishing session");
-                await this.olmDevice.recordSessionProblem(deviceKey, "wedged", false);
-                retryDecryption();
-                return;
-            }
-        }
-        const devicesByUser = new Map([[sender, [device]]]);
-        await olmlib.ensureOlmSessionsForDevices(this.olmDevice, this.baseApis, devicesByUser, true);
-
-        forceNewSessionRetryTimeDevices.set(deviceKey, Date.now() + MIN_FORCE_SESSION_INTERVAL_MS);
-
-        // Now send a blank message on that session so the other side knows about it.
-        // (The keyshare request is sent in the clear so that won't do)
-        // We send this first such that, as long as the toDevice messages arrive in the
-        // same order we sent them, the other end will get this first, set up the new session,
-        // then get the keyshare request and send the key over this new session (because it
-        // is the session it has most recently received a message on).
-        const encryptedContent: IEncryptedContent = {
-            algorithm: olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM,
-            sender_key: this.olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key!,
-            ciphertext: {},
-            [ToDeviceMessageId]: uuidv4(),
-        };
-        await olmlib.encryptMessageForDevice(
-            encryptedContent.ciphertext,
-            this.userId,
-            this.deviceId,
-            this.olmDevice,
-            sender,
-            device,
-            { type: "m.dummy" },
-        );
-
-        await this.olmDevice.recordSessionProblem(deviceKey, "wedged", true);
-        retryDecryption();
-
-        await this.baseApis.sendToDevice(
-            "m.room.encrypted",
-            new Map([[sender, new Map([[device.deviceId, encryptedContent]])]]),
-        );
-
-        // Most of the time this probably won't be necessary since we'll have queued up a key request when
-        // we failed to decrypt the message and will be waiting a bit for the key to arrive before sending
-        // it. This won't always be the case though so we need to re-send any that have already been sent
-        // to avoid races.
-        const requestsToResend = await this.outgoingRoomKeyRequestManager.getOutgoingSentRoomKeyRequest(
-            sender,
-            device.deviceId,
-        );
-        for (const keyReq of requestsToResend) {
-            this.requestRoomKey(keyReq.requestBody, keyReq.recipients, true);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Handle a change in the membership state of a member of a room
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event -  event causing the change
-     * @param member -  user whose membership changed
-     * @param oldMembership -  previous membership
-     */
-    private onRoomMembership(event: MatrixEvent, member: RoomMember, oldMembership?: string): void {
-        // this event handler is registered on the *client* (as opposed to the room
-        // member itself), which means it is only called on changes to the *live*
-        // membership state (ie, it is not called when we back-paginate, nor when
-        // we load the state in the initialsync).
-        //
-        // Further, it is automatically registered and called when new members
-        // arrive in the room.
-
-        const roomId = member.roomId;
-
-        const alg = this.roomEncryptors.get(roomId);
-        if (!alg) {
-            // not encrypting in this room
-            return;
-        }
-        // only mark users in this room as tracked if we already started tracking in this room
-        // this way we don't start device queries after sync on behalf of this room which we won't use
-        // the result of anyway, as we'll need to do a query again once all the members are fetched
-        // by calling _trackRoomDevices
-        if (roomId in this.roomDeviceTrackingState) {
-            if (member.membership == KnownMembership.Join) {
-                logger.log("Join event for " + member.userId + " in " + roomId);
-                // make sure we are tracking the deviceList for this user
-                this.deviceList.startTrackingDeviceList(member.userId);
-            } else if (
-                member.membership == KnownMembership.Invite &&
-                this.clientStore.getRoom(roomId)?.shouldEncryptForInvitedMembers()
-            ) {
-                logger.log("Invite event for " + member.userId + " in " + roomId);
-                this.deviceList.startTrackingDeviceList(member.userId);
-            }
-        }
-
-        alg.onRoomMembership(event, member, oldMembership);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Called when we get an m.room_key_request event.
-     *
-     * @internal
-     * @param event - key request event
-     */
-    private onRoomKeyRequestEvent(event: MatrixEvent): void {
-        const content = event.getContent();
-        if (content.action === "request") {
-            // Queue it up for now, because they tend to arrive before the room state
-            // events at initial sync, and we want to see if we know anything about the
-            // room before passing them on to the app.
