@ultimat3/core 22.14.0 → 23.0.0

package/src/process-metrics.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+// Single responsibility: the series every Ultimate PROCESS emits about itself — memory, CPU,
+// event-loop lag, start time and which role it is. `runtime-metrics.ts` names what a role does;
+// this names what the process costs, so "what is growing?" is a query and not a guess. Runs
+// nothing at import: the first `startProcessMetrics()` declares the instruments.
+
+import { type Clock, systemClock } from './clock';
+import { finiteCount } from './finite-option';
+import type { Counter, Gauge, Histogram } from './metrics';
+import { counter, gauge, histogram } from './metrics';
+
+/**
+ * One reading of the process, in bytes and seconds — everything `process` answers in microseconds.
+ * No object count and no collection count: `bun:jsc`'s `heapStats()` runs a full collection to
+ * answer (9 ms on an empty framework process, measured 2026-10-01), which a scrape must not cause.
+ */
+export interface ProcessReading {
+  /** Resident set size: what the kernel charges the container for. */
+  readonly rss: number;
+  /** Bytes of JavaScript heap in use, garbage not yet collected included. */
+  readonly heapUsed: number;
+  /** Bytes the engine has reserved for the heap, used or not. */
+  readonly heapTotal: number;
+  /** Bytes held outside the heap on behalf of heap objects: buffers, strings, compiled code. */
+  readonly external: number;
+  /** User plus system CPU seconds consumed since the process started. */
+  readonly cpuSeconds: number;
+  /** Seconds since the process started — what places `process_start_time_seconds`. */
+  readonly uptimeSeconds: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * How often the event loop is asked how late it is, and the only work this module does unasked.
+ * One timer wake a second: measured at 0.12 millicore on top of the 1.8 an idle Bun process
+ * already spends (20 s of `process.cpuUsage()`, sampler on against off, 2026-10-01).
+ */
+export const EVENT_LOOP_SAMPLE_MS = 1000;
+
+/** A stalled loop is the signal, so the buckets run from a millisecond to a frozen process. */
+export const EVENT_LOOP_LAG_BOUNDS: readonly number[] = Object.freeze([
+  0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2.5, 10,
+]);
+
+/** The default reading: `process.memoryUsage()` and `process.cpuUsage()`, ~12 µs together. */
+export function readProcess(): ProcessReading {
+  const memory = process.memoryUsage();
+  const cpu = process.cpuUsage();
+  return {
+    rss: memory.rss,
+    heapUsed: memory.heapUsed,
+    heapTotal: memory.heapTotal,
+    external: memory.external,
+    cpuSeconds: (cpu.user + cpu.system) / 1_000_000,
+    uptimeSeconds: process.uptime(),
+  };
+}
+
+export interface ProcessMetricsOptions {
+  /** What this process is: a `ROLE`, or `x dev`'s several joined. The `process_info` label. */
+  readonly role: string;
+  /** Defaults to `readProcess`. Injected by a test. */
+  readonly read?: (() => ProcessReading) | undefined;
+  readonly clock?: Clock | undefined;
+  /** The sampler's timer. Injected by a test; the default is an unref'd `setInterval`. */
+  readonly every?: ((tick: () => void, intervalMs: number) => () => void) | undefined;
+  readonly sampleMs?: number | undefined;
+}
+
+interface Instruments {
+  readonly cpu: Counter;
+  readonly lag: Histogram;
+  readonly info: Gauge;
+}
+
+// The live source. The observers below are declared ONCE and read through it, because a gauge
+// redeclared with a different `observe` is refused (`X_METRIC_NAME_INVALID`) and a process may
+// start, stop and start this again — every `x dev` reload does.
+let source: (() => ProcessReading) | undefined;
+let startedAtSeconds = 0;
+let instruments: Instruments | undefined;
+// What the counter already holds, kept across a stop and a start so neither loses the CPU spent
+// before the first sample — a boot is where most of it goes — nor counts it twice.
+let cpuCounted = 0;
+// The start that owns `source` and the sampler, compared by identity: two starts may share a
+// reader (the default one), so the reader cannot say which start a stop belongs to.
+let active: { readonly stopTimer: () => void } | undefined;
+// The role `process_info` last said 1 for, so a start under another role sets it back to 0 —
+// one process, one role, even across a stop and a start.