-            const req = new IncomingRoomKeyRequest(event);
-            this.receivedRoomKeyRequests.push(req);
-        } else if (content.action === "request_cancellation") {
-            const req = new IncomingRoomKeyRequestCancellation(event);
-            this.receivedRoomKeyRequestCancellations.push(req);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Process any m.room_key_request events which were queued up during the
-     * current sync.
-     *
-     * @internal
-     */
-    private async processReceivedRoomKeyRequests(): Promise<void> {
-        if (this.processingRoomKeyRequests) {
-            // we're still processing last time's requests; keep queuing new ones
-            // up for now.
-            return;
-        }
-        this.processingRoomKeyRequests = true;
-
-        try {
-            // we need to grab and clear the queues in the synchronous bit of this method,
-            // so that we don't end up racing with the next /sync.
-            const requests = this.receivedRoomKeyRequests;
-            this.receivedRoomKeyRequests = [];
-            const cancellations = this.receivedRoomKeyRequestCancellations;
-            this.receivedRoomKeyRequestCancellations = [];
-
-            // Process all of the requests, *then* all of the cancellations.
-            //
-            // This makes sure that if we get a request and its cancellation in the
-            // same /sync result, then we process the request before the
-            // cancellation (and end up with a cancelled request), rather than the
-            // cancellation before the request (and end up with an outstanding
-            // request which should have been cancelled.)
-            await Promise.all(requests.map((req) => this.processReceivedRoomKeyRequest(req)));
-            await Promise.all(
-                cancellations.map((cancellation) => this.processReceivedRoomKeyRequestCancellation(cancellation)),
-            );
-        } catch (e) {
-            logger.error(`Error processing room key requsts: ${e}`);
-        } finally {
-            this.processingRoomKeyRequests = false;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Helper for processReceivedRoomKeyRequests
-     *
-     */
-    private async processReceivedRoomKeyRequest(req: IncomingRoomKeyRequest): Promise<void> {
-        const userId = req.userId;
-        const deviceId = req.deviceId;
-
-        const body = req.requestBody;
-        const roomId = body.room_id;
-        const alg = body.algorithm;
-
-        logger.log(
-            `m.room_key_request from ${userId}:${deviceId}` +
-                ` for ${roomId} / ${body.session_id} (id ${req.requestId})`,
-        );
-
-        if (userId !== this.userId) {
-            if (!this.roomEncryptors.get(roomId)) {
-                logger.debug(`room key request for unencrypted room ${roomId}`);
-                return;
-            }
-            const encryptor = this.roomEncryptors.get(roomId)!;
-            const device = this.deviceList.getStoredDevice(userId, deviceId);
-            if (!device) {
-                logger.debug(`Ignoring keyshare for unknown device ${userId}:${deviceId}`);
-                return;
-            }
-
-            try {
-                await encryptor.reshareKeyWithDevice!(body.sender_key, body.session_id, userId, device);
-            } catch (e) {
-                logger.warn(
-                    "Failed to re-share keys for session " +
-                        body.session_id +
-                        " with device " +
-                        userId +
-                        ":" +
-                        device.deviceId,
-                    e,
-                );
-            }
-            return;
-        }
-
-        if (deviceId === this.deviceId) {
-            // We'll always get these because we send room key requests to
-            // '*' (ie. 'all devices') which includes the sending device,
-            // so ignore requests from ourself because apart from it being
-            // very silly, it won't work because an Olm session cannot send
-            // messages to itself.
-            // The log here is probably superfluous since we know this will
-            // always happen, but let's log anyway for now just in case it
-            // causes issues.
-            logger.log("Ignoring room key request from ourselves");
-            return;
-        }
-
-        // todo: should we queue up requests we don't yet have keys for,
-        // in case they turn up later?
-
-        // if we don't have a decryptor for this room/alg, we don't have
-        // the keys for the requested events, and can drop the requests.