+let infoRole: string | undefined;
+
+/** 0 while stopped: a scrape between a stop and a start reads a flat line, never a throw. */
+const observed = (pick: (reading: ProcessReading) => number) => (): number =>
+  source === undefined ? 0 : pick(source());
+
+function declare(): Instruments {
+  if (instruments !== undefined) return instruments;
+  gauge('process_resident_memory_bytes', {
+    unit: 'By',
+    description: 'Resident set size of this process',
+    observe: observed((reading) => reading.rss),
+  });
+  gauge('process_heap_used_bytes', {
+    unit: 'By',
+    description: 'JavaScript heap in use, garbage not yet collected included',
+    observe: observed((reading) => reading.heapUsed),
+  });
+  gauge('process_heap_total_bytes', {
+    unit: 'By',
+    description: 'JavaScript heap reserved by the engine',
+    observe: observed((reading) => reading.heapTotal),
+  });
+  gauge('process_external_memory_bytes', {
+    unit: 'By',
+    description: 'Memory held outside the heap for heap objects: buffers, strings, compiled code',
+    observe: observed((reading) => reading.external),
+  });
+  gauge('process_start_time_seconds', {
+    unit: 's',
+    description: 'When this process started, in seconds since the Unix epoch',
+    observe: () => startedAtSeconds,
+  });
+  instruments = {
+    cpu: counter('process_cpu_seconds_total', {
+      unit: 's',
+      description: 'User and system CPU time consumed by this process',
+    }),
+    lag: histogram('process_event_loop_lag_seconds', {
+      unit: 's',
+      description: `How late the event loop ran a ${String(EVENT_LOOP_SAMPLE_MS)}ms timer, sampled once per interval`,
+      bounds: EVENT_LOOP_LAG_BOUNDS,
+    }),
+    info: gauge('process_info', {
+      unit: '1',
+      description: 'Always 1; the labels say which role this process runs',
+    }),
+  };
+  return instruments;
+}
+
+const unrefInterval = (tick: () => void, intervalMs: number): (() => void) => {
+  const timer = setInterval(tick, intervalMs);
+  timer.unref();
+  return () => clearInterval(timer);
+};
+
+/** Test-only: forget the CPU already counted, beside `resetMetrics()` dropping the counter. */
+export function resetProcessMetrics(): void {
+  active?.stopTimer();
+  active = undefined;
+  source = undefined;
+  cpuCounted = 0;
+  infoRole = undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Starts the process series and the one sampler behind two of them, and answers the stop. Called
+ * by whatever opens the scrape listener, so every role that can be scraped reports itself.
+ *
+ * CPU is a COUNTER fed by the sampler rather than a gauge read at scrape time: `rate()` over a
+ * counter survives a restart, and an observed gauge named `_total` would lie about its type.
+ */
+export function startProcessMetrics(options: ProcessMetricsOptions): () => void {
+  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock;
+  const read = options.read ?? readProcess;
+  const sampleMs = finiteCount(
+    'startProcessMetrics',
+    'sampleMs',
+    options.sampleMs ?? EVENT_LOOP_SAMPLE_MS,
+    1,
+  );
+  const declared = declare();
+  // A start that replaces a live one ends its sampler: two timers would sample twice.
+  active?.stopTimer();
+  source = read;
+  // Uptime subtracted from now: the process started before this module was asked.
+  startedAtSeconds = Math.floor(clock.now().getTime() / 1000 - read().uptimeSeconds);
+  if (infoRole !== undefined && infoRole !== options.role) {
+    declared.info.record(0, { role: infoRole });
+  }
+  infoRole = options.role;
+  declared.info.record(1, { role: options.role });
+
+  const countCpu = (): void => {
+    const cpu = read().cpuSeconds;
+    // Monotonic by construction, and guarded anyway: a counter refuses a negative delta.
+    if (cpu > cpuCounted) declared.cpu.add(cpu - cpuCounted);
+    cpuCounted = Math.max(cpu, cpuCounted);
+  };
+  countCpu();
+  let due = clock.monotonic() + sampleMs;
+  const stopTimer = (options.every ?? unrefInterval)(() => {
+    const now = clock.monotonic();
+    // Late by this much; a timer that fires early reports no lag rather than a negative one.