-        if (!this.roomDecryptors.has(roomId)) {
-            logger.log(`room key request for unencrypted room ${roomId}`);
-            return;
-        }
-
-        const decryptor = this.roomDecryptors.get(roomId)!.get(alg);
-        if (!decryptor) {
-            logger.log(`room key request for unknown alg ${alg} in room ${roomId}`);
-            return;
-        }
-
-        if (!(await decryptor.hasKeysForKeyRequest(req))) {
-            logger.log(`room key request for unknown session ${roomId} / ` + body.session_id);
-            return;
-        }
-
-        req.share = (): void => {
-            decryptor.shareKeysWithDevice(req);
-        };
-
-        // if the device is verified already, share the keys
-        if (this.checkDeviceTrust(userId, deviceId).isVerified()) {
-            logger.log("device is already verified: sharing keys");
-            req.share();
-            return;
-        }
-
-        this.emit(CryptoEvent.RoomKeyRequest, req);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Helper for processReceivedRoomKeyRequests
-     *
-     */
-    private async processReceivedRoomKeyRequestCancellation(
-        cancellation: IncomingRoomKeyRequestCancellation,
-    ): Promise<void> {
-        logger.log(
-            `m.room_key_request cancellation for ${cancellation.userId}:` +
-                `${cancellation.deviceId} (id ${cancellation.requestId})`,
-        );
-
-        // we should probably only notify the app of cancellations we told it
-        // about, but we don't currently have a record of that, so we just pass
-        // everything through.
-        this.emit(CryptoEvent.RoomKeyRequestCancellation, cancellation);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get a decryptor for a given room and algorithm.
-     *
-     * If we already have a decryptor for the given room and algorithm, return
-     * it. Otherwise try to instantiate it.
-     *
-     * @internal
-     *
-     * @param roomId -   room id for decryptor. If undefined, a temporary
-     * decryptor is instantiated.
-     *
-     * @param algorithm -  crypto algorithm
-     *
-     * @throws `DecryptionError` if the algorithm is unknown
-     */
-    public getRoomDecryptor(roomId: string | null, algorithm: string): DecryptionAlgorithm {
-        let decryptors: Map<string, DecryptionAlgorithm> | undefined;
-        let alg: DecryptionAlgorithm | undefined;
-
-        if (roomId) {
-            decryptors = this.roomDecryptors.get(roomId);
-            if (!decryptors) {
-                decryptors = new Map<string, DecryptionAlgorithm>();
-                this.roomDecryptors.set(roomId, decryptors);
-            }
-
-            alg = decryptors.get(algorithm);
-            if (alg) {
-                return alg;
-            }
-        }
-
-        const AlgClass = algorithms.DECRYPTION_CLASSES.get(algorithm);
-        if (!AlgClass) {
-            throw new DecryptionError(
-                DecryptionFailureCode.UNKNOWN_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
-                'Unknown encryption algorithm "' + algorithm + '".',
-            );
-        }
-        alg = new AlgClass({
-            userId: this.userId,
-            crypto: this,
-            olmDevice: this.olmDevice,
-            baseApis: this.baseApis,
-            roomId: roomId ?? undefined,
-        });
-
-        if (decryptors) {
-            decryptors.set(algorithm, alg);
-        }
-        return alg;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Get all the room decryptors for a given encryption algorithm.
-     *
-     * @param algorithm - The encryption algorithm
-     *
-     * @returns An array of room decryptors
-     */
-    private getRoomDecryptors(algorithm: string): DecryptionAlgorithm[] {
-        const decryptors: DecryptionAlgorithm[] = [];
-        for (const d of this.roomDecryptors.values()) {
-            if (d.has(algorithm)) {
-                decryptors.push(d.get(algorithm)!);
-            }
-        }
-        return decryptors;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * sign the given object with our ed25519 key
-     *
-     * @param obj -  Object to which we will add a 'signatures' property
-     */
-    public async signObject<T extends ISignableObject & object>(obj: T): Promise<void> {
-        const sigs = new Map(Object.entries(obj.signatures || {}));
-        const unsigned = obj.unsigned;
-
-        delete obj.signatures;
-        delete obj.unsigned;
-
-        const userSignatures = sigs.get(this.userId) || {};
-        sigs.set(this.userId, userSignatures);
-        userSignatures["ed25519:" + this.deviceId] = await this.olmDevice.sign(anotherjson.stringify(obj));
-        obj.signatures = recursiveMapToObject(sigs);
-        if (unsigned !== undefined) obj.unsigned = unsigned;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @returns true if the room with the supplied ID is encrypted. False if the
-     * room is not encrypted, or is unknown to us.