+    declared.lag.record(Math.max(0, now - due) / 1000);
+    due = now + sampleMs;
+    countCpu();
+  }, sampleMs);
+
+  const owner = { stopTimer };
+  active = owner;
+  return () => {
+    stopTimer();
+    if (active !== owner) return;
+    active = undefined;
+    source = undefined;
+  };
+}

package/src/seal-errors.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// Single responsibility: the three X_SEAL_* refusals and the errors that carry them. Three codes
+// rather than one "it will not open" because each names a different fact — no key at all, a key
+// this process was not given, a value that did not authenticate — and a different thing to do
+// next. No error here carries a key, a plaintext or the sealed string itself. Titles live in
+// `core-error-codes.ts` and the retry class in `error-retry.ts`, so this module runs nothing at
+// import and stays out of every bundle that does not seal.
+
+import { renderCauseValue } from './error-render';
+import { UltimateError } from './errors';
+
+/**
+ * No key in the environment and none on disk. Never a pass-through: storing the plaintext because
+ * the key was missing is the failure a sealed column exists to prevent, and it would look healthy.
+ */
+export class SealKeyMissingError extends UltimateError {
+  constructor(input: { envVar: string; keyPath: string }) {
+    super({
+      code: 'X_SEAL_KEY_MISSING',
+      cause: `${input.envVar} is unset and ${input.keyPath} does not exist, so there is no master key to seal or open a value with`,
+      fix: 'x secrets init   # or, where the key already exists: export ULTIMATE_SECRETS_KEY="$(cat .secrets.key)"',
+      meta: { keyPath: input.keyPath },
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The value names a key id the ring does not hold — a rotation whose retired key was dropped
+ * before the re-seal finished, or a value copied from another environment. `keyId` is matched
+ * against 16 hex characters before it gets here, so it is safe to print; `declared` is computed.
+ */
+export class SealKeyUnknownError extends UltimateError {
+  constructor(input: { keyId: string; declared: readonly string[] }) {
+    super({
+      code: 'X_SEAL_KEY_UNKNOWN',
+      cause: `the sealed value names master key ${input.keyId}, which is not among the declared keys: ${input.declared.join(', ')} (current first)`,
+      // The variable is written out, not interpolated: `x errors explain` prints this line with no
+      // instance behind it. `seal.test.ts` holds it equal to `SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS_ENV`.
+      fix: `x secrets edit   # put the retired key back in ULTIMATE_SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS (64 hex characters, comma-separated) and keep it there until the re-seal backfill() has finished`,
+      meta: { keyId: input.keyId, declared: [...input.declared] },
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+export type SealInvalidReason = 'malformed' | 'unauthenticated';
+
+/**
+ * Either the string is not a sealed value at all, or the tag rejected it. AEAD cannot tell a wrong
+ * purpose from changed bytes — both are "the tag did not verify" — so the cause names both rather
+ * than guessing one and sending the reader after the wrong thing.
+ */
+export class SealInvalidError extends UltimateError {
+  constructor(
+    input:
+      | { reason: 'malformed'; purpose?: string | undefined; length: number }
+      | { reason: 'unauthenticated'; purpose: string; keyId: string },
+  ) {
+    const purpose =
+      input.purpose === undefined ? '' : ` for purpose ${renderCauseValue(input.purpose)}`;
+    super({
+      code: 'X_SEAL_INVALID',
+      cause:
+        input.reason === 'malformed'
+          ? `a ${input.length}-character string read${purpose} is not a sealed value (x1.<keyId>.<iv>.<ciphertext>) — it was never sealed, or it was truncated`
+          : `the value did not authenticate under master key ${input.keyId}${purpose}: it was sealed for a different purpose, or its bytes changed after it was sealed — AES-GCM cannot tell the two apart`,
+      // ONE literal covering both conditions, so `x errors explain` prints it without an instance.
+      // A string that was never sealed is almost always a column sealed AFTER rows were written,
+      // and no key fixes that: there is no reading of an unsealed value, so the rows are migrated.
+      fix: 'x secrets show --json   # a value that failed its tag: confirms the key id in force, and the value must be re-entered. A value that was never sealed — a column sealed after rows were written — is migrated: add a NEW .sealed() column, copy into it with a backfill(), drop the old one',
+      meta: {
+        reason: input.reason,
+        ...(input.purpose === undefined ? {} : { purpose: input.purpose }),
+        ...(input.reason === 'unauthenticated' ? { keyId: input.keyId } : {}),
+      },
+    });
+  }
+}

package/src/seal-keys.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// Single responsibility: the key ring `seal()` and `open()` work under. The CURRENT key is the one
+// `x secrets` already manages — `ULTIMATE_SECRETS_KEY` first, `.secrets.key` second, through
+// `findMasterKey`, no second variable. RETIRED keys are one more env var, which `x secrets rotate`
+// writes into the committed file and `installSecrets()` carries into the process like any secret.
+
+import { SealKeyMissingError } from './seal-errors';
+import { importKey, masterKeyId, parseMasterKey } from './secrets';
+import { findMasterKey, masterKeyPath, SECRETS_KEY_ENV } from './secrets-store';
+
+/**
+ * Master keys that no longer seal but still open: 64 hex characters each, separated by commas or
+ * whitespace. A secret like any other — it lives in `secrets.enc.json` under this name, sealed by
+ * the current key, so a deploy is handed ONE key and the ring travels in the repository.
+ */
+export const SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS_ENV = 'ULTIMATE_SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS';
+
+type EnvRecord = Record<string, string | undefined>;
+
+/** Where the keys are read from. The same two fields, with the same defaults, as `installSecrets`. */
+export interface SealKeySource {
+  /** The app root holding `.secrets.key`. Defaults to the process's working directory. */
+  readonly root?: string | undefined;
+  /** Read for the current key and the retired ring. Defaults to `process.env`. */
+  readonly env?: EnvRecord | undefined;
+}
+
+export interface SealKey {
+  /** `masterKeyId`'s — the id a sealed string carries. */
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly aes: CryptoKey;
+  /** HMAC key the deterministic IV is derived under; never the AES key itself. */
+  readonly mac: CryptoKey;
+}
+
+export interface SealKeyRing {
+  readonly current: SealKey;
+  /** Current first, then retired in declaration order. */
+  readonly keys: readonly SealKey[];
+  /** The same keys by the id a sealed string names — built once, read on every `open()`. */
+  readonly byId: ReadonlyMap<string, SealKey>;
+}
+
+const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+const MAC_DOMAIN = encoder.encode('ultimate.seal.iv.v1');
+
+/**
+ * The MAC key is DERIVED from the master key under a fixed label rather than being the master key:
+ * one key used for both AES-GCM and HMAC has no known break, and no proof either.
+ */
+async function sealKey(hex: string, at: string, variable?: string): Promise<SealKey> {
+  const raw = parseMasterKey(hex, at, variable);
+  const hmac = { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' } as const;
+  const master = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', raw, hmac, false, ['sign']);
+  const derived = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', master, MAC_DOMAIN);
+  return {
+    id: await masterKeyId(raw),
+    aes: await importKey(raw),
+    mac: await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', derived, hmac, false, ['sign']),
+  };
+}
+
+/** The retired ring as written: hex entries, in order, blanks dropped. Nothing is validated here. */
+export function splitRetiredKeys(raw: string | undefined): readonly string[] {
+  return (raw ?? '').split(/[\s,]+/).filter((entry) => entry.length > 0);
+}
+
+async function buildRing(
+  current: string,
+  currentAt: string,
+  retired: string,
+): Promise<SealKeyRing> {
+  const first = await sealKey(current, currentAt);
+  const keys = [first];
+  for (const [index, hex] of splitRetiredKeys(retired).entries()) {
+    // A malformed entry is refused by position, never skipped: a ring that silently lost a key
+    // surfaces later as X_SEAL_KEY_UNKNOWN on a row, far from the edit that caused it.
+    const next = await sealKey(
+      hex,
+      `${SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS_ENV} (entry ${index + 1})`,
+      SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS_ENV,
+    );
+    if (!keys.some((key) => key.id === next.id)) keys.push(next);
+  }
+  return { current: first, keys, byId: new Map(keys.map((key) => [key.id, key])) };
+}
+
+// The last ring, kept by the exact strings it was built from. Importing a key is three WebCrypto
+// calls and a list read opens hundreds of values, so the ring is built once — but it is keyed by
+// its SOURCE, never by time or by process, so a rotated key file or a changed variable is a new
+// ring on the very next call. Only a resolved ring is kept; a refusal is recomputed.