-     */
-    public isRoomEncrypted(roomId: string): boolean {
-        return this.roomList.isRoomEncrypted(roomId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Implementation of {@link Crypto.CryptoApi#isEncryptionEnabledInRoom}.
-     */
-    public async isEncryptionEnabledInRoom(roomId: string): Promise<boolean> {
-        return this.isRoomEncrypted(roomId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * @returns information about the encryption on the room with the supplied
-     * ID, or null if the room is not encrypted or unknown to us.
-     */
-    public getRoomEncryption(roomId: string): IRoomEncryption | null {
-        return this.roomList.getRoomEncryption(roomId);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Returns whether dehydrated devices are supported by the crypto backend
-     * and by the server.
-     */
-    public async isDehydrationSupported(): Promise<boolean> {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Stub function -- dehydration is not implemented here, so throw error
-     */
-    public async startDehydration(createNewKey?: boolean): Promise<void> {
-        throw new Error("Not implemented");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Stub function -- restoreKeyBackup is not implemented here, so throw error
-     */
-    public restoreKeyBackup(opts: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult> {
-        throw new Error("Not implemented");
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Stub function -- restoreKeyBackupWithPassphrase is not implemented here, so throw error
-     */
-    public restoreKeyBackupWithPassphrase(
-        passphrase: string,
-        opts: KeyBackupRestoreOpts,
-    ): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult> {
-        throw new Error("Not implemented");
-    }
-}
-
-/**
- * Fix up the backup key, that may be in the wrong format due to a bug in a
- * migration step.  Some backup keys were stored as a comma-separated list of
- * integers, rather than a base64-encoded byte array.  If this function is
- * passed a string that looks like a list of integers rather than a base64
- * string, it will attempt to convert it to the right format.
- *
- * @param key - the key to check
- * @returns If the key is in the wrong format, then the fixed
- * key will be returned. Otherwise null will be returned.
- *
- */
-export function fixBackupKey(key?: string): string | null {
-    if (typeof key !== "string" || key.indexOf(",") < 0) {
-        return null;
-    }
-    const fixedKey = Uint8Array.from(key.split(","), (x) => parseInt(x));
-    return encodeBase64(fixedKey);
-}
-
-/**
- * Represents a received m.room_key_request event
- */
-export class IncomingRoomKeyRequest {
-    /** user requesting the key */
-    public readonly userId: string;
-    /** device requesting the key */
-    public readonly deviceId: string;
-    /** unique id for the request */
-    public readonly requestId: string;
-    public readonly requestBody: IRoomKeyRequestBody;
-    /**
-     * callback which, when called, will ask
-     *    the relevant crypto algorithm implementation to share the keys for
-     *    this request.
-     */
-    public share: () => void;
-
-    public constructor(event: MatrixEvent) {
-        const content = event.getContent();
-
-        this.userId = event.getSender()!;
-        this.deviceId = content.requesting_device_id;
-        this.requestId = content.request_id;
-        this.requestBody = content.body || {};
-        this.share = (): void => {
-            throw new Error("don't know how to share keys for this request yet");
-        };
-    }
-}
-
-/**
- * Represents a received m.room_key_request cancellation
- */
-class IncomingRoomKeyRequestCancellation {
-    /** user requesting the cancellation */
-    public readonly userId: string;
-    /** device requesting the cancellation */
-    public readonly deviceId: string;
-    /** unique id for the request to be cancelled */
-    public readonly requestId: string;
-
-    public constructor(event: MatrixEvent) {
-        const content = event.getContent();
-
-        this.userId = event.getSender()!;
-        this.deviceId = content.requesting_device_id;
-        this.requestId = content.request_id;
-    }
-}
-
-// a number of types are re-exported for backwards compatibility, in case any applications are referencing it.
-export type { IEventDecryptionResult, IMegolmSessionData } from "../@types/crypto.ts";