+let memo: { readonly source: string; readonly ring: Promise<SealKeyRing> } | undefined;
+
+/** The ring in force now, or `X_SEAL_KEY_MISSING`. A malformed key is `X_SECRETS_KEY_INVALID`. */
+export function resolveSealKeys(source: SealKeySource = {}): Promise<SealKeyRing> {
+  const root = source.root ?? process.cwd();
+  const env = source.env ?? (process.env as EnvRecord);
+  const found = findMasterKey(root, env);
+  if (found === undefined) {
+    return Promise.reject(
+      new SealKeyMissingError({ envVar: SECRETS_KEY_ENV, keyPath: masterKeyPath(root) }),
+    );
+  }
+  const retired = env[SECRETS_RETIRED_KEYS_ENV] ?? '';
+  const key = `${found.hex}\n${retired}`;
+  if (memo?.source === key) return memo.ring;
+  const ring = buildRing(found.hex, found.at, retired);
+  const entry = { source: key, ring };
+  memo = entry;
+  ring.catch(() => {
+    if (memo === entry) memo = undefined;
+  });
+  return ring;
+}
+
+/** The ids a sealed value may name right now. Safe to print: an id is not a key. */
+export async function sealKeyIds(
+  source: SealKeySource = {},
+): Promise<{ readonly current: string; readonly retired: readonly string[] }> {
+  const ring = await resolveSealKeys(source);
+  return { current: ring.current.id, retired: ring.keys.slice(1).map((key) => key.id) };
+}

package/src/seal.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+// Single responsibility: seal ONE value under the app's master key and open it back. The wire form
+// is one string, `x1.<keyId>.<iv>.<ciphertext+tag>`, AES-256-GCM through WebCrypto with a REQUIRED
+// purpose bound in as additional authenticated data. `secrets.ts` is the env envelope — a file of
+// many values; this is the per-value form a column or a stored session holds.
+
+import { assert } from './assert';
+import { UltimateError } from './errors';
+import { SealInvalidError, SealKeyUnknownError } from './seal-errors';
+import type { SealKey, SealKeyRing, SealKeySource } from './seal-keys';
+import { resolveSealKeys } from './seal-keys';
+import {
+  decodeBase64,
+  encodeBase64,
+  SECRETS_ALG,
+  SECRETS_IV_BYTES,
+  SECRETS_TAG_BYTES,
+} from './secrets';
+
+/** The format tag. A string without it was never sealed by this function. */
+export const SEAL_VERSION = 'x1';
+
+/** What a value was sealed FOR — `entity:connections.password`, `scrape-session`. Never optional. */
+export interface SealPurposeOptions extends SealKeySource {
+  /** Bound into the tag: a value sealed for one purpose does not open as another. */
+  readonly purpose: string;
+  /**
+   * A ring already resolved — `await resolveSealKeys()` — for a caller sealing or opening MANY
+   * values in one operation. Without it every call finds the master key again (an environment
+   * read, or a file read in a checkout); with it a 500-row page asks once. Never held past the
+   * operation: a ring kept across requests would outlive a rotation.
+   */
+  readonly keys?: SealKeyRing | undefined;
+}
+
+const ringFor = (options: SealPurposeOptions): Promise<SealKeyRing> | SealKeyRing =>
+  options.keys ?? resolveSealKeys(options);
+
+export interface SealOptions extends SealPurposeOptions {
+  /**
+   * Derive the IV from the purpose and the plaintext instead of drawing it, so equal values seal
+   * to equal strings and a column can be looked up by equality. It REVEALS EQUALITY to anyone who
+   * can read the stored strings: two rows holding the same value are visibly the same. Never use
+   * it for a low-entropy value (a boolean, a status, a PIN, a date of birth) — the handful of
+   * possible ciphertexts is a lookup table. Under a rotation the same value seals differently per
+   * key; `sealAll` returns every candidate.
+   */
+  readonly deterministic?: boolean | undefined;
+}
+
+// 12 bytes are exactly 16 unpadded base64url characters; a 16-byte tag alone is 22.
+const SEALED = /^x1\.([0-9a-f]{16})\.([A-Za-z0-9_-]{16})\.([A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,})$/;
+
+const encoder = new TextEncoder();
+
+const toUrl = (bytes: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>): string =>
+  encodeBase64(bytes).replaceAll('+', '-').replaceAll('/', '_').replaceAll('=', '');
+
+function fromUrl(text: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
+  const standard = text.replaceAll('-', '+').replaceAll('_', '/');
+  return decodeBase64(standard.padEnd(standard.length + ((4 - (standard.length % 4)) % 4), '='));
+}
+
+/** A fresh copy either way, so a caller's buffer is never the one WebCrypto is handed. */
+const bytesOf = (plaintext: string | Uint8Array): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> =>
+  typeof plaintext === 'string' ? encoder.encode(plaintext) : new Uint8Array(plaintext);
+
+/**
+ * The bytes the tag covers besides the ciphertext: the format, the algorithm, the key id and the
+ * purpose. A string moved to another column, or relabelled with another key id, fails the tag.
+ */
+const additionalData = (keyId: string, purpose: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> =>
+  encoder.encode(
+    `ultimate.seal|${SEAL_VERSION}|alg=${SECRETS_ALG}|kid=${keyId}|purpose=${purpose}`,
+  );
+
+function requirePurpose(purpose: unknown): asserts purpose is string {
+  assert(
+    typeof purpose === 'string' && purpose.length > 0,
+    'seal() and open() were called without a purpose, and the purpose is what stops a value sealed for one column opening as another',
+    "pass purpose: '<what the value is for>' — seal(value, { purpose: 'entity:<table>.<column>' })",
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The deterministic IV: HMAC-SHA-256 over the length-prefixed purpose and the plaintext, cut to
+ * GCM's 96 bits. Length-prefixed so (`a`, `bc`) and (`ab`, `c`) are different inputs. A repeated
+ * (key, IV) pair then means a repeated (purpose, plaintext) — the same ciphertext, which is the
+ * mode's stated leak and not a nonce reuse across two messages.
+ */
+async function derivedIv(
+  key: SealKey,
+  purpose: string,
+  plaintext: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>,
+): Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>> {
+  const label = encoder.encode(purpose);
+  const material = new Uint8Array(4 + label.length + plaintext.length);
+  new DataView(material.buffer).setUint32(0, label.length);
+  material.set(label, 4);
+  material.set(plaintext, 4 + label.length);
+  const mac = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key.mac, material);
+  return new Uint8Array(mac).slice(0, SECRETS_IV_BYTES);
+}
+
+async function sealUnder(
+  key: SealKey,
+  plaintext: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>,
+  purpose: string,
+  deterministic: boolean,
+): Promise<string> {
+  const iv = deterministic
+    ? await derivedIv(key, purpose, plaintext)
+    : crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(SECRETS_IV_BYTES));
+  const sealed = await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
+    {
+      name: 'AES-GCM',
+      iv,
+      additionalData: additionalData(key.id, purpose),
+      tagLength: SECRETS_TAG_BYTES * 8,
+    },
+    key.aes,
+    plaintext,
+  );
+  return `${SEAL_VERSION}.${key.id}.${toUrl(iv)}.${toUrl(new Uint8Array(sealed))}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Seal one value under the CURRENT master key — the one `x secrets` manages, found where
+ * `installSecrets()` finds it.
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * const stored = await seal(password, { purpose: 'entity:connections.password' });
+ * const password = await openText(stored, { purpose: 'entity:connections.password' });
+ * ```
+ *
+ * `X_SEAL_KEY_MISSING` when there is no key: the plaintext is never returned in its place.
+ */
+export async function seal(plaintext: string | Uint8Array, options: SealOptions): Promise<string> {
+  requirePurpose(options.purpose);
+  const ring = await ringFor(options);
+  return sealUnder(
+    ring.current,
+    bytesOf(plaintext),
+    options.purpose,
+    options.deterministic === true,
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * The DETERMINISTIC seal of one value under every declared key, current first. During a rotation
+ * a row written before it holds the old key's string and a row written after holds the new one's,
+ * so an equality lookup has to match either: `where column in (…sealAll(value))`. Outside a
+ * rotation this is one string. Uniqueness cannot be held across keys — one value has two forms.
+ */
+export async function sealAll(
+  plaintext: string | Uint8Array,
+  options: SealPurposeOptions,
+): Promise<readonly string[]> {
+  requirePurpose(options.purpose);
+  const ring = await ringFor(options);
+  const bytes = bytesOf(plaintext);
+  return Promise.all(ring.keys.map((key) => sealUnder(key, bytes, options.purpose, true)));
+}
+
+interface SealedParts {
+  readonly keyId: string;
+  readonly iv: string;
+  readonly body: string;
+}
+
+function partsOf(value: unknown): SealedParts | undefined {
+  const match = typeof value === 'string' ? SEALED.exec(value) : null;
+  const [keyId, iv, body] = [match?.[1], match?.[2], match?.[3]];
+  if (keyId === undefined || iv === undefined || body === undefined) return undefined;
+  // No whole number of bytes encodes to 4n+1 base64 characters: a truncated write, not a value.
+  return body.length % 4 === 1 ? undefined : { keyId, iv, body };
+}
+
+const malformed = (sealed: unknown, purpose?: string): SealInvalidError =>
+  new SealInvalidError({
+    reason: 'malformed',
+    purpose,
+    length: typeof sealed === 'string' ? sealed.length : 0,
+  });
+
+/**
+ * Whether a value has the SHAPE of a sealed string. Not a claim that it opens: it exists so a
+ * caller migrating a plaintext column can tell an unsealed legacy row from a sealed one without
+ * attempting a decryption — `open()` itself never falls back to the raw string.
+ */
+export function isSealed(value: unknown): value is string {
+  return partsOf(value) !== undefined;
+}
+
+/** The id of the key a sealed string names — what a re-seal `backfill()` compares to the current. */
+export function sealedKeyId(sealed: string): string {
+  const parts = partsOf(sealed);
+  if (parts === undefined) throw malformed(sealed);
+  return parts.keyId;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Open a sealed string to its bytes. Three refusals, in the order the facts become knowable: the
+ * string is not a sealed value (`X_SEAL_INVALID`), it names a key this process does not declare
+ * (`X_SEAL_KEY_UNKNOWN` — read off the string before any decryption is attempted, so a rotation
+ * is never reported as tampering), or the tag rejected it under the purpose given
+ * (`X_SEAL_INVALID`).
+ */
+export async function open(
+  sealed: string,
+  options: SealPurposeOptions,
+): Promise<Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>> {
+  requirePurpose(options.purpose);
+  const parts = partsOf(sealed);
+  if (parts === undefined) throw malformed(sealed, options.purpose);
+  const { keyId, iv, body } = parts;
+  const ring = await ringFor(options);
+  // A lookup by the id the string names. An id is public — it is in every sealed value — and a
+  // `Map` says so: nothing here is compared byte by byte against a secret.
+  const key = ring.byId.get(keyId);
+  if (key === undefined) {
+    throw new SealKeyUnknownError({
+      keyId,
+      declared: ring.keys.map((one) => one.id),
+    });
+  }
+  try {
+    const plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(
+      {
+        name: 'AES-GCM',
+        iv: fromUrl(iv),
+        additionalData: additionalData(keyId, options.purpose),
+        tagLength: SECRETS_TAG_BYTES * 8,
+      },
+      key.aes,
+      fromUrl(body),
+    );
+    return new Uint8Array(plaintext);
+  } catch {
+    // No `sourceError`, for `openSecrets`' reason: WebCrypto's OperationError says nothing more.
+    throw new SealInvalidError({ reason: 'unauthenticated', purpose: options.purpose, keyId });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * `open()` for a value that was sealed from a string. Bytes that are not UTF-8 are refused rather
+ * than decoded with replacement characters: a caller would store the repaired text back.
+ */
+export async function openText(sealed: string, options: SealPurposeOptions): Promise<string> {
+  const bytes = await open(sealed, options);
+  try {
+    return new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes);
+  } catch {
+    throw new UltimateError({
+      code: 'X_INVARIANT',
+      cause: `the value opened to ${bytes.length} byte(s) that are not UTF-8 text, so it was sealed from bytes and openText() cannot return it`,
+      fix: 'call open() instead of openText() for a value sealed from a Uint8Array',
+    });
+  }
+